Criminal Law 1

CRIMINAL LAW 1
ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
Jay Karel P. Sanchez II

Senior Assistant City Prosecutor
Davao City
CRIMINAL LAW – Branch or division of
law which :
a. DEFINES CRIMES;
b. TREATS OF THEIR NATURE
c. PROVIDES FOR THEIR PUNISHMENT
Crime - an act committed or omitted in

violation of a public law forbidding or
commanding it.
• Sec. 144. Violations of the Code. - Violations of any of the
provisions of this Code or its amendments not otherwise
specifically penalized therein shall be punished by a fine of not
less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not more than
ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos or by imprisonment for not
less than thirty (30) days but not more than five (5) years, or
both, in the discretion of the court. If the violation is
committed by a corporation, the same may, after notice
and hearing, be dissolved in appropriate proceedings
before the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Provided, That such dissolution shall not preclude the
institution of appropriate action against the director,
trustee or officer of the corporation responsible for said
violation: Provided, further, That nothing in this section
shall be construed to repeal the other causes for
dissolution of a corporation provided in this Code.
L E N T V. T U L L E T T P R E B O N , G . R . N O . 1 8 9 1 5 8 , 1 1 J A N U A R Y 2 0 1 7
According to SC, a close reading Section 144 shows that it is not purely a penal provision
because it provides that when the violator is a corporation, an administrative penalty
is imposed in form of dissolution, which is not a criminal sanction. The Court also added
that there is no provision in the Corporation Code using an emphatic language to compel the SC
to construe the provision as a penal offense.
SC held that through a thorough scrutinizing of the different provisions in the
Corporation Code including Sections 31 and 34, they only impose civil liability aside
from Section 74.
SC concludes that had it been the intention of the drafters of the law to define
Sections 31 and 34 as offenses, they could have easily included similar language as
that found in Section 74. The intention can also be gleaned from the floor deliberations of its
proponents. Quite apart that no legislative intent to criminalize Sections 31 and 34 was
manifested in the deliberations on the Corporation Code, it is noteworthy from the same
deliberations that legislators intended to codify the common law concepts of corporate
opportunity and fiduciary obligations of corporate officers as found in American jurisprudence
into said provisions. In common law, the remedies available in the event of a breach of
director's fiduciary duties to the corporation are civil remedies. If a director or officer
is found to have breached his duty of loyalty, an injunction may be issued or damages
may be awarded. A corporate officer guilty of fraud or mismanagement may be held
liable for lost profits. A disloyal agent may also suffer forfeiture of his compensation.
There is nothing in the deliberations to indicate that drafters of the Corporation Code
intended to deviate from common law practice and enforce the fiduciary obligations of
SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW
The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and

Special Penal Laws passed
its amendments
• The Philippine Commission
• The Philippine Assembly
• The Philippine Legislature
• The National Assembly
• Congress of the Philippines
• Presidential Decrees issued by President
Marcos during Martial Law
• The Interim Batasang Pambansa
• The Regular Batasang Pambansa
• Executive Orders issued by President
Corazon Aquino during the Revolutionary
Government before the 1987 Constitution
• Congress of the Philippines under the 1987
Constitution
• NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGIS
(NO CRIME UNLESS THERE IS A LAW PUNISHING IT)
No common law crimes
• crimes that are known in the USA or England becomes punishable
not because there is an express or positive legation BUT they are
accepted principles, or are usages and are rules of action.
• Not recognized in the Philippines
In the Philippines, unless there is a particular provision in the

Penal Code or Special Penal Law that defines and punishes
the act, even if it be socially or morally wrong, no criminal
liability is incurred. (US Vs. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599, 604)
• ARE COURT DECISIONS SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW?

( U S V S . TAY L O R , 2 8 P H I L . 5 9 9 , 6 0 4 )
• In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States
and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so
by law.
• Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission. Said Act (No.
277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the particular conditions necessary to
constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty of such crime. In the present case
the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the publication of said
alleged article "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a
certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large
circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other
countries."
It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor, proprietor, manager,
printer, and publisher." From an examination of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides
that: "Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable
with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper
or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."
By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for the
publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for the punishment of "the
author, editor, or proprietor." It would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that
• THE STATE
WHO HAS • Article II Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
THE “Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The

AUTHORITY maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty and property, and promotion of
TO PUNISH the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
CRIMES? democracy.
• Police Power of the State (one of the inherent

powers of the state)
U S V S . PA B L O 3 5 P H I L 9 3 , 1 0 0
G.R. NO. L-11676; OCTOBER 17, 1916
• The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the

attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society
to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the
individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the
guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
• The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the
necessity for its existence has been recognized even by the most backward
peoples. At times the criticism has been made that certain penalties are
cruel, barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are light and inadequate
to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment is
admitted to be just by the whole human race, and even barbarians and
savages themselves, who are ignorant of all civilization, are no exception.
PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO
G. R. N O. 1 7 5 8 4 ; M A RC H 8 , 1 9 2 2
• The State has the authority,

under its police power, to define and
punish crimes and to lay down the
rules of criminal procedure. States,
as a part of their police power, have
a large measure of discretion in
creating and defining criminal
offenses.
IS THE POWER
OF THE STATE
TO PUNISH
CRIMES
ABSOLUTE?
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
1. Section 1 (Article 3, Bill of Rights)
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property

without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws.
WHITE LIGHT CORP. V. CITY OF MANILA , G.R . NO.
122846, 20 JANUARY 2009
• We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to

the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must
be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its
citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect
an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly
restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as
restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than
twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous
intentions.
GARCIA V. DRILON, G.R . NO. 179267, 25 JUNE 2013
• R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
• IR.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender
bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.
As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.
• R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by
the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened
• It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised
of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner
of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in
a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
GUINGGUING V. PEOPLE, G.R . NO. 128959, 30 SEPTEMBER
2005
• Criminal libel laws present a special problem. At face value,

they might strike as laws passed that abridge the freedom of
speech, expression, or the press. Whatever seeming conflict
between these two precepts has long been judicially resolved
with the doctrine that libelous speech does not fall within the
ambit of constitutional protection. Nonetheless, in ascertaining
what class of materials may be considered as libelous, the
freedom of expression clause, its purposes as well as the evils
it guards against, warrant primordial consideration and
application.
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR , AM NO. P-02-1651, 22 JUNE 2006,
492 SCRA 1
• Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically

articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is
a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend
that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself
holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must
articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in
preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for
only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests
can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule
otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause
as a source of right by itself.
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or

inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE V. ECHAGARAY, G.R . NO. 117472, 7 FEBRUARY
1997, 267 SCRA 682
• Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that

our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on
the morality or propriety of the death sentence where
the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-
defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951
case of Limaco that:x x x there are quite a number of
people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty
is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books,
and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law regardless of their private opinions,”
PEOPLE V. ECHAGARAY, G.R . NO. 117472, 7 FEBRUARY
1997, 267 SCRA 682
• Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing
in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a
positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither
does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse
when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is
immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the
yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice,
public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal
sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for
said crimes."
PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY, G.R . NO. 117472, 7 FEBRUARY
1997, 267 SCRA 682
• Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is

substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which
invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a
sentimentalized hyper fastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the
society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the
humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character and
will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquillity and civility may rule
comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a x x x
necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and
ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the
luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity
of social survival.
CORPUZ V. PEOPLE, G.R . NO. 180016, 29 APRIL 2014
• Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for
instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not
thus be within the prohibition.
• It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it
has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community."
• Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the
law and adapt it to our modern time.
5. Section 20 (Article
3, Bill of Rights)
CONSTITUTIONA
L LIMITATIONS
No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or
non-payment of a
poll tax.
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall

be enacted.
BILL OF ATTAINDER – is a legislative act

which inflicts punishment without trial. Its
essence is the substitution of a legislative
act for a judicial determination of guilt.
PEOPLE V. FERRER, L-32613-14, 27 DECEMBER 1972,
48 SCRA 382
• A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is
the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
powers by confining legislatures to
rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
• History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and
political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed.
The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a
legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize statute as a bill of attainder.
• In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of
attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a
"continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear,
present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial
court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial."
Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the
accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has
expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall

be enacted.
What is an ex post facto law?
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done and punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when committed
What is an ex post facto law?
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon

less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;
5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful;
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to
which he has become entitles, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty
US V. DIAZ CONDE, L-18208, 14
FEBRUARY 1922
• Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the

defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that
makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such
action, is an ex post facto law. The Legislature is prohibited
from adopting a law which will make an act done before
its adoption a crime, as in the case of Act No. 2655. A
law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it
is curative in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely
prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the
defendant.
IN RE: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI INC., 35 SCRA 429
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision

of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed after the approval of
the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is
nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and
18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out
prior to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs that the
entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved
on August 24, 1970.
PEOPLE VS. VILLARAZA, 81 SCR 95
• The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one

day to ten years, imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818,
applies only to swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks
which was committed on or after October 22, 1975. That
increased penalty does not apply to Estafa committed
on October 16, 1974.
• To apply it to the accused would make the decree an ex post
facto law. Its retroactive application is prohibited by articles 21
and 22 of the Revised Penal Code and section 12, ArticleIV of
the Constitution
1.GENERAL
C HA R AC T E R IST I C S
OF C R IMI N A L L AW 2.TERRITORIAL
3.PROSPECTIVE
• Article 14 of the New Civil Code
“Penal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory subject to the principles of
GENERAL public international law and to treaty
stipulations”
CRIMINAL LAW is binding on all

persons who live or sojourn in the
Philippine Territory
PERSONS EXEMPT FROM PHILIPPINE
CRIMINAL LAW UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNAL LAW
1. Sovereigns
2. Head of State
GENERAL 3. Ambassadors
4. Ministers plenipotentiary
5. Ministers residents
6. Charges d’affaires
(These people enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution

– reason: they represent the political interest of their
state)
PERSONS NOT EXEMPT FROM
PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW UNDER THE
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNAL LAW
1. Consuls
GENERAL 2. Vice Consuls
3. Consular officials
They do not enjoy immunity from

criminal prosecutions
CRIMES COMMITTED INSIDE AN
GENERAL EMBASSY OF A FOREIGN STATE
LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES ARE
NOT TRIABLE IN THE PHILIPPINES
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL AND
TERRITORIAL CHARACTER OF THE RPC:
GENERAL
1. TREATIES
2. LAWS OF PREFERRENTIAL
APPLICATION
TREATIES
1. RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951
VFA between RP and USA dared February 10, 1998
-Acts covered by the VFA – ALL OFFENSES committed
within the Philippine Territory by the United States
“military” and “civilian” personnel
GENERAL
VFA provides for 2 kinds of Jurisdiction
a. Exclusive Jurisdiction
b. Concurrent Jurisdiction
2. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations
Adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 21,
1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate under
Resolution No. 21 dared May 17, 1949
WHO vs. Aquino (November 29, 1972)
The Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed
by the President of the Philippines on February 1,
1959 applying the convection to the WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION
GENERAL SC ruled: the Acting Assistant Director of Health

Services assigned to the Manila Regional Health
Office of the WHO is entitled to DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY pursuant to the HOST AGREEMENT (July
22, 1951)
Such diplomatic immunity carries with it among
others diplomatic privileges and immunities,
personal inviolability, inviolability of the official’s
properties, exemption from local jurisdiction and
exemption from taxation and custom duties
M I N U C H E R V S . C O U RT O F A P P E A L S G . R . N O. 1 4 2 3 9 6 , F E B R UA RY 1 1 , 2 0 0 3
• It might be recalled that the privilege is not an

immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is,
rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial
jurisdiction. But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo
might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently
established that, indeed, he worked for the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to
conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within
the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it
should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting
well within his assigned functions when he committed
the acts alleged in the complaint, the present
• The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is
a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified
with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the
emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of
the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state
itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of
a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily
a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit
without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to
be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in
whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet
imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another.
• This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. “It is a different

matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such
for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff.
Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to
act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights
of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within
the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
L I A N G V. P E O P L E , G . R . N O . 1 2 5 8 6 5 , 2 8 J A N U A RY 2 0 0 0
• Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the

communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice
and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without
notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was
violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the
accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in
what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged
utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet
to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled
that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto
result in the dropping of the charges.
L I A N G V. P E O P L E , G . R . N O . 1 2 5 8 6 5 , 2 8 J A N U A RY 2 0 0 0
• Likewise, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by

the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a

diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As
already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official
duty..
CRIMINAL LAWS undertake to
punish crimes committed within the
Philippine Territory
TERRITORIA
L
(The principle of territoriality means
that as a rule, penal laws of the
Philippines are enforceable only
WITHIN ITS TERRITORY)
EXCEPTIONS: ARTICLE 2 RPC
• Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the
treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of
this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine
Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and
maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those
who:
•
TERRITORIAL • 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or

airship
• 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
• 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into
these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the
presiding number;
• 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an
offense in the exercise of their functions; or
• 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security
and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this
Code.
P E O P L E V. T U L I N , G . R . N O . 1 1 1 7 0 9 , 3 0 A U G U S T 2 0 0 1 , 3 6 4 S C R A 1 0
• As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters,
suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
(renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where
its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
waters.
• Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such,
it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle
applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified
piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be
applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise,
A penal law cannot
make an act
punishable in a
manner in which it
was not punishable
PROSPECTIVE when committed.
Article 366 RPC –
Crimes are punished
under the law in force
at the time of their
commission
GENERAL RULE:
criminal law looks forward (prospectively)
Exceptions:
criminal law can be given a retroactive application
When a new statute dealing with crime establishes

PROSPECTIVE conditions more lenient or favorable to the accused
Exceptions to exception:
1. Where the new Law is expressly made inapplicable to

pending actions or existing causes of action (Tavera vs.
Valdez)
2. Where the offender is a habitual criminal (Article 22
RPC)
Art. 21. Penalties that may be
imposed.
No felony shall be punishable
by any penalty not prescribed
by law prior to its
commission.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of
penal laws.
PROSPECTIVE Penal Laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the persons guilty
of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 5 of Article
62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
EFFECTS OF REPEAL OF PENAL LAWS
1. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the
new law shall be applied.
EXCEPITIONS:
1. when the offender is a Habitual Delinquent
2. when the new law is made not applicable to
pending actions
2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force

at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied.
3. If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the
act which was penalized under the old law is no longer
punishable, the crime is obliterated.
CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS
1. Penal laws are STRICTLY construed

against the GOVERNMENT
2. Penal Laws are construed LIBERALLY
in favor of the ACCUSED.
3. Construction/Interpretation of the
RPC, Spanish Text is controlling
PEOPLE V. ABILONG, L-1960, 26 NOVEMBER
1948.
• It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a

wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de
libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense
that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was
deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Under the case of
People vs. Samonte, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it
is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation
of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he
enters the prohibited area."
HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R . NO. 217874, 5
DECEMBER 2017.
• But when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the

passage of an amendatory law imposing penalties
more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court
can direct reopening of a final and immutable
judgment, the objective of which is to correct
not so much the findings of guilt but the
applicable penalties to be imposed.
ARTICLE 5 - RPC
Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties.
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should
be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence,
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.
PEOPLE V. FORMIGONES, L-3246, 29 NOVEMBER 1950
• We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited
such moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the
provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention
of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after appellant
has served an appreciable amount of confinement
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the
judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be credited
with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay
costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two
cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty,
this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his
discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetuato death or
otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
ARTICLE 10 - RPC
Offenses not subject to the provisions of this

Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may
be punishable under special laws are not subject
to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
LADONGA V. PEOPLE, G.R . NO. 141066, 17 FEBRUARY 2005
• B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22,
the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.
People the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment
under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
• The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is
analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17
in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.
PEOPLE V. SIMON, G.R. NO. 93028, 29 JULY 1994
QUESTION: whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should be given
retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of
the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of
said Code the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to
crimes punished by special laws. The exception in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses
since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or
less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.
whether this court, at the present stage, can sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article
QUESTION:
22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant.
The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as
they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not
under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would
also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty."If the judgment which could be
affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and
executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations
 Originated from the old Spanish Penal Code of
1887 (July 4, 1887)
 Americans did not change the Penal and Civil
Codes. Although they introduced laws/rules on
criminal procedure.
 Several moves to amend the Penal Code
HISTORY  1927 committee chaired by Anacleto Diaz came
ACT N0. 3815, out with a draft of the Revised Penal Code
AS AMENDED  The draft was passed by the Philippine

Legislature on DECEMBER 8, 1930
 RPC became effective on January 1,
2932
 RPC despite some amendments over
the years has essentially remains the
same for the last 88 years
ARTICLE 1
Time when Act takes effect.
“This Code shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred
and thirty-two.”
THEORIES UNDERLYING THE
REVISED PENAL CODE
1. The Classical Theory

The Classicist’s Theory: Man is a rational being. If he is a rational being, he can
distinguish right from wrong. If he commits a crime, such as murder, he assumes he
knows that he is wrong. Since he knew that it was wrong, he must prepare himself for the
consequences of what he did.
2. The Positivist Theory

The positivist advocate that we cannot simply consider a crime as permanently governed
or continuously governed by laws. Meaning, we have to take into consideration the
environment, the social conditioning of persons and therefore it is wrong to simply fix a
predetermined penalty for a crime, because there are so many factors to consider.
ARTICLE 2
Application of its provisions.
Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against
those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the
presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this
Code.
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Title One
(FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY)

Chapter One
(FELONIES)
ARTICLE 3
Definitions
Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there
is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
ARTICLE 3
FELONIES - Acts or omissions punishable by law.
ELEMENTS OF FELONY
1. There must be an ACT or OMISSION
2. The act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal Code
3. The act is performed or the omission incurred by means of DOLO or
CULPA
EXAMPLES OF FELONIES COMMITTED
BY “OMISSION”
1. Art. 116. Misprision of treason. — Every person owing allegiance to (the United States) the Government of the Philippine
Islands, without being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, conceals or does not
disclose and make known the same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province, or the mayor or fiscal of
the city in which he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason.
2. Article 275 Par 1
•Art. 275. Abandonment of person in danger and abandonment of one's own victim. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be
imposed upon:
1.
Any one who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall find in an uninhabited place wounded
or in danger of dying, when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall
constitute a more serious offense.
3. Article 213 Par 2 (b)
•Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any public
officer who:
•1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing supplies, the making of contracts, or the
adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property or funds, shall enter into an agreement with any interested
party or speculator or make use of any other scheme, to defraud the Government;2. Being entrusted with the collection of
taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts, shall be guilty or any of the following acts or omissions:

(a)
xxxxxx
(b)
Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially.
ARTICLE 3
FELONIES - Acts or omissions punishable by law.
ELEMENTS OF FELONY
1. There must be an ACT or OMISSION
2. The act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal Code
3. The act is performed or the omission incurred by means of DOLO or
CULPA
PEOPLE V. SYLVEST RE AND AT IENZA , G.R. NO. 35748, 14 D ECEMB ER
1931, 56 P H IL. 353
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and

so hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of
another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do
not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of
the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent;
and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without
knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to
one known to be vacant at the time, which results in
destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and
penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.
PEOPLE V. TALINGDAN, L-32126, 6 JULY 1978, 84 SCRA 19
Not showing the actual cooperation on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable
acts does not mean she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record
morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense
committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was
shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was
able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified
appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not
only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to
the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to
somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their house to
investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information given
to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words,
whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her
attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after
Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the
principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact
ARTICLE 3
MOTIVE vs. INTENT

Motive is the moving power that impels a person to commit a crime.
intent the purpose to use a particular means to achieve a particular result.
NOTE: While criminal intent is an element of a felony, motive is

completely immaterial.
ARTICLE 3
CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES ACCORDING TO THE MEANS BY

WHICH THEY ARE COMMITTED
1. INTENTIONAL FELONIES
2. CULPABLE FELONIES
PRINCIPLE:
Every Felony must be committed VOLUNTARILY
Whether intentional or culpable felonies
ELEMENTS of VOLUNTARINESS (Intentional Felonies)
• Freedom
• Intelligence
ARTICLE 3 • Intent
ELEMENTS of VOLUNTARINESS (Culpable Felonies)
• Freedom of Action
• Intelligence
• Fault/Negligence
MANUEL V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 165842, 29 NOVEMBER 2005
• Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act

without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.
When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to
have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumed
it to have been intentional.
• For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a

confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus reus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea.
• In the present case, the petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice
or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule,
mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense. However,
P EOPLE V. PUNO, G. R. NO. 97471, 17 FEBR UA RY 1993, 219 SCR A 85
• Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime
for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of
variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances
thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable
aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the
specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of
rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal
motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which
case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. Also, where injuries were inflicted on a
person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the
offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous performance of official
duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical
injuries
• With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped
the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to
exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to
deprive the offended party of her liberty, and not where such restraint of her freedom of
action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated
PEOPLE V. DELIM
• Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be
alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo
Puno, et al. that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the
malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action
is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor.
• What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal
complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.
Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender
actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure
to act. Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the
prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a
crime requiring specific intent. Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. Specific intent may be proved
by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of
the accused as established by the evidence on record. Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive
generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity.
Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a
general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and
absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime
charged such as murder.
• In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive
the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted
MISTAKE OF FACT
Mistake of fact - Misperception of fact on the part of a person who injures another.
Ignoratia Facti excusat - Mistake of Fact is an Excuse
ACTUS REA + MENS REA = CRIME/FELONY
(CRIMINAL ACT + CRIMINAL MIND/INTENT )
Actus no facit reum nist mens sit rae - the act is not criminal when the mind is not criminal.
Elements of Honest Mistake of Fact
1. the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
2. the intention of the accused was lawful
3. there was NO FAULT or NEGLIGENCE
MALA IN SE VS.
M A L A P R O H I B I TA
MALA IN SE MALA PROHIBITA
1. Crimes so serious in their effects to 1. Violations of mere rules of
society as to call for unanimous convenience designed to secure a
condemnation to its members more orderly regulation of the affairs of
society
2. Criminal intent is necessary 2. Criminal intent is immaterial
because the only inquiry is: has the
law been violated?
3. Generally, refers to those act or 3. Generally, refers to acts or
omission punished by the RPC. omissions made criminal by special
laws.
4. Honest Mistake of fact is a defense 4. Honest Mistake of fact is NOT a

defense
5. Good Faith is a defense 5. Good Faith is not a defense
PADILLA V. DIZON, AC NO. 3086, 23 FEBRUARY 1988, 158 SCRA 127
The respondent judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in
holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent
(mensrea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala
prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance
allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at the
Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in
assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any
specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law. At the time of his
apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his
possession. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his previous trips
to the Philippines.
GA R C I A V. C A , G . R . N O. 1 5 7 1 7 1 , 1 4 MA R C H 2 0 0 6 , 4 8 4 S C R A 6 1 7
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala
prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of
are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but
become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether
the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy.
• Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.F or otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes
to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are
bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election
canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate
is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
• Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its
existence.
CULPABALE FELONIES
CULAPABLE FELONIES MUST ALSO BE VOLUNTARY TO BE CRIMINAL
ELEMENTS:
1. Freedom of Action
2. Intelligence
3. Fault/Negligence
PEOPLE V. PUGAY, L-74324, 17 NOVEMBER 1988, 167 SCRA 439
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his
notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that
may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the
deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as
follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to
be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which
no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all
manner of danger and injury.
IVLER V. SAN PEDRO, G.R. NO. 172716, 17 NOVEMBER 2010
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
• The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad
to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our
Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x
• Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed
willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent
variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according
IVLER V. SAN PEDRO, G.R. NO. 172716, 17 NOVEMBER 2010
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
• Quizon, rooted in Spanish law (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated, stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x
x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,” has long been abandoned when the Court
en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller
in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes
under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing
crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes
and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will
be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-
offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense
alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon
ARTICLE 4
Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
HOW CAN A PERSON COMMIT A FELONY AND THE
WRONGFUL ACT DONE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT
WHICH HE INTENDED?
There are three situations contemplated by Article 4 (1):
1.Error in personae – error in identity

2.Aberratio ictus – mistake in blow
3.Praeter Intentionem – the result exceeded the intention.
ERROR IN PERSONAE
PEOPLE V. SABALONES, G.R. NO.
123485, 31 AUGUST 1998, 294
SCRA 751
• Transferred intent is used when a defendant intends to harm one victim,
but then unintentionally harms a second victim instead. In this case, the
defendant's intent transfers from the intended victim to the actual victim
and can be used to satisfy the mens rea element of the crime that the
defendant is being charged with. The transferred intent doctrine is only
used for completed crimes, and is not used for attempted crimes.
• Aberratio ictus means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one

but hitting the other due to imprecision of the blow. In the case at bar, the
appellants opened fire because they mistook the vehicles to be
carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez. The fact that they were
mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court has held that
“mistake in identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when
the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.”
ABERRATIO ICTUS
PEOPLE V. GUILLEN, L-1477, 18
JANUARY 1950, 85 PHIL. 307.
The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant.
In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the intention
of killing him, the appellant acted with malice and is therefore
liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by
Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing a felony although the wronful act done be different
from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. As held by this Court,
a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence.
PRAETER INTENTIONEM
“DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE”,
A person, committing a felony, is liable for the direct, logical and natural consequences of his
criminal act.
“doctrine of proximate cause” the cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, results in a particular felony, without which the felony would not have resulted.
An efficient intervening cause is something absolutely foreign and totally unexpected which intervened
and which break the relation of cause and effect, between the original felonious act and the result.
NOTE: generally, Infections are considered as a continuation or natural effect – not efficient intervening cause
Illustration:
Punch victim head hits rock victim dies

(proximate cause) (fractured skull) effect
immediate cause
ALBUQUERQUE, G.R. NO.38773,19
DECEMBER1933, 59PHIL.150
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave
an injury as the death of the deceased. We find that his conclusion is
supported by the evidence. In his testimony the appellant
emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that
would leave a permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or
one that would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week
or two but never intended to kill him, because then it would
frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least, support
his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his
letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his
proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of the appellant in
stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his
neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore mentioned that appellant
did not have control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the
blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.
BATACLAN V. MEDINA , L-10126, 22
OCTOBER 1957, 102 PHIL. 181
Definition of proximate cause:
That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom
The proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not
only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably,
by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to
carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to
use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
The coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. The driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the
overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank. Yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
Moreover, a victim overheard Medina speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately
because they were already old. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to
insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, especially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably,
despite his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.
PEOPLE V. ILIGAN, G.R. NO. 75369, 26
NOVEMBER 1990
We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he
was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr.
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are:
(a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and
(b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.
We hold that these requisites are present in this case.

• The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by the physician
who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of
the wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the
body: the head.
• The hacking incident happened on the national highway [30] where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle passed
seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of
people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle.
• Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan's hacking of Quiñones, Jr.'s head might not have been the direct cause, it was
the proximate cause of the latter's death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom."[31] In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan's assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is,
considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
liability.
U R B A N O V. IN T E R M E D I ATE A P P E L L AT E C O U R T,
G . R . N O. 7 29 64 , 7 J A N U A R Y 19 88
The medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of

the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
However, the act of Javier working in his farm where the soil is filthy,
using his own hands, is an efficient supervening cause which relieves
Urbano of any liability for the death of Javier. There is a likelihood
that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death
with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME - ELEMENTS
1.The act performed would have constituted an

OFFENSE AGAINST PERSONS or PROPERTY;
2.That the act was done with evil intent;
3.That its accomplishment is inherently
impossible or that the means employed is
either inadequate or ineffectual; and
4.That the act performed should not constitute a
violation of the Revised Penal Code
I M P O SS I B L E C R I M E - T H E AC T P E R F O R M E D
W O U L D H AV E C O N S T I T U T E D A N O F F E N S E
A G A I N S T P E R S O N S O R P R O P E RT Y;
FELONIES AGAINST FELONIES AGAINST

PERSONS PROPERTY
Parricide Robbery
Murder Brigandage
Homicide theft
Infanticide Occupation of real property
Abortion Culpable Insolvency
Duel Swindling and other deceits
Physical Injuries and Rape Chattel mortgae and Malicious
Mischief
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME- ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT
IS INHERENTLY IMPOSSIBLE OR THAT THE
MEANS EMPLOYED IS EITHER INADEQUATE
OR INEFFECTUAL
1. Inherent nature of the act;

a. Physical or factual impossibility
b. legal impossibility of
accomplishment
2. Employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME- THE ACT WAS
DONE WITH EVIL INTENT;
The offender must be of the

belief that he was committing a
crime at that moment.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME- THAT THE ACT
PERFORMED SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
A person could be liable for an

impossible crime only if the act
does not fall under any specific
provision of the RPC.
• Impossible crime is the last
resort.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME- PENALTY
Art. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime

because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. —
When the person intending to commit an offense has already
performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless
the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act
intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or
because the means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in
mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the
offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a
fine from 200 to 500 pesos.
I N T O D V. CA , G . R . N O. 10 3 11 9, 21 O CT O B E R
19 92 , 2 15 S CR A 5 2
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where

1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
2. there is intention to perform the physical act;
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.
factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have
been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no
defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
P E O P L E V. S A L A D I N O , L- 3 6 3 4 , 3 0 M A Y 1 9 5 1 , 8 9 P H I L . 8 0 7
• From the foregoing it is plain that Bernabe having died as a

consequence of the violent mauling by Saladino, the latter
must be declared guilty of assassination.
• Anastacio Alejo does not appear to have conspired with him,
and is not liable either as principal or as accomplice of the
murder. But he is guilty as accessory after the fact for
having performed acts tending to conceal Saladino’s crime
by making it appear that Bernabe had run away.
JACINTO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 162540, 13 J U LY 2009.
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where

1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
2. there is intention to perform the physical act;
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have
been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no
defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
HOW A FELONY DEVELOPS

1. Mental Process / Internal Acts Not punishable

1. External / Physical Acts:
Gen. Rule: Not Punishable
a. Preparatory Acts
Exception: If the RPC penalizes it.

Example: Article 304 (Possession of

picklocks and false keys)

b. Acts of Execution

 Attempted
Punishable
 Frustrated
 Consummated
ARTICLE 6
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and

attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its

execution and accomplishment are present.
It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a

felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than this own spontaneous desistance.

ATTEMPTED STAGE
There is an attempt when the offender
1. commences the commission of a felony directly by

overt acts, and
2. does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony
3. by reason of some cause or accident other than this
own spontaneous desistance.

FRUSTRATED STAGE
It is frustrated when the offender
1. performs all the acts of execution which would

produce the felony as a consequence but which,
2. nevertheless, do not produce it
3. by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.

CONSUMMATED STAGE
A felony is consummated when all

the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are
present.
3 possibilities:
1.The accused can be found guilty
only of frustrated or attempted
felony.
2.The accused cannot be convicted
of the felony charged in its
SOME ELEMENTS consummated stage but he can
PRESENT, SOME ABSENT be found guilty of another felony
in its consummated stage.
3.When a person is charged with a
crime consists of two or more
elements, some elements are
proven but the others are not, the
accused should be acquitted
because no crime was
established.
DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH
1. There is no distinction between the attempted felony and consummated felony.

2. Consummated or Nothing
EX: Felony by Omission
False Testimony in Court
Slander
FORMAL CRIMES – ONLY ONE (1) STAGE OF EXECUTION

MATERIAL CRIMES – COMPOSED OF SEVERAL STAGES
U S V. E D U A V E , G . R . N O . 1 2 1 5 5 , 2 F E B R U A R Y 1 9 1 7 , 3 6 P H I L . 2 0 9
In case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phased is completely passed making the crime
subjectively complete. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the
intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. Eduave did all that was
necessary to commit the crime but it did not result as a consequence due to something
beyond his control.
The crime was not consummated because the elements of the crime’s execution and
accomplishment were not complete, as the victim did not die.
Neither was the crime an attempted one because the accused’s actions has already
passed the subjective phase, that is, there was no external force or intervention of a
foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of
the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed preventing
defendant from performing all the acts of execution necessary to commit the felony.
That external force is the essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony.
Consequently, the victim did not die because an external element has prevented such death after
Eduave has performed all the necessary acts of execution that would have caused the death of
the victim.
R I V E R A V. P E O P L E , G . R . N O. 1 6 6 3 2 6 , 2 5 J A N U A R Y
2006, 480 SCRA 188
Accused are criminally liable for attempted murder. That the head wounds
sustained by Rodil were merely superficial and could not have produced his
death does not negate the criminal liability for attempted murder.

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating
the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards
the consummation of the design. The act done need not constitute the last proximate
one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime.
The overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
B A L E R O S V. P E O P L E , G . R . N O. 1 3 8 0 3 3 , 2 2
FEBRUARY 2006, 483 SCRA 10
in order for a crime of rape to have been committed in an attempted

stage, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating
the woman’s vagina with his sex organ but was not able to
completely do so due to some reason or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
Even with the acts of kissing the victim and mashing her breasts, the
offense would not have constituted attempted rape absent the
accused’s commencement of penetrating the victim’s vagina with
his sex organ.
In the present case, the perpetrator was even fully dressed when it
attacked Albano.
JURISPRDENCE
THEFT
V A L E N Z U E L A V. P E O P L E , G . R . N O . 1 6 0 1 8 8 , 2 1 J U N E 2 0 0 7
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all the
elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.
Article 308 states that, in the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that
there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.

The Court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by
one with intent to gain.
Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the
property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the
deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts.
Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.
R O B B E R Y
P E O P L E V. S A L V I L L A , G . R . N O . 8 6 1 6 3 , 2 6 A P R I L 1 9 9 0 .
The robbery shall be deemed consummated if the unlawful “taking” is

complete.
Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an essential part of the

crime of robbery. The respondent claimed that none of the items (money,
watches and wallet) were recovered from them. However, based on the
evidence, the money demanded, the wallet and the wristwatch were within
the dominion and control of the appellant and his co-accused and thus the
taking was completed.
It is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the
robber or that he should have actually carried the property away, out
of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should
have made his escape with it.
ROBBERY
PEOPLE V. DIO, L-36461, 29 JUNE 1984, 130 SCRA 151
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the evidence adduced show that the appellant and
his companion were unsuccessful in their criminal venture of divesting the victim of his wrist watch
so as to constitute the consummated crime of robbery. When the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch
was still securely strapped to his wrist. The killing, of Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely
incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery, which however was not
consummated because of the resistance offered by the deceased.
This case would properly come under the provision of Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that by reason or on occasion of an attempted robbery a homicide is committed, the person
guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this
Code.
The crime committed by the appellant is attempted robbery with homicide and the penalty
prescribed by law is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Since there
was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be applied in its medium period.
i.e. 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law has also to be
applied.
I L L E G A L T R E S P A S S
P E O P L E V. L A M A H A N G , L - 4 3 5 3 0 , 3 A U G U S T 1 9 3 5 , 6 1 P H I L . 7 0 3
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt
acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation.
There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence,
passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely
arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution.
But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere
beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause
and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the
Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or
violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant
case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.
From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was making an opening by means
of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention
was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in
entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the
record to justify a concrete finding.
PHYSICAL INJURIES, HOMICIDE, AND MURDER
P E O P L E V. K A L A LO, G . R . N O. 3 9 3 0 3 - 0 5 , 1 7 M A R C H 1 9 3 4 ,
59 PHIL. 715
the evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at
Hilarion Holgado while the latter was fleeing from the scene of the
crime in order to be out of reach of the appellants and their companions and
save his own life. The fact that the said appellant, not having contended himself
with firing only once, fired said successive shots at Hilarion Holgado, added to
the circumstance that immediately before doing so he and his co-appellants had
already killed Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, cousin and brother-in-
law, respectively, of the former, shows that he was then bent on killing said
Hilarion Holgado. He performed everything necessary on his pat to
commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason
of causes independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or
because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, none of
which found its mark. The acts thus committed by the said appellant
Marcelo Kalalo constitute attempted homicide with no modifying
circumstance to be taken into consideration, because none has been
established.
P H Y S I C A L I N J U R I E S , H O M I C I D E , A N D M U R D E R
P E O P L E V . B O R I N A G A , G . R . N O . 3 3 4 6 3 , 1 8 D E C E M B E R 1 9 3 0 , 5 5 P H I L . 4 3 3
Dissenting opinion, J. Villa-Real:

“The acts of execution perfomed by [Borinaga] did not produce the death of Mooney as a
consequence because the blow did not reach his body; therefore, the culprit did not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony.
There was lacking the infliction of the deadly wound upon a vital spot of the body of Mooney.”
What the back of the chair prevented was the wounding of Mooney, not his death.
It is the preventing of death by causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, after all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence had been performed,
that constitutes a frustrated felony, according to the law, and not the preventing of the
performances of all the acts of execution which constitute a felony, as in the present case.
Attempted murder only.
P E O P L E V. T R I N I D A D , G . R . N O. 7 9 1 2 3 - 2 5 , 9 J A N UA RY
1989, 169 SCRA 51
The defense is correct, however, in contending that in the Frustrated

Murder case, TRINIDAD can only be convicted of Attempted Murder.
TRINIDAD had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts but was unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance,
such as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion, and there
was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body. Moreover, the
wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that
where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause
his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not
having performed all the acts of execution that would have
brought about death (People vs. Phones, L-32754-5, July 21, 1978, 84
SCRA 167; People vs. Garcia, L-40106, March 13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497).
PH Y S IC A L IN JU R I E S, H O MI C I D E , A N D
MU R DE R
M A RT IN E Z V. C A , G . R . N O. 168 827 , 1 3 AP R IL
200 7.
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated
physical injuries (if offender had no intention to kill the victim), or frustrated or attempted homicide or
frustrated or attempted murder (if the offender intends to kill the victim).
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of the following: (a) motive; (b) nature or number of weapons used in
the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the
crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the
victim.
To begin with, as between the petitioner and the victim, the former had more hatred to harbor arising from the
fact that the victim filed a suit against him and his wife. Petitioner thus had more motive to do harm than the
victim. Secondly, petitioner was armed with a deadly 14 ½-inch bolo. Thirdly, if it were true that petitioner
stabbed Dean merely to defend himself, it defies reason why he had to stab the victim three times.
The wounds, two of which penetrated his heart and lung, being serious, would not only negate self-defense;
they likewise indicate determined effort to kill. Moreover, physical evidence is evidence of highest order. It
speaks more eloquently than a hundred of witnesses. Fourthly, from the manner the crime was
committed, there can be hardly any doubt that intent to kill was present. Dean was defenseless and
unarmed while petitioner was deadly armed. Lastly, the words uttered by petitioner while he was assaulting
Dean were most revealing, “You kneel down because I will kill you now.”It cannot be denied that petitioner had
the intention to kill Dean. Petitioner performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not consummated
because of the timely medical intervention applied on the victim.
PH Y S IC A L IN JU R I E S, H O MI C I D E , A N D
MU R DE R
M A RT IN E Z V. C A , G . R . N O. 168 827 , 1 3 AP R IL
200 7.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties. In this regard, the Court
find ample evidence to establish treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might take. In the present case, the
prosecution had met the requisites for alevosia to be appreciated: (1) at
the time of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend himself;
and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method, or form of the attack employed by him. Petitioner was armed with
a deadly 14 ½ - inch bolo. The attack on Dean was swift and
unannounced; undeniably, petitioner’s attack was treacherous.
M O N D R A G O N V. P E O P L E , L - 1 7 6 6 6 , 3 0 J U N E
1966, 17 SCRA 476
The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide,
said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That element must be proved with
the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of
intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488).
We hold that the facts brought out in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case do
not justify a finding that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party. On the contrary,
there are facts brought out by the decision appealed from which indicates that the petitioner had
no intention to kill, namely: the petitioner started the assault on the offended party by just
giving him fist blows; the wounds inflicted on the offended party were of slight nature,
indicating no homicidal urge on the part of the petitioner; the petitioner retreated and went
away when the offended party started hitting him with a bolo, thereby indicating that if the
petitioner had intended to kill the offended party he would have held his ground and kept on hitting
the offended party with his bolo to kill him.
The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and considering that the injuries
suffered by the offended party were not necessarily fatal and could be healed in less than 30 days,
We hold that the offense that was committed by the petitioner is only that of less serious physical
injuries.
P H Y S I C A L I N J UR I E S , H O M IC I D E , A N D M U R D E R
P E OP L E V. S Y P I O, L- 5848 , 3 0 A P R I L 195 4, 9 4
P H IL . 885
The court had previously held (U.S. vs. Eduave, People vs. Dagman, and People vs.
Borinaga) that it is not necessary that the accused actually commit all the acts of
execution necessary to produce the death of his victim, that it is sufficient that he
believes that he has committed all said acts. In these cases, the court held that the
crimes committed were frustrated murder, because there was full and complete belief on
the part of the assailant that he had committed all the acts of execution necessary to
produce the death of the intended victim.
In the case at bar, Sy Pio fired at Tan Siong Kiap, and the latter was hit, but
was able to escape and hide in another room. Sy Pio must have seen that Tan
Siong Kiap was able to escape; Sy Pio knew that he had not performed all the
acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. It cannot be said that the
subjective phase had been completed. But because Sy Pio ran away after the
incident, there was reasonable doubt in the court that Sy Pio may have
actually believed that he had committed all the acts of execution. This doubt
must be resolved in Sy Pio’s favor.
Sy Pio was found guilty of attempted murder.
RAPE
P E OP LE V. OR I TA , G .R . N O. 887 24, 3 A PR I L
1 990 , 1 84 SC R A 1 05
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated. In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v.
Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA
666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set
the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil.
559; People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because
not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements
and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is
hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
RA P E
P E O P L E V. C A M P U H A N , G . R . N O. 1 2 9 4 3 3 , 3 0 M A R C H
2000
In Orita, the court held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of
the offense were already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do,
having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. The
court ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential, any penetration of
the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. Even
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant
conviction of consummated rape.
However, the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus in proving that
Primo’s penis was able to penetrate Crysthel’s vagina.
Under Art 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the RPC, the rape is attempted when the offender
commences of rape directly by overt acts, and does performs all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape – and only attempted
rape – are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
ARTICLE 8
Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable

only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty
therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to

commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person
or persons.

ARTICLE 8
GENERAL RULE: CONSPIRACIES AND PROPOSALS are NOT

PUNISHABLE!
EXCEPTION: IF THERE IS A LAW PUNISHING IT
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit a Crime
CONSPIRACY PROPOSAL
Elements  Agreement among 2 or  A person has decided to commit a
more persons to commit a crime
crime  He proposes its commission to another
 They decide to commit it
Crimes 1. Conspiracy to commit 1. Proposal to commit treason
sedition 2. Proposal to commit rebellion or
2. Conspiracy to commit insurrection
rebellion
3. Conspiracy to commit
treason
ARTICLE 8
Instances when mere conspiracy or mere proposal becomes a felony:

CONSPIRACY
1. Conspiracy to commit treason (Art. 115)
2. Conspiracy to commit rebellion or insurrection (Art 136)
3. Conspiracy to commit coup d’etat (Art.136, as amended by RA 6968)
4. Conspiracy to commit sedition.

PROPOSAL

GENERAL RULE: mere proposal and conspiracy is not punishable.

EXCEPT: in crimes of treason, rebellion, coup d’tat,. If you succeed in your treason or rebellion,
the State is the victim. Since the crime is directed against the State, the State had the absolute
power to prosecute you even if you are only preparing to commit a crime.
ARTICLE 8
Two kinds of conspiracy:

(1) Conspiracy as a crime;
a. no overt act is necessary

b. cannot be inferred or deduced because there is no overt act
c. mere agreement
d. a clear and convincing evidence of its existence is necessary
(2) Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability
a. there must be an overt act done

b. same may be deduced or inferred from the acts of several offenders in
carrying out the commission of the crime
ARTICLE 8
Two ways for conspiracy to exist:

(1) There is an express agreement.

(2) There is an implied agreement
The participants acted in concert or simultaneously which is

indicative of a meeting of the minds towards a common criminal
goal or criminal objective.
When several offenders act in a synchronized, coordinated

manner, the fact that their acts complimented each other is
indicative of the meeting of the minds. There is an implied
agreement.
PEOPLE V AGUILOS
G.R. NO. 121828. JUNE 27, 2003
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness
of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders,
and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the
scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of
it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-
conspirators.
If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and
extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the
conspirators is the agent of all the others.
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally
ARTICLE 8
Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable

only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty
therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to

commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person
or persons.

ARTICLE 8
GENERAL RULE: CONSPIRACIES AND PROPOSALS are NOT

PUNISHABLE!
EXCEPTION: IF THERE IS A LAW PUNISHING IT
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit a Crime
CONSPIRACY PROPOSAL
Elements  Agreement among 2 or  A person has decided to commit a
more persons to commit a crime
crime  He proposes its commission to another
 They decide to commit it
Crimes 1. Conspiracy to commit 1. Proposal to commit treason
sedition 2. Proposal to commit rebellion or
2. Conspiracy to commit insurrection
rebellion
3. Conspiracy to commit
treason
ARTICLE 8
Instances when mere conspiracy or mere proposal becomes a felony:

CONSPIRACY
4. Conspiracy to commit sedition.

PROPOSAL

GENERAL RULE: mere proposal and conspiracy is not punishable.

EXCEPT: in crimes of treason, rebellion, coup d’tat,. If you succeed in your treason or rebellion,
the State is the victim. Since the crime is directed against the State, the State had the absolute
power to prosecute you even if you are only preparing to commit a crime.
ARTICLE 8
Two kinds of conspiracy:

(1) Conspiracy as a crime;
a. no overt act is necessary

b. cannot be inferred or deduced because there is no overt act
c. mere agreement
d. a clear and convincing evidence of its existence is necessary
(2) Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability
a. there must be an overt act done

b. same may be deduced or inferred from the acts of several offenders in
carrying out the commission of the crime
ARTICLE 8
Two ways for conspiracy to exist:

(1) There is an express agreement.

