Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lecture Topic -2
Before Independence
• Between 1891 and 194 7, aggregate grain output in British India increased at an
average rate of 0.11 per cent per year
• Rice output, constituting half of the total output, actually declined over the 56
year period at an average annual rate of 0.09 per cent
• During this period, population increased at a mercifully low rate of 0.67 per cent
per annum in British India
• Even so, between 1911 and 1941, per capita availability of food grain - taking into
account international trade flows – declined by as much as 26 per cent.
After Independence
• This was from where agriculture in Independent India took off. Its subsequent
performance though not a shining example of success is not as dismal as is sometimes
depicted
• Between 1951 and 1971, food grains production increased from 55.0 million tonnes to
108.4 million, or at the annual rate of 2.7 per cent, keeping slightly ahead of the growth
rate of population
• The growth was, however, not smooth and there were quite a few years - particularly
1966, 1967, 1973 - when the country experienced a severe food crisis
• Throughout the period - with the exception of the year 1972 – food grains had to be
imported, the maximum being 10 million tonnes in 1966
• After 1971, food grains production started declining again, dropped to 97 million tonnes in
1973, and rose to about 104 million tonnes in the next two years
• In 1975-76, it regained it momentum and reached 115 million tonnes
Policy Issues till 1975
• Inadequacy of plan investment for agricultural development,
• Price policy and terms of trade,
• Urban bias,
• "Green Revolution" and inegalitarian growth, and
• Failure of agricultural policy to make significant contribution to the reduction in
rural poverty and unemployment.
Specifically
• The "neglect" of agriculture for which the Indian policy-makers have often been criticised
is generally identified with the failure to allocate an adequate share of public expenditure
to agriculture
• The relative prices of agriculture in India have remained consistently high and agricultural
price policy in India has been on the whole favourable to the surplus producing farmers.
Year after year, the Government of India gave higher procurement prices than those
recommended by the Agricultural Prices Commission, appointed by the Government to
advise it on price and procurement policies.
• Urban-bias is largely misleading in the sense that cropping pattern has changed due to
technology and government policies rather than demand for food for the rich
• The need for the "Green Revolution" was first felt in the year 1967-68, after the two
successive drought years. The linear rates of growth based on Index Numbers of
production - in the five years preceding the year 1964-65 (the year 1964-65 was the best
year till then) and the five subsequent years were 1.81 and 3.86 per cent per year
respectively.
…Contd.)
• Green Revolution’s impact on the behavioural response of farmers judged by a
sharp step-up in investments in irrigation and increased purchases of modern
inputs is an equally relevant criterion for judging its contribution.
• The failure of agricultural strategy - and its economic policy content – to make any
impact on rural poverty and unemployment or equitably distribute the gains from
technological change has been variously attributed to socio-political factors such
as lack of political will, the elitist composition of political leadership and
bureaucracy - no less than that of its critics – structural inequalities in the
ownership of land and other assets, a bias in favour of big farmers, etc.
Two explanations of perpetuation of rural
poverty
• Harris Todaro Model
• Interlinkage of rural credit and labour markets
A curious feature of rural markets in underdeveloped countries is that differences
in factor prices often tend to persist indefinitely
In India one can find adjacent villages paying different wages to unskilled labourer
It has been postulated that rural credit markets are 'isolated' and thus each
moneylender-landlord acts as a monopolist.
Lender's risk hypothesis (LRH) which is the traditional explanation of high rural
interest rates
LRH
• Unlike the urban lender, the rural lender faces a risk of default when he makes a
loan
• Let q be the proportion of his loans which are defaulted on an average.
• Under such circumstances, if he charges an interest i, his effective interest, d, (i.e.
what he actually recovers from one unit of money loaned) is less than i.
• In particular, d = i(1-q)-q.
• Arbitrage eliminates any difference between the effective interest rate and the
urban or the organised sector rate,
• . Thus d = r in equilibrium; and clearly if q >0 then i > r.
• Hence the rural interest rate is above the urban organised interest in equilibrium
Isolation
• Many economists have challenged this thesis on the empirical ground that
typically when a rural landlord makes a loan, he faces very little risk
• The loans are repaid, if not in cash, in terms of confiscated land or bonded labour.
• Clearly if the debtor is the landlord's tenant or employee, it is very unlikely that he
will be able to get away; and if on the other hand the debtor is one who has no
dealings with the landlord it is highly likely that he will not repay, there being
hardly any legal machinery in backward regions to enforce repayment.]
• Hence Isolation can explain perpetual poverty
Policy Phases
• Phase 1: 1947-1965:
Land reforms
The establishment of the National Seeds Corporation (NSC) in 1963 marked the beginning
of the formal seed sector.
The seed industry had been dominated by the public sector until 1988, when the
liberalisation of seed policy through the New Policy on Seed Development (NPSD) opened
the door for private domestic and multinational seed companies in the import of seeds and
technologies, as well as in research and development investment.
However, the main focus of private seed companies has been on the high-value low-
volume hybrid seeds such as fruit and vegetables
The public sector seed corporations still dominate the market for low-value high-volume
seeds of cereals, pulses and oilseeds
Access to financial services
• While the rural banking system in India made significant achievements in increasing the
amount of loans granted to the agricultural sector, several qualitative aspects of the credit
delivery system have been neglected
• Rural areas currently dispose of a range of financial service providers, including formal
sector financial institutions at one end of the spectrum, informal providers (mostly
moneylenders) at the other end, and in between a number of semi-formal/microfinance
providers
• India currently has over 32 000 rural branches of commercial banks (mostly public sector
commercial banks) and regional rural banks (RRBs), some 14 000 co-operative bank
branches, 98 000 PACS providing financial services, thousands of mutual fund sellers,
several non-bank finance companies (NBFCs), and a large post office network with 154 000
outlets that are required to focus on deposit mobilisation and money transfers.
• This hides nevertheless a notable inter-state variation in access to formal credit: in 2013,
Andhra Pradesh had the lowest share from the formal sector at 31%, while Kerala and
Maharashtra had the highest at about 83%
Access to financial services (…Contd.)
• There are also big differences across socio-economic groups, with 87% of marginal
farmers not having access to credit from a formal source.
Agricultural credit by source, 1971-2013
Access to financial services (…Contd.)
• The range of financial products of rural financial institutions remains limited and
inadequate in relation to long-term farm investment needs
• The banking sector has focused disproportionately on basic financial products,
such as short-term credit, also motivated by interest rate subsidies on this type of
credit
• To compensate for the relative lack of success of formal banks in reaching the
rural poor, new microfinance approaches were developed. These include the “Self-
Help Groups (SHGs) - Bank Linkage”, initiated by the National Bank for Agriculture
and Rural Development (NABARD) to target the poorest segments of the rural
population
• However, outreach, volume of lending, and average loan size remain limited, with
disbursements accounting for only 2% of the formal sector credit in rural areas
Marketing channels for farm output
• Marketing infrastructure
Current infrastructure deficiencies in India – concerning transport connectivity,
cold chain and storage infrastructure, logistics, and energy supply – can be
disruptive for agricultural supply chains, particularly when connecting small-scale
producers to other market actors.