Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Unit 2
Wage Theories that explain
Compensation
Economic theory Behavioual Theory
7. Bargaining Theory
1. Labor Market Theory -
• Here the compensation is determined by the forces of supply and demand of
labour.
• Based on the supply of employees , the employer decides how many and which
types of employees to employ at the compensation at which it can trade
profitability in its product market.
• For a given type of labour , the compensation is equal to their marginal product,
the additional added value gained by the organization from it’s least productive
employee.
• Neo-classical labour market theory predicts higher compensation for employees
who are more productive
EVA Reward
Management in TNC’s
EVA Reward Management in TNC’s
CEO Compensation
A Guide To CEO Compensation
• Company boards, at least in principle, try to
use compensation contracts to align
Executives' actions with company success.
• The idea is that CEO performance provides
value to the organization.
• "Pay for performance" is the mantra most
companies use when they try to explain their
compensation plans
• While everyone can support the idea of paying
for performance, it implies that CEOs take on
risk: CEOs' fortunes should rise and fall with
companies' fortunes.
• When you are looking at a company's
compensation program, it's worth checking to
see how much stake executives have in
delivering the goods for investors.
• Let's take a look at how different forms of
compensation put a CEO's reward at risk if
performance is poor.
Model of Compensation
https://www.erieri.com/dlc/onlinetextbook/model-of-
compensation
for CEO
1.Cash/Base Salaries
• These days, it's common for CEOs to receive
Base salaries in good amounts.
• In other words, the CEO gets a terrific reward
when the company does well, but still receives
the reward when the company does badly.
• On their own big Basic salaries offer little
Incentive for Executives to work harder and
make smart decisions.
2.Bonuses
• Be careful about bonuses. In many cases, an
annual bonus is nothing more than a base
salary in disguise.
• A CEO with a $1 million salary may also
receive a $700,000 bonus. If any of that
bonus, say $500,000, does not vary with
performance, then the CEO's real salary is $1.5
million.
• Performance can be gauged by any number of things,
such as
• profits or revenue growth,
• Return on Equity, or share price appreciation.
• But using simple measures to determine appropriate
pay for performance can be tricky. Financial metrics
and annual share price gains are not always a fair
measure of how well an executive is doing his or her
job.
• Executives can get unfairly penalized for one-time
events and tough choices that might hurt performance
or cause negative reactions from the market. I
• It's up to the Board of Directors to create a balanced
set of measures for judging the CEO's effectiveness.
3.Stock Options
• Companies trumpet stock options as the way to link
executives' financial interests with shareholders'
interests.
• But options are far from perfect. In fact, with options,
risk can get badly skewed.
• When shares go up in value, executives can make a
fortune from options - but when they fall, investors
lose out while executives are no worse off than before.
• Indeed, some companies let executives swap old
option shares for new, lower-priced shares when the
company's shares fall in value.
• Many companies use employee stock options plans to
retain and attract Employees, the objective being to
give employees an incentive to behave in ways that will
boost the company's stock price.
• If the company's stock market price rises above the call
price, the employee could exercise the option, pay the
exercise price and would be issued with ordinary
shares in the company.
• The employee would experience a direct financial
benefit of the difference between the market and the
exercise prices.
• If the market price falls below the stock exercise price
at the time near expiration, the employee is not
obligated to exercise the option, in which case the
option will lapse.
• Restrictions on the option, such as vesting and
non-transferring, attempt to align the holder's
interest with those of the business shareholders.
• Another substantial reason that companies issue
employee stock options as compensation is to
preserve and generate cash flow.
• The cash flow comes when the company issues
new shares and receives the exercise price and
receives a tax deduction equal to the "intrinsic
value" of the ESOs when exercised.
• Employee stock options are mostly offered to management as
part of their Executive Compensation package.
• They may also be offered to non-executive level staff, especially
by businesses that are not yet profitable, insofar as they may
have few other means of compensation.
• Alternatively, employee-type stock options can be offered to
non-employees: suppliers, consultants, lawyers and promoters
for services rendered.
• Employee stock options are similar to exchange traded call
options issued by a company with respect to its own stock.
• At any time before exercise, employee stock options can be said
to have two components: "time value" and "intrinsic value".
• Any remaining "time value" component is forfeited back to the
company when early exercises are made.
• Most top executives hold their ESOs until near expiration,
thereby minimizing the penalties of early exercise.
• Employee Stock Options are non standard contracts with
the employer whereby the employer has the liability of
delivering a certain number of shares of the employer
stock, when and if the employee stock options are
exercised by the employee.
• Traditional employee stock options have structural
problems, in that when exercised followed by an immediate
sale of stock, the alignment between
employee/shareholders is eliminated.