(2) There is an implied agreement
The participants acted in concert or simultaneously which is

indicative of a meeting of the minds towards a common criminal
goal or criminal objective.
When several offenders act in a synchronized, coordinated

manner, the fact that their acts complimented each other is
indicative of the meeting of the minds. There is an implied
agreement.
PEOPLE V AGUILOS
G.R. NO. 121828. JUNE 27, 2003
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness
of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders,
and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the
scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of
it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-
conspirators.
If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and
extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the
conspirators is the agent of all the others.
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally
C I R C U M S TA N C E S
AFFECTING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF A PERSON
UNDER THE RPC
Numbe Circumstanc Article

r e
1. Justifying Circumstances
2. Exempting Circumstances 6 Justifying Article 11
3. Mitigating Circumstances
7 Exempting Article 12
4. Aggravating
Circumstances
5. Alternative Circumstances
10 Mitigating Article 13
21 Aggravating Article 14
There are two others which are
found elsewhere in the 3 Alternative Article 15
provisions of the Revised Penal
Code:
(1) Absolutory cause; and
(2) Extenuating
circumstances
ARTICLE 11
JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES
1. SELF DEFENSE
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
1. Unlawful aggression.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
1. SELF DEFENSE
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided

that the following circumstances concur;
1. Unlawful aggression
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
1. SELF DEFENSE
(1 S T ELEMENT)
Unlawful Aggression
- an indispensable element
- a sudden unprovoked unlawful attack that exposes a person’s life or
limb to actual, real, imminent danger; mere threatening, imagined or
speculative danger is not enough
DOCTRINES TO REMEMBER:
1. When one claims self-defense, the law assumes that there is no mutual agreement
between both parties to fight, when there is mutual agreement to fight, no one can
claim self-defense and each one is susceptible for each one’s injury.
2. A person does not have to be cornered against the wall before he can lawfully
defend himself from an unlawful aggression. MAINTAIN YOUR GROUND
3. One can only act in self-defense when the aggression is ongoing or about to begin.
But once the aggression has ended and because you wanted to get even, you hit back,
that is no longer self-defense
1. SELF DEFENSE
TWIO TYPES OF AGRESSION

1.Lawful Aggression
2.Unlawful Aggression
In defense of his PERSON OR RIGHT

1. SELF DEFENSE
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to

Prevent the Aggression
Law does not require MATERIAL COMMENSURABILITY
It is sufficient that there is RANTIONAL EQUIVALENCE between the means of the
offense and the defense
HOW DETERMINED: (several factors)
1. The existence of emergency
2. The imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed
3. The instinct, more than reason, which impels the defense
4. The nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor
5. The character and number of the aggressor
1. SELF DEFENSE
(2 N D ELEMENT)
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to
Prevent the Aggression
Law does not require MATERIAL COMMENSURABILITY
It is sufficient that there is RANTIONAL EQUIVALENCE between the means of the
offense and the defense
HOW DETERMINED: (several factors)
1. The existence of emergency
2. The imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed
3. The instinct, more than reason, which impels the defense
4. The nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor
5. The character and number of the aggressor
1. SELF DEFENSE
(3 N D ELEMENT)
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself
PROVOCATION is sufficient when it is adequate to steer one to its commission
PRINCIPLES TO REMEMBER: ( can invoke self-defense)
1. there was no provocation at all on the part of the person defending himself.
2. the person defending himself might have given some provocation but it is not sufficient.
3. the person defending himself might have given sufficient provocation, but his
provocation was not immediate to the act of aggression, he can still invoke self-defense.
1. SELF DEFENSE
(3 N D ELEMENT)
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself
PROVOCATION is sufficient :
- when it is adequate to steer one to its commission
- when it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
PRINCIPLES TO REMEMBER: ( can invoke self-defense)
1. there was no provocation at all on the part of the person defending himself.
2. the person defending himself might have given some provocation but it is not sufficient.
3. the person defending himself might have given sufficient provocation, but his
provocation was not immediate to the act of aggression, he can still invoke self-defense.
2. DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE
Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his
relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed
in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case
the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense
had no part therein.
WHO ARE CONSIDERED RELATIVES?
1. Spouse ( lawful or legitimate spouse)
2. Ascendants ( relatives by blood in the direct ascending line ex. Grandfather, great-grand parents ,
great-great-grand parents and so on)
3. Descendants ( child, grandchild, great-grandchild and so on)
4. Brothers and sisters, whether legitimate, illegitimate, natural or adopted
5. Relatives by affinity, within same degrees, like: Parents-in-law, Son-in-law, Daughter-in-law, Brother-in-
law
6. Relatives of consanguinity within fourth civil degree
2. DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE
ELEMENTS:
1. Unlawful Aggression
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression
3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the person defending has no
part therein.
3. DEFENSE OF A STRANGER
Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided

that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of
this Act are present and that the person defending be not induced
by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
ELEMENTS:
1. Unlawful Aggression
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression
3. person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive
D E F E N S E O F S E L F , R E L A T I V E S , A N D S T R A N G E R S
M A N A B A N V . C A
G . R . N O . 1 5 0 7 2 3 J U L Y 1 1 , 2 0 0 6
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury
upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful
aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful
intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real peril.
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the
back as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was
still inside a locked holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at
Manaban, Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista. These circumstances
clearly belie Manaban’s claim of unlawful aggression on Bautista's part.
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he turned his back at
Manaban is mere speculation. Besides, Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista
when the latter turned his back. In that situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger considering
that Manaban, who had already fired a warning shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista,
who was a policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and would not have attempted to
draw his gun which was still inside a locked holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really
feared that Bautista was about to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled
Bautista by shooting his arm or leg considering that Manaban’s firearm was already aimed at
S E N O J A V P E O P L E
G R 1 6 0 3 4 1
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an unlawful aggression ceases
to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor.
The Court ruled that Senoja was the unlawful aggressor in the last confrontation and not
Leon Lumasac. The victim had already left the hut and was ten (10) meters away from it.
There is no showing that the victim, who was drunk, was aware that Senoja was following him, or that
the Senoja called out to him so that he (the victim) had to turn around and notice him. It is clear
that at that point in time, the victim was simply walking toward his home. He had stopped
being an aggressor. It was Senoja who wanted a confrontation. Senoja stabbed or poked the
victim in the left buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound, and when the latter turned around,
successively stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit and chest until he fell. In all, the victim
suffered nine (9) wounds.
While Leon Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home,
accused Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their
confrontation. Being now the unlawful aggressor, Senoja cannot validly claim that he
acted in self-defense as Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code requires that there must be
an unlawful aggression on the person killed.
P E O P L E V S D E C E N A
A U G 4 , 1 9 9 4
RETALIATION: The aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the
accused attacked him.
SELF-DEFENSE: The aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the
person making a defense
Requirement for self-defense: That there is an unlawful aggression against the person defending
himself
It must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that
placed the life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his
assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist said attack
he burden of proof is usually with the prosecution, but by invoking self-defense, the burden of
proof shifts to the accused. If he fails to sufficiently prove this, he shall be convicted from his
admission of killing the victim. Accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if that was weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the
accused himself admitted the killing.
P E O P L E V S . R O B E R T O E . D E L A C R U Z
G . R . N O . 1 2 8 3 5 9 , 6 D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 0
Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude – but most importantly at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor.
In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the appellant, upon seeing the
victim pointing a gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing
the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he confronted the victim.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful

aggression- The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this component of self
defense. The four gunshot wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself - When the
appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures, appellant could no longer
argue that there was no provocation on his part

T H E P E O P L E V S . N I C O L A S J A U R I G U E A N D A V E L I N A J A U R I G U E
C . A . N O . 3 8 4 F E B R U A R Y 2 1 , 1 9 4 6
To be entitled to a complete self-defense of chastity, there must

be an attempt to rape. To provide for a justifying circumstance
of self-defense, there must be a) Unlawful aggression, b)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it, c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Attempt to rape is an unlawful aggression.
However, under the circumstances of the offense, there
was no possibility of the defendant to be raped as they
were inside the chapel lighted with electric lights and
contained several people. Thrusting at the base of
Capino’s neck as her means to repel aggression is not
reasonable but is instead, excessive.
P E O P L E V S . N A R V A E Z ,
1 2 1 S C R A 3 8 9 ( 1 9 8 3 )
1. Unlawful aggression - In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression

towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6
months and he should have left him in peace before time was up,
instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art.
536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be
acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides
that every possessor has the right to be respected in his
possession
2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. - In

the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself - Here,
there was no provocation at all since he was asleep
N I L O S A B A N G V P E O P L E
G . R . N O . 1 6 8 8 1 8 : M A R C H 9 , 2 0 0 7
In order to successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had
no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation been given by the relative attacked.
Unlawful aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this case, there is a divergence in the
testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses as to whether Butad aimed a gun at petitioner’s son as he
uttered the words "I will shoot you." With this conflict emerges the question of whether petitioner sensed an
imminent threat to his son’s life. Payud unequivocally testified that petitioner even dismissed Butad’s
utterance saying, "Just try to shoot my child because I’ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled
brat."This indicates to us that petitioner did not consider Butad’s words a threat at all.
Furthermore, the presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad’s body negates the claim that the
killing was justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. Even assuming that it was Butad who
initiated the attack, the fact that petitioner was able to wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression which
Butad had started already ceased. Petitioner became the unlawful aggressor when he continued to shoot Butad
even as he already lay defenseless on the ground.
P E O P L E V S D A G A N I
The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were
unable to present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22 caliber
pistol were found and no bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident. Javier also tested
negative for gunpowder residue. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without
any proof of the existence of its requisites.
Danger to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and
grappled for the gun with the latter. After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was
no longer any unlawful aggression . Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when
he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, Means that are reasonable
and necessary were not satisfied to invoke self defense.Considering the circumstances in its entirety.
It does not justify appellant Santiano’s act of fatally shooting the victim twice.
R U J J E R I C Z . P A L A G A N A S , V S . P E O P L E ,
G . R . N O . 1 6 5 4 8 3 S E P T E M B E R 1 2 , 2 0 0 6
Unlawful aggression:
no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of petitioner in
shooting them. Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not
carrying any weapon When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a
state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from
the location of the former. He was still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or byt taking
cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help
Let it not be forgotten that unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-defense It is an

essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, there can be, in a jural sense, no complete or incomplete self-defense. Without
unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance
cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present. To our mind, unlawful
aggression, as an element of self-defense, is wanting in the instant case.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:

gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.
4. AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL OR INJURY
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which
causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are
present.
1. the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
2. The injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
3. There be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it
4. The evil or injury sought to be avoided must not be caused by the
negligence or imprudence the accused, nor must it be the result of
any violation of law
ONLY JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE where even if there is NOR criminal

Liability, there is civil liability
A V O I D A N C E O F G R E A T E R E V I L
P E O P L E V R I C O H E R M O S O
M A R C H 2 9 , 1 9 7 4
•
Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is
erroneous because his act in preventing Marianito from
shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the
aggressors in this case, was designed to insure the
killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the
assailants and not an act to prevent infliction of greater
evil or injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in
the assault.
A V O I D A N C E O F G R E A T E R E V I L
P E O P L E V . N O R M A H E R N A N D E Z
C A 5 5 O G 8 4 6 5
Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil

of going througha loveless marriage. (Art. 11
par.4, rpc)
5 . F U L F I L L M E N T O F D U T Y / L AW F U L E X E R C I S E
O F R I G H T O R O F F I CE
Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office.
ELEMENTS:
1. The accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office
2. The injury caused or the offense committed should have been the
necessary consequence of such lawful exercise
3. The fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office
must be done within the limits of the law.
4. There should be no imprudence, neglect or abuse in the fulfillment of
duty ;
F U L F I L L M E N T O F D U T Y
P E O P L E V . D E L I M A
D E C E M B E R 2 2 , 1 9 2 2
The killing was done in the performance of a duty.

The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading service
of his sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which
compelled the policeman to resort to such an
extreme means, which, although it proved to be
fatal, was justified by the circumstances.
P E O P L E V . L A G A T A
M A R C H 2 4 , 1 9 4 9
It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The record does
not show that Tipace was bent on committing any act of aggression or that he
attempted to escape.
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around him. How
could anyone intending to escape run towards and around the very guard
one was supposed to escape from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of his duties,
the circumstances show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly
against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and even kill one of
them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE
NECESSITY would authorize them to fire against them.
M A M A N G U N V P E O P L E
G . R N O 1 4 9 1 5 2 , F E B . 2 , 2 0 0 7
The justifying circumstance of fulfilment of duty may be invoked only after the defense successfully
proves that:
The accused acted in the performance of a duty; and the injury inflicted or offense committed is
the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.
The first requisite is present. However, proof that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was
a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt
him from criminal liability.
There was no reason to shoot Contreras because he was already unarmed and shouted
that it wasn’t him before petitioner fatally shot him.
Petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him with a steel pipe is intriguing for it was only when a
lead pipe was recovered from the scene that petitioner remembered Contreras trying to hit him.
Such vital information could not have escaped petitioner’s mind.
In the absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that the injury be the
NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE of the due performance of such duty, there can only be
INCOMPLETE JUSTIFICATION, a privileged mitigating circumstance.
There was no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras.
M A M A N G U N V P E O P L E
G . R N O 1 4 9 1 5 2 , F E B . 2 , 2 0 0 7
Regarding exercise of lawful duty as justifying, two requisites must concur before
this defense can prosper:
1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and
2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise.
These criteria was not satisfied. Accused were not in duty when incident
happened.
Assuming arguendo that they are, what they did will still not fall within the
boundaries of fulfilling their lawful duty. The law does not clothe police officers with
authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It must be stressed that the
judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their
duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within
reasonable limits.
5 . F U L F I L L M E N T O F D U T Y / L AW F U L E X E R C I S E
O F R I G H T O R O F F I CE
three separate and distinct justifying circumstances:
1. One who acts in the fulfillment of duty

2. One who acts in the exercise of a right
3. One who acts in the exercise of an office
6 . O B E D I E N C E T O A L AW F U L O R D E R O F A
SUPERIOR
Any person who acts in obedience to an order

issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Requisites:
1. That an order has been issued by a superior;
2. That such order must be for some lawful
purpose; and
3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry
out said order is lawful.
O B I E N C E T O A L A F U L O R D E R
P E O P L E V . B E R O N I L L A
G . R . N O . L - 4 4 4 5 F E B R U A R Y 2 8 , 1 9 5 5
The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher
command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel after finding that the
late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to
be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly
declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the
accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal"
Appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-
appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as military
subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware
of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we cannot say
that criminal intent has been established
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit
reum, nisi mens rea-a is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of be innocent."
O B I E N C E T O A L A F U L O R D E R
T A B U E N A V S . S A N D I G A N B A Y A N
G . R . N O . 1 0 3 5 0 1 - 0 3 & G . R . N O . 1 0 3 5 0 7 2 6 8 S C R A 3 3 2 ( 1 9 9 7 )
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the
MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to
obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise
is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior
— the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably
exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other
words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and
transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another
and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a
directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on
Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS
Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any
person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is
clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS
Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one
government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).
ARTICLE 12
EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES
DI ST I N C T I O N S
JUSTIFYING EXEMPTING
1. There is neither criminal or civil 1. There is no criminal liability but
liability, except in Par. 4 there is civil liability except in
(avoidance of greater evil), paragraph 4 (accidenT0 where there
where there is no criminal is neither civil nor criminal liability
liability but there is civil liability
2. There is no crime and there is no 2. There is a crime BUT there is no
criminal criminal
3. The element of VOLUNTARINESS 3. The elements of VOLUNTARINESS
which is lacking is criminal intent which are lacking are intelligence
and freedom
A RTI CLE 1 2
Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.
2. A child 15 years old or under at the time of the commission of the offense. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of RA No. 9344. (As
amended by Section 6 of RA No. 9344).
3. A child above 15 years old but below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense who shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of RA No.
9344, UNLESS he acted with discernment, in which case such child shall be subjected to
appropriate DIVERSION proceedings under Section 23 to 31 of RA No. 9344.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause.
1. A N I MB E C I LE OR A N I N SA N E P E R SO N,
U N LE SS T H E L AT T E R H AS A C T E D D U R IN G A
LU C ID IN T E R VA L.
INSANITY – manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the

brain, or more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the
mentality, functional or organic and characterized by perversion,
inhibition or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties or
by impaired or disordered volition (People vs. Ambal; citing Section 1039 of the
Revised Administrative Code)
IMBECILITY – analogous to “childishness” and dotage.

one who is deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of
will at the time of the commission of the crime.
One who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable
to that of children between 2 and 7 years of age.
DISTINCTIONS
INSANITY IMBECILITY
1. A temporary ailment 1. Permanent Ailment
2. Not continous 2. Continous
3. Exempts the accused from 3. Exemots the accused from

criminal liability UNLESS he criminal liability at all times
commits a crime during a
LUCID INTERVAL
MENTAL RETARDATION
LEVEL DECRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE

QUOTIENT (IQ
RANGE)
I Prfound Below 20
II Severe 20-35
III Moderate 36-52
IV Mild 53-68
INSANITY
P E O P L E V. TA N E O,
L- 3 7 6 7 3 , 3 1 M A R C H 1 9 3 3 , 5 8 P H I L . 2 5 5
Dr. Serafica, an expert witness in the case, stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream,
under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind. The
wife's wound may have been inflicted accidentally. The defendant did not
dream that he was assaulting his wife, but that he was defending
himself from his enemies.
INSANITY
P E O P L E O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S V. B O N OA N
G R N O. L- 4 5 1 3 0 , F E B R U A RY 1 7 , 1 9 3 7
Insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance must be proved beyond

reasonable doubt when the commission of the crime is established. When a
defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing that fact rests upon him.
In this case, the defense interposed that the defendant was insane at the time he killed
the deceased. Prior to the commission of the offense, he was confined in the
insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease
diagnosed as dementia praecox. The circumstance tends to show that the recurrence of
the ailment at the time of the occurrence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational
or scientific foundation. All persons suffering from dementia praecox are clearly to
be regarded as having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for
legal responsibility for their actions. It is similar to those of manic depressive
psychosis where the mind appears “deteriorated” because when a person becomes
affected by this kind of disease, during the time of excitement, he has no control whatever
he acts. The accused was held by the court to be exempted from criminal liability.
INSANITY
PEOPLE VS. PUNO
N O. L- 3 3 2 1 1 J U N E 2 9 , 1 9 8 1
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the
time of committing the crime.
"Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,
that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because
there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He was mentally ill when he
committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical records,
as properly evaluated and confirmed by the expert testimony of the three physicians/pyschiatrists
who examined and treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been ailing with a
psychotic disorder medically known as chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type.
INSANITY
P E O P L E V. D U N G O
G . R. N O. 8 9 4 2 0 . J U LY 3 1 , 1 9 9 1
Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However, the definition of
insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that
insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties, which
is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the act.
However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period
before and after the time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by
outward acts.
It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged
him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to confront Mrs. Sigua. From this, it can be
inferred that the accused was aware of his acts. This also established that the accused has lucid
intervals. Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been
aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during
laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that
the accused was insane when he committed the act.
INSANITY
P E O P L E V S R A FA N A N J R
In the findings of the case, testimonies negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of
insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita
with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the
mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that
assault. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must
be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving
his affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence
regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has
been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on
the testimonies of two (2) physicians which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental
condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances
occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad
statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.
INSANITY
PEOPLE VS. MADARANG
G . R. N O. 1 3 2 3 1 9 . M AY 1 2 , 2 0 0 0
Philippine Courts have established a stringent criterion for insanity. To be exempting, it is

required that:
(1) there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act;
(2) (2) he acted without the least discernment because there is complete absence of power
to discern; and
(3) (3) or that there is total deprivation of will.
Appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia AFTER he killed his

wife. Record is also bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior prior to
event.
Evidence of insanity after the fact may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of
abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to commission of crime.
Appellant failed to establish convincing evidence of alleged insanity at the time of killing
INSANITY
P E O P L E V. R O B I O S
G . R. N O. 1 3 8 4 5 3
Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show

no substantial evidence that appellant was completely
deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated
the brutal killing of his wife. The fact that appellant admitted
to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may
have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a
natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the
wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the
killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his
claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done
and he was not insane during the commission of the
crime.
INSANITY
VERDADERO VS. PEOPLE
M A RC H 2 , 2 0 1 6
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999,

Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC
for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3)
he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was
confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a
relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of
his first confinement in 1999 until the stabbing incident; and (6)
he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.
ACQUITTED.
INSANITY
P E O P L E V S . G E N O S A , G . R . N O. 1 3 5 9 8 1
JA N U A RY 1 5 2 0 0 4 .
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is

repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman,
the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.
Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a
man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
NOTE: READ SECTION 26 OF RA NO. 9262
R E P U B LI C A C T N O. 9344
( JU V E N I LE JU ST IC E LAW)
CICL – “CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW”

• Child below 18 years of age and is alleged or adjudged to have committed an offense.
“CHILD AT RISK “ – refers to child who is vulnerable to and at risk of committing a criminal
offense because of personal, family and social circumstances such but not limited to:
1. abused/exploited (sexual, physical, mental, or economic)
2. Abandoned or neglected
3. Dysfunctional/broken family
4. Out of school
5. Street child
6. Member of a gang
7. Living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug abuse;
8. Living in situations of armed conflict
2. C H ILD 15 Y E A R S O LD OR B E LOW AT T H E
T I ME OF T H E C O MMI SSIO N OF T H E
OF F E N S E.
A child 15 years old or under at the time of the

commission of the offense. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of RA No. 9344. (As
amended by Section 6 of RA No. 9344).
OF F E N S E.
IMPORTANT TERMS UNDER RA NO. 9344

1. "Best Interest of the Child" refers to the totality of the circumstances and conditions
which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of
the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional
development. It also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding
the growth and development of the child.
2. "Restorative Justice" refers to a principle which requires a process of resolving

conflicts with the maximum involvement of the victim, the offender and the community. It
seeks to obtain reparation for the victim; reconciliation of the offender, the offended and
the community; and reassurance to the offender that he/she can be reintegrated
into society. It also enhances public safety by activating the offender, the victim and the
community in prevention strategies.
3. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed
by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child.
OF F E N S E.
IMPORTANT TERMS UNDER RA NO. 9344

4. "Intervention" refers to a series of activities which are designed to
address issues that caused the child to commit an offense. It may
take the form of an individualized treatment program which may
include counseling, skills training, education, and other
activities that will enhance his/her psychological, emotional
and psycho-social well-being.
5. "Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of
determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict
with the law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic,
psychological or educational background without resorting to formal
court proceedings.
2 . C H I L D 1 5 Y E A R S O L D O R B E L O W AT T H E T I M E O F T H E
C O M M I SS I O N O F T H E O F F E N S E .
DETERMINATION OF THE AGE OF THE CHILD – Sierra vs. People; July 3, 2009
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall
be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in
any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age
before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court,
the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the
case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law
Guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as

a qualifying circumstance: (Pople vs. Sariego; February 24, 2016 citing the
case of People vs. Purina)
1.The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2.In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents, such
as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth
of the victim, would suffice to prove age.
3.. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
Guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a

qualifying circumstance: (Pople vs. Sariego; February 24, 2016 citing the case of People
vs. Purina)
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony
will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party.
HOW TO CONTEST THE AGE OF THE CICL:

1. BEFORE THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IN COURT
- any person may contest the age of the CICL by filing before the FAMILY COURT of a
SUMMARY PROCEEDING FOR THE DETERMINATION OF AGE
must be decided by the court within 24 hours from receipt of the appropriate
pleadings of all interested parties
2. AFTER THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN FILED IN COURT AGAINST THE CICL
- file a MOTION to DETERMINE THE AGE OF THE CHILD in the same court where the
case is pending.
Pending determination of the age, the proceeding on the main case shall be
suspended.
3 . C H I L D A B O V E 1 5 Y E A R S O L D B U T B E L O W 1 8 Y E A R S O L D AT
T H E T I M E O F T H E C O M M I SS I O N O F T H E O F F E N S E .
A child above 15 years old but below 18 years old at the

time of the commission of the offense who shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of RA No. 9344, UNLESS he acted with discernment, in which
case such child shall be subjected to appropriate DIVERSION
3 . C H I L D A B O V E 1 5 Y E A R S O L D B U T B E L O W 1 8 Y E A R S O L D AT
T H E T I M E O F T H E C O M M I SS I O N O F T H E O F F E N S E .
15 below = EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

above 15, below 18 + not acting with discernment = EXEMPT from criminal
Liability must undergo INTERVENTION
above 15, below 18 + acting with discernment + penalty six years or below =
DIVERSION
above 15, below 18 + acting with discernment + penalty above six years but
below 12 years = COURT SUPERVISED DIVERSION
above 15, below 18 + acting with discernment + penalty above 12 years =
TRIAL
BUT: if the child would plead guilty may avail of suspension of sentence
Suspended sentence is the holding in abeyance of the service of the sentence
imposed by the court upon a finding of guilt of the child in conflict with the law,
whereby the child undergoes rehabilitation within a fixed period under such
terms and conditions as may be ordered by the court.
MINORITY
PEOPLE VS. DOQUENA
[68 PHIL. 580 (1939)]
Accused mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of

intention, as a mitigating circumstance.
However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an exception to the exemption from

criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between
right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in
each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and
behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but
also after and even during the trial.
MINORITY
J O E M A R O RT E G A V S . P E O P L E
G . R . N O. 1 5 1 0 8 5 , 2 0 A U G U S T 2 0 0 8
By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age
of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the alleged rape. The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly
provides that, a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.
The Court gives retroactive application insofar as it favors the persons
guilty of a felony.
While the law exempts the petitioner from criminal liability,

however, he is not exempt from civil liability. For this reason,
MINORITY
P E O P L E V. M A N TA L A B A ,
G . R . N O. 1 8 6 2 2 7 , 2 0 J U LY 2 0 1
The appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38
and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[ that while Section 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with
the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the
child reaches the maximum age of 21.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer
avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence,
because such is already moot and academic.
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. A penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
MINORITY
S A M A H A N N G M G A P R O G R E S I B O N G K A B ATA A N V. Q U E Z O N
CITY
G . R. N O. 2 2 5 4 4 2 DAT E : A U G U S T 8 , 2 0 1 7
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions
— i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment.
Pertinently, Secs. 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors
for status offenses such as curfew violations.
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors,
when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead,
what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
"Penalty" is defined as "punishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine."
Punishment, in turn, is defined as "a sanction — such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or
privilege — assessed against a person who has violated the law."
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of
the regulations are without legal consequences. Sec. 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt
appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs recognized under Sec. 54. In this regard,
requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Secs. 57 and 57-
A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof" or "counsel or warning against fault
or oversight.” In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and
admonition are clearly not penalties — as they are not punitive in nature — and are generally less
MINORITY
S A M A H A N N G M G A P R O G R E S I B O N G K A B ATA A N V. Q U E Z O N
CITY
G . R. N O. 2 2 5 4 4 2 DAT E : A U G U S T 8 , 2 0 1 7
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions
— i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment.
Pertinently, Secs. 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors
for status offenses such as curfew violations.
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors,
when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead,
what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
"Penalty" is defined as "punishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine."
Punishment, in turn, is defined as "a sanction — such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or
privilege — assessed against a person who has violated the law."
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of
the regulations are without legal consequences. Sec. 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt
appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs recognized under Sec. 54. In this regard,
requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Secs. 57 and 57-
A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof" or "counsel or warning against fault
or oversight.” In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and
admonition are clearly not penalties — as they are not punitive in nature — and are generally less
4. ACCIDENT
Any person who, while performing a lawful act with

due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
Requisites:
1.A person is performing a LAWFUL ACT;
2.With due care
3.Causes an INJURY to another by MERE ACCIDENT
4.Without Fault or INTENTION of CAUSING IT
AC C I D E N T
U S V S TA N E D O
G . R. N O 5 4 1 8 ; F E B R U A RY 1 2 , 1 9 1 0
If life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful

act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is
no criminal liability.
In the case where there is no evidence of negligence upon the part of the
accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the
commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any
evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the
defendant are his concealment and denial.
AC C I D E N T
P E O P L E O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S V S . I S A I A S C A S T I L LO Y C O M P L E
TO
G . R. N O. 1 7 2 6 9 5 2 9 J U N E 2 0 0 7
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear
and convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof.
The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow
be considered as performing a "lawful act” Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's
defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act
during the incident.
AC C I D E N T
P O M OY V. P E O P L E
G . R. 1 5 0 6 4 7 , 2 9 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2)
the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent
to cause the injury.
From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was
an investigator for the PNP. Thus, he was in the lawful performance of his duties that, under the instructions
of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation. Also, it was in the lawful
performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the
weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner
was duty bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his
custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in thevicinity, including
petitioner himself. Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary
precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so
assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside
itsholster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area. At no instance during his
testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in thecourse of the
lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from itsholster, the release of
the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots all of which led to the death of the victim were
sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the
very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latter’s culpability.
AC C I D E N T
P O M OY V. P E O P L E
G . R. 1 5 0 6 4 7 , 2 9 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2)
the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent
to cause the injury.
From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was
an investigator for the PNP. Thus, he was in the lawful performance of his duties that, under the instructions
of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation. Also, it was in the lawful
performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the
weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner
was duty bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his
custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in thevicinity, including
petitioner himself. Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary
precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so
assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside
itsholster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area. At no instance during his
testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in thecourse of the
lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from itsholster, the release of
the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots all of which led to the death of the victim were
sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the
very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latter’s culpability.
5. COMPULSION OF IRRESTIBLE FORCE
Any person who act under the compulsion of

irresistible force.
Elements:
1. that the compulsion is by means of physical force;

2. that the physical force must be irresistible;
3. that the physical force must come from a third person.
I R R I S I S T I B L E F O RC E
U S V. A P O LO N I O C A B A L L E R O S E T A L .
G R N O. 1 3 5 2 , M A R 2 9 , 1 9 0 5
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto
Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the
corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by
the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm
this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate,
who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present
when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the
group who killed the Americans, but that he was in a banana plantation on his
property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run;
that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that
the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced
him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act
by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless,
under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged
against him.
IRRISISTIBLE FORECE/CONTROLLABLE FEAR
P O E P L E V. LO R E N Z O A N D M A R A N TA L
G . R. N O. L- 5 4 4 1 4 J U LY 9 , 1 9 8 4
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without
will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Loreno and Marantal had admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against
Elias and is family. Facts inconsistent with the appellants’ defense were established:
(a) having been armed with a firearm,
(b) Loreno positioning himself near the post of the balcony without prior instructions,
(c) Loreno furnishing the rattan to tie the victims, and
(d) Loreno pointing his gun to the other victims when Monica was being raped.
Furthermore, Loreno brought Beata, Elias’s wife to the different rooms to open the trunks and closets, without the
threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And lastly, Loreno tried to molest Cristina after
being raped by the man in dark sweater.
6. IMP U L SE O F AN UNC O NT RO L LAB LE FEAR O F EQ UAL O R
G R E AT E R I N J U RY
Any person who acts under the impulse of an

uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.
Elements
1. Existence of an uncontrollable fear;
2. The fear must be real and imminent.
3. the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.
6. IMP U L SE O F AN UNC O NT RO L LAB LE FEAR O F EQ UAL O R
G R E AT E R I N J U RY
In order to avail of this, there must be a demonstration that:

1. There is no possibility of defending yourself from the threat.
2. There is no possibility of escaping from the threat. If there is a
chance of escaping so that you will commit the crime, then you are
not covered.
3. The threat must be of equal or greater injury. It must be clear,
concrete, not speculative.
7 . P R E V E N T I O N BY S O M E L A W F U L O R I N S U P E R A B L E C A U S E
Any person who fails to perform an act required by

law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable
cause.
7 . P R E V E N T I O N BY S O M E L A W F U L O R I N S U P E R A B L E C A U S E
Any person who fails to perform an act required by

law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable
cause.
I N S U P RA B L E C A U S E
PEOPLE VS. BANDIAN
G . R. N O. 4 5 1 8 6 S E P T E M B E R 3 0 , 1 9 3 6
The law exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the
circumstances in which the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a child in
the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other cause
than that she was overcome by severe dizziness and extreme debility, with
no fault or intention on her part, she should not be blamed therefor because it
all happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves
under such circumstances (Art. 12, subsection 4, RPC).
Taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she
later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of
causes entirely independent of her will, and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances
in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and
convicted
OTHER EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
1. Article 6 – when a person did not perform all acts of execution which would produce
the felony because of his own voluntary desistance. One who voluntarily desists
from committing a crime is exempt from any criminal liability because of public
policy. - known as spontaneous
desistance
2. Article 7 – light felonies are punishable only when they are consummated,
except those committed against persons or property. So, the rule is: attempted or
frustrated light felonies are not punishable if they are not committed against persons or
property. This is an exemption from liability for reason of public policy. But if the light
felony is committed against persons or property, they are punishable even if
attempted or frustrated.
3. Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional

circumstances.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
4. Article 16 – where accessories are not liable for light felonies.

5. Article 20 – where the accessory who is related to the principal is exempt from
criminal liability
6. Article 344 - Express Pardon by the offended party of the offender in CONCUBINAGE,
ADULTERY, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION OR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
7. Article 344 – Marriage of the offender with the offended party in SEDUCTION,
ABDUCTION OR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
8. Rape – offender is rape husband and the wife forgives him.
9. Rape - the subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party.
10.Article 280 - legal grounds for entering another’s dwelling
11. Instigation
ENTRAPMENT VS. INSTIGATION
ENTRAPMENT - is the employment of such ways and

means for the purpose of TRAPPING or CAPTURING a
lawbreaker in the execution of their criminal plan.
- the idea to commit the crime originates from the
accused.
INSTIGATION – criminal intent originates in the mind of the

instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of
the offense charged in order to prosecute him.
INSTIGATION VS. FRAME-UP
Both are incompatible with each other. Cannot be present

concurrently.
INSTIGATION – the crime is actually performed by the

accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of
the inducer.
FRAME-UP – the offense is not committed by the accused.

Precisely, the accused is only FRAMED or SET-UP in a
situation leading to a false accusation against him.
I N S T I G AT I O N
P E O P L E V S . LUA C H U ,
G . R . N O. 3 4 9 1 7 , 7 S E P T E M B E R 1 9 3 1 , 5 6 P H I L . 4 4
It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug,
but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered
for said drug.
Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the accused to import the opium in
question, but pretended to have an understanding with the Collector of
Customs, who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the
way of their enterprise so far as the customs house was concerned.
This is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely
to prosecute him, but it is simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
Therefore, the mere fact that the chief of customs secret service pretended to agree to
a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order
to better the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the
DISTINCTIONS
Entrapment Instigation
The practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose This is the involvement of a law officer in the crime itself in
of instituting criminal prosecutions. the following manners:
1. He induces a person to commit a crime for personal gain.

2. Doesn’t take the necessary steps to seize the instrument
of the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained
the profits in mind.
3. He obtained the profits in mind even through afterwards
does take the necessary steps seize the instrument of the
crime and to arrest the offenders.
It is a scheme or technique ensuring the apprehension of the

criminals by being in the actual crime scene.
The law officers shall not be guilty to the crime if he have
done the following:
a. He does not induce a person to commit a crime for
personal gain or is not involved in the planning of the
crime.
b. b. Does take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of
the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained
the profits in mind.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
13.Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but only civil
liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to
the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the
possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living
together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers

participating in the commission of the crime.
A RT I C L E 3 3 4 R P C
I N T E S TAT E E S TAT E O F M A N O L I TA G O N Z A L E S V. P E O P L E ,
G . R . N O.
181409, 11 FEBRUARY 2010.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to
the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the
State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender
for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable. However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies
mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision
shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under
Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification
or estafa through falsification. Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State
waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to
property committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter
and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of
the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a
breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public
documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property
ARTICLE 13
MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
2 KINDS OF MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
PRIVILEGED MITIGATING ORDINARY MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE CIRCUMSTANCE
1. If present in the commission of a 1. If present in the commission of a
felony, REDUCES the penalty to felony, reduces the penalty to be
be imposed upon the accused by imposed upon the accused by
DEGREE. PERIOD.
2. It cannot be OFFSET by a 2. It can be OFFSET by a GENERIC
GENERIC Aggravating Circumstance Aggravating Circumstance.
EXAMPLE OF PRIVILEGED
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Incomplete Justifying Circumstance

2. Incomplete exempting circumstance
3. When the child in conflict with the law is over 15 years old but
under 18 at the time of the commission of the offense and he acted
with discernment but was never subjected to diversion programs
under RA No. 9344
4. When there are 2 or more mitigating and no aggravating
circumstances, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the law in the period that it may deem proper (Article
64, Paragraph 5 RPC)
ARTICLE 13
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from
criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony
(delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had
voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his
means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however
depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
10.And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.
1. INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING OR
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Those mentioned in the preceding chapter,

when all the requisites necessary to justify
the act or to exempt from criminal liability in
the respective cases are not attendant.
I N C O M P L E T E J U S T I F Y I N G O R E X E M P T I N G C I RC U M S TA N C E S
P E O P L E V. N A R VA E Z ,
G . R. N O S . L- 3 3 4 6 6 - 6 7 ( 1 2 1 S C RA 3 8 9 )
Narvaez admitted having shot the two deceased but did so in defense of his person
and of his property however, he cannot be exempted from criminal liability because
the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the
3 requisites are present (unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself). Although there was unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims towards Narvaez’s property rights and lack (or
absence even) of provocation since appellant was resting, it was not a
reasonable necessity for him to kill the two. Since not all requisites were
present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense. Also, there was no direct evidence of planning or
preparing to kill. The crime committed was homicide and the penalty for
such is reclusion temporal but due to mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and obfuscation and incomplete self-defense, penalty
was lowered to arresto mayor. Appellant has been under detention for
almost 14 years thus his immediate release was ordered by the Court.
PEOPLE VS. ULEP
G . R. 1 3 2 5 4 7 S E P 2 0 , 2 0 0 0
• the second requisite is absent which states that the injury caused
or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In
this case, when SPO1 shot the victim in the head even the latter
slumped to the ground is unreasonable act. However, when the
accused fired a warning shot, it shows that he has no motive and
intention to kill the victim. The court reiterated that the appellant’s
decision to kill was made in an instant and the victim’s helpless position was
merely incidental to his having been previously shot. In this respect, there
is an incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty
which is deemed as special or privileged mitigating circumstance.
Such circumstance reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than
that prescribed by law in accordance to Article 69 of the RPC. In
addition, the court acknowledged the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
GUILLERMO VS. PEOPLE
JUNE 30, 2008
Self-defense must be appreciated as Alon was about to

attack Guillermo with a broken bottle when
Guillermo realized he had a knife. Guillermo had
attacked Alon in self-defense, albeit the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to repel it was
not found as he stabbed Alon 3 times. There was also
a disproportionate difference between an actual blade and
a broken beer bottle. All this would lead to an
incomplete self-defense, which is a mitigating
circumstance only, and not a justifying one.
Penalty reduced.
2. OVER 15 UNDER 18 WITH
DISCERNMENT
A child above fifteen (15) but below 18 years

of age at the time of the commission of the
offense who acted with discernment, in which
case he shall be subjected to appropriate
diversion programs under Section 23 to 31 of
RA No.9344.
DISCERNMENT
"Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of

determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the
law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic, psychological or
educational background without resorting to formal court proceedings.
DISCERNMENT
System of Diversion.
Children in conflict with the law shall undergo diversion programs without undergoing court
proceedings subject to the conditions herein provided:
1. Where the imposable penalty for the crime committee is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the law enforcement officer or Punong Barangay with the assistance of the local
social welfare and development officer or other members of the LCPC shall conduct mediation,
family conferencing and conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt indigenous modes of conflict
resolution in accordance with the best interest of the child with a view to accomplishing the objectives
of restorative justice and the formulation of a diversion program. The child and his/her family shall be
present in these activities.
2. In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the local social welfare and development officer shall meet with the child and
his/her parents or guardians for the development of the appropriate diversion and
rehabilitation program, in coordination with the BCPC;
3. Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed exceeds six (6) years imprisonment,
diversion measures may be resorted to only by the court.
DISCERNMENT
Duties of the child under the CONTRACT OF DIVERSION

1. The child shall present himself/herself to the competent authorities
that imposed the diversion program at least once a month for
reporting and evaluation of the effectiveness of the program.
2. Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of
diversion, as certified by the local social welfare and development
officer, shall give the offended party the option to institute the
appropriate legal action.
3. The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended
during the effectivity of the diversion program, but not exceeding
a period of two (2) years.
DISCERNMENT
Instances when the CICL may not be subjected

to Diversion measures
1. when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify for
diversion.
2. when the child, his/her parents or guardian does not agree
to diversion as specified in Sections 27 and 28; and
3. when considering the assessment and recommendation of
the social worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion
is not appropriate for the child in conflict with the law.
2. OVER 70 YEARS OF AGE
THE OFFENDER IS OVER SEVENTY (70) YEARS.

3. NO INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A
WRONG AS THAT COMMIT TED
That the offender had no intention to commit

so grave a wrong as that committed.
N O I N T E N T T O C O M M I T S O G RAV E A W R O N G A S T H AT C O M M I TT E D
PEOPLE VS. URAL
M A RC H 2 7 , 1 9 4 7
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed"
(Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts
that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only
to maltreat him may be because in his drunken condition he was
making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When Ural
realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed
Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic

aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial
court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the
N O I N T E N T T O C O M M I T S O G RAV E A W R O N G A S T H AT C O M M I TT E D
P E O P L E V. G O N Z A L E S ,
G . R . N O. 1 3 9 5 4 2 , 2 1 J U N E 2 0 0 1 , 3 5 9 S C R A 3 5 2
Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit.
This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable
disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a
wrong and the resulting crime committed.
The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the
crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack
employed and the injury sustained by the victim.
The appellant’s use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor
employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the
appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act.
• The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes
committed.
4. SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR
THREAT
That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the

offended party immediately preceded the act.
There are actually two circumstances here:

1. That sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the act.
2. That sufficient threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act.
4. SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR
THREAT
1st attack 2nd attack 3rd attack
Attacked Shot using

Shot using a
him using a gun
gun
a wood
ran away chased died
1. Self-defense on the part of the old man?

2. Mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense on part of the old man? If
no, what mitigating circumstances can he invoke?
3. What if the young man in the 3rd attack, fought back and killed the old man.
Can he claim self-defense?
4. In relation to question no. 3; can the young man invoke the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense?
S U F F I C I E N T P R OVO C AT I O N
P E O P L E V. PA G A L
L- 3 2 0 4 0 , 2 5 O C T O B E R 1 9 7 7 , 7 9 S C R A 5 7 0
Thirdly, the maltreatment that appellants claim the

victim to have committed against them occurred
much earlier than the date of the commission of the
crime.
Provocation in order to be a mitigating

circumstance must be sufficient and immediately
proceeding the act. We hold that the trial court did not
commit any error in not appreciating the said mitigating
circumstances in favor of the appellants.
S U F F I C I E N T P R OVO C AT I O N
U R B A N O V. PA G A L
G . R . N O. 1 8 2 7 5 0 , 2 0 J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 9
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential

element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act
and should immediately precede the act.
In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered
immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other
irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was
the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight. Petitioner’s unrebutted testimony on the
events immediately preceding the fisticuff and earlier dovetails with the testimony of
Salazar.
It is abundantly clear from the above transcript that the provocation came from Tomelden.
In fact, petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying
to avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when
petitioner’s lucky punch found its mark.
5. IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A
GRAVE OFFENSE
That the act was committed in immediate vindication of a grave offense to

the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives
by affinity within the same degree.
RELATIVES against whom a grave offense is committed
1. spouse,
2. ascendants,
3. descendants,
4. legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters,
5. relatives by affinity within the same degree
5. IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A
GRAVE OFFENSE
PROVOCATION OR THREATS VINDICATION

1. The provocation or threat must 1. The vindication may be
IMMEDIATELY precede the crime. “PROXIMATE” (allows a lapse of time
between the grave offense and the
vindication.
2. The provocation must be personal 2. The grave offense maybe
to the accused. committed even against the relatives
specified by the law.
3. The act that caused the 2. The act being vindicated should be
provocation does not have to be a a grave offense committed against
grave offense. the accuse himself or any of his
relatives specified by the law.
I M M E D I AT E V I N D I C AT I O N O F A G RAV E O F F E N S E
P E O P L E V. B E N I T O
L- 3 2 0 4 2 , 1 3 F E B R U A R Y 1 9 7 5 , 7 4 S C R A 2 7 1
OSG said that the defamatory remark was not specifically directed at Benito. SC said
that even assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, Benito "had
more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did
resent it.” The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo
against Benito and the assassination was more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his
serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his composure, he evolved the plan of
liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes
after the victim had left the office.
Benito did not act primarily to vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but
mainly to chastise Moncayo for having exposed the alleged anomalies or
defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately refusing to change his
report. Because according also to Benito’s testimony, he saw Moncayo three hours
later after the remark or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him
about his case and Moncayo said that he had already submitted his report and he
could not do anything more about Benito's case
I M M E D I AT E V I N D I C AT I O N O F A G RAV E O F F E N S E
B AC A B AC V. P E O P L E
G . R . N O. 1 4 9 3 7 2 , 1 1 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 7
As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate

vindication of a grave offense," it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be
credited, the act should be, following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to
the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters,
or relatives by affinity within the same degree." The offense committed
on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo
pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was hit at [his]
ear, not on [his] head." That act would certainly not be classified as "grave
offense." And Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity
"within the same degree" contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code.
6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have

produced passion or obfuscation.
Requisites:
1. An unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was
committed by the intended victim.
2. the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the
commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the
accused’s mind.
3. The passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a
spirit of lawlessness or revenge.
PA S S I O N O R O B F U S C AT I O N
U S V. H I C K S
SEPTEMBER 23, 1909
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no

mitigating circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in
paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason
and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense,
inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from
legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy,
and immoral passions.
US V DELA CRUZ
M A RC H 2 9 , 1 9 1 2
In the former case, the cause of the alleged "passion and obfuscation"
of the aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment and
deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to
continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect
right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that she had
elected to leave him and with her full knowledge to go and live with
another man.
In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted
and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was not that
the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in
flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in
the above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and
natural course of things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law
P E O P L E V S . G E L AV E R
G R N O. 9 5 3 5 7 , J U N 0 9 , 1 9 9 3
However, the trial court erred in finding the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation "as a result of his (appellant's) wife
leaving their home and their children." (Rollo, p. 28) Before this
circumstance may be taken into consideration, it is necessary to
establish the existence of an unlawful act sufficient to produce such
a condition of mind.
The act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the accused might have recovered his equanimity. (I Revised
Penal Code, Aquino, 1987 ed., p. 267)
The crime was committed almost a year after the victim had
abandoned the conjugal dwelling.
P E O P L E V S . B E L LO
G R N O. L- 1 8 7 9 2 , F E B 2 8 , 1 9 6 4
We are inclined to agree with the defense, having due regard to the circumstances
disclosed by the record. It will be recalled that the lower court found that the
accused had previously reproved the deceased for allowing herself to be
caressed by a stranger. Her loose conduct was forcibly driven home to the
accused by Marasigan's remark on the very day of the crime that the
accused was the husband "whose wife was being used by Maring for
purposes of prostitution", a remark that so deeply wounded the appellant's
feelings that he was driven to consume a large amount of wine (tuba)
before visiting Alicia (the deceased) to plead with her to leave her work.
Alicia's insulting refusal to renew her liaison with the accused, therefore, was not
motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life henceforth, but showed her
determination to pursue a lucrative profession that permitted her to distribute her
favors indiscriminately. We can not see how the accused's insistence that she
live with him again, and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, can be
properly qualified as arising from immoral and unworthy passions. Even
without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison appears morally of a
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his
agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
PERSON IN AUTHORITY
Any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of
some court or government corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barrio captain and barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection or
security of life and property, such as barrio captain, barrio councilman, barrio policeman
and barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed an. agent of a person in authority (ARTICLE 152, RPC. )
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may properly

be appreciated in favor of the accused when the following
requisites concur:
1. The offender has not actually been arrested;
2. The offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or an
agent of person in authority;
3. The surrender was voluntary.
4. The surrender must be unconditional; and
5. The surrender must be spontaneous
7. VOUNTARY CONFESSION
Requisites:
1. The offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
2. The confession of guilt was made in open court; and
3. The confession was made PRIOR to the presentation of evidence
for the prosecution.
Import or meaning of Plea of Guilt
Where the accused entered the plea of guilt in open court, he
admitted not only his guilt but also the material allegations in the
information and is precluded from showing he has not committed
them.
VO LU N TA RY S U R R E N D E R
PEOPLE VS. AMAGUIN
J U LY 1 0 , 1 9 9 4
Finally, we agree with accused-appellants' view that voluntary surrender

should be appreciated in their favor. While it may have taken both Willie
and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact is, they
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could
be effected. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance, the following elements must be present: (a) the offender has
not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. 28 All these requisites
appear to have attended their surrender.
VO LU N TA RY C O N F E S S I O N
PEOPLE VS. FRANCISCO
DECEMBER 29, 1936
On the other hand, the appellant's plea of guilty does not constitute a
mitigating circumstance under article 13, subsection 7, of the Revised Penal
Code, which requires that this plea be spontaneous and that it be made
prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution. The
confession of guilt, although subsequent to the consummation of the crime
and entirely alien to its development, constitutes a cause for the mitigation of
the penalty, not because it is a circumstance modifying criminal responsibility
already incurred and in the evolution of which it has not intervened
absolutely, but because, as an act of repentance and respect for the
law, it indicates a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his
reform. It is clear that these benefits are not deserved by the
accused who submits to the law only after the presentation of some
evidence for the prosecution, believing that in the end the trial will
result in his conviction by virtue thereof.
8. PHYSICAL DEFECTS
That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or

otherwise suffering some physical defect
which thus restricts his means of action,
defense, or communications with his fellow
beings.
9. ILLNESS THAT DIMINISHES WILL-
POWER
Such illness of the offender as would

diminish the exercise of the will-power
of the offender without however depriving
him of the consciousness of his acts.
10. SIMILAR OR ANALOGOUS
CIRCUMSTANCES
Examples:
1. Extreme poverty and necessity – for theft cases
2. Belief in witchcraft –murder/homicide/physical injury
cases
3. Outraged feeling of a creditor upon seeing a bad creditor
4. Restitution of the peculated funds in Malversation cases
– analogous to voluntary surrender
5. Accused who was 60 years old with failing eye sight –
analogous to Par.2 (over 70 years old)
A N A LO G O U S C I RC U M S TA N C E
C A N TA V S . P E O P L E
G . R. N O. 1 4 0 9 3 7 . F E B R U A RY 2 8 , 2 0 0 1
Accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous

to voluntary surrender.
The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements: (1) the offender has
not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the
latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. In the present case, petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint had
yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. It
has been repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must be an
intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an
intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require.
In petitioners case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre
Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus
saved them the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This
circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should
SPECIAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
OUTSIDE OF ARTICLE 13
1. Article 255 – Concealing the dishonor of the mother by the mother

herself or the maternal grandparents – mitigating circumstance
of Infanticide
2. Article 258 – Concealing the dishonor of the mother – mitigating
circumstance in the crime of Abortion
3. Article 268 paragraph 3 – Voluntary release within 3 days without
attaining the purpose and before criminal prosecution is instituted
against him – privileged mitigating circumstance in Slight
Illegal detention
4. Article 333 paragraph 3 - Abandonment of the wife by the husband
without justification – privileged mitigating circumstance in
Adultery.
ORDINARY PRIVILEGED
If there is an ordinary mitigating If the mitigating circumstance is privileged,
circumstance, the penalty is fixed it is better because, according to the law,
within the minimum period within the the penalty should be lowered by one or
same penalty. two degrees.
The presence of an ordinary (Now, if penalty is punishable by prision

mitigating circumstance will call for correccional, the privilege mitigating
the imposition of the penalty within circumstance will even lower the penalty
the minimum period of that particular not only to the minimum of prision
penalty. correccional, but to the penalty next lower
in degree, which under the scheme of
penalties is Arresto Mayor.)
An ordinary mitigating circumstance -A privilege mitigating circumstance

is offset by an aggravating cannot be cancelled or offset by an
circumstance. They eliminate each aggravating circumstance.
other.
ARTICLE 14
AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
ARTICLE 14
Article 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances:

1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.
2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities.
3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the
latter has not given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where
public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious
worship.
6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever
such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic
or other calamity or misfortune.
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
ARTICLE 14
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more
crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or international damage thereto,
derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation.
14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.
20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft,
airships, or other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438).
5 KINDS OF AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE
1. GENERIC - apply generally to all crimes

a) Taking advantage of public position (Article 14, par. 1)
b) Committing the crime in contempt of or with insult to public authorities (Article
14, Par, 2)
c) Committing the crime in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account if his rank, age or sex or that the crime be committed in the dwelling of
the offended party if the latter has not given provocation (Article 14, par. 3)
d) Committing the crime with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness
(Article 14, par. 4)
e) Committing the crime in the palace of the Chief Executive, in his presence ir
where public authorities are engaged in the discharged of their functions or in a
place dedicated to religious worship (Article 14, par.5)
CIRCUMSTANCE
1. GENERIC - apply generally to all crimes

f) Committing the crime at nighttime, in an uninhabited place or by a band
(Article 14, par. 6)
g) Recidivism (Article 14, par. 9)
h) Reiteration or habituality *Article 14, par. 10)
i) Employing craft, fraud or disguise (Article 14, par. 14)
j) Committing the crime after an unlawful entry (Article 14, par. 18)
k) Breaking a wall, floor, door or window (Article 14, par. 19)
l) Committing a crime with aid of persons under fifteen (15) years old or by
means of motor vehicle, airship or other similar means (Article 14, par, 20)
CIRCUMSTANCE
2. SPECFIC - apply only to particular crimes

a. Treachery (Article 14, par. 16)
b. Cruelty (Article 14, par. 21)
• ONLY in crimes against Persons
c. Ignominy (Article 14, par. 17
• Only in crimes against Chastity
CIRCUMSTANCE
3. QUALIFYING - Those that change the nature of the crime

a. Treachery (Article 14, par. 16)
• Qualifies Homicide to Murder
b. Abuse of confidence (Article 14, par. 4)
• Qualified the taking of personal property from Simple Theft to Qualified
Theft
c. Unlawful entry(Article 14, par. 18)
• Changes the taking of personal property from theft to robbery
CIRCUMSTANCE
4. INHERENT - those that already form part of the commission of a felony and
do NOT have the effect of increasing the penalty. (article 62, par. 2)
a. sex (Article 14, par. 3)
• Inherent in Rape and other crimes against chastity
b. Dwelling (Article 14, par. 3)
• Inherent in trespass to dwelling and violation of domicile
c. abuse of public position (Article 14, par. 1)
• Inherent in Malversation and robbery with use of force upon things
CIRCUMSTANCE
5. SPECIAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE - those that arise under special

conditions which increase the penalty to the maximum period without
however exceeding the penalty prescribed by law.
a. Use of an unlicensed firearm (RA No. 10591)
• Aggravating circumstance if the unlicensed firearm was used in the
commission of the crime.
b. Quasi-recidivism (Article 160 RPC)
A RT I C L E 1 4 A N D A RT I C L E 6 2
PEOPLE VS LEGASPI
G . R. N O. 1 3 6 1 6 4 ; A P R I L 2 0 , 2 0 0 1
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now
been formalized in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 now provide that:
SECTION 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is
no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
SECTION 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding
to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
PEOPLE VS LEGASPI
G . R. N O. 1 3 6 1 6 4 ; A P R I L 2 0 , 2 0 0 1
Sections 8 and 9 were discussed by this Court En Banc on June 20, 2000. According to the minutes
of said session:
Justice Puno then invited the attention of the Court to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110. He explained that the
proposal requiring the allegation of qualifying circumstances in the information reflects the recent
decisions of the Court, especially in heinous crimes. However, the Court concerned itself with the
proposed requirement of likewise alleging aggravating circumstances in the information. Justice
Panganiban raised the question of what to do with an aggravating circumstance which was
not alleged but was proved and not objected to during trial. Justice Melo answered that it
cannot be used to increase the penalty if it was not alleged even if proved. Justice Puno
explained that the proposal strengthens the right to due process of an accused, part of which
is to be shielded from surprises.
Chief Justice Davide and Justice Panganiban agreed and emphasized that the presence of aggravating
circumstances can make the difference between life and death where the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal maximum to death or reclusion perpetua to death.
Justice Panganiban added that the prosecutors will now be compelled to prepare well-worded
information.
To make sure that the circumstances that need to be alleged are not missed out in the information,
Justice Mendoza suggested that the Court can prescribe an updated form in the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS LEGASPI
G . R. N O. 1 3 6 1 6 4 ; A P R I L 2 0 , 2 0 0 1
Thus, the Rules now require qualifying as well as aggravating

circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the
Complaint or Information, otherwise the same will not be
considered by the court even if proved during the trial.
And this principle is applicable in all criminal cases, not only in cases were
the aggravating circumstance would increase the penalty to death. With
this, the Court gives fair warning to prosecutors that henceforth,
they must prepare well-crafted information that allege the
circumstances qualifying and aggravating the crimes charged,
otherwise the same will not be considered by the court in
determining the proper imposable penalty.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
GENERIC AGGRAVATING QUALIFYING

AGGRAVATING
1. INCREASES the penalty 1. CHANGES the nature of
to the maximum period the felony
2. maybe offset by an 2. CANNOT be offset by an

ordinary mitigating ordinary mitigating
circumstance circumstance
1. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC
POSITION
That advantage be taken by the offender of his public

position.
1. Must be a public official; and

2. Use of influence, prestige or ascendency which his office
gives him as a means by which he realized his purpose.
* Did the accused ABUSE his office in order to commit the

crime?
TA K I N G A DVA N TAG E O F P U B L I C P O S I T I O N
P E O P L E V S C A PA L A C
G . R. N O. L 3 8 2 9 7 ; O C T O B E R 2 3 , 1 9 8 2
The mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a member of the

police force certainly did not of itself justify that the
aggravating circumstance of advantage being taken by the
offender of his public position be considered as present. He
acted like a brother, instinctively reacting to what was
undoubtedly a vicious assault on his kin that could
cause the death of a loved one. It would be an affront to
reason to state that at a time like that and reacting as he did,
he purposely relied on his being a policeman to commit the act.
He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his
pistol with him. It came in handy and he acted
accordingly. That he was a policeman is of no relevance
TA K I N G A DVA N TAG E O F P U B L I C P O S I T I O N
P E O P L E V S C G A PA S I N
G . R. N O. 7 3 4 8 9 ; A P R I L 2 5 , 1 9 9 4
The trial court properly appreciated taking

advantage of public position as an
aggravating circumstance. Appellant, a
member of the Philippine Constabulary,
committed the crime with an armalite
which was issued to him when he
received the mission order (People v.
Madrid, 88 Phil. 1 [1951])
2. CONTEMPT OR INSULT TO PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES
That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to

the public authorities.
Requisites:
1. the public authority must be engaged in the
performance of his official duty;
2. The public authority must not be the person against
whom the crime is committed;
3. The offender knows him to be a public authority
C O N T E M P T O R I N S U LT T O P U B L I C A U T H O R I T I E S
PEOPLE VS TIONGSON
G . R. N O. L- 3 5 1 2 3 - 2 4 ; J U LY 2 5 , 1 9 8 4
The aggravating circumstance that the crimes were committed in

contempt of or with insult to the public authorities cannot also be
appreciated since Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela were the
very ones against whom the crime were committed.
Besides, Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela are not persons in authority,
but merely agents of a person in authority.
PEOPLE VS MAGDUENO
G . R. N O. L- 6 8 6 9 9 ; S E P T E M B E R 2 2 , 1 9 8 6
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with

insult to public authority does not seem to be borne by the records. For
this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only
be shown that the crime was not committed in the presence of
the public authority but also that the crime was not committed
against the public authority himself. (U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150;
People v. Rizal, 103 SCRA 282). In the instant case Fiscal Dilig, the
public authority involved in the crime, was the victim. Hence, the
lower court, erred in including commission of the crime with
insult to public authority as an aggravating circumstance.
P E O P L E V S TA C - A N
G . R. N O. 7 6 3 3 8 - 3 9 ; F E B R U A RY 2 6 , 1 9 9 0
We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978 and
Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. — Who shall be deemed as such. — In applying the provisions of the
preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a
public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or
professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon
a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or
the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code.
In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the
Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc."
is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach
and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words
used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a
teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a
"public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, .
3. DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, SEX OR
DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended
party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling
of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.
Requisites:
1. Offender is either a woman, a person of a higher rank or older than the offended
party;
2. In the commission of the crime, the offender DELIBERATELY INTENDED to offend or
insult the sex, rank, or age of the offended party.
3. Applies only crimes against PERSON OR HONOR
NOTE: (El Pueblo de Filipinas vs. Santos; May 21, 1952)
these circumstances may be considered SEPARATELY against the offender if they
concur in the same case and their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist
INDEPENDENTLY, revealing a greater degree of perversity.
DWELLING - the place of abode, where the offended party resides and
which satisfies the requirements of his domestic life.
REASON: Sanctity of privacy the law accords to a human abode.
REQUISITES:
1. the crime must be committed in the dwelling of the offended party;
2. The offended party has not given provocation;
3. There must be specific evidence to show that the offender
INTENTIONALLY and DELIBERATELY disregarded the respect the law
accords to another’s dwelling.
DWELLING is not aggravating when it is an ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A FELONY or is

INHERENT in the commission of such a felony, such as:
1. Violation of Domicile (ART. 128)
2. Trespass to Dwelling (ART. 280)
3. Robbery in an INHABITED HOUSE (ART. 299)
EXAMPLES of INSTANCES when Dwelling was not considered as an aggravating
circumstance;
4. When the crime was committed through negligence or carelessness
5. When the sufficient provocation immediately preceded the act;
6. When the crime was committed out of passion or obfuscation;
7. When the crime was committed at the spur of the moment; and
8. When there was merely an accidental encounter between the accused and the victim.
D I S R E G A R D O F R E S P E C T D U E T O AG E
PEOPLE VS DIAZ
G . R. N O. L- 2 4 0 0 2 ; JA N U A RY 2 1 , 1 9 7 4
But it was unlikely in this case that Tadia, a sexagenarian

grandfather, would have gone to the extent of assaulting the
twenty-four year old Francisco Diaz who was armed with a gun
and a bolo, just because the latter refused to give him a pig.
The circumstance of old age cannot be considered

aggravating. There was no evidence that the accused
deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim.
That circumstance may be absorbed in treachery (People
v. Gervacio, L-21565, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 960; People v.
Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People v. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35, 44).
DISREGARD OF RESPECT DUE TO DWELLING
PEOPLE VS ARIZOBAL
G . R . N O. 1 3 5 0 5 1 - 5 2 , ; D E C E M B E R 1 4 , 2 0 0 0
The trial court is correct in appreciating dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.

Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be
committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an
inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors thereof can
commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent
disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their
way in, looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into
submission, disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before
dragging them out of the house to be killed.
But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The accused stand
charged with, tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex
crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and
not against persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the latter
being the main purpose and object of the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be
validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of The Revised
Penal Code
PEOPLE VS DANIEL
G . R. N O. L- 4 0 3 3 0 N OV E M B E R 2 0 , 1 9 7 8
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with

the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating circumstance
of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party.
Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a
boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and
purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article
14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the
law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or
dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the
place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to
protect and uphold.
PEOPLE VS APDUHAN JR.
G . R. N O. L- 1 9 4 9 1 A P R I L 3 0 , 1 9 6 8
The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or

intimidation of persons, like the offense at bar. The rationale behind
this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be
committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of
the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be committed
in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass and
robbery in an inhabited house. This Court in People vs. Pinca, 16 citing
People vs. Valdez, 17 ruled that the "circumstances (of dwelling and
scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime committed,
because, the crime being robbery with violence or intimidation
against persons (specifically, robbery with homicide) the authors
thereof could have committed it without the necessity of violating
or scaling the domicile of their victim." Cuello Calon opines that the
commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in
the accused and produces greater alarm.
4. ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR
OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS
That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious

ungratefulness.
2 aggravating circumstances:
1. Abuse of Confidence
• The offended party trusted the offender
• The offender ABUSED such trust by committing the crime against the
offended party
• The abuse of confidence FACILITATED the commission of the crime, the
culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former
would not abuse such confidence.
2. Obvious Ungratefulness
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
PEOPLE VS MANDOLADO
L- 5 1 3 0 4 - 0 5 , 2 8 J U N E 1 9 8 3
In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that

"there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one
against whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such a
relationship to commit the crime." (People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155, 172). It is also
essential that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as
would give that accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the crime; that
such confidence was a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking
advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence
(People vs. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534).
In the instant case, there is absolutely no showing of any personal or immediate
relationship upon which confidence might rest between the victims and the
assailants who had just met each other then. Consequently, no confidence and
abuse thereof could have facilitated the crimes.
Similarly, there could have been no obvious ungratefulness in the commission of
the crime for the simple reason that the requisite trust of the victims upon the
accused prior to the criminal act and the breach thereof as contemplated under
Article 14, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code are manifestly lacking or non-existent.
In all likelihood, the accused Army men in their uniforms and holding their high-
5. PLACE WHERE THE CRIME WAS
COMMIT TED
That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or
where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place
dedicated to religious worship.
PALACE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE - official residence and place work of the President.
President need not be inside the palace
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE FOLLOWING:
1. crime committed through Negligence or carelessness
2. Sufficient provocation immediately preceded the crime
3. When the crime was committed in a fit of passion or obfuscation on the part of the accused
REASON: Specific evidence must be shown that the accused DELIBERATELY DISREGARDED the
respect due to the palace.
COMMIT TED
That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in

his presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge
of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
PLACE WHERE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES ARE ENGAGED IN THE

DISCHARGED OF THEIR DUTIES – not necessary that public authorities
were actually in the performance of their official functions at the time
of the commission of the felony. It is enough that it was committed in
the place where public authorities perform their official functions.
COMMIT TED
That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in

his presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge
of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
PLACE DEDICATED FOR WORSHIP– not required that there be a a

religious minister or ceremony transpiring in a place dedicated to
religious worship. It is enough that the crime was committed in a place
dedicated to religious worship, because the place deserves to be
respected.
6. NIGHT TIME, UNINHABITED PLACE
OR BAND
That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place,

or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the
commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in
the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by
a band.
REQUISITES:
1. When it facilitated the commission of the crime
2. When it is especially sought for by the accused to ensure the commission
of the crime .
3. When the offender took advantage of nigh time, uninhabited place or
band for purposes of impunity.
OR BAND
NIGHT TIME – that period of DARKNESS beginning the end of dusk and
ending at dawn. SUNSET to SUNRISE.
GENERAL RULE: the mere fact that it was committed at NIGHT will not
suffice to sustain a finding of NOCTURNITY. By and of itself, NIGHTTIME
is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes so only when:
1. It is especially sought by the offender;
2. It was taken advantage of by him;
3. It facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender’s
immunity from capture.
OR BAND
2 tests in determining NOCTURNITY:
1. OBJECTIVE TEST - night is aggravating because the DARKNESS

facilitated the commission of the offense.
2. SUBJECTIVE TEST – night is aggravating because the DARKNESS was

purposely sought by the offender.
NOTE: TREACHERY absorbs NOCTURNITY

OR BAND
UNINHABITED PLACE – a place where there are no houses at all. A place
at a considerable distance from the town, or where the houses are
scattered at a great distance from each other.
CRITERIA:
the uninhibitedness of a place is not determined by the distance of the
nearest house to the scene of the crime BUT whether or not in the place
of the commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim
receiving some help.
NOTE: the uninhabited place must have been DELIBERATELY SELECTED

/SOUGHT by the offender to perpetrate the crime.
6 . N I GH T T IM E , U N IN H A B IT E D PL A C E O R
BA N D
Band – when more than three armed malefactors shall have acted
together in the commission of an offense.
ARMS – may include, guns, revolvers, bolos, daggers, swords, rifles,

stones and other deadly weapons.
NOTE:
1. Band is absorbed by “Abuse of Superior Strength”.
2. Band is inherent in Brigandage and Robbery in a band. (Art. 306
RPC)
N I G H TT I M E
PEOPLE VS GARCIA
G . R. N O. L- 3 0 4 4 9 ; O C T O B E R 3 1 , 1 9 7 9
The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was
committed at night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil Code,
Article 13. Is this basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal Code, Article
14, provides that it is an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the
nighttime, whenever nocturnity may facilitate the commission of the offense.
There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which
nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective
test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender.
These two tests should be applied in the alternative.
In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the
accused purposely sought the cover of night time. Next, we proceed and apply the objective
test, to determine whether nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were
engaged in a drinking spree, in the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven
others. The criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover,
which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading
the malefactors that it would be difficult to determine their Identity because of the
darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets. There circumstances combine
to pass the objective test, and find that nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated
the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those with the lust to kill to follow
N I G H TT I M E
P E O P L E V S R O D A S E T. A L .
G . R. N O. 7 5 8 8 1 ; A U G U S T 2 8 , 2 0 0 7
The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be considered against

appellants. This circumstance is considered aggravating only when it
facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken
advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of
this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and
not merely the chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the
offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying
factor when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer
insure the offender’s immunity from identification or capture. In the
instant case, the prosecution failed to show that nighttime
facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought
or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity.
The crime scene was sufficiently lighted by a Petromax which led
to the identification of all the accused.
UNINHABITED; BAND
PEOPLE VS DAMASCO
G . R. N O. L- 3 0 1 1 6 ; N OV E M B E R 2 0 , 1 9 7 8
The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors act together
in the commission of an offense. Counsel concedes that at least three of the accused-appellants, namely
Eugenio, Alviar, and Gregorio, ,were armed during the commission of the crime. He doubts, however,
whether accused Damaso carried any weapon and whether the "two stones" carried by accused Espejo fall
under the category of "arms." But even granting that Espejo's stones do not constitute arms, the
prosecution presented the following evidence to show that Damaso was also armed and, as
such, there were more than three of the accused who were armed:
(1) that extrajudicial confession of Damaso himself (Exhibit "P") that he was carrying a caliber .22 paltik
revolver;
(2) the sworn statement of accused Eugenio (Exhibit "O") that Damaso had a caliber .22 paltik revolver;
(3) the separate written confessions of Alviar, Gregorio and Espejo (Exhibits R, Q, and "N") that Damaso
had a caliber .30 Springfield rifle; and
(4) the testimonies of Donata Rebolledo and Victoriano de la Cruz that both men who entered their house
(one of whom they later Identified as Damaso) were carrying firearms.
It is clear from the above, that Damaso was armed during the night of the commission of the
crime, and it is immaterial what kind of firearm he carried, the only important thing being that
he was armed. In this case, the presence of an armed band is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code inasmuch as the crime
committed was that provided for and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 1 and not under Article 295,
UNINHABITED; BAND
PEOPLE VS DAMASCO
G . R. N O. L- 3 0 1 1 6 ; N OV E M B E R 2 0 , 1 9 7 8
Anent the circumstances of uninhabited place, counsel disclaims its existence by pointing to the
proximity of the sugarcane field where the victims were killed to the national highway as well as to
certain houses in the barrio. The uninhibitedness of a place is determined not by the
distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place
of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. 8
Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the field was
tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable
possibility for the victims to receive any assistance.
That the accused deliberately sought the solitude of the place is clearly shown by the fact that they
brought the victims to the sugarcane field although they could have disposed of them
right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were found.
Thus, in People v. Saguing, the Court considered the crime as having been committed in an
uninhabited place because the killing was done in a secluded place at the foot of a hill, forested, and
uninhabited. 9
The trial court considered separately the three circumstances of armed band, treachery and
uninhabited place where under other situations one may be considered absorbed or inherent in the
other. There is ample justification for this. The elements of each circumstance subsist independently
and can be distinctly perceived thereby revealing a greater degree of perversity on the part of the
accused
7. C A LA MI T Y OR OT H E R MI SF ORT U N E
That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration,

shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
NOTE:
It is not enough that the offender committed the crime on the occasion
of “a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or
misfortune” for it to be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
There should be specific facts and circumstances to show that
the accused DELIBERATELY sought any of these occasions in
order to facilitate the commission of the crime or intentionally
take advantage of any of these occasions in committing the
crime.
8. AID OF ARMED MEN
That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or

persons who insure or afford impunity.
AID OF ARMED MEN BAND
1. it is enough that there are at least 1. There should be at least four
2 persons who are armed persons who are armed
2. Actual aid of armed men is not 2. At least four armed men should
necessary. Psychological reliance on have acted together in the
the aide of armed men is sufficient commission of the crime.
3. This is a Qualifying Aggravating 3. this is a generic aggravating
Circumstance circumstance
NOTE: Aid of armed men is ABSORBED

in BAND
9. R E C ID I V IS M
That the accused is a recidivist.

Recidivist - one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of this Code.
EX.
previously convicted for Robbery with homicide
while incarcerated committed Homicide
RECIVIDIVIST?
Robbery with Homicide – Title X RPC (Crimes against Property)
Homicide – Title VIII RPC (Crimes against Persons)
F O U R T Y PE S O F C R IM IN A L R E P E T IT IO N
Four types of criminal repetition in the Penal Code:
1.Recidivism - (Art. 14 par. 9)

2.Habituality or Reiteracion - (Art. 14 par. 10)
3. Habitual Delinquency or Multi-Recidivism - (Art. 62
par. 5)
4.Quasi-Recidivism - (Art. 160 RPC)
RECIDIVISM
PEOPLE VS BALDERA
G . R. N O. L- 2 3 9 0 ; A P R I L 2 4 , 1 9 5 0
The lower court did, however, err in appreciating against the

accused the circumstance of recidivism by reason of his previous
conviction for theft, it appearing that crime was committed
on or about December 30, 1947 (Exhibit E) while the
offense now charged took place seven days before that
date.
10 . R E IT ER AC I ON OR H A B IT UA LI T Y
That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or
greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
3 situations:
1.At the time of his trial for a crime, the accused has been previously PUNISHED for an offense
to which the law attaches an equal penalty.
EX.
YEAR 2000 X convicted for Estafa (Art. 315 par. 3 RPC)
PENALTY: Arresto mayor in its maximum period to Prision Correccional in its minimum period (4 months and 1
day to 2 years and 4 months)
YEAR 2005. After serving his sentence X committed and was tried for the crime of Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 263
par. 4)
PENALTY: Arresto mayor in its maximum period to Prision Correccional in its minimum period (4 months and 1
day to 2 years and 4 months)
NOTE: for X’s conviction for Serious Physical Injuries the aggravating circumstance of REITERCION will be considered because
at the time of his trial for the 2 nd time, he was PREVIOUSLY PUNSHED for a crime to which the law attaches an equal penalty.
3 situations:
2. At the time of his trial for a crime, the accused has been previously PUNISHED for an
offense to which the law attaches a greater penalty.
EX.
YEAR 2000 Y convicted for Simple Theft (Art. 309 RPC)
PENALTY: Prision Correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 year, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years )
YEAR 2005. After serving his sentence Y committed and was tried for the crime of Grave Coercion (Art.286 RPC)
PENALTY: Arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Php 500.00 (1 month and 1 day to 6 months )
NOTE: for Y’s conviction for Grave Coercion, the aggravating circumstance of REITERCION will be considered because at the
time of his trial for the 2 nd time, he was PREVIOUSLY PUNSHED for a crime to which the law attaches a greater penalty.
3 situations:
3. At the time of his trial for a crime, the accused has been previously PUNISHED for an
offense to which the law attaches a lighter penalty.
EX.
YEAR 2000 Z convicted for Simple Theft (Art. 309 RPC)
PENALTY: Prision Correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 year, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years )
YEAR 2002 After serving his sentence Z was convicted for the crime of Grave Coercion (Art.286 RPC)
PENALTY: Arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Php 500.00 (1 month and 1 day to 6 months )
YEAR 2010 After serving his sentence Z committed and was tried for the crime of Murder (Art. 248 RPC)
PENALTY: Reclusion Perpetua
NOTE: for Z’s conviction for Murder, the aggravating circumstance of REITERCION will be considered because at the time of his
trial for the 3nd time, he was PREVIOUSLY PUNSHED for two crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties.
9. RE I T E R AC I ON O R H A B IT UA L IT Y
REITERACION RECIDIVISM
1. It is not necessary that the 1. The previous and subsequent
felonies be embraced in the same convictions must be for felonies
title of the Revised Penal Code embraced in the same title of the
Revised Penal Code
2. Final conviction for the previous 2. It is enough that there is a final
crime is not enough. The accused judgment of conviction for a
must have SRERVED the sentence. previous felony. Service of
Sentence is not necessary.
3. There must be 2 or more previous 3. One previous final judgment of
convictions and punishments conviction is sufficient provided
provided that these previous that the previous and subsequent
convictions and punishments are convictions are for felonies
for crimes to which the law embraced in the same title of the
attaches a lighter penalty. Revised Penal Code
H A BI TUA L D EL IN Q U E N C Y (A RT IC LE 62 , PAR .
5)
Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:

(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which
he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be
found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period.
HABITUAL DELINQUENCY - if within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of :
1. Serious or Less Serious Physical Injuries
2.Theft
3.Robbery
4.Homicide
5.Estafa; or
6.Falsification
He is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or often.
H A BI TUA L D EL IN Q U E N C Y (A RT IC LE 62 , PAR .
5)
ELEMENTS:
1. there must be a third conviction;

2. the crime committed by the offender for the 3rd, 4th, or 5th times
should be among those mentioned in Article 62, like serious
physical injuries, less serious physical injuries, theft, robbery, Estafa
an falsification;
3. there must be a time gap of not more than ten years between
convictions.
HABITUAL DELINQUENCY
(ARTICLE 62, PAR. 5)
RECIDIVISM HABITUAL DELIQUENCY
Recidivism is broader. Any two offenses, But to be a habitual delinquent, the crimes
all that are necessary is for the two offenses are more specific. These are all limited to
committed before and now are embraced in those mentioned in Article 62.
the same title of the Penal Code.
The second conviction is sufficient to There must at least a third conviction.
make a person a recidivist.
There is no time limitation between the The time gap between the previous
prior conviction and the present conviction and present should not be more
conviction. It could be twenty years ago. than 10 years.
This simply maximizes the principal This cause for the imposition of a separate
penalty for the new crime. and distinct additional penalty.
HABITUAL DELINQUENT
PEOPLE VS MELENDREZ
G . R. N O. 3 9 9 1 3 . D E C E M B E R 1 9 , 1 9 3 3
On the other hand, the fiscal contends that the aggravating circumstance
of recidivism should be taken into account against the appellant. This claim
of the fiscal is in accordance with the judgment rendered by this court in
banc in the case of People v. Aguinaldo (47 Phil., 728) while the old Penal
Code was in force. But the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code has
resulted in a difference of opinion regarding this point on the part of the
members of this court. For this reason, after reviewing all the decisions
affecting this matter, rendered by this court both in banc and in division, it
is now held that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should
be taken into account in imposing the principal penalty in its
corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant is also sentenced to suffer an additional penalty as a
habitual delinquent.
Q UA SI -R E C I VI D ISM (A RT I C LE 1 60)
Article 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed

for another offense; Penalty. - Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any
person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving
the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal,
shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served
out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching the said
age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be
worthy of such clemency.
11 . PR I C E, R E WA RD O R P R OMI SE
That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward,

or promise.
NOTE:
Price, reward or promise MUST be the sole motivating factor

in the commission of the crime, without which the crime would
have not been committed.
12 . IN U N D AT IO N , F I R E , PO ISO N , E TC .
That the crime be committed by means of

inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a
vessel or intentional damage thereto, derailment
of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice
involving great waste and ruin.
Paragraph 7 Paragraph 12
This refers to the occasion of a This refers to the MEANS
calamity or misfortune WHEN employed in the commission of
THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED the crime.
13 . E V ID E N T PR EM E D ITAT IO N
That the act be committed with evidence premeditation.
REQUISITES:
1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination;
3. A sufficient interval of time between the determination and the
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome
the resolution of his will.
13 . E V ID E N T PR EM E D ITAT IO N
EXAMPLE:
June 10, 2019 – “A” threatened “B”, that he will kill him.
June 15, 2019 – “A” was seen sharpening his bolo and was also seen loitering around the
house of “B”
June 20, 2019 – “A” went to the house of “B” and stabbed him using a bolo, causing “B”
death
REQUISITE No. 1 - It was on June 10, 2019 when “A” verbalized his intent to commit a
crime (Kill B);
REQUISITE No. 2 - “A” clung to his determination to kill when he was seen sharpening his
bolo and loitering around the house of B
REQUISITE No. 3 - June10, 2019 to June 10, 2019 – 10 days sufficient time lapse
E V I D E N T P R E M E D I TAT I O N
PEOPLE VS MANALINDE
G . R. L- N O. 5 2 9 2 ; A U G U S T 2 8 , 1 9 0 9
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the
order and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered
and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the
acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to
that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on
a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate
persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did
there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed.
Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise,
premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and
there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not necessarily be
considered as included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was made,
for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the
other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by
means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a
persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally
agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the
crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.
P E O P L E V S I L A OA
G . R. N O. 9 4 3 0 8 ; J U N E 1 6 , 1 9 9 4
Despite the foregoing, however, we hold appellant liable only for homicide, not
murder, on the ground that the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
information, namely, abuse of superior strength, cruelty and evident
premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be appreciated against appellant.
Evident premeditation cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in the

records to show that appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill
Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show that such killing was the result of
meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the evidence
tends to show that the series of circumstances which culminated in the
killing constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no interval of time
separating them for calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying
circumstance, Ruben Ilaoa should only be held liable for homicide.
P E O P L E V S B I B AT
G . R. N O. 1 2 4 3 1 9 ; M AY 1 3 , 1 9 9 8
Besides, even without the testimony of Rogelio Robles, the presence of the first requisite
of evident premeditation appears to have been thoroughly and sufficiently
established.
The determination or conception of the plan to kill the victim could be deduced from
the outward circumstances that happened on the fateful day of October 14, 1992.
Records show that at 11:30 in the morning of October 14, 1992, prosecution witness Nona
Cinco saw the accused with some companions at Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the
plan to kill someone. Another prosecution witness, Florencio Castro, who works at the Funeraria
Gloria also saw the group of Gari Bibat in the said place. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Nona
Cinco saw the appellant for the second time. She saw the appellant hurry towards the victim,
take a pointed thing from a notebook and with the use of such weapon, stabbed the victim on
the chest. These overt acts clearly evinced that the appellant clung to his resolution
to kill the victim.
From the time Nona Cinco heard the plan to kill someone at 11:30 up to the killing incident at
1:30 in the afternoon of the same day, there was a sufficient lapse of time for appellant
to reflect on the consequences of his dastardly act.
As held in the case of People v. Dumdum20 the killing of the deceased was aggravated by
evident premeditation, because the accused conceived of the assault at least one hour before
1 4. C R A F T, F R AU D , D IS GU I SE
That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.
CRAFT – cunning or trickery, resorted to by the accused to aid the execution of

his criminal design.
FRAUD – constitutes deceit and is manifested by insidious word and

machinations.
DISGUISE – one uses some device to prevent recognition
NOTE: Craft, Fraud, or Disguise is ABSORBED in Treachery

C RA FT , F RA U D , D I S G U I S E
P E O P L E V S E M PA C I S
G . R. N O. 9 5 7 5 6 M AY 1 4 , 1 9 9 3
The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud was properly appreciated against Empacis.

He and Romualdo pretended to be bona fide customers of the victim's store and
on his pretext gained entry into the latter's store and later, into another part of
his dwelling. This Court has held stratagems and ruses of this sort to constitute the
aggravating circumstance of fraud or craft, e.g: where the accused —
a) pretended to be constabulary soldiers and by that ploy gained entry into the residence of
their prey whom they thereafter robbed and killed;
b) pretended to be needful of medical treatment, and through this artifice, entered the house of
the victim whom they thereupon robbed and killed;
c) pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way and by this means gained entry into a
house, in which they then perpetrated the crime of robbery with homicide;
d) pretended to be customer wanting to buy a bottle of wine;
e) pretended to be co-passengers of the victim in a public utility vehicle;
f) posed as customers wishing to buy cigarettes; and as being thristy, asking for drink of water.
•
1 5. TA K IN G A DVA N TAG E OF SU P E R IO R
S T RE N GT H
That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH – present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH depends on several factors, such as:

1. age
2. size
3. sex
4. Built
5. Weapon
6. Number
7. Strength of the parties
8. Simultaneousness of the attack
9. Others
TREACHERY ABSORBS ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
1 5. TA K IN G A DVA N TAG E OF SU P E R IO R
S T RE N GT H
BAND Abuse of superior strength

1. the offense is committed by 1. the offense is committed by the
MORE THAN 3 armed malefactors culprits taking advantage of their
REGARDLESS of the comparative collective strength to overpower
strength of the victim/victims their relatively WEAKER
victim/victims
2. The indispensable component of 2. The gravamen of the abuse of
“cuadrilla” are: superiority is the taking
a. At least 4 malefactors; advantage by the culprits of their
b. All of the 4 malefactors are COLLECTIVE STRENGTH to
ARMED overpower their relatively weaker
victims.
What is taken into account is the NOT

the number of aggressors nor the
fact that they are ARMED, BUT their
relative physical might vis-à-vis the
offended party.
A B U S E O F S U P E R I O R S T R E N GT H
PEOPLE VS BIGCAS
G . R. N O. 9 4 5 3 4 J U LY 2 , 1 9 9 2
For this qualifying circumstance to be considered, it is not sufficient that there

be superiority in number or strength; it is necessary that the accused
must have cooperated and intended to use or secure advantage from
such superior strength. 24
As we also emphasized in People vs. Cabiling, 25 abuse of superior strength
may be considered not only when there is an inequality of force between
the victim and the aggressor but there must be a situation of superiority
of strength notoriously selected or taken advantage of by him in the
We find that the prosecution has fallen short of proof that appellants had
specifically contrived or deliberately intended and prepared to take advantage of
superior strength in a projected assault against the victim. This requisite cannot
be drawn from mere assumptions or conjectures, for qualifying circumstances
must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. 26
1 5. M EA N S TO W EA KE N T H E D E FE N SE
That advantage be taken of superior strength, or

means be employed to weaken the defense.
Treachery ABSORBS “means employed to weaken the

defense”.
1 6. T R E AC H E RY
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
TESTS TO DETERMINE WHTHER TREACHERY IS PRESENT:
1. Was the attack sudden and unexpected?
2. Was the accused given an opportunity to defend himself, to
retaliate, to repel the attack or to escape?
3. Was the MODE OF ATTACK, consciously adopted by the accused
to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to himself?
TREACHERY CANNOT BE APPRECIATED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ATTACK WAS SUDDEN AND
UNEXPECED , IF:
1. the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was done impulsively.
(People vs. Rivera; September 3, 1998)
2. the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim’s helpless position was accidental. (People
vs. Vilbar; February 1, 2012)
3. The attack appeared to have ben impulsively done, a spur of the moment act in the heat of anger
or extreme annoyance. (People vs. Vilbar; February 1, 2012)
4. It does not appear that the aggressor consciously adapted such mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself; accused did not make any preparation before the
killing. . (People vs. Rivera; September 3, 1998)
5. The encounter between the accused and the victim was a chance encounter and the accused’s
gun was in the glove compartment of his car before he left the house (People vs. Gonzales; June
21, 2001)
6. The attack was preceded by a quarrel and a heated discussion. (People vs. Zeta; May 9, 2002)
7. The victim was already aware of the accused’s hostile attitude towards him even before the
attack; hence, he was already forewarned of the impending danger to his life. (People vs.
Cabacan; August 22, 2002)
NOTE:
1. NO TREACHERY WHEN THE VICTIM HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO COUNTER OR EVADE THE ATTCK OR
TO ESCAPE
EX. People vs. Flores; February 29, 1972
The accused made his known BEFORE the stabbing. He uttered some kind of a WARNING, and then directed his fist
blow not at the homicide victim but at another person. The deceased was therefore neither caught by surprise nor
totally unprepared when he received the wound in the right abdominal region.
2. THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM MAY HAVE BEEN FOREWARNED OF HIS PERIL DOES NOT EXCLUDE
TREACHERY. WHAT IS DECISIVE IS THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR
THE VICTIM TO DEFEND HIMSELF OR RETALIATE.
EX. People vs. Landicho; July 3, 1996
The MURDER VICTIM seemed to have expected trouble, considering that upon seeing the 2 accused approaching
him, he told his companion to move away. Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated for even when the victim
was warned of danger to his person, what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The evidence CLEARY BEARS this out. The victim was UNARMED and the
accused gave no warning. The victim then totally UNPREPARED to even guess that the accused would pepper him
with bullets.
NOTE:
3. When the attack is continuous and uninterrupted, treachery, to be

considered aggravating, must be present at the inception or
commencement of the attack.
EX. People vs. Zeta; May 9, 2002
Treachery must be present at the inception of the attack. If absent and the
attack is continuous, treachery, even if present at a subsequent stage, is not to
be considered. That the final blows may have in truth been delivered under
conditions exhibiting some features of treachery does not remedy the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove the existence of treachery at the ONSET of the
attack. In the absence of qualifying circumstance of treachery, the accused’s
conviction must be modified so that he is found guilty not of Murder but only of
Homicide.
NOTE:
4. Treachery is not present at the commencement of the attack that is continuous and
uninterrupted.
EX. People vs. Artajo; November 14, 2012
In a prosecution for Homicide, Dolor’s testimony contains nothing that hints upon treachery being
employed. She did not see how the attack began. As she went outside and looked, accused Joel was
already attacking her father. Quite cyriously, what she further saw was that he father was trying to
”fight back”, nit just trying to parry Joel’s blows indicating that the latter had not employed means that
eliminate any risk to him arising from the defense which Clarence might make. If he employed
treachery, Joel could very well have aimed his fist blow to immediately disable Clarence. On the other
hand, a neighbor testified that he saw Clarence and Joel come out of the back door of the house
together. Clearly them Joel did not lie in ambush. Since theycame out together, Clarence must have
perceived the attack for he even tried to keep his grip on his assailant after it started. Joel did not
purposely stab Clarence on the back. The neighbor testified that it was only when Clarence fell to the
ground flat on his face that Joel sat astride on him and stabbed him on the back. Those back wounds
were not treacherously delivered at the beginning with the victim having no premonition of their
coming.
NOTE:
5. Treachery may be considered against the accused when the same is present
at the beginning of the attack.
EX. People vs. Dolorido; January 20, 2011
The accused hid behind a coconut tree and when the victim passed by the tree, completely
unaware of any danger, the accused immediately hacked him with a bolo. The victim could
only attempt to parry the blows with his bare hands and as a result, he got wounded. When
the deceased tried to retreat, stumbling in the process, the accused even took advantage
of this and stabbed him resulting in his death. Evidently, the means employed by the
accused assured himself of no risk at all arising from the defense which the deceased
might make. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim
was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. Without a doubt, treachery attended the
Murder.
1 6 . T R E AC H E RY
NOTE:
6. There is treachery in a frontal attack when the same is sudden and unexpected
and the victim was not given a chance to defend himself, repel the attack,
retaliate or evade the attack
EX. People vs. Escleto; April 25, 2012
The victim alighted from his carabao and even waited for a while for the assailant to come
down the balcony, ready for a handshake. He was walking to meet the accused, expecting
that they would not talk. He was surprised that the handshake was in the form of a knife
being plunged towards his chest that he could not even block the blow or dodge it. He just
stood there in surprise as the assailant suddenly hacked him. The deceased was unarmed
while the accused had a knife. Even though the attack on the victim was frontal, the same
was so sudden and unexpected. He was completely unaware of the imminent peril to his life.
The victim was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself and repel the attack . The victim
was not even anle to offer any form of resistance. He never saw it coming that he would be
stabbed. Treachery qualified the crime to Murder.
NOTE:
7. The fact that the accused fired his gun from behind the victim does
not by itself amount to treachery
EX. People vs. Gonzales; June 21, 2001
The fact that the accused fired his gun from behind the homicide victim does not
by itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the accused
deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him
when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that the position of
the accused’s car was not of his own doing but it became so when the victim
overtook his car and cut off his path.
NOTE:
8. Attacking a child o f tender years constitutes treachery.
EX. People vs. Sanchez; June 29, 2010
A mother turned her 11-year-old son upside down only to discover that he was
bathed in blood. The son weakly uttered “Mama, si kuya Albert sinaksak ako”. At
this point, the accused ran outside the room. There is treachery when an adult
person attacks and causes the death of a child of tender years. As the Supreme
Court elucidated in People vs. Cabarrubias “the killing of a child is characterized
by treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For, the weakness of
the victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the
accused.
NOTE:
9. Attacking a sleeping victim or one who has just woken up

constitutes treachery.
EX. People vs. Bernal; September 2, 2002
In a prosecution for Murder, the attack on the victim was sudden and
unexpected, and this was evident in the manner the accused shot his
victim – from behind and while asleep, giving his victim no opportunity
to defend himself or repel the accused’s attack. .
Treachery may absorbed other aggravating circumstances:
1. Taking advantage of public position – People vs. Garciola; October

30, 29151
The victim was hiding in his house. Probably the accused’s act in
mentioning his office as a peace officer was a part of his scheme to
catch the victim unaware. The accused stabbed the victim as soon as
the latter opened up. This constitutes treachery that qualified the crime
as Murder. Taking advantage of public position may therefore be
considered as ABSORBED in the element of treachery, and cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in computing the penalty.
2. Abuse of Superior Strength– People vs. Damiar; February 20, 1984
Taking advantage od superior strength is absorbed in treachery- it

cannot be estimated as an independent aggravating circumstance when
treachery is present.
3. Nighttime – People vs. Pinca; February 28, 1962
Except in special cases, nighttime and treachery always go together

and are absorbed in the same offense.
4. Abuse of Superior Strength and aid of armed men – People vs.

