Top 25 FAQs in Criminal Law

TOP 25 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
IN CRIMINAL LAW
(WITH JUSTICE MARIANO DEL CASTILLO
CASES AND RECENT JURISPRUDENCE)
Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra

1975-2017 2000-2017
Art. 11 (including battered
Book I Justifying Circumstances 35 11
wife syndrome)
Book II Estafa Art. 315 34 10
Book I Persons Criminally Liable Art. 16 to 19 31 9
Book I Aggravating Circumstances Art. 14 29 6
Book II Murder Art. 248 23 8
Book I Proximate Cause Art. 4 par. 1 21 7
Book II Theft Art. 308 20 10
RA 4103 Indeterminate Sentence Law 20 8
Book I Ordinary Circumstances Art. 13 19 3
Book II Homicide Art. 249 19 5
Book I Exempting Circumstances Art. 12 16 5
RA 9165 Dangerous Drugs Act 16 11
Book I and II Complex Crimes Art. 48 15 6
Book II Malversation of Public Property Art. 217 15 2
Book II Robbery with Homicide 14 9

BP 22 Bouncing Checks Law 14 3
Book II Parricide Art. 246 13 3
Falsification of Public
Book II Art. 171 12 5
Document
Book II Rape Art. 266-A 12 4
1975-2017 2000-2017
Book II Qualified Theft Art. 310 12 4
Book I Impossible Crime Art. 4 par. 2 10 5
Book I Conspiracy Art. 8 10 1
Death/Serious Physical Injuries
Book II under Exceptional Art. 247 10 6
Circumstances
Physical Injuries (Serious to
Book II Art. 263-266 10 4
Slight
Book I Stages of Commission Art. 6 9 5
Privileged Mitigating
Book I Art. 68 9 4
Circumstances
Extinguishment of Criminal
Book I Art. 89 9 4
Liability
RA 3019 Anti-Graft 9 9
Book II Direct Bribery Art. 210 8 4
Book II Grave Coercion Art. 286 8 2
Book II Adultery Art. 333 8 4
Book II Acts of Lasciviousness Art. 336 8 3
Exemption from Criminal
Liability
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention
Book II Destructive Arson Art. 320 7 3
Book II Bigamy Art. 349 7 2
1975-2017 2000-2017
Book II Libel Art. 353 7 4
RA 7610 Special Protection of Children 7 6
RA 7659 Death Penalty Law 7 0
Book I Civil Liability Art. 113 6 1
Book II Coupd’état Art. 134-A, 135 6 2
Falsification of Private
Book II Art. 1`72 6 0
Document
Book II Evasion through negligence Art. 224 6 2
Book II Qualified Trespass to Dwelling Art. 280 6 4
Book II Concubinage Art. 334 6 2

Book I Territoriality Art. 2 5 2
Accessories Exempt from
Book I Art. 20 5 2
Criminal Liability
Robbery with Violence against
Book II Art. 294 1
or intimidation of Persons 6
Book I Penalty, Complex Crimes Art. 48 5 0
Reclusion Perpetua vs. Life
Book I 5 2
Imprisonment
Qualified Piracy/ Robbery On
Book II Art. 123/PD 532 5 3
The High Seas
1975-2017 2000-2017
Book II Corruption of Public Officials Art. 212 5 2
Infidelity in the Custody of
Prisoners
Book II Penalties Art. 266-B 5 1
Book II Unjust Vexation Art. 287 5 2
Book II Slander Art. 358 5 1
RA 6539 Anti-Carnapping Act 5 4
Book I Light Felonies Art. 8 4 0
Book I Preventive Imprisonment Art. 29 4 0
Book I Prescription of Offense Art. 90 4 3
Book I Penalty, Habitual Delinquency Art. 62 4 2
Compound vs. Complex
Book I 4 2
Crimes
Book I Intent vs. Motive 4 2
Book I Entrapment vs. Instigation 4 1
Book II Arbitrary Detention Art. 124 4 1
Book II Direct Assault Art. 148 4 1
Book II Unintentional Abortion Art. 257 4 1
Book II Effect of Pardon Art. 266-C 4 1
1975-2017 2000-2017
Attempted and
Book II Frustrated Robbery committed Art. 297 4 0
under certain circumstances
Book II Qualified and Simple Seduction Art. 337-338 4 1
Book II Reckless Imprudence Art. 365 4 3
PD 1612 Anti-Fencing Law 4 4
Diplomatic Immunity from
3 2
Criminal Prosecution
nullum crimen, nulla poena
3 3
sine lege
Book I Definition of Felony Art. 3 3 2
Book I Alternative Circumstances Art. 15 3 3
Book I Classes of Penalty Art. 25 3 0
Extinguishment of Civil
Book I 3 2
Liability upon acquittal
Book I Pardon and Disqualification Art. 30, 36 3 2
Book I Pecuniary Liabilities Art. 39 3 1
Circumstances under which
Book I death penalty Art. 47 3 2
cannot be inflicted
1975-2017 2000-2017
Application of Penalty in
Book I Art. 64 3 1
Relation to ISL
Subsidiary Liability of
Book I Art. 103 3 0
Employers
Book I Motive 3 1
Book I Mala in se vs. Mala Prohibita 3 2
Rape with Serious Illegal
Book II Detention/Forcible Abduction 3 3
complexed with rape
Robbery with Homicide
Book II 3 0
aggravated by Rape
Book II Rebellion Art. 134 3 3
Resistance and disobedience to
Book II a person in authority or his Art. 151 3 2
agents
Book II Persons in authority Art. 152 3 3
Book II Delivery of prisoner from Art. 156 3 2
Book II False Testimony in other cases Art. 183 3 0
Book II Perjury Art. 184 3 0
Book II Prevaricacion Art. 208 3 0
Death caused in a tumultuous
affray
Book II Grave Threats Art. 282 3 1
1975-2017 2000-2017
Robbery with Violence against
Persons
Book II Who are guilty of Robbery Art. 293 3 0
PD 532 Highway Robbery 3 2
RA 8294 Illegal Possession of Firearms 3 2
PD 1829 Obstruction of Justice 3 3
RA 9160 Anti-Money Laundering Act Money Launder Offense 3 3
RA 7080 Plunder 3 2
Cardinal Principles of Criminal
2 0
Law
Limits on Power of Congress 2 0
Art. 13 (voluntary
Book I Mitigating Circumstances 2 2
surrender)
Book I Qualifying Circumstances 2 2
Book I Successive Service of Sentence Art. 70 2 1
Computation of prescription of
Book I Art. 91 2 2
offenses
Book I Prescription of penalty Art. 92 2 1
Application of Indivisible
Book I Art. 63 2 0
Penalties
Book I Minority Art. 68 2 1
1975-2017 2000-2017
Book I Subsidiary penalty 2 1
Book I Corpus Delicti and Elements 2 2
Delito Continuado vs. Complex
Book I 2 0
Crimes
Estafa through Falsification of
Book II 2 1
Commercial Document
No complex crime if one of the
Book I offense is slight physical 2 0
injuries
Book II Misprision of Treason Art. 116 2 1
Book II Illegal Detention Art. 129-130 2 0
Book II Evasion of Service of Sentence Art. 157 2 0
Possession of False Treasury or
Bank Notes
Book II Definition of Public Officers Art. 203 2 1
Book II Indirect Bribery Art. 211 2 1
Book II Illegal Exaction Art. 213 2 0
Book II Technical Malversation Art. 220 2 1
Book II Custodia Legis Art. 222 2 2
Kidnapping and failure to
Book II Art. 270 and 271 2 2
return a minor
Book II Slavery/Involuntary Servitude Art. 272-274 2 2
1975-2017 2000-2017
Execution of Deeds by means
of violence or intimidation
Robbery with Force upon
things
Book II Usurpation of Real Property Art. 312 2 0
Book II Malicious Mischief Art. 327 2 1
Marriage Contracted Against
Laws
Book II Premature Marriages Art. 351 2 0
Book II Slander by Deed Art. 359 2 0
Reckless Imprudence resulting
Book II 2 1
to Physical Injuries
Reckless Imprudence resulting
Book II 2 0
to Homicide
RA 8049 Anti-Hazing Law 2 2
PD 442; (Art. 38) Illegal
Labor Code 2 2
RA 10022 Recruitment
PD 1689 Syndicated Estafa 2 2
Code of Conduct and Ethical
RA 6713 2 1
Standards for Public Officials
RA 9262 Anti-VAWC Law 2 2
1975-2017 2000-2017
Juvenile Justice and Welfare
RA 9344 2 3
Act of 2006
Common Law Crimes 1 0
Different Schools of Thought in
1 0
Criminal Law
Classes of Crimes Defined by
1 0
Penal Laws
Characterization of Criminal
1 0
Law
Double Jeopardy 1 1
Delito continuado (continuing
1 1
crime)
Ex post facto law; bill of
1 1
attainder
Book I Implied Conspiracy 1 1
Book I Effect of Pardon Art. 36 1 1
Execution and Service of
Book I Art. 80 1 0
Penalties
Extinguishment of Civil Art. 1157
Book I 1 1
Liability upon death Civil Code
Extinguishment of Civil Art. 30
Book I 1 0
Liability upon death Civil Code
Partial Extinction of Criminal
Book I Art. 94 1 0
Liability
Book I Amnesty 1 1
1975-2017 2000-2017
Book I Death, its accessory penalties Art. 40 1 0
Confiscation vs. civil action for
Book I Art. 45 1 0
recovery
Pro reo principle as an
Book I Art. 48 1 1
exception to Art. 48
Penalty to be imposed in case
Book I of failure to commit the crime Art. 59 1 0
because the
Book I Suspended Sentence 1 1
Book I Amnesty Art. 89(3) 1 1
Subsidiary Civil Liability of
Book I Art. 102 1 0
Innkeepers, etc
Book I Finality of Judgment 1 0
Book I Censure 1 0
Book I Criminal Conversation 1 1
Book I Malice 1 0
Book I Mistake of Fact 1 0
Book I Crime without Intent 1 0
Book I Flight as a sign of guilt 1 0
Book I Dolo vs. Culpa 1 0
1975-2017 2000-2017
Penalty to be imposed upon the
principals when the crime
Book I and II Art. 49 1 1
committed is different from that
intended
Book II Direct Assault Art. 148 1 1
Direct Assault with Serious
Book II 1 0
Physical Injuries
Book II Direct Assault with Murder 1 1
Book II Direct Assault with Homicide 1 0
Qualifying Circumstances
Book II 1 1
(Murder and Homicide)
Book II Violation of Domicile Art. 128 1 1
Interruption of religious
worship
Book II Offending religious feelings Art. 133 1 1
Book II Sedition Art. 141 1 0
Book II Inciting to a Sedition Art. 142 1 1
Book II Illegal Assemblies Art. 146 1 0
Commission of another crime
during service of penalty
imposed for another previous
offense
1975-2017 2000-2017
Book II Mutilation of coins Art. 164 1 0
Book II Forgery Art. 169 1 0
False Testimony against a
Defendant
False Testimony favorable to
the defendant
Book II Grave Scandal Art. 200 1 0
Malfeasance vs. misfeasance in
office
Book II Qualified Bribery Art. 211-A 1 1
Book II Infanticide Art. 255 1 0
Book II Intentional Abortion Art. 256 1 0
Abandonment of Persons-in-
danger
Definition of a Band & Penalty
Incurred by Member thereof
Book II Other Forms of Swindling Art. 316 1 0
Removal, Sale or Pledge of
Mortgaged Property
When and How Rape is
Committed
Book II Consented Abduction Art. 343 1 1
1975-2017 2000-2017
Prosecution of the Crimes of
Adultery, Concubinage, etc
Civil Liability of Persons guilty
of crimes against Chastity
Book II Simulation of Birth Art. 347 1 1
Libel by means of
writing/television
Book II Libel by theatrical exhibition 1 0
Declaring Violations of Gen.
PD 9 1 0
Orders 6 & 7
PD 1866 1 1
RA 8484 Access Devices Act 1 1
CA 142 Alias Use Regulation Act 1 1
PD 46 Gifts vs. Public Officers 1 1
RA 4200 Anti-Wire Tapping Act 1 0
RA 7438 Rights of Persons Arrested 1 0
RA 8484 Access Devices Act 1 1
PD 1829 Obstruction of Justice 1 1
RA 9231 Anti-Child Labor Law 1 1

1975-2017 2000-2017
RA 9208 &
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act 1 1
10364
PD 1613 Arson 1 1
Attempted murder with
Book II 0 0
Homicide
Book II Robbery with Rape 0 0
Ordinary Complex Crime vs.
Book I 0 0
Special Complex Crime
1. JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE
S
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,

provided that the following circumstances concur;
 First. Unlawful aggression.
 Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or

repel it.
 Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person

defending himself.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of
his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural
or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in
the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present,
and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no
part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a
stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are
present and that the person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does
not act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done

to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful

means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by

a superior for some lawful purpose.
SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense includes not only the defense of the person or
body of the one assaulted but also that of his rights, that is,
those rights the enjoyment of which is protected by law.
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers

exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily
proved… Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when
it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-
defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused
claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. (People
v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 224900, 15 March 2017, J. Peralta)
SELF-DEFENSE
Requisites:
1. There must be unlawful aggression. - This is an

indispensable requisite.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least

a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. A
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered
unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and
menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause
injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real
peril.
SELF-DEFENSE
At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence
of an unlawful aggression committed against appellant.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a
leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and
will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are
present. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting
to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the
person claiming self-defense. (Velasquez v. People, G.R.
No. 195021, 15 March 2017, J. Leonen)
SELF-DEFENSE
There must be peril to one’s life which may either be:
a. actual – that the danger must be present, that is,

actually in existence, or
b. imminent- that the danger is on the point of

happening. It is not required that the attack already begins,
for it may be too late.
SELF-DEFENSE
N.B. A slap on the face constitutes unlawful aggression
since the face represents a person and his dignity. Slapping
it is a serious personal attack.
Test: Does the person invoking the defense believe, in due

exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger? (Senoja
v. People, 2004)
SELF-DEFENSE
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it

The reasonableness of the necessity depends upon the
circumstances particularly the time and location where the
aggression took place.

The means employed by the person making a defense
must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression.
SELF-DEFENSE
The reasonableness of the means adopted is not one of
mathematical calculation or "material commensurability”
between the means of attack and defense but the imminent
danger against the subject of the attack as perceived by the
defender and the instinct more than reason that moves the
defender to repel the attack.
The reasonableness of the means used will depend upon

the NATURE and QUALITY of the weapon used by the
aggressor, his PHYSICAL CONDITION, SIZE and other
circumstances, and those of the person defending himself,
and also the place and occasion of the assault. (People v.
Rabanal, G.R. No. 146687, 22 August 2002.)
SELF-DEFENSE
Velasquez v. People
G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017, J. Leonen
The Supreme Court stated in the case of People v. Lara,

in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act
upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty
of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act
irresponsible in law for the consequences.
SELF-DEFENSE
Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not
imply material commensurability between the means of
attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in consideration of which will enter as
principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to
which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct,
more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense,
and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the
harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such
injury
SELF-DEFENSE
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

Requisite is complied with when:

a. When no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor by the person defending himself; or

b. When, even if a provocation was given, it was not
sufficient; or
SELF-DEFENSE
c. When, even if the provocation was sufficient, it was
not given by the person defending himself; or
d. When, even if provocation was given by the person

defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to
the act of aggression.
SELF-DEFENSE
The third requisite – lack of sufficient provocation –
requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably
blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited
the attacker into launching an assault. This also requires a
consideration of proportionality. As explained in People v.
Boholst-Caballero, “[p]rovocation is sufficient when it is
proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to
impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense.”
(Velasquez v. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017, J.
Leonen)
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (BWS)
Battered Woman Syndrome refers to a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering relationships as a result
of cumulative abuse (Sec. 3[c], R.A. No. 9262).
Under Section 28 of R.A. No. 9262, Victim-survivors

who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability, notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under
the Revised Penal Code.
People v. Genosa (2004)
The Battered Woman Syndrome is characterized by a

“cycle of violence”, which has three phases:

a. TENSION-BUILDING PHASE: minor battering,
slight abuse occurs; woman’s placatory behavior
legitimizes the attacker’s belief that he has a right to abuse
her.
b. ACUTE-BATTERING INCIDENT: serious and
brutal abuse begins; woman develops sense of detachment
from the attacks.

c. TRANQUIL/NON-VIOLENT PHASE: batterer
shows tender and nurturing behavior, promises never to
hurt the woman again. She believes he’s changed.
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
RELATIVES THAT CAN BE DEFENDED:
1. Spouse
2. Ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Legitimate, natural or adopted brothers and sisters, or
relatives by affinity in the same degrees.
5. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree.
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
Relatives by affinity, are those who, because of
marriage, are parents-in-law, son or daughter-in-law, and
brothers or sisters-in-law.
Consanguinity refers to blood relatives. Brothers and

sisters are within the second civil degree; uncle and niece
or aunt and nephew are within the third civil degree; and
first cousins are within the fourth civil degree.
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
Requisites:
1. Unlawful aggression;
Unlawful aggression may not exist as a matter of fact, it

can be made to depend upon the honest belief of the one
making a defense.

Ex. The sons of A honestly believed that their father was the
victim of an unlawful aggression when in fact it was their
father who attacked B. If they killed B under such
circumstance, they are justified.
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it;
The gauge of reasonable necessity of the means

employed to repel the aggression as against one’s self or in
defense of a relative is to be found in the situation as IT
APPEARS TO THE PERSON REPELLING THE
AGGRESSION (the defender).
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
3. In case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, the one making a defense had no part therein.

There is still legitimate defense of relative even if the
relative being defended has given provocation, provided
that the one defending such relative has no part in the
provocation.
N.B. Like in self-defense, the motive of the person

defending himself or his relative is immaterial.
DEFENSE OF STRANGER
Requisites:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
3. The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment
or other evil motive.
N.B. Unlike in self-defense where motive of the person

defending himself is immaterial, in defense of strangers,
the person defending must not be motivated by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.
DEFENSE OF STRANGER
Who are deemed strangers?
Any person not included in the enumeration of relatives

mentioned in paragraph 2 of this article, is considered
stranger for the purpose of paragraph 3.

BASIS: What one may do in his defense, another may do
for him. The ordinary man would not stand idly by and see
his companion killed without attempting to save his life.
STATE OF NECESSITY
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury,
does an act which causes damage to another.

N.B. DAMAGE TO ANOTHER covers injury to persons
and damage to property.
STATE OF NECESSITY
Requisites:

1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
The evil must actually exist and not merely expected or
anticipated or may happen in the future.

2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
The greater injury feared should not have been brought
about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful
inaction of the actor. The evil which brought about the greater
evil must not result from a violation of law by the actor. (Ty v.
People, G.R. No. 149275, 27 September 2004)
STATE OF NECESSITY
3. That there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it.
Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,

infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil
or injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it
is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice
to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without
causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such
other way but the damage to another may be minimized
while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self, then such
course should be taken. (People v. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No.
199892, 10 December 2012).
STATE OF NECESSITY
General rule: No liability in justifying circumstances
because there is no crime.
Exception: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under this

paragraph. It is borne by the persons benefited by the act.
They shall be liable in proportion to the benefit which they
may have been received (Art. 101, par. 4, RPC).
N.B. Euthanasia is not a defense, thus, the accused may be

held liable for murder or parricide. However, assistance to
suicide is a felony.
STATE OF NECESSITY
Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil, Co. (1952)
Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong materials. On

May 3, 1949, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the
delivery to the garage of Rural Transit Company 1,925 gallons of
gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck trailer. The truck was driven
by Sto. Domingo, who was helped by Igmidio Rico. While the
gasoline was being discharged to the underground tank, it caught
fire, whereupon Sto. Domingo drove the truck across the road and
upon reaching the middle of the street he abandoned the truck
which continued moving to the opposite side of the first street
causing the buildings on that side to be burned and destroyed. The
house of Anita Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair
she spent P12,000.
STATE OF NECESSITY
Issue: Who may be held civilly liable?
Held: Considering the above quoted law and facts, the cause of
action against the Rural Transit Company can hardly be disputed, it
appearing that the damage caused to Anita Tan was brought about
mainly because of the desire of driver Sto. Domingo to avoid
greater evil or harm, which would have been the case had he not
brought the tank-truck trailer to the middle of the street, for then
the fire would have caused the explosion of the gasoline deposit of
the company which would have resulted in a conflagration of much
greater proportion and consequences to the houses nearby or
surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this company is one of
those for whose benefit a greater harm has been prevented, and as
such it comes within the purview of said penal provision.
STATE OF NECESSITY
Ty v. People
439 SCRA 220 (2004)
FACTS: Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila

Doctors' Hospital from October 1990 until June 1992. Being the
patient's daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of
Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission. Ty's
sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the same hospital. The total
hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. Ty
executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the
obligation in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she
drew 7 postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital
which were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid
to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds.
STATE OF NECESSITY
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks
because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.” She
averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain
release for her mother who was being inhumanely and
harshly treated by the hospital. She alleged that her mother
has contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged
from the hospital. Ty was found guilty by the lower courts
of 7 counts of violation of BP22.
STATE OF NECESSITY
HELD: The court sustained the findings of the lower courts. The
evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the
evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, the defense of an uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury” is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of
an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own
admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of
security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing,

the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by
the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the
actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought
about by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills.
FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR LAWFUL
EXERCISE OF RIGHT OR OFFICE
Requisites:

1. the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office; and
2. the injury caused or the offense committed be the

necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office.
People v. Oanis (1943)
When two (2) police officers tasked to arrest a

purported criminal saw a sleeping man in the alleged
residence of the person to be arrested and assumed that the
man was said criminal, and shot him instead of verifying
his identity, the justifying circumstance is not present since
the officers exceeded in the performance of their duties.
Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 120744-46, 25 June 2012
FACTS: A jeepney containing several people who

attended a fiesta was fired at by 6 men who were PNP
officers and barangay officials. One of the passengers was
killed and others were severely wounded. The accused
officers claim that the vehicle refused to stop at a
checkpoint and they were only acting in the fulfillment of
duties.
HELD: Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the
law. Only absolute necessity justifies the use of force, and
it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such
necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in that
respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms
does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners
in this case do not seem to have been confronted with the
rational necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney
occupied by the victims.
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which
caused injuries to Villanueva and which brought the
eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners
herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and
order; that the acts performed by them preparatory to the
shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan
without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to
kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they
had by collective action deliberately and consciously
intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily
performed those acts negates their defense of lawful
performance of official duty.
OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED FOR
SOME LAWFUL PURPOSE
Requisites:
1. That an order has been issued by a superior.
2. That such order must be for some lawful purpose.
3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out

said order is lawful.
OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED FOR
SOME LAWFUL PURPOSE
When the order is not for a lawful purpose, the
subordinate who obeyed it is criminally liable.
The subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal

order of his superior, if he is not aware of the illegality of
the order and he is not negligent. (People v. Beronilla,
1955).
J. DEL CASTILLO’S PONENCIA ON
People v. Ramos
702 SCRA 204, G.R. No. 190340, 24 July 2013
FACTS: Rogelio Ramos and Marissa Intero-Ramos were

accused of the crime of Murder with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength
for attacking and causing the death of Ronald A. Abacco.
The defense invoked self-defense, denial and alibi.
HELD: Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-
defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense is unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The
unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life and personal safety
of the person defending himself in actual peril. A mere threatening or
intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression.
The Supreme Court did not accept the defense of self-defense

since the nature, number, and location of the wounds inflicted on the
victim is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to
defend. Here, the wounds sustained by Abacco clearly show Rogelio’s
intent to kill him and not merely to prevent or repel an attack from
him. The means employed by Rogelio were unreasonable and
excessive.
People v. Agacer
662 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 177751, 14 December 2011
FACTS: Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin and Eric, all

surnamed Agacer, were found guilty by the lower courts
for the killing of a common relative, Cesario Agacer
(“Cesario”). All of the accused contend that both lower
courts erred in finding that they conspired to kill Cesario as
there was no evidence sufficient to establish their
intentional participation.
HELD: Like in the case of self-defense, unlawful aggression
is also an indispensable element in defense of relative.
The Supreme Court did not entertain the defense of

defense of relative because Florencio failed to prove that he
defended himself against the unlawful aggression of
Cesario. He failed to present any evidence to substantiate his
claim that there was an actual or imminent peril to his life or
limb. Aside from his unreliable and self-serving claim, there
is no proof that Cesario assaulted and shot him with a
firearm during their struggle or, if at all, that there was
indeed a struggle between them.
People v. Concillado
661 SCRA 363, G.R. No. 181204, 28 November 2011
FACTS: Edgar Concillado voluntarily surrendered himself

to the police on the night that Diosdado Pido was shot,
stabbed, and hacked. Edgar was implicated in the murder
along with his wife Dolores and his cousin Erlito due to a
witness testimony. The defense invoked the argument of
self-defense which the RTC rejected while the CA
acquitted Erlito and Dolores and held Edgar liable only for
homicide and granted a lower penalty due to voluntary
surrender.
HELD: When an accused admits the commission of the crime but
claims the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the burden of proof
is shifted to him. When the accused miserably fails to discharge his
burden, he does not deserve an acquittal. His conviction must be
sustained.
The Supreme Court did not entertain the defense of self-defense

because there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Diosdado.
Edgar miserably failed to discharge his burden to prove self-defense.
Furthermore, the disparity of the injuries sustained by both Edgar and
Diosdado belies all pretensions of self-defense. Diosdado suffered a
total of 26 incised, stab and bullet wounds. On the other hand, Edgar
suffered only three superficial wounds. The nature, number and
location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-
defense.
People v. Campos
653 SCRA 99, G.R. No. 176061, 4 July 2011
FACTS: Romeo F. Abad died due to the attack made by

Dingky Campos and Danny Acabo. The defense claimed
that the stabbing of the victim was done in self-defense.
HELD: The first element of unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense unless
there was unlawful aggression from the person injured or
killed by the accused; for otherwise, there is nothing to
prevent or repel.
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must

be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude and the accused must present proof of positively
strong act of real aggression.
For this reason, the accused’s observation that one of
the men was pulling an object from his waist is not a
convincing proof of unlawful aggression. A threat, even if
made with a weapon or the belief that a person was about
to be attacked, is not sufficient. An intimidation or
threatening attitude is by no means enough.
The Supreme Court did not accept the defense of self-

defense because the accused failed to prove it other than
their own self-serving allegation that the victim attacked
them first.
2. ESTAFA
ESTAFA
Three general ways of committing Estafa:
1. with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;

2. by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; and

3. through fraudulent means.
ESTAFA
Elements of Estafa IN GENERAL:

1. That the accused defrauded another by
a. abuse of confidence or
b. by means of deceit
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary a. estimation is

caused to
b. the offended party or
c. third person
N.B. DECEIT is NOT an essential requisite of estafa with abuse of

confidence
ESTAFA
As to second general element of DAMAGE, it should
be capable of pecuniary estimation, since amount of the
damage is the basis of the penalty.

