MORAL RELATIVISM

Nama : Elsa Pavita

Nim : G2B017063
Prodi : S1 Ilmu Gizi
They care about different things and most importantly they differ about
what things count as right and wrong.
The particular moral values that people hold depend on the culture in
which they live or were raised.
This is a concern about moral authority, “If we want to oppose cruelty, or
defend free speech, or outlaw child sex, we need the conviction that is not
‘just us’, voicing a contingent or accidental aspect of how we feel. We want
to hold rhat truth is on our side’ (Blackburn. 2001. p. 38)
Why are we so committed to them when there is no obvious
reason that they are better than anyone else’s ? Moreover, we
might, on these grounds, think that we should not judge those
with whom we differ. After all, their moral values are as good as
ours.
Disagreement about facts often looks to be resolvable by appeal to
evidence or argument.
Then it would seem that we have no grounds on which to judge
those whose moral views are different from ours.
So the requirement that we ought be toleran is not an absolute
one that applies to all but, as a key part of our own cultural
viewpoint, is one that applies specifically to us. Though tolerance
is required of us, we cannot impose it on others.
So some acts performed by an outsider will be objectionable
enough to us to warrant intolerance and some will not, we may
be prepared to tolerante very mild forms of circumcision but we
will not tolerante genocide.
The moral relativist need not be committed to a prohibition on
judging others because we can weaken the tolerance claim to
allow exceptions.
So, for instance, we might think that some variation is to be
expected about when and to what extent abortion is permissible
and this is in the nature of the case, the particular clash of
values involved can be resolved.
Finally we might look at official document laws, policies,
institutional regulations and the like in an effort to extract the
key moral tenets of a culture. The problem in this case will be
change and representation.
Finally, there may be situations where, although there is a real
issue, a real question of what ought to be done, it is not clear
that any of the parties is in a position to decide and to be
justified there is no manifest possibility of any winning set of
considerations ever being mustered (wiggins, 1990, p. 76).
What is shown, then, by these arguments is that the price of not
thiking that slavery is unjust and insupportable is that one opts
out of the point of view that is common between people and
which is aimed at by the considerations and arguments brought
forward.