Ronquillo; April 5, 2002
Although the murderous attack was frontal, treachery was present

since the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was not in a
position to offer an effective defense. The accused and his armed
companions also positioned themselves behind the fence at the
compound, which showed the employment of a means of execution that
insured their safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of
the victim or residents of the compound. The other qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men are
absorbed by treachery and cannot be appreciated separately.
5. Band and Abuse of Superior Strength– People vs. Bantillo; October

23, 2000
Treachery absorbs both aggravating circumstances of band and

abuse of superior strength.
6. Craft, Fraud and Disguise– People vs. Malig; May 30, 1949
Craft may well be included in and absorbed by treachery because it

was used to insure the commission of the Murder without any danger or
risk to the culprits.
7. By taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men or

by employing means to weaken the defense– People vs. Hernandez;
February 27, 1990
The crime committed by the accused was Murder with treachery by

taking advantage of superior strength, with aid of armed men or by
employing means to weaken the defense. Three men, armed with a knife,
crept up in the dark against a defenseless and unsuspecting victim, who was
answering a call of nature. When two of the victim’s attackers pinioned his
arms so that their companion could stab him repeatedly and with impunity,
they thereby employed means which assured the execution of the Murder
without risk to themselves arising from the defense that heir victim might
make.
7. Taking advantage of public position, abuse of superior

strength and nocturnity– People vs. Pascual; December 5, 1991
Taking advantage of public position, abuse of superior strength

and nocturnity, are deemed absorbed in treachery and cannot be
separately considered. .
T R E AC H E RY
PEOPLE VS SANGALANG
G . R. N O. L- 3 2 9 1 4 ; A U G U S T 3 0 , 1 9 7 4
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut
tree. He was unarmed and defenseless. He was not expecting to
be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The
deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his
companions employed a mode of execution which insured the
killing without any risk to them arising from any defense
which the victim could have made. The qualifying circumstance
of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was
duly established (See art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the
killing can be categorized as murder (See People v. Sedenio, 94 Phil.
1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of
band (U. S. v. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568).
T R E AC H E RY
PEOPLE VS SAN PEDRO
G . R. N O. L- 4 4 2 7 4 ; JA N U A RY 2 2 , 1 9 8 0
We cannot subscribe to the theory of craft being absorbed by treachery, as

nighttime and abuse of superior strength may be so absorbed, as held in numerous
decisions of this Court.' In the instant case, craft was employed not with a view to
making treachery more effective as nighttime and abuse of superior strength
would in the killing of the victim. It was directed actually towards facilitating
the taking of the jeep in the robbery scheme as planned by the culprits. From the
definition of treachery, it is manifest that the element of defense against bodily injury
makes treachery proper for consideration only in crimes against person as so explicitly
provided by the Revised Penal Code (Art. 14[16]).
Aside from the foregoing observation, decisional rulings argue against appellant's
submission. Thus in the case of U.S. vs. Gampona, et al., 36 Phil. 817 (1917) where the
crime charged was murder, qualified by treachery, craft was considered
separately to aggravate the killing. Note that in this cited case, the crime was killing
alone, which has a weightier rationale. for, merging the two aggravating circumstances,
than when, as in crime of robbery with homicide, craft has a very distinct application to
the crime of robbery, separate and independent of the homicide. Yet, it was held that craft
and treachery were separate and distinct aggravating circumstances. The same ruling was
announced in People vs. Sakam, et al., 61 Phil. 27 (1934).
T R E AC H E RY
P E O P L E V S C A S T I L LO
G R N O. 1 2 0 2 8 2 ; A P R I L 2 0 1 9 9 8
Nonetheless, we hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. "Treachery

is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means,
methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate[;] and that such means,
methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person."45 These requisites
were evidently present in this case when the accused appeared
from nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim
just he was bidding goodbye to his friend, Witness Velasco. Said
action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of
"defense wounds" does not negate treachery because, as testified to by
Velasco, the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest. The
incised wounds in the arms were inflicted when the victim was already
rendered defenseless.
T R E AC H E RY
PEOPLE VS ARIZOBAL
G . R . N O. 1 3 5 0 5 1 - 5 2 , 1 4 D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 0
But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The

accused stand charged with, tried and convicted of robbery with
homicide. This special complex crime is primarily
classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property,
and not against persons, homicide being merely an incident
of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object of
the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be validly
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art.
14 of The Revised Penal Code.
T R E AC H E RY
PEOPLE VS ESCOTE
G . R. N O. 1 4 0 7 5 6 . A P R I L 4 , 2 0 0 3
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a

crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of
robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not
inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance

in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with

homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against
persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery
is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent crime of
robbery of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as
a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating
T R E AC H E RY
PEOPLE VS ESCOTE
G . R. N O. 1 4 0 7 5 6 . A P R I L 4 , 2 0 0 3
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a

crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of
robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not
inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance

in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with

homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against
persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery
is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent crime of
robbery of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as
a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating
T R E AC H E RY
P E O P L E V S V I L LO N E Z
G . R. N O S . 1 2 2 9 7 6 - 7 7 ; N OV E M B E R 1 6 , 1 9 9 8
However, we do not share the assessment of the trial court that there was
no treachery in this case because the victim had engaged in a fight
previous to the killing and was thus forewarned of an attack against him.
Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of
danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.31 The
overwhelming number of the accused, their use of weapons against the unarmed
victim, and the fact that the victims hands were held behind him preclude
the possibility of any defense by the victim.
The other qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the trial
court appreciated, will no longer be taken against accused-appellants, for it is
absorbed in treachery.
T R E AC H E RY
PEOPLE VS GUZMAN
G . R. N O. 1 6 9 2 4 6 JA N U A RY 2 6 , 2 0 0 7
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions are required in order that treachery may
be appreciated:
1. The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s
safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus no opportunity
for self-defense or retaliation;
2. Deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution.
Further, it must always be alleged in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered.
In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant. Moreover, all the essential
elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial.
After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay, Michael proceeded home. While
Michael was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, appellant and his two
companions, who were drinking nearby, suddenly approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant
positioned himself at the back of Michael while his two companions stood in front of Michael. In an
instant, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter. One of the appellant’s
companions, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and
repeatedly stabbed Michael on the stomach. Unsatisfied, the appellant’s other companion, whom the
prosecution witnesses described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife and stabbed Michael on the
stomach. As the finale, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife and also stabbed Michael
on the stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked him at the body. Upon noticing that
the bloodied Michael was no longer moving, appellant and his two companions fled the scene.
T R E AC H E RY
PEOPLE VS GUZMAN
G . R. N O. 1 6 9 2 4 6 JA N U A RY 2 6 , 2 0 0 7
As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant and his
two companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape.
It appears that Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. Further, he was merely
seventeen years of age then.38 In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely impossible for Michael to escape or
to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two companions. Being young and weak, Michael is
certainly no match against adult persons like appellant and his two companions. Michael was also
outnumbered since he had three assailants, and, was unarmed when he was stabbed to death.
Appellant and his two companions took advantage of their size, number, and weapon in killing
Michael. They also deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel death of Michael
by first surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of
them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the
ground. The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely damaged the
latter’s large intestine.39
The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were walking then in different
directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. 40 This is even more
true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years,
cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists. 41
As we earlier found, Michael was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone to a fight when he
was stabbed to death by appellant and his two companions. Further, Michael was a minor at the time of
his death while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.
17. IGNOMINY
That means be employed or circumstances brought about

which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
IGNOMINY – is a circumstance pertaining to the moral

order, which adds DIDGRACE and OBLOQUY to the material
injury caused by the crime.
NOTE: the intention of the accused was to cause humiliation

or shame on the victim.
17. IGNOMINY
NOTE:
1.THERE IS NO IGNOMINY IF THE VICTIM WAS ALREADY DEAD

WHEN THE IGNOMINOUS ACT WAS COMMITTED
a.Slicing the corpse – People vs. Fuertes; February 28, 2000

b.Body was dismembered – People vs. Carmina; January 28, 1991
c.Taking of flesh from the thighs, legs and shoulder of the victim –
People vs, Ferrera ; June 18, 1987
REASON: because what is required is that the crime be committed in a

manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim,
that is, adds to his MORAL SUFFERING
17. IGNOMINY
2.People vs. Valla; January 24, 2000
The pubic area of the victim bore blisters brought about by a contact
with a lighted cigarette. This circumstance added disgrace and obloquy
to the material injury inflicted upon the victim of the crime of rape with
homicide.
3. People. Soriano; June 24, 1983
In prosecution for robbery with rape, the victim was raped in the
presence of the husband who was hogtied was beside her on the floor.
Disgrace or obloquy was added to the natural effects of the Rape,
making the outrage more humiliating.
17. IGNOMINY
4. People vs. Bumindang; December 4, 2000
The accused used the flashlight and examined the genital of

the victim before he ravished her. He committed his bestial
deed in the presence of the victim’s older father. These facts
clearly show that the accused deliberately wanted to further
humiliate the victim, thereby aggravating and compounding
her moral suffering.
IGNOMINY
PEOPLE VS TORREFIEL
C A - G R . N O. 6 5 9 - R , 2 9 N O V E M B E R 1 9 4 7
The novelty of the act of winding cogon grass on his genitals

before raping the victim , augmented the wrong done by
increasing its pain and adding moral disgrace thereto.
IGNOMINY
PEOPLE VS JOSE
L- 2 8 2 3 2 , 6 F E B R U A R Y 1 9 7 1
ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant

to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten
minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance
which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating;
IGNOMINY
PEOPLE VS BUTLER
L- 5 0 2 7 6 , 2 7 J A N U A R Y 1 9 8 3
While We reject the presence of treachery, We, however, find and sustain
the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of
outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against
the accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at
the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse
with her after she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the
anus did not close and also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal region
as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and
confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, Exhibit "B1 ", clearly
established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal
intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at
her corpse.
IGNOMINY
P E O P L E V S S AY L A N
G . R. N O. L- 3 6 9 4 1 J U N E 2 9 , 1 9 8 4
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the
appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male
supenor female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do"
i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no
ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter
have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly
and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation.
(Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed by
consenting partners but not otherwise.
IGNOMINY
P E O P L E V S S U LTA N
G R. 1 3 2 4 7 0 ; A P R I L 2 7 , 2 0 0 0
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the
appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male
supenor female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do"
i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no
ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter
have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly
and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation.
(Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed by
consenting partners but not otherwise.
1 8 . U N L AW F U L E N T RY
That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
UNLAWFUL ENTRY - when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the
purpose.
UNLAWFUL ENTRY is inherent in the following felonies:
1. Violation of domicile (Art. 128 RPC)

2. Evasion of sentence (2nd sentence Art, 157 RPC)
3. Trespass to Dwelling (280 RPC)
4. Robbery in an Inhabited Place, Public Building or place dedicated to religious
worship (Art. 299 a1 RPC)
5. Robbery with Homicide
6. Robbery in an Inhabited place or in a private building
NOTE: UNLAWFUL ENTRY cannot include means to ESCAPE.

1 9 . B R E A K I N G O F WA L L , R O O F, F LO O R , D O O R
ETC.
That as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door or window
be broken.
NOTE:
To be considered as an aggravating circumstance, breaking a wall, roof, floor,
door or window MUST BE USED AS A MEANS TO COMMIT THE CRIME.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PAR. 18 (UNLAWFUL ENTRY) and PAR. 19 (BREAKING OF

WALL AND ETC.) – People vs. Lamosa; May 23, 1989
The crime committed by the accused for the killing of the victim is simple
Homicide, with the aggravating circumstance of breaking a wall or door to gain
entry, instead of Unlawful Entry, as erroneously found by the trial court, since,
the accused rammed the DOOR off its hinges in order to gain entry. Unlawful
Entry exists only when the entrance into a building is made by a way
NOT for the purpose of Entry.
1 9 . B R E A K I N G O F WA L L , R O O F, F LO O R , D O O R
ETC.
Breaking of a wall, roof, floor, door or window is INHERENT in the

following crimes:
1. Robbery in an Inhabited House or Public Building or Edifice devoted for

Religious Worship (Art. 299 A2 RPC); and
2. Robbery in an Uninhabited Place or in a Private Building (Art. 302 RPC)
NOTE:
Unlawful Entry (Par. 18) absorbs breaking down a wall (Par. 19)
(People vs. Bondoy; May 18,1993)
20. AID OD PERSONS UNDER 15 OR MOTOR
VEHICLE
That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under 15 years of age, or
by means of motor vehicles, airships, or other similar means.
USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE:
1. Used to facilitate the commission of the crime;
2. Used in going to the place of the crime;
3. Used to carry away effects of the crime; and
4. Used to facilitate their escape.

2 1 . C R U E LT Y
That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing another
wrong not necessary for its commission. .
CRUELTY – when the culprit enjoys and delights in making the victim suffer slowly and gradually,
causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act.
EXAMPLES:
1. Pouring hot liquid to the victim at various times before committing Murder (People vs. Mariano;
December 6, 2000)
2. The victim was stoned, stabbed and beheaded. (People vs. Valdez; January 24, 2011)
3. Strangulating the victim with a rope and setting him on fire as the victim was dying after he was
truck twice in head (People vs. Develos; January 31, 1966)
4. Cutting the ear of the victim in a case for Murder (People vs. Mendoza)
5. Cruelty is aggravating in rape where the offender tied the victim to a bed and burnt her face with a
lighted cigarette while raping her laughing all the way (People v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 315).
2 1 . C R U E LT Y
DISTINCTION between CRUELTY and IGNOMINY
Ignominy – Moral suffering
Cruelty – induces physical suffering.
Cruelty and ignominy are circumstances brought about

which are not necessary in the commission of the crime.
OUTRAGING OR SCOFFING OF CORPSE
OUTRAGED – subject to gross insult.
SCOFF – show contempt by derisive acts or language.
EXAMPLES:
1. Having anal intercourse after the victim was already dead. (People vs. Butler; January 27,
1983);
2. The corpse of the victim was dismembered with the cutting off the head and limbs and
the opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs and liver (People vs. Carmina;
January 28, 1991)
3. Dumping the body of the victim into a ravine in order to hide the effects of his criminal
acts (People vs. Obenque; January 30, 1987)
NOTE: In scoffing at the victim, the accused must be already dead AFTER the acts
were committed.
O T H E R A G G R AVAT I N G C I R C U M S TA N C E S O U T S I D E
O F A RT I C L E 1 4
1. Art. 128 par. 2 RPC – If any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be
not returned immediately after the search made by the offender in violation of domicile.
2. Art. 132 par. 2 RPC – if the crime shall have been committed with violence or threats in
interruption of religious worship.
3. Art. 148 RPC – When the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a
public officer or employee or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority
in direct assault.
4. Art. 265 RPC - If inflicted upon the offender’s patients ascendants, guardians, curators,
teachers or persons of rank, or persons in authority in less serious [physical injuries.
5. Art. 272 RPC - If the crime be committed for the purpose of assigning the offended
party to some immoral traffic in slavery.
O T H E R A G G R AVAT I N G C I R C U M S TA N C E S O U T S I D E
O F A RT I C L E 1 4
6. Art. 286 - RPC If the offense be committed by means of violence or

intimidation in qualified trespass to dwelling.
7. Art. 282 RPC - If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman in

Grave Threats.
8. Art. 286 RPC – If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling
another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so doing in Grave
Coercion.
9. Art. 350 RPC - If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of
the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud in marriage contracted
against provisions of laws.
S Y N D I C AT E D E S TA FA
( P D N O. 1 6 8 9 )
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable
shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud
exceeds 100,000 pesos.
L A R G E S C A L E O R S Y N D I C AT E I L L E G A L R E C R U I T M E N T
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042)
SECTION 6
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by

a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with
one another.
It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or

more persons individually or as a group.
U S E O F I L L E G A L F I R E A R M S O R E X P LO S I V E S
( R E P U B L I C A C T N O. 1 0 5 9 1 )
Section 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime.

The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under
the Revised Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance: Provided,
That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a
maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal
possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu
of the penalty for the crime charged: Provided, further,
That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a
maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the preceding section for illegal
possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code
or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the
violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
PEOPLE VS LADJAALAM
G . R. N O S . 1 3 6 1 4 9 - 5 1 ; S E P T E M B E R 1 9 , 2 0 0 0
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph
were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should [the courts].
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
“other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an
aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.
Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no
longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively absolves the appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle,
an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the
first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade
conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter
offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto
menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not
subject to the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from
the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. [The Court's] task is constitutionally confined
only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and [this Court] have done so in this case.
C E L I N O V S C O U RT O F A P P E A L S
G . R. N O. 1 7 0 5 6 2 ; J U N E 2 9 , 2 0 0 7
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those

enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal
possession of firearm should be quashed because the
illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried
together with such other offense, either considered as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,40 or
absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection,
sedition or attempted coup d’etat.41
Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those

enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
( R E P U B L I C A C T N O. 9 1 6 5 )
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a

Crime by an Offender Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs.
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive finding
for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime by an offender, and the application
of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.
C R I M E S C O M M I T T E D B Y, T H R O U G H A N D W I T H T H E U S E O F
I N F O R M A T I O N A N D C O M M U N I C AT I O N T E C H L O G I E S
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175)
Section 6.
All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through
and with the use of information and communications
technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of
this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be
one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the
case may be.
ARTICLE 15
ALTERNATIVE
CIRCUMSTANCES
A RT I C L E 1 5
Alternative circumstances - those which must be taken into consideration as

aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and
the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship,
intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration
when the offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees
of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a
mitigating circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said
felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance.
A LT E R N AT I V E C I R C U M S TA N C E S
A RT I C L E 1 5
1. RELATIONSHIP
2. INTOXICATION
3. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION OR EDUCATION OF THE OFFENDER

R E L AT I O N S H I P
The alternative circumstances of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the
OFFENDED party is the:
a) Spouse
b) Ascendant
c) Descendant
d) Legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister
e) Relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender
As to when it is mitigating or aggravating, it would depend upon the nature and effects of
the crime and the other conditions attending its commission.
GENERAL RULES: relationship is a MITIGATING circumstance in crimes against property.
relationship is AGGRAVATING circumstance in crimes against chastity.
relationship is AGGRAVATING circumstance in Rape.
relationship is INHERENT in Parricide.
R E L AT I O N S H I P
P E O P L E V S AT O P
G . R. 1 2 4 3 0 3 - 0 5 ; F E B R U A RY. 1 0 , 1 9 9 8
Neither can we appreciate relationship as an aggravating circumstance. The scope of relationship as

defined by law encompasses (1) the spouse, (2) an ascendant, (3) a descendant, (4) a
legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (5) a relative by affinity in the same
degree.17
Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by
affinity therefore are those commonly referred to as in-laws, or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild
and the like; in contrast to relatives by consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed under the
second, third and fourth enumeration above.
The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here,
there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus,
the modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him.
I N T OX I C AT I O N
AGGRAVATING when:
1. is is habitual
2. It is subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.
MITIGATING when:
3. is is NOT habitual
4. It is NOT subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.
HABITUAL DRUNKARD – one that is characterized by EXCESSIVE use of intoxicating drinks.
PRESUMPTION: in the absence of proof to the contrary, INTOXICATION is presumed to be

Unintentional or not Habitual
Instances when INTOXICATION was neither an aggravating or mitigating circumstance:
1. Where the Medical Certificate does not show the accused was intoxicated. (People vs.
Reyes; February 27, 1976)
2. Where there was no showing that intoxication was habitual or intentional; and neither
can it be considered mitigating because it did not sufficiently impair the accused’s will
power or his capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his acts (People vs. Ancheta;
February 27, 1987)
3. Where there is no proof that the amount of liquor the accused had taken was of such
quantity as to affect his mental faculties (People vs. Bernal; September 2, 2002)
4. Where there is no proof that the accused is a habitual and excessive drinker or that he
intentionally got drunk in order to commit the crime or where there is no showing that
the accused was so drunk that his will power was impaired or that he could not
comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. (People vs. Banez; January 20, 1999)
US VS MACMANN
G R N O. 2 2 2 9 ; J U LY 0 1 , 1 9 0 5
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Whitney (5 Gray, 85) the court said:

"The exact degree of intemperance which constitutes a drunkard it may not be easy to define, but
speaking in general terms, and with the accuracy of which the matter is susceptible, he is a
drunkard whose habit is to get drunk, 'whose ebriety has become habitual.' To convict a
man of the offense of being a. common drunkard it is, at the least, necessary to show that he is an
habitual drunkard.
Indeed the terms 'drunkard' and 'habitual drunkard' mean the same thing."
In the case of Ludwick vs. Commonwealth (18 Penn. St., 172) the court said:
"A man may be an habitual drunkard, and yet be sober for days and weeks together. The only rule
is, Has he a fixed habit of drunkenness? Was he habituated to intemperance whenever
the opportunity offered?"
DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCTION OF
THE OFFENDER
TEST OF LACK OF INSTRUCTION AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE:

-it is not ILLITERACY alone but the lack of sufficient intelligence and
knowledge of the full significance of one’s acts
EXAMPLE:
1. Double Homicide – Lack of instruction was considered as a mitigating circumstance
because the records show that he can neither read nor write and that he is illiterate.
(People vs. Layos; July 25, 1934)
2. Murder - Lack of instruction was considered as a mitigating circumstance because it
was shown that the accused is ignorant and unschooled. (People vs. Undong; August
29, 1975)
3. Murder - Lack of instruction was considered was NOT considered as a mitigating
circumstance because the records disclose that far from his claim that he suffers from
lack of education, the accused possesses an intelligence worthy of an educated man. In
fact the trial court observed that he talked as if he were a doctor. (People vs. Abanes;
September 28, 1976)
L AC K O F D E G R E E O F I N S T R U C T I O N O R E D U C AT I O N
US VS SAN PEDRO
G R N O. L- 4 4 2 7 4 ; JA N U A RY 2 2 , 1 9 8 0
With the presence of two aggravating circumstances, craft and treachery, it would make no
difference even if the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction were appreciated in appellant's
favor which is even doubtful from the fact alone, as was allegedly proven by the testimony of
appellant that he cannot read and write but can only sign his name (P. 9, t. s. n. Sept. 1,
1975). This, apart from the fact that as held categorically in the case of People vs. Enot, 6 SCRA 325
(1962) lack of instruction is not applicable to crimes of theft and robbery, much less to
the crime of homicide. The reason is that robbery and killing are, by their nature,
wrongful acts, and are manifestly so to the enlightened, equally as to the ignorant
(People vs. Salip Manla et al., 30 SCRA 389 [1969]).
As recently held by this Court, speaking through Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., the "criteria
in determining lack of instruction is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient
intelligence." It is significant that neither to the trial court nor to the appellant's counsel has the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction entered the mind. No attempt was made to prove it, as
direct proof, not mere inference, is required, and must be invoked in the court below (People vs.
Mongado, et al., 28 SCRA 642, [1969]), the reason being that the trial court can best gauge a
person's level of intelligence from his manner of answering questions in court (People v. Manuel, 29
SCRA 337 [1969]). If the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstance invoked for the first
time here on appeal, it must be because from appellant's testimony, and even more so from his
given occupation as a merchant (T.S.N., p. 3, Sept. 1, 1975), his alleged lack of intelligence
never suggested itself to the trial court or to his lawyer, as entitling him to the
ARTICLE 16
PERSONS CRIMINALLY
LIABLE FOR FELONIES
P E R S O N S C R I M I N A L LY L I A B L E F O R F E LO N I E S
( A RT I C L E 1 6 )
The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices
NOTE: ONLY natural persons can be criminally liable.
REASONS:
1. Felonies are committed either by dolo (deceit/intent) or culpa (negligence); only natural persons can
commit a crime with personal intent or negligence. Juridical persons are in capable of acting with dolo
or fault.
2. Only natural persons can suffer IMPRISONMENT or deprivation of Liberty as a form of punishment.
HOWEVER, Juridical persons can bring a criminal action – Art. 46 of the New Civil Code
P R I N C I PA L S
Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

(PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION)
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
(PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT)
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
(PRINCIPAL BY INDIPENSABLE COOEPRATION)
P R I N C I PA L S
Principal by direct participation – one who takes direct part in the execution of the
crime.
EXAMPLE:
1. MURDER, HOMICIDE, PARRICIDE – the person who actually kills the victim.
2. RAPE – the person who had carnal knowledge of the woman through force or intimidation.
3. Theft/Robbery – the person who unlawfully took the personal property
belonging to another.
NOTE:
- if there is conspiracy the conspirators are equally liable as principals by direct
participation, no matter how minimal the participation maybe.
- If there is conspiracy it is unnecessary to pinpoint who inflicted the fatal blow since the
conspirators are equally liable as conspirators, regardless of the extent of their
contributory participation.
P R I N C I PA L S
Principal by inducement– one who directly forces or induces another to commit a crime.
He does not take part in the material execution of the crime.
REQUIREMENTS:
1. the inducement should PRECEDE the commission of the crime.
2. The inducement should be direct and the determining cause of the crime.
3. The inducement was offered with the intention of producing the result thereof.
Principal by DIRECT INDUCEMENT (US vs. Bundal; December 1903)

1. Conceives the perpetration of a crime;
2. Calls a meeting of his co-accused to deliberate concerning its execution;
3. Persuades them to carry the purpose into effect;
4. Present at the time of its consummation
P R I N C I PA L S
Principal by indispensable cooperation – one who having direct participation in the criminal design,
cooperates in the commission of the crime by committing another act without which the crime would have
not be accomplished.
REQUIREMENTS:
1. Participation in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose
and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and
2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
EXAMPLE:
3. Holding the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself, while his co-accused
was simultaneously stabbing the victim repeatedly is an act of a principal indispensable cooperation. (People
vs. Montealegre; May 31, 1988)
4. Robbery with Homicide – Although it was Efren who shot the security guard in the head and it was Efren who
physically spirited away the dollars and pesos he extracted at gunpoint from the Bazaar’s cashier. (People vs.
Degoma; May 22, 1992)
NOTE: if the contributory acts were made AFTER the crime was committed, the accused cannot be considered to
be a principal by indispensable cooperation.
P R I N C I PA L
P E O P L E V S YA N S O N - D U M A N C A S
G R N O. L- 4 4 2 7 4 ; JA N U A RY 2 2 , 1 9 8 0
What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the
killers to commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by
causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to
conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-
appellants. The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the
said meeting to come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis
relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by inducement,
is the supposed “commands” or order given by her to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial
court, to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants should
they abduct and later kill the victims in this case.By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to
“take care of the two” does not constitute the command required by law to justify a finding that she is
guilty as a principal by inducement.
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the commission of
the crime itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]).
In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with
murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant Geroche to “take care of
the two.”
Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the crime charged in this case.
P R I N C I PA L
P E O P L E V S M A LU E N D A
G . R. N O. 1 1 5 3 5 1 M A RC H 2 7 , 1 9 9 8
Legarto cannot be convicted under this definition because the prosecution failed to allege, much less prove, any overt
act on his part showing direct participation in the kidnapping itself, his participation in the incident being limited to acts
committed after the abduction was already consummated.
He was not with the kidnappers (1) when they forcibly solicited money and medicine from the Resus
couple, (2) when they brought the kidnap victim to Alegria, and (3) when Mondaga demanded ransom for
the victim's release. Together with the Resus housemaid, he accompanied Mondaga to the hideout in Alegria only
upon Dr. Resus' request.
In short, the prosecution failed to piece together a clear story as to show Legarto figured in the kidnapping caper.
Despite its belief that Legarto was not a co-principal or a co-conspirator, this Court cannot completely free him from
criminal liability. Established by the prosecution are the following: (1) he reported the "loss" of the motorcycle to
the police authorities despite the fact that it had been given to Mondaga as part of the ransom; (2) he had
received P36,000 for it; (3) he paid the balance of the purchase price of the motorcycle with the said
money; and (4) he claimed, regained and retained its possession. Legarto may not have had a direct hand
in the kidnapping, but he received part of the ransom and used it to pay off his arrears in his motorcycle
loan. Thus, having knowledge of the kidnapping for ransom and without having directly participated
therein, he took part in the crime subsequent to its commission by profiting from its effects.37 He may not be
the devil with the face of an angel that the trial court described, but he is definitely not a saint. He is criminally liable as
an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, accessories are defined
as those who (1) have knowledge of the commission of the crime, (2) did not take part in its commission as principal or
accomplice, but (3) took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in this article, 38
one of which is by profiting or by assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the crime. 39 These elements are all
present and proven in Legarto's case.As an accessory to the consummated crime of kidnapping, the penalty imposable
upon Legarto is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law under Article 267 of the said Code.
P R I N C I PA L
PEOPLE VS MONTEALEGRE
G . R. N O. L- 6 7 9 4 8 ; M AY 3 1 , 1 9 8 8
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with
Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually
stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victim's
hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true
that the accused- appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless
equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him.
The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable cooperation under Article
17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal
resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
P R I N C I PA L
G . R. N O. L- 6 7 9 4 8 ; M AY 3 1 , 1 9 8 8
Nevertheless, the Court finds that proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established as to the existence of
conspiracy between the Madali spouses. While direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it may be
shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among
the accused to commit the offense(s) charged, the evidence to prove the same must be positive and convincing
considering that conspiracy is a facile devise by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold. 75 With this and the principle that in criminal prosecution, doubts must be resolved in favor of
the accused, as guides, the Court rules that the liability of Annie Mortel Madali with respect to the
crimes committed herein, is only that of an accomplice
Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at them and
warning her husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. By beaming her flashlight at a
victim, Annie assisted her husband in taking a good aim. However, such assistance merely facilitated the
commission of the felonious acts of shooting. Considering that, according to both of the Madali spouses, "it was
not so dark nor too bright 76 that night or that "brightness and darkness were equally of the same intensity. 77
Ricarte Madali could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts without Annie's cooperation
and assistance.
Neither may Annie's shouts of "here comes, here comes another, shoot" be considered as having incited
Ricarte to fire at the victims to make Annie a principal by inducement. There is no proof that those inciting
words had great dominance and influence over Madali as to become the determining cause of the
crimes. 78 The rapidity with which Madali admittedly fired the shots 79 eliminated the necessity of encouraging
words such as those uttered by Annie.
The fact that Annie dealt a blow on Agustin while he was being dragged by Madali to their yard does not make
her a principal by direct participation. Annie's act, being previous to Madali's act of shooting Agustin,
ACCOMPLICES
Article 18. Accomplices - are those persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
ELEMENTS:
1. The community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and
2. The performance of previous or simultaneous acts which are not indispensable to the
NOTE:
An accomplice MUST have knowledge of the CRIMINAL INTENTION of the principal and his
complicity is evidenced by a simultaneous or previous act which contributes to the
commission of the felony, as an aid thereto, whether physical or moral.
ACCOMPLICES
NOTE:
1. The previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be INDISPENSABLE to the commission
of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation.
EX. (People vs. Tampus; June 16, 2009)
Ida (the mother of the victim) assented to the intent of the accused to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter. She then forced her daughter to drink beer then she left her daughter alone with the
accused. SC: previous acts of Ida were not indispensable to crime of Rape. She was convicted as an
accomplice.
2. Acting as a lookout may hold one liable either as a principal or accomplice. A Lookout would be
considered as an accomplice if he is NOT part of the conspiracy or the resolution to commit the crime.
(even though he has knowledge of the conspiracy)
EX. (People vs. De Vera; August 18, 1999)
Knowing that Kenneth intended to Murder the victim and that the 3 accused were carrying
weapons, Edwin had acted as a lookout to watch for passerby. He was not an innocent spectator. He
was at the locus criminis in order to aide and abet the commission of the crime. These facts,
however, did not make him a conspirator; at most he as only an accomplice.
ACCOMPLICES
NOTE:
(even though he has knowledge of the conspiracy; did not participate in the planning)
EX. (People vs. Corbes; March 26, 1997)
Manuel knew of the criminal design to commit a Robbery and he cooperated with the robbers
by driving the vehicle to and from the crime scene. In convicting him as an ACCOMPLICRE and not as a
conspirator, the SC observed that he was merely approached by one of the robbers who was tasked to
look for a get away vehicle. He was not with the robbers when they resolved to commit a Robbery.
When his services were requested, the decision to commit the crime had already been made.
ACCOMPLICES
CONSPIRATOR ACCOMPLPICE
1. Conspirators TAKE PART in 1. Accomplices merely agree to cooperate

the criminal intention or in the execution of the criminal intention
design. or design.
2. They decide that a crime 2. They merely concur in it. They do not
should be committed. decide whether the crime should be
committed. They merely assent to the
plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment.
3. They are authors of the 3. They are merely the authors’ instruments
crime. who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
A C C O M P L I C E S W H O S H A L L B E P U N I S H E D A S P R I N C I PA L S
Article 346. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons

entrusted with the custody of the offended party.
The ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and any person who, by abuse of
authority or confidential relationships, shall cooperate as accomplices in the
perpetration of the crimes embraced in chapters, second, third and fourth, of this title,
shall be punished as principals.
CRIMES COVERED:
1. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (ART. 336)
2. QUALIFIED SEDUCTION (ART. 337)
3. SIMPLE SEDUCTION (ART. 338)
4. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS WITH THE CONSENT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY (ART. 339)
5. CORRUPTION OF MINORS (ART. 340)
6. WHITE SLAVE TRADE (ART. 341)
7. FORCIBLE ADBUDCTION (ART. 342
8. CONSENTED ABDUCTION (ART. 343)

AC C O M P L I C E
ABEJUELA VS PEOPLE
G R N O. 8 0 1 3 0 , A U G 1 9 , 1 9 9 1
After carefully weighing the arguments of both parties as well as taking into consideration the
evidence on record, we are inclined to believe that petitioner Abejuela was completely
unaware of the malevolent scheme of Balo.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (in this case, Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential
in order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime
of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there
must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly
or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of
the offense intended to be committed. In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been
held that knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal is indispensable in order to
hold a person liable as an accomplice.
Thus: “It appearing that the accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused rode did not
actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery but only furnished
the means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with knowledge of the said
criminal design, he is not guilty as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide but is an
accomplice therein."[14]"There is no evidence that appellant had conspired with the malefactors, nor that
he actually participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot, therefore, be considered as a
principal. But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention and in staying outside of the house with
AC C O M P L I C E
PEOPLE VS DOBLE
G . R. N O. L- 3 0 0 2 8 M AY 3 1 , 1 9 8 2
First, as to appellant SIMEON, evidence shows that the malefactors met in his house to discuss the
plan to rob the bank. This circumstance alone doesn’t conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The facts do not show that he performed any act tending to the perpetration of the robbery,
nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other persons to commit, or that he
cooperated in its consummation by some act without which it would not have been
committed. At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable. Simeon
then was not a principal both by agreement and encouragement for his non-participation in the
commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proven that he had received any part/fruits of the looted
money as to make him an accessory. AS RECOMMENDED BY SOLGEN, SIMEON DOBLE IS ENTITLED
TO ACQUITTAL WITH NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in the crime charged. At
the most their liability would be that of mere accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when
Cresencio consented to look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe
Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil
purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that brought the malefactors to the bank to
be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to prevent their apprehension.
Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner. Even without appellants
providing the banca, the robbery could have been committed, specially with the boldness and
determination shown by the robbers in committing the crime. An accomplice is one who, not being
principal as defined in Art 17 RPC, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
AC C O M P L I C E
PEOPLE VS DOBLE
G . R. N O. L- 3 0 0 2 8 M AY 3 1 , 1 9 8 2
As to ROMAQUIN, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as should have been his natural impulse had he not joined in the
criminal design. His act of hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and repainting his boat, all attest to
his guilty conscience arising from the act of cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve
their criminal purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperates in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a Community of unlawful purpose
between the principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil. 526), to supply
material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense and in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this
case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as
held in People vs. Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had
agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal
design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing.
Having been left in the banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for
assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised Penal Code). 2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient considering the gravity and viciousness of the
offense with which they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a previous
conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed and injured several persons,
including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the
wrath of the victims nor of the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not been shown to be as
abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in
meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.a
AC C O M P L I C E
PEOPLE VS DOCTOLERO
G . R. N O. 1 1 4 3 4 3 , D E C E M B E R 2 8 , 1 9 9 5
"Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house of Marcial
Sagun, they must have already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at them (pp.
39-41, 97, 119, tsn, Jan. 13, 1971; pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up the house.
Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not know or
were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the
nature, number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1), it could not
have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear
either the screams of pain of their brother's victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their
brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times. x x x Under these circumstances, it is obvious that
appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was going on inside the room of the house at the
time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his
women victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio,
merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend
assistance.
Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun
gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed, as he did proceed, in
committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women and a child." [22]We have held that where one goes
with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the
former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.[23]
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a common
criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the
actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act. [24] This is a doctrine that dates back to the
ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus[25] that where the accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, they
were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the
AC C O M P L I C E
PEOPLE VS DE VERA
G . R. N O. 1 2 8 9 6 6 ; A U G U S T 1 8 , 1 9 9 9 .
The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing that could inculpate De Vera.
Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere
presence does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of
conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common
design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The fact that De Vera was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the
crime did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice. Moreover, the
prosecution evidence has not established that De Vera was part of the conspiracy to kill
Capulong. De Vera’s participation, as culled from his own statement, was made after the
decision to kill was already a fait accompli.
In the present case, De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong
at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the
decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them
that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there
because “nagkahiyaan na.” Consequently, he is convicted as an accomplice, not as a
principal, in the crime of murder.
AC C O M P L I C E
GARCES VS PEOPLE
G R N O. 1 7 3 8 5 8 ; 1 7 J U LY 2 0 0 7
The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime even before
complainant was raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted complainant and when
he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn together with the other
accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he
entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa.
Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout,

petitioner is liable as an accomplice, there being insufficient evidence to prove
conspiracy, and not merely as an accessory. As defined in the Revised Penal Code,
accomplices are those who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as an accomplice are present:
(1) community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and
(2) performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
A C C E SS O R I E S
Article 19. Accessories - those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and
without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of
the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
Requisites:
4. He should have KNOWLEDGE of the crime;
5. He did not take part in its commission as a principal or accomplice;
6. He took part SUBSEQUENT to its commission in any of the 3 wats enumerated in Article
19.
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit

by the effects of the crime.
EX.
a. receiving a portion of the ransom money in a case for
Kidnapping
(note: knowledge of the crime + did not participate in the
commission)
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the

effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
EX.
a. Dumping the gun in a garbage bin after it was used in
the commission of Murder.
b. Hiding the body of the Murder victim
commission)
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of

the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive,
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
2 kinds of Accessory in Art. 19 par. 3
a. a PUBLIC OFFICER who harbors, conceals, assists in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided he does so with abuse of his public
function;
b. a PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL or a PUBLIC OFFICER who, without abusing his
public function, harbors, conceals, assists in the escape of the
principal of guilty of treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take
the life of the chief executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime.
ACTS that do not make a person an ACCESSORY:
1. Mere silence of one knowing of the commission of the crime;

2. Refraining from reporting to the proper authorities
3. Mere fact that one does not denounce the perpetration of a crime to
the authorities
4. Mere presence of a person at the time and place of the commission of
a crime.
ACCOMPLICE ACCESSORY
1. Participates in the 1. does NOT directly
commission of the crime participate in the
commission of the crime
2. takes part in the 2. takes part in the crime by
commission of the crime by performing acts
performing PREVIOUS or SUBSEQUENT to its
SIMULTANEOUS ACTS commission
3. criminally liable for light 3. NOT criminally liable for
felonies light felonies
4. sentenced to a penalty that 4. sentenced to a penalty that
is 1 degree lower than the is 2 degrees lower than the
penalty prescribed by law penalty prescribed by law.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1612
(ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979)
"Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.
Section 5
Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
( A N T I - F E N C I N G L AW O F 1 9 7 9 )
ELEMENTS:
1. a crime of Robbery or Theft has been committed;
2. the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the
crime of Robbery or Theft, buys, receives, possesses keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes or buys and sells or in any manner deals
any item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from from the
proceeds of the said crimes;
3. the accused knows or should have knoen that the said article, object,
iten, or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of Robbery or Theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, INTENT TO GAIN, for himself or for another.
( AN T I - F E N C I N G LAW O F 1 979 )
EXAMPLE:
Capili vs. CA; August 15, 2000
The jewelry of Christine‘s mother were stolen by Michael.
Michael delivered the jewelry to Gabriel
Michael admitted to Gabriel that he stole it from the bedroom of Christine’s

mother
Gabriel agree to pay Michael Php 50,000 for the jewelry.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1612 (ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979)

Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For
purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and
sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to
the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station
commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store,
establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General,
Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this section.
Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this section or
who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder shall upon conviction be punished as a fence.
NOTE: (Tan vs. People; August 26, 1999)

The accessory in the felonies of Robbery and Theft could be prosecuted
under PD No. 1612, and this time they cease to be mere accessory but
becomes a PRINCIPAL in the crime of Fencing.
The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the RPC or PD
No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem to be
inevitable considering that fencing is:
1. malum prohibitum; and
2. PD 1612 creates a presumption of fencing; and
3. prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the penalty.
P R E S I D E N T I A L D E C R E E N O. 1 8 2 9
(OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE)
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
a. preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by
means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
b. altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility,
availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases;
c. harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
d. publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true
name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;
e. delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
f. making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases
g. soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal
offender;
h. hreatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or
members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;
i. giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the
life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background
information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.
EXAMPLE:
Naval vs. Panday; December 21, 1999)
Judge Panday had sexual congress with a 15 year old girl. He then offered the
girl’s father money as consideration for the withdrawal of their charges against
him.
SC: what judge Panday did amounts to Obstruction of Justice. The fact that Judge
Panday even reneged on the agreed amount for the withdrawal of the him only
serves to underscores the greater perversity of his character and betrays his
disdain for the lowly whose rights he has sworn to protect.
E X E M P T A C C E SS O R I E S
( A B S O LU T O RY C AU S E F O R S O M E A C C E SS O R I E S )
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal

liability.
The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be

imposed upon those who are such with respect to their
spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
AN ACCESSORY is exempt from criminal liability when the principal is his:

1. spouses
2. ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Legitimate
5. natural, and adopted brothers and sisters
6. relatives by affinity within the same degrees
and he committed acts falling under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 19 RPC.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order
to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime
EXAMPLE:
People vs. Mariano; December 2000
Ruth committed Murder. Ruby who is the sister of Ruth drove the car where
the corpse of the victim was hidden. By reason of her relationship with
Ruth, Ruby resisted to stop the car when chased by the police and refused
to open the luggage compartment as requested by the police. Ruby lied to
the police claiming that the box in the compartment contained only dirty
clothes and she refused to open the box.
SC: these acts indicate knowledge of the crime and assistance to
Ruth in concealing the corpus delicti to prevent discovery.
However, Ruby is EXEMPT from criminal liability by reason of her
relationship with Ruth. Consequently, Ruby is acquitted of the
crime of Murder.
When is a relative criminally liable as an accessory:

when his act falls under Article 19 paragraph 1:
“By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.”
EXAMPLE: US vs. Deuda; December 1909)
The mother Basilia saw earrings in the possession of her daughter
Valeriana. Instead of investigating how they came into her possession,
together with her daughter she took steps to obtain gain and profit from
their value. She went with her daughter to have them repaired by a
goldsmith, then pawned and finally sold them to a third person. Such
behavior clearly indicates that the mother was an accessory after the
fact.
AC C E S S O R I E S
P E O P L E V. TA L I N G D A N
L- 3 2 1 2 6 ; J U LY 6 , 1 9 7 8
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record
committed by her co-accused.
She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the
shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her
father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the
culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to
anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill
you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their
house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information given
to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas,
before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
D I Z O N - PA M I N T UA N V. P E O P L E ,
G . R . N O. 1 1 1 4 2 6 ; J U LY 1 1 , 1 9 9 4
The accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the RPC
or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal
in the crime of fencing. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D.
No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is
a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based
on the value of the property.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established. A robbery was
committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants who afterwards reported the incident to the
authorities and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry that were later displayed for sale at a stall
tended to by the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly
manifested an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything
of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the
petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of
robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does
not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of
her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner
was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.
ARTICLE 16
PERSONS CRIMINALLY
LIABLE FOR FELONIES
P E R S O N S C R I M I N A L LY L I A B L E F O R F E LO N I E S
( A RT I C L E 1 6 )
The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices
NOTE: ONLY natural persons can be criminally liable.
REASONS:
1. Felonies are committed either by dolo (deceit/intent) or culpa (negligence); only natural persons can
commit a crime with personal intent or negligence. Juridical persons are in capable of acting with dolo
or fault.
2. Only natural persons can suffer IMPRISONMENT or deprivation of Liberty as a form of punishment.
HOWEVER, Juridical persons can bring a criminal action – Art. 46 of the New Civil Code
P R I N C I PA L S
Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

(PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION)
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
(PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT)
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
(PRINCIPAL BY INDIPENSABLE COOEPRATION)
P R I N C I PA L S
Principal by direct participation – one who takes direct part in the execution of the
crime.
EXAMPLE:
1. MURDER, HOMICIDE, PARRICIDE – the person who actually kills the victim.
2. RAPE – the person who had carnal knowledge of the woman through force or intimidation.
3. Theft/Robbery – the person who unlawfully took the personal property
belonging to another.
NOTE:
- if there is conspiracy the conspirators are equally liable as principals by direct
participation, no matter how minimal the participation maybe.
- If there is conspiracy it is unnecessary to pinpoint who inflicted the fatal blow since the
conspirators are equally liable as conspirators, regardless of the extent of their
contributory participation.
P R I N C I PA L S
Principal by inducement– one who directly forces or induces another to commit a crime.
He does not take part in the material execution of the crime.
REQUIREMENTS:
1. the inducement should PRECEDE the commission of the crime.
2. The inducement should be direct and the determining cause of the crime.
3. The inducement was offered with the intention of producing the result thereof.
Principal by DIRECT INDUCEMENT (US vs. Bundal; December 1903)

1. Conceives the perpetration of a crime;
2. Calls a meeting of his co-accused to deliberate concerning its execution;
3. Persuades them to carry the purpose into effect;
4. Present at the time of its consummation
P R I N C I PA L S
Principal by indispensable cooperation – one who having direct participation in the criminal design,
cooperates in the commission of the crime by committing another act without which the crime would have
not be accomplished.
REQUIREMENTS:
1. Participation in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose
and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and
2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
EXAMPLE:
3. Holding the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself, while his co-accused
was simultaneously stabbing the victim repeatedly is an act of a principal indispensable cooperation. (People
vs. Montealegre; May 31, 1988)
4. Robbery with Homicide – Although it was Efren who shot the security guard in the head and it was Efren who
physically spirited away the dollars and pesos he extracted at gunpoint from the Bazaar’s cashier. (People vs.
Degoma; May 22, 1992)
NOTE: if the contributory acts were made AFTER the crime was committed, the accused cannot be considered to
be a principal by indispensable cooperation.
P R I N C I PA L
P E O P L E V S YA N S O N - D U M A N C A S
G R N O. L- 4 4 2 7 4 ; JA N U A RY 2 2 , 1 9 8 0
What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the
killers to commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by
causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to
conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-
appellants. The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the
said meeting to come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis
relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by inducement,
is the supposed “commands” or order given by her to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial
court, to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants should
they abduct and later kill the victims in this case.By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to
“take care of the two” does not constitute the command required by law to justify a finding that she is
guilty as a principal by inducement.
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the commission of
the crime itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]).
In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with
murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant Geroche to “take care of
the two.”
Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the crime charged in this case.
P R I N C I PA L
P E O P L E V S M A LU E N D A
G . R. N O. 1 1 5 3 5 1 M A RC H 2 7 , 1 9 9 8
Legarto cannot be convicted under this definition because the prosecution failed to allege, much less prove, any overt
act on his part showing direct participation in the kidnapping itself, his participation in the incident being limited to acts
committed after the abduction was already consummated.
He was not with the kidnappers (1) when they forcibly solicited money and medicine from the Resus
couple, (2) when they brought the kidnap victim to Alegria, and (3) when Mondaga demanded ransom for
the victim's release. Together with the Resus housemaid, he accompanied Mondaga to the hideout in Alegria only
upon Dr. Resus' request.
In short, the prosecution failed to piece together a clear story as to show Legarto figured in the kidnapping caper.
Despite its belief that Legarto was not a co-principal or a co-conspirator, this Court cannot completely free him from
criminal liability. Established by the prosecution are the following: (1) he reported the "loss" of the motorcycle to
the police authorities despite the fact that it had been given to Mondaga as part of the ransom; (2) he had
received P36,000 for it; (3) he paid the balance of the purchase price of the motorcycle with the said
money; and (4) he claimed, regained and retained its possession. Legarto may not have had a direct hand
in the kidnapping, but he received part of the ransom and used it to pay off his arrears in his motorcycle
loan. Thus, having knowledge of the kidnapping for ransom and without having directly participated
therein, he took part in the crime subsequent to its commission by profiting from its effects.37 He may not be
the devil with the face of an angel that the trial court described, but he is definitely not a saint. He is criminally liable as
an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, accessories are defined
as those who (1) have knowledge of the commission of the crime, (2) did not take part in its commission as principal or
accomplice, but (3) took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in this article, 38
one of which is by profiting or by assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the crime. 39 These elements are all
present and proven in Legarto's case.As an accessory to the consummated crime of kidnapping, the penalty imposable
upon Legarto is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law under Article 267 of the said Code.
P R I N C I PA L
G . R. N O. L- 6 7 9 4 8 ; M AY 3 1 , 1 9 8 8
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with
Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually
stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victim's
hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true
that the accused- appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless
equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him.
The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable cooperation under Article
17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal
resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
P R I N C I PA L
G . R. N O. L- 6 7 9 4 8 ; M AY 3 1 , 1 9 8 8
Nevertheless, the Court finds that proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established as to the existence of
conspiracy between the Madali spouses. While direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it may be
shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among
the accused to commit the offense(s) charged, the evidence to prove the same must be positive and convincing
considering that conspiracy is a facile devise by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold. 75 With this and the principle that in criminal prosecution, doubts must be resolved in favor of
the accused, as guides, the Court rules that the liability of Annie Mortel Madali with respect to the
crimes committed herein, is only that of an accomplice
Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at them and
warning her husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. By beaming her flashlight at a
victim, Annie assisted her husband in taking a good aim. However, such assistance merely facilitated the
commission of the felonious acts of shooting. Considering that, according to both of the Madali spouses, "it was
not so dark nor too bright 76 that night or that "brightness and darkness were equally of the same intensity. 77
Ricarte Madali could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts without Annie's cooperation
and assistance.
Neither may Annie's shouts of "here comes, here comes another, shoot" be considered as having incited
Ricarte to fire at the victims to make Annie a principal by inducement. There is no proof that those inciting
words had great dominance and influence over Madali as to become the determining cause of the
crimes. 78 The rapidity with which Madali admittedly fired the shots 79 eliminated the necessity of encouraging
words such as those uttered by Annie.
The fact that Annie dealt a blow on Agustin while he was being dragged by Madali to their yard does not make
her a principal by direct participation. Annie's act, being previous to Madali's act of shooting Agustin,
ACCOMPLICES
Article 18. Accomplices - are those persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
ELEMENTS:
1. The community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and
2. The performance of previous or simultaneous acts which are not indispensable to the
NOTE:
An accomplice MUST have knowledge of the CRIMINAL INTENTION of the principal and his
complicity is evidenced by a simultaneous or previous act which contributes to the
commission of the felony, as an aid thereto, whether physical or moral.
ACCOMPLICES
NOTE:
1. The previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be INDISPENSABLE to the commission
of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation.
EX. (People vs. Tampus; June 16, 2009)
Ida (the mother of the victim) assented to the intent of the accused to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter. She then forced her daughter to drink beer then she left her daughter alone with the
accused. SC: previous acts of Ida were not indispensable to crime of Rape. She was convicted as an
accomplice.
(even though he has knowledge of the conspiracy)
EX. (People vs. De Vera; August 18, 1999)
Knowing that Kenneth intended to Murder the victim and that the 3 accused were carrying
weapons, Edwin had acted as a lookout to watch for passerby. He was not an innocent spectator. He
was at the locus criminis in order to aide and abet the commission of the crime. These facts,
however, did not make him a conspirator; at most he as only an accomplice.
ACCOMPLICES
NOTE:
(even though he has knowledge of the conspiracy; did not participate in the planning)
EX. (People vs. Corbes; March 26, 1997)
Manuel knew of the criminal design to commit a Robbery and he cooperated with the robbers
by driving the vehicle to and from the crime scene. In convicting him as an ACCOMPLICRE and not as a
conspirator, the SC observed that he was merely approached by one of the robbers who was tasked to
look for a get away vehicle. He was not with the robbers when they resolved to commit a Robbery.
When his services were requested, the decision to commit the crime had already been made.
ACCOMPLICES
CONSPIRATOR ACCOMPLPICE
1. Conspirators TAKE PART in 1. Accomplices merely agree to cooperate

the criminal intention or in the execution of the criminal intention
design. or design.
2. They decide that a crime 2. They merely concur in it. They do not
should be committed. decide whether the crime should be
committed. They merely assent to the
plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment.
3. They are authors of the 3. They are merely the authors’ instruments
crime. who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
A C C O M P L I C E S W H O S H A L L B E P U N I S H E D A S P R I N C I PA L S
Article 346. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons

entrusted with the custody of the offended party.
The ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and any person who, by abuse of
authority or confidential relationships, shall cooperate as accomplices in the
perpetration of the crimes embraced in chapters, second, third and fourth, of this title,
shall be punished as principals.
CRIMES COVERED:
1. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (ART. 336)
2. QUALIFIED SEDUCTION (ART. 337)
3. SIMPLE SEDUCTION (ART. 338)
4. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS WITH THE CONSENT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY (ART. 339)
5. CORRUPTION OF MINORS (ART. 340)
6. WHITE SLAVE TRADE (ART. 341)
7. FORCIBLE ADBUDCTION (ART. 342
8. CONSENTED ABDUCTION (ART. 343)

AC C O M P L I C E
ABEJUELA VS PEOPLE
G R N O. 8 0 1 3 0 , A U G 1 9 , 1 9 9 1
After carefully weighing the arguments of both parties as well as taking into consideration the
evidence on record, we are inclined to believe that petitioner Abejuela was completely
unaware of the malevolent scheme of Balo.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (in this case, Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential
in order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime
of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there
must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly
or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of
the offense intended to be committed. In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been
held that knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal is indispensable in order to
hold a person liable as an accomplice.
Thus: “It appearing that the accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused rode did not
actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery but only furnished
the means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with knowledge of the said
criminal design, he is not guilty as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide but is an
accomplice therein."[14]"There is no evidence that appellant had conspired with the malefactors, nor that
he actually participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot, therefore, be considered as a
principal. But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention and in staying outside of the house with
AC C O M P L I C E
PEOPLE VS DOBLE
G . R. N O. L- 3 0 0 2 8 M AY 3 1 , 1 9 8 2
First, as to appellant SIMEON, evidence shows that the malefactors met in his house to discuss the
plan to rob the bank. This circumstance alone doesn’t conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The facts do not show that he performed any act tending to the perpetration of the robbery,
nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other persons to commit, or that he
cooperated in its consummation by some act without which it would not have been
committed. At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable. Simeon
then was not a principal both by agreement and encouragement for his non-participation in the
commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proven that he had received any part/fruits of the looted
money as to make him an accessory. AS RECOMMENDED BY SOLGEN, SIMEON DOBLE IS ENTITLED
TO ACQUITTAL WITH NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in the crime charged. At
the most their liability would be that of mere accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when
Cresencio consented to look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe
Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil
purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that brought the malefactors to the bank to
be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to prevent their apprehension.
Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner. Even without appellants
providing the banca, the robbery could have been committed, specially with the boldness and
determination shown by the robbers in committing the crime. An accomplice is one who, not being
principal as defined in Art 17 RPC, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
AC C O M P L I C E
PEOPLE VS DOBLE
G . R. N O. L- 3 0 0 2 8 M AY 3 1 , 1 9 8 2
As to ROMAQUIN, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as should have been his natural impulse had he not joined in the
criminal design. His act of hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and repainting his boat, all attest to
his guilty conscience arising from the act of cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve
their criminal purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperates in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a Community of unlawful purpose
between the principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil. 526), to supply
material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense and in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this
case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as
held in People vs. Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had
agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal
design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing.
Having been left in the banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for
assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised Penal Code). 2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient considering the gravity and viciousness of the
offense with which they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a previous
conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed and injured several persons,
including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the
wrath of the victims nor of the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not been shown to be as
abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in
meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.a
AC C O M P L I C E
PEOPLE VS DOCTOLERO
G . R. N O. 1 1 4 3 4 3 , D E C E M B E R 2 8 , 1 9 9 5
"Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house of Marcial
Sagun, they must have already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at them (pp.
39-41, 97, 119, tsn, Jan. 13, 1971; pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up the house.
Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not know or
were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the
nature, number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1), it could not
have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear
either the screams of pain of their brother's victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their
brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times. x x x Under these circumstances, it is obvious that
appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was going on inside the room of the house at the
time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his
women victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio,
merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend
assistance.
Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun
gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed, as he did proceed, in
committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women and a child." [22]We have held that where one goes
with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the
former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.[23]
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a common
criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the
actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act. [24] This is a doctrine that dates back to the
ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus[25] that where the accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, they
were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the
AC C O M P L I C E
PEOPLE VS DE VERA
G . R. N O. 1 2 8 9 6 6 ; A U G U S T 1 8 , 1 9 9 9 .
The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing that could inculpate De Vera.
Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere
presence does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of
conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common
design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The fact that De Vera was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the
crime did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice. Moreover, the
prosecution evidence has not established that De Vera was part of the conspiracy to kill
Capulong. De Vera’s participation, as culled from his own statement, was made after the
decision to kill was already a fait accompli.
In the present case, De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong
at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the
decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them
that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there
because “nagkahiyaan na.” Consequently, he is convicted as an accomplice, not as a
principal, in the crime of murder.
AC C O M P L I C E
GARCES VS PEOPLE
G R N O. 1 7 3 8 5 8 ; 1 7 J U LY 2 0 0 7
The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime even before
complainant was raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted complainant and when
he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn together with the other
accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he
entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa.
Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout,

petitioner is liable as an accomplice, there being insufficient evidence to prove
conspiracy, and not merely as an accessory. As defined in the Revised Penal Code,
accomplices are those who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as an accomplice are present:
(1) community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and
(2) performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
Article 19. Accessories - those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and
without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of
the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
Requisites:
4. He should have KNOWLEDGE of the crime;
5. He did not take part in its commission as a principal or accomplice;
6. He took part SUBSEQUENT to its commission in any of the 3 wats enumerated in Article
19.
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit

by the effects of the crime.
EX.
a. receiving a portion of the ransom money in a case for
Kidnapping
commission)
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the

effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
EX.
a. Dumping the gun in a garbage bin after it was used in
the commission of Murder.
b. Hiding the body of the Murder victim
commission)
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of

the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive,
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
2 kinds of Accessory in Art. 19 par. 3
a. a PUBLIC OFFICER who harbors, conceals, assists in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided he does so with abuse of his public
function;
b. a PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL or a PUBLIC OFFICER who, without abusing his
public function, harbors, conceals, assists in the escape of the
principal of guilty of treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take
the life of the chief executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime.
CRIME WAS COMMITTED BY AN U NIDENTIFIED,
DEAD OR AT L ARGE PRINCIPAL:
• A. Billon doctrine (Pp vs. Billon, CA 48 OG 1391) Even if the principal
was not tried and convicted, offender may be held liable as accessory
as long as there is evidence that the crime was committed by principal.
• B. Barlam doctrine (Pp vs. Barlam, CA 59 OG 2474) The accused
cannot be held liable as accessory under par. 3 Article 19, if the
principal charged with murder died before trial.
• C. Controlling Rule: (Pp vs. Inovera, et.al. 65 OG 3168) CA reverted
back to the Billon doctrine.
- see Viño vs. People (GR No. 84163, October 19, 1989) SC re-
affirmed the principle in Billon. 3 pronouncements:
a. Acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the
accessory since it was shown that no crime was committed;
b. If the principal died or escaped before he could be tried and
sentenced, accessory may be held criminally liable;
c. If the principal was not identified but the accessory was identified,
the latter can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the
assailant.
ACTS that do not make a person an ACCESSORY:
1. Mere silence of one knowing of the commission of the crime;

2. Refraining from reporting to the proper authorities
3. Mere fact that one does not denounce the perpetration of a crime to
the authorities
4. Mere presence of a person at the time and place of the commission of
a crime.
ACCOMPLICE ACCESSORY
1. Participates in the 1. does NOT directly
commission of the crime participate in the
commission of the crime
2. takes part in the 2. takes part in the crime by
commission of the crime by performing acts
performing PREVIOUS or SUBSEQUENT to its
SIMULTANEOUS ACTS commission
3. criminally liable for light 3. NOT criminally liable for
felonies light felonies
4. sentenced to a penalty that 4. sentenced to a penalty that
is 1 degree lower than the is 2 degrees lower than the
penalty prescribed by law penalty prescribed by law.
(ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979)
"Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.
Section 5
Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
( A N T I - F E N C I N G L AW O F 1 9 7 9 )
ELEMENTS:
1. a crime of Robbery or Theft has been committed;
2. the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the
crime of Robbery or Theft, buys, receives, possesses keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes or buys and sells or in any manner deals
any item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from from the
proceeds of the said crimes;
3. the accused knows or should have knoen that the said article, object,
iten, or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of Robbery or Theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, INTENT TO GAIN, for himself or for another.
EXAMPLE:
Capili vs. CA; August 15, 2000
The jewelry of Christine‘s mother were stolen by Michael.
Michael delivered the jewelry to Gabriel
Michael admitted to Gabriel that he stole it from the bedroom of Christine’s

mother
Gabriel agree to pay Michael Php 50,000 for the jewelry.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1612 (ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979)

Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For
purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and
sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to
the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station
commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store,
establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General,
Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this section.
Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this section or
who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder shall upon conviction be punished as a fence.
NOTE: (Tan vs. People; August 26, 1999)

The accessory in the felonies of Robbery and Theft could be prosecuted
under PD No. 1612, and this time they cease to be mere accessory but
becomes a PRINCIPAL in the crime of Fencing.
The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the RPC or PD
No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem to be
inevitable considering that fencing is:
1. malum prohibitum; and
2. PD 1612 creates a presumption of fencing; and
3. prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the penalty.
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
a. preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by
means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
b. altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility,
availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases;
c. harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
d. publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true
name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;
e. delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
f. making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases
g. soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal
offender;
h. hreatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or
members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;
i. giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the
life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background
information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.
EXAMPLE:
Naval vs. Panday; December 21, 1999)
Judge Panday had sexual congress with a 15 year old girl. He then offered the
girl’s father money as consideration for the withdrawal of their charges against
him.
SC: what judge Panday did amounts to Obstruction of Justice. The fact that Judge
Panday even reneged on the agreed amount for the withdrawal of the him only
serves to underscores the greater perversity of his character and betrays his
disdain for the lowly whose rights he has sworn to protect.
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal

liability.
The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be

imposed upon those who are such with respect to their
spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
AN ACCESSORY is exempt from criminal liability when the principal is his:

1. spouses
2. ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Legitimate
5. natural, and adopted brothers and sisters
6. relatives by affinity within the same degrees
and he committed acts falling under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 19 RPC.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order
to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime
EXAMPLE:
People vs. Mariano; December 2000
Ruth committed Murder. Ruby who is the sister of Ruth drove the car where
the corpse of the victim was hidden. By reason of her relationship with
Ruth, Ruby resisted to stop the car when chased by the police and refused
to open the luggage compartment as requested by the police. Ruby lied to
the police claiming that the box in the compartment contained only dirty
clothes and she refused to open the box.
SC: these acts indicate knowledge of the crime and assistance to
Ruth in concealing the corpus delicti to prevent discovery.
However, Ruby is EXEMPT from criminal liability by reason of her
relationship with Ruth. Consequently, Ruby is acquitted of the
crime of Murder.
When is a relative criminally liable as an accessory:

when his act falls under Article 19 paragraph 1:
“By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.”
EXAMPLE: US vs. Deuda; December 1909)
The mother Basilia saw earrings in the possession of her daughter
Valeriana. Instead of investigating how they came into her possession,
together with her daughter she took steps to obtain gain and profit from
their value. She went with her daughter to have them repaired by a
goldsmith, then pawned and finally sold them to a third person. Such
behavior clearly indicates that the mother was an accessory after the
fact.
P E O P L E V. TA L I N G D A N
L- 3 2 1 2 6 ; J U LY 6 , 1 9 7 8
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record
committed by her co-accused.
She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the
shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her
father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the
culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to
anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill
you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their
house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information given
to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas,
before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
D I Z O N - PA M I N T UA N V. P E O P L E ,
G . R . N O. 1 1 1 4 2 6 ; J U LY 1 1 , 1 9 9 4
The accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the RPC
or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal
in the crime of fencing. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D.
No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is
a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based
on the value of the property.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established. A robbery was
committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants who afterwards reported the incident to the
authorities and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry that were later displayed for sale at a stall
tended to by the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly
manifested an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything
of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the
petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of
robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does
not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of
her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner
was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.
ARTICLE 48
COMPLEX CRIMES
COMPLEX CRIMES
TWO MAIN TYPES OF PLURALITY OF CRIMES:
1. Material or plurality means that the person performs 2

or more criminal acts one after the other and he is liable
for every criminal act that he commits because every
crime is motivated by a separate criminal intent from the
other
2. Formal or real plurality means that a person commits 2
or more criminal acts, there will be 2 or more victims or
offended parties, but in the eyes of the law, only one
crime was committed.
COMPLEX CRIMES
3 types of formal or ideal (real) Plurality of

Crimes 1. Compound Crime or
Delito Compuesto
1. Complex crimes 2. Complex crime proper

or delito complejo
(Article 48)
2. Continuous crimes (Delito Continuado)

3. Composite Crimes/Special Complex Crimes
COMPLEX CRIMES
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a

single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
COMPLEX CRIMES
WHAT IS A COMPLEX CRIME?
When:
1. a single act constitutes 2 or more grave or
less grave felonies; OR
2. when the offense is a necessary means of
committing the other.
COMPLEX CRIMES
2 types of complex crimes:

1. Compound Crime or Delito Compuesto
When a single act constitutes 2 or more grave or
less grave felonies
2. Complex crime proper or delito complejo
When an offense is committed as a necessary
means to commit the other
COMPLEX CRIMES
Compound Crime
( Delito Compuesto)
“When a single act constitutes 2 or more grave or less

grave felonies”
COMPLEX CRIMES
Compound Crime ( Delito Compuesto)

EXAMPLE:
“A” detonates an IED (improvised explosive device)in

a park, resulting to the death of 16 people and
wounding 50 others.
Q: what crime/s was or were committed?

COMPLEX CRIMES
Compound Crime ( Delito Compuesto)

“When a single act constitutes 2 or more grave or less
grave felonies”
Meaning:
1. Two grave felonies can be complexed with each other
2. Two less grave felonies can be complexed with each other
3. Grave and less grave can be complexed with each other.
How about light felonies?

COMPLEX CRIMES
“Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies.

Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital
punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive,
in accordance with Article 25 of this Code.
Less gave felonies are those which the law punishes with
penalties which in their maximum period are correctional in
accordance with abovementioned article.
Light felonies are those infractions of law or the commission of
which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty
Thousand pesos (₱40,000) or both is provided.
COMPLEX CRIMES
2 possibilities if a single act produces a grave or less

grave felony and a LIGHT FELONY :
1. Light felony will be ABSORBED
2. There are as many light felonies as there are victims.

COMPOUND CRIME
P E O P L E V. TA B AC O
G . R. N O S . 1 0 0 3 8 2 - 1 0 0 3 8 5 ; M A RC H 1 9 , 1 9 9 7
The trial court mis-appreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which
killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of
complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave
felonies.
In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the
four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully
loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its
magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty.
Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in
People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling
laid down in People vs. Desierto. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-
machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously . As stated
therein: “In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of
the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other
persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said
article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of
time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical
injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused,
who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every single
act that produced the same.Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in
a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim,
respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five
crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the
COMPOUND CRIME
P E O P L E V. TA B AC O
G . R. N O S . 1 0 0 3 8 2 - 1 0 0 3 8 5 ; M A RC H 1 9 , 1 9 9 7
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the
Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing
the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which
should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex
crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied in the said case because the Supreme
Court found that there were actually several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it
would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48
of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of
Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into
the law." (emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous
burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate
crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four
victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other.
In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that: Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from
two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case
only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all
of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex
crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he
COMPOUND CRIME
P E O P L E V. VA L D E Z
G . R. N O. 1 2 7 6 6 3 | M A RC H 1 1 , 1 9 9 9
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined above. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as falling under the first. It is clear
from the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a
single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that
there was more than one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that
of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There
were also several empty bullet shells recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the
fact that several shots were fired. Furthermore, considering the relative positions of the gunmen and
their victims, some of whom were riding the motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside
the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four victims to have been hit and killed
by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms,
aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts
which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple murder.
We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four
counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this case. In the same manner, Accused-
appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
COMPOUND CRIME
P E O P L E V. S A N C H E Z
G . R. N O. 1 3 1 1 1 6 | A U G U S T 2 7 , 1 9 9 9
However, we disagree with the trial court that the accused committed a single complex
crime of double murder. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of
committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be
imposed.
The question is whether the act of shooting the victims using armalites in automatic
firing mode constitutes a single act and, thus, the felonies resulting therefrom are
considered as complex crimes. We rule in the negative.
In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled that several shots from a Thompson sub-machine, in view of its
special mechanism causing several deaths, although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger,
are considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was caused by one single act of
pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the person
firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and
it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be
considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually
produced them.
In the instant case, Malabanan testified that he heard three bursts of gunfire from the two
armalites used by accused Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus, the accused are criminally liable
for as many offenses resulting from pressing the trigger of the armalites. Therefore,
COMPLEX CRIMES
Complex Crime proper

( Delito Complejo)
“When an offense is committed as a

necessary means to commit the other’
COMPLEX CRIMES
Complex Crime Propet ( Delito Complejo)

EXAMPLE:
1. “A” falsifies the signature of “B” in a check and

had the check encashed in the bank.
2. “A” abducted “B” brought her in a desolate place

and had carnal knowledge of her through force
and intimidation.
COMPLEX CRIMES
NOTE: the law says:

“When an offense is committed as a necessary means to commit the
other”
1st crime is not indispensable in the commission of the 2nd crime
Effect?
If it is indispensable then the 1st crime becomes an element of the 2nd
crime.
Example: Absorption doctrine/Doctrine of Absorption in the felony of

Rebellion (read: People vs. Hernandez)
A BS O R P T I O N D O C T R I N E
P E O P L E V. H E R N A N D E Z
G . R. N O S . L- 6 0 2 5 - 2 6 ; J U LY 1 8 , 1 9 5 6
The murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of
the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said Defendants, as means
“necessary” for for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion that the crime
charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies.
HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE: Rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes

such as killings, destruction of property, etc., committed on the occasion and in
furtherance thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more so that there is no
legal basis for such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME
ABSORPTION DOCTRINE: rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and
parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
P E O P L E V. H E R N A N D E Z
G . R. N O S . L- 6 0 2 5 - 2 6 ; J U LY 1 8 , 1 9 5 6
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition
that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would
be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present.* In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48, said penalty
would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance.
E N R I L E V. S A L A Z A R
G . R. N O S . 9 2 1 6 3 ; J U N E 5 , 1 9 9 0
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of
the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not
complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine
not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding
12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon
him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be
meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with
the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the
E N R I L E V. S A L A Z A R
G . R. N O S . 9 2 1 6 3 ; J U N E 5 , 1 9 9 0
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical
and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered
as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before
conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the
proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for
any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become
functus oficio.
COMPLEX CRIMES
NOTE: the law says:

“When an offense is committed as a necessary means to commit the other”
1st crime is not the direct means in committing the 2nd crime.
Effect?
Look at the primary intent of the perpetrator
Example: (People vs. Abidosa)

“A” wanted to kill “B”. So, ”A” went inside the house of “B” and killed him.
Q: What crime was committed? Murder? Trespass to dwelling?

COMPLEX CRIME
P E O P L E V. G A R C I A
G . R. N O S . 1 4 1 1 2 5 ; F E B R U A RY 2 9 , 2 0 0 2
The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of
the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs.
The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal
knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. 39
In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible abduction,
i. e., the taking of complainant against her against her will and with lewd design. It was
likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired,
confederated and mutually aided one another in having carnal knowledge of complainant
by means of force and intimidation and against her will.
Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly established
that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation. Moreover, the prosecution
sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant succeeded in forcibly abducting
the complainant with lewd designs, established by the actual rape. 40
COMPLEX CRIME
P E O P L E V. G A R C I A
G . R. N O S . 1 4 1 1 2 5 ; F E B R U A RY 2 9 , 2 0 0 2
Hence, Accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. He should also be held liable for
the other three counts of rape committed by his three co-accused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their
obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused
helped one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her, the other three
held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted cigarettes to stop her from
warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by
him but for the rape committed by the others as well.
However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The
crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be
considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and
considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, Accused-appellant should be convicted of one
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape.
The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be imposed in its maximum period. Rape is
the more serious of the two crimes and, when committed by more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus, Accused-appellant should
be sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for forcible abduction with rape.
As regards the other three acts of rape, Accused-appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The trial
court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior strength and motor vehicle. However, these were not
alleged in the information. Under the amended provisions of Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information, otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if proven at the trial. Being favorable to accused-
appellant, this rule should be applied retroactively in this case. 44 Hence, there being no aggravating circumstance that may be
appreciated, and with no mitigating circumstance, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be applied, pursuant to Article
COMPLEX CRIME
B AT U L A N O N V. P E O P L E
G . R . N O. 1 3 9 8 5 7 , 1 5 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 6
The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not
commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen
to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions 41 nor are they defined and regulated by the
Code of Commerce or other commercial law.42 Rather, they are private documents, which have been
defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary
or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set
forth. 43
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,45 it is important
to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document OR with
estafa.
IF THE FALSIFICATION OF A PRIVATE DOCUMENT IS COMMITTED AS A MEANS TO COMMIT
ESTAFA, THE PROPER CRIME TO BE CHARGED IS FALSIFICATION.
IF THE ESTAFA CAN BE COMMITTED WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF FALSIFYING A DOCUMENT,
THE PROPER CRIME TO BE CHARGED IS ESTAFA.
Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days
during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the
wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of
falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of
greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article
pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document.
COMPLEX CRIMES
PENALTY
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
EXAMPLE:
“A” fire his gun with the intention of killing “B” but it was “C” who was hit and
eventually died.
Q: what crime was committed?

Q: what is the penalty to be imposed?
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
Continuous (continuing) crimes (Delito Continuado)

- consists of a series of acts but all emanating from one (1)
criminal resolution.
EXAMPLE: (People vs. De leon)

One night “A” decided to steal roosters. He then went to the
house of a neighbor and stole 2 roosters. Thereafter, it was
found out that the 2 roosters are owned by 2 individuals.
Q: How many counts of theft is “A” liable for?

CONTINUOUS CRIMES
P E O P L E V. M A D R I G A L - G O N Z A L E S
G . R. N O S . L- 1 6 6 8 8 - 9 0 ; A P R I L 3 0 , 1 9 6 3
In effect, it will be noted that although all the informations in the 27

falsification cases were uniformly worded, the numbers of the
vouchers alleged to have been falsified and the amounts thereof
are different. We have in the three (3) cases, subject of the proceeding at
bar, Voucher No. 4, dated September 3, 1955, for P2,275.00; Voucher No.
6, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,590.00 and Voucher No. 13, dated
September 6, 1955, for P3,410.00. The other informations also show
different vouchers, dates and amounts. These undeniable facts,
alleged in the informations, evidently show that different acts of
falsification were committed on different vouchers and covering
distinct amounts.
Each information did not refer to all said acts of falsification.

Neither is there merit in the argument that said acts of
falsification constituted a continuing offense, so as to have them
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
P E O P L E V. M A D R I G A L - G O N Z A L E S
G . R. N O S . L- 1 6 6 8 8 - 9 0 ; A P R I L 3 0 , 1 9 6 3
This Court in a number of cases, dealing on the same subject, held:
"The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and distinct documents. They had no relation to each
other as members of a series of instruments, so intimately related, that the falsification of one individual of the
series would be, in effect, a falsification of the entire series. The crime of falsification of a private document
was completed and consummated when, with intent to prejudice a third person, the first pawn ticket was
actually falsified; and a wholly separate and distinct crime was initiated and consummated when the second
ticket was falsified. That both documents may have been falsified to be used together in the perpetration of an
embezzlement in no wise affects the case, as under the definition of the crime of falsification of private
documents set out in Article 304 of the Penal Code, the crime is consummated and complete at the moment
when such a document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of, or with intent to prejudice a third person, it
matters not to what use the document may be put thereafter. ..." (U.S. v. Infante & Barreto, 36 Phil. 148-
149).
"The falsification of each of these six money orders committed separately by means of different
acts constitutes independent crimes of falsification (U.S. v. Infante & Barreto, 36 Phil. 146), and the
appropriation of the respective amounts thereof by the defendant, likewise constitutes different crimes of
malversation. In the record of payments then kept by the defendant, it appears that the respective amounts of
the money orders had been paid on different dates, proving that the appropriation thereof was made on
different occasions. Furthermore, no objection had been filed to any of the informations presented in the trial
court." (People v. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671)
"The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the falsifications committed on April 30, 1931 and on May 2 of the
same year were not necessary means for the commission of the malversations on the same dates, is
correct. Each falsification and each malversation constitute independent offenses which must be punished
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
CONTINIUOUS CRIMES COMPLEX CRIMES

(DELITO CONTINUADO
1. NOT GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 48 1. GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 48 RPC
RPC
2. OFFENDER PERFORMS A SERIES 2. OFFENDER EITHER:
OF ACTS BUT COMING FROM 1
CRIMINAL IMPULSE OR RESOLUTION a. performs a single act which
produces 2 or more grave or less
grave felonies; OR
b. one offense is a necessary means

of
committing the other.
3. DOES NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF 3. the penalty for the most serious
IMPOSING THE PENALTY IN ITS crime shall be imposed, the same
MAXIMUM PERIOD to be applied in its maximum
period
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
CONTINIUOUS CRIMES (DELITO CONTINUADO CONTINUING CRIME/TRANSITORY OFFENSE

1. CRIMINAL LAW (RPC) - SUBSTANTIVE LAW 1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RULES OF COURT) –
PROCEDURAL
2. OFFENDER PERFORMS A SERIES OF ACTS 2. when the ingredients of the crime took place
BUT COMING FROM 1 CRIMINAL IMPULSE OR in two or more places - and the crime may be
RESOLUTION filed in the place where the crime was
committed, or where any one of its essential
ISSUE: how many crimes were committed. ingredients took place.
ISSUE: what court has jurisdiction (venue) over

the case?
EXAMPLE:
“A” was kidnapped in Davao City and was brought in Cotabato City
Where should the case be filed?
Since, Kidnapping is a continuing crime or a transitory offense, it can be

filed in either a Davao City court or in a court in Cotabato City.
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
G A M B O A V. C O U RT O F A P P E A L S
L- 4 1 0 5 4 , 2 8 N O V E M B E R 1 9 7 5
There is plurality of crimes or "concurso de delitos" when the actor commits various delictual
acts of the same or different kind.
"Ideal plurality" or "concurso ideal" occurs when a single act gives rise to various infractions of
law. This is illustrated by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: (a) when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies (described as "delito compuesto" or compound crime); and (b)
when an offense is a necessary means for committing another offense (described as "delito
complejo" or complex proper).
"Real plurality" or "concurso real", on the other hand, arises when the accused performs an act
or different acts with distinct purposes and resulting in different crimes which are judicially
independent. Unlike "ideal plurality" this "real plurality" is not governed by Article 48.
Apart and isolated from plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito continuado"
or "continuous crime." This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a
single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division.
Thus, it is said that when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits
diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution
of a single particular delict, such a concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." In
order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed separately, during a period of
time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated any unity of criminal intent and purpose,
which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
L- 4 1 0 5 4 , 2 8 N O V E M B E R 1 9 7 5
To apply the first half of Article 48, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminal impulse is not written into the law. So long as the act or acts complained of
resulted in a single criminal impulse it is usually held to constitute a single offense to be
punished with the penalty corresponding to the most serious crime, imposed in its
maximum period. The test is not whether one of the two offenses is an essential
element of the other. Thus, the taking of thirteen cows at the same time and in
the same place where they were found grazing, or the taking of two roosters, in
response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion,
constitutes a single crime of theft. There is no series of acts committed for the
accomplishment of different purposes, but only one which was consummated and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the cows or roosters in
the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having
in independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct
appropriation nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
L- 4 1 0 5 4 , 2 8 N O V E M B E R 1 9 7 5
Where the abstractions from, and diversion of, the deposits were not made at the same time and on
the same occasion, but on various dates, the same cannot be considered as proceeding from a single
criminal act within the meaning of Article 48.
Each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence and criminal intent of
its own. All the conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal resolution,
because each conversion is a complete act by itself.
Specifically, the abstractions and the accompanying deposits thereof in the personal accounts of
accused cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous crime." A defalcation on a certain day cannot be
considered as merely constitutive of partial execution of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1-b of
the Revised Penal Code. An individual abstraction or misappropriation results in a complete
execution or consummation of the delictual act of defalcation.
Accused cannot be held to have entertained continuously the same criminal intent in making the
first abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the subsequent abstraction on the following days and
months until December 30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not possessed of any
foreknowledge of any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which would pass on to
his possession and control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may arise only when he comes in
possession of the deposits on each business day but not in future, since his employer operates only
on a day-to-day transaction. *As a result, there could be as many acts of misappropriation as there
are times the accused abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit.
Thus the City Fiscal had acted properly when he filed one information for every single day of abstraction
and bank deposit made by accused. The similarity of pattern resorted to be accused in making the diversions
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
L- 4 1 0 5 4 , 2 8 N O V E M B E R 1 9 7 5
The sole import of the characterization or description of estafa as a continuing

offense is that the necessary element of estafa may separately take
place in different territorial jurisdictions until the crime itself is
consummated.
The moment, however, that the elements of the crime have completely
occurred or transpired, then an individual crime of estafa has occurred
or has been consummated.
The term "continuing" here must be understood in the sense similar to that of
"transitory" and is only intended as a factor in determining the proper
venue or jurisdiction for that matter of the criminal action pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
This is so, because "a person charged with a transitory offense may be
tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part committed."
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
P E O P L E V. M A L L A R I
G R N O. L- 5 8 8 8 6 , D E C E M B E R 1 3 , 1 9 9 8
A comparison of the Informations filed in the two cases under consideration as well as the findings
of facts of the appellate court tells us that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of
acts amount to what is known in law as a continued, continuous or continuing offense.
A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one
criminal resolution. It is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse
and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Although there are
series of acts, there is only one crime committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.
The singularity of the offense committed by petitioner is further demonstrated by the fact that the
falsification of the two (2) public documents as a means of committing estafa were
performed on the same date, in the same place, at the same time and on the same
occasion. This Court has held in the case of People v. de Leon, that the act of taking two or more
roosters in the same place and on the same occasion is dictated by only one criminal design and
therefore, there is only one crime of theft even if the roosters are owned by different persons.
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
S A N T I A G O V. G A R C H I T O R E N A
G R N O. 1 0 9 2 6 6 , D E C E M B E R 2 , 1 9 9 3
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions
are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the
same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987
ed).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in
reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised
Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippines Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent
or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed., pp. 53-54) . . . The concept of delito continuado, although an
outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g.
violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for
war veteran’s benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]). Under Article 10 of the Revised
Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity
to crimes punished under special laws.
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
G R N O. 1 0 9 2 6 6 , D E C E M B E R 2 , 1 9 9 3
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner’s
case, and hence, there should only be one information to be filed against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued
crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime.." . .
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal
act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to
enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i) committed by
petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated April 1988, (ii) caused an undue
injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except
that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the
name of the individual whose stay was legalized . . . The 32 Amended Informations aver that
the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application for the
legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when
the approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public prosecutors
manifested at the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a
CONTINUOUS CRIMES
G R N O. 1 0 9 2 6 6 , D E C E M B E R 2 , 1 9 9 3
he trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the
taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same
time and place constitutes but one larceny.
Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there are
distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that
the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused for one offense or for as
many distinct offenses as there are victims (Annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission
of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same
"transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257,
138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659,
52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee
against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d
1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate
charge could be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for
the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
Special Complex crimes (composite crimes)

- Where the law (RPC) provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses,
the resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
- Composite crimes are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on
complex crimes in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, since they do not consist of a
single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies (compound crimes)
nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another (complex
crime proper).
- However, just like the regular complex crimes, only a single penalty is imposed for
each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses. [ People v.
Malinao, G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004]
EXAMPLE: Robbery with Homicide
“A” robbed “B” by pointing a gun against the latter. After taking B’s money, “A” then
killed him.
Q: is it a complex crime? Can you apply Art. 48?
SOME OF THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES UNDER THE REVISED

PENAL CODE:
1. Robbery with Homicide (ARTICLE 294, PAR. 1)

2. Robbery with Rape (ARTICLE 204, PAR. 2)
3. Kidnapping with serious physical injuries (ARTICLE 267, PAR 3)
4. Kidnapping with homicide/murder (ARTICLE 267, PAR. 3)
5. Rape with Homicide. (ARTICLE 266-B, PAR.5)
SEE:
1. Art.266-B - RAPE
2. Art.267 – KIDNAPPING/ILLEGAL DETENTION
3. Art.294 - ROBBERY
4. Art.297 - ROBBERY
5. Art.320 - ARSON
In People v. Larrañaga, this Court explained the concept of a special complex

crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative.

Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with
serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,
and (5) rape with homicide.
In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove

each of the component offenses with the same precision that would
be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.
People v. Larrañaga:
As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed;["] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime.
In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the

Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the
occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent
thereto and on the occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was
able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be
convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape. x x x42(Emphasis supplied.)
People v. Larrañaga:
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its

own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v.
Barros,43 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal
basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the
Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to
two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they
involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex
crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the
present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a
single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes
although composed of two or more offenses.
COMPLEX CRIMES
I N R E L AT I ON T O QUA S I - C R I M E S
Ivler vs. San Pedro (GR No. 172716; November 17, 2010 )
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two
separate offenses:
(1)Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2)Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death
of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second
delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
of reckless imprudence.
COMPLEX CRIMES
SC: Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on

Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the
Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedevilling the question posed in this petition, to which the
MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in
criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code.
COMPLEX CRIMES
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple

felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from
its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving
multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty
for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act

defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
•
COMPLEX CRIMES
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single

prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively
alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,
penalizing each consequence separately. By prohibiting the splitting
of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of
the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible
second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, it is held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed
from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article
365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.
PENALTIES
PENALTIES
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed.

No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.
Penalty is the suffering that is inflicted by the State for the

violation or transgression of a law.
PENALTIES
JURIDICAL CONDITIONS OF PENALTY UNDER THE CLASSICAL

THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. Must be productive of suffering , without however affecting the integrity of
the human personality.
2. Must be commensurate with the offense—-different crimes must be punished
with different penalties.
3. Must be personal - No one shall be punished for the crime of another.
4. Must be legal. There is a law punishing the crime committed and the said
law violated provided for a penalty
5. Must be certain. No one may escape its effects
6. Must be equal for all; and
7. Must be correctional.
PENALTIES
5 THEORIES JUSTIFYING PENALTIES

1. Prevention - The State must permit the criminal to prevent or suppress the
danger of the State rising from the criminal acts of the offender.
2. Self-defense - The State has a right to punish the criminal as a measure of
self-defense so as to protect a society from the threat and wrong inflicted by
the criminal.
3. Reformation - the object of punishment in criminal cases is to correct and
reform the offender.
4. Exemplarity -- The crime must be punished to serve as an example to
deter others from committing crimes.
5. Justice- The criminal is punished to serve by the State as an act of
retributive justice, a vindication of absolute right and moral law violated by
the criminal.
PENALTIES
3 FOLD PURPOSE OF PENALTIES UNDER

THE RPC
1. Retribution or expiation - The penalty is commensurate

with the gravity of the offense.
2. Correction or reformation As shown by the rules which
regulate the execution of the penalties consisting in
deprivation of liberty.
3. Social defense - As shown by its inflexible severity to
recidivists and habitual delinquents.
P E N A LT I E S
Art. 24. Measures of prevention or safety which are not considered penalties.
The following shall not be considered as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their

detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their
confinement in a hospital.
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80 and

for the purposes specified therein.
3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in order to
institute proceedings.
4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their

administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their
subordinates.
P E N A LT I E S
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES
1. Capital punishment
2. Afflictive penalties
Reclusion Perpetua
Reclusion Temporal
Perpetual or Temporary Disqualification
Perpetual or Temporary Disqualification
Prision Mayor
3. Correctional penalties
Prision correccional
Arresto Mayor
Suspension
Destierro
4. Light penalties
Arresto Menor
Public Censure
P E N A LT I E S
PENALTIES COMMON TO THE THREE PRECEDING CLASSES:

Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.
ACCESSORY PENALTIES
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or
calling.
Civil interdiction,
Indemnification,
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the
offense,
Payment of costs.
P E N A LT I E S
TWO MAIN CLASSES OF PENALTIES UNDER ART. 25
1. Principal Penalties - impose by the court in a judgment of conviction

2. Accessory Penalties – deemed imposed with the principal penalty.
PENALTIES THAT ARE PRICIPAL AND AT THE TIME ACESSORY
3. Suspension
4. Perpetual Or Temporary Absolute Disqualification
5. Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification
2 KINDS OF PENALTIES UNDER THE RPC
6. INDIVISIBLE – NO FIXED DURATION

7. DIVISIBLE – HAS A FIXED DURATION AND IS DIVISIBLE INTO 3 PARTS KNOWN
AS MINIMUM, MEDIUM AND MAXIMUM PERIODS
P E N A LT I E S
OTHER CLASSSFICATION OF PENALTIES
Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.
A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an:

1. afflictive penalty, if it exceeds One million two hundred thousand (₱1,200,000);
2. correctional penalty, if it does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,200,000) but is not less than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000); and
3. light penalty, if it be less than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).
Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies.
4. Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Article 25 of this
Code.
5. Less gave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their
maximum period are correctional in accordance with abovementioned article.
6. Light felonies are those infractions of law or the commission of which the penalty
of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) or both is
P R I N C I PA L P E N A LT I E S
A. DEATH
Section 19 Article III 1987 Constitution
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to Reclusion Perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or

detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions
shall be dealt with by law.
A. DEATH
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659 - IMPOSES DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIL HEINOUS CRIME
WHAT CRIMES ARE COVERED?