Intent of defrauding another is always an element.
N.B.: There is no estafa through negligence.

ESTAFA
ESTAFA THROUGH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
Article 315, Paragraph 1 (a): Estafa with unfaithfulness by

altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of
value
Elements:
1. That the offender has an onerous obligation to deliver
something of value
2. That he alters its substance, quantity, or quality
3. That damage or prejudice is caused by another
ESTAFA
If the thing delivered had not yet been fully paid or just
partially paid, NO ESTAFA even if there was alteration 
Ratio: there was no damage to talk about

When there is no agreement as to the quality of the
thing to be delivered, delivery of a thing unacceptable to
the complainant is NOT estafa.
Even though such obligation be based on an immoral or

illegal consideration. Estafa may arise even if the thing to
be delivered is not subject of lawful commerce (ex. opium)
ESTAFA
Article 315, Paragraph 1 (b): misappropriating or converting
money, goods, or other personal property OR denying having
received such money, goods, or other personal property
Elements:
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be
received by the offender in
a. trust (Trust Receipts Law)
b. on commission
c. for administration
d. under any obligation involving duty to return the very same
thing
ESTAFA
2. There is (a) misappropriation or conversion of such
property by the offender OR (b) denial of such receipt
3. There is prejudice to another
4. Demand was made by the offended to the offender
ESTAFA
Estafa with abuse of Theft
confidence
Offender acquires the Offender acquires only

juridical possession of the material possession of the
property property
Offender receives the thing Offender takes the thing

from the offended party from the offended party
Estafa with abuse of confidence Malversation
The offenders are entrusted with funds or property
Both are continuing offenses
The funds or property are always Involves public funds or property
private
The offender is a private individual or a Offender is usually a public officer
public officer who is not accountable who is accountable for public funds
for public funds or property or property
The crime is committed by The crime is committed by

misappropriating, converting or appropriating, taking or
denying having received money, goods misappropriating or consenting, or
or other personal property through abandonment or negligence,
permitting any other person to take
the public funds or property
ESTAFA
Private individual allegedly in conspiracy with public
officer in a prosecution of the latter for malversation, may
still be held liable for Estafa even if the public officer was
acquitted.
Misappropriation of firearms received by a policeman

is Estafa, if it is not involved in the commission of a crime.
It is malversation, if it is involved in the commission of a
crime.
ESTAFA
Article 315, par 1, (c): estafa by taking undue
advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank
Elements:
1. That the paper with the signature of the offended party be in
blank;
2. That the offended party should have delivered it to the
offender;
3. That above the signature, a document is written by offender
without authority to do so;
4. That the document so written creates a liability of, or causes
damage to the offended party or any third person.
ESTAFA
The paper with the signature in blank MUST BE
DELIVERED by the offended party to the offender
(otherwise, crime is falsification of instrument)
ESTAFA
ESTAFA BY DECEIT
Elements of Estafa by means of deceit:
1. There must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;

2. Such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud;
3. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part
with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means;
4. As a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
ESTAFA
Article 315, par 2, (a)
Three (3) ways of committing estafa under this provision:

1. using fictitious name
2. falsely pretending to possess
a. power
b. influence
c. qualifications
d. property
e. credit
f. agency
g. business or imaginary transactions
3. other similar deceits
ESTAFA
Fictitious name: when a person found a pawnshop ticket in the
name of another and, using the name of that person, redeemed the
jewelry

Pretending to possess power: "pretend to be a magician who can
find gold, but pay me to find the gold under your house" trick.

Pretending to possess influence: I have connections in
Malacañang so pay me if you want to get your documents approved"
trick

Estafa by means of deceit v. theft: juridical/legal possession is still
transferred to offender in case of estafa. But it is transferred through
deceit.
ESTAFA
Article 315, Paragraph 2 (b): by altering quality,
fineness, or weight of anything pertaining to his art or
business
Example: A gives B, a jeweler, a diamond to be made into

a ring. B changed the stone with one of lower quality.
N.B. Manipulation of Scale: violation of Revised

Administrative Code
ESTAFA
Article 315, Paragraph 2 (c): pretending to have bribed
any Government employee
Person would ask money from another for the alleged

purpose of bribing a government employee but just
pocketed the money after

"without prejudice to an action for calumny": the
offender may also be charged with defamation which the
government employee allegedly bribed may deem proper
to bring against the offender
ESTAFA
Article 315, Paragraph 2 (d): postdating a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds
in the bank, or his funds were not sufficient to cover the
amount
Elements:
1. That the offender postdated a check, or issued a check in
payment of an obligation
2. That such postdating or issuing was done when:
a. offender had no funds; or
b. funds deposited were not sufficient.
ESTAFA
check must be genuine and not falsified, otherwise, it is estafa
under paragraph 2(a), not 2(d) (example: signing a check with a
fictitious name and falsely pretending said check could be encashed)

the issuance of a check is NOT for a pre-existing obligation. It
MUST be for an obligation contracted at the time of the issuance
or delivery of the check.

When check is issued in substitution of a promissory note, it is
in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
When the check is issued by a guarantor, there is no Estafa

because it is not in payment of an obligation.
ESTAFA
Article 315, Paragraph 3 (a): Estafa by inducing another to
sign any document
Elements:
1. That the offender induced the offended party to sign a
document;
2. That deceit be employed to make him sign the document;
3. That the offended party personally signed the document;
4. That prejudice be caused.
ESTAFA
There must be inducement:
if the offended party was willing to sign although there

was deceit as to the character or contents of the document
(because the contents are different from those which the
offended party told the accused to state in the document)
crime is falsification

accused should make statements tending to mislead the
complainant as to the character of the document executed
by him.
ESTAFA
Article 315, Paragraph 3 (b): Estafa by resorting to
some fraudulent practice to insure success in gambling
ESTAFA
Article 315, Paragraph 3 (c): Estafa by removing,
concealing, or destroying documents
Elements:
1. That there be court record, office files, documents or any
other papers;
2. That the offender removed, concealed or destroyed any of
them; and
3. That the offender had intent to defraud another
N.B. If no intent to defraud, the act of destroying court

record will be malicious mischief
ESTAFA
Estafa under par. 3 (c) Infidelity in the custody of
documents
Manner of committing offenses is the same

The offender is a private The offender is a public officer who
individual or even a public is officially entrusted with the
officer who is not officially document
entrusted with the documents
There is intent to defraud Intent to defraud not an element in

this crime
ESTAFA
ESTAFA THROUGH THEFT
The accused CANNOT be convicted of estafa with abuse of

confidence under an information alleging estafa by means of deceit.

If there is no deceit and no abuse of confidence, there is no
estafa, even if there is damage. There is only civil liability.

There CAN be a complex crime of theft and estafa, when the
former is a necessary means to commit the latter. Example: C, with
intent to gain, took the pawnshop tickets without the consent of A
(Theft). By redeeming the jewels by means of the tickets, C also
committed estafa, using a fictitious name.
ESTAFA
The basis of the penalty for estafa is the amount or value
of the property misappropriated BEFORE the institution of
the criminal action. Hence, partial payment made subsequent
to the commission of estafa does not reduce the amount
misappropriated which is the basis of the penalty.

A private person who procures a loan by means of deceit
through a falsified public document of mortgage, but who
effects full settlement of the loan within the period agreed
upon, does not commit the crime of Estafa, there being no
disturbance of proprietary rights and no person defrauded
thereby. The crime committed is only falsification of public
document.
ESTAFA
"Prejudice" consists in:
1. The offended party being deprived of his money or property
as a result of the fraud
2. Disturbance in property rights
3. Temporary prejudice
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951
Penalties for Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code [except par. 2(d)]:
Amount of the Fraud under Amount of the Fraud
Penalty
Old RPC under R.A. No. 10951
Prision correccional in
Over Php12,000.00 but over Php2,400,000.00
its maximum period to
does not exceed but does not exceed
prision mayor in its
Php22,000.00 Php4,400,000.00
minimum period
If such amount exceeds
Php4,400,000.00, the
Php22,000.00, the penalty
penalty provided in this
provided in this
paragraph shall be
paragraph shall be
imposed in its
imposed in its maximum
maximum period,
period, adding one year
adding one year for
for each additional 10,000
each additional
pesos; but the total penalty
Php2,000,000.00; but the
which may be imposed
total penalty which may
shall not exceed 20 years.
be imposed shall not

exceed 20 years.
Amount of the Fraud Amount of the Fraud

Penalty
under Old RPC under R.A. No. 10951
Prision correccional in Over Php6,000.00 but Over Php1,200,000.00
its minimum and does not exceed but does not exceed
medium periods Php12,000.00 Php2,400,000.00
Arresto mayor in its
Over Php200.00 but Over Php40,000.00
maximum period to
prision correccional in
Php6,000.00 Php1,200,000.00
its minimum period
Arresto mayor in its Does not exceed Does not exceed
maximum period Php200.00 Php40,000.00
Penalties for Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code :
Penalty Amount of the Fraud under R.A.
No. 10951

reclusion perpetua exceeds Eight million eight
hundred thousand pesos
(₱8,800,000)
reclusion temporal in its maximum over Four million four hundred
period thousand pesos (₱4,400,000) but
does not exceed Eight million
eight hundred thousand pesos
(₱8,800,000)
reclusion temporal in its minimum over Two million four hundred
and medium periods thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but
does not exceed Four million four
(₱4,400,000)
No. 10951

prisión mayor in its maximum over One million two hundred
does not exceed Two million four
(₱2,400,000)
prisión mayor in its medium over Forty thousand pesos
period (₱40,000) but does not exceed One
million two hundred thousand
pesos (₱1,200,000)
prisión mayor in its minimum does not exceed Forty thousand
period pesos (₱40,000)
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON ESTAFA
Capulong v. People
G.R. No. 199907, 27 February 2017, J. Peralta
For failure to comply with her promise to return the

original OR-CR, or even furnish new ones in lieu thereof,
and in misrepresenting that she already gave De Guzman
the subject documents, Anita's intent to defraud is shown
beyond question. Such malicious intent was even made
more prominent with the replacement of the truck's engine
without De Guzman's knowledge and the unknown
whereabouts of the vehicle.
Gamaro v. People
FACTS: Fineza engaged in a business with Norma Gamaro

and her daughters – Josephine Umali and Rowena Gamaro – in
buying foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier
Pawnshop. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were
placed in the possession of Norma and Rowena would issue
several checks drawn from their joint bank account in favor of
Fineza reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of jewelry.
Fineza tried to encash the checks which were issued to her
by Rowena, however, the same were dishonored because the
joint account of the Norma and Rowena had been closed.
HELD: Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa

committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice
of another money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or
by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation
arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an
account of their whereabouts.
The failure to account upon demand, for funds or

property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.
Here, Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon
demand, the jewelry which was received by her in trust.
This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation or conversion to petitioner's own personal
use. The failure to return upon demand the properties
which one has the duty to return is tantamount to
appropriating the same for his own personal use. In fact, in
this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the pieces of jewelry
using her own money.
J. DEL CASTILLO’S PONENCIA ON ESTAFA
People v. Go
732 SCRA 216, G.R. No. 191015, 6 August 2014
FACTS: BSP issued a resolution ordering the closure of

Orient Commercial Banking Corp. and placed the PDIC as
receiver. The PDIC, upon investigation, discovered that Go
converted OCBC funds to his own personal use and
benefit.
HELD: The elements of estafa through abuse of
confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code are:
1. that money, goods or other personal property is received by
the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same;
2. that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money
or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. that such misappropriation or conversion or fenial is
to the prejudice of another; and
4. there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an

act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were
one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s own
use includes not only conversion to one’s personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right.
Meaning of “convert”
In proving the element of conversion or

misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation
arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an
account of their whereabouts. Thus, the mere presumption
of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude
that a probable cause exists for the indictment.
In this case, the Supreme Court ordered the
continuation of the hearing of the case as there was
sufficient evidence against the accused. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court declared that the President of a bank is a
fiduciary with respect to the bank’s funds, and he holds the
same in trust or for administration for the bank’s benefit.
From this, it may be inferred that when such bank president
makes it appear through falsification that an individual or
entity applied for a loan when in fact such individual or
entity did not, and the bank president obtains the loan
proceeds and converts the same, estafa is committed.
Tanenggee v. People
699 SCRA 639, G.R. No. 179448, 26 June 2013
FACTS: By falsely representing that Tan requested him to
process purported loans on the latter’s behalf, Tanenggee
counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the
cashier’s checks which he used to withdraw money from
the bank and invested the same in Eurocan Future
Commodities.
HELD:
ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA IN GENERAL
Estafa is generally committed when:
1. the accused defrauded another by abuse of

confidence, or by means of deceit, and
2. the offended party or a third party suffered damage
or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.

Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive
another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
The Supreme Court affirmed Tanenggee’s conviction of

estafa. Tanenggee could not have withdrawn the money
without falsifying the questioned documents.
D’Aigle v. People
675 SCRA 206, G.R. No. 174181, 27 June 2012
FACTS: D’ Aigle received from Samfit Philippines, Inc.
(“SPI”) electric parts in accordance with their agreement
that D’ Aigle would fabricate bending machines for SPI.
However, D’ Aigle was not able to finish the work
allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI. SPI demanded for
the return of its properties but D’ Aigle did not heed the
demand and simply kept the properties as lien for his
claims against SPI.
HELD: The elements of estafa through abuse of
confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code are:
1. that money, goods or other personal property is received by
the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same;
2. that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money
or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and
4. there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
When the money, goods or any other personal property

is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in
trust, or (2) on commission, or (3) for administration, the
offender acquires both material or physical possession and
juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a
right over the thing which the transferee may set up even
against the owner.
Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the
prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence. The failure to account upon demand, for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.
The Supreme Court affirmed D’Aigle’s conviction of

estafa because it was proven that he failed to account for,
upon demand, the properties of SPI which were received
by him in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said
properties for his own personal use.
Even if D’Aigle merely retained the properties for the
purpose of preserving his right of lien over them it is
immaterial because of his failure to return upon demand
the properties which one has the duty to return. This is
tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal
use.
Franco v. People
643 SCRA 474, G.R. No. 171328, 16 February 2011
FACTS: Franco et al. presented themselves to Lourdes as

persons possessing the authority and capacity to engage in
the financing of used vehicles in behalf of Final Access
Marketing. However, Franco et al. had previous knowledge
not only of Erlinda’s complaint but also of 12 other
complaints as to the failure of Final Access Marketing to
deliver the motor vehicles bought by its customers.
HELD: The elements of the crime of estafa by means of
deceit are:

1. There must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or
fraudulent means;
2. Such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud;
3. The offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus
induced to part with his money or property; and
4. As a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
MISREPRESENTATION
An employee’s act of soliciting a client despite

previous knowledge of several complaints against his or
her employer for failure to deliver the motor vehicle that
was the subject of the agreement, is tantamount to
misrepresentation.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was estafa and
misrepresentation since the accused presented themselves
to Lourdes as persons possessing the authority and capacity
to engage in the financing of used vehicles in behalf of
Final Access Marketing. This was a clear misrepresentation
considering their previous knowledge not only of Erlinda’s
complaint but also of several others as regards the failure
of Final Access Marketing to deliver the motor vehicles
bought. Lourdes relied on their misrepresentations when
she parted with her money.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado
627 SCRA 88, G.R. No. 164538, 9 August 2010
FACTS: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(“MBTC”) charged Reynado et al. before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa.
Subsequently, the partners entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement whereby Reynaldo et al. acknowledged its
indebtedness to the MBTC.
HELD:
NOVATION IN ESTAFA CASES
Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or

novation of contract. In a crime of estafa, reimbursement or
belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by
the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter.
In a crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the

amount misappropriated after the commission of the crime affects
only the civil liability of the offender and not his criminal liability.
The Supreme Court did not entertain the
reimbursement given by the accused. The SC discussed
that the criminal action commenced by petitioner had its
genesis from the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of
confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their
positions as responsible bank officers. It did not arise from
a contractual dispute or matters strictly between petitioner
and Universal. The accused cannot rely on the subject
settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the
offense already committed to the end of extinguishing their
criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any liability
that may arise from the criminal offense.
Ansaldo v. People
616 SCRA 556, G.R. No. 159381, 26 March 2010
FACTS: Ramirez entrusted her owner’s duplicate copy of

TCT to Ansaldo and his wife, on the condition that it would
be returned after 1 month, based on Ansaldo and his wife’s
representation that they have direct connections with the
LRA and that they could have her property subdivided.
However, Ansaldo and his wife did not return the TCT
after 1 month and Ramirez discovered that her lot has been
mortgaged by Ansaldo and his wife.
HELD:
ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF

PUBLIC DOCUMENT
For a complex crime of estafa through falsification of a

public document to prosper, all the elements of both the
crimes of estafa and falsification of a public document
must exist.
Elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a):

1. The accused made false pretenses or fraudulent
representations as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
2. The false pretenses or fraudulent representations were
made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
3. The false pretenses or fraudulent representations
constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to
part with his money or property;
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.
Elements of falsification of public documents:

1. That the offender is a private individual or a public
officer or employee who took advantage of his official position;
2. That he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (which in
this case involves forging a signature;
3. That the falsification was committed in a public or
official or commercial document.
The Supreme Court found Ansaldo and his wife guilty
of the crime of estafa since he and his wife falsely
represented to Ramirez that they had the influence and
capability to cause the subdivision of the lot. In view of
said false representation, Ramirez was induced to part with
the owners copy of her TCT on the condition that the same
would be returned after a month as evidenced by the
Acknowledgment Receipt.
People v. Martinez
614 SCRA 254, G.R. No. 158627, 5 March 2010
FACTS: Martinez misrepresented herself to the

complainants as one who can make arrangements for job
placements in South Korea as factory workers. By reason
of her misrepresentations, complainants were induced to
part with their money when in reality. Martinez has no
authority to make job placements in Korea.
HELD:
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA

The three elements of the crime of illegal recruitment are:
1. the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers;
2. the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
“recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code,
or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and
3. the offender committed the same against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.
N.B. Illegal recruitment and estafa can arise from the same
acts.
NOVATION IN ESTAFA CASES
Criminal liability for estafa already committed is not

affected by the fact that offender returned a portion of their
money. Compromise or novation of contract pertains and
affects only the civil aspect of the case. Estafa is a public
offense that must be prosecuted and punished by the Court
in its motion even though complete reparation should have
been made of the damage suffered by the offended party.
The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the lower
courts that Martinez is guilty of the crimes of illegal
recruitment and four counts of estafa since she
misrepresented herself to the complainants as one who can
make arrangements for job placements in South Korea as
factory workers. By reason of her misrepresentations, false
assurances, and deceit, complainants were induced to part
with their money. The recruits waited for at least a year,
only to realize that they were hoodwinked, as no jobs were
waiting for them abroad.
3. PERSONS
CRIMINALLY
LIABLE
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following
are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:

a. Principals.

b. Accomplices.

c. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:

a. Principals

b. Accomplices.

N.B. The treble division of persons criminally responsible
for an offense rests upon the very nature of their
participation in the commission of the crime.
The ACCESSORIES are not liable for light felonies
because in the commission of light felonies, the social
wrong as well as the individual prejudice is so small that
penal sanction is deemed not necessary for accessories
RULES RELATIVE TO LIGHT FELONIES

1. Light felonies are punishable only when they have
been consummated.

2. But when light felonies are committed against
persons or property, the are punishable even if they are
only in the attempted or frustrated stage of the execution.
3. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light
felonies.

4. Accessories are not liable for light felonies, even if
they are committed against persons or property.

N.B. Only natural persons can be the active subject of
crime because of the highly personal nature of the criminal
responsibility.
Only a natural person can be the offender because:

1. The RPC requires that the culprit should have acted
with personal malice or negligence. An artificial or
juridical person cannot act with malice or negligence.

2. A juridical person, like a corporation, cannot commit
a crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious intent is
required.
There is substitution of deprivation of liberty
(subsidiary imprisonment) for pecuniary penalties in case
of in case of insolvency of the accused.

Other penalties consisting in imprisonment and other
deprivation of liberty like destierro, can be executed only
against individuals.
Officers, not the corporation, are criminally liable.

Juridical persons are criminally liable under certain
special laws.

