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Mcgraw-Hill/Irwin Corporate Finance, 7/E
Mcgraw-Hill/Irwin Corporate Finance, 7/E
CHAPTER
1
Introduction to
Corporate Finance
McGraw-Hill/Irwin
Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Chapter Outline
1.1 What is Corporate Finance?
1.2 Corporate Securities as Contingent Claims on
Total Firm Value
1.3 The Corporate Firm
1.4 Goals of the Corporate Firm
1.5 Financial Markets
1.6 Outline of the Text
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Fixed Assets
1 Tangible Shareholders’
2 Intangible Equity
McGraw-Hill/Irwin
Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Long-Term
Debt
Long-Term
How can the firm Debt
raise the money
for the required
Fixed Assets
investments?
1 Tangible Shareholders’
2 Intangible Equity
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Capital Structure
The value of the firm can be
thought of as a pie.
Treasurer Controller
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Taxes (D)
The cash flows from the
Ultimately, the firm
firm must exceed the
must be a cash cash flows from the
generating activity. Government
financial markets.
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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McGraw-Hill/Irwin
Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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$F
$F $F
Value of the firm (X) Value of the firm (X)
Debt holders are promised $F. If the value of the firm is
more than $F, share holders
If the value of the firm is less than $F, they get the
get everything above $F.
whatever the firm if worth.
Algebraically, the bondholder’s claim is: Algebraically, the shareholder’s claim is:
Min[$F,$X] Max[0,$X – $F]
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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A Comparison of Partnership
and Corporations
Corporation Partnership
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Managerial Goals
Managerial goals may be different from
shareholder goals
Expensive perquisites
Survival
Independence
Increased growth and size are not necessarily the
same thing as increased shareholder wealth.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin
Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Board of Directors
Debtholders
Shareholders
Management
Debt
Assets
Equity
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Do Shareholders Control
Managerial Behavior?
Shareholders vote for the board of directors,
who in turn hire the management team.
Contracts can be carefully constructed to be
incentive compatible.
There is a market for managerial talent—this
may provide market discipline to the
managers—they can be replaced.
If the managers fail to maximize share price,
they may be replaced in a hostile takeover.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin
Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Financial Markets
Stocks and
Investors
Bonds
Firms securities
Money Hasan Imam
money
Primary Market
Secondary
Market
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Corporate Finance, 7/e © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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