1. TREASON – ART. 114
2. PIRACY /QUALIFIED - ART. 122 AND 123
3. QUALIFIED BRIBERY – ART. 211-A
4. PARRICIDE – ART. 246
5. MURDER – ART. 248
6. INFANTICIDE – ART. 255
7. KIDNAPPING – ART. 267
8. ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS – ART. 294
9. DESTRUCTIVE ARSON – ART. 320
10.RAPE – ART. 266-A AND ART. 266-B
11.PLUNDER – SECTION 2 OF RA NO. 7080
12.IMPORTATION, MANUFACTURE, SALE AND POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS,
MEINTENANCE OF A DEN, - REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
13.CARNAPPING – RA NO. 10883
A. DEATH
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177- DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
SECTION 1. Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7659 is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. – The death sentence shall be
executed with preference to any other penalty and shall consist in putting the person under the sentence
to death by lethal injection. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under
the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.
"The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be
administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict.
"Pursuant to this, all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to
the performance of such task.
"The authorized physician of the Bureau of Corrections, after thorough examination, shall officially
make a pronouncement of the convict's death and shall certify thereto in the records of the Bureau of
Corrections. ”The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one (1) year nor later than eighteen
(18) months after the judgment has become final and executory without prejudice to the exercise by the
A. DEATH
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9346- AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE
PHILIPPINES
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed, Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
A. DEATH
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties.
The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with
it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty
years following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
Article 47. In what cases the death shall not be imposed; Automatic Review of Death
Penalty Cases.
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing
laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the crime or is more that seventy years of age or when upon
appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority
vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua.

In all cases where the penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the court en
banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than (15) days after promulgation of
the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The
A. DEATH
The following are the instances when death penalty will
not be imposed:

1. When the guilty person is below 18 years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime
2. When the convict is more than 70 years of age;
3. When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the

Supreme Court the required majority vote is not obtained for
the imposition of the death penalty.
A. DEATH
Republic Act No. 9344 – Juvenile Justice Act
SEC. 59. Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, and other special laws notwithstanding, no death penalty shall
be imposed upon children in conflict with the law.
“Child” refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
“Child in Conflict with the Law” refers to a child who is alleged as,
accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under
Philippine laws.
A. DEATH
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON

G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be
affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu of the death penalty,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer
uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the
accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate.

The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is the prescribed
penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age
and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The
determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. Following the scale prescribed in
Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with
a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty
A. DEATH
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON
G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without
complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable
penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two
degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant
should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest
remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be
sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.

The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion
perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing
premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It
does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on
both the consummated and frustrated felony.

Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by
reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule
emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and
accomplices. In the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned
not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. HENCE, THE
MAXIMUM TERM OF HIS PENALTY SHALL NO LONGER BE RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS RULED BY THE
B. AFFLICTIVE PENALTY - Reclusion Perpetua
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby

amended to read as follows:
“Art. 27. Reclusion Perpetua. – The penalty of reclusion Perpetua

shall be from twenty years and one day to forty years.
Art. 41. Reclusion Perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties.
The penalties of reclusion Perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

People vs Lucas,
GR Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994
Prior to R.A. No. 7659,[36] the presence of modifying circumstances would not affect
the penalty of reclusion perpetua prescribed for the crime of rape because such a
penalty was then indivisible and under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659, which amended Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetua has now a defined duration, i.e.,
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. There is, however, no
corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the same Code for the purpose of
converting reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty with three specific period --
minimum, medium, and maximum -- and including it in the table provided therein
showing the duration and the time included in each of the periods.

People vs Lucas,
GR Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994
It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua, it did not make
explicit its intention to convert it into a divisible penalty. In any event, Article 65 of the Code which
provides:
"ART 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. -- In cases in
which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply
the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions of time
included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.
Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion Perpetua (twenty [20] years and one [1] days to
forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions, with each composing a period. The periods
of reclusion Perpetua would then be as follows: minimum - 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8
months; medium - 26 years, 8 months and 1 day to 33 years and 4 months; maximum - 34 years, 4
months and 1 day to 40 years
Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case No. Q-
91-18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion perpetua. Considering again such aggravating circumstance, the accused may be sentenced
in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision

People vs Lucas,
G.R. No. Nos. 108172-73 ; January 9, 1995
It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua, it
did not make After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A.
No. 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the
duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty.
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the deed, and if the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, then the greater penalty shall be applied if
there is present only one aggravating circumstance, and the lesser penalty shall be applied when
the commission of the act was attended by some mitigating circumstance but without an
aggravating circumstance or when there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
and if both mitigating and aggravating circumstances were present, the court shall reasonably
allow them to offset one another taking into account their number and importance and then to
apply preceding rules according to the result of such compensation.

People vs Lucas,
G.R. No. Nos. 108172-73 ; January 9, 1995
Verily, if Reclusion Perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for existence.
To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended R.A. No. 6425 provides for the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs involved are of any of the quantities
stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer applicable because reclusion perpetua is
supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for determining when
either reclusion perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no
occasion for imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug cases, regardless of the attendant
modifying circumstances.
This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules in Article 63 assumes serious
proportions since it does not involve only drug cases, as aforesaid. Under the amendatory
sections of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is also imposed on
treason by a Filipino (section 2), qualified piracy (Section 3), parricide (Section 5),
murder (Section 6), kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Section 8), robbery with
homicide (Section 9), destructive arson (Section 10), rape committed under certain
circumstances (Section 11), and plunder (Section 12).

People vs Lucas,
G.R. No. Nos. 108172-73 ; January 9, 1995
Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion perpetua as a divisible

penalty, then it should have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal
Code. The latter if the law on what are considered divisible penalties under the Code and what
should be the duration of the period thereof. There are, as well, other provisions of the Revised
Penal Code involving Reclusion Perpetua , such as Article 41 on the accessory penalties thereof
and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 61, which have not been touched by a corresponding
amendment.
What then may be the reason for the amendment fixing the duration of Reclusion
Perpetua?
The deliberations in the Bicameral Conference Committee and in both Chambers of Congress
do not enlighten us on this, except the cryptic statement of Senior Tolentino adverted to above
on the elimination of the "new penalty" of life imprisonment by the Bicameral Conference
Committee. It may, however, be pointed out that although the Revised Penal Code did
not specify the maximum of Reclusion Perpetua , it is apparent that the maximum
period for the service of this penalty shall not exceed forty (40) years.

People vs Lucas,
G.R. No. Nos. 108172-73 ; January 9, 1995
It will be observed that Article 27 of the Code provides for the minimum
and maximum ranges of all the penalties in the Code (except bond to keep
the peace which shall be for such period of time as the court may
determine) from arresto menor to reclusion temporal, the latter being
specifically from twelve years and one day to twenty years.
For reclusion perpetua, however, there is no specification as to its

minimum and maximum range, as the aforesaid article merely
provides that "(a)ny person sentenced to any of the perpetual
penalties shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty
years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other
serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as
unworthy of pardon

People vs Lucas,
G.R. No. Nos. 108172-73 ; January 9, 1995
The other applicable reference to Reclusion Perpetua is found in Article 70 of the Code
which, in laying down the rule on successive service of sentences where the
culprit has to serve more than three penalties, provides that "the maximum duration of
the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him," and "(i)n
applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties ( pena perpetua)
shall be computed at thirty years."
The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for Reclusion Perpetua, therefore, is only to
serve as:
1. the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon; OR

2. for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.

People vs Lucas,
G.R. No. Nos. 108172-73 ; January 9, 1995
Since, however, in all the graduated scales of penalties in the Code, as set out in
Article 25, 70 and 71, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to
reclusion temporal, it follows by necessary implication that the minimum of
reclusion perpetua is twenty (20) years and one (1) day with duration
thereafter to last for the rest of the convict's natural life although, pursuant to
Article 70, it appears that the maximum period for the service of penalties shall not
exceed forty (40) years.
It would be legally absurd and violative of the scales of penalties in the

Code to reckon the minimum of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years since
there would thereby be a resultant lacuna whenever the penalty exceeds
the maximum twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but is less than thirty
(30) years.
At most then in fixing a specific duration for reclusion perpetua , Section 21


People vs Latupan
G.R. Nos. 112453-56 June 28, 2001
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder at
the time of the commission of the crime in April 1991
was reclusion temporal maximum to death. The trial court
convicted accused-appellant of murder and sentenced him to "life
imprisonment."
The proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, not life

imprisonment. Obviously, the trial court intended to
impose reclusion perpetua. However, the penalty of life
imprisonment is not the same as reclusion perpetua. They are
distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties.1

People vs Latupan
G.R. Nos. 112453-56 June 28, 2001
First, "life imprisonment" is imposed for serious offenses penalized by

special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised
Penal Code.
Second, "life imprisonment" does not carry with it any accessory

penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties.
Third, "life imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty
(30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although
the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

People vs Latupan
G.R. Nos. 112453-56; June 28, 2001
We likewise note that the trial court sentenced accused to "ten days of
imprisonment" for each count of slight physical injuries. We reiterate
the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal
terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the substantial
difference in their corresponding legal effects and accessory
penalties.
The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified inasmuch as under the
scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the principal penalty for a
felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties. 21
Thus, the courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified in

the Revised Penal Code, such as "reclusion perpetua," not "life
B. AFFLICTIVE PENALTY - Reclusion Temporal
Art. 27. Reclusion temporal. – The penalty of reclusion temporal

shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years.
Art. 41. Reclusion Perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties.
The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
B. AFFLICTIVE PENALTY - Perpetual or Temporary

Disqualification
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification.
The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall
produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if
conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such
office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

B. AFFLICTIVE PENALTY - Perpetual or Temporary Special

Disqualification
Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification.
The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public

office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling
affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either

perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such
disqualification.
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Temporary Disqualification. – The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and

temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years,
B. AFFLICTIVE PENALTY - Perpetual or Temporary Special

Disqualification
Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special

disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the

exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually
or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty,
of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
B. AFFLICTIVE PENALTY - Prision Mayor
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to

read as follows:
Prision Mayor. – The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and

temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to
twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as
an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
Art. 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it
that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
C. CORRECTIONAL PENALTY - Prision Correccional
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as

follows:
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. – The duration of the penalties

of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and
one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory
penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Art. 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
C. CORRECTIONAL PENALTY - Arresto Mayor

Arresto mayor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor

shall be from one month and one day to six months.
Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of
suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of
the sentence.

C. CORRECTIONAL PENALTY - Suspension
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as

follows:
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. – The duration of the penalties of

prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and
one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory
penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the
right of suffrage.
The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall
disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence.

The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions
during the period of his suspension.
C. CORRECTIONAL PENALTY - Destierro

Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. – The duration

of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and
destierro shall be from six months and one day to six
years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory
penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal
penalty.
D. LIGHT PENALTY - Arresto Menor

Arresto menor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto menor

shall be from one day to thirty days.
Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of
suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
D. LIGHT PENALTY - Bond to keep the Peace

Bond to keep the peace – The bond to keep the peace shall
be required to cover such period of time as the court may
determine.
COMMON PENALTIES
1. Fine
2. Bond to keep the Peace

COMMON PENALTIES – FINES

(Section 26 as amended by Republic Act No. 10951)
Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.
A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be

considered an:
1. afflictive penalty, if it exceeds One million two hundred thousand

(₱1,200,000);
2. correctional penalty, if it does not exceed One million two hundred

thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but is not less than Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000); and
3. light penalty, if it be less than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).”

COMMON PENALTIES – Bond to keep the Peace
Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace.
It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to
present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit
the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they
will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to
deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said
undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the
bond.

Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be
detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, if he shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a
light felony.
COMMON PENALTIES – Bond to keep the Peace
Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace.
It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to
present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit
the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they
will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to
deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said
undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the
bond.

Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be
detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, if he shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a
light felony.
PENALTIES WHICH DEPRIVE RIGHTS:
1. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification (Art. 30);

2. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification (Art. 31 and
32);
3. Suspension (Art. 33) ; and
4. Civil interdiction (Art. 34)
Art. 34. Civil interdiction.
Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the:
1. rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to

the person or property of any ward,
2. marital authority of the right to manage his property; and
3. right to dispose of such property by any act or any

conveyance inter vivos.
Type Entire length Minimum length Medium length Maximum Accessory penalties
length
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Reclusion 30 years Civil interdiction for life or during the period

Perpetua of the sentence as the case may be, and
perpetual absolute disqualification
Reclusion 12 years 20 12 years 14 years 14 years 17 years 17 years 20
temporal and one years and one and 8 and 8 and 4 and 4 years
day day months months months months
· If disqualification is imposed, 12 years and

Prision
mayor and 6 years 1 day
temporary and one 12 6 years 8 years and 10 years 10 years 12
disqualificatio day years and 1 day 8 years 1 day and 1 day years Temporary absolute disqualification and that of
n perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage
· If suspension is imposed, 6 years

Suspension from public office, from the right to
Prision 6 months follow a profession or calling, and that of
correccional, and one 6 6 months 2 years
and 4
2 years, 4 4 years
months and and 2
4 years, 2 6
months and years
suspension, years and 1 day months perpetual special disqualification from the
anddestierro day 1 day months 1 day
right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months
6 6 Suspension of the right to hold office and the

Arresto mayor 1 month
and 1 day month 1 month 2 months 2 months
and 1 day 4 months 4 months
and 1 day month right of suffrage during the term of the
s s sentence
Arresto menor 1 day 30 1 day 10 days 11 days 20 days 21 days 30

days days
A C C E SS O RY P E N A LT I E S ( A RT. 4 0 - 4 5 )
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties.

The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry
with it that of:
1. perpetual absolute disqualification; and

2. civil interdiction
during thirty years following the death sentence, unless such accessory penalties have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties.
The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of
3. civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be; and
4. perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES THAT CARRY THE ACCESSORY

PENALTY OF CIVIL INTERDICTION:
1.Death
2.Reclusion Perpetua
3.Reclusion Temporal
Art. 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties.
The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of:

1. temporary absolute disqualification; and
2. perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage
which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory penalties.
The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of:
3. suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling; and
4. perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment
shall exceed eighteen months.
The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties.
The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of :
1. suspension of the right too hold office; and

2. right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the

crime.
Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the:
3. forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime; and

4. Forfeiture of the instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in

favor of the Government, unless they be property of a third person not liable for
the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties.
The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of :
1.suspension of the right too hold office; and

2. right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
O T H E R A C C E SS O RY P E N A LT I E S
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or

instruments of the crime.
Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall

carry with it the:
1. forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime; and

2.Forfeiture of the instruments or tools with which it was
committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated

and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those
articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
O T H E R A C C E SS O RY P E N A LT I E S
Art. 37. Cost; What are included.
Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial
proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts previously
determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not subject to schedule.

Art. 38. Pecuniary liabilities; Order of payment.
In case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the
payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following
order:
1. The reparation of the damage caused.

2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The cost of the proceedings.
S U B S I D I A RY P E N A LT Y
Art. 39 as amended by Republic Act No. 10159
Subsidiary Penalty - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the
next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each
amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition
of judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under
confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall
not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year,
and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. . When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if
the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a
fight felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correctional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall
be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of
fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer
the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not
relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve.” (As amended by Republic Act
No. 5465, which lapsed into law on April 21, 1969.)

1. “A” was convicted of Falsification of Public document committed by a private individual under Art. 172 in
relation Art. 171 RPC. The judgment expressly provides for subsidiary penalty if the convict is insolvent.
PENALTY: Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000)
2 year, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years; 1,000,000/500 highest minimum wage = 2,000 days
2, 190 days + 2,000 days = 4, 190 days

1/3 of 2, 190 = 730 days
1 year = 365 days
2. “A’ was convicted for violation ART. 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property)
penalty is fine of Php 100,000. ( less grave felony)
100,000/500 highest minimum wage = 200 days

6 months = 180 days
what if the crime committed is a light felony? (penalty is fine of not more than Php 40,000; i.e. Php
20,0000)
20,000/500 (highest minimum wage) = 40 days

law provides must not exceed 15 days.
3. “A’ was convicted for Robbery in an Inhabited House and was

sentenced to Reclusion Temporal and a fine of Php 50,000.00 = NO
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
4. “A” was convicted for concubinage and was sentenced to 3 years of Destierro
and a fine of Php 50,000.
50,000/500 highest minimum wage = 100 days

365 x 3 = 1, 095 days
1, 095 days + 100 days = 1, 195 days of Destierro (go back to par. 1)
365 days of destierro
5. service of the subsidiary penalty will not relieve you from the payment of
the fine, if your financial condition will improve in the future. The government
has only 10 years to collect the fine. Only 10 years. It is an obligation arising
from law and the prescriptive period is 10 years
NOTE:
 Subsidiary penalty – refers only to FINE

effect: does not apply to civil damages, cost
 Subsidiary penalty – not an accessory penalty

effect: it is not necessarily included in the decision; it must be expressly
mentioned in the decision. If not stated in the decision then
convict cannot undergo subsidiary imprisonment.

INSTANCES WHEN THERE CAN BE NO SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
1. non-payment of reparation, indemnification (civil damages) and costs

2. if the principal penalty is higher than prison correccional.
3. if the convicted felon is not insolvent
4. if the court did not mention it expressly in the judgment of conviction
A P P L I C AT I O N A N D C O M P U TAT I O N O F P E N A LT I E S
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 28. Computation of penalties.
If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the

temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the
judgment of conviction shall have become final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty
consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that
the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for
the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties
shall be computed only from the day on which the defendant
commences to serve his sentence.
GENERAL RULES: Art. 29 RPC as amended by RA No. 10592
“ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment.
Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service
of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing
after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any
crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from
thirty (30) years.
GENERAL RULES: Art. 29 RPC as amended by RA No. 10592
“ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to

the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on
appeal, if the same is under review.
Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this

paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time
allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause
at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons
charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the
maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is Destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
GENERAL RULES:
PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT – a kind imprisonment undergone by the accused while his case is
pending trial either because the charge is not bailable or if the charge is bailable, he cannot post bail
for his provisional liberty.
- refers to a detention prisoner
RULES:
1. FULL TIME credit – agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners.
UNLESS:
a. RECIDIVIST or PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED TWICE or more of any crime
b. Upon being summon to serve sentence failed to surrender voluntarily.

GENERAL RULES:
RULES:
2. 4/5 credit – did not agree to abide with the disciplinary rules
3. how about felony which carries the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua? Duration of preventive suspension
will be deducted from 30 years.
4. Preventive imprisonment = maximum penalty of the crime charge

Effect: immediate release. (without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the
proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review.)
How computed: ACTUAL DETENTION + GCTA (Good Conduct Time Allowance)
RE-ARREST: if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the
court may motu proprio order the re-arrest of the accused
5. Rules 1-4 will not apply if:

a. Recidivists
b. habitual delinquents
c. Escapees; and
d. persons charged with heinous crimes
6. If the maximum penalty is Destierro, detained person must be released after 30 days of preventive
imprisonment.
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general.
The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be

imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in general terms, it shall be
understood as applicable to the consummated felony.
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory penalties .
Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law,

carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40, 41,
42, 43 and 44 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory
penalties are also imposed upon the convict.
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 74. Penalty higher than Reclusion Perpetua in certain cases.
In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without
specially designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that
of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be considered
as the next higher penalty.
EXAMPLE: Qualified Theft Art. 310

Penalty is 2 degrees higher of the penalty for Simple Theft (Art. 309)
”A” was convicted for Qualified theft and the value of the stolen item is Php
2,400,000.00
Penalty is 2 degrees higher of Reclusion Temporal= Death
SC: penalty is 40 years of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40.
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 74. Penalty higher than Reclusion Perpetua in certain cases.
In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without
specially designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that
of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be considered
as the next higher penalty.
EXAMPLE: Qualified Theft Art. 310

Penalty is 2 degrees higher of the penalty for Simple Theft (Art. 309)
”A” was convicted for Qualified theft and the value of the stolen item is Php
2,400,000.00
Penalty is 2 degrees higher of Reclusion Temporal= Death
SC: penalty is 40 years of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40.
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees.
Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more
degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one-fourth of
the maximum amount prescribed by law, without however, changing the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard of fines that do not consist of a fixed
amount, but are made proportional.
GENERAL RULES:
COMPUTATIONS
Therefore
EXAMPLE: 12y 1d
Reclusion temporal - 12y 1d to 20y 2y 8m
Minimum 12y 1d to 14y 8m 14y & 8m

Medium 12y 8m 1d to 17y 4m
So the minimum period is 12 y 1d to 14y 8m
Maximum 17y 4m 1d to 20y
Formula 14y 8m
1. Determine the duration of the entire felony 2y 8m
16y & 16m or 17y 4m

Maximum 20y So the medium necessarily starts at 14y 8m 1d to
Minimum 12y disregard the 1d 17 y 4m

17y 4m
2. Subtract the maximum to the minimum
2y 8m
19y 12m or 20y
20y - 12y = 8y. This is the duration of the entire penalty.
So, the maximum starts at 17y4m1d to 20y
3. Divide by 3 because there are 3 parts.
8y divided by 3 (if it difficult to divide convert some years into months; in such a way that it is divisible by 3)
8y-2y = 6y, 24m(2y)

6y24m divided by 3 = 2 years and 8 months

4. Add (2 years and 8 months) to the minimum ( 12 years and 1day )
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties.
In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct penalties, each
one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum , the next the medium,
and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided for in
this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules.
NOTE:
In determining whether it is the minimum,
COMPLEX PENALTY : one composed of three distinct penalties medium or maximum penalty, it is the rules
EX. Reclusion Temporal to Death (still a divisible penalty) provided in Art. 64 that would apply. It would
depend on the presence or absence of mitigating
What is the minimum, medium and maximum period? and aggravating circumstances.
In the example:
Apply Art. 77 1. If there is no mitigating, the penalty should be
Reclusion Perpetua.
minimum – Reclusion Temporal (lightest)
2. If there is aggravating, convict will be
medium - Reclusion Perpetua (next lightest) sentenced to death.
maximum – Death (most severe) 3. if there is mitigating and no aggravating, the
penalty should be in the range of reclusion
temporal.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
SPECIFIC RULES:
ARTICLE 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from
that intended.
In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended
to commit, the following rules shall be observed:

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to
the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter
shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lowered than that corresponding to
the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts
committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of
another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which
case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Effect of degree of participation and stage of commission
ARTICLE 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall
be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.
---------------------------------
ARTICLE 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes.
A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be
imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit felony
---------------------------------
ARTICLE 53. Penalties to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.
The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall
be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of consummated felony.
SPECIFIC RULES:
ARTICLE 54. Penalty imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed
upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony.
---------------------------------
ARTICLE 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime.
The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be
imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony.
---------------------------------
ARTICLE 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall
be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.
---------------------------------
ARTICLE 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime.
The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be
imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.
SPECIFIC RULES:

ARTICLE 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribed a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees
than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty.

The courts in applying such lower or higher penalty shall observe the following graduated scales.

SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correccional
6. Arresto Mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto Menor
9. Public Censure
10. Fine

SCALE NO. 2
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification
2. Temporal absolute disqualification
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a professional calling
4. Public Censure
5. Fine
SPECIFIC RULES:
CONSUMATED FRUSTRATED ATTEMPTED
Principal 0 1 2
Accomplice 1 2 3
Accessories 2 3 4
SPECIFIC RULES:
ARITICLE 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50-57.
The provisions contained in Articles 50-57, inclusive of this Code shall not be
applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty
provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon
accomplices or accessories.
EXAMPLE:
ARTICLE 346. RPC. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons entrusted with the custody of
the offended party. The ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and any person who, by abuse of authority or
confidential relationship, shall cooperate as accomplice in the perpetration of the crime embraced in Chapter
Second, Third and Fourth of this Title, shall be punished as principals. xxx

Crimes against chastity (Acts of lasciviousness, seduction corruption of minors, and abduction).
PROBLEM: “A” committed Acts of Lasciviousness against “B” with the help of ”C” who is the mother of “B”. “C”
acted as an accomplice of “A”. According to Article 346, the penalty for “A” (principal) and the penalty
for the ”C” (accomplice) are the same.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties.
For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be
imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following
rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that
immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be
impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the
penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of
another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the
proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale.
4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum prescribed and of the two next
following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the
above mentioned respective graduated scale.
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four preceding
rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated
felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.
SPECIFIC RULES:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower
in degrees shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective
graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.
EXAMPLE:
Penalty for the Principal and in its consummated stage provided by law is the single and
indivisible penalty of DEATH.
1 degree lower – Reclusion Perpetua Follow the Scale

2 degrees lower – Reclusion Temporal provided Article 71
3 degrees lower – Prision Mayor
4 degrees lower – Prision Correccional
SPECIFIC RULES:
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible
penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
EXAMPLE:
3. Penalty is the two indivisible penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to Death. (e.g. MURDER; PARRICIDE)
What is the penalty for an Accomplice – 1 degree lower; how to determine the 1 degree lower penalty?
Look at Par. 2 Art. 61 “the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the
lesser of the penalties”
So, lesser penalty is Reclusion Perpetua… what is before Reclusion Perpetua?

Reclusion Temporal. - penalty for an Accomplice
2. Penalty is the two divisible penalty of Prision Mayor to Reclusion Temporal.

Look at Par. 2 Art. 61 “the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the
lesser of the penalties”
So, lesser penalty is Prision Mayor… what is before Prision Mayor?

Prision Correccional. - penalty for an Accomplice
SPECIFIC RULES:
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the
maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the
medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately
following in said respective graduated scale.
EXAMPLE:
Penalty is one indivisible penalty and the maximum of a divisible penalty of Reclusion Temporal Maximum to Death.
Previously the penalty for Murder before Art. 248 was amended by the Heinous Crime Act
Look at Par. 3 Art. 61 “the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of
the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper divisible penalty and
the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale ”
NOTE: The point of reference will be on the proper divisible penalty which is reclusion temporal.
Under the 3rd rule, the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal is composed of the medium and minimum periods
of reclusion temporal and the maximum of prision mayor.
So, Prision Mayor in its maximum period to Reclusion Temporal in its minimum and medium periods -
penalty for an Accomplice
SPECIFIC RULES:
4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different
divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately
following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the
penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned
respective graduated scale.
EXAMPLE:
Penalty is composed of several periods from different divisible penalties:

Prision Mayor in its medium period to Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period .
Look at Par. 4 Art. 61 “the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following
the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the
penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above
mentioned respective graduated scale”
So, Prision Correccional in its medium and maximum periods to Prision Mayor in its minimum period -
penalty for an Accomplice
NOTE: The penalty immediately following the minimum of the entire sentence, which is prision
mayor medium, is prision mayor in its minimum and the 2 periods next following, which are
prision correccional max and medium.
SPECIFIC RULES:
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the
four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those
guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and
accessories.
EXAMPLE:
Penalty is Prision Correccional in its medium and minimum . (e.g. Abduction)
Arresto Mayor in its medium to maximum periods - penalty for an Accomplice
Note:. The next penalty following is formed by 2 periods to be taken from the same penalty if
possible or from the periods of the penalty numerically following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed. The penalty next following prision correccional in its med and min shall be Arresto mayor
in its med and max.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Additional penalty for certain accessories
Art. 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories.
Those accessories falling within the terms of paragraph 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should
act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of:
1. absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony;and
2. absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.
Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manners:
3. xxx
4. xxxx
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Penalty for an Impossible Crime
Article 59 of the RPC. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the
means employed or the aims sought are impossible.
When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of
the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended
was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by
such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court,
having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose
upon him the penalty of Arresto Mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos
SPECIFIC RULES:
Effect of mitigating, aggravating, and qualifying circumstances
ARTICLE 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency.
Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the
following rules:

1. Aggravating circumstances, which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty
therefore shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
2. The same rule shall not be taken into account for any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal
cause, shall not only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons
only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:

a. Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by the law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
b. Upon a forth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor
in its minimum and medium periods; and
c. Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he is found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith shall in no case exceed 30 years.

For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period often years from the date of his release or last conviction of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener.

SPECIFIC RULES:
1.Aggravating circumstances, which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law

or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefore shall
not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
when is an aggravating circumstance constitute a crime itself?

EX. Arson – by means of fire - no longer an aggravating circumstance
when included in the definition of a crime?

EX. Robbery in an Inhabited house – dwelling - no longer an aggravating circumstance
NOTE:
2. The breaking of a roof, floor or window may constitute malicious mischief. The burning of anything of value may
constitute arson. These aggravating circumstances, if considered as felonies, do not increase the penalty.
3. Among the aggravating circumstances included in the definition of a crime are taking advantage of public position in
Estafa under Art. 215, abuse of confidence in qualified theft (Art. 310); the circumstances which qualify homicide to
murder (Art. 248); and the use of artifice involving great waste and ruin in the crimes punished in Arts. 324 and 330.
SPECIFIC RULES:
2. The same rule shall not be taken into account for any aggravating circumstance inherent in the
crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
when inherent in the crime ?

EX. Robbery – evident premeditation - no longer an aggravating circumstance
NOTE:
3. Relationship is inherent in the crimes of Parricide and Infanticide;

4. Abuse of confidence is inherent in Malversation, Qualified Theft, Seduction and Estafa;
5. Sex is inherent in crimes against chastity, Rape;
6. Taking advantage of public position, in crimes committed by public officers;
7. Premeditation is inherent in Robbery, Theft, Estafa and similar offenses.
8. Nocturnity, abuse of superiority and craft are absorbed by Treachery and are therefore inherent
in Murder qualified by treachery.
9. Premeditation, abuse of superiority and treachery are inherent in treason.
SPECIFIC RULES:
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the offender’s:
a. moral attributes of the offender; or

b. private relations with the offended party, or
c. any other personal cause
shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals,

accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant
EX. “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D” conspiring with one another killed “E”.
“A” was 16 years old; “B” was drunk and known to be a habitual drinker; “C” was a recidivist.
“A” – privilege mitigating circumstance of minority

“B” – aggravating circumstance of intoxication
“C” – aggravating circumstance of recidivism
“D” - none
SPECIFIC RULES:
4. The circumstances which consist in the
a. material execution of the act, or

b. in the means employed to accomplish it,
shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of
them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
EX. “A” hired ”B” to kill “C” paying “B” Php 50,000.00.
“A” told “B” I do not care how you do it, for as long as I will no longer see “C” alive tomorrow.
“B” employed treachery in killing “C” when he surreptitiously and suddenly shot “C” in the
middle of the night while the latter was walking home.
the qualifying aggravating circumstance of Treachery will only be applicable to “B”
But if “A” had prior knowledge as to the means and ways of commission, then treachery will
also be applicable to be him.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Cases where the attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances are not considered
in the imposition of penalties:
1. Penalty that is single and indivisible

2. Felonies through negligence
3. Penalty is a fine
4. Penalty is prescribed by a special law
SPECIFIC RULES:
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:

a. Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by the law for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
b. Upon a forth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which
he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods; and
c. Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last
crime of which he is found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in
conformity herewith shall in no case exceed 30 years.

For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten
(10) years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any said crimes a third
time or oftener.
SPECIFIC RULES:
HABITUAL DELINQUENT is a person who within the period of 10 years from the date of his
(last) release or last conviction of the crimes of:
1. Serious or less serious physical injuries

2. Robbery
3. Theft
4. Estafa
5. Falsification
is found guilty of any of the said crimes a third time or oftener.

Ten year period to be computed from the time of last release OR conviction

Subsequent crime must be committed after conviction of the former crime.
Cases still pending are not to be taken into consideration.

SPECIFIC RULES:
HABITUAL DELINQUENCY RECIDIVISM

Crimes are specified Same title
W/ in 10 years No time fixed by law

Must be found guilty 3rd time or Second conviction
oftener
Additional penalty is imposed Is not offset by MC, increases
penalty to maximum
SPECIFIC RULES:
CRIMES DATE OF DATE OF

COMMITTED CONVICTION RELEASE
Serious Physical January, 1960 January, 1973

Injury
Theft February, 1968 February, 1975
Robbery March, 1980

SPECIFIC RULES:
NOTES:
1. Habitual delinquency is not a crime. It is a circumstance that will authorize the court to add an
additional penalty for the present crime committed.
2. Habitual delinquency imposes an additional penalty, however, if the same is imposed after the court
has acquired jurisdiction over the crime, and the total penalty would exceed the jurisdictional limit of
the court, such situation will not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the crime. (Pp vs. Blanco, 86
Phil. 296)
3. In order that habitual delinquency may be appreciated against the accused, it must be alleged and
detailed in the information or complaint. The dates of the commission of the previous crimes; the
last conviction of release must be contained or written in the information.
4. Under Article 22, when one is a habitual delinquent and he commits felony or offense, any future
punitive law that may favor him in relation to the punishment imposed on him, will not be
given a retroactive effect insofar as said offender is concerned.
SPECIFIC RULES:
NOTES:

1. ten year period is counted NOT from the date of commission of the subsequent offense
BUT TO THE DATE OF CONVICTION or DATE OF RELEASE thereof in relation to the date of his
last release or last conviction
2. when an offender has committed several crimes mentioned in the definition of habitual
delinquent, without being first convicted of any of them before committing the others,
he is not a habitual delinquent
3. commissions of those crimes need not be consummated
4. habitual delinquency applies to accomplice and accessories as long it is in the crimes

specified
5. a crime committed in the minority of the offender is not counted
6. imposition of additional penalty is mandatory and constitutional

SPECIFIC RULES:
NOTES:

7. habitual delinquency is not a crime, it is simply a fact or circumstance which if present gives rise to the imposition of
additional penalty
8. penalty for habitual delinquency is a real penalty that determines jurisdiction
9. In no case shall be the total penalties imposed upon the offender exceed 30 years
10. The imposition of the additional penalties on habitual delinquents are constitutional, it is simply a punishment on
future crimes on account of the criminal propensities of the accused.
11.Habitual delinquency applies at any stage of the execution because subjectively, the offender reveals
the same degree of depravity or perversity as the one who commits a consummated crime.
12. Habitual delinquency applies to all participants because it reveals persistence in them of the inclination to
wrongdoing and of the perversity of character that led them to commit the previous crime.
13. There is no habitual delinquency in offenses punished by special laws. Courts cannot also take judicial notice
of the previous convictions of the accused. Facts of previous convictions must be established during the trial of the
accused.
SPECIFIC RULES:
SPECIAL AGGRVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. ABUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION
Effect: When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his
public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of
mitigating circumstances; cannot be offset by any ordinary mitigating
circumstance, regardless of its number and nature.
2. ORGANIZED OR SYNDICATED CRIME GROUP
refers to a group of 2 or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one

another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. (section 23 of RA No.
7659)
Effect: increases the penalty

SPECIFIC RULES:
SPECIAL AGGRVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
3. QUASI-RECIDIVISM (ART. 160 RPC)
Effect: increases the penalty to the maximum and cannot be offset by any ordinary
mitigating circumstance, regardless of its number and nature.
4. USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS IN COMMISSION OF THE CRIME (SECTION 25 OF RA NO.

9165)
Effect: increases the penalty to the maximum and cannot be offset by any ordinary
mitigating circumstance, regardless of its number and nature.
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an

Offender Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. – Notwithstanding the
provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous
drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime
by an offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal
Code shall be applicable.
SPECIFIC RULES:
ARTICLE 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
In all cases in which the law prescribed a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribed a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance,
for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.
SPECIFIC RULES:

General rule: When the penalty is composed of indivisible penalty, the penalty cannot be
lowered by one degree no matter how many mitigating circumstances are present
Exception: in cases of privileged mitigating circumstances
RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES:
1. Penalty is single and indivisible – applied regardless of the presence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances
2. Penalty composed of two indivisible penalties
a. One aggravating circumstance present – higher penalty

b. One mitigating circumstance present – lower penalty
c. Some mitigating circumstances present and no aggravating – lower penalty
d. Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstance are present – basis in number and
importance
SPECIFIC RULES:

ARTICLE 64. Rules for the application of penalties, which contain three periods.
In all cases in which the penalties prescribed by the law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provision of Article 76 and 77, the
court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or
aggravating circumstance:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its
medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum
period.
3. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty
in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class
against the other according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number
and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater
penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. When the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the
SPECIFIC RULES:

RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES
1. No aggravating and no mitigating circumstances – medium period

2. One mitigating circumstance – minimum period
3. One aggravating circumstance – maximum period
4. Mitigating and aggravating circumstance offset each other; according to
relative weight
5. 2 or more mitigating without any aggravating circumstance – one degree
lower

* If in the commission of the crime, one aggravating circumstance is present, and
four mitigating circumstances are likewise left, the offsetting of one aggravating
circumstance will not entitle the accused to a reduction of his penalty by one
degree. You will only lower the penalty by one degree if it is divisible and there is
absolutely no aggravating circumstance.
SPECIFIC RULES:
EXAMPLE: “A” was convicted of Homicide. The trial court appreciated the following
modifying circumstance:

aggravating circumstance of nocturnity
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
mitigating circumstance of no intent to commit so grave a wrong
mitigating circumstance of Illiteracy
mitigating circumstance of Voluntary surrender
Penalty for homicide: Reclusion Temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years)
Taking into account the attendant mitigating and aggravating circumstances

determine the proper penalty to be imposed upon the accused:

SPECIFIC RULES:
For it to be offset
 The mitigating circumstances must be ordinary, not privileged.
 The aggravating circumstances must be generic or specific, not qualifying or inherent.

Example: a qualifying circumstance (treachery) cannot be offset by a generic mitigating
circumstance (voluntary circumstance)

The court has discretion to impose the penalty within the limits fixed by law

Art 64 not applicable when the a. penalty is indivisible; b. prescribed by special law;
c. Fine
• No matter how many aggravating circumstances are present, you cannot

increase the penalty by 1 degree higher; will only call for the imposition of the
maximum penalty without exceeding the penalty prescribed by law.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three

periods.
In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of

three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing
articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty
prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Art. 66. Imposition of fines.
In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the
amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.

COURT MUST CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING IN IMPOSING THE FINE:
1. mitigating and aggravating circumstances
2. wealth and means of the culprit

 When the minimum of the fine is not fixed, the court shall have the discretion provided it does not
exceed the amount authorized by law

* it is not only the mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances that the court shall take into
consideration, but primarily, the financial capability of the offender to pay the fine.

If the fine imposed by the law appears to be excessive, the remedy is to ask the Congress to amend
the law by reducing the fine to a reasonable amount.
SPECIFIC RULES:
Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances
Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth circumstance of
Article 12 are present.
When all the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt
from criminal liability are not present, the penalty of Arresto Mayor in its maximum period to
Prision Correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have
been guilty of a grave felony, and Arresto Mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less
grave felony.

REQUISITES OF ARTICLE 12, PAR. 4 (ACCIDENT)
1. act causing the injury must be lawful
2. act performed w/ due care
3. injury was caused by mere accident
4. no fault or intention to cause injury

IF THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT ALL PRESENT, THEN THE FOLLOWING PENALTIES SHALL
BE IMPOSED:
Grave Felony – Arresto Mayor maximum to Prision Correccional minimum

SPECIFIC RULES:
Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable.
A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the
deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to
justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in
Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of
the conditions of exemption present or lacking.

PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED WHEN THE CRIME COMMITTED IS NOT WHOLLY EXCUSABLE
1 or 2 degrees lower if the majority of the conditions for justification or exemption in the
cases provided in Arts. 11 and 12 are present.
 This a privilege mitigating circumstance

 incapable of offsetting by an aggravating
SPECIFIC RULES:
MINORS - REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344
Art. 68. as amended by Section 6 of RA No. 9344 - Penalty to be imposed upon a person under
eighteen years of age.
When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be
observed:

1. Upon a person over fifteen but under eighteen years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
2. Upon a person fifteen below - exempted from criminal liability
3. Upon a person above fifteen but under eighteen who acted without discernment -
exempted from criminal liability
ART. 68 PROVIDES FOR A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
OVER 15 but UNDER 18 and has acted w/ discernment - 1degree lower

SPECIFIC RULES:
MINORS - REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344
Art. 68. as amended by Section 6 of RA No. 9344
People vs. Baltar; GR No. 130341; February 10, 2000
In a prosecution for three counts of Rape, Rommel is entitled to the privileged

mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68. When he took the
witness stand on April 1, 1997, he was already 22 years old. As the crimes were
committed way back in the months of October and November 1991, it logically
follows that he was then below 18 years old. The conclusion is supported by his
arrest report which discloses that he was born on November 15, 1974. Thus, the
penalty that should be imposed on him should be one degree lower than
that prescribed by law.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (ACT NO. 4103)
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished

by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum period of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by
another law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
term fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.
 Section 1 states that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is

mandatory.
 What the law says is if a person is found guilty of a crime, a sentence should
THREE THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW:

1. Its purpose;
2. Instances when it does not apply; and
3. How it operates

 Indeterminate Sentence Law governs whether the crime is punishable under the
Revised Penal Code or a special Law. It is not limited to violations of the Revised
Penal Code.
 It applies only when the penalty served is imprisonment. If not by imprisonment,

then it does not apply.
REASON FOR THE ISL MAX AND MIN: so that the prisoner could be released on
parole after serving the minimum sentence and could be rearrested to serve the
maximum.
Purpose

The purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence law is to avoid prolonged
imprisonment, because it is proven to be more destructive than
constructive to the offender. So, the purpose of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law in shortening the possible detention of the convict in jail is to
save valuable human resources. In other words, if the valuable human
resources were allowed prolonged confinement in jail, they would
deteriorate. Purpose is to preserve economic usefulness for these
people for having committed a crime -- to reform them rather than to
deteriorate them and, at the same time, saving the government expenses
of maintaining the convicts on a prolonged confinement in jail.

If the crime is a violation of the Revised Penal Code, the court will impose a
sentence that has a minimum and maximum. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence will be arrived at by taking into account the
attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances according to Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code. In arriving at the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence, the court will take into account the penalty
prescribed for the crime and go one degree lower. Within the range of one
degree lower, the court will fix the minimum for the indeterminate
sentence, and within the range of the penalty arrived at as the maximum
in the indeterminate sentence, the court will fix the maximum of the
sentence. If there is a privilege mitigating circumstance which has
been taken in consideration in fixing the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence, the minimum shall be based on the penalty as reduced by the
privilege mitigating circumstance within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree.
If the crime is a violation of a special law, in fixing the maximum of

the indeterminate sentence, the court will impose the penalty within
the range of the penalty prescribed by the special law, as long as it will not
exceed the limit of the penalty. In fixing the minimum, the court can fix a
penalty anywhere within the range of penalty prescribed by the special
law, as long as it will not be less than the minimum limit of the penalty
under said law. No mitigating and aggravating circumstances are
taken into account.

 The minimum and the maximum referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Law
are not periods. So, do not say, maximum or minimum period.
 For the purposes of the indeterminate Sentence Law, use the term minimum to
refer to the duration of the sentence which the convict shall serve as a
minimum, and when we say maximum, for purposes of ISLAW, we refer to the
maximum limit of the duration that the convict may be held in jail. We are not
referring to any period of the penalty as enumerated in Article 71.
 Courts are required to fix a minimum and a maximum of the sentence

that they are to impose upon an offender when found guilty of the
crime charged. So, whenever the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable,
there is always a minimum and maximum of the sentence that the convict shall
serve.
If the crime is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the law provides that:
a. Maximum shall be arrived at by considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the crime according to the proper rules of the Revised Penal Code. To fix the
maximum, consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances according to the rules found in
Article 64. This means –

1. Penalties prescribed by the law for the crime committed shall be imposed in the medium period if no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance;
2. If there is aggravating circumstance, no mitigating, penalty shall be imposed in the maximum;
3. If there is mitigating circumstance, no aggravating, penalty shall be in the minimum;
4. If there are several mitigating and aggravating circumstances, they shall offset against each other. Whatever
remains, apply the rules.
5. If there are two or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, penalty next lower in degree
shall be the one imposed.
 The attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime are taken into consideration only
when the maximum of the penalty is to be fixed.
 Therefore, the rule is, in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is that penalty arrived at by the court after applying the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances that should be the basis.
b. Minimum - the basis is the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, and go one degree
lower than that.
CRIMES PUNISHED UNDER SPECIAL LAW:
Since crimes punished by special law:
1. carry only one penalty;

2. there are no degree or periods.
3. do not consider mitigating or aggravating circumstance
Under the ISL, when the crime is punished under a special law, the court may fix any
penalty as the:
a. Maximum - NOT exceeding the penalty prescribed by special law for the crime
committed
b. Minimum - courts are given discretion to fix a minimum anywhere within the
range of the penalty prescribed by special law, as long as it will not be lower than
the penalty prescribed.
Disqualification may be divided into three, according to –

1. The time committed;
2. The penalty imposed; and
3. The offender involved.

THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW SHALL NOT APPLY TO:

4. Persons convicted of offense punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment;
5. Persons convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
6. Persons convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage;
7. Persons convicted of piracy;
8. Persons who are habitual delinquents;
9. Persons who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
10.Those who have been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive and shall have
violated the term thereto;
11.Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year (Arresto Menor
and Arresto Mayor)
12.Those sentenced to Destierro or suspension( this are not punishable by imprisonment ).