In all crimes there are always 2 parties: ACTIVE (the
criminal) and PASSIVE (the injured party).
PRINCIPALS
PRINCIPALS
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered

principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
PRINCIPALS
KINDS OF PRINCIPALS
1. Principals by Direct Participation
2. Principals by Inducement
3. Principals by Indispensable Cooperation

PRINCIPALS – BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION
PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION
The principal by direct participation PERSONALLY

TAKES PART IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ACT
constituting the crime.
Two or more persons who took part in the commission

of the crime are principals by direct participation, when the
following requisites are present:
1. That they participated in the criminal resolution
2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its
execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.
PARTICIPATION
First requisite – Participation in the criminal resolution
Two or more persons are said to have participated in

the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the
time of the commission of the crime.
It is well settled that a person may be convicted for the

criminal act of another where, between them, there has
been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the
commission of the crime charged.
PARTICIPATION
Second requisite – that the culprits “carried out their plan
and personally took part in its execution, by acts which
directly tended to the same end.”

 The principals by direct participation must be at the scene
of the crime, personally taking part in its execution.
 The acts of each offender must directly tend to the same
end.
 One serving as guard pursuant to the conspiracy is a
principal by direct participation.
 When the second requisite is lacking, there is only
conspiracy.
PARTICIPATION
People v. Dacillo
G.R. No. 149368, 14 April 2004
FACTS: Pacot stabbed and strangled Rosemarie leading

to the latter’s death. Dacillo for his part, hold down
Rosemarie’s legs to prevent her from struggling. The two
men stopped only when they were sure that the victim was
already dead. Dacillo then encase her corpse in cement.
PARTICIPATION
HELD: Two or more persons taking part in the
commission of a crime are considered principals by direct
participation if the following requisites are present:
1. they participated in the criminal resolution and
2. they carried out their plan and personally took part in its
execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. Both
requisites were met in this case.
Further Dacillo’s admission that he participated in the
commission of the crime by holding Rosemarie’s legs
made him a principal by direct participation.
PRINCIPALS – BY INDUCTION
PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION
“Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.”
The principal by induction becomes liable only when

the principal by direct participation committed the act
induced.
2 WAYS OF BECOMING PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION

1. BY DIRECTLY FORCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME

a. By using IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
b. By causing UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR

2. BY DIRECTLY INDUCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A
CRIME.
a. By giving price, or offering reward or promise.

b. By using words of command.
REQUISITES
1. That the inducement be made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and
a. A thoughtless expression without intention to produce the
result is not an inducement to commit a crime.
b. The inducement may be by acts of command, advice, or
through influence, or agreement for consideration.
2. That such inducement be the determining cause of
the commission of the crime by the material executor.
PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT PROPOSAL TO COMMIT THE
FELONY
There is an inducement to commit a crime.
The principal by inducement becomes The mere proposal to commit a felony
liable only when the crime is is punishable in treason and rebellion.
committed by the principal by direct The person to whom the proposal is
participation. made should not commit the crime;
otherwise, the proponent becomes a
principal by inducement.
The inducement involves any crime The proposal to be punishable must

involve only treason or rebellion.
EFFECTS OF ACQUITTAL OF PRINCIPAL BY
DIRECT PARTICIPATION UPON THE LIABILITY OF
PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT
 Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal of co-defendant.

 One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the
commission of a crime without first being shown that the
crime has been actually committed by another.
Ambagan v. People
G.R. Nos. 204481-82, 13 November 2015

FACTS: Santos and Domingo Bawalan were killed during
the July 5, 2004 shooting incident, and that the killing was
not attended by any of the circumstances that would
qualify the offense to murder, parricide, or infanticide.
Here, the Sandiganbayan adjudged Ambagan guilty for two
counts of homicide as principal by inducement for
allegedly uttering "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga
kasama banatan na ninyo yan!" which impelled his
bodyguards to open fire at the victims.
HELD: The conviction of a person as a principal by
inducement requires (1) that the inducement be made with
the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;
and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of
the commission by the material executor. As applied, the
Sandiganbayan would have been correct in holding
Ambagan criminally liable if he indeed made the utterance
immediately before the shooting incident.
However, this Court is not inclined to believe that
Ambagan indeed made the declaration that started the fray.
The court a quo failed to take note of substantial
inconsistencies in the testimonies of star prosecution
witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan. These
contradictions refer not only to minor details but even to
the facts constituting important aspects of the case,
seriously eroding the weight of the evidence of the
prosecution, and casting reasonable doubt on the
culpability of Ambagan.
PRINCIPALS – BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION
PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION
“Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by

another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.”
COOPERATION
REQUISITES
1. Participation in the criminal resolution, that is, there

is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose
and intention immediately before the commission of the
crime charged; and
2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by

performing another act, without which it would not have
been accomplished.
COOPERATION
 To be liable as principals, the offender must fall under any
of the three concepts defined in Article 17.
 There is collective criminal responsibility when the
offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and to
the same extent. The penalty to be imposed must be the
same for all.
 Principals by direct participation have collective criminal
responsibility. Principal by induction, except that who
directly forced another to commit a crime, and principal by
direct participation have collective criminal responsibility.
Principal by indispensable cooperation has collective
criminal responsibility with the principal by direct
participation.
COOPERATION
People v. Montealegre
161 SCRA 700 (1988)
FACTS: Abadilla was eating at a restaurant when he detected the

smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table. Intending to
call a policeman, he went outside and saw a police and reported the
matter. The police approached the table and held Montealegre and
Capalad. Capalad suddenly pulled out his knife and started stabbing
the police at the back. The police released the 2 in order to draw his
gun but Montealegre restrained the police so that Capalad may
continue stabbing. The 3 grappled and the police was able to draw
his gun and fired at the 2 assailants. A chase ensued. Capalad was
shot which resulted to his death. The police also died because of the
wounds inflicted by Capalad.
COOPERATION
HELD: The accused was correctly considered a co-
principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the
killing of the police officer. The 2 acted in concert. Even if
the accused did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he
is nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented
the police from resisting the attack against him. The
accused was a principal by indispensable cooperation.
COOPERATION
People v. Fronda
222 SCRA 71 (1993)
FACTS: The Balaan brothers were abducted and killed by

members of the New People’s Army. Fronda and Padwa
accompanied the rebels to the victims’ house. They were
the ones who tied the hands of the victims and supplied the
spade and crowbar for digging the graves. The trial court
convicted Fronda and Padwa as principals by indispensable
cooperation.
COOPERATION
HELD: The accused are only accomplices for the crime
can be committed even without their participation. An
accomplice is one who cooperates by previous or
simultaneous acts and his participation is of a minor
character. He must be aware of the criminal intent and
participates by supplying material and moral aid for its
execution.
ACCOMPLICES
ACCOMPLICES
Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons

who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
ACCOMPLICES
 In quasi-collective criminal responsibility, some of the
offenders in the crime are principals and the others are
accomplices.
 The participation of an accomplice presupposes the commission
of the crime by the principal by direct participation.
 When there is no conspiracy between or among the defendants
but they were animated by one and the same purpose to
accomplish the criminal objective, those who cooperated by
previous or simultaneous act but cannot be held liable as
principals are accomplices.
 An accomplice does not have a previous agreement or
understanding or is not in conspiracy with the principal by
direct participation.
ACCOMPLICES
CONSPIRATOR ACCOMPLICE
They know and agree with the criminal design.
Conspirators know the criminal Accomplices come to know about
intention because they themselves it after the principals have reached
have decided upon such course of the decision and only then do they
action. agree to cooperate in its execution.
Conspirators decide that a crime Accomplices merely assent to the

should be committed. plan and cooperate in it
accomplishment

Conspirators are the authors of a Accomplices are merely
crime instruments who perform acts not
essential to the perpetration of the
offense.
ACCOMPLICES
REQUISITES
1. There be community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation,
he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. he cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the
crime in an efficacious way; and
3. there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.
ACCOMPLICES
 The community of design need not be to commit the
crime actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a
common purpose to commit a particular crime and that
the crime actually committed was a natural or probable
consequence of the intended crime.
 The cooperation of an accomplice is not due to a
conspiracy.
 When the acts of the accused are not indispensable in the
killing, they are merely accomplices.
ACCOMPLICES
 The accomplice merely supplies the principal with
material or moral aid without conspiracy with the latter.
 The wounds inflicted by an accomplice in crimes against
persons should mot have caused the death of the victim.
ACCOMPLICES
RULES:
 The one who had the original criminal design is the
person who committed the resulting crime.
 The accomplice, after concurring in the criminal purpose
of the principal, cooperates by previous or simultaneous
acts.
 When the cooperation is by simultaneous act, the
accomplice takes part while the crime is being
committed by the principal by direct participation or
immediately thereafter.
 The accomplice in crimes against persons does not inflict
the more or most serious wounds.
ACCOMPLICES
PRINCIPAL by ACCOMPLICE
COOPERATION
Cooperation is Cooperation is not

indispensable in the indispensable in the
commission of the act. commission of the act.
ACCOMPLICES
People v. Gambao
G.R. No. 172707, 1 October 2013
FACTS: Lucia Chan was abducted and brought to a resort

in Laguna. The abductors demanded 20 million pesos as
ransom. The police eventually rescued Chan and arrested
the perpetrators. Among those arrested was Perpenian, who
was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime. She chatted with the abductors and claimed that she
thought that there was only a swimming party.
ACCOMPLICES
HELD: An accomplice cooperates in the execution by
supplying material and moral aid in relation to the acts
done by the principal. In this case, her presence gave moral
support to the abductors as she kept quiet and didn’t tell the
police even when there was obviously a crime being
committed. She is an accomplice to the kidnapping.
Santiago v. People
G.R. No. 200233, 15 July 2015
FACTS: Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang

since 2 June 1974, 6 asked Santiago to marry him.
Santiago, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married
Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-
in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she
should choose someone who was “without responsibility.”
Santiago was convicted as principal to the crime of
bigamy.
ACCOMPLICES
HELD: Her punishment as a principal to the crime is
wrong. People v. Archilla holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an
accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an
eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person,
whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees
to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock
is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy."
Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
accomplice to the crime.
ACCESSORIES
ACCESSORIES
Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having

knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects
of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of
the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions
or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known
to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
ACCESSORIES
An accessory does not participate in the criminal
design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but,
with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he
subsequently takes part in 3 ways:
a. by profiting from the effects of the crime;
b. by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in
order to prevent its discovery; and
c. by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of
the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or
the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
ACCESSORIES
“knowledge of the commission of the crime”
 Mere possession of stolen property does not make the

accused an accessory where the thief was already
convicted.
 Entertaining suspicion that a crime has been committed
is not enough.
 Knowledge of the commission of the crime may be
established by circumstantial evidence
ACCESSORIES
“commission of the crime”
 the crime committed by the principal must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
“without having participated therein either as principals

or accomplices”
“take part subsequent to its commission”

 The accessory takes part AFTER the crime has been
committed.
ACCESSORIES
SPECIFIC ACTS OF THE ACCESSORIES
1. BY PROFITING THEMSELVES OR ASSISTING THE

OFFENDER TO PROFIT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE
CRIME
 The accessory must receive the property from the principal.
He should not take it without the consent of the principal, or
else, he is not an accessory but a principal in the crime of
theft.
 When is profiting by the effect of the crime punished as the
act of principal, and not the act of accessory?
 When a person knowingly acquired or received property
taken by the brigands.
ACCESSORIES
2. BY CONCEALING OR DESTROYING THE BODY
OF THE CRIME TO PREVENT ITS DISCOVERY.
 BODY OF THE CRIME –“corpus delicti” which means

that a specific offense was in fact committed by someone
ACCESSORIES
3. BY HARBORING, CONCEALING OR ASSISTING IN THE
ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL OF THE CRIME
2 CLASSES
a. Public officers who harbor conceal or assist in the escape of the

principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his public functions
REQUISITES
(1) The accessory is a public officer;
(2) He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the principal;
(3) The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions.
(4) The crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light
felony.
ACCESSORIES
b. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape
of the author of the crime – guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt against the life of the President, or
who is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
REQUISITES
(1) The accessory is a private person.
(2) He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of
the crime.
(3) The crime committed by the principal is either: (a) treason, (b)
parricide, (c) murder, (d) attempt against the life of the president,
or (e) that the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.
ACCESSORIES
An ACESSORY is exempt from criminal liability, when the
principal is his:
1. spouse,
2. ascendant,
3. descendant,
4. legitimate, natural or adopted brother, sister or
relative by affinity within the same degree.
 even if only two of the principals guilty of murder are the
brothers of the accessory and the others are not related to
him, such accessory is exempt from criminal liability.
 a nephew or niece is not included
ACCESSORIES
An accessory is NOT EXEMPT from criminal liability
even if the principal is related to him, if such accessory (1)
PROFITED by the effects of the crime, or (2) assisted
the offender to profit by the effects of the crime
ACCESSORIES
People v. Talingdan
84 SCRA 19 (1978)
FACTS: Bernardo and Teresa lived together but for quite some
time their relationship has gotten bitter. Bernardo knew that Teresa
had an illicit relationship with Talingdan. Their child testified that
on the day the killing occurred, there were 4 men inside their
house and Bernardo knew about it but continued plowing his field.
Later, when Bernardo came inside the kitchen, Talingdan and
Tobias fired at Bernardo and the 4 climbed the stairs of the
batalan. Seeing that the victim was alive, they fired at him again.
Teresa came out after from her room and pulled her child to
question her. Teresa threatened to kill her if she would reveal the
incident.
ACCESSORIES
HELD: One who conceals or assists in the escape of the
principal in the crime can be held guilty as accessory.
There is morally convincing proof that Teresa is an
accessory to the offense. She was inside the room when her
husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she
inquired from the child if she was able to recognize the
assailants and when the latter identified the 4 accused as
the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to
reveal what she knew to anyone but she went to the extent
of warning her not to tell anyone or else she would kill her.
Later when the police came, she claimed she had no
suspects in mind. She, thus, became active in her
cooperation with the 4 accused.
4. AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE
S
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Aggravating circumstances are those which, if
attendant in the commission of the crime, serve to increase
the penalty without, however, exceeding the maximum of
the penalty provided by law for the offense.
They are based on the greater perversity of the offender
manifested in the commission of the felony as shown by:

1. motivating power itself;
2. the place of commission;
3. the means and ways employed;
4. the time; or
5. the personal circumstances of the offender, or of the offended
party.
FOUR KINDS OF AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES

GENERIC – Those that can generally apply to all crimes,
i.e., nos. 2, 3 (dwelling), 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, and 20
except “by means of motor vehicles.”

SPECIFIC – Those that apply only to particular crimes.
Nos. 3 (except dwelling), 15, 16, 17 and 21.
GENERIC AC QUALIFYING AC
As to Effect
The effect of a generic AC, not offset by The effect of a qualifying AC is not
any mitigating circumstance, is to increase only to give the crime its proper and
the penalty which should be imposed upon exclusive name but also to place the
the accused to the MAXIMUM PERIOD. author thereof in such a situation as
to deserve no other penalty than that
specially prescribed by law for said
crime.
As to Offsetting
A generic aggravating circumstance may be A qualifying AC cannot be offset by
compensated by a mitigating circumstance. a mitigating circumstance.
According to the new rules, generic and qualifying aggravating circumstances

must be alleged in order to be appreciated.
QUALIFYING –Those that change the nature of the
crime. Art. 248 enumerates the qualifying AC which
qualify the killing of person to murder.
INHERENT – Those that must accompany the

commission of the crime.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DO NOT
HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE
PENALTY

1. (a) which in themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law, or (b) which are included by the law in
defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefore shall
not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the
penalty (Art. 62, par. 1)
2. AC which arise:
a. from the moral attributes of the offender or
b. from his private relations with the offended party, or
c. from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate

the liability of the principals, accomplices, and accessories as to
whom such circumstances are attendant.
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF BEING A
PUBLIC OFFICER
Par. 1. - THAT ADVANTAGE BE TAKEN BY THE
OFFENDER OF HIS PUBLIC POSITION.
 The mere fact that the offender is a public officer or

employee is a “SPECIAL aggravating circumstance” in
violation of R.A. No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 31) and
a “QUALIFYING circumstance” in violation of R.A.
No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
(R.A. No. 9208, Sec. 5).
WITH CONTEMPT OR INSULT TO PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES
Par. 2. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN
CONTEMPT OR WITH INSULT TO THE PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES.
REQUISITES
 That the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his
functions.
 That he who is thus engaged in the exercise of his functions
is not the person against whom the crime is committed.
 The offender knows him to be a public authority.
 His presence has not prevented the offender from

committing the criminal act.
AUTHORITIES
PUBLIC AUTHORITY / PERSON IN AUTHORITY
 A public officer who is directly vested with jurisdiction,

that is, a public officer who has the power to govern and
execute the laws. The councilor, mayor, governor,
barangay captain etc. are persons in authority. A school
teacher, town municipal health officer, agent of the BIR,
chief of police, etc. are now considered a person in
authority.
 Par. 2 is not applicable if committed in the presence of

an agent only such as a police officer.
AUTHORITIES
AGENT
 A subordinate public officer charged with the

maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as barrio policemen,
councilmen, and any person who comes to the aid of
persons in authority.
 The crime should not be committed against the public
authority or else it becomes direct assault.
 Lack of knowledge on the part of the offender that a
public authority is present indicates lack of intention to
insult the public authority.
DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE OR SEX
Par. 3 (1) WITH INSULT OR IN DISREGARD OF THE
REPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT:
(a) OF THE RANK OF THE OFFENDED PARTY

ex. An attempt upon the life of a general of the Philippine
Army is committed in disregard of his rank.

(b) OF THE AGE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
ex. When the aggressor is 45 years old and the victim was an
octogenarian.
It is not proper to consider disregard of old age in crimes
against property. Robbery with homicide is primarily a crime
against property.
(c) OF THE SEX OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
This refers to the female sex, not to the male sex
(Reyes)
Killing a woman is not attended by this AC if the
offender did not manifest any specific insult or disrespect
towards her sex.
THIS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE FOLLOWING:
 When the offender acted with passion and obfuscation.
 When there exists a relationship between the offended

party and the offender.
 When the condition of being a woman is indispensable in
the commission of the crime i.e. parricide, rape, etc.
N.B. Disregard of sex absorbed in treachery.

DWELLING
Par. 3 (2) THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN
THE DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
DWELLING – BUILDING OR STRUCTURE,

EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR REST AND COMFORT.
 a “combination house and store” or a market stall where
the victim slept is not a dwelling.
 This is considered an AC primarily because of the
sanctity of privacy, the law accords to human abode.
Also, in certain cases, there is an abuse of confidence
which the offended party reposed in the offender by
opening the door to him.
DWELLING
 The evidence must show clearly that the defendant
entered the house of the deceased to attack him.
 The offended party must not give provocation. If the
provocation did not take place in the house, dwelling
may be considered as an AC.
 Dwelling is aggravating, even if the offender did not
enter the upper part of the house where the victim was,
but shot from under the house.
 Even if the killing took place outside the dwelling, it is
aggravating provided that the commission of the crime
was begun in the dwelling.
DWELLING
 Dwelling is aggravating in abduction or illegal detention.
 It is not aggravating where the deceased was called down
from his house and he was murdered in the vicinity of
his house.
 Dwelling includes dependencies, the foot of the staircase
and the enclosure under the house. If the deceased was
only about to step on the first rung of the ladder when he
was assaulted, the AC of dwelling will not be applicable.
DWELLING
DWELLING NOT APPLICABLE
 When both offender and offended party are occupants of the same
house.
 When the robbery is committed by the use of force upon things,
dwelling is not aggravating because it is inherent to the crime.
 In the crime of trespass to dwelling, it is also inherent or included
by law in defining the crime.
 When the owner of the dwelling gave sufficient and immediate
provocation.
 When the dwelling where the crime was committed did not belong
to the offended party.
 When the rape was committed in the ground floor of the 2-storey
structure, the lower floor being used as a video rental store and not
as a private place of abode or residence.
DWELLING
 A victim raped in the boarding house where she was a
bed spacer. Her room constituted a “dwelling”.
 Dwelling may be temporary dwelling.
 Dwelling is not aggravating in adultery when paramour

also lives in the conjugal home.
 Dwelling is not included in treachery.
N.B.: The Code speaks of dwelling, not domicile.

DWELLING
People v. Taño
331 SCRA 448 (2000)
FACTS: Amy was tending a video rental shop owned by Marina.

Taño kept going in and out of the shop and on the last time he
went inside said shop, he suddenly jumped over the counter,
strangled Amy, poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled
her towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and gained
carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent. Before they
could reach the upper floor, he suddenly pulled Amy down and
started mauling her until she lost consciousness; then he freely
ransacked the place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly
banging her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl, he took
her bracelet, ring and wristwatch.
DWELLING
He then proceeded upstairs where he took as well the
jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his
victim's employer. The trial court appreciated dwelling as
an aggravating circumstance because the incident took
place supposedly at the residence of private complainant's
employer, "which doubles as a video rental shop.
DWELLING
HELD: Dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in this case because the rape was committed
in the ground floor of a two-story structure, the lower floor
being used as a video rental store and not as a private place
of abode or residence.
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR OBVIOUS
UNGRATEFULNESS
Par. 4. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED WITH
(1) ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE, OR (2) OBVIOUS
UNGRATEFULNESS.
1. Abuse of confidence
Requisites:
a. That the offended party had trusted the offender.
b. That the offender abused such trust by committing a
crime against the offended party.
c. That the abuse of confidence facilitated the
UNGRATEFULNESS
 For abuse of confidence to exist, it is essential to show
that the confidence between the parties must be
immediate and personal such as would give the accused
some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the
criminal act. The confidence must be a means of
facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit
taking advantage of the offended party’s belief that the
former would not abuse said confidence (People vs.
Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492, 31 January 2001, 350 SCRA
679).
 It is inherent in malversation, qualified theft, estafa
by conversion or misappropriation and qualified
seduction.
UNGRATEFULNESS
2. Obvious ungratefulness
 The ungratefulness must be obvious–manifest and

clear.
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE
THE PALACE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR IN
HIS PRESENCE, OR WHERE PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES ARE ENGAGED IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES, OR IN A PLACE
DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS WORSHIP.
If it is the Malacañang palace or a church, it is

aggravating, regardless of whether State or official
or religious functions are being held.
NIGHTTIME, UNINHABITED PLACE OR BY
A BAND
Par. 6. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED (1) IN
THE NIGHT TIME, OR (2) IN AN
UNINHABITED PLACE, OR (3) BY A BAND,
WHENEVER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES MAY
FACILITATE THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE.
WHENEVER MORE THAN THREE ARMED