• Early exercises also have substantial penalties to the
exercising employee.
• Those penalties are
• a) part of the "fair value" of the options, called "time value"
is forfeited back to the company and
• b) an early tax liability occurs. These two penalties
overcome the merits of "diversifying" in most cases.
4.Stock Ownership
• Stock ownership is the most important
performance driver. So, one way for CEOs to truly
have their interests tied with shareholders is for
them to own shares, not options.
• Ideally, that involves giving executives bonuses on
the condition they use the money to buy shares.
Face it: top executives act more like owners when
they have a stake in the business.
Different Components of
Compensation Package
Component of Compensation
• Fixed Components
• Base pay
• Dearness Allowance
• House Rent Allowance
• Competency – Based Pay
• Fixed period employment contract
• Fringe benefits
• International compensation
• Performance Pay
• Retirement funds
• Total Package
• International Compensation – to any
remuneration that is received overseas. Eg
director’s fees, bonuses, retirement etc.
• Retirement funds – provident funds, pension
funds, deferred compensation.
• Total package – the concept includes all
remuneration grossed up and monetized , and
then the employee is given a choice of structuring
their own package within organizational
regulations.
• Variable components
• Long – term incentives (EVA)
• Share schemes
• Short- term incentives ( profit – sharing,
gain – sharing, commission & bonus
scheme.)
• Organization wide incentives- incentive
schemes devised for all the employees in
collectivity.
• Extend the vesting period of Executives' stock and
options.
• Current vesting periods can be as short as three
years, which encourages managers to inflate short-
term stock price at the expense of long-run value,
since they can sell their holdings before a decline
occurs.
• As passed in the Swiss referendum "against
corporate Rip-offs" of 2013, investors gain total
control over executive compensation, and the
executives of a board of directors.
• Institutional intermediaries must all vote in the
interests of their beneficiaries and banks are
prohibited from voting on behalf of investors.
• Disclosure of salaries is the first step, so that
company stakeholders can know and decide
whether or not they think remuneration is fair.
• In the UK, the Directors' Remuneration Report
Regulations 2002 introduced a requirement
into the old Companies Act 1985, the
requirement to release all details of pay in the
annual accounts.
• This is now codified in the Companies Act
2006. Similar requirements exist in most
countries, including the U.S., Germany, and
Canada.
• A say on pay - a non-binding vote of the general meeting to
approve director pay packages, is practised in a growing
number of countries. Some commentators have advocated
a mandatory binding vote for large amounts (e.g. over $5
million).
• The aim is that the vote will be a highly influential signal to
a board to not raise salaries beyond reasonable levels.
• The general meeting means shareholders in most countries.
In most European countries though, with two-tier board
structures, a supervisory board will represent employees
and shareholders alike.
• It is this supervisory board which votes on executive
compensation
• Another proposed reform is the bonus-malus system, where executives carry
down-side risk in addition to potential up-side reward.
• Progressive taxation is a more general strategy that affects executive
compensation, as well as other highly paid people. There has been a recent trend
to cutting the highest bracket tax payers, a notable example being the tax cuts in
the U.S.[citation needed] For example, the Baltic States have a flat tax system for
incomes.[citation needed] Executive compensation could be checked by taxing more
heavily the highest earners, for instance by taking a greater percentage of income
over $200,000.
• Maximum wage is an idea which has been enacted in early 2009 in the United
States, where they capped executive pay at $500,000 per year for companies
receiving extraordinary financial assistance from the U.S. taxpayers. The argument
is to place a cap on the amount that any person may legally make, in the same way
as there is a floor of a minimum wage so that people can not earn too little.[36]
• Debt Like Compensation - If an executive is compensated exclusively with equity,
he will take risks to benefit shareholders at the expense of debtholders. Thus,
there are several proposals to compensate executives with debt as well as equity,
to mitigate their risk-shifting tendencies
• Indexing Operating Performance is a way to make bonus targets business cycle
independent. Indexed bonus targets move with the business cycle and are
therefore fairer and valid for a longer period of time.
• Two strikes - In Australia an amendment to the Corporations
Amendment(Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Bill
2011[39] puts in place processes to trigger a re-election of a Board where a 25%
"no" vote by shareholders to the company's remuneration report has been
recorded in two consecutive annual general meetings. When the second "no" vote
is recorded at an AGM, the meeting will be suspended and shareholders will be
asked to vote on whether a spill meeting is to be held. This vote must be upheld by
at least a 50% majority for the spill (or re-election process) to be run. At a spill
meeting all directors current at the time the remuneration report was considered
are required to stand for re-election.[40]
• Independent non-executive director setting of compensation is widely
practised.[citation needed] An independent remuneration committee is an attempt to
have pay packages set at arms' length from the directors who are getting paid.