 Although the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is death or reclusion perpetua, if after
considering the attendant circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal or less, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies (People v. Cempron, 187 SCRA 278).
 Recidivists entitled to the availment of the Indeterminate Sentence Law since those disqualified
are Habitual delinquents. (People vs. Venus, 63 Phil. 435)
 When the accused escaped from jail while his case was on appeal, he is not entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. (People vs. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712)
 A youthful offender whose sentence is suspended under Sec. 192 of P.D. 603 and who escaped
from his confinement is still entitled to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
same is true with an accused confined in the National Center for Mental Health (formerly National
Mental Hospital) since their confinement cannot be considered punishment but more of
administrative matters for their rehabilitation. (People vs. Soler, 63 Phil. 868)
 A person sentenced to Destierro who entered the prohibited area within the prohibited period has
evaded the service of his sentence (People vs. Abilog, 82 Phil. 174) and when he committed a
crime in that area, he will not be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law for
the new crime.
EXAMPLE:
1. No mitigating, aggravating, or the circumstances were offset

“A” was convicted for Homicide
1st step: determine the penalty as prescribed by law - Reclusion Temporal
2nd step: determine the maximum – by applying Article 64
Art. 64 (1) Penalties prescribed by the law for the crime committed shall be imposed in the
medium period if no mitigating or aggravating circumstance;
so, after applying Art. 64 (1) the Maximum is Reclusion Temporal Medium
3rd step: determine the minimum – go one degree lower of the penalty prescribed by law
so, Reclusion Temporal go one degree lower is Prision Mayor
Under the ISL, the penalty imposable is:
ISL max – Reclusion Temporal Medium

ISL min – Prision Mayor any period (discretion of the judge)

EXAMPLE:
2. One (1) mitigating circumstance

Art. 64 (3) If there is mitigating circumstance, no aggravating, penalty shall be in the

minimum;
so, after applying Art. 64 (3) the Maximum is Reclusion Temporal Minimum
ISL max – Reclusion Temporal Minimum


EXAMPLE:
3. One (1) aggravating circumstance

Art. 64 (2) If there is aggravating circumstance, no mitigating, penalty shall be imposed in

the
maximum
so, after applying Art. 64 (2) the Maximum is Reclusion Temporal Maximum
ISL max – Reclusion Temporal Maximum


EXAMPLE:
4. Two (2) mitigating circumstances; one (1) aggravating

Art. 64 (4) If there are several mitigating and aggravating circumstances, they shall offset against each other.
Whatever remains, apply the rules.
so, after applying Art. 64 (4) the Maximum is Reclusion Temporal Minimum
(because after offsetting one mitigating and one aggravating, only one mitigating will be
left.)
ISL max – Reclusion Temporal Minimum


EXAMPLE:
5. Complex Crime
“A” was convicted for Direct Assault with Homicide

1st step: determine the penalty as prescribed by law
Homicide - Reclusion Temporal

Direct Assault – Prision Correccional
 Remember that complex crimes are punishable by the more severe penalty of the two crimes to
imposed in its maximum period.
2nd step: determine the maximum – Reclusion Temporal Maximum

ISL max – Reclusion Temporal Maximum


EXAMPLE:
6. A privileged mitigating and an ordinary mitigating
When there is a privileged mitigating (minority or incomplete self-defense) and an ordinary mitigating (plea of
guilty or voluntary surrender), the rule is: Lower first the penalty prescribed by the Code by one degree (because
of the privileged mitigating). This will be the max of the ISL and the penalty next lower will be the minimum of the
ISL.
“A”, a sixteen (16) year old minor was convicted for Murder.
Reclusion Temporal Maximum to Death
2nd step: Apply the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority – one degree lower
Prision Mayor Maximum
3rd step: Apply the ordinary mitigating circumstance – minimum period
Between Prision Mayor Maximum to Death – follow the Minimum, which is PM Max.
4th step: determine the Minimum – go one degree lower of the penalty prescribed by law
so, Prision Mayor Maximum, go one degree lower is Prision Correccional maximum to Prision Mayor
Minimum
ISL max – Prision Mayor Maximum

ISL min –any period between Prision Correccional maximum to Prision Mayor Medium

EXAMPLE:
7. Two privileged mitigating and ordinary mitigating circumstance
“A”, a sixteen (16) year old minor killed “B” in self-defense but “A’ did not employ reasonable means.
“A’ then voluntarily surrendered to the police. He was then convicted for Homicide.

Reclusion Temporal
2nd step: Apply the two (2) privilege mitigating circumstances of minority and incomplete self-defense
– two (2) degrees lower
Prision Correccional
3rd step: Apply the ordinary mitigating circumstance (voluntary surrender) – minimum period
Prision Correccional Minimum
4th step: determine the Minimum – go one degree lower of the penalty prescribed by law
Arresto Mayor
ISL max – Prision Correccional Minimum

ISL min – Arresto Mayor, any period (discretion of the judge)
EXAMPLE: VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAW
PNELATY: Anyone who is found guilty of violation of this Act shall, upon conviction be punished by
imprisonment ranging form”1 year to 5 years” .

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will sentence you to the maximum, the
maximum would be anywhere within that range, and the minimum should also be within
that range.
It could be:
one year as minimum to five years as maximum; Or
one year as minimum to four years as maximum.
*Anywhere between one to five, for as long as it does not go down to less that one, or
exceed five.
For penalties under special laws, there is no such thing as periods, no such thing as one degree
lower. This is easier. Just fix it anywhere within the prescribed penalty.


G.R. No. 188562; August 17, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RODEL LANUZA
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City in Criminal Case No. 13388-14, finding accused-appellant
Rodel B. Lanuza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC, taking into
consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and applying the indeterminate sentence law,
sentenced accused-appellant to imprisonment from four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Issue: whether or not the RTC imposed the correct penalty, applying the ISL?
Ruling: Yes.
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of frustrated homicide is one degree lower than that prescribed by
law for the crime of homicide. Under the indeterminate sentence law, the maximum of the sentence shall
be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Considering that the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal, the penalty for
the crime of frustrated homicide would be prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, there
being the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the
sentence should be within the range of prision mayor in its minimum term which has a duration of six (6)
years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, and that, on the other hand, the minimum should be within the range
of prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the
imposition of imprisonment from four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)

G.R. No. 180219. November 23, 2011
Virgilio Talampas vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS: On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness Jose
Sevilla, found Talampas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, and disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, with one mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of IMPRISONMENT ranging from TEN (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) years and EIGHT (8) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Matic y Masinloc ….
Issue: whether or not the RTC imposed the correct penalty, applying the ISL?
Ruling: No.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and eight months, as maximum, legally
erroneous.
The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Under
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 15 the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14
years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code.16 It is such period that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
reckoned from. Hence, limiting the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at only 14 years and
eight months contravened the express provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for such
penalty was within the minimum period of reclusion temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one
day to the maximum term fixed by the lower courts.
The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence. It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the minimum
term thus fixed was entirely within the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of one
day to the 10 years as the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of Talampas may occasion a
degree of inconvenience when it will be time for the penal administrators concerned to consider and
determine whether Talampas is already qualified to enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Hence, in order to simplify the computation of the minimum penalty of the
indeterminate sentence, the Court deletes the one-day increment from the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2007 finding VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y
MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and IMPOSES the indeterminate sentence of 10
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal,

G.R. No. 173473; December 17, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Beth Temporada,
FACTS: After joint trial, on May 14, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime of large
scale illegal recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, and five (5) counts
of Estafa under Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On February 24, 2006, the CA
affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE, with MODIFICATION to the effect that in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-208373,
02-208375, & 02-208376, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum; and in Criminal
Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects
Issue: whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty, applying the ISL?
Ruling: No.
While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts of estafa, we find, however, that the CA erroneously
computed the indeterminate penalties therefor. The CA deviated from the doctrine laid down in People v.
Gabres;16 hence its decision should be reversed with respect to the indeterminate penalties it imposed. The
reversal of the appellate court’s Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate
penalties imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms, as determined by the latter, were
For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to first clarify the meaning of certain
terms in the sense that they will be used from here on. Later, these terms shall be
aligned to what the dissent appears to be proposing in order to clearly address the
points raised by the dissent.
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies
defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to
as the "PRESCRIBED PENALTY." For instance, under Article 24922 of the RPC, the
prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges from 12
years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for
attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission of a
felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This
penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "IMPOSABLE PENALTY." In the case
of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. FROM THIS IMPOSABLE PENALTY, THE
COURT CHOOSES A SINGLE FIXED PENALTY (ALSO CALLED A STRAIGHT
PENALTY) WHICH IS THE "PENALTY ACTUALLY IMPOSED" ON A CONVICT, I.E.,
THE PRISON TERM HE HAS TO SERVE.
With the passage of the ISL, THE LAW CREATED A PRISON TERM WHICH CONSISTS OF A
MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM TERM CALLED THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE.25 Section 1 of the ISL
provides –
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense; x x x.
Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed under the pre-ISL
regime became the maximum term under the ISL regime. Upon the other hand, the minimum term
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty.
Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,23 a pre-ISL case, the accused was found guilty of homicide with a prescribed penalty
of reclusión temporal. Since there was one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances in this
case, the imposable penalty is reclusión temporal in its maximum period, i.e., from 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years. The court then had the discretion to impose any prison term provided it is within said period, so that the
penalty actually imposed on the accused was set at 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal,24 which is a single
fixed penalty, with no minimum or maximum term
To illustrate using ISL, if the case of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL regime, then the maximum term would be 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal and the minimum term could be anywhere within the range
of prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) which is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal.
If we use the formula as proposed by the dissent, i.e., to compute the minimum term based on
the maximum term after the attending or modifying circumstances are considered, the basis for
computing the minimum term, under this interpretation, is the imposable penalty 26 as
hereinabove defined. This interpretation is at odds with Section 1 of the ISL which
clearly states that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be "WITHIN THE
RANGE OF THE PENALTY NEXT LOWER TO THAT PRESCRIBED BY THE CODE FOR THE
OFFENSE." CONSEQUENTLY, THE BASIS FOR FIXING THE MINIMUM TERM IS THE
PRESCRIBED PENALTY,27 AND NOT THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY.
In People v. Gonzales,28 the Court held that the minimum term must be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense "without regard to circumstances
modifying criminal liability."29 The Gonzales’ ruling that the minimum term must be based
on the prescribed penalty "without regard to circumstances modifying criminal liability" is only
a restatement of Section 1 of the ISL that the minimum term shall be taken from within the
range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty (and from nowhere else)
The penalty is considered "indeterminate" because after the convict serves the minimum term,
he or she may become eligible for parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the
period between the minimum and maximum term indeterminate in the sense that he or she
may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or
in part. (People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 114 [1933])
E X E C U T I O N A N D S E R V I C E O F P E N A LT I E S
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 70. Successive service of sentence.
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties
will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed
successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first
imposed, or should they have been served out.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the penalties shall
be determined in accordance with the following scale:

1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10 Temporal absolute disqualification.
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling, and
12. Public censure.
GENERAL RULES:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the
convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to
the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be
liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum
period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years
In applying the provision of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua)
shall be computed at thirty years.
GENERAL RULES:
RULES:
1. Simultaneous service of sentence if the nature of the penalty permits.
Example: 1st crimes: ”A” was sentenced to 6 years of prision correccional.

2nd crime: “A” sentenced to 15 years of temporary disqualification
3rd crime: “A” was sentenced to 20 years of absolute disqualification.
Is it possible for ‘A” to serve simultaneously? Yes.
2. Successive service of sentence – if the nature of the penalties does not allow simultaneous service

2nd crime: “A” sentenced to 4 years of prision correccional
3rd crime: “A” was sentenced to 1 years of prision correccional.
4th crime: “A” was sentenced to 6 months Arrest Mayor
5th crime: “A” was sentenced to 6 months Arresto Menor
Is it possible for “A” to serve simultaneously? No, must be served successively, one
after the other.
GENERAL RULES:
RULES:
3. If served successively, it must be in the order of severity.

2nd crime: “A” sentenced to 4 years of prision correccional
3rd crime: “A” was sentenced to 1 years of prision correccional.
5th crime: “A” was sentenced to 6 months Arresto Menor
start with the most severe penalty, 6 years of prision correccional, then so
and so forth…

GENERAL RULES:
RULES:
4. But the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence must not exceed three (3) times of the most severe penalty - Known as the
“THREE-FOLD Rule”
Example: 1st crimes: ”A” was sentenced to 1 year of prision correccional.

2nd crime: “A” sentenced to 6 months of Arresto Mayor
3rd crime: “A” was sentenced to 5 months of Arresto Mayor
5th crime: “A” was sentenced to 8 months Arresto Mayor
If “A” was to serve all of his penalties, that would be 4 years and one month, to be served one by one.
BUT, the rules provide, not more than 3 times the most severe penalty
So, 1 year multiply by 3 = 3 years (On the 3rd year, “A” should be released. )

 the three-fold rule does not apply when the application of the rule will not benefit the convict.

Example: 1st crimes: ”A” was sentenced to 1 year of Prision Correccional
2nd crime: “A” sentenced to 2 months of Arresto Mayor
3rd crime: “A” was sentenced to 3 months of Arresto Mayor
4th crime: “A” was sentenced to 1 months Arrest Menor
 If “A” was to serve all of his penalties, that would be 1 years and 6 months, to be served one by one.
 three-fold rule will not apply, because it would be higher; 1year multiped by 3 = 3 years
GENERAL RULES:
RULES:
5. provided that the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence in no case shall it
exceed 40 years,
Example: ”A” was convicted for ten (10) counts of Murder sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua for each count.
How long be “A” serve his sentence?
Apply Rule no 5. NOT MORE THAN 40 YEARS.
 So, technically, under the RPC, there is no such thing as perpetual imprisonment.

 For purposes of the Three-Fold Rule, even perpetual penalties are taken into account.
For purposes of the Three-Fold rule, indivisible penalties are given equivalent
of 30 years.
3 SYSTEMS OF PENALTIES:
1."MATERIAL ACCUMULATION SYSTEM." - if one commits 2 or more crimes and you

are sentenced to 2 or more penalties, you have to serve all of them, even if it goes
beyond the rest of your life.

2."JUDICIAL ACCUMULATION SYSTEM”- if the convict serves his sentence up to a
certain point he will be be released.

3."ABSORPTION SYSTEM". - the convict serves the highest penalty; the minor penalties
are deemed absorbed by the service of the highest penalty.

 Subsidiary penalty/imprisonment – is excluded in computing for the maximum duration
Example: Juan has ten (10) sentences of 6 months and 1 day each and a fine of 1000.
He was not able to pay the fine.
6 months and 1 day multiplied by 10 = 5 years and 10 days

6 months and 1 day multiplied by 3 = 18 months and 3 days (three-fold rule)
so, AFTER 18 months and 3 days, Juan can serve his subsidiary penalty/imprisonment
 Although this rule is known as the Three-Fold rule, you cannot actually apply this if the convict is
to serve only three successive penalties. The Three-Fold Rule can only be applied if the convict is
to serve four or more sentences successively.

 The chronology of the penalties as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
followed.

 It is in the service of the penalty, not in the imposition of the penalty, that the Three-Fold
rule is to be applied. The three-Fold rule will apply whether the sentences are the product of
one information in one court, whether the sentences are promulgated in one day or whether the
sentences are promulgated by different courts on different days. What is material is that the
Example:
Penalties imposed are –

1 Prision Correccional minimum – 2 years and 4 months
1 Arresto Mayor - 1 month and 1 day to 6 months
1 Prision Mayor - 6 years and 1 day to 12 years

Do not commit the mistake of applying the Three- Fold Rule in this case.
Never apply the Three-Fold rule when there are only three sentences.
Even if you add the penalties, you can never arrive at a sum higher than the product of the most
severe multiplied by three.

 If asked, if you were the judge, what penalty would you impose, for purposes of imposing the
penalty, the court is not at liberty to apply the Three-Fold Rule, whatever the sum total of penalty
for each crime committed, even if it would amount to 1,000 years or more. It is only when the
convict is serving sentence that the prison authorities should determine how long he
should stay in jail.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF PETE C. LAGRAN,

[G.R. No. 147270. August 15, 2001]

FACTS:

April 18, 1994 – petitioner Pete Lagran was convicted for 3 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year for each count.
August 6, 1997 – Decision became final and executory
March 5, 1998 – Entry of judgment was made
February 24, 1999 – detained to Quezon City Jail
April 3, 1999 – transferred to the New Bilibid Prison and served there till the date of the decision
March 19, 2001 – Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus
He prayed for his immediate release as he had allegedly completed the service of his
sentence. Citing Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, he argued that if the penalties or sentences
imposed on the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences emanated from one
court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously. He stated that he has
been incarcerated for two (2) years and four (4) days, counted from February 28, 2001, thus, his detention
in the New Bilibid Prison is now without legal basis.

ISSUE:

W/N the penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences
emanated from one court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously?

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF PETE C. LAGRAN,

[G.R. No. 147270. August 15, 2001]

RULING:
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature of
the penalties so permit. The penalties that can be simultaneously served are:
(1) perpetual absolute disqualification,
(2) perpetual special disqualification,
(3) temporary absolute disqualification,
(4) temporary special disqualification,
(5) suspension,
(6) Destierro,
(7) public censure,
(8) fine and bond to keep the peace,
(9) civil interdiction, and
(10) confiscation and payment of costs.
These penalties, except destierro, can be served simultaneously with imprisonment. The penalties
consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such
penalties. Where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should
be served successively.
In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one-year imprisonment for every count of the offense
committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms
simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service of sentence, it can be found that petitioner has not
yet completed the service of his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence only on February
ARTICLE 71, RPC. Graduated Scales. In case in which the law prescribed a penalty lower or higher by one or more
degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty. The courts,
in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:

Scale No. 1
Death
Reclusion Perpetua
Reclusion Temporal
Prision Mayor
Prision Correccional
Arresto Mayor
Destierro
Arresto Menor
Public Censure
Fine

Scale No. 2
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification
Temporal Absolute Disqualification
Suspension from Public Office, The Right to Vote and to be Voted for, The right to follow a
Profession or Calling
Public Censure
Fine
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ART. 70 AND 71

ARTICLE 71 - ISSUE IS GRADUATION OF PENALTIES
ARTICLE 70 - ISSUE IS SUCCESSIVE SERVICE OF SENTENCE

Example:
”A”,” B”, and “C” are charged criminally. “A” as principal, “B” as accomplice, and “C” as accessory.
All of them were convicted. The penalty for “A” is Arresto Mayor.
What is the penalty for” B” as an accomplice and “C” as an accessory?
The issue is how do you go one or two degrees lower?, Graduation of Penalties… then apply ART. 71
For “B” accomplice, 1 degree lower of Arresto Mayor – Destierro
For “C’ accessory , 2 degrees lower of Arresto Mayor – Arresto Menor
Example:
”A”,” was charged and convicted for three (3) separate felonies.
1st crime “A” was sentenced for 6 months of Arresto Mayor
2nd crime “A” was sentenced for 6years of Destierro
3rd crime “A” was sentenced for 5 days of Arresto Menor.
The issue is how “A” will serve the sentences? Service of sentence… then apply ART. 70
Serve first the most severe. Arresto Mayor first, then Arresto Mayor then Destierro.
 why is it that in Article 71, Destierro is higher than Arresto Menor?

It is because Destierro is a correccional penalty, while Arresto Menor is a light penalty.

 Why is it that in Article 70, it is the reverse
Destierro does not involve the imprisonment, but only banishment.
Our common sense will tell us that the penalty, which consists in the deprivation of freedom, is more severe than a penalty, which is not confinement.
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed.
No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or
incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.

In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the institutions
in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be
performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the convicts among
themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.

The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into
different departments and also for the correction and reform of the convicts.
NOTE:
 Only penalty by final judgment can be executed. Judgment is final if the accused has not appealed within 15 days or
he has expressly waived in writing that he will not appeal.

 An appeal suspends the service of the sentence imposed by the trial court. In the absence of an appeal, the law
contemplates a speedy execution of the sentence, and in the orderly administration of justice, the defendant should
be forthwith remanded to the sheriff for the execution of the judgment.

 There could be no subsidiary liability if it was not expressly ordered in the judgment
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed.
The death sentence shall be executed with preference to any other and shall consist in putting the
person under sentence to death by lethal injection. The death sentence shall be executed under
the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of
the person under sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to insure that the lethal injection to
be administered is sufficient to cause instantaneous death of the convict.

The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one(1) year but not later than
eighteen(18) months after the judgment has become final and executory without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his clemency powers at all times . (As
amended by RA# 8177)
GENERAL RULES:
DEATH PENALTY
To which crimes imposed:

Applies only to those crimes which are specified under RA 7659. If a crime is not included in the list of heinous
crimes, the penalty cannot be validly imposed for said crime.

What are heinous crimes?
These are grievous, odious and hateful offenses, which by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

What are the heinous crimes under RA 7659?
Treason
Qualified piracy / mutiny
Qualified bribery
Parricide
Murder
Infanticide
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
Robbery with Homicide
Robbery with rape
Robbery with Intentional Mutilation
Robbery with arson
Destructive Arson
Rape committed with the use of deadly weapon
Rape committed by two or more persons
Rape with Homicide / Attempted rape with homicide
Rape under certain circumstances
Plunder
Violation of RA 6425, where quantity involved is more than or equal to that certified under Sec. 20 thereof
Carnapping where the owner or occupant of the vehicle is killed
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit.
The court shall designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such
designation shall not be communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the
execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least eight hours following
the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the notification and the
execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in
order to be attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the religion he professes and to
consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his family or persons
in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of
his descendants.
NOTE:
 Designate a working day which shall not be communicated to the offender before the sunrise of
said day. The execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least 8 hours following
such notification.

 He can execute a will.
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.
The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one(1) year
after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death
sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40.

In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records of the case shall be forwarded
immediately by the Supreme Court to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power. (As amended by Sec. 25, RA No. 7659)
NOTE:
Death sentence commuted to Reclusion Perpetua:

1. Convict is over 70 years old.
SUSPENSION of Death Sentence :
2. woman, while pregnant or within 1 year r after delivery

GENERAL RULES:
Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same.
The execution shall take place in the penitentiary or Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and
shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives,
not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary personnel of the penal
establishment, and by such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorize.

Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial.
Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal
proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific
research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institute
shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall
order the burial of the body of the culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present
thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall
the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with pomp.
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same.
The execution shall take place in the penitentiary or Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and
shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives,
not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary personnel of the penal
establishment, and by such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorize.

Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial.
Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal
proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific
research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institute
shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall
order the burial of the body of the culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present
thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall
the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with pomp.
GENERAL RULES:
Art. 86. Reclusion Perpetua, Reclusion Temporal, Prision Mayor, Prision

Correccional and Arresto Mayor.
The penalties of Reclusion Perpetua, Reclusion Temporal, Prision Mayor, Prision Correccional and
Arresto Mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided
by the Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future.

Art. 87. Destierro.
Any person sentenced to Destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places
designated in the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more
than 250 and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.

Art. 88. Arresto Menor.
The penalty of Arresto Menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the
defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in
its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may
seem satisfactory to it.
GENERAL RULES:
DESTIERRO SHALL BE IMPOSED IN THE FOLLOWING CASES:
1. death or serious physical injuries is caused or are inflicted under exceptional circumstance
2. person fails to give bond for good behavior
3. concubine’s penalty for the crime of concubinage
4. lowering the penalty by degrees

EXECUTION OF DISTIERRO
Convict shall not be permitted to enter the place designated in the sentence nor within the radius
specified, which shall not be more than 250 and not less than 25 km from the place designated.
If the convict enters the prohibited area, he commits evasion of sentence

ARRESTO MENOR served where:
5. In the municipal jail
6. In the house of the offender, but under the surveillance of an officer of the law whenever the
court so provides in the decision due to the health of the offender. But the reason is not
satisfactory just because the offender is a respectable member of the community
SUSPENTION OF SENTENCE
1.Probation law – Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by

Republic Act No. 10707
2.Insanity – Art. 79
3.Minors – Republic Act No. 9344
4.Parole ( Indeterminate Sentence Law)

SUSPENTION OF SENTENCE - PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLUC ACT NO. 10707
(PROBATION LAW)
PROBATION is a manner of disposing of an accused who have been convicted by a trial court by placing
him under supervision of a probation officer, under such terms and conditions that the court may fix. This
may be availed of before the convict begins serving sentence by final judgment and provided
that he did not appeal anymore from conviction.

THE FOLLOWING ARE DISQUALIFIED:
1. sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years
2. convicted of any crime against the national security
3. who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
4. who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
5. who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became
applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.”

NOTE:
 If the offender was convicted of several offenses which were tried jointly and one decision was rendered
where multiple sentences imposed several prison terms as penalty, the basis for determining whether
the penalty disqualifies the offender from probation or not is the term of the individual imprisonment
and not the totality of all the prison terms imposed in the decision. So even if the prison term
would sum up to more than six years, if none of the individual penalties exceeds six years,
the offender is not disqualified by such penalty from applying for probation.
(PROBATION LAW)
WHEN TO APPLY FOR PROBATION:
1. After the trial court have convicted and sentenced the accused for a probationable penalty(not more than 6 years of
imprisonment; fine not more than Php 1,000)
2. Upon application by the accused within the period for perfecting an appeal (within 15 days from promulgation of
judgment)
3. The filing of the application for probation shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
 No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction
Provided, That when a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and
such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed
to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. The
application for probation based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since
been re-raffled. In a case involving several defendants where some have taken further appeal, the other
defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written application and attaching thereto a certified true
copy of the judgment of conviction.
This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation should he seek a review
of the modified decision which already imposes a probationable penalty
4. An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
EFFECT OF PROBATION:
(PROBATION LAW)
May a recidivist be given the benefit of Probation Law?

GENERAL RULE: NO
EXCEPTION: If the earlier conviction refers to a crime the penalty of which does not exceed 30 days
imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00 (Arresto Menor), such convict is not disqualified of
the benefit of probation.
 Although a person may be eligible for probation, the moment he perfects an appeal from
the judgment of conviction, he cannot avail of probation anymore. So the benefit of
probation must be invoked at the earliest instance after conviction. He should not wait up to the
time when he interposes an appeal or the sentence has become final and executory. The idea is
that probation has to be invoked at the earliest opportunity.

 An application for probation is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the trial court that
renders the judgment.

 Once he appeals, regardless of the purpose of the appeal, he will be disqualified from applying for
Probation, even though he may thereafter withdraw his appeal.

(PROBATION LAW)
 If the offender would appeal the conviction of the trial court and the appellate court reduced the
penalty to say, less than six years, that convict can still file an application for probation,
because the earliest opportunity for him to avail of probation came only after judgment by the
appellate court.

 PURPOSE OF PROBATION: Probation is intended to promote the correction and rehabilitation of
an offender by providing him with individualized treatment; to provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence; to prevent the commission of offenses; to decongest our jails; and to save the
government much needed finance for maintaining convicts in jail

 Probation is only a privilege. So even if the offender may not be disqualified of probation, yet
the court believes that because of the crime committed it was not advisable to give probation
because it would depreciate the effect of the crime, the court may refuse or deny an application
for probation.

 Probation is only available once and this may be availed only where the convict starts serving
sentence and provided he has not perfected an appeal.
(PROBATION LAW)
PROBATION SHALL BE DENIED IF THE COURT FINDS:
1. That the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by
his commitment to an institution;
2. That there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another
crime; or
3. Probation will depreciate the seriousness of the crime.

THE PROBATION LAW IMPOSES TWO KINDS OF CONDITIONS:

4. Mandatory conditions; and
5. Discretionary conditions.

(PROBATION LAW)
Mandatory conditions:

1. The convict must report to the Probation Officer (PO) designated in the court order approving his
application for Probation within 72 hours from receipt of Notice of such order approving his
application; and
2. The convict, as a probationer, must report to the PO at least once a month during the period of
probation unless sooner required by the PO.

 These conditions being mandatory, the moment any of these is violated, the probation
is cancelled.

Discretionary conditions:

The trial court which approved the application for probation may impose any condition which may
be constructive to the correction of the offender, provided the same would not violate the
constitutional rights of the offender and subject to this two restrictions: (1) the conditions imposed
should not be unduly restrictive of the probationer; and (2) such condition should not be
incompatible with the freedom of conscience of the probationer

(PROBATION LAW)
Procedure of Probation:
1. trial court gives a sentence

2. within the period for filing an appeal, must apply for probation in the trial court. If already filed an appeal. As
long as records haven’t reached appellate courts, must withdraw to apply for probation. Applying for probation
means waiver of Right to Appeal.
3. upon application, trial court to suspend execution of sentence. But does not mean already on probation
4. judge to order probation officer to investigate case(whether qualified, character antecedents, environment,
mental and physical condition and available institutional and community resources)
5. Officer to submit report not later than 60 days. Court to give decision not later than 15 days after receipt of
report. Pending investigation, may be released under bail. No bail filed, can be released on the custody of a
responsible member of the community.
6. the judge may grant the application or not

Granted – release the convict subject to certain conditions: Two important requirements: (1) present self to probation officer within 72
hours from receipt of order (2) you will report to said officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by the officer.
Other conditions are special and discretionary and are provided in Sec. 10 of the Probation Law.
Once granted, principal and accessory penalties are deemed suspended.

Denied – reasons of the court may be:
that you need correctional treatment
there is undue risk that you will commit another crime
probation may depreciate the seriousness of the offense

 an order granting or denying probation is NOT appealable
SUSPENTION OF SENTENCE - PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLUC ACT NO.
10707 (PROBATION LAW)
DURATION OF PROBATION (probation will last according to the following)
 if sentence is not more than 1 year, probation shall not exceed 2 years
 if sentence is more than 1 year, probation shall not exceed 6 years
 if sentence is fine with subsidiary imprisonment, probation shall be twice the days of
subsidiary

 Probationer may be arrested at anytime during probation if there was a serious violation
of the conditions.
 If Probation is revoked, must serve the sentence originally imposed. Court’s order not
appealable.

 Probation ends after the court, basing on the probation’s officer’s report, orders final discharge.
All civil rights will be restored. Pay fine for the original crime.

 Expiration of the probation period does not automatically terminate probation.
Must have court order.

SUSPENTION OF SENTENCE - PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLUC ACT NO.
10707 (PROBATION LAW)
Termination of Probation.
1. After the period of probation; and

2. upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer
The court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended
as a result of his conviction and to totally extinguish his criminal liability as to the offense
for which probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order.”

SUSPENTION OF SENTENCE (INSANITY)
Art. 79. Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity.
When a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced,
the execution of said sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the personal
penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance number 1 of article 12 being
observed in the corresponding cases.

If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the
penalty shall have prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs
while the convict is serving his sentence
NOTE:
CASES OF INSANITY:
 after final sentence, suspend the sentence regarding the personal penalties
 if he recovers, the sentence is executed unless it has prescribed
 the payment of civil or pecuniary liabilities shall not be suspended
SUSPENTION OF SENTENCE (MINORITY)
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence.
Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing
the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
NOTE : Rule 67 IRR RA NO. 9344
If the CICL was under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the 38 offense, and was found guilty of
the offense charged, the Court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability of the parents, which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the Court shall place the child
in conflict with the law under a suspended sentence, without need of application; Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied or shall still be available, even if the CICL is already eighteen years (18) of age,
until the CICL reaches twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of the pronouncement of guilt.
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law.
Upon the recommendation of the social worker who has custody of

the child, the court shall dismiss the case against the child whose
sentence has been suspended and against whom disposition measures
have been issued, and shall order the final discharge of the child if it
finds that the objective of the disposition measures have been
fulfilled.
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil
liability resulting from the commission of the offense, which shall be
enforced in accordance with law.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.
If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
NOTE: RULE 71. IRR RA NO. 9344 - Credit in the Service of Sentence
The child in conflict with the law shall be credited in the service of his or her sentence,
with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act. Any form of
physical restraint imposed on the child in conflict with the law, including community service, the
implementation of the Diversion Contract, and commitment to an institution for the youth, shall be
considered as preventive imprisonment for purposes of crediting the service of sentence.
RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW (A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC; February 28, 2002)
Section 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders.
The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court
shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence
which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad
litem.
It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the
rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile:
1. Care, guidance, and supervision orders;

2. Community service orders;
3. Drug and alcohol treatment;
4. Participation in group counseling and similar activities;
5. Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juveniles in
conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in
conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status
and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such
report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence
may be deemed necessary.
Section 33. Discharge of Juvenile Subject of Disposition Measure.
Upon the recommendation of the SSCD and a duly authorized officer of the DSWD, the head of an
appropriate center or the duly accredited child-caring agency which has custody over the juvenile, the Family
Court shall, after due notice to all parties and hearing, dismiss the case against the juvenile who has been
issued disposition measures, even before he has reached eighteen (18) years of age, and order a final discharge
if it finds that the juvenile has behaved properly and has shown the capability to be a useful member of the
community.
If the Family Court, however, finds that the juvenile has not behaved properly, has been incorrigible, has
not shown the capability of becoming a useful member of society, has willfully failed to comply with
the conditions of his disposition or rehabilitation program, or should his continued stay in the training
institution where he has been assigned be not in his best interests, HE SHALL BE BROUGHT BEFORE
THE COURT FOR EXECUTION OF HIS JUDGMENT.
If the juvenile in conflict with the law has reached the age of eighteen (18) years while in commitment, the Family
Court shall determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the first paragraph of this Section or to
execute the judgment of conviction. In the latter case, unless the juvenile has already availed of probation under
Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, he may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of
the Probation Law.
The final release of the juvenile shall not extinguish his civil liability. The parents and other persons
exercising parental authority over the juvenile shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the
Section 34. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment.
After promulgation of sentence and upon application at any time by the juvenile in conflict with the law within the period to
appeal, the Family Court may place the juvenile on probation, if he is qualified under the Probation Law.
Section 35. Credit in Service of Sentence.
The juvenile in conflict with the law who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment, if he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same or similar disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, except in any of the following cases:
1. When the juvenile is a recidivist or has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; or
2. When upon being summoned for execution of sentence, he failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the juvenile does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Whenever the juvenile has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released
immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In
case the maximum penalty to which the juvenile may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.
Any form of physical restraint imposed on the juvenile in conflict with the law, including community service and commitment to a
rehabilitation center, shall be considered preventive imprisonment
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 89. How criminal liability is TOTALLY extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1.By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as

to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2.By service of the sentence;
3.By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5.By prescription of the crime;
6.By prescription of the penalty;
7.By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article
344 of this Code.
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
PERSONAL PENALTIES – imprisonment, loss of rights, suspension, disqualifications, civil

interdiction
PECUNIARY PENALTIES – fine
 Criminal liability whether BEFORE OR AFTER final judgment is extinguished upon death
because it is a personal penalty
 Pecuniary penalty is extinguished only when death occurs BEFORE final judgement.
 Pecuniary penalty is NOT extinguished if death happens AFTER final judgment. - State can
collect through the convict’s assets
 Where there are several accused, the death of one does not result to the dismissal of the
action because the liabilities, whether civil or criminal of said accused are distinct and
separate.
 The death of the offended party pending the trial is not included in the total extinction of criminal
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
HOW ABOUT CIVIL DAMAGES? (PP vs. BAYOTAS)
 Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction EXTINGUISHES HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS WELL
AS THE CIVIL LIABILITY BASED SOLELY THEREON.
 The claim of civil liability SURVIVES notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
ARTICLE 1157, CIVIL CODE. Obligations arises from; (SOURCES OF OBLIGATION)

1. Law;
2. Contracts;
3. Quasi-contracts;
4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and,
5. Quasi-delicts.
 Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore, may be pursued but only by way of FILING
A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION and subject to Section 1 Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the
estate of the accused, depending on the source obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
2. By service of the sentence

 Crime is like a debt; hence extinguished upon payment

 Service does not extinguish civil liability.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all

its effects

AMNESTY – is an act of the sovereign power granting oblivion or general
pardon. It WIPES ALL TRACES AND VESTIGES OF THE CRIME but does not
extinguish civil liability
Civil liability not extinguished; basis ARTICLE 113, RPC.
Obligation to satisfy civil liability.—Except in case of extinction of his civil

liability as provided in the next preceding article, THE OFFENDER SHALL
CONTINUE TO BE OBLIGED TO SATISFY THE CIVIL LIABILITY RESULTING FROM
THE CRIME COMMITTED BY HIM not withstanding the fact that he has served his
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been
required the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or
any other reason.
4. By Absolute Pardon

PARDON – an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of laws, which EXEMPTS THE INDIVIDUAL FROM THE PUNISHMENt
the law inflicts for the crime.

 Pardon, although absolute does NOT erase the effects of conviction.
 Pardon only excuses the convict from serving the sentence.
 Pardon will not wipe out the effects of the crime, unless the language
of the pardon absolutely relieve the offender of all the effects thereof.

 Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 191, it was held that absolute pardon does not ipso facto
entitle the convict to reinstatement to the public office forfeited by reason of his conviction.
Although pardon restores his eligibility for appointment to that office, the pardoned convict must
re-apply for the new appointment
AMNESTY PARDON
1. Extended to classes of 1. Exercised individually by
persons who may be guilty of the President (any crime)
political offenses
Pardon becomes
2. Exercised even before trial or 2. Exercised when one is valid only when
investigation convicted there is a final
3. Looks backward and 3. Looks forward and relieves judgment. If given
abolishes the offense itself the offender of the before this, it is
consequences premature and hence
void. There is no such
4. Does not extinguish civil 4. Same thing as a premature
liability amnesty, because it
5. A public act that needs the 5. A private act of the President does not require a
declaration of the final judgment; it may
President with the be given before final
judgment or after it.
concurrence of Congress
6. Courts should take judicial 6. Must be pleaded and proved
notice in court
5. By Prescription of the crime

 When the crime prescribes, the state loses the RIGHT TO PROSECUTE

Prescription of a crime – is the loss/forfeiture of the right of the state
to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time.
6. By Prescription of the penalty

Prescription of the penalty – the loss or forfeiture of the RIGHT OF
GOVERNMENT TO EXECUTE the final sentence after the lapse of a
certain time.
Conditions:
1. there must be final judgement;

2. The convict began serving sentence but thereafter evaded it
3. the period has elapsed.
7. BY THE MARRIAGE OF THE OFFENDED WOMAN, AS PROVIDED IN ART 344 OF THIS CODE

 Applicable in the crimes of Rape, Abduction, Seduction and Acts of Lasciviousness
 the marriage by the offender with the offended woman shall EXTINGUISH CIVIL LIABILITY, NOT
ONLY CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL WHO MARRIES THE OFFENDED WOMAN, BUT
ALSO THAT OF THE ACCOMPLICE AND ACCESSORY, IF THERE ARE ANY.
 Co-principals who did not themselves directly participate in the execution of the crime but who only
cooperated, will also benefit from such marriage, but not when such co-principal himself took direct part
in the execution of the crime.
 Marriage as a ground for extinguishing criminal liability must have been contracted in good
faith. The Supreme Court ruled that marriage contemplated must be a real marriage and not one
entered to and not just to evade punishment for the crime committed because the offender will be
compounding the wrong he has committed. Woman may re-file the complaint.
 In cases of multiple rapes, however, the principle does not apply. Thus, if “A”, “B” and “C” raped “W”
in that when “A” was having sex with “W”, “B” and “C” were holing the legs and arms, and when it was
“B’s turn, “A” and “C” were the ones holding “W’s legs and arms, and when “C” was the one having sex
with :W”, the ones holding her arms and legs were “A” and “B”. Even if later on, “A” contracted marriage
with “W”, there is no extinction of penal responsibility because this is a case of multiple
rapes.
Art. 90. Prescription of CRIME.
Crimes punishable by Death, Reclusion Perpetua or Reclusion Temporal shall prescribe in twenty
years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years;
with the exception of those punishable by Arresto Mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis
of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As
amended by RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966.)

Penalty or Felony Time after which Crime will Prescribe

PENALTY OR FELONY TIME AFTER WHICH
CRIME WILL PRESCRIBE
Death,Death, Reclusion
reclusion perpetua or reclusion 2020
yearsyears
Perpetua or Reclusion
temporal
Temporal
Other
Other afflictive afflictive
penalties 1515
yearsyears
penalties
Correctional
Correctional penalty,
penalty, except arresto 1010
yearsyears
mayor
except Arresto Mayor
Arresto
Arresto mayor mayor 5 years
5 years
Libel or other similar

Libel or other similar offenses
1 year
1 year
offenses
Oral defamation and slander by deed 6 months
Oral defamation and 6 months
slander by deed
Light offenses 2 months
Light offenses 2 months

computing the period:
 Follow Art. 25
Capital punishment: Afflictive penalties:
Death. Reclusion Perpetua,
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prision mayor.
Correctional penalties Light penalties:
Prision correccional, Arresto Menor
Arresto mayor, Public censure.
Suspension,
Destierro.
 first day is excluded and the last day included.
 Subject to leap years
 When the last day of the prescriptive period falls on a Sunday or a legal holiday, the
information can no longer be filed the following day
 Simple Slander prescribes in 2 months and Grave Slander in 6 months
Offense punished with a fine

 It should be classified into an afflictive, correctional, or light penalty pursuant to Article
26.
Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.— A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an
afflictive penalty, if it exceeds One million two hundred thousand (₱1,200,000); a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed One
million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but is not less than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000); and a light penalty, if it be
less than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).
 When fine is imposed as an alternative penalty to imprisonment (imposed together w/ a
penalty lower than the fine), and fine constitute a higher penalty than the penalty of
imprisonment, the basis of the prescriptive period should be the fine.
Prescriptive periods of offenses punished under special laws and municipal ordinances
(Act No. 3326)
Penalty or Offense Time
after which RULE:
offense will
prescribe
Fine only; or 1 year 1. Follow the
imprisonment for not more than 1 prescriptive
month, period provided
Or both,
Imprisonment for more than 1 month, 4 years in the special
but less than 2 years law, if there is
Imprisonment for 2 years or more but 8 years any.
less than 6 years
Imprisonment for 6 years or more 12 years
Internal Revenue Law offenses 5 years
2. If the special
Violations of municipal ordinances 2 months law does not
Violations of the regulations or provide any,
conditions of certificate of convenience by 2 months then follow Act.
the Public Service Commission
3326
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.
The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be INTERRUPTED by
the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
NOTE:

Art. 92 is not applicable in the following cases:
1. In crimes which are not concealed because there is a constructive notice to the public, such
as to those which involve a public document registered in public offices. It is a rule that
registration is tantamount to a declaration to the whole world. In such cases, the prescriptive
period shall commence from the time of the registration of the document.
2. In the crime of false testimony where the prescriptive period is reckoned from the day of final
Crime needs to be discovered by:
1. offended party
2. Authorities
3. their agents

(Ex. If a person witnesses the crime but only tells the authorities 25 years later, prescription
commences on the day the authorities were told.)

WHAT INTERRUPTS PRESCRIPTION?
1. Barangay Conciliation – Chapter 7, Local Government Code, suspension of the prescriptive

period is good only for 60 days. After which the prescription will resume to run, whether the
conciliation or mediation is terminated for not.
2. Preliminary investigation – Rules on Criminal Procedure
3. Filing information with the court that has proper jurisdiction
WHEN THE PERIOD COMMENCES TO RUN AGAIN
1. When the proceeding is terminated without the accused being convicted or acquitted
2. When the proceeding is unjustifiably stopped for a reason not imputable to the offender

“when such proceedings terminate” – termination that is final; an unappealed conviction or
acquittal

“unjustifiably stopped for any reason” – example: accused evades arrest, proceedings must be
stopped

 The prevailing rule now is, PRESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME IS NOT WAIVABLE, When a crime
prescribes, the STATE LOSES THE RIGHT TO PROSECUTE THE OFFENDER, hence, even though the
offender may not have filed a motion to quash on this ground the trial court, but after conviction
and during the appeal he learned that at the time the case was filed, the crime has already
prescribed, such accused can raise the question of prescription even for the first time on appeal,
and the appellate court shall have no jurisdiction to continue, if legally, the crime has
indeed prescribed.
Art. 92. When and how PENALTIES prescribe.
The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:

1. Death and Reclusion Perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years;

with the exception of the penalty of Arresto Mayor, which prescribes in five
years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.