MALEFACTORS SHALL HAVE ACTED
TOGETHER IN THE COMMISSION OF AN
OFFENSE, IT SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE
BEEN COMMITTED BY A BAND.
A BAND
N.B. If the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the
crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance
only as a general rule although they can be considered
separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can
subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of
perversity. (People vs. Librando, G.R. No. 132251, 6 July
2000)
A BAND
Nighttime, uninhabited place or band is aggravating:
a. When it facilitated the commission of the crime; or

b. When especially sought for by the offender to insure
the commission of the crime or for the purpose of
impunity; or
c. When the offender took advantage thereof for the
purpose of impunity.
A BAND
1. Nighttime
− The commission of the crime must begin and be
accomplished in the nighttime.
− The offense must be actually committed in the darkness
of the night. When the place is illuminated by light,
nighttime is not aggravating.
N.B. There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating

circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is
aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the
offense; and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is
aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender.
These two tests should be applied in the alternative. (People v.
Garcia, 31 October 1979)
A BAND
2. Uninhabited place
TEST: Whether or not in the place of the commission

of the offense, there was a reasonable possibility of
the victim receiving or securing aid from third
persons. (People v. Desalisa, G.R. No. 95262, 4 January
1994)
A BAND
3. Crime was committed by a band
 Whenever more than 3 armed malefactors shall

have acted together in the commission of an
offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed
by a band.
 The requisite four (4) armed persons contemplated

in this circumstances must all be principals by
direct participation who acted together in the
execution of the acts constituting the crime (Gamara
v. Valero, G.R. No. L-36210, 25 June 1973).
OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE
Par. 7. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED ON
THE OCCASION OF A CONFLAGRATION,
SHIPWRECK, EARTHQUAKE, EPIDEMIC OR
OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE.
The reason for the existence of this AC is found in

the debased form of criminality in one who, in the
midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the
afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage
of their misfortune to despoil them. The offender
must take advantage of the calamity or misfortune.
OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE
“Or other calamity or misfortune”
 refers to other conditions of distress similar to
“conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake or
epidemic.”
IN AID OF ARMED MEN
Par. 8. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED WITH THE AID
OF ARMED MEN OR PERSONS WHO INSURE OR AFFORD
IMPUNITY.
Requisites:
a. That the armed men or persons took part in the commission of
the crime, directly or indirectly.
b. That the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon
them when the crime was committed.
N.B. In "aid of armed men," the men must act as accomplices only.
They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the
same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be
regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. (People v. Enojas, G.R.
No. 204894, 10 March 2014)
RECIDIVISM
Par. 9. - THAT THE ACCUSED IS A RECIDIVIST.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one

crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the
RPC.
Requisites:
a. That the offender is on trial for an offense;
b. That he was previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime;
c. That both the first and the second offenses are embraced in the
same title of the Code;
d. That the offender is convicted of the new offense.
RECIDIVISM
 In recidivism, provided the accused was convicted by
final judgment, the number of intervening years between
that conviction and his subsequent convictions is
immaterial.
 Even if the accused was granted pardon for the first
offense, but he commits another felony embraced in the
same title of the Code, the first conviction is still counted
to make him a recidivist since pardon does not obliterate
the fact of his prior conviction.
 If the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is alleged
and proved against an accused, who upon said conviction
is also a habitual delinquent, the imposable penalty must
consider both the circumstances of recidivism and
habitual delinquency.
RECIDIVISM
People v. Bernal
G.R. No. L-44988, 31 October 1936
Issue: Whether or not in instances where the accused

turns out to be an habitual delinquent the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism, when alleged
and proved, should be taken into account in fixing the
penalty applicable for the commission of the principal
offense, independently of the additional penalty
provided by law for habitual delinquency.
RECIDIVISM
Held: Yes, since recidivism as an aggravating circumstance
modifying criminal liability is not an inherent or integral
element of habitual delinquency which the Revised Penal
Code considers as an extraordinary and special aggravating
circumstance. For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the
accused, on the date of his trial, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in
the same title. For the existence of habitual delinquency, it is
not enough that the accused shall have been convicted of
any of the crimes specified, and that the last conviction shall
have taken place ten (10) years before the commission of the
last offense. It is necessary that the crimes previously
committed be prior to the commission of the offense with
which the accused is charged a third time or oftener.
RECIDIVISM
Quasi-recidivism – a special aggravating circumstance defined and
penalized under Art. 160 of the RPC which provides:
Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for

another offense; Penalty. — Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article
62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such
sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a
habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he
shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall
complete it after reaching the said age, unless by reason of his
conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such
clemency.
REITERACION
Par. 10. - THAT THE OFFENDER HAS BEEN
PREVIOUSLY PUNISHED BY AN OFFENSE TO
WHICH THE LAW ATTACHES AN EQUAL OR
GREATER PENALTY OR FOR TWO OR MORE CRIMES
TO WHICH IT ATTACHES A LIGHTER PENALTY.
(otherwise known as habituality or reiteracion)
Requisites for reiteracion:

a. That the accused is on trial for an offense;
b. That he previously served sentence for another offense to
which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty, or for 2
or more crimes to which it attaches lighter penalty than that
for the new offense; and
c. That he is convicted of the new offense.
REITERACION
This differs from recidivism because reiteracion
requires that the offender be punished for the
previous offenses of which he was convicted and the
penalties imposed for the previous offenses are
determinative, i.e. an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or two or more
offenses to which it attaches lighter penalties.
PRICE, REWARD OR PROMISE
CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR
PROMISE.
When this AC is present, there must be two (2) or

more principals, the one who gives or offers the price
or promise and the one who accepts it, both of whom
are principals—to the former, because he directly
induces the latter to commit the crime, and the latter
because he commits it. When this AC is present, it
affects not only the person who received the price or
reward, but also the person who gave it.
INVOLVING GREAT WASTE OR RUIN
Par. 12. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED BY
MEANS OF INUNDATION, FIRE, POISON,
EXPLOSION, STRANDING OF A VESSEL OR
INTENTIONAL DAMAGE THERETO, DERAILMENT
OF A LOCOMOTIVE, OR BY THE USE OF ANY OTHER
ARTIFICE INVOLVING GREAT WASTE AND RUIN.
Unless used by the offender as a means to accomplish a

criminal purpose, any of the circumstances in paragraph 12
cannot be considered to increase the penalty or to change
the nature of the offense. When another AC already
qualifies the crime, any of these AC’s shall be considered as
generic aggravating circumstance only.
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
Evident premeditation implies a deliberate

planning of the act before executing it. The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act
must be preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment (People v. Alinao, G.R. No. 191256, 18
September 2013).
Requisites:
a. The time when the offender determined to commit

the crime;
b. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung
to his determination; and
c. When the crime was carefully planned by the
offenders; and
d. When the offenders previously prepared the means
which they considered adequate to carry it out.
Rules regarding appreciation of evident
premeditation:
a. Evident premeditation can be appreciated if the
persons killed were not intended or predetermined,
provided that the intent was generic as where the
accused agreed to kill anyone he meets;
b. It cannot be considered if the supposed victim was
neither specific nor generic, as where the accused had
merely stated several days before the crime that he
intended to kill “a person.”
c. The circumstance cannot be considered if the specific
victim is intended but a different victim is killed
because of a miscarriage of the blow as in aberratio
ictus. (Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus (2003), p. 96)
 A sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution, to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act and to allow his
conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
 The offender must have an opportunity to coolly

and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning
and the consequences of what he planned to do, an
interval long enough for his conscience and better
judgment to overcome his evil desire and scheme.
CRAFT, FRAUD OR DISGUISE
Par. 14. - THAT CRAFT, FRAUD OR DISGUISE BE
EMPLOYED.
Craft – involves intellectual trickery and cunning on

the part of the accused. It is employed as a scheme in
the execution of the crime. (People v. Labuguen, G.R. No.
127849, 9 August 2000, 337 SCRA 488)
Fraud – insidious words or machinations used to

induce the victim to act in a manner which would
enable the offender to carry out his design. (People v.
Labuguen, G.R. No. 127849, 9 August 2000, 337 SCRA 488)
CRAFT, FRAUD OR DISGUISE
Craft v. Fraud
When there is a DIRECT INDUCEMENT by insidious
words or machinations, fraud is present; otherwise, the
act of the accused done in order NOT TO AROUSE THE
SUSPICION of the victim constitutes craft.
Disguise
Resorting to any device to conceal identity. The test of
disguise is whether the device or contrivance resorted to
by the offender was intended to or did make
identification more difficult, such as the use of a mask or
false hair or beard.
SUPERIOR STRENGTH OR WEAKEN THE
DEFENSE
Par. 15. - THAT (1) ADVANTAGE BE TAKEN OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH, OR (2) MEANS BE
EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE.
Abuse of superior strength
There is abuse of superior strength when the

perpetrators of a crime deliberately used excessive force,
thereby rendering the victim incapable of defending
himself. The notorious inequality of forces creates an
unfair advantage for the aggressor (People v. Credo, G.R.
No. 197360, 3 July 2013).
DEFENSE
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is
a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.
(Fantastico, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 190912, 12 January
2015)
DEFENSE
Means employed to weaken defense
This circumstance is applicable only to crimes

against persons and sometimes against person and
property, such as robbery with physical injuries or
homicide.
This aggravating circumstance is absorbed in

treachery.
TREACHERY
TREACHERY (ALEVOSIA).
There is treachery when the offender commits any

of the crimes against person, employing means
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might take.
TREACHERY
A treacherous attack is one in which the victim was not
afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack.
The existence of treachery is not solely determined by the type
of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was deliberately
chosen to insure the execution of the crime, and to render the
victim defenseless, then treachery may be properly
appreciated against the accused (People v. Labiaga, G.R. No.
202867, 15 July 2013).
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected

attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the victim of any
chance to defend himself. (People v. Bosito, G.R. No. 209346,
12 January 2015)
TREACHERY
For treachery to be appreciated, that circumstances must
be present at the inception of the attack, and if absent and the
attack is continuous, treachery, even if present at a subsequent
stage is not to be considered (People v. Loterono, G.R. No.
146100, 13 November 2002, 391 SCRA 593).
Chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at

the spur of the moment, or those that were preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by treachery, for lack of
opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a
treacherous mode of attack (People v. Caratao, G.R. No.
126281, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 482).
TREACHERY
For treachery to be considered, two elements must
concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted. (Fantastico, et
al. v. People, G.R. No. 190912, 12 January 2015)
The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the

sole basis in finding treachery. There must be evidence to
show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted
the means of execution to ensure its success. (People v.
Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, 18 March 2015)
TREACHERY
Rules regarding treachery:
 Treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons.

However, in several cases of robbery with homicide,
treachery was appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance (People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, 4
April 2003.
 The means, methods or forms used by the perpetrator
need not insure accomplishment of crime.
 The mode of attack must be consciously adopted.
TREACHERY
Attacks which show intention to eliminate risk:
 Victim asleep (People v. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722 27 July
1943).
 Victim half-awake or just awakened.
 Victim grappling or being held.
 Victim was a child of tender age (U.S. v. Antonio, G.R.
No. L-10562, 3 August 1915)
TREACHERY
As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether
frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of
attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him,
with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance
to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply,
however, where the sudden attack was not
preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just
triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the
accused because of the provocative act of the
victim, or where their meeting was purely accidental
(People v. Monte, G.R. No. 125332, 2 March 2000).
TREACHERY
Additional rules:
a. When the aggression is CONTINUOUS, treachery must

be present in the BEGINNING of the assault (U.S. v.
Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6432, 22 March 1911).
b. When the assault WAS NOT CONTINUOUS, in that

there was an interruption, it is sufficient that treachery
was present AT THE MOMENT THE FATAL BLOW
WAS GIVEN (U.S. v. Baluyot, G.R. No. L-14476, 6
November 1919).
IGNOMINY
Par. 17. - THAT MEANS BE EMPLOYED OR
CIRCUMSTANCES BROUGHT ABOUT WHICH ADD
IGNOMINY TO THE NATURAL EFFECTS OF THE ACT.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order,

which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime. (People v. Acaya, G.R. No. L-72998, 29
July 1988).
The means employed or the circumstances brought about
must tend to make the effects of the crime MORE
HUMILIATING or TO PUT THE OFFENDED PARTY TO
SHAME. It is not solely applicable to crimes against chastity
i.e. when the victim was made to kneel before his servants
before he was shot by the accused.
UNLAWFUL ENTRY
Par. 18. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED AFTER AN
UNLAWFUL ENTRY.
 There is unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a

way not intended for the purpose.
 Unlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance and not
for escape.
 In People v. Galapia (1978), it was ruled that there was
unlawful entry because of the destruction of the glass blades
or jalousies of a window in order to gain entrance to the
house.
 There is no unlawful entry when the door is broken and
thereafter the accused made an entry thru the broken door.
The breaking of the door is covered by paragraph 19.
BROKEN WALL, ROOF, FLOOR, DOOR OR
WINDOW
Par. 19 – THAT AS A MEANS TO THE
COMMISSION OF A CRIME A WALL, ROOF,
FLOOR, DOOR, OR WINDOW BE BROKEN.
− To be considered as an AC, breaking the door must

be utilized as a means to the commission of the
crime.
− It is only aggravating in cases where the offender
resorted to any of said means TO ENTER the
house. If the wall, etc. is broken in order to get out
of the place, it is not aggravating.
WITH AID OF PERSONS UNDER 15 YEARS OF
AGE AND BY MEANS OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
Par. 20. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED (1)
WITH THE AID OF PERSONS UNDER FIFTEEN
YEARS OF AGE OR (2) BY OEANS OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, MOTORIZED WATERCRAFT,
AIRSHIPS, OR OTHER SIMILAR MEANS. (AS
AMENDED BY R.A. No. 5438).
1. With the aid of persons under 15 years of age; or

WITH AID OF PERSONS UNDER 15 YEARS OF
AGE AND BY MEANS OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
2. By means of a motor vehicle
 It is aggravating where the accused used the motor
vehicle in going to the place of the crime, in carrying
away the effects thereof, and in facilitating their
escape.
 The availment by the accused of the motor vehicle
must have been for the purpose of ensuring the
success of their criminal enterprise.
3. “or other similar means”

 The expression should be understood as referring to
MOTORIZED vehicles or other efficient means of
transportation similar to automobile or airplane.
CRUELTY
Par. 21. - THAT THE WRONG DONE IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME BE
DELIBERATELY AUGMENTED BY CAUSING
OTHER WRONG NOT NECESSARY FOR ITS
COMMISSIONS.
Cruelty
 For cruelty to exist, it must be shown that the accused
enjoyed and delighted in making his victim suffer.
 The contemplation of the law requires deliberate
prolongation of the victim’s suffering.
 Victim was alive while the sadistic acts were being
committed against him by the accused.
CRUELTY
Requisites:
1. That the injury caused be deliberately increased by causing other

wrong;
2. That the other wrong be unnecessary for the execution of the

purpose of the offender.
The number of wounds on the corpse of the victim does not per
se mean that there was cruelty in the commission of the crime.
There must be a showing that the wounds were inflicted while
the victim was alive and such intervals as to reveal that the
number of wounds and manner of inflicting them were
intentionally designed to augment and prolong his physical
sufferings. (People v. Ang, 1985)
CRUELTY
For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that
the accused delighted in making their victim suffer slowly
and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral
pain in the consummation of the criminal act (People v.
Catian, G.R. No. 139693, 24 January 2002, 374 SCRA
514).
LOOSE FIREARMS
Under P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance (Sec. 1).
Under Republic Act No. 10591, otherwise known as the

“Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act:”
If the use of a loose firearm is inherent in the commission of a
crime punishable under the RPC or other special laws – the use of
loose firearm is an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the penalty for
the use of a loose firearm is not imposed (Sec. 29).
However, if the crime is committed by the person without using
the loose firearm, the violation of this law shall be considered as a
distinct and separate offense (Sec. 29).
USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
Under the Republic Act No.9165 otherwise known as
the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002:”
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the

contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs
shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime by an offender, and the application
of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall
be applicable (Sec. 25).
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON
People v. Ambatang
G.R. No. 205855, 29 March 2017, J. Leonen
Accused employed treachery when he attacked the

victim. This is shown by the suddenness of the attack
against the unarmed victim, without the slightest
provocation on the latter’s part and opportunity to defend
himself. Accused was a tall, young man with a sturdy
physique. Armed with a sharp bladed weapon, he attacked
and repeatedly stabbed the victim who was at that time
sixty years old and inferior in size and built compared to
him.
People v. Villanueva
G.R. No. 226475, 13 March 2017, J. Reyes
The fact that the accused-appellants and Valencia,

armed with a knife and a stone, ganged up on Enrico does
not automatically merit the conclusion that the latter's
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. In People v. Beduya, et al.,
brothers Ric and Elizer Beduya (Elizer) were charged for
the death of Dominador Acope, Sr.; it was shown that Ric
slapped the victim while Elizer stabbed the latter.
The Court, elucidating on the proper appreciation of the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, ruled that:
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact
that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not
per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of
superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of
the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that
the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had
the deliberate intent to use this advantage.
People v. Calinawan
G.R. No. 226145, 13 February 2017
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be

factored in because there was no showing that Calinawan
especially sought the same or took advantage of it, or that
it had facilitated the commission of the crime by insuring
his immunity from identification or capture. It is
noteworthy that the attack occurred in the kitchen of the
house of Janice, which was sufficiently lighted, enabling
Marigor to identify him as the assailant.
People v. Macaspac
G.R. No. 198954, 22 February 2017, J. Bersamin
Macaspac's having suddenly left the group and his

utterance of Hintayin n’yo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo
marked the time of his resolve to commit the crime. His
returning to the group with the knife manifested his clinging to
his resolve to inflict lethal harm on the others. The first and
second elements of evident premeditation were thereby
established. But it is the essence of this circumstance that the
execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolve to carry out the criminal intent
during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
Was the lapse of time between the determination and
execution – a matter of three minutes, based on the records
– sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act? By quickly returning to the group with the knife,
he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon
his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the
execution immediately followed the resolve to commit the
crime. As such, the third requisite was absent.
People v. Bugarin
G.R. No. 224900, 15 March 2017, J. Peralta
The qualifying circumstance of treachery or alevosia

does not even require that the perpetrator attack his victim
from behind. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous
when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be
in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in
a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape the sudden blow.
People v. Sibbu
822 SCRA 161, G.R. No. 214757, 29 March 2017
FACTS: Tirso Sibbu along with his companions conspired

to kill Bryan Julian and his family which caused the
attempted murder of Bryan Julian and the murder of
Brian’s daughter, mother, and father. The crime was
committed in the dwelling of the victim at nighttime and
with the employment of disguise as Sibbu was wearing a
bonnet on his face.
HELD:
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DWELLING
For this circumstance to be considered, it is not

necessary that the accused should have actually entered the
dwelling of the victim to commit the offense. It is enough
that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although
the assailant may have devised means to perpetuate the
assault from without.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DISGUISE
The use of bonnet, to conceal identity in the

commission of the crime, can be considered as an
aggravating circumstance referred to as “other similar
means” in par. 21 of Art. 14 of the RPC.
It is correct to appreciate the use of disguise as an

aggravating circumstance such as appellant’s covering of
his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident. There
could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet
over appellant’s face but to conceal his identity.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was indeed the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disguise. There
is the aggravating circumstance of dwelling because the
victims were inside their house when the crime was
committed. There is the aggravating circumstance of
disguise because Sibbu used a bonnet to hide his face while
committing the crime.
People v. Dela Cruz
FACTS: Federico Dela Cruz was convicted with murder

with the qualifying circumstance of treachery for stabbing
Corazon Claudio to death inside Corazon’s apartment. Dela
Cruz denied the charges interposing an alibi as a defense.
HELD:
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY
Treachery is present when the offender employs means,

methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the
victim might make.

What is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without
the slightest provocation from a victim who is unarmed, made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove that:

1. He was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and

2. It was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene during its commission.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was indeed treachery
because of Dela Cruz’s sudden attack on Corazon inside her
apartment, Corazon could not have been aware that her life
was in imminent danger inside the comforts of her own
home.

As to alibi, the accused failed to satisfactorily establish
his claims that he was in Orion, Bataan during the time of the
commission of the crime and that it was physically
impossible for him to be at or near the place of the crime.
Aside from his own statement, the accused did not bother to
present other witnesses or any other proof to support his
defense.
People v. Alvarez
FACTS: The RTC and CA found Edgar Alvarez and Rodel

Caballero guilty of the crime of murder for the fatal
shooting of Nicanor Agon with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation and qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Appellants insist that the
evidence was insufficient to warrant their conviction.
HELD:
REQUISITES FOR THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation

has the following elements:

1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution
to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
For treachery to be properly appreciated, two
conditions must be present:
1. At the time of the assault, the victim was not in a position

to defend himself; and

2. The offender consciously adopted the particular means,
methods, or forms of attack employed by him.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even
when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
The Supreme Court ruled that there is indeed evident
premeditation considering the period of time when
appellants planned to kill Agon and the time when they
implemented such plan afforded them the opportunity for
meditation and reflection on the consequences of the
murder they committed.
There is also treachery given the fact that at the time

the group commenced their aggression, Nick Agon was
entirely unsuspecting and was surprised when the accused
suddenly approached from the right side of his vehicle and
promptly fired at him successively.
People v. Amora
FACTS: Virgilio Amora was convicted for the crime of

murder attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery for assaulting and stabbing Romeo Gibaga which
directly caused his death. The appellant argues that the
prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD:
ESSENCE OF TREACHERY
The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that

the perpetrator attack his victim from behind. Even a frontal
attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed
victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it.

The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape.
REQUISITES FOR THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI TO
PROSPER

Physical impossibility refers to the distance and the
facility of access between the crime scene and the location
of the accused when the crime was committed. The
accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and
could not have been physically present at the crime scene
and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.
The Supreme Court ruled that there is treachery
because of the fact of the appellant’s sudden attack on
Romeo. The eyewitnesses were all consistent in declaring
that the appellant in such a swift motion stabbed Romeo
such that the latter had no opportunity to defend himself or
to fight back. As to alibi, the accused failed to prove his
alibi except for his own statement.
People v. Torres
735 SCRA 687, G.R. No. 189850, 22 September 2014
FACTS: Espino was driving in Divisoria when Ronnie

suddenly blocked his path causing Espino to alight from his
vehicle and approach Ronnie who tried to grab his belt-bag.
When Espino resisted, Ronnie’s brothers and an unidentified
companion suddenly appeared and joined Ronnie in stabbing
Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified
companion held him by the neck. When Espino was already
sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet, and
jewelries and immediately fled.
HELD: There is abuse of superior strength when the
offenders took advantage of their combined strength in
order to consummate the offense.
The presence of abuse of superior strength should not

result in qualifying the offense to murder. When abuse of
superior strength obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, it is to be regarded as a generic
circumstance, robbery with homicide being a composite
crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code.
With the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
imposed for committing robbery with homicide, the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength attending the killing of the victim qualifies the
imposition of the death penalty on appellant. In view,
however, of Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty that must
be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua without
eligibility of parole.
The Supreme Court found that there was abuse of
superior strength since the accused and his four
companions not only took advantage of their numerical
superiority but were also armed with knives. Espino, on the
other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. It is clear that
they executed the criminal act by employing physical
superiority over Espino.
People v. Alawig
FACTS: Alawig and his companions, all police officers,

shot Miel De Ocampo Café multiple times causing his
death. Evidence points to the fact that the victim was
surrounded and manhandled before he was shot before he
could defend himself.
HELD:
Before evident premeditation may be appreciated, the

following elements must be proved:
a. The time when the accused was determined to commit the crime;
b. An act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and
c. Sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
When it is not shown how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was
carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It
must appear not only that the accused decided to commit
the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that
this decision was the result of meditation, calculation,
reflection or persistent attempt.
TREACHERY

For treachery to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown
that:

1. the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of
execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or
retaliatory acts of the victim; and
2. the said means, method and manner of execution were
deliberately adopted.”

The circumstances surrounding the killing must be proved as
indubitably as the crime itself. Treachery cannot be presumed.
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no evident
premeditation since the Dispatch Logbook (which is the main
basis why the CA found evident premeditation) which states that
the appellant and his cohorts were going to conduct a police
operation regarding illegal drugs, as well as the telephone call
made by the victim to his friend Reyes before the incident, do not
constitute clear and positive evidence of outward acts showing a
premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are indicative
only of conspiracy among the accused.

