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Labour in Developing Countries
Labour in Developing Countries
Lecture Outline/Questions
These models also assume that households maximise profits by deciding (i)
on what and how to produce and then (ii) what consumption bundle is
chosen – assume production and consumption can be completely
separated (these markets are complete).
Empirically in rural Africa this is not the case due to (i) risk (ii) asymmetric
information and (iii) incentive problems.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
Such subsistence farming provides the household with the primary source
of food.
Physical
Productivity
Hp Hp’ Hr Hr’
Health units
Effect of increase in one health unit on physical productivity: A comparison of initial ‘poor’
and initial ‘rich’ individuals – D.Ray calls a Capacity Curve (p489)
W3
W2
W1
Physical
Productivity
W1>W2>W3
Health units
=f(wages)
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
Even when labourers can earn more from hiring out their labour
to others they may well remain farming their plot of land because
of the importance of producing/providing food for the
household given agricultural production is uncertain - food
security.
The risk of not having food security for the household will in
itself lead to (now well-known) diversification of income sources
– importance of non-farm income and issue of
migration/remittances.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
Also the issue of people not being attracted back to rural areas
by the promise of land from urban areas. Could be a sense of
failure?
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
Pay rent to the land owner, but is little or no security in tenure on the land.
Hence poor incentive to invest in capital and technology and no improvement in
productivity.
The relationship between land owner and tenant is modelled using principal-agent
theory.
The tenant (agent) attempts to maximise his utility subject to effort levels and the
contractual agreement with the land owner.
(v) Commercial Farming: Can lead to significant change in how rural labour markets
work.
If solely reliant on contract farming income then open yourself up to poor wages.
Work can be casual (day or so), seasonal (month or two), or permanent (more than
3 months), see Duncan and Howell, (1992) ODI, Structural Adjustment and the
African Farmer.
[See Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997), World Development Vol 25(2), pp. 227-
238].
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
To prevent shirking employer can offer permanent contracts – offers certainty of income in
return for no shirking GIVEN NO ALTERNATIVE PERMANENT CONTRACT JOB.
Wp>Wc
If caught shirking the worker will only ever get Wc for rest of working life or N periods.
If
Non-Farming Activities
Arthur Lewis (1954) argued the urban (or the formal) wage was greater than
the rural (informal) wage for 3 reasons:-
(1) the payoff to experience was greater in the formal sector than the informal
sector
(2) labour unions and minimum wages ensure higher initial wages
(3) ‘psychological cost of transferring from the easy going life of the
subsistence sector to the more regimented environment of the capitalist
sector’.
Dualism within the urban labour market: in reality there are multi-tiered
labour markets with some over-lap and therefore chance of ‘switching’, but
only for the lucky few.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
The urban wage is equal to the MP of workers and is greater than the rural
wage.
The basic premise is that if the Expected urban wage > Certain rural wage,
then urban to rural migration will occur until the expected wages are
equalised.
where represents the probability of being unemployed in the urban labour market.
It is assumed in the Harris-Todaro model that being employed in the urban labour market is uncertain – not
full-employment so is a cost to not being employed.
Being employed in the rural labour market is assumed in the model to be certain – even though the MP in the
rural labour market could well be 0 (under-employment).
From the equation, the expected wages in the two sectors are equal when,
(1 )Wu Wa
where (1 ) Eu / Lu
so, ( Eu / Lu )Wu Wa (2)
Eu=Urban formal sector employees, Lu=Urban formal sector labour force, (Eu/Lu)=probability of being
employed in urban labour market.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
( Eu / Lu )Wu Wa
( Eu / Lu ) Wa / Wu , if Wa / Wu 1 then
( Eu / Lu ) 1,
Table 2.1: Proportion of labour force in private formal sector wage employment, selected African economies,
percentages, 1980-1995
Source: 2001 World Employment Report: Life at work in the information economy, ILO, Geneva.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
More complex theories of labour market dualism exist, e.g. Esfahani and
Salehi-Isfahani, (Economic Journal 1989).
This model looks at how observability of effort differs amongst formal and
informal workers – Borrows from efficiency wage theory.
Lower observability in the formal sector means firms pay higher wages so as
to encourage effort with the price of shirking being employment in the
informal sector at a lower wage.
Formal sector jobs are more likely to be about mental capital rather than
physical capital.
Informal jobs are more physical and labour intensive and hence easier to
observe effort.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
Schneider and Enste (March 2000, Journal of Economic Literature, pp77-114) argue
that 4 factors feed into the informal sector:
(1) Formal sector unemployment – there is no welfare net to catch the unemployed
who thus have to become involuntarily employed in the informal sector to survive.