WHEN PENALTIES PRESCRIBE
Penalty Prescriptive Period
Death 20 years
Reclusion Perpetua
Other afflictive 15 years

penalties
Correctional penalties, 10 years

except Arresto Mayor
Arresto Mayor 5 years
Light penalties 1 year

Note:
 The penalty, to be subject of prescription must have been imposed by final judgment.
Thus, if “A” after conviction by the trial court, appealed the decision, and escaped
from jail, the penalty will never prescribe. In prescription of penalty, the
offender must be serving sentence, and must have escaped, committing the crime
of Evasion of Sentence. From the day he escaped, the prescription of penalty
commence to run.
Problem:
“A” was sentenced to Reclusion Temporal for Homicide and while serving sentence, in
January 1, 1980, he was able to elude authorities up to January 2, 1995. Penalty
prescribed.
Supposed he was arrested after five (5) years of escape – that is, on January 1, 1985, and
was able to hide for just ten (10) more years. The five-year period during his first escape
must have to be considered for purposes of completing the fifteen (15)-year
period for the prescription of the penalty of Homicide.
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties.
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should EVADE THE SERVICE OF HIS SENTENCE, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant
should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this
Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration
of the period of prescription.
Elements:
1. penalty is final
2. convict evaded the sentence
3. convict has not given himself up, not captured, did not go to foreign country, did not commit
another crime.
NOTE:
 On the prescription of the penalty, the period will only commence to run from the moment
the convict evades the service of the sentence. Sentence evasion clearly starts the running
of the prescription.
So if an accused was convicted in the trial court, and the conviction becomes final and executory, so this
fellow was arrested to serve the sentence, on the way to the penitentiary, the vehicle carrying him collided
with another vehicle and overturned, thus enabling the prisoner to escape, no matter how long such
convict has been a fugitive from justice, the penalty imposed by the trial court will never prescribe
because he has not yet commenced the service of his sentence. For the penalty to prescribe, he
Infante vs. Prison Warden (theory and the reason behind the law of prescription of penalties)
“If a convict under confinement, at the risk of being killed succeeds in breaking jail and also succeeds in evading re-
arrest for a certain period of time which by no means is short, despite the efforts of all the instrumentalities of the
Government including sometimes the setting of a prize or reward on his head, which thereby enlists the aid of the
citizenry, the law calls off the search for him, and condones the penalty. But during that period of prescription the
escaped convict lives a life of a hunted animal, hiding mostly in the mountains and forests in constant
mortal fear of being caught. His life far from being happy, comfortable and peaceful, is reduced to a mere
existence filled with fear, discomfort, loneliness and misery. As the distinguished penal law commentator Viada
said, the convict who evades sentence is sometimes sufficiently punished by his voluntary and self-imposed
banishment, and at times voluntary exile is more grievous than the sentence he was trying to avoid. (Viada
y Villasca, Codigo Penal, Vol. III, p. 41, 5th ed.) AND ALL THE TIME HE HAS TO UTILIZE EVERY INGENUITY AND
MEANS TO OUTWIT THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES BENT ON RECAPTURING HIM. FOR ALL THIS, THE
GOVERNMENT EXTENDS TO HIM A SORT OF CONDONATION OR AMNESTY.
Interruption of the period

1. If the defendant surrenders
2. If he is captured
3. If he should go into a foreign country with which the Philippines has no extradition treaty
4. If he should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription
5. If he should commit another crime
6. Acceptance of a conditional pardon(People v. Puntilos)
* Presently the Philippines has an extradition treaty with Taiwan, Indonesia, Canada, Australia, USA and Switzerland
* The moment the convict commits another crime while he is fugitive from justice, prescriptive period of the penalty shall
be suspended and shall not run in the meantime. The crime committed does not include the initial evasion of service of
sentence that the convict must perform before the penalty shall begin to prescribe, so that the initial crime of evasion of
service of sentence does not suspend the prescription of penalty, it is the commission of other crime, after the convict has
evaded the service of penalty that will suspend such period.
Sermonia vs. CA
GR No. 109454; June 14, 1994
FACTS: Information for Bigamy was filed against Jose C. Sermonia on May 26, 1992. There was an
implied admission on the part of Semonia that he was in a bigamous marriage but he contends that
his prosecution for Bigamy was already time-barred.
ISSUE: Whether its (bigamy) discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the offended
party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the
subsequent marriage was registered with the civil registry consistent with the rule on constructive
notice?
Ruling: From the time of discovery by the offended party (first wife)
1.This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in
regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous
subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the
offender is not known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to
contract another marriage.
Sermonia vs. CA
GR No. 109454; June 14, 1994
2. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice

is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the
offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the
offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration,
the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority
and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not
reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate
spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place
where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere,
under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult
and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the
crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Sermonia vs. CA
GR No. 109454; June 14, 1994
3. Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and
sundry for inspection. WE CANNOT GO ALONG WITH HIS ARGUMENT because why did he
indicate in the marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a
married man? Or for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent
marriage in Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He
knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as
this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law. Obviously, petitioner had no
intention of revealing his duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability that
she or any third party would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime,
through the simple expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil registry,
he has set into motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and
the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
4. Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of
marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due
regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of
which is a primary concern of our society.
Republic v. Desierto
G.R. No. 136506, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 585
Facts:
1. On February 12, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) initiated the complaint against private
respondents for violation of R.A. No. 3019 before the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG).
2. The complaint was subsequently referred to the Office of the Ombudsman.
3. The complaint alleged, among others, that respondent Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. taking advantage
of his close relationship with then President Marcos, had caused the government, through the
National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) to enter into a contract with him under
terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous to the government, and, in conspiracy with the
respondents members of the UCPB Board of Directors, in flagrant breach of the fiduciary duty as
administrator-trustee of the COCONUT INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT FUND (CIDF), MANIPULATED THE
SAID FUND resulting in the successful siphoning of P840,789,855.53 of CIDF to his own
corporation, the Agricultural Investors, Inc. (AII) in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
to the grave damage and prejudice of public interest, the Filipino people, the Republic of the Philippines, and
the coconut farmers.
4. Subsequently, cojuangco, jr. sought the dismissal of the complaint on the GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION
G.R. No. 136506, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 585
ISSUE: Whether or not prescription has already set in?
Ruling: No.
1.The Court ruled that R.A. No. 3019 being a special law, the commencement of the period
for the prescription for any act violating it is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326. As
a rule, if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on
the day it was committed. However, in cases where the time of commission is unknown,
prescription shall only run from its discovery and institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. Ordinarily, there is no problem in determining the date when the
crime consists of a series of acts, especially when some or all of these acts are innocent in
themselves. The Ombudsman should not have dismissed the complaint on the basis of
prescription which was erroneous. The Ombudsman should have given the Solicitor
General the opportunity to present his evidence and then resolve the case for purposes
of preliminary investigation. The assailed Review and Recommendation dated August 6,
1998 of Graft Investigation Officer Emora C. Pagunuran, and approved by Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto is hereby reversed and set aside
G.R. No. 136506, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 585
2.The applicable provisions of law on prescription of offenses are found in Article 90 and Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder and Act No. 3326 for those penalized
by special laws. R.A. No. 3019 being a special law, the commencement of the period for
the prescription for any act violating it is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
provides:
"Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.”
As a rule, if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on
the day it was committed. However, in cases where the time of commission is unknown,
prescription shall only run from its discovery and institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment. Ordinarily, there is no problem in determining the date when
the crime consists of a series of acts, especially when some or all of these acts are innocent in
themselves.
G.R. No. 136506, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 585
3. As in the present case, the Ombudsman in that case (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto) dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. In holding
that the case had not yet prescribed, this Court ruled that: "In the present case, it was well-
nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019
at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-
0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not
from the day of such commission. . . . People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated
there stands reiteration: In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are
frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the
applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the
time, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof i.e., discovery of
the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts." There are STRIKING PARALLELISMS
BETWEEN THE SAID BEHEST LOANS CASE AND THE PRESENT ONE which lead us to apply the
ruling of the former to the latter. First, both cases arose out of seemingly innocent
business transactions; second, both were "discovered" only after the government
created bodies to investigate these anomalous transactions; third, both involve
prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 3019; and, fourth, in both cases, it was
Romualdez v. Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 165510-33; July 28, 2006
Facts: Romualdez Claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending
the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were
previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of
prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation
of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos.
28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
CONTENTION of the PCGG: Considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods
of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin To Run, ARE SILENT as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender
is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be
applied.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the defense of Prescription may be raised before trial?
2. Whether prescription has already set in?
3. whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the
Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period?
G.R. Nos. 165510-33; July 28, 2006
Ruling: 1st issue - YES
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time
before he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and
information18 on the ground that the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished,19 which ground includes the defense of prescription
considering that Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates
prescription as one of those grounds which totally extinguishes criminal
liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a
criminal case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of
prescription.
G.R. Nos. 165510-33; July 28, 2006
Ruling: 2nd issue - YES
1. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered:
a. the period of prescription for the offense charged;

b. the time the period of prescription STARTS TO RUN; and
c. the time the prescriptive period was INTERRUPTED
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets and
Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the
period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
2. Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years.
Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador22 that:
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was
approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said
statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that
the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given
retroactive effect.
3. Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall
prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the
period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
G.R. Nos. 165510-33; July 28, 2006
4. As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of
prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
5. In the case of People v. Duque, we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the rule on the running of the
prescriptive period as follows: In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until."
Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law; and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;”
or as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and until institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment." (Emphasis supplied)25
G.R. Nos. 165510-33; July 28, 2006
6. Thus, this Court rules that the PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF THE OFFENSES HEREIN BEGAN TO RUN
FROM THE DISCOVERY THEREOF OR ON MAY 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by
the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
7. Supreme Court disagreed with the contention that: “applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented
the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.”
8. Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the
Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. THE SILENCE OF THE LAW CAN ONLY BE
INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT SECTION 2 OF ACT NO. 3326 DID NOT INTEND SUCH AN
INTERRUPTION OF THE PRESCRIPTION UNLIKE THE EXPLICIT MANDATE OF ARTICLE 91. Thus, as
previously held:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to
G.R. Nos. 165510-33; July 28, 2006
Ruling: 3rd issue – No.
9. The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as
well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman
directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already
prescribed. Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SUCH
PROCEEDING INSTITUTED AGAINST THE PETITIONER TO WARRANT THE TOLLING OF THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED AGAINST HIM.
10.Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that
which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, HOWEVER, THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED WITH THE WRONG BODY,
THE PCGG. THUS, THE SAME COULD NOT HAVE INTERRUPTED THE RUNNING OF THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS.
G.R. Nos. 165510-33; July 28, 2006
Final Ruling:
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant
case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987.
As a consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-
1982 prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the
alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15
years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his
counter-affidavit, THE ALLEGED OFFENSES SUBJECT THEREIN HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case
Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
ARTICLE 94 AS AMENDED BY SECTION 2 OF RA NO. 10591
ART. 94. PARTIAL extinction of criminal liability.
Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is
undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence."
1. CONDITIONAL PARDON – contract between the sovereign power of the executive and the
convict
Convict shall not violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines
Effects of violation of conditions:
a. Offender is re-arrested and re-incarcerated

b. Prosecution under Art. 159
Art. 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the
granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original
sentence

2. COMMUTATION – the reduction of the duration of a prison sentence of a prisoner; as may be
granted
by the President of the Philippines
REVISED RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE
(Pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Act No. 4103, “The Indeterminate Sentence Law”
SECTION 21. Factors to be Considered in Petition for Conditional Pardon, Commutation of Sentence
or Parole.
The following factors may be considered by the Board in the grant of conditional pardon,
commutation of sentence or parole: a. the age of the petitioner, the gravity of the offense and the
manner in which it was committed, and the institutional behavior or conduct and previous criminal
record, if any; b. evidence that petitioner will be legitimately employed upon release; c. a showing
that the petitioner has a place where he will reside; d. availability of after-care services for the
petitioner who is old, seriously ill or suffering from a physical disability; e. attitude towards the
offense and the degree of remorse; and, f. the risk to other persons, including the victim, his
witnesses, his family and friends, or the community in general, the possibility of retaliation by the
victim, his family and friends.
SECTION 22. Special Factors.
The Board may give special consideration to the recommendation for commutation of sentence or conditional
pardon whenever any of the following circumstances are present: a. youthful offenders; b. prisoners who are sixty
(60) years old and above; c. physical disability such as when the prisoner is bedridden, a deaf mute, a leper, a
cripple or is blind or similar disabilities; d. serious illness and other life-threatening disease as certified by a
government physician; e. those prisoners recommended for the grant of executive clemency by the trial/appellate
court as stated in the decision; f. alien prisoners where diplomatic considerations and amity between nations
necessitate review; g. circumstances which show that his continued imprisonment will be inhuman or will pose a
(Pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Act No. 4103, “The Indeterminate Sentence
Law”
SECTION 25. Board Action. A majority of the members of the Board, constituting a
quorum, shall be necessary to recommend the grant of executive clemency or to
grant parole; to modify any of the terms and conditions appearing in a Release Document,
to order the arrest and recommitment of a parolee/pardonee; and to issue certificate of
Final Release and Discharge to a parolee/pardonee. The minutes of the meeting of the
Board shall show the votes of its individual members and the reason or reasons
for voting against any matter presented for the approval of the Board. Any
dissent from the majority opinion to grant or deny parole shall be reduced in writing and
shall form part of the records of the proceedings.
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY - refers to Reprieve, Absolute Pardon, Conditional Pardon with

or without Parole Conditions and Commutation of Sentence
as may be granted by the President of the Philippines
(Pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Act No. 4103, “The Indeterminate Sentence Law”
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE BOARD
SECTION 17. Interview of Prisoners. Any Board member or government official authorized by the Board may interview
prisoners confined in prison or jail to determine whether or not they may be released on parole or recommended for executive
clemency. The Board or its authorized representatives shall interview an inmate who was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua or Life
imprisonment, or whose sentence had been commuted from Death to Reclusion Perpetua. Before an interview, the Board may
require a prisoner convicted of a heinous crime as defined under Republic Act No. 7659 and other special laws to undergo
psychological/psychiatric examination if the prisoner has a history of mental instability, or in any case, if the Board finds a need
for such examination in the light of the nature of the offense committed or manner of its commission.
SECTION 18. Publication of those Eligible for Executive Clemency/Parole. The Board shall cause the publication in a
newspaper of general circulation the names of prisoners convicted of heinous crimes or those sentenced by final judgment to
Reclusion Perpetua or Life imprisonment, who may be considered for release on parole or for recommendation for absolute or
conditional pardon.
SECTION 19. Objections to Petitions. When an objection is filed, the Board may consider the same by requesting the person
objecting to attach thereto evidence in support thereof. In no case, however, shall an objection disqualify from executive
clemency/parole the prisoner against whom the objection is filed.
SECTION 20. Documents to be Considered. The carpeta and prison record of the prisoner and other relevant documents, such
as the mittimus or commitment order, prosecutor’s information and trial/appellate court’s decision of the case of the prisoner
shall be considered by the Board in deciding whether or not to recommend executive clemency or to grant parole. In case the
prisoner has one or more co-accused who had been convicted, the Board shall consider at the same time the prison records and
carpetas of said co-accused.
PAROLE – consists in the suspension of the sentence of a convict after serving

the minimum
term of the indeterminate penalty, without granting pardon, prescribing the
terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended.
If parole conditions are not observed, a convict may be returned to the custody
and continue to serve his sentence without deducting the time that elapsed.
CONDITIONAL PARDON PAROLE

Given after final judgement Given after service of the
minimum penalty
Granted by Chief Executive Given by the Board of Pardons and

Parole
For violation, convict maybe For violations, may be rearrested,
prosecuted under Article 159 convict serves remaining sentence
3. GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCE (Art. 97 as amended by RA NO. 10592)
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct.
The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this
Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail
shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
i. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a DEDUCTION OF TWENTY DAYS FOR
EACH MONTH OF GOOD BEHAVIOR DURING DETENTION;
ii. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a REDUCTION OF
TWENTY-THREE DAYS FOR EACH MONTH OF GOOD BEHAVIOR DURING DETENTION;
iii. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be ALLOWED A
DEDUCTION OF TWENTY-FIVE DAYS FOR EACH MONTH OF GOOD BEHAVIOR DURING DETENTION
iv. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of THIRTY
DAYS FOR EACH MONTH OF GOOD BEHAVIOR DURING DETENTION; and
v. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in
addition to numbers one to four hereof, FOR EACH MONTH OF STUDY, TEACHING OR MENTORING
SERVICE TIME RENDERED.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good
conduct
3. GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCE (Art. 97 as amended by RA NO. 10592)
Allowances for Good conduct per year
Years Allowance
At any time during the period of
First 2 years 20 days per month of good behavior imprisonment, he shall be allowed
another deduction of FIFTEEN
DAYS, in addition to numbers one to
3rd to 5th years 23 days per month of good behavior four hereof, FOR EACH MONTH OF
STUDY, TEACHING OR
MENTORING SERVICE TIME
Following years up to 10th 25 days per month of good behavior
RENDERED.
year
11th year and successive 30 days per month of good behavior
years
Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon.
Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the
obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed
therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified
shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of
Article 159 shall be applied to him.

NOTE:
 Condition of pardon is limited to unserved portion of the sentence, unless

an intention to extend it beyond the time is manifest
Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence.
The commutation of the original sentence for another of a

different length and nature shall have the legal effect of
substituting the latter in the place of the former.
Commutation of Sentence – refers to the reduction of the

duration of a prison sentence of a prisoner;
"ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. (as amended by RA No.

10592)
A deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted

to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the
service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158
of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours
following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing
away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.
A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be

granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe
enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
"This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving sentence."
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances.

(as amended by RA No. 10592)
Whenever lawfully justified the:
1. Director of the Bureau of Corrections,

2. Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or
3. Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail
shall grant allowances for good conduct.
Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.”

Republic Act No. 10592 which was passed into law on 29 May 2013 amended Articles 29,
94, 97, 98, and 99 of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815 or “RPC”.
The important amendments under Republic Act No. 10592, among others, are as follows:
1. It expanded the application of the good conduct time allowance for prisoners even
during preventive imprisonment.
2. It increased the number of days that may be credited for good conduct time
allowance.
3. It allowed additional deduction of 15 days for each month of study, teaching,

or mentoring service.
4. It expanded the special time allowance for loyalty and made it applicable even
during preventive imprisonment.
5. Recidivists, Habitual delinquents, Escapees and Persons charged with heinous crimes
are EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE of Republic Act No. 1092.
Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, et al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al.; Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al.; William M.
Montinola, et al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al. (G.R. No. 212719).
Reynaldo D. Edago, et al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al. (G.R. No. 214637); June 25, 2019
Facts: On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending
Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
On 26 March 2014 an IRR was jointly issued by the Secretary of the Department of Justice, Leila H. De
Lima, and the Secretary of the Department of Interior, Manuel A. Roxas II. However, Section 4, Rule 1
of the IRR directed the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance
(GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching, and mentoring (TASTM) and special time
allowance for loyalty (STAL) to prisoners.
Issue: The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases is the legality of Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592,
which states:
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new
procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as
provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management, Screening
and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant of
good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective
in application.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time
CONTENTION: The petitioners assail the validity of the said provision of the IRR on the ground that it
violates Article 22 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a

retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of the felony, who
is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Ruling: SC declared invalid Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(“IRR”) of
Republic Act No. 10592 (“R.A. 10592”) in so far as the said IRR provided for the prospective
application of the grant of time allowance of prisoners for: i.) good conduct, ii.)
study, teaching, and mentoring service, and iii.) loyalty.
CONTENTION: The petitioners assail the validity of the said provision of the IRR on the ground that it
violates Article 22 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of the felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
Ruling: SC declared invalid Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(“IRR”) of
Republic Act No. 10592 (“R.A. 10592”) in so far as the said IRR provided for the prospective
application of the grant of time allowance of prisoners for: i.) good conduct, ii.) study,
teaching, and mentoring service, and iii.) loyalty.
1. Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, A PENAL LAW
THAT IS FAVORABLE OR ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ACCUSED SHALL BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE
EFFECT IF HE IS NOT A HABITUAL CRIMINAL. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception
to the exception on the effectivity of laws. In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is
2. The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural
rules
3. Penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense

committed against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power
to pardon.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide for their punishment.
4. In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No.
10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC as
Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to
the RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot
5. While Republic Act No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe a penalty as it
addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions have the
purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further
reduction of the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis,
beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the
application of Article 22 of the RPC.
6. The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of Republic Act. No. 10592
actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated.
It precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their
prison stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes committed. Depriving
them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in
extending their sentence and increasing their punishment. Evidently, this transgresses
the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.”
7. With the said ruling of the Supreme Court, and considering the increased time allowances for
GCTA, TASTM, and STAL under R.A. 10592 given to qualified inmates, there will be a substantial
reduction in their respective penalties; which eventually will result in the decongestion of the jail
system in the country.
Ricardo Ranier G. Cruz Iii, In His Capacity As Director General Of The Bureau Of Corrections; Richard W. Schwarzkopf, In His Capacity As Superintendent,
New Bilibid Prison, Bureau Of Corrections; And Emerenciana M. DIVINA, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, INMATE DOCUMENTS AND
PROCESSING DIVISION OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, Petitioners, Vs. Rolito T. Go, Detained At The Maximum Security
Compound;
[G.R. No. 223446. November 28, 2016.]
Facts:
1. By virtue of the 4 November 1993 Decision of the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 87411,
respondent Rolito T. Go was convicted of Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
2. He began serving his sentence on 30 April 1996 at the New Bilibid Prison.
3. On 30 July 2008, in carrying out the Resolution and Corticate of Eligibility by then Bureau of Corrections
(BuCor) Director Oscar C. Calderon, the New Bilibid Prison Classification Board granted Go, along with other 24
inmates, a colonist status.
4. Accordingly, in view of his commuted sentence, Go filed a petition for habeas corpus on 30 January
2014, PLEADING FOR HIS RELEASE.
5. He posits that his original prison sentence which shall expire on 31 January 2022 instead should
have expired on 21 August 2013 upon deduction of lawful and proper allowances for good conduct,
colonist status, and preventive imprisonment based on the provisions of Act No. 2489, otherwise known as "An
Act Authorizing Special Compensation, Credits, and Modification in the Sentence of Prisoners as a Reward for
Exceptional Conduct and Workmanship and for Other Purposes.”
Compound;
[G.R. No. 223446. November 28, 2016.]
CONTENTION: Petitioners aver that Go's commutation of sentence as a result of the grant of
penal
colonist status, deduction of lawful and proper allowances for good conduct, and
preventive imprisonment of Go is ineffective without prior approval by the
President
because it violates Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, which mandates
that only the President has the power to exercise executive clemency.
Issue: Whether or not Go should be released?
Ruling: Yes
1.As correctly resolved by the trial court, while only the President can commute a prison
sentence, Articles 70 and 97 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) recognize PARTIAL
REDUCTION OR COMMUTATION OF SENTENCES by providing that "for penal penalties,
the duration shall be computed for 30 years and the allowances of good conduct must be
Compound;
[G.R. No. 223446. November 28, 2016.]
2. Accordingly, to implement the provisions of Article 97, the law has granted the Director of Prisons
the power to grant good conduct allowances. The mandate of the Director of Prisons embodied in
Article 99 of the RPC is clear and unambiguous. In fact, once granted, such allowances shall not be revoked.
Article 99 of the RPC explicitly states:
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
(Emphasis supplied)
4. Therefore, after crediting his preventive imprisonment of nine (9) months and sixteen (16) days, and the
regular Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) under Act No. 3815 and Special Credit Time Allowance (SCTA)
under Act No. 2409 granted upon him, Go has completed serving his sentence of thirty (30) years on
21 August 2013, which he commenced to serve on 30 April 1996.
5. The intent and spirit of the law in affording persons the remedy of writ of habeas corpus is to devise a speedy
and effective means to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. To rule otherwise would render Article
99 of the RPC as a mere surplusage and would unduly impose excessive imprisonment on
inmates in violation of the basic right to liberty.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to immediately RELEASE petitioner Rolito T. Go from detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause.
E F F E C T O F PA R D O N BY T H E O F F E N D E D PA RT Y
Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party.
A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action

except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard
to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.

NOTES:
 Even if injured party already pardoned the offender – Prosecutor can still prosecute.
 Not even considered a ground for dismissal of the information. Exception: Art 344 -
crimes of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness – pardon must be
expressed.

 A crime committed is an offense against the State. In criminal cases, the intervention of
the aggrieved parties is limited to being witnesses for the prosecution, the offended
party being the Republic of the Philippines.

E F F E C T O F PA R D O N BY T H E O F F E N D E D PA RT Y
Art. 2034 of the New Civil Code provides:
“there may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising

from an offense; but such compromise shall not extinguish the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty.”
 Can’t compromise criminal liability

 Can compromise only civil liability – but it still shall not extinguish the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty.
 A contract stipulating for the renunciation of the right to prosecute an

offense or waiving the criminal liability is VOID.

E F F E C T O F PA R D O N
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect.
A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
NOTE:

 Pardon by the President does not restore the right to public office or suffrage except when both
are expressly restored in the pardon. Nor does it exempt from civil liability/from payment of civil
indemnity.

LIMITATIONS TO PRESIDENT’S POWER TO PARDON:
1. can be exercised only after final judgment

2. does not extend to cases of impeachment
3. does not extinguish civil liability – only criminal liability
General rule: Pardon granted in general terms does not include accessory penalties.
Exceptions:

1. If the absolute pardon is granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, it
removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
However, if the penalty is life imprisonment and after the service of 30 years, a pardon is granted,
the pardon does not remove the accessory penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification
2. if the facts and circumstances of the case show that the purpose of the President
is to precisely restore the rights i.e., granting absolute pardon after election to a
post (mayor) but before the date fixed by law for assuming office to enable him to
assume the position in deference to the popular will

 Pardon must be accepted

Pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the Chief Executive, which exempts
the individual upon whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the law
inflicts for the crime he has committed. It is a private, though official, act of the
Chief Executive delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is not intended.
It is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not
complete without acceptance. Until delivery, all that may have been done is a
matter of intended favor, and the pardon may be cancelled to accord with the
change of intention. If cancelled before acceptance, it has no effect.

EFFECTS OF PARDON

There are two kinds of pardon that may be extended by the President:
1. CONDITIONAL PARDON - contemplates of a situation wherein the offender is granted

temporary liberty under certain conditions. If he violates the conditions of this pardon,
he commits a crime known as evasion of service of sentence.

2. ABSOLUTE PARDON –it releases the offender from the punishment imposed by the
court on him, so that in the eyes of the law, the offender is innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all
his civil rights. It makes him a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity.

PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY – does not extinguish criminal liability, may include
offended party waiving civil indemnity and it is done before the institution of the criminal
prosecution and extended to both offenders.

PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE DISTINGUISHED FROM PARDON BY THE
OFFENDED PARTY:

1. Pardon by the Chief Executive extinguishes the criminal liability of the offender;
such is not the case when the pardon is given by the offended party.
2. Pardon by the Chief Executive cannot include civil liability which the offender
must pay; but the offended party can waive the civil liability which the offender must
pay.
3. In cases where the law allows pardon by the offended party, the pardon should
be given before the institution of criminal prosecution and must be extended to
both offenders. This is not true for pardon extended by the Chief Executive for the
same may be extended to offenders whether the crime committed is public or private
offense.

PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY – does not extinguish criminal liability, may include
offended party waiving civil indemnity and it is done before the institution of the criminal
prosecution and extended to both offenders.

PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE DISTINGUISHED FROM PARDON BY THE
OFFENDED PARTY:

1. Pardon by the Chief Executive extinguishes the criminal liability of the offender;
such is not the case when the pardon is given by the offended party.
2. Pardon by the Chief Executive cannot include civil liability which the offender
must pay; but the offended party can waive the civil liability which the offender must
pay.
3. In cases where the law allows pardon by the offended party, the pardon should
be given before the institution of criminal prosecution and must be extended to
both offenders. This is not true for pardon extended by the Chief Executive for the
same may be extended to offenders whether the crime committed is public or private
offense.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
ACTS OR OMISSIONS RESULTING IN FELONIES PRODUCE TWO CLASSES OF INJURIES.
1. Injury against the state known as “social injury”. The offended party is the government or the collective right of our
people. It is repaired through the imposition of penalties.
2. Injury against the private offended party known as “personal injury”. The injury is caused to the victim of the crime
who may have suffered damage, either to his person, to his property, or to his honor which is compensated by way
of indemnity which is civil in nature.
BASIS FOR CIVIL INDEMNITY ARISING FROM A CRIME:
A. Article 100 RPC – “Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable”.
B. Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176of the New Civil Code
C. Article 1157 (4) , the New Civil Code. Sources of obligation
Obligations arises from;

1. Law;
2. Contracts;
3. Quasi-contracts;
4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and,
5. Quasi-delicts.
D. Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court governs. Section 1, Rule 111 provides that:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is DEEMED INSTITUTED with the criminal action, unless the offended party 1. waives the
civil action, 2. reserves his right to institute it separately, or 3. institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

LIABILITY
GENERAL RULE: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is
DEEMED INSTITUTED with the criminal action
EXCEPTIONS:
1. offended party waives the civil action;

2. offended party reserves his right to institute it separately,; or
3. offended party institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
 In cases of separation of the civil and criminal case, the criminal case must precede the civil
case. The Civil case must await the outcome of the criminal case. The civil case is suspended
until the criminal is decided. Suppose, he is acquitted. How about that? No problem because Rule
111 says that the extinction of the criminal liability does not extinguished civil liability.
In civil cases, only preponderance of evidence is needed. The evidence may not be sufficient to convict but it is
sufficient to prove your cause of action. But what happens if you already have file the civil case? According to Criminal
Procedure, when the criminal case is filed, the trial of the civil case is suspended to await the outcome of the
criminal case unless, there is an attempt to consolidate the trial.' So, the rule is: The criminal case takes
precedence over civil case.

LIABILITY
Instance when a civil action is not suspended and will simultaneously proceed together
with the criminal case, separately:
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS – found in Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
can be filed separately from the criminal case.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case provided the right is reserved.
a. any of the cases referred to in Art 32 (violation of ones fundamental rights)
b. defamation, fraud and physical injury (bodily injury and not the crime of physical
injury)(Art.33)
c. civil action is against a member of a city or municipal police force for refusing or
failing to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or
property(Art.34)
d. in an action for damage arising from fault or negligence and there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties (quasi-delict)(Art.2176)

LIABILITY
Instance when a civil action takes precedence over the criminal case:
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION - where the innocence or guilt of the accused depends on the outcome
of
the civil case.
Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Effect: The pendency of the civil case will suspend the criminal.

LIABILITY
Civil Liability Pecuniary

Liability
1. Includes 1. Includes
reparation of reparation of
damage caused damages caused
and and
indemnification for indemnification for
consequential consequential
damages damages
2. Does not include
2. Includes restitution
restitution
3. Does NOT include 3. Includes fine and
fines and costs of the costs of the
the proceedings proceedings
LIABILITY
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony.
“ Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”

BASIS:
obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of an act or
omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law

NOTE:
 The civil liability of the accused may be enforced in the criminal action or in a direct civil
action. The choice is in the offended party. If his preference is to prosecute the civil
action in the criminal proceedings, he cannot be compelled to institute a separate civil
action instead. (Pp vs. Guido, 57 Phil. 52)

LIABILITY
Damages that may be recovered in criminal cases:
1. Actual Damages - whatever he spent for treatment of wounds, doctor’s fees, medicines as well as
salary or wages unearned; Crimes against persons, like crime of physical injuries

2. Moral Damages: seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage,
illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of
defamation, malicious prosecution

3. Exemplary Damages: imposed when crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances

LIABILITY
NOTES:

 If there is no damage caused by the commission of the crime, offender is not civilly liable

 Dismissal of the information or the crime action does not affect the right of the offended party to
institute or continue the civil action already instituted arising from the offense, because such
dismissal does not carry with it the extinction of the civil one.

 When during the trial what was established was only the civil aspect of the case and the same
facts adduced did not constitute a crime, civil liability is also awarded. (Padilla vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 558)

 Acquittal in the criminal action for negligence does not preclude the offended party from filing a
civil action to recover damages, based on the theory that the act is quasi-delict
 In a criminal case, the presence of a private prosecutor is justified because of the civil
aspect of the case. As a rule, the moment the private prosecutor makes a manifestation that
the offended party is reserving the civil aspect of the case, he is immediately disqualified to
appear as private prosecutor. (Roas vs. dela Cruz)
LIABILITY
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11
of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

FIRST. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and
by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such
person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

SECOND. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented
shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with
the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily
liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of
their property exempt from execution.
LIABILITY
General Rule: exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability
Exception: No civil liability in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 12.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by
some lawful
insuperable cause.

Who are civilly liable for:

a. Acts of insane or minor (15 years old below)
Criminal Liability – exempted

Civil Liability – not exempt
Civil Liability shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control UNLESS: it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
LIABILITY

b. above 15 years old acting without discernment
1. civil code says parents

2. guardians
3. if minor owns property, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed

 In actual practice, when a minor or an insane person is accused of a crime, the court will inquire who are the
persons exercising legal control upon the offender. When the names of such persons are made known to the
court, they are required to participate in the proceedings, not only to help the accused in his defense but also
for said persons in legal authority to protect their interests as persons primarily liable to pay the civil liability
caused by the minor or insane.
They may, however, invoke the defense embodied under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
which provides that in order to escape civil liability, the persons primarily liable must
prove that they observed all the diligence of a god father of a family to prevent
damages.

 In the event that the minor or insane has no parents or guardian, the court will appoint a guardian ad
litem to protect the interests of the minor or insane. In such a case, the court will render judgment fixing the
civil liability of the minor or insane and under such a situation, the property of the minor shall be
primarily liable in the payment of civil liability.
LIABILITY

b. Avoidance of Greater Evil (Par. 4 Art. 11)
Criminal Liability – exempted (justifying circumstance)

the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall
be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all
events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or
their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
No civil liability in justifying circumstances EXCEPT: par 4 of Art 11, the one benefited by the act is civilly
liable.

CIVIL LIABILITY IN CASE OF STATE OF NECESSITY
Those who benefited by the act and court shall determine the proportionate amount for which each shall be
liable. If the government or majority of the inhabitants are liable, such will be determined by special laws or
LIABILITY

c. Persons acting under an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear (Pars. 5 and 6 Art. 12)

Persons using violence or causing the fear are primarily liable

if there are none, those doing the act

LIABILITY
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments.
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have
been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarity liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or
theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.

LIABILITY
Elements of Paragraph 1:
1. the innkeeper of the establishment or his employee committed a violation of

municipal ordinance or some general or special police regulation
2. A crime is committed in such establishment
3. Person criminally liable is insolvent

When the foregoing circumstances are present in the commission of the crime, the civil
liability of the offender shall also be the civil liability of the owners of the
establishments.
Such civil liability arises only if the person criminally liable is insolvent because the
nature of the liability of the innkeeper and the others is only subsidiary.

LIABILITY
Elements of Paragraph 2:
1. guests notified in advance the innkeeper of the deposit of such goods within the inn
2. guests followed the directions of the innkeeper with respect to the care and vigilance
over the such goods
3. such goods of the guest lodging therein were taken by robbery with force upon things or
theft

When all these are present, the innkeeper is subsidiarily liable

No civil liability in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of person, UNLESS
committed by the innkeeper’s employees

 Actual deposit of the things of the guest to the innkeeper is not necessary, it is enough that they
were within the inn.

 The Supreme Court ruled that even though the guest did not obey the rules and regulations
prescribed by the management for safekeeping of the valuables, this does not absolve
management from the subsidiary civil liability. Non-compliance with such rules and
regulations by the guests will only be regarded as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, but it
won’t absolve the management from civil liability.
LIABILITY
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

ELEMENTS:
1. employer, teacher, person or corporation is engaged in any kind of industry
2. any of their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices of employees commits a felony

while in the discharge of his duties which are related to the business of his employer
3. the said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability

Industry – any department or branch of art, occupation or business; especially one which employs
so much labor and capital is a distinct branch of trade

 Hospitals are not engaged in industry; hence not subsidiarily liable for acts of nurses

 Private persons without business or industry, not subsidiarily liable
LIABILITY
 No need to file a civil action against the employer in order to enforce the subsidiary civil
liability for the crime committed by his employee, it is enough that the writ of
execution is returned unsatisfied.

 In the trial of the case, if the court will allow the participation of the employer to protect
its civil liability, it cannot put up the defense of diligence of a good father of a family.
Such kind of defense is available only if the action is based or predicated on
quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

 A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity is
conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter’s
subsidiary liability. (Rotea vs. Halili, 109 Phil. 495)

 Acquittal of the driver in the criminal case is not a bar to the prosecution of
the civil action based on quasi-delict. The source of obligation in the criminal case
is Article 103, or obligations arising from crime, while the civil action is based on Article
2176 or quasi-delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code provides that quasi-delicts and acts
or omissions punishable by law are two different sources of obligations.( Virata vs.
Ochoa )
LIABILITY
Pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the following persons are liable for the acts or omissions of
those persons for whom one is responsible:
For the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible:
(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
(2) Guardians are liable for damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
(3) The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
(4) Employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
(5) The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official or to whom the task done properly pertains.
(6) Teachers and heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remained in their custody.
LIABILITY
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER UNDER ARTICLE 103 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND HIS LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE:

1. As to the source of the civil liability of the offender-employer.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil liability arises from crime; while under Article
2180, the obligation arises from quasi-delict.

2. As to the nature of the liability of the employer.

The liability of the employer under the RPC is subsidiary; while under the Civil Code, it is direct and
primary;

3. As to whether a separate complaint must be filed against the employer.

Under the RPC, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary
liability is clear from the decision of conviction against the accused. Under the Civil Code, the
complaint must be filed against the employer because his liability is direct and primary.

4. As to the necessity of previous conviction in a criminal case.

The RPC requires previous conviction of the offender-employer. Such is not required under the Civil
Code.

5. As to the availability of the defense of the “exercise of diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of employee.”

This defense is not available to defeat the employer’s subsidiary liability under the RPC. On the
other hand, the Civil Code allows such defense in favor of the employer.
LIABILITY
Art. 104. What is included in civil liability.
The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
NOTE:
RESTITUTION – in theft, the culprit is duty bound to return the property stolen

REPARATION – in case of inability to return the property stolen, the culprit must pay the
value of
the property stolen. In case of physical injuries, the reparation of the
damage
cause would consist in the payment of hospital bills and doctor’s fees to the
offended party

INDEMNIFICATION – the lost of salary or earnings
 First remedy granted by law is RESTITUTION, if not possible then REPARATION of the damage
caused, in either case, INDEMNIFICATION of consequential damages is required.
LIABILITY
Art. 105. Restitution. How made.
The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible, with allowance for any
deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.

The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third
person who has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper
person, who may be liable to him.

This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third
person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its
recovery.

NOTE:
 The convict cannot by way of restitution, give to the offended party a similar thing of the same
amount, kind or species and quality. The very thing should be returned.

 If the property stolen while in the possession of the third party suffers deterioration due to his
fault, the court will assess the amount of the deterioration and, in addition to the return
of the property, the culprit will be ordered to pay such amount

LIABILITY
General Rule: the owner of the property illegally taken by the offender can recover it from
whomsoever is in possession thereof.
Thus, even if the property stolen was acquired by a 3 rd person by purchase

without knowing that it has been stolen, such property will be returned to the
owner.
Exceptions: Purchased in a public sale or auction in good faith. (reason: in public sale or auction
the law
protects the buyer.)
Restitution or Restoration - presupposes that the offended party was divested of property,
and such
property must be returned.
 If the thing is acquired by a person knowing that it was stolen, then he is an accessory and
therefore criminally liable(liable under anti-fencing law)

 The third party who acquired the stolen property may be reimbursed with the price paid
therefor if it be acquired at (a) a public sale or auction and (b) in good faith

LIABILITY
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH BAR AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY:
1. Torrens title (OCT/TCT)

2. When sale is authorized

 The obligation of the offender transcends to his heirs, even if the offender dies, provided he
died after judgment became final, the heirs shall assume the burden of the civil liability, but
this is only to the extent that they inherit property from the deceased, if they do not inherit, they
cannot inherit the obligations.

 Some believed that this civil liability is true only in crimes against property, this is not correct.
Regardless of the crime committed, if the property is illegally taken from the offended
party during the commission of the crime, the court may direct the offender to restore
or restitute such property to the offended party. It can only be done if the property is
brought within the jurisdiction of that court.
 If the property cannot be restituted anymore, then the damage must be repaired,
requiring the offender to pay the value thereof, as determined by the court. That value
includes the sentimental value to the offended party, not only the replacement cost. But if what
would be restored is brand new, then there will be an allowance for depreciation, otherwise, the
offended party is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of the offender.
LIABILITY
Art. 106. Reparation. How made.
The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing,
whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall
be made accordingly.

Notes:

 Reparation will be ordered by the court if restitution is not possible

REPARATION SHALL BE:
1. the price of the thing

2. its sentimental value

 If there is no evidence as to the value of the thing unrecovered, reparation cannot be made
 The damages shall be limited to those caused by the crime

LIABILITY
Art. 107. Indemnification; What is included.
Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured party,
but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.

NOTE:
Indemnification of consequential damages - refers to the loss of earnings, loss of profits. This does
not
refer only to consequential damages suffered by the
offended party; this also includes consequential damages
to third party who also suffer because of the commission of
the crime.
 The amount of damages for death shall be at least 150,000, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances.
In addition:
1. payment for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased
2. if the deceased was obliged to give support, the recipient who is not an heir,
may demand support from the defendant
3. the spouse, illegitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand for moral damages.
LIABILITY
MORAL DAMAGES may be recovered in the following:
a. physical injuries
b. seduction, abduction, rape
c. adultery, concubinage
d. illegal or arbitrary detention
e. illegal search
f. libel, slander, defamation
g. malicious prosecution

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES – may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating
circumstances; cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the court will
decide whether they should be adjudicated.

 Indemnification also includes the award of attorney’s fees. Private prosecutor is therefore entitled
to the award of attorney’s fees.
LIABILITY
Art. 38. Pecuniary liabilities; Order of payment.
In case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his
pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:
1. The reparation of the damage caused.

3. The fine.
4. The cost of the proceedings.
To relate with Article 38, when there is AN ORDER OR PREFERENCE OF PECUNIARY (MONETARY)
LIABILITY, therefore, restitution is not included here.

 There is not subsidiary penalty for non-payment of civil liability.

LIABILITY
Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony
Preference in payment.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and
accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among
themselves for their quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.

The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next,
against that of the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories.

Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom
payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of
their respective shares.
NOTE:

SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY WILL BE ENFORCED ON:
1. first, against the property of the principal

2. second, against that of the accomplice
3. third, against that of the accessories
LIABILITY
Illustration:
Two principals, two accomplices and two accessories were convicted in a homicide case, and the
indemnity to the heirs of the victim was fixed at Php6,000.00. The quota of the principals was fixed
at Php3,000.00; the accomplices at Php2,000.00 and the accessories at Php1,000.00 and as
between themselves, the liability of each was ½.
If both principals were insolvent, their quota would be borne by the two accomplices whose
liability would be Php2,500.00 each for a total of Php5,000.00, the quota of both principals and
accomplices.
If the accessories were insolvent, the principals would bear their quota.
Subsidiarily and in default of the principals, the accomplices would bear the quota of the
accessories.
LIABILITY
Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases.
Any person who has participated gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to
make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation.

Notes:
 This refers to a person who has participated gratuitously in the commission of a felony and
he is bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation

 The third person must be innocent of the commission of the crime otherwise he would be liable as
an accessory and this article will not apply
LIABILITY
Art. 112. Extinction of civil liability.
Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in
the same manner as obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.

CIVIL LIABILITY IS EXTINGUISHED BY:
1. payment or performance
2. loss of the thing due
3. condonation or remission of the debt
4. confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor
5. compensation
6. novation

Other causes of extinguishment of obligations: annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory
condition and prescription .

LIABILITY
CIVIL LIABILITY MAY ARISE FROM:
Crime - RPC
Breach of contract - CC
Tortious act – CC

 The civil liability from any of these is extinguished by the same causes mentioned in the previous
slide.

 Civil liability of the offender is extinguished in the same manner as civil obligation is extinguished
but this is not absolutely true. Under civil law, a civil obligation is extinguished upon loss
of the thing due when the thing involved is specific. This is not a ground applicable to
extinction of civil liability in criminal case if the thing due is lost, the offender shall
repair the damages caused.

 The judgment for civil liability prescribes in ten years. It may be enforced by writ of
execution within the first five years and by action for revival of judgment during the next five
years. Insolvency is not a defense to an action to enforce judgment.

LIABILITY
Art. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability.
Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article the
offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime
committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.

Notes:

 Unless extinguished, CIVIL LIABILITY SUBSISTS even if the offender has served sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights or has served the same, due to amnesty,
pardon, commutation of the sentence or any other reason.

 While AMNESTY wipes out all traces and vestiges of the crime, it does not extinguish the civil
liability of the offender. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence

LIABILITY
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994
FACTS: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas was charged with Rape
and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National
Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his
comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did NOT EXTINGUISH his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that
the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on
which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
ISSUE: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

civil liability?
LIABILITY
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994
Ruling: Yes
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction (before the judgment has
become final) extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
LIABILITY
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible deprivation of right by prescription.
Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is iNTERRUPTED when they are filed before the court, when there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape.
LIABILITY
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994
5. Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
"Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of
the civil liability for which his estate would be liable."
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on
whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the
source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as
basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

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ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY

Jay Karel P. Sanchez II

Crime - an act committed or omitted in

The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and

In the Philippines, unless there is a particular provision in the

• ARE COURT DECISIONS SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW?

WHO HAS • Article II Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

THE “Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The

• Police Power of the State (one of the inherent

• The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the

• The State has the authority,

1. Section 1 (Article 3, Bill of Rights)

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property

• We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to

2. Section 4 (Article 3, Bill of Rights)

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

• Criminal libel laws present a special problem. At face value,

3. Section 5 (Article 3, Bill of Rights)

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

• Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically

4. Section 19 (Article 3, Bill of Rights)

Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or

• Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that

• Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is

6. Section 22 (Article 3, Bill of Rights)

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall

BILL OF ATTAINDER – is a legislative act

7. Section 22 (Article 3, Bill of Rights)

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall

What is an ex post facto law?

What is an ex post facto law?

4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon

• Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the

While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision

• The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one

CRIMINAL LAW is binding on all

(These people enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution

They do not enjoy immunity from

GENERAL SC ruled: the Acting Assistant Director of Health

• It might be recalled that the privilege is not an

• This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. “It is a different

• Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the

• Likewise, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by

Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a

TERRITORIAL • 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or

When a new statute dealing with crime establishes

1. Where the new Law is expressly made inapplicable to

2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force

1. Penal laws are STRICTLY construed

• It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a

• But when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the

Offenses not subject to the provisions of this

22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant.

AS AMENDED  The draft was passed by the Philippine

Time when Act takes effect.

1. The Classical Theory

2. The Positivist Theory

Application of its provisions.

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship

FELONIES - Acts or omissions punishable by law.

FELONIES - Acts or omissions punishable by law.

For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and