As to treachery, the SC ruled that there is treachery since the
evidence points to the fact that the victim was surrounded and
manhandled before he was shot before he could even defend
himself.
People v. Zulieta
FACTS: Armando Labando, Jr. was eating bananas outside

his boarding house when Andy Zulueta and his
companions approached him. After a signal was given,
Labando, Jr. was stabbed in the chest by Andy Zulieta
which caused his immediate death.
HELD: There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
Otherwise stated, an unexpected and sudden attack which
renders the victim unable and unprepared to put up a
defense is the essence of treachery.
The Supreme Court ruled that there is treachery since
the victim Labando was totally unaware of the threat. He
was merely sitting on the bench in front of a sari-sari store
eating bananas when appellant, without any provocation or
prior argument, suddenly stabbed him on his chest,
piercing the right ventricle of his heart thus causing his
instantaneous death. The stabbing was deliberate,
unexpected, swift and sudden which foreclosed any escape,
resistance or defense coming from the victim.
People v. Biglete
673 SCRA 546, G.R. No. 182920, 18 June 2012
FACTS: Arnel Acos was driving his passenger jeepney

when he was shot with an unlicensed firearm by Michael
Biglete who was driving a motorcycle when the crime was
committed.
HELD:
USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME AND EVENTUAL ESCAPE

The aggravating circumstance of the use of a motor
vehicle attended the commission of the crime. Appellant was
on board his motorcycle when he tried to overtake the
jeepney being driven by the victim. When he was already
near the left side of the victim, appellant shot him at close
range. Immediately thereafter, he fled from the crime scene
using his motorcycle. There is therefore no doubt that the
motorcycle was used to facilitate the commission of the crime
as well as his escape.
People v. Agacer

for the killing of a common relative, Cesario Agacer,
through the use of a shotgun. All of the accused contend
that both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired
to kill Cesario as there was no evidence sufficient to
establish their intentional participation.
HELD: There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defense which the offended party might
make.
The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an

aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime
without risk to the aggressor. In this case, treachery is
evident from the same circumstances.
The Supreme Court found that there was indeed
treachery since from the facts, Cesario could not have been
aware that he would be surrounded, attacked and killed by
the appellants who were all related to him. He could not
have also been aware that Eddie had a shotgun concealed
in a sack because if he was, he would not have casually
approached Florencio when the latter summoned him.
People v. Lucero
FACTS: After Rodriguez Lucero sought help from Edgar

Aydaon, a barangay kagawad, he suddenly assaulted
Aydaon by hacking him with the use of a bolo on the left
side of the head which caused the instantaneous death of
the victim. Lucero further stabbed Aydaon on his waist
after Aydaon fell on the ground.
HELD: Treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal, as
long as the attack is sudden and unexpected, giving the
victim no opportunity to repel it or to defend himself. What
is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the
slightest provocation from an unarmed victim, made it
The Supreme Court ruled that there was treachery since
the records show that appellant lulled the victim into
believing that he was being pursued by somebody.
Believing in the tale being spun by the appellant, the victim
even offered appellant the security and protection of his
house. However, appellant reciprocated the victim’s trust
and hospitality by suddenly hacking him on the head and
stabbing him on the waist.
Bug-atan v. People
FACTS: Manatad, Bug-atan, and Maramara met to plan

about killing Pastor Papauran. It was Maramara and
another person, Labandero, who proceeded to the house of
Papauran where Maramara shot Papauran in the back of his
head.
HELD:
TREACHERY
Treachery qualifies the crime to murder. There is treachery

when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, method or forms which tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
There is treachery when the attack on the unarmed victim

was so sudden, unexpected, without preliminaries and
provocation.

Before evident premeditation may be appreciated, the
following elements must be proved:

1. The time when the accused was determined to commit the crime;

2. An act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and

3. Sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was treachery
considering that the victim was shot from behind his back
turned to the assailant. This position was disadvantageous
to the victim since he was not in a position to defend
himself or to retaliate.

As to evident premeditation, the SC ruled that it is also
present considering the accused all met each other to plan
the eventual commission of the crime.
People v. Baron
621 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 185209, 28 June 2010
FACTS: Baron and his companions boarded the tricycle of

the victim pretending to be passengers. Midway to their
destination, one of the accused declared a hold-up and at
gun point, tied the hands of the victim, brought him
towards the sugarcane field where he was stabbed to death,
and took the personal belongings as well as the wallet of
the victim.
HELD: The aggravating circumstance of treachery exists
when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof that tend directly and specifically to insure
its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make.
The Supreme Court ruled that there is treachery since the

evidence points that one of the co-conspirators tied the hands
of the victim before dragging him to the sugarcane field.
Thus, he was unable to defend himself against his
malefactors who were superior in number and armed with
knives and guns.
People v. Napalit
616 SCRA 245, G.R. No. 181247, 19 March 2010
FACTS: Joseph Genete was attacked, assaulted, and

stabbed thereby inflicting injuries which caused his death.
Richard Napalit together with two John Does who are still
at large was charged with murder for this crime.
HELD: Treachery is present when the offender employs
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make. What is
decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the
slightest provocation from a victim who is unarmed, made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was treachery since
there is no doubt that the victim was surprised by the attack
coming from the appellant. The victim was merely walking
along the street unsuspecting of any harm that would befall
his person. That appellant shouted “ano, gusto n’yo, away?”
immediately before stabbing the victim could not be deemed
as sufficient warning to the latter of the impending attack on
his person. Records show that after challenging the
unsuspecting victim to a fight, appellant immediately lunged
at him and stabbed him at the back. Under the circumstances,
the victim was indisputably caught off guard by the sudden
and deliberate attack coming from the appellant, leaving him
with no opportunity to raise any defense against the attack.
593 SCRA 523, G.R. No. 187152, 22 July 2009
FACTS: The victims who were siblings and are all minors
were sleeping when they were awakened to see Villanueva
and his companions inside their house. The events that
unfolded resulted in the stabbing of the siblings, the taking
of their personal belongings including jewelry and
cellphone, and an attempt to pull down one of the victim’s
shorts and underwear.
HELD: There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and
specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense that the offended party might
make.
When treachery is present in the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide, treachery is to be regarded as a
generic aggravating circumstance since robbery with
homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and
special penalty in the RPC. The generic aggravating
circumstance of treachery attending the killing of the
victim qualifies the imposition of the death penalty on
accused-appellant. However, in the case at bar, the
imposable penalty for accused-appellant is still reclusion
perpetua, in view of R.A. No. 9346 which prohibits the
death penalty.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was treachery in
this case since the victims were all sleeping when the crime
was commenced. The victims were assaulted when they
were not in a position to defend themselves.
5. MURDER
MURDER
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
MURDER
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car
or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great
waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting
the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659)
MURDER
Murder is the unlawful killing of any person which is
neither parricide nor infanticide, provided any of the
qualifying circumstances are present.

Murder will exist with only one of the circumstances
described in this article. When more than one of the
circumstances is present, the others must be considered as
generic aggravating.
MURDER
However, when the other circumstances are absorbed
or included in one qualifying circumstance, they cannot be
considered as generic aggravating. (example: abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by treachery)

The qualifying circumstance must be alleged, in order
to qualify the killing to murder. If not alleged, it is only a
generic aggravating circumstance.
MURDER
The offender must have intent to kill to be liable for
murder committed by means of fire, poison, explosion etc.

Cruelty – when other injuries or wounds are inflicted
deliberately by the offender, which are not necessary for
the killing of the victim. The victim must be alive when
the other injuries or wounds are inflicted.
MURDER
N.B.
Outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse’ – the only
qualifying circumstance which is not mentioned in Article
14 as an aggravating circumstance.
outraging – to commit an extremely vicious or deeply

insulting act. [Reyes, Book II]
scoffing – to jeer, and implies a showing of irreverence.
[Reyes, Book II]
MURDER
People v. Soriano
825 SCRA 591, G.R. No. 216063, 5 June 2017
FACTS: Marlon Soriano y Narag stabbed to death his 71-
year-old maternal uncle Perfecto Narag allegedly because
of legitimate self-defense. He also insists that there was no
treachery in the killing.
MURDER
HELD:
DAMAGES IN MURDER CASES
Only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have

been actually expended in connection with the death of the victim
may be allowed as damages. Thus, it is proper to award temperate
damages since the heirs of the victim suffered a loss but could not
produce documentary evidence to support their claims.

For a felony like murder where the penalty imposed is death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua because of Republic Act No. 9346, the
amount is fixed at P100,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages.
MURDER
The Supreme Court awarded temperate damages in lieu
of actual damages to the heirs of the victims since they
suffered a loss but could not produce documentary
evidence to support their claims.
MURDER
People v. Sibbu
822 SCRA 161, G.R. No. 214757, 29 March 2017
FACTS: Sibbu shot Bryan twice with an unlicensed

firearm but missed. Sibbu denies the crime and uses the
alibi that he was in his parent’s house tending his child.
MURDER
HELD:
1. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional

Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim
where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9364:
a. Civil indemnity – P100,000.00
b. Moral damages – P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – P100,000.00
MURDER
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – P75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – P75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – P75,000.00

b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – P50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – P50,000.00
MURDER
The Supreme Court applied the proper amount of
damages as mentioned above against the accused. The SC
did not entertain the defense of alibi since the accused
failed to prove that he was at some other place when the
crime was committed and that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate
vicinity.
MURDER
People v. Quita
816 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 212818, 25 January 2017
FACTS: Gregorio Quita and Fleno Quita were indicted for

Murder. The accused interposed the lone assignment of
error set forth in his Brief with the CA that the RTC erred
in finding them guilty of the crime of murder.
MURDER
HELD:
The award of P15,000.00 as actual damages is deleted

and in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 is awarded; the awards of moral damages and
exemplary damages are increased to P75,000.00 each; and
the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is maintained.
Finally, all damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
MURDER
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the RTC
and CA in finding the accused guilty of the crime of
murder. The SC applied the damages mentioned above
against the accused.
MURDER
People v. Alvarez
FACTS: Edgar Allen Alvarez and Rodel Caballero,

together with the accused who remain at-large, were
charged with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of
Nicanor Morfe Agon. The prosecution was able to establish
treachery, evident premeditation, and conspiracy between
the accused.
MURDER
HELD:
CONSPIRACY
There is conspiracy “when two or more persons come

to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith decide to pursue it.” Each of the offender is
equally guilty of the criminal act since in conspiracy the
act of one is the act of all.
MURDER
The Supreme Court ruled that there was murder since the
prosecution was able to establish all of its elements.

There is also evident premeditation considering the period of
time when appellants planned to kill Agon and the time when they
implemented such plan afforded them the opportunity for
meditation and reflection on the consequences of the murder they
committed.

There is also treachery given the fact that at the time the group
commenced their aggression, Nick Agon was entirely unsuspecting
and was surprised when the accused suddenly approached from the
right side of his vehicle and promptly fired at him successively.
MURDER
There is also conspiracy as the evidence is sufficient to
prove that appellants conspired to murder Agon. The accused
and appellants agreed to murder Agon. In accordance with
their plan, they proceeded the next day to the cockpit arena, a
place which they knew that Agon would be at on that
particular day. Upon their arrival, they positioned themselves
according to their plan and waited for Agon to leave.
Caballero signaled that the target had left the arena and that
his vehicle was already approaching their position. When
Agon’s vehicle came, Vitan and Theo fired at him. Vitan,
Caballero, Alvarez, who acted as one of the back-ups, and
the rest of the group then fled the scene of the crime. Clearly,
there was unity of action and purpose among them.
MURDER
People v. Abaigar
721 SCRA 73, G.R. No. 199442, 7 April 2014
FACTS: Francisco Abaigar shot Joseph Gabuya with a
homemade shotgun which led to the death of Gabuya.
Abaigar challenges the testimony of the witnesses that was
given credence by both the trial court and the CA.
MURDER
HELD:
PAROLE
Abaigar is not eligible for parole. This is in accordance

with Sec. 3 of RA 9346 which states that “persons
convicted of offenses punished by reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4180 or the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

MURDER
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within

the province and expertise of the trial court.
The Supreme Court ruled that Abaigar is not eligible

for parole. As to the testimony of witnesses, the SC did not
entertain Abaigar’s challenge as to the testimony of the
witnesses against him.
MURDER
People v. Gunda
FACTS: Eladio Globio, Sr. was attacked by Gunda from

behind with a blow to the head with a wooden pole. After
Gunda’s cohorts held the victim’s arms rendering him
helpless and immobile, Gunda then stabbed the victim
multiple times.
MURDER
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there is treachery
since the victim was unarmed and had no inkling of the
impending attack on his person. In fact, he was just on his
way home together with his son Eladio, Jr when the victim
was attacked by the appellant from behind with a blow to
his head with a wooden pole. His cohorts then held the
victim’s arms rendering him helpless and immobile. In
such position, there is no opportunity for the victim to
escape or even offer a feeble resistance.
MURDER
People v. Alawig
FACTS: Alawig and his companions, all police officers,

shot Miel De Ocampo Café multiple times causing his
death. Evidence points to the fact that the victim was
could defend himself.
MURDER
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there is treachery
since the evidence points to the fact that the victim was
could even defend himself.
MURDER
People v. Jalbonian
700 SCRA 280, G.R. No. 180281, 1 July 2013
FACTS: Valenciano saw Jalbonian position himself behind

Quintanilla and stab the latter on the back with a knife, and
immediately run away. Valenciano testifies as the lone
witness for the prosecution.
MURDER
HELD: Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a
person, which is not parricide or infanticide, committed with
any if the attendant circumstances enumerated in Art. 248 of
the RPC, one of which is treachery.
The killing committed in this case is neither parricide nor

infanticide and the same was attended with treachery. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
MURDER
The Supreme Court ruled that treachery is evident from
the fact that the victim could not have been aware of the
imminent peril to his life. He was unprepared for the
sudden, unexpected and unprovoked attack on his person
when appellant stabbed his back with a knife then swiftly
run away.

Clearly, appellant’s execution of the killing left the
victim with no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.
MURDER
People vs. Agacer
FACTS: The appellants all surnamed Agacer filed this
motion for reconsideration over the judgement of
conviction made against them by the SC.
MURDER
HELD:
PENALTY OF MINOR OFFENDER IN MURDER CASES
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority

embodied in Article 68(2) of the RPC. Provides that: When the
offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the
accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of the
law in extending such leniency and compassion is that because
of his age, the accused is presumed to have acted with less
discernment.
MURDER
This is regardless of the fact that his minority was not
proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was
belatedly presented for our consideration, since to rule
accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state,
the victim and his heirs.
Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his

conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability
ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on
the criminal action.
MURDER
The Supreme Court ruled that: As to Franklin Agacer,
Franklin’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born
on December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime. He is therefore entitled
to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
embodied in Article 68(2) of the RPC.

As to Florencio Agacer who has died pending appeal, the
criminal action against him is extinguished inasmuch as there
is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. The civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal action.
MURDER
People v. Cabtalan
FACTS: Benny and Adriano hid in a dark portion of the

road and assaulted Jesus with their bolos while he was
urinating with his back to them. They held him by his
shoulders to render him defenseless and unable to resist
their attack on him.
MURDER
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed that there was
murder with the aggravating circumstance of treachery
given the facts that was established: that Benny and
Adriano were in the crime scene prior to the incident; that
they hid in a dark portion of the road and assaulted Jesus
with their bolos while Jesus was urinating with his back to
them; and that they even held him by his shoulders to
render him defenseless and unable to resist the attack on
him by his assailants.
MURDER
People v. Mamaruncas
FACTS: Baginda Palao, Renandang Mamaruncas and

Pendatum Ampuan went to Baudelio Batoon’s auto repair
shop to serve upon Baudelio an arrest warrant. Baudelio
told them to wait while he finishes up with his work to
which Palao reacted by slapping Baudelio’s stomach. This
led to a struggle which ended with Palao, Mamaruncas, and
Ampuan shooting Baudelio which caused his death.
MURDER
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there was treachery
in the murder because at the moment when Pendatum
Ampuan and Renandang Mamaruncas shot Batoon, Batoon
was not in any position to defend himself. And when Abdul
Wahid shot him while lying wounded on the ground, he
was utterly defenseless.
MURDER
People v. Beduya
627 SCRA 275, G.R. No. 175315, 9 August 2010
FACTS: Bughao was assaulted by the Beduya brothers

causing him to hide in Acope Sr.’s yard. When Acope Sr.
told the Beduya brothers to go home, the Beduya brothers
punched and stabbed Acope Sr. which led to his death.
MURDER
HELD:
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.” “The
fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the
relative strength of the aggressors and the victim.”
MURDER
The evidence must establish that the offenders purposely
sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to
use this advantage. “To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked.” The
appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on
the age, size, and strength of the parties.

The presence of two assailants, one of them armed with
a knife, does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior
strength; Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the
presence of abuse of superior strength.
MURDER
The Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts erred in
finding that there was abuse of superior strength because the
prosecution failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in
age, size and strength, or force, except for the showing that two
assailants, one of them (Elizer) armed with a knife, assaulted
the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them armed
with a knife, does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior
strength. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the
presence of abuse of superior strength. Neither did the
prosecution present proof to show that the victim suffered from
an inferior physical condition from which the circumstance can
be inferred. In fact, there is evidence that the victim was able to
get hold of a piece of wood and deliver retaliatory blows
against the knife-wielder, Elizer.
MURDER
Vidar v. People
FACTS: Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda was brutally murdered

while taking a bath and valuables were taken from his
house. Consequently, a criminal charge for Robbery with
Homicide was filed against Vidar, Butalon, Marbella, and
several Does.
MURDER
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that treachery was
present since the victim was innocently taking a bath
totally unaware of the planned attack against him. Or while
he may have realized a possible danger to his person, the
attack was executed by the accused in such a manner as to
make defense, not to say counter attack, impossible.
6. PROXIMATE
CAUSE
PROXIMATE CAUSE
PROXIMATE CAUSE – the cause, which, in the natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
When death is presumed to be the natural consequence
of physical injuries inflicted:

1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were
inflicted was in normal health.

2. That the death may be expected from the physical
injuries inflicted.

3. That death ensued within a reasonable time.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the
resulting injury when:

1. There is an active force that intervened between the
felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active
force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the
felonious act of the accused; or

2. The resulting injury is due to the intentional act of
the victim.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The causes which may produce a result different from that
which the offender intended are:

ERROR IN PERSONAE – mistake in the identity of the
victim; injuring one person mistaken for another (this is a
complex crime under Art. 49)

ABERRATIO ICTUS – mistake in the blow, that is, when the
offender intending to do an injury to one person actually inflicts
it on another; and

PRAETER INTENTIONEM – the act exceeds the intent, that
is, the injurious result is greater than that intended.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
People v. Sales
658 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 177218, 3 October 2011
FACTS: Sales was whipping his son Noemar while his son
was tied to a coconut tree when his son slipped, lost
consciousness, and subsequently died. Sales argues that he
had no intention of killing Noemar as he only meant to
discipline him.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
HELD:
FELONY DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH WAS

INTENDED
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony

different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible
that:
a) That a felony was committed; and
b) That the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct

consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The Supreme Court did not entertain the argument of
Sales that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not
to kill him. The SC ruled that in this case, there is no doubt
that Sales, in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon
him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct
consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he
expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his
son, Noemar, is thus clear.
7. THEFT
THEFT
Persons liable:
1. Those who with intent to gain, but without violence

against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent;
2. Those who having found lost property, fails to

deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
THEFT
3. Those who, after having maliciously damaged the
property of another, remove or make use of the fruits or
objects of the damage caused by them;
4. Those who enter an enclosed estate or a field where

trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and,
without the consent of its owner, hunt or fish upon the
same or gather fruits, cereals or other forest or farm
products.
THEFT
Elements:
1. There is taking of personal property;

2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking was done with intent to gain;
4. The taking was done without the consent of the owner;
and
5. The taking is accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons of force upon things.
THEFT
“taking”  taking away or carrying away; thus, theft is
consummated when the culprits were able to take
possession of the thing taken by them. It is not an
indispensable element of theft that the thief carry, more or
less far away, the thing taken by him from its owner.
As of 2007, the Supreme Court held that asportation is

complete from the moment the offender had full
possession of the thing, even if he did not have an
opportunity to dispose of the same.
THEFT
The unlawful taking may occur at or soon after the
transfer of physical possession (not juridical possession)
of the thing to the offender. The actual transfer of
possession may not always and by itself constitute the
unlawful taking, but an act done soon thereafter by the
offender which may result in unlawful taking or
asportation. In such case, the article is deemed to have
been taken also, although in the beginning, it was in fact
given to, and received by, the offender.
THEFT
Illustration: Tina gave Rey her Rolex watch for the
purpose of having it examined since Rey has a pawnshop.
Rey subsequently appropriated the Rolex watch with intent to
gain and without consent of Tina. – This is THEFT.
But if the accused received the thing from another person

in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under a
quasi-contract or a contract of bailment, and later
misappropriated or converted the thing to the prejudice of
another, the crime is ESTAFA, because under those
transactions, the juridical possession of the thing is
transferred to the offender. (note: thus, the distinction
between juridical and mere physical possession is important.)
THEFT
Intent to gain is presumed from the unlawful taking of
personal property belonging to another.

There is theft even if accused did not take them for his
own use.
It is not necessary that there was real or actual gain on

the part of the offender. It is enough that on taking them,
he was then actuated by the desire or intent to gain.
THEFT
For robbery to exist, it is necessary that there should be
a taking against the will of the owner; for theft, it suffices
that consent on the part of the owner is lacking.

It is not robbery when violence is for a reason entirely
foreign to the fact of taking.

When goods were lost at the same time, in the same
place, and on the same occasion, the person in possession
of part of the missing property is presumed to be the thief
of the entire property.
THEFT
The presumption regarding possession of stolen property
does not exclusively refer to actual physical possession thereof
but may include prior unexplained possession. In any case, for
the presumption to work, the property must be recently stolen.
Thus, if it was stolen a long time ago, the presumption will not
lie.

Intent to gain is inferred from deliberate failure to deliver
the lost property to the proper person.