In reality things are a little more complex with issues of household risk insurance, with
the unemployed able to return to family/friends if cannot find employment in the
formal sector.
(2) Complicated/restrictive rules and regulations – these include labour legislation that
may prevent more employment in the formal sector, registration costs of a business
that ‘force’ it into the informal sector.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
(4) Rise in taxation in the formal sector – forces those formal sector
businesses that are making very small profits into the informal sector as rising
costs tip average cost above average revenue.
See Figure 1.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted opportunities?
Figure 1
ATC2
Costs/Revenues
ATC
LOSS
ATC
MR=P=AR
PROFIT MR2=P2=AR2
MC
MC
MC2
Informal: post tax increase – COSTS Output
Formal: post tax increase – LEAVE
DECLINE AS CHEAPER LABOUR AND
MARKET TO ENTER NOT PAY TAXES, PRICE DECLINES TOO
INFORMAL SECTOR BUT PROFITS MADE
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
All these factors can effect the size of the informal sector.
(2) and (4) represent the additional costs argument which ‘forces’ employees
and employers to leave the formal sector since profits (likely to be small in the
first place especially for start-up projects) are reduced.
This can result in economic agents choosing the informal sector in the short-
run which then limits potential growth since the business is not legitimate –
issue too of the informal sector having no rules and regulations, protection
etc…more likelihood of crime which has large negative externalities for the
country/region.
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
(4) Are there any linkages between the formal and informal sectors, e.g. can people
switch from one sector to the other easily?
As J.S.Mill said
“….the really exhausting and really repulsive labours instead of being paid better than others
are almost invariably paid the worst of all because performed by those who have no choice”.
“…so strongly marked is the line of demarcation between the different grades of labourers as
to be equivalent to a hereditary distinction of caste”.
Very different to how Adam Smith saw it: he argued the worst jobs would be paid the most
since nobody would want to do them, i.e. supply constraint……did not reckon on a lack of
job choice or of institutional barriers preventing job mobility (e.g. discrimination, caste,
class…)
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
Some Answers
(i) Job insecurity relative to formal sector workers.
(ii) Results in huge uncertainty which effects (i) household production and
consumption decisions (ii) human capital investment, (ii) returns to human
capital (will be lower than in the formal sector), (iii) reduce the likelihood
of switching to formal sector employment, ceteris paribus.
Survivalist activities
These are generally activities that provide workers with the means to survive, e.g. eat once a
day.
Examples from Africa include selling single cigarettes on the side of the road, selling individual
sweets, selling curio’s, fruit and vegetables, car parking attendants.
This activity is highly uncertain in nature, is informal, can be subject to turf wars, or individual
fights and is highly competitive.
Few if any street vendors have access to any micro-finance or financial markets in order to
invest in stock – this needs to be addressed in order to take advantage of the entrepreneurial
spirit, but HOW?
The labour market in Developing countries: Wasted
opportunities?
Fafchamps, M., (1997), “Introduction: Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa”, World Development, Vol 25(5), pp. 773-734.
Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997), “Comparing contracts: an evaluation of contract farming schemes in Africa “, World
Development Vol 25(2), pp. 227-238
Arthur Lewis (1954), “Lewis, W.A. (1954) 'Development with unlimited supplies of labor', Manchester School of Economics and Social
Studies, 20:139-192.
or go to http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~sozio/mitarbeiter/m72/content/dokumente/568/Lewis1954.pdf
Schneider, Friedrich and Dominik Enste (2000): Informal Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences, The Journal of Economic
Literature, 38/1, pp. 77-114.
Taubman, P., Wachter, M. (1993) Segmented Labor Markets, in Ashenfelter, O., Layard, R.(1993) Handbook of Labor Economics,
vol.2, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1183-217.
Leavy, J., and White, H., Rural Labour and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, from Institute for Development Studies, University of
Sussex website, www.ids.ac.uk/ids/pvty/pvrurallabour.html
T. H. Gindling, (1991), “Labor Market Segmentation and the Determination of Wages in the Public, Private-Formal, and Informal
Sectors in San José, Costa Rica”, Economic Development and Cultural Change Vol. 39, No. 3 (Apr., 1991), pp. 585-605.
Michael B. Tannen, (1991), “Labor Markets in Northeast Brazil: Does the Dual Market Model Apply?” Economic Development and
Cultural Change
Vol. 39, No. 3 (Apr., 1991), pp. 567-583.
William Maloney, “Are labour markets in developing countries dualistic?”, and other working/research papers for the World
Bank.