PROACTIVE SPECTRUM SHARING INCENTIVE

FOR PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY

ENHANCEMENT

Group Members
Madiha Rasheed
Samin Kainat
Saneea Malik
• Since the characteristics of wireless channel are open and
broadcasting, wireless networks are very vulnerable to be
attacked via :

 eavesdropping
 jamming,
 interference. 

Wireless Network Issues

• PHY layer of wireless networks is at the bottom of the
network, which is mainly responsible for frequency
selection, carrier frequency generation, and signal
detection and modulation.
• Because of PHY layer transmission characteristics, major
types of physical attacks include interference, jamming,
eavesdropping, and traffic analysis.

 Attacks to PHY Layer

• Active attacks
• Passive attacks.

Types of Physical Layer

Attacks
• Active attacks mainly include interference and jamming.
• These two kinds of active attacks are implemented
similarly in principle by broadcasting interference signals
on some specific frequency bands. The differences
between them are the different objectives they attack. 

Active Attacks
• Passive attacks are mainly divided into two categories:
eavesdropping and traffic analysis.
• The two attacks are caused by the fundamental
characteristic of wireless medium, namely, broadcast.
• The broadcast nature of wireless communication makes it
difficult to shield transmitted signals from unintended
recipients, while these legal or illegal users within the
transmission range analyze and utilize wireless broadcast
signals.

Passive attacks
• Wire Trap Channel
• Cooperative Jamming (CJ)
• Multiple-Antenna CJ Bidding
• Risk-Aware Cooperative Spectrum Access Scheme

Previous Strategies and shortcoming

System Model
• It is is a method of diversity combining in which:
• The signals from each channel are added together.
• The gain of each channel is made proportional to the
rms signal level and inversely proportional to the mean
square noise level in that channel.
• Different proportionality constants are used for each
channel.

Maximum Ratio Combining

 • Assuming that A and the ST are transmitting with equal
power P, the received signal to interference plus noise
ratios (SINR) at B and the SR are given by :

• SINR at E is given by :

SINR Calculations
• We derive the SOP of the scheme under consideration, given by

• The MOP expression can be expressed as :

where R is the secondary transmission rate.

Secrecy outage
probability (SOP)
p=.5;
N=25;
Rp=0.5;
Rs=0.3;
npTx=4;
nsTx=4;
i1=sqrt(-1);
count=0;
M=100;

sp=[.25;.25];
evep=[.5;.5];
y=[sp,evep];
z=dist(y)
for j=1:M
    for i=1:N
    
        h = 1/sqrt(2)*(randn(npTx,i) + i1*randn(npTx,i));          %primary path gain 
        pow_h=abs(h).*abs(h);
        [Pchan ind_h]=max(pow_h);
    
    
  

MATLAB Code
• for j=1:M
• for i=1:N
•
• h = 1/sqrt(2)*(randn(npTx,i) + i1*randn(npTx,i)); %primary path gain
• pow_h=abs(h).*abs(h);
• [Pchan ind_h]=max(pow_h);
•
•
• g = 1/sqrt(2)*(randn(nsTx,i) + i1*randn(nsTx,i)); %interference path gain
• pow_g=abs(g).*abs(g);
• [ItoPchan ind_g]=min(pow_g);
• N0=1;
•
• SINR_PRx(i)=(p*Pchan)/((p*ItoPchan)+N0) ; % SINR at Primary
•
• f = z(2).*(1/sqrt(2)*(randn(npTx,i) + i1*randn(npTx,i))); %secondary path gain
• pow_f=abs(f).*abs(f);
• [Schan ind_f]=max(pow_f);
•
• e = z(2).*(1/sqrt(2)*(randn(nsTx,i) + i1*randn(nsTx,i))); %secondary interference
path gain
• pow_e=abs(e).*abs(e);
• [ItoSchan, ind_e]=min(pow_e);

MATLAB Code
•
•
• l = 1/sqrt(2)*(randn(npTx,i) + i1*randn(npTx,i)); %eve's path gain
• pow_l=abs(l).*abs(l);
• [Echan_l ind_l]=max(pow_l);
•
•
• m = 1/sqrt(2)*(randn(nsTx,i) + i1*randn(nsTx,i)); %path gain on eve from
secondary
• pow_m=abs(m).*abs(m);
• [ItoEchan ind_m]=min(pow_m);
• SINR_SRx(i)=(p*Schan)/((p*(ItoSchan))+N0) ; % SINR at Secondary
•
• SINR_E(i) = (p*Echan_l)/ (p*ItoEchan+N0);
•
• SINR_SRxm=(p*Schan)/((p*(pow_e))+N0) ;
• SINR_PRxm=(p*Pchan)/((p*(pow_g))+N0) ;
• OP(i)=sum(SINR_PRxm<((2^Rp)-1))/M;
• OS(i)=sum(SINR_SRxm<((2^Rs)-1))/M;
• MOP=OP+OS;
• c=log2((1+SINR_PRx(i))/(1+SINR_E(i)));
•
• if (SINR_PRx(i) < SINR_E(i))
• prob=SINR_PRx/N;
• end
• if (c<Rs && SINR_PRx(i)>SINR_E(i))
• prob1=SINR_PRx/N;
•
• end
•
• end
• [row col]=size (prob);
• [row1 col1]=size (prob1);
• if (col<col1)
• prob=[prob zeros(col1-col)]
• end
• if (col1<col)
• prob1=[prob1 zeros(col-col1)]
• end
•
• sop=prob+prob1;
• sop1=sort(sop,'ascend');
• mop1=sort(MOP,'ascend');
• end
• dB=10*log(SINR_SRx);
• db=sort(dB,'descend');
•
• subplot(211),plot(db,sop1,'r*-');
• legend('NS=NP=4')
• xlabel('SNR')
• ylabel('SOP')
• title('SOP VS SNR')
• subplot(212),plot(db,mop1,'c*-');
• legend('NS=NP=4')
• xlabel('SNR')
• ylabel('MOP')
• title('MOP VS SNR')
•
SIMULATION RESULTS
Increasing number of
antennas
By increasing distance
• ST should be well placed to gain the transmission
opportunity while enhancing the legitimate secrecy rate.
• ST should be close to E when it is equipped with a small
number of antennas.
• However, more antennas at ST and A can provide a better
flexibility to the ST optimal placement.

Conclusion
NO Questions ???

ThanKs 