Finder of hidden treasure who misappropriated the share
pertaining to the owner of the property is guilty of theft as
regards that share.
Penalties for Theft under Article 309 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Penalty Value of Property under Value of Property under
Old RPC R.A. No. 10951
Prision mayor in its More than Php12,000.00 More than
minimum and medium but does not exceed Php1,200,000.00 but does
periods Php22,000.00 not exceed
Php2,200,000.00

If the value of the thing If the value of the thing
stolen exceeds stolen exceeds
Php22,000.00 amount the Php2,200,000.00, the
penalty shall be the penalty shall be the
maximum period of maximum period of
prision mayor, and one prision mayor, and one (1)
year for each additional year for each additional
Php10,000.00, but the Php1,000,000.00, but the
total of the penalty which total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not may be imposed shall not
exceed 20 years. exceed 20 years
Penal Code:
Penalty Value of Property Value of Property

Prision correccional in More than Php6,000.00 More than
its medium and but does not exceed Php600,000.00 but
maximum periods Php12,000.00. does not exceed
Php1,200,00.00
Prision correccional in More than Php200.00 More than
its minimum and but does not exceed Php20,000.00 but does
medium periods Php6,000.00. not exceed
Php600,000.00
Arresto mayor in its Over Php50.00 but over Php5,000.00 but
medium period to does not exceed does not exceed
prision correccional in Php200.00. Php20,000.00
its minimum period

Penal Code:
under Old RPC under R.A. No.
10951

Arresto mayor to its Over Php5.00 but Over Php500.00 but
full extent does not exceed does not exceed
Php50.00 Php5,000.00
minimum and Php5.00 Php500.00
medium periods

Penal Code:
Penalty Value of Property under Old RPC Value of Property under R.A. No. 10951
If the theft is committed under the

circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding
Arresto menor
article and the value of the thing
or a fine not
stolen does not exceed Php5.00. If
exceeding 200
such value exceeds said amount,
pesos
the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.
Arresto paragraph 3 of the next preceding
menor or a fine article and the value of the thing stolen

not exceeding does not exceed Php500.00. If such
Php20,000.00 value exceeds said amount, the
provisions of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
Penal Code:
Value of Property under Old Value of Property under R.A.
Penalty
RPC No. 10951
When the value of the thing
stolen is not over Php5.00, and
Arresto menor in the offender shall have acted
its minimum under the impulse of hunger,
period or a fine poverty, or the difficulty of
not exceeding earning a livelihood for the
Php50.00 support of himself or his
family.

stolen is not over Php500.00,
Arresto menor in
and the offender shall have
its minimum
acted under the impulse of
period or a fine
hunger, poverty, or the
of not exceeding
difficulty of earning a
Php5,000.00
livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.
J. DEL CASTILLO’S PONENCIA ON THEFT
People v. Tanchanco
670 SCRA 130, G.R. No. 177761, 18 April 2012
FACTS: Rebecca hired Tanchanco to work in her office as

legal secretary and liaison officer. Tanchanco suddenly
abandoned her job. Rebecca reviewed documents she
discovered that Tanchanco betrayed her trust and
confidence on several occasions by stealing sums of money
entrusted to her as payment for expenses intended for the
transfer of the titles of properties from their previous
owners to Rebecca’s clients.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there was indeed theft.
The prosecution has sufficiently established all the elements
of theft. Circumstantial evidence which shows that Tanchanco
employed misrepresentations to get the money from Rebecca
established the first two elements. As to the third element, her
intentional failure to properly and correctly account for the
money entrusted to her constitutes appropriation with intent
to gain. As to the fourth element, there was clearly no consent
as it was only after Tanchanco abandoned her job on that
Rebecca discovered the missing sums of money. Finally, as to
the fifth element, it is clear from the facts that the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
San Miguel Corporation v. Puzon Jr.
FACTS: Puzon purchased SMC products on credit. To

ensure payment and as a business practice, SMC required
him to issue postdated checks equivalent to the value of the
products purchased on credit before the same were released
to him. Puzon visited the SMC Sales Office in Paranaque
City to reconcile his account with SMC. When he got hold
of BPI Check which was attached to a bond paper together
with BPI Check he allegedly immediately left the office
with his accountant, bringing the checks with them.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Puzon is not liable
for Theft. To consider that a thing belongs to another, it is
relevant to determine whether ownership of the subject
check was transferred to petitioner SMC. In here, if the
subject check was given by Puzon to SMC in payment of
the obligation, the purpose of giving effect to the
instrument is evident, thus title to or ownership of the
check was transferred upon delivery. However, if the check
was not given as payment, there being no intent to give
effect to the instrument, then ownership of the check was
not transferred to SMC.
8. INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
The indeterminate sentence is composed of:
1. a MAXIMUM taken from the penalty imposable under

the penal code
2. a MINIMUM taken from the penalty next lower to that

fixed in the code.
The law does not apply to certain offenders:
1. Persons convicted of offense punished with death
penalty or life imprisonment;
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence;
7. Those granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive
and shall have violated the term thereof;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not
exceed one year;
9. Those who, upon the approval of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, had been sentenced by final judgment
(Section 2 of Act No. 4103, as amended);
10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension
(Perlas v. People, G.R. Nos. 84637-39, 2 August 1989); and
11. Use of trafficked victim (Section 11 of R.A. No. 9208, as
amended by R.A. No. 10364)
Purpose of the law: to uplift and redeem valuable human
material and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and economic usefulness
It is necessary to consider the criminal first as an

individual, and second as a member of the society.
The law is intended to favor the defendant, particularly

to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending upon his
behavior and his physical, mental and moral record as a
prisoner, to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence.
The settled practice is to give the accused the benefit of
the law even in crimes punishable with death or life
imprisonment provided the resulting penalty, after
considering the attending circumstances, is reclusion
temporal or less.
ISL does not apply to destierro. ISL is expressly

granted to those who are sentenced to imprisonment
exceeding 1 year.
PROCEDURE FOR DETERMING THE MAXIMUM
AND MINIMUM SENTENCE
1. It consists of a maximum and a minimum instead of a

single fixed penalty.
2. Prisoner must serve the minimum before he is eligible for

parole.
3. The period between the minimum and maximum is

indeterminate in the sense that the prisoner may be exempted
from serving said indeterminate period in whole or in part.
4. The maximum is determined in any case punishable
under the RPC in accordance with the rules and provisions
of said code exactly as if the ISL had never been enacted.
5. Apply first the effect of privileged mitigating

circumstances then consider the effects of aggravating and
ordinary mitigating circumstances.
6. The minimum depends upon the court’s discretion with

the limitation that it must be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense committed.
N.B.: A minor who escaped from confinement in the
reformatory is entitled to the benefits of the ISL because
his confinement is not considered imprisonment.
MANDATORY APPLICATION

The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to
both the Revised Penal Code and the special laws (Romero vs. People,
G.R No. 171644, November 23, 2011). However, the Supreme Court, in
People vs. Nang Kay, G.R. No. L-3565, April 20, 1951, has provided an
exception. In this case, the accused pleased guilty to offense where the law
prescribed a penalty of 5 to 10 years imprisonment. The court sentenced
the accused to suffer 5 years of imprisonment. The Supreme Court
sustained the penalty. Fixing the penalty at the minimum limit without
applying Act No. 4103 is favorable to the accused since the accused shall
be automatically released upon serving 5 years of imprisonment. Applying
Act No. 4103 would lengthen the penalty because the indeterminate
maximum penalty must be necessarily more than 5 years (People vs.
Arroyo, G.R. No. L-35584-85, February 13, 1982).
However, the Nang Kay principle is not applicable where the crime is
punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The application of ISLAW is
always mandatory if the penalty is prescribed by RPC since it is favorable to
the accused. It is favorable to the accused since in fixing the minimum
penalty, the prescribed penalty under the Code shall be lowered by one
degree. On the other hand, in fixing the minimum penalty for offense under
special law involved in the Nang Kay case, the prescribed penalty shall not
be lowered (People vs. Judge Lee, Jr, G.R. No. 66859, September 12, 1984).
The Nang Kay principle is not also applicable where the accused does
not deserve a lenient penalty. In Batistis vs. People, G.R. No. 181571,
December 16. 2009, the SC through Justice Bersamin said the Nang Kay
exception is not applicable where there is no justification for lenity towards
the accused since he did not voluntarily plead guilty, and the crime
committed is a grave economic offense because of the large number of fake
Fundador confiscated.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON
INCORRECT PENALTIES
People v. Fontanilla
G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012

The trial court sentenced the accused to suffer reclusion
perpetua to death for murder. This is erroneous. Reclusion
perpetua and death should not be imposed as a compound,
alternative or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the
imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.
Article 64 of RPC provides the rules on application of

divisible penalty. Under this provision, the penalty prescribed
for a felony shall be applied in its proper imposable period based
on the presence of modifying circumstances.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
Lasanas v. People
G.R. No. 159031, 23 June 2014

Under Article 349 of RPC, the penalty for bigamy is prision
mayor. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prision mayor
pursuant to Article 64 shall be applied in its medium period,
which ranges from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying
the ISLAW, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed for the offense, which is from 6 months and 1
day to 6 years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of 2 years
and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor as maximum is proper.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
De Castro v. People
G.R. No. 171672, 2 February 2015

The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in
strict observance of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court
should impose the penalty for the graver offense in the maximum
period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is invalid, and will not attain
finality.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through

falsification of a commercial document was established beyond
reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the bank
depositors who had trusted her enough to leave their passbooks with her
upon her instruction.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the
falsification of commercial documents is punished
with prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (i.e., two years, four months and one day to six
years) and a fine of P5,000.00. In contrast, the estafa is
punished according to the value of the defraudation.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver
felony because the amount of the fraud was P20,000.00;
hence, the penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its
maximum period. However, the RTC and the CA fixed the
indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10
days of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years,
eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as maximum.
Such maximum of the indeterminate penalty was short by
one day, the maximum period of the penalty being six
years, eight months and 21 days to eight years. Thus, the
indeterminate sentence is corrected to three years
of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving P2,000.00, the estafa is punished
with four months and one day of arresto mayor in its maximum period to two
years and four months of prision correccional in its minimum period. The
falsification of commercial document is penalized with prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months and one day to six
years) and a fine of P5,000.00. The latter offense is the graver felony, and its
penalty is to be imposed in the maximum period, which is from four years, nine
months and 11 days to six years plus fine of P5,000.00. The penalty next lower
in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months).
Thus, the indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum that both the
RTC and the CA fixed was erroneous. The SC rectified the error by prescribing in
lieu thereof the indeterminate sentence of two years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision correccional plus
fine of P5,000.00, as maximum.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving P10,000.00, the
RTC and the CA imposed the indeterminate sentence of four
months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
maximum. However, the penalty for the falsification of
commercial documents is higher than that for the estafa. To
accord with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
for falsification of commercial documents (i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of
P5,000.00) should be imposed in the maximum period.
Accordingly, the SC revised the indeterminate sentence so that
its minimum is two years and four months of prision
correccional, and its maximum is five years of prision
correccional plus fine of P5,000.00.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was
P35,000.00, the penalty for estafa (i.e., prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or four years, two months and
one day to eight years) is higher than that for falsification of commercial
documents. The indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as
maximum, was prescribed. Considering that the maximum period ranged from
six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years, the CA should have
clarified whether or not the maximum of eight years of prision mayor already
included the incremental penalty of one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00. Absent the clarification, we can presume that the incremental
penalty was not yet included. Thus, in order to make the penalty clear and
specific, the indeterminate sentence is hereby fixed at four years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus one year incremental penalty. In other words, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence is seven years, eight months and 21
days of prision mayor.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
Fransdilla v. People
G.R. No. 197562, 20 April 2015
The trial judge fixed the indeterminate sentence at

"imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum". This is a patent elementary error. Considering
that the clear objective of the ISLAW is to have the convict
serve the minimum penalty before becoming eligible for
release on parole, both the minimum and the maximum
penalties must be definite, not ranging.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
This objective cannot be achieved otherwise, for
determining when the convict would be eligible for release
on parole would be nearly impossible if the minimum and
the maximum were as indefinite as the RTC fixed the
indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the sentence is an
indeterminate one relates only to the fact that such
imposition would leave the period between the minimum
and the maximum penalties indeterminate "in the sense
that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be
released from serving said period in whole or in part."
INCORRECT PENALTIES
Ladines v. People
G.R. No. 167333, 11 January 2016

Under Article 249 of RPC, the penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying
circumstances, reclusion temporal shall be applied in its
medium period, which ranges from 14 years, 8 months and
1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
INCORRECT PENALTIES
Applying Article 64, within the limits of the medium period of
reclusion temporal, the courts shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil
produced by the crime. Thus, the court could not impose the highest
penalty of the medium period of reclusion temporal, and that, is 17
years and 4 months without specifying the justification for so
imposing. Without proper justification, the court should impose the
lowest penalty of the medium period of reclusion temporal, and that
is, 14 years, 8 months. Since ISLAW is applicable, 14 years, 8 months
shall be considered as the maximum penalty while the minimum
penalty shall be fixed within the limits of prision mayor, which ranges
from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Hence, the accused is sentenced
to suffer 10 years of prision mayor as minimum indeterminate penalty
to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum penalty.
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS
Q: Andres is charged with an offense defined by

a special law. The penalty prescribed for the
offense is imprisonment of not less than five (5)
years but not more than ten [10) years. Upon
arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty. In the
imposition of the proper penalty, should the
Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied? If you
were the Judge trying the case, what penalty
would you impose on Andres? (1999 Bar)
A: Yes, the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be

applied because the minimum imprisonment is
more than one (1) year.
If I were the Judge, I will impose an indeterminate

sentence, the maximum of which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum penalty
prescribed by the same. I have the discretion to
impose the penalty within the said minimum
and maximum.
Q: Itos was convicted of an offense penalized

by a special law. The penalty prescribed is not
less than six years but not more than twelve
years. No modifying circumstance attended
the commission of the crime. If you were the
judge, will you apply the Indeterminate
Sentence Law? If so, how will you apply it?
(1994 Bar)
A: If I were the judge, I will apply the provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as the last
sentence of Section 1 Act 4103, specifically
provides the application thereof for violations of
special laws.
Under the same provision, the minimum must

not be less than the minimum provided therein
(six years and one day) and the maximum shall
not be more than the maximum provided
therein, i.e. twelve years. (People vs. Rosalina
Reyes, 186 SCRA 184)
9. MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
ORDINARY MITIGATING PRIVILEGED
MITIGATING
Susceptible of being offset
Cannot be offset by
by any aggravating
aggravating circumstance
circumstance
If not offset by aggravating
The effect of imposing upon
circumstance, produces the
the offender the penalty
effect of applying the penalty
lower by one or two degrees
provided by law for the
than that provided by law for
crime in its minimum period
the crime.
in case of divisible penalty
ORDINARY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Incomplete Justifying or Exempting Circumstance: When all
the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from
criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
Classes of Self-Defense:
a. Incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives, defense
of stranger
N.B. In these 3 classes of defense, UNLAWFUL

AGGRESSION must always be present. It is an
indispensable requisite (Reyes, p. 247).
2. That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over
seventy years. x x x
In People v. Hermie Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, 16 March

2011, the child in conflict with the law was found guilty of
qualified rape punishable by death. Supreme Court considered
the minority of the accused as privilege mitigating circumstance.
Notwithstanding the Anti-Death Penalty Law (R.A. 9346) and
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the Supreme
Court sentenced the accused to reclusion perpetua. The Supreme
Court held that for purposes of determining the proper penalty
because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.
This circumstance can be taken into account only when

the facts proven show that there is a notable and evident
disproportion between the means employed to execute the
criminal act and its consequences (Reyes, p. 258).
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the act.
PROVOCATION
Any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended
party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone (Reyes,
p. 266).
REQUISITES:
1. That the provocation must be sufficient
2. That it must originate from the offended party
3. That the provocation must be immediate to the act, i.e., to the
commission of the crime by the person who is provoked.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication
of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito)
his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees.
 Vindication of grave offense cannot co-exist with

passion or obfuscation (People v. Pedro Pangal, et al.,
G.R. No. L-32040, 25 October 1977).
PROVOCATION VINDICATION
It is made directly only to the The grave offense may be
person committing the offense committed also against the
offender’s relatives mentioned in
the law.
The cause that brought about the The offended party must have
provocation need not be a grave done a grave offense to the
offense. offender or his relatives mentioned
in the law.
It is necessary that the provocation The vindication of the grave
or threat immediately preceded the offense may be proximate, which
act. admits of an interval of time
between the grave offense done by
the offended party and the
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
REQUISITES:
1. The accused acted upon an impulse.
2. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produce
passion or obfuscation in him.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to
a person in authority or his agents, or that he had
voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER:

1. That the offender had not been actually arrested.
2. That the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or to the latter’s agent.
3. That the surrender was voluntary.
REQUISITES OF PLEA OF GUILTY:
1. That the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
2. That the confession of guilty was made in open court, that
is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and
3. That the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering
some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action,
defense, or communication with his fellow beings.
The fact that the accused suffers from a physical defect, a severed
left hand, does not mean that he should automatically be credited
with the mitigating circumstance. In order for this condition to be
appreciated, it must be shown that such physical defect limited his
means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings
to such an extent that he did not have complete freedom of action,
consequently resulting in diminution of the element of voluntariness.
In fact, despite his handicap, the accused nevertheless managed to
attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim (People v. Rogelio
Deopante, G.R. No. 102772, 30 October 1996).
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts.
REQUISITES:
1. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise
of his will-power.
2. That such illness should not deprive the offender of
consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature

and analogous to those above mentioned.
In Emilio Cimafranca v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
94408, 14 February 1991, the Supreme Court held that the
return of the funds malversed is not a defense and will not be
an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing
the criminal liability of the accused but it can be a mitigating
circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender.
In the instant case, the return of the property malversed

was not mitigating because it took the accused several years
before he returned the government property. In fact, when
the engine was returned, it was already scrap and the
revolver was rusty and had to be reblued.
PRIVILEGE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under
eighteen (18) years of age. — When the offender is a minor
under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of
this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is
not exempted from liability by reason of the court having
declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty
shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than
that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed. [N.B.
Not anymore applicable because of R.A. No. 9344]
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed,
but always in the proper period.
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime
committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of
the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several
cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the
majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed
proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions
of exemption present or lacking.
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain
three periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by
law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty
or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms
a period x x x, the court shall observe for the application of the
penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are
not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
... ... ...
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that
it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of
such circumstances.
Lumauig v. People
729 SCRA 191, G.R. No. 166680, 7 July 2014
FACTS: Lumauig was the Municipal Mayor of Alfonso
Lista, Ifugao, and was the accountable public officer
responsible for the amount of P101,736.00 which he
received as cash advance for the payment of the insurance
of the 12 motorcycles purchased by the Municipality.
Lumauig failed to liquidate and account for the amount
upon investigation by the COA. Subsequently, as not to
prolong the issue, he paid the amount of P101,736.00 to the
municipal treasurer.
HELD:
SPECIAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN

MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY AND IN
FAILURE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT
In malversation of public funds, the payment,

indemnification, or reimbursement of the funds
misappropriated may be considered a mitigating
circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.
Although this case does not involve malversation of
public funds under Article 217 of the RPC but rather
failure to render an account under Article 218, the same
reasoning may be applied to the return or full restitution of
the funds that were previously unliquidated in considering
the same as a mitigating circumstance in favor of
petitioner.
People v. Agacer

for the killing of a common relative, Cesario Agacer,
through the use of a shotgun. All of the accused contend
that both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired
to kill Cesario as there was no evidence sufficient to
establish their intentional participation.
HELD:
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY

SURRENDER
A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the

intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities either because:

1. He acknowledges his guilt; or

2. He wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.
The Supreme Court ruled that Florencio’s subsequent
presentation of himself at the police station cannot be
considered as a voluntary surrender which would mitigate
the penalty imposed since his act did not emanate from a
natural impulse to admit the killing of Cesario or to save
the police officers the effort and expense that would be
incurred in his search and incarceration.
People v. Sales
FACTS: Sales was whipping his son Noemar while his son
was tied to a coconut three when his son slipped, lost
consciousness, and subsequently died. Sales argues that he
had no intention of killing Noemar as he only meant to
discipline him.
HELD: To save the authorities the trouble and expense
that may be incurred for his search and capture is the
essence of voluntary surrender. The presentation by
appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a
spontaneous manner is a manifestation of this intent.
The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the trial court

that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is
present since the evidence shows that he went to the police
station a day after the barangay captain reported the death
of Noemar.
10. HOMICIDE
HOMICIDE
Art. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not fallowng
within the provisions of Article 246 [Parricide], shall kill
another with out the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the next preceding Article [Murder], shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion
temporal.
Elements:
1. A person was killed;
2. The accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;
3. The accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and
4. The killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.
HOMICIDE
Evidence of intent to kill is important only in attempted or
frustrated homicide (to differentiate it from physical injuries). In
such cases, intent to kill must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
[Reyes, Book II]
There is no offense of frustrated homicide through imprudence

because the element of intent to kill in frustrated homicide is
incompatible with negligence or imprudence. [Reyes, Book II]
Accidental homicide – the death of a person brought about by a

lawful act performed with proper care and skill, and without
homicidal intent. (example: the death of a boxer following a serious
blow in a boxing bout, provided that the rules of boxing had been
followed) [Reyes, Book II]
HOMICIDE
Josue v. People (2012)
FACTS: The accused was charged with and convicted of homicide.

The accused confronted the victim using a pistol. Thereafter, he
fired upon the latter inflicting mortal wounds on the latter’s back
and chest. However, the victim survived the attack due to timely
medical attention given to him.

HELD: The elements of frustrated homicide are: (a) the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon; (b) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but he did
not die because of timely medical assistance; and (c) none of the
qualifying circumstance for murder under Art. 248 of the RPC is
present. These elements were present in the case.
HOMICIDE
Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, among other things, of the means
used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim. In addition, one of the witnesses
testified that the accused shouted, “Papatayin kita!” In
proving the second element, the doctor who attended to the
wounds of the victim testified that the gunshot wounds
sustained were fatal if not given medical attention.
HOMICIDE
Olarte v. People
761 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 197731, 6 July 2015
FACTS: Petitioners Hermie Olarte and Ruben Olavario

together with Salvador Pasquin were charged with the
crime of frustrated homicide. The victim Villostas was
fetched by his half-brother, Penilla, from a drinking
session. On their way home, Villostas decided to buy
cigarettes from a nearby videoke bar when three men, who
belonged to a group then singing and drinking, suddenly
stabbed him on different parts of his body.
HOMICIDE
HELD: The elements of frustrated homicide are:
1. The accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;
2. The victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did
not die because of timely medical assistance; and
3. None of the qualifying circumstances for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code exist.
HOMICIDE
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners are guilty
of the crime of frustrated homicide since the elements were
proved during trial. First, direct and positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses established that Villostas sustained
seven stab wounds on vital parts of his body caused by a
pointed sharp object. Plainly, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by him demonstrate
petitioners’ intent to kill. Next, the injuries suffered by
Villostas were all fatal.
HOMICIDE
Seguritan v. People
618 SCRA 406, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010
FACTS: Seguritan was charged with the crime of Homicide. A heated

discussion thereafter ensued between Seguritan and Lucrecio wherein
Seguritan’s punches landed on Lucrecio’s right and left temple,
causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block which
was being used as an improvised stove. Lucrecio lost consciousness
but was revived with the assistance of Baltazar. Upon his arrival at
home, his wife noticed blood on his forehead. Lucrecio explained that
he was stoned, then went directly to his room and slept. Lucrecio’s
wife and daughter noticed that his complexion has darkened and
foamy substance was coming out of his mouth. Attempts were made to
revive Lucrecio but to no avail. He died that same night.
HOMICIDE
HELD: When death resulted, even if there was no intent to
kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since
with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law
looks particularly to the material results following the
unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.
HOMICIDE
PENALTY FOR HOMICIDE

The penalty for Homicide under Article 249 of the RPC
is reclusion temporal the range of which is from 12 years
and one day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision
mayor the range of which is from six years and one day to
12 years.
HOMICIDE
The Supreme Court ruled that Seguritan is guilty of
Homicide. He cannot be guilty of physical injuries
resulting to Homicide. Seguritan committed an unlawful
act by punching Lucrecio, his uncle who was much older
than him, and even if he did not intend to cause the death
of Lucrecio, he must be held guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for killing him pursuant to Art. 4 of the RPC. He
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.
HOMICIDE
As to the penalty, the SC found that the mitigating
circumstance of “no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed” attended the commission of the crime.
Thus, the appellate court correctly imposed the
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
11. EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCE
S
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. An Imbecile or Insane Person: An imbecile or an
insane person, unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval (Art. 12, par.1).
Insanity
There is a complete deprivation of intelligence in

committing the act but capable of having lucid intervals.
During a lucid interval, the insane acts with intelligence
and thus, not exempt from criminal liability.
Mental retardation includes (a) idiot, whose mental age
is two-year old; (b) imbecile, whose mental age is seven-
year old; (c) moron or feebleminded, whose mental age is
twelve-year old and (d) borderline intelligence.
In exempting circumstance, there is a difference

between actual age and mental age. In exempting
circumstance of imbecility, what is important is the mental
age of the accused. An idiot, whose mental age is 2 years,
and imbecile, whose mental age is 7 years old are exempt
from criminal liablity. (People v. Butiong, G.R. No.
168932, 19 October 2011, J. Bersamin)
PROCEDURE WHEN AN IMBECILE OR INSANE
COMMITTED A FELONY
1. The court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals

or asylums established for persons afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
court. The court must obtain the opinion of the Director of Health
before permitting his release.
2. When the person is sane at the time of the commission of the

crime but he becomes insane at the time of the trial, he is liable
criminally. The trial, however, shall be suspended until mental
capacity of the accused be restored to afford him a fair trial.
2. Minority: A child fifteen (15) years of age or under
at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall
be subjected to an intervention program (R.A. No.
9344).
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen

(18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment.
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.9344);
also refer to Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603, as
amended)
A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the

commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected
to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to appropriate
proceedings.
The exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption
from civil liability.
Amendments to Juvenile Justice And Welfare Act Of
2006
(R.A. No. 10630, amending R.A. No. 9344)
A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of

the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. A child is deemed to be fifteen (15)
years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of
his/her birthdate (R.A. No. 10630, amending Section 6 o
R.A. No. 9344).
Serious Crimes Committed by Children Who Are Exempt From Criminal
Responsibility
A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15)

years of age and who commits parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is killed or
raped, robbery, with homicide or rape, destructive arson, rape, or
carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or offenses
under Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002) punishable by more than twelve (12) years of imprisonment,
shall be deemed a neglected child under P.D. No. 603 (The Child and
Youth Welfare Code), as amended, and shall be mandatorily placed in
a special facility within the youth care faculty or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’
called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC)
(Sec. 20-A of R.A. No. 9344, as amended by R.A. No. 10630).
Repetition of Offenses
A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15)

years of age and who commits an offense for the second time or
oftener shall be deemed a neglected child under P.D. No. 603, as
amended, and shall undergo an intensive intervention program
supervised by the local social welfare and development officer,
provided that:
1. the child was previously subjected to a community-based
intervention program;
2. if the best interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in
a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or
guardians shall execute a written authorization for the voluntary
commitment of the child; and
3. if the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse
or fail to execute the written authorization for voluntary
commitment, the proper petition for involuntary
commitment shall be immediately filed by the DSWD
or the LSWDO pursuant to P.D. No. 603, as amended
(Sec. 20-B of R.A. No. 9344, as amended by R.A. No
10630).
DISCERNMENT INTENT
Moral significance that a Desired act of the person
person ascribes to the said
act
DISCERNMENT – means the mental capacity of a minor

between 15 and 18 years of age to fully appreciate the
consequences of his lawful act.
3. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it (Art. 12, par. 4).
ELEMENTS:
1. A person performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
 Striking another with a gun in self-defense, even if it

fired and seriously injured the assailant is a lawful act.
ACCIDENT – something that happen outside the sway of
our will and although it comes about through some act of
our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences.
If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a

case of negligence (Reyes, p. 223).
People v. Latosa
G.R. No. 186128, 23 June 2010
The pointing of the gun towards the victim’s head and

pulling the trigger cannot be considered as performing a
lawful act with due care. Furthermore, the location of the
wound sustained by the victim shows that the shooting was
not merely accidental.
4. Under The Compulsion of an Irresistible Force: Any
person who acts under the compulsion of irresistible
force (Art. 12, par. 5).
ELEMENTS:
1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force;
2. That the physical force must be irresistible; and
3. That the physical force must come from a third person.
 Before force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it

must produce such an effect upon the individual that, in
spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument
and, as such, incapable of committing a crime.
5. Under The Impulse of an Uncontrollable Fear of
an Equal or Greater Injury: Any person who acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury (Art. 12, par. 6).
ELEMENTS:
1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil greater
than or at least equal to, that which he is required to
commit;
2. That it promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that
the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.
6. Lawful or Insuperable Cause: Any person who
fails to perform an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause (Art.
12, par. 7).
ELEMENTS:
1. That an act is required by law to be done;
2. That a person fails to perform such act;
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful
or insuperable cause.
People v. Baron
621 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 185209, 28 June 2010

the victim. One of Baron’s defenses is that he was acting
under duress from his companions.
HELD:
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ACTING UNDER

THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF
AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY

To avail this exempting circumstance, the evidence must
establish:
1. The existence of an uncontrollable fear;
2. That the fear must be real and imminent; and
3. The fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.
A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for
the accused to escape.
The Supreme Court did not uphold that the appellant's

insistence that he acted under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. There is
nothing to substantiate appellant’s insistence that he was
under duress from his co-accused in participating in the
crime.
12. DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT
Definitions (Art. I, Sec. 3):
Take note of the following terms:
− Dangerous Drugs [DD] (par. j), compare with

Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals
[CPAEC](par. h);
− Chemical Diversion (par. d), contrast with Controlled
Delivery (par. g) and Illegal Trafficking (par. r);
− Den, Dive or Resort (par. l);
− Drug Dependence (par. m);
− Drug Syndicate (par. o); and
− Financier (par. q) vs. Protector/Coddler (par. ee).
ACT
Prohibited Acts (Art. II, Secs. 4-19):
a. Importation of DD or CPAEC;
b. Cultivation of plants known to produce DD or
CPAEC;
c. Sale, Trade, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of DD or CPAEC;
d. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort;
− Den, Dive or Resort shall be confiscated and
escheated in favor of the government;
− Knowingly working at or visiting the Den, Dive or
Resort is punishable.
e. Manufacturing DD or CPAEC or tools and
instruments used for the same.
ACT
f. Illegal Chemical Diversion of DD or or CPAEC;
g. Unlawful or unnecessary prescription of DD or CPAEC;
h. Failure to keep proper records of legal
importation/distribution of DD or CPAEC;
i. ILLEGAL POSSESSION:
− DD or CPAEC;
− Tools/Instruments used for the same;
− DD or CPAEC during social gatherings (at least 2
people)
j. ILLEGAL USE OF DD or CPAEC (2nd Offense or more);
k. Violation of any Dangerous Drugs Board [DDB]
regulation.
ACT
Liability of public officers
i. Misappropriation or failure to account for DD/CPAED or
paraphernalia confiscated/used as evidence;
ii. Planting DD/CPAEC as evidence.
Attempt or Conspiracy (Sec. 26):

An attempt or conspiracy to commit the following are punishable.
Penalty same as if consummated;
i. Importation of DD/CPAEC;
ii. Sale, trade, administration, dispensation, distribution of
DD/CPAEC;
iii. Maintaining den, dive or resort;
iv. Manufacture of DD/CPAEC;
v. Cultivation of plants known to be sources of DD/CPAEC.
ACT
Plea Bargaining (Sec. 23):
Any person charged with a violation of RA 9165 cannot
avail of plea bargaining.
N.B. Declared unconstitutional in Estipona v. Lobrigo, infra.
Probation (Sec. 24):

Convicted drug traffickers or pushers cannot apply for
probation.
Drug Use as a Qualifying Aggravating Circumstance (Sec.

25):
− Commission of an offense by a culprit under the
influence of dangerous drugs.
− There must be a positive finding of drug use.
ACT
When Drug Tests are Required (Sec. 36):
a. Applications for Driver’s License;

b. Applications for Firearms License/Permit;
c. Secondary/Tertiary School students;
d. Officers/Employees in Private companies; and
e. Public Officers/Employees, incl. Members of law
enforcement units.
N.B. Drug tests of: (a) persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office, and (b) candidates for public office, or Section 36 (f) and
(g) were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No.
157870, 3 November 2008).
ACT
Drug Rehabilitation Programs (Art. VIII)
Voluntary Submission Program (Sec. 54):

1. File Application For Voluntary Rehabilitation with the DDB or its
representative;
2. Board transmits the application to the Court, which shall order the
applicant to undergo drug testing.
3. If the applicant is found to be drug dependent, Court shall order him to
undergo treatment for 6m-1yr.
4. Participants in the VSP are EXEMPT from criminal liability, if qualified
under Sec. 55:
i. Complied with the rules and regulations of the Center;
ii. First-time Offender (DD Use);
iii. No record of escape from rehabilitation center or surrendered within
one week from escape;
iv. Does not pose a serious danger to himself or to the public.
ACT
Drug Rehabilitation Programs (Art. VIII)
Compulsory Submission Program (Sec. 61):

1. DDB files a Petition to Rehabilitate a drug
dependent with the Court, which shall order the
applicant to undergo drug testing.
− APPLIES TO DRUG DEPENDENTS CHARGED
WITH AN OFFENSE (SEC. 62)
2. If the applicant is found to be drug dependent,
Court shall issue a Commitment Order charging
him to undergo treatment and rehabilitation.
3. Minors found to be first time offenders entitled to
suspended sentence (superseded by R.A. No. 9344).
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Estipona v. Lobrigo
G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017, J. Peralta
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the prohibition

on plea-bargaining in drugs cases, is declared
unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Hementiza
G.R. No. 227398, 22 March 2017, J. Mendoza
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking

of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after
they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means
the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer
of his/her initials and signature on the items seized.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial
link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be
immediately marked because the succeeding handlers of
the specimens will use the markings as reference.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal
proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or
contamination of evidence.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited
drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent
doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty.
Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale
are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed
and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in
court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same
degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Macapundag
G.R. No. 225965, 13 March 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In People v. Sanchez, the Court recognized that under varied

field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, may not always be
possible, and ruled that under the implementing guidelines of the
said Section, "non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items." However, the Court
added that the prosecution bears the burden of proving justifiable
cause.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Thus, in People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for
the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
the integrity and value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman,
it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Barte
G.R. No. 179749, 1 March 2017, J. Bersamin
It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are

"susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is
its use as a tool for extortion." The high possibility of abuse
was precisely the reason why the procedural safeguards
embodied in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up as
a means to minimize, if not eradicate such abuse. The
procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent from
abuse and violation of their rights but also guide the law
enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the evidence to be
presented in court.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Gayoso
821 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 206590, 27 March 2017
FACTS: Myrna Gayoso was found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 (illegal sale of a dangerous drug) and
11 (illegal possession of a dangerous drug), Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. Appellant argues that the "confirmatory
test-buy" by the police officers was not valid since she was
induced by the' designated poseur buyer, SP03 De Dios,
and the confidential informant to sell the seized shabu.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
INDUCEMENT OR INSTIGATION DISTINGUISHED

FROM ENTRAPMENT

In inducement or instigation - the criminal intent originates
in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him.
The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into
the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-
principal. This is distinguished from entrapment wherein ways
and means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing the
lawbreaker in flagrante delicto.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
TEST-BUY OPERATION FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS NOT
PROHIBITED BY LAW
A test-buy operation is not prohibited by law. It does not

amount to instigation.
CONVICTION CANNOT BE SUSTAINED IF THERE IS A

PERSISTENT DOUBT ON THE IDENTITY OF THE
DRUG THAT IS SUBJECT OF THE CASE
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu,

conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on
the identity of said drug.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The identity of the shabu must be established with
moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the shabu
illegally possessed and sold is the same shabu offered in
court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same
degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict. The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court ruled that the solicitation of drugs from
appellant by the poseur buyer merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that
appellant habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur
buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction with
appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced
appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

Notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court granted the appellant
an acquittal for failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken
chain of custody, and the non-compliance by the arresting officers
with the most basic procedural safeguards relative to the custody
and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article II of
R.A. No. 9165.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Ismael
FACTS: Salim Ismael was caught during a buy-bust

operation selling and possessing shabu worth P100.00. It is
his contention that his guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution: (1) failed to
establish the identity of the prohibited drugs allegedly
seized from him and; (2) likewise failed to comply with the
strict requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
GROUNDS FOR ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED IN CASES

OF ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the dangerous drug seized from the accused constitutes
the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost
importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs
must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of
custody rule performs this function as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed."
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court resolved to acquit Ismael based on
reasonable doubt after finding that the prosecution failed to
establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs in
violation of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. In conclusion,
the SC found that the prosecution failed to:
a. overcome the presumption of innocence which appellant

enjoys;
b. prove the corpus delicti of the crime;
c. establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized
drugs; and
d. offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21,
RA 9165 were not complied with.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Abenes
799 SCRA 56, G.R. No. 210878, 7 July 2016
FACTS: Jonalyn Abenes was arrested through a buy-bust operation for

violating Section 5 (illegal sale) and Section 11 (illegal possession) of
R.A. No. 9165, where two plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance (methylamphetamine hydrochloride) were marked on site.
Giving credence to the prosecution witnesses who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, the RTC ruled the
prosecution has sufficiently proven that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto selling dangerous drug to a law enforcement agent
who posed as buyer and while being frisked, another plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance was found in her possession.
The Trial Court and CA found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs has
the following elements:
a. identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and
b. delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of
the substance seized as evidence.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court ruled that these elements were
satisfied by the prosecution’s evidence. The prosecution
witnesses positively identified appellant as the seller of the
white crystalline substance which was found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

However, Supreme Court acquitted the appellant’s after
it found that the quantum of evidence needed to convict, that
is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately
established in the charge of dangerous drugs since the
prosecution was not able to provide a clear identification of
the illegal drug seized from appellant’s possession.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Cunanan
753 SCRA 275, G.R. No. 198024, 16 March 2015
FACTS: Rafael “Paeng Putol” Cunanan was engaged in

selling illegal drugs. Eventually, he was caught through a
buy-bust operation where 0.02 grams of shabu was found
to be in the possession of Cunanan.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs has
the following elements:

consideration; and

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court ruled that the appellant was
lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto
selling an illegal drug in a buy-bust operation.
Furthermore, contrary to his contention, it was not
inconceivable that he would openly sell an illegal drug in
public. It is crystal clear from the foregoing that a sale
transaction took place between appellant and the police
poseur-buyer. That said transaction involved the illegal sale
of dangerous drug was sufficiently shown by the
prosecution through its establishment of the elements
mentioned.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Tionco v. People
752 SCRA 589 , G.R. No. 192284, 11 March 2015
FACTS: PO1 Sta. Maria and PO1 Reyes were conducting

an anti-criminality patrol when they confiscated a plastic
sachet with white crystalline substance believed to be
shabu from the petitioner who was later arrested. Petitioner
was charged with violation of Section 11(3), Article II of
R.A. 9165. RTC and CA convicted petitioner of the same
charges. Petitioner attempts to raise doubts on the identity
of the item confiscated from him.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The essential elements in illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are:
a. the accused is in possession of an item or object that
is identified to be a prohibited drug;
b. such possession is not authorized by law; and
c. the accused freely and consciously possess the said
drug.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution was able
to establish through testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence the aforesaid elements. The circumstances on
how petitioner was seen holding and examining a piece of
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, how
the same was confiscated from him by the police and
having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is prima facie
evidence that petitioner freely and consciously possessed
the drug, which he failed to rebut. Indeed, all the elements
of the offense charged are obtaining in this case.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Reyes
FACTS: Reyes was arrested as a result of a buy-bust

operation involving shabu against him. After trial, RTC
found him guilty. Upon appeal, Reyes called the attention
to the absence of marked money in the buy-bust operation
and the failure of the prosecution to establish all elements
of illegal delivery of dangerous drugs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: To establish the guilt of an accused for the illegal
delivery of a dangerous drug, there must be evidence that:
1. The accused passed on possession of a dangerous
drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any
means;
2. Such delivery is not authorized by law; and
3. The accused knowingly made the delivery with or
without consideration.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
PRESENTATION OF MARKED MONEY NOT
INDISPENSABLE FOR PROSECUTION

The presentation of the marked money is immaterial in this
case since the crime of illegal delivery of a dangerous drug can
be committed even without consideration or payment.
The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution succeeded in

establishing all the elements of illegal delivery of dangerous
drugs. Furthermore, the contention of the appellant that the
marked money was not presented during trial is immaterial
since the said mark money is not indispensable in the
prosecution of illegal delivery of dangerous drugs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Perondo
FACTS: A buy-bust operation was conducted where

Virgilio Largo Perondo was arrested for selling 0.05 gram
of shabu. The appellant argued that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty of crime charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
NON-PRESENTATION OF POSEUR BUYER IS NOT

FATAL TO THE PROSECUTION

The presentation of the poseur buyer is not indispensable
to the successful prosecution of the case against appellant if
the police officers who participated in the planning and
implementation of the buy-bust operation and were all direct
witnesses to the actual sale of the shabu, the appellant’s
arrest immediately thereafter, and the recovery from him of
the marked money, testified for the prosecution during trial.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court ruled that is not impressed with
appellant’s insistence that the failure to present the poseur-
buyer is fatal to the prosecution. It must be noted that
whatever relevant information the poseur-buyer may have
was also equally known to the police officers who testified
for the prosecution during trial. This is considering that
they all participated in the planning and implementation of
the buy-bust operation and were all direct witnesses to the
actual sale of the shabu, the appellant’s arrest immediately
thereafter, and the recovery from him of the marked
money. Hence, the testimony of the poseur-buyer was not
indispensable or necessary; it would have been cumulative
merely, or corroborative at best.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Bio
FACTS: PO2 Salonga and his team conducted a buy-bust operation

against the appellant after reports from police assets of the former’s
illegal activities in Brgy. Nova, Quezon City. Appellant, together
with the buy-bust and the two plastic sachets, were then brought to
the Novaliches Police Station. Appellant was charged and was
found guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. RTC ruled that the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established
and was affirmed by CA. Appellant argues that the prosecution
failed to show that the Police officers complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9165 in handling the seized evidence.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that as correctly ruled by both
lower courts, all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of
shabu are obtaining in this case. In the same vein, appellant,
upon being frisked after his apprehension, was found possessing
another plastic sachet containing 0.15 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. There is no evidence on record showing
that he was legally authorized to possess the same. Neither was
there any explanation that he did not freely or consciously
possess the said illegal drug. Settled is the rule that "possession
of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict
an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession." Clearly, all the elements of the offense of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs are likewise present in this case.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Gabuya
FACTS: Jimmy Gibuya was caught selling shabu through

a buy-bust operation. Appellant asserts that the RTC erred
in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt since the
failure of the buy-bust team to coordinate with the PDEA
and to mark the seized items at the place of seizure
constituted gaps in the chain of custody.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
PRIOR COORDINATION WITH THE PDEA IS NOT
INDISPENSABLE IN BUY-BUST OPERATIONS

The failure of the police officers to coordinate with the
PDEA is not a serious procedural defect. It is not a fatal
flaw since coordination of the buy-bust operation with the
PDEA is not an indispensable element of the crimes of
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs such as
shabu.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the
lower courts and ruled that the lack of prior coordination
by the police with PDEA for the buy-bust operation will
not result in appellant’s exoneration since coordination of
the buy-bust operation with the PDEA is not an
indispensable element of the crimes of illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Nepomuceno
FACTS: Nepomuceno was caught through a buy-bust

operation involving shabu worth P100.00. The appellant
now questions the decision convicting her of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs based on the alleged failure of the
prosecution to establish all the elements of the said crime.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The Supreme Court did not entertain the
contention of Nepomuceno since the prosecution has
successfully established all the elements of the crime. PO2
Barrameda, the police officer who acted as buyer, testified
on the buy-bust operation against appellant and positively
identified her as the seller of the seized shabu that was sold
to him for P100.00. PO1 Santos, another police officer and
member of the buy-bust team, corroborated the testimony
of PO2 Barrameda. While they had not seen appellant prior
to the buy-bust operation, the CI readily identified and
introduced her to PO2 Barrameda.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Opiana
FACTS: The Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)

operatives conducted an entrapment operation on Opiana
who was reportedly engaged in illegal drug trade. After
making the pre-arranged signal, Manolito Opiana was
apprehended and 19 heat-sealed sachets of shabu were
recovered from his possession. The appellant now
questions the decision convicting him of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs based on the alleged failure of the
prosecution to establish all the elements of the said crime.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution
satisfactorily established the following elements of the said
crime:
consideration; and

Similarly, the prosecution satisfactorily established the
following elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs
in violation of Section 11, to wit: (1) appellant was shown to
have been in possession of 0.74 gram of shabu, a prohibited
drug; (2) his possession was not authorized by law; and (3) he
freely and consciously possessed the said illegal drug.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Dela Cruz
FACTS: Venerando Dela Cruz was entrapped through a

buy-bust operation involving shabu worth P1,500.00. Dela
Cruz contends that the prosecution failed to establish all
elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu, particularly
the price and quantity of shabu that was agreed upon.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummates the buy-bust transaction.

In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is not necessary
that the agreement on the price and quantity be established
to consummate the offense. The offense is consummated
after the exchange of the illegal drug for the marked
money.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution
submitted evidence that duly established the elements of
illegal sale of shabu. It positively identified appellant as the
seller of the seized shabu. Appellant sold and delivered the
drug for ₱1,500.00 to Ebio, a police asset who acted as
poseur-buyer. Verily, all the elements of the sale of illegal
drugs were established to support appellant’s conviction of
the said offense.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Baturi
734 SCRA 55, G.R No. 189812, 1 September 2014
FACTS: A buy-bust procedure was conducted against

Reynaldo Baturi who was allegedly involved in illegal
drug activities. He was subsequently caught possessing and
selling shabu to the poseur-buyer. He now contends that the
prosecution failed to establish all elements of the crime of
illegal sale of shabu.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
successfully established all the essential elements of the
illegal sale of shabu. PO3 Velassuez, who acted as poseur-
buyer, positively identified appellant as the seller of the
shabu and categorically testified that the shabu was
received by him, and the payment therefor by appellant, in
a legitimate buy-bust operation.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Marcelo
733 SCRA 223, G.R. No. 181541, 18 August 2014
FACTS: Marissa Marcelo was caught through an

entrapment operation involving shabu worth P1,500.00.
She now contends that the prosecution failed to establish
all elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
successfully proved the existence of all the essential
elements of the illegal sale of shabu. Appellant was
positively identified by the police officers who conducted
the buy-bust operation as the person who sold the shabu
presented in court. P/Insp. Rabulan testified that Tarog,
their informant acting as a buyer, purchased the shabu from
appellant during a legitimate buy-bust operation.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Aplat
720 SCRA 260, G.R. No. 191727, 31 March 2014
FACTS: Manuel Aplat and Jackson Danglay were caught

through a buy-bust operation involving shabu worth
P1,500.00. They now assert that no such transaction
between them and the poseur-buyer ever took place.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the
selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller.

Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer went
through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted
by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the
former, the crime is considered consummated by the
delivery of the goods.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
BUY BUST OPERATIONS IN DRUG CASES

It is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.

In this regard, police authorities are given a wide
discretion in the selection of effective means to apprehend
drug dealers and the Court is hesitant to establish on a priori
basis what detailed acts they might credibly undertake in
their entrapment operations for there is no prescribed
method on how the operation is to be conducted.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
A buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction as long
as it is carried out with due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards, such as in this case.

to establish that a sale of one brick of marijuana for
P1,500.00 took place between PO3 Fines, as buyer, and
appellant as seller. The brick of marijuana was presented
before the trial court as Exhibit "O." PO3 Fines positively
identified appellant as the seller. It is, therefore, beyond
doubt that a buy-bust operation involving the illegal sale of
marijuana, a dangerous drug, actually took place.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Montevirgen
FACTS: Montevirgen was caught through a buy-bust

operation of the combined forces of the police and
MADAC involving shabu worth P200.00. She now asserts
that the prosecution failed to establish all elements of the
crime of illegal sale of shabu.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that all the elements for
the illegal sale of shabu were established. PO3 Ruiz, the
poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person
he caught in flagrante delicto selling a white crystalline
substance believed to be shabu in the entrapment operation
conducted by the police and MADAC operatives. Upon
receipt of the ₱200.00 buy-bust money, appellant handed to
PO3 Ruiz the sachet containing 0.04 gram of white
crystalline substance which later tested positive for shabu.
"The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummated the buy-bust transaction.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Collado
698 SCRA 628, G.R. No. 185719, 17 June 2013
FACTS: Appellants Marcelino Collado and Myra Collado were

charged with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and
maintenance of a den, dive, or resort in violation of Sections 5 and
6 of Article II, RA 9165. Marcelino was also charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of the
same law. This was a result of a buy-bust operation conducted
against the appellants at their house. Consequently, appellants
Cipriano, Latario, Ranada, together with co-accused Apelo,
Abache, Sumulong, and Madarang, were charged with possession
of drug paraphernalia in violation of Section 14, Article II of RA
9165.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Ranada
as he was caught having custody and control of a drug
paraphernalia intended for smoking and injecting illegal
drugs into one’s body. As regards Cipriano, Latario, Apelo,
Abache, Sumulong and Madarang, the CA found them
guilty not as principals but only as accessories.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION OF THE OFFENDERS NO

EFFECT ON LIABILITIES AND IMPOSABLE PENALTY
The illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and

other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs during parties, social
gatherings, or meetings under Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a
crime of malum prohibitum, that is, the act is made wrong or evil
because there is a law prohibiting it. Since violation of Section 14 of
R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of mala prohibita, the degree of
participation of the offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated
the prohibited act are penalized to the same extent. There is no
principal or accomplice or accessory to consider.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
In short, the degree of participation of the offenders does not
affect their liability, and the penalty on all of them are the same
whether they are principals or merely accomplices or accessories.

In addition, Section 98 of RA 9165 specifically provides that
“notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the
provisions of the RPC, as amended, shall not apply to the
provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders.
Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by
life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.” It is therefore clear that the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 19 on Accessories, cannot
be applied in determining the degree of participation and criminal
liability of Ranada’s co-accused.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court found that the CA erred in
convicting Cipriano, Latario, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong,
and Madarang as accessories. The SC ordered their
acquittal since nothing was confiscated in the person of all
the other accused except for Ranada.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Robelo
FACTS: Robelo and his companion, Umali, were caught

through a buy-bust operation involving shabu worth
P100.00. Robelo asserts that the absence of prior
surveillance before the buy-bust operation was commenced
is fatal to the prosecution against him of the crime of sale
of illegal drugs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
ABSENCE OF PRIOR SURVEILLANCE NOT FATAL
Prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary

during an entrapment. There is no textbook method of conducting
buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police
authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug
dealers.
The Supreme Court ruled that the buy-bust operation was

valid as there was no defect therein and because the constitutional
rights of the suspected drug dealer are not violated.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Eyam
FACTS: Security Guard Sahid was doing routinary

inspection of people entering the Guadalupe Commercial
Complex where he inspected and confiscated from the
appellant a plastic sachet found later to be shabu. Appellant
was charged and convicted of violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA No. 9165. Appellant appealed that the
prosecution failed to establish that the item allegedly
confiscated was indeed a prohibited drug.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The Supreme Court found no merit in this appeal
since All the elements were duly established by the
prosecution. Appellant was caught in possession of shabu,
a dangerous drug. He failed to show that he was authorized
to possess the same. Lastly, by his mere possession of the
drug, there is already a prima facie evidence of knowledge,
which he failed to rebut.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Ho Wai Pang v. People
FACTS: Ho Wai Pang and his companion arrived from a

flight from Hong Kong. Upon inspection of their luggage,
there were chocolate boxes containing white crystalline
substance contained in a white transparent plastic that were
found. The petitioner tried to show that he was not aware
of the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag
was provided by the travel agency.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
TRANSPORTING DANGEROUS DRUGS IS MALUM

PROHIBITUM

The act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum
prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a
special law. As such, the mere commission of the act is
what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing
the act so punished regardless of criminal intent.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court is convinced that the lower courts
committed no error in finding the petitioner guilty of
transporting shabu into the country. The SC did not
entervain the petitioner’s argument that he was not aware
of any shabu in his luggage.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Gonzaga
FACTS: Gonzaga was caught through a buy-bust

operation involving 200 grams of shabu for P170,000.00.
Gonzaga contests that the prosecution failed to establish all
the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs especially
since the money used during the buy-bust operation was no
presented in court.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
BUY-BUST MONEY NOT INDISPENSABLE

Neither law nor jurisprudence require the presentation of
any money used in the buy-bust operation. Much less is it
required that the money be marked. In fact, not even the
absence or non-presentation of the marked money would
weaken the evidence for the prosecution. The elements
necessary to show that the crime had indeed been committed
are proof that the illicit transaction took place coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
to prove all the essential elements of illegal sale of shabu.
Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses as the person who sold the shabu presented in
court. SPO2 Male, the poseur-buyer, testified that he
bought the shabu from appellant during a legitimate buy-
bust operation. Furthermore, the SC did not entertain the
argument that the non-presentation of the money used in
the buy-bust operation is fatal to the prosecution since no
law nor jurisprudence requires it.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Rebellion v. People
623 SCRA 343, G.R. No. 175700, 5 July 2010
FACTS: While patrolling, PO3 Sotomayor and PO3 Garcia

chanced upon petitioner and Yanson in the act of exchanging
something. The police officers confiscated a plastic sachet
which contained white crystalline substance which was later
on identified as shabu. Petitioner and Yanson were arrested
and were subsequently charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. RTC found petitioner guilty as charged
based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
ruled that the elements of the offense charged were duly
established.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of
Rebellion for his unlawful possession of 0.03 gram of
shabu since all the elements of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are obtaining and duly established by the
prosecution.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Berdadero
622 SCRA 196, G.R. No. 179710, 29 June 2010
FACTS: Berdadero was caught through a buy-bust

operation involving shabu worth P500.00. He now contests
that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
successfully proved the existence of all the essential
elements of the illegal sale of shabu. The appellant was
positively identified by police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation as the seller of the shabu presented in
the case. PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas testified that their
confidential informant acted as the buyer of the shabu from
the appellant. It was likewise established that the sale
actually occurred and that two sachets of shabu were sold
for the price of P500.00. The marked money used in the
buy-bust operation was duly adduced in evidence. The
shabu sold by the appellant was also positively and
categorically identified during trial.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Alberto
FACTS: Alberto was caught through a buy-bust operation

involving shabu worth P500.00. He now contests that the
prosecution failed to establish all the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that all the elements of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs have been sufficiently established.
Prosecution witness PO1 Inopia consistently testified that a buy-
bust operation took place. As the poseur-buyer, he positively
identified the appellant as the seller of a sealed sachet containing a
white crystalline substance for a sum of P500.00.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Noque
FACTS: Noque was apprehended in a buy-bust operation

where sachets of shabu were found and seized in his
possession. He was subsequently charged and convicted of
illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Appellant
raised in his appeal that the prosecution failed to prove that
the former violated Section 16, Article III of R.A. No.
6425.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
ANIMUS POSSIDENDI IN THE PROSECUTION OF

VIOLATIONS OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

Animus possidendi means the intention to possess. In
prosecuting violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, mere
possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. The onus probandi is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court found that the appellant failed to
prove or explain his alleged lack of knowledge. Since the
burden of evidence has now shifted to the appellant, it was
his duty, which he failed, to explain his innocence on the
regulated drug seized from his person.
PROSECUTION OF DRUGS
CASES
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Bombasi
FACTS: Bombasi was the drug seller whom the informant

met in a house during a buy-bust operation involving shabu
worth P200.00. When the police charged in, Bombasi has
disappeared and instead of him, the police arrested two
individuals who were inside the house from whom sachets
of shabu were recovered.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: For a successful prosecution of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs like shabu, the prosecution
is bound not only to establish the following elements:
Identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration of the sale; and
The delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor…but it is also equally essential that the prohibited
drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very
same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the
identity of said drug be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding
of guilt.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Havana
FACTS: Havana was arrested through a buy-bust operation
involving shabu worth P100.00. The accused persistently
argue that the prosecution failed to establish with moral
certainty the identity of the substance seized and the
preservation of its integrity specifically because the police
failed to make a physical inventory of the confiscated
drugs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
REQUIREMENTS OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE
Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable

requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-
bust operation; that in fact, even the absence of
coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust
operation.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
It must be established with unwavering exactitude that
the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against
the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first
place. The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in that in ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Chain of custody as “duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.”
What is of utmost importance “is the preservation of

the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused.”
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Diaz
FACTS: Diaz was arrested through a buy-bust operation

argues that the prosecution failed to establish with moral
preservation of its integrity.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
ACCUSED STILL MAY BE FOUND GUILTY AS

LONG CHAIN OF CUSTODY IS UNBROKEN
An accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure

to faithfully observe the requirements provided under
Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165, for as long as the chain of
custody remains unbroken. The chain of custody was
sufficiently proven in the present case.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Butial
FACTS: Butial was arrested through a buy-bust operation

argues that the prosecution failed to establish with moral
preservation of its integrity, specifically the failure of the
police officers to properly observe the procedure outlined
in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and that the same
constitutes a break in the chain of custody.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
FOUR LINKS IN CHAIN OF CUSTODY
There are links that must be established in the chain of custody

in a buy-bust situation, namely:

a. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;

b. The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer;

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
c. The turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and

d. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The
initial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of
the plastic sachets from appellant and their marking by the
apprehending officer.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference.

The marking of the evidence serves to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal
proceedings, obviating switching, ‘planting,’ or
contamination of evidence
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Opiana
FACTS: Opiana was arrested through a buy-bust operation

involving shabu worth P300.00. The accused questions his
conviction by the lower courts.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
PENALTIES IN DRUG CASES
The penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its

quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However, with the enactment of
R.A. No. 9346, only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed.

The penalty for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the
other hand, is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000 to P400,000, if
the quantity of the dangerous drug is less than five (5) grams.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Gandawali
FACTS: Gandawali and Pagalad were arrested through a

buy-bust operation involving shabu worth P500.00. The
accused persistently argue that the prosecution failed to
establish with moral certainty the identity of the substance
seized and the preservation of its integrity.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the

post-seizure procedure for the custody and disposition of seized
drugs. The law mandates that the officer taking initial custody of
the drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct
the physical inventory of the same and take a photograph thereof in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official, who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Equally settled is the rule that “the delivery of the illicit
drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the
marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.”

The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution has
sufficiently established all the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs as well as the unbroken chain of custody
in handling the prohibited drug itself from the buy-bust
operation up to its presentation in court.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Brita
FACTS: Brita was arrested through a buy-bust operation

argue that the prosecution failed to establish with moral
preservation of its integrity, specifically the absence of the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
Mere lapses in procedures need not invalidate a seizure if the

integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items can be shown
to have been preserved.
The Supreme Court found that the inconsistencies pointed

out by Brita was inconsequential and unfounded. Contrary to his
allegations, the SC found that the prosecution was able to
establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs have been preserved.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The facts show that appellant sold one sachet of shabu
to PO2 Tejero in the buy-bust operation. PO2 Tejero, after
the arrest of appellant, marked the sachet “MDB-1” before
turning it over to Police Inspector Eduardo Paningbatan
who prepared the necessary documents for the transmittal
of the sachet, particularly the letter-request for laboratory
examination. He then handed the request and the sachet to
PO1 Saez who, together with PO2 Tejero, delivered them
to the PNP Crime Laboratory where the sachet was
received by Police Inspector Gural who found the sachet
positive for shabu. The same sachet was identified in open
court by PO2 Tejero.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Bis
718 SCRA 250, G.R. No. 191360, 10 March 2014
FACTS: Bis was arrested through a buy-bust operation

involving shabu worth P1,000.00. The accused argues that
the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty the
identity of the substance seized and the preservation of its
integrity.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
On the matter of handling the confiscated illegal drugs after a

buy-bust operation, Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165
provides:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Accordingly, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 which implements the
afore-quoted provision reads: (a) The apprehending
officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Case law has it that noncompliance with the above-
quoted provision of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations is not fatal and will not render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court found that the totality of the
prosecution’s evidence shows that the integrity of the drugs
seized is intact. The identity of the drugs was proven and
the chain of its custody and possession has been duly
accounted for and not broken. This can be gleaned from the
testimonies of police officers Espejo and Arce who
narrated that from the moment the items were seized from
appellant up to the moment the items were presented in
court.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Salvador
FACTS: Salvador and Parcon were arrested through a buy-

bust operation involving shabu worth P200.00. The
accused persistently argue that the prosecution failed to
establish with moral certainty the identity of the substance
seized and the preservation of its integrity.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of

dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti” or the illicit drug in evidence. “The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens the moment the exchange of money and
drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place.”
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police
officers conducted the required physical inventory and
photographed the objects confiscated does not ipso facto
result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render
inadmissible in evidence the items seized. This is due to
the proviso added in the implementing rules stating that it
must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and
proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence have not been preserved.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved for they will be
used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are

properly preserved for as long as the chain of custody of
the same are duly established.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who had temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution established
clearly the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
shabu. There is no evidence that PO2 Soriano lost possession
and control of the seized shabu from the time it was
recovered from the appellant until its turnover to the police
station. Appellant’s contention that the marking of the seized
sachets of shabu should have been made in his presence
while at the scene of the crime instead of in the police station
fails to impress. It is clear from Sec. 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 that
in a buy-bust situation, the marking of the dangerous drug
may be done in the presence of the violator in the nearest
police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Araza
FACTS: Araza and his companions were caught sniffing

and possessing shabu when the police were confiscating a
video karera machine in the same house. The accused
persistently argue that the prosecution failed to establish
with moral certainty the identity of the substance seized
and the preservation of its integrity.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug
was clearly established to have not been broken and the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs
seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person
who came into possession of the drugs should take the
witness stand.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Aneslag
FACTS: Aneslag and his companions were arrested

through a buy-bust operation involving shabu. The accused
claim that the prosecution failed to establish with moral
preservation of its integrity.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD: Non-compliance with Section 21 does not
necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized
inadmissible. What is essential is that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Fernandez
692 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 188841, 6 March 2013
FACTS: The combined forces of the Bula Police and

Camarines Sur Provincial Intelligence Forces implemented
a search warrant at the residence of Fernandez where shabu
and marijuana were found and confiscated. The accused
challenges the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence
to the allegedly inconsistent and incredible testimonies of
the police officers involved in the operation.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE

PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY IN DRUG
CASES
When a case involves violation of the Dangerous Drugs

Act, “credence should be given to the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they
are police officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to
the contrary.”
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Fundales, Jr.
FACTS: Fundales Jr. was arrested through a buy-bust

operation involving shabu worth P500.00. He argues that
the prosecution’s failure to present the forensic chemist
during trial was fatal to the prosecution’s cause as there is
no one who will attest as to the authenticity of the
laboratory report.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
HELD:
PRESENTATION OF FORENSIC CHEMIST NOT

INDISPENSABLE
Non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drugs cases is an

insufficient cause for acquittal; It is the prosecution which has the
discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom
it wishes to present as witnesses; What is important is that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized drugs are properly preserved as it had
been so in this case.
Slight infractions or nominal deviations by the police from the

prescribed method of handling the corpus delicti should not exculpate an
otherwise guilty defendant.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
People v. Gonzaga
FACTS: Gonzaga was arrested through a buy-bust

operation involving shabu worth P1,000.00. He argues that
his conviction was unwarranted due to the non-presentation
of the informant who allegedly told the police that he was a
drug pusher.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
PRESENTATION OF INFORMANT NOT INDISPENSABLE
The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in a

prosecution for drug cases. The failure of the prosecution to present
the informant does not vitiate its cause as the latter’s testimony is
not indispensible to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing,
since his testimony would be merely corroborative of and
cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in
court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale
and delivery of the prohibited drug. Failure of the prosecution to
produce the informant in court is of no moment, especially when he
is not even the best witness to establish the fact that the buy-bust
operation has indeed been conducted.
13. COMPLEX
CRIMES
COMPLEX CRIME
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
TWO KINDS OF COMPLEX CRIMES

1. COMPOUND CRIME - When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies
2. COMPLEX CRIME PROPER - When an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other.
COMPLEX CRIME
COMPLEX CRIME PROPER
REQUISITES (Reyes, p. 659) :

1. That at least two offenses are committed;
2. That one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit
the other; and
3. That both or all the offenses must be punished under the same
statute.

 The phrase “necessary means” does not mean “indispensable
means”
 In complex crimes, when the offender executes various acts,
he must have a single purpose.
COMPLEX CRIME
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME
Special complex crimes are those which are treated as

single indivisible offenses, although comprising more than
one specific crime and with specific penalty.
Examples:
1. Robbery with Homicide (Art. 294 (1))
2. Robbery with Rape (Art. 294 (2))
3. Kidnapping with serious physical injuries [Art. 267 (3)]
4. Rape with Homicide (Art. 335)

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON COMPLEX
CRIME
People v. Valdez
G.R. No. 216007-09, 8 December 2015, J. Peralta
FACTS: Luzviminda S. Valdez, a former mayor of

Bacolod City was charged with 4 counts of violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and 4 counts of the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the RPC. State Auditors of the
Commission on Audit Region VI conducted a post-audit of
the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City
government.
CRIME
Based on the verification conducted in the
establishments that issued the official receipts, it was
alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to enable
Valdez to receive reimbursement from the government the
total amount of P279,150.00.
CRIME
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended “no bail”
for the charge of complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents.
While Valdez was still at-large, she filed a Motion to Set
Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of
Bail. Thereafter, a warrant of arrest was issued against
Valdez, causing her to subsequently file an Urgent
Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with
Additional Prayer to Recall/Lift Warrant of Arrest.
CRIME
Valdez was granted bail in the amount of
Php200,000.00 for each offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether an accused who is charged with the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds Php22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
CRIME
HELD: The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of
right to an accused who is charged with a complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00.
CRIME
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of
exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty" is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
After trial, should the commission of such crime be proven
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the
"imposable penalty" is reclusion perpetua in view of the
RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty of reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied
in its maximum.
CRIME
The falsification, which is the means used to commit
the crime of malversation, is in the nature of a generic
aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period. The phrases "shall be applied" and "shall impose,"
found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of the RPC, are
of similar import as the phrase "shall be imposed" found in
Article 48. Both Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to
be imposed after considering the aggravating or mitigating
circumstance/s. Finally, the "penalty actually imposed" is
still reclusion perpetua, considering that the ISL finds no
application as the penalty is indivisible.
CRIME
To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not
change the nature of the constituent offenses; it only requires
the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed
by law. When committed through falsification of official/public
documents, the RPC does not intend to classify malversation as
a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in Republic
Act No. 7659. If truly a non-bailable offense, the law should
have already considered it as a special complex crime like
robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide,
and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have
prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
CRIME
Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder
committed through malversation of public funds, but the
aggregate amount or total value of ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at least Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused
who is alleged to have committed malversation of public
funds thru falsification of official/public documents, which
is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled to bail as a
matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low
as P22,000.0l. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and
could not have been contemplated by the law.
COMPLEX CRIMES
Tanenggee v. People
699 SCRA 639, G.R. No. 179448, 26 June 2013
FACTS: By falsely representing that Tan requested him to

process purported loans on the latter’s behalf, Tanenggee
counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the
cashier’s checks which he used to withdraw money from
the bank and invested the same in Eurocan Future
Commodities.
COMPLEX CRIMES
HELD:
COMPLEX CRIMES
When the offender commits on a public, official, or commercial

document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171
of the RPC as a necessary means to commit another crime like
estafa, theft, or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime.

Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of a complex
crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a
necessary means for committing another.
COMPLEX CRIMES
The Supreme Court ruled that the falsification was a
necessary means to commit estafa and that falsification
was already consummated even before the falsified
documents were used to defraud the bank. Thus, the
conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Document by the
lower courts was proper.
COMPLEX CRIMES
Domingo v. People
FACTS: Gina Domingo is a dentist and a friend of

Remedios Perez who was entrusted by Perez to deposit
certain checks to the BPI Bank account of Perez. However,
it was discovered that Gina fraudulently withdrew money
from the bank account of Perez through the use of the
forged signatures of Perez.
COMPLEX CRIMES
HELD:
ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC,

OFFICIAL OR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT IS A
COMPLEX CRIME

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because,
before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated.
COMPLEX CRIMES
Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. The
damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of
the public, official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit estafa.
14. MALVERSATION
OF PUBLIC
PROPERTY
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.
Acts punishable:
1. Appropriating public funds or property;
2. Taking or misappropriating the same;
3. Consenting, through abandonment or negligence, and/or
permitting any other person to take such public funds or
property; and
4. Being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.
Elements common to all acts of malversation under
Article 217:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office;
3. Those funds or property were public funds or
property for which he was accountable; and
4. He appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take
them.
N.B. Private property may be involved in
malversation. This article applies to administrators or
depositories of funds or property attached, seized, or
deposited by public authority, even if such property
belongs to a private individual.
− Presumption from failure to have duly

forthcoming public funds or property upon
demand is prima facie evidence that the said
funds have been put to personal use. This may be
rebutted.
− Demand not necessary in malversation in spite of
the last paragraph in Art. 217 as the latter provides
only for a rule of procedural law, a rule of
evidence and no more.
− Damage to Government not necessary. Penalty is

based on the amount involved, not on the amount
of damage to the government.
Penalties for Malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Value of Property under Value of Property
Penalty
Prisión correccional in
its medium and does not exceed does not exceed
maximum periods Php200.00 Php40,000.00

Prisión mayor in its more than
more than Php200.00
minimum and Php40,000.00 but
but does not exceed
medium periods does not exceed
Php6,000.00.
Php1,200,000.00
Prision mayor in its
more than
maximum period to more than Php6,000.00
Php1,200,000.00 but
reclusion temporal but is less than
does not exceed
in its minimum Php12,000.00
Php2,400,000.00
period
Revised Penal Code:
Penalty
more than
Reclusion temporal in more than Php12,000.00
Php2,400,000.00 but
its medium and but is less than
does not exceed
maximum periods Php20,000.00
Php4,400,000.00
Reclusion temporal in
its maximum period exceeds Php20,000.00
to Reclusion perpetua
more than
Php4,400,000.00 but
does not exceed
its maximum period
Eight million
Php8,800,000.00.
exceeds
Reclusion perpetua
Php8,800,000.00
People v. Valdez

government.

matter of right.
exceeds P22,000.00.
in its maximum.
Lumauig v. People
729 SCRA 191, G.R. No. 166680, 7 July 2014
FACTS: Lumauig was the Municipal Mayor of Alfonso
Lista, Ifugao, and was the accountable public officer
responsible for the amount of P101,736.00 which he
received as cash advance for the payment of the insurance
of the 12 motorcycles purchased by the Municipality.
Lumauig failed to liquidate and account for the amount
upon investigation by the COA. Subsequently, as not to
prolong the issue, he paid the amount of P101,736.00 to the
municipal treasurer.
HELD:
SPECIAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN

MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY AND IN
FAILURE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT
In malversation of public funds, the payment,

indemnification, or reimbursement of the funds
misappropriated may be considered a mitigating
circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.
Although this case does not involve malversation of
public funds under Article 217 of the RPC but rather
failure to render an account under Article 218, the same
reasoning may be applied to the return or full restitution of
the funds that were previously unliquidated in considering
the same as a mitigating circumstance in favor of
petitioner.
15. ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation
of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by

reason or on occasion of the robbery (taking of personal
property belonging to another with intent to gain), the
crime of homicide is committed; or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
 The crime defined in this article is a special complex
crime. Thus, Art 48 no longer applies.
 “on the occasion” = “in the course of”
 “by reason of” = “because of”
 Robbery and homicide are separate offences, when the
homicide was not committed “on the occasion” or “by
reason of” the robbery.
 Where the original design comprehends robbery, and
homicide is perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of
the consummation of the former, the crime committed is
robbery with homicide.
 There is no such crime as robbery with murder. The
treachery which attended the commission of the crime
must be considered not qualifying but merely as a
generic aggravating circumstance.
 An intent to take personal property belonging to another
with intent to gain must precede the killing.
 The crime is robbery with homicide, even if the motive
of the offenders was that of robbery as well as
vengeance.
 Homicide may precede robbery or may occur after
robbery.
 It is immaterial that the death of a person supervened by
mere accident, provided that the homicide be produced
by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
 Killing a person to escape after the commission of
robbery is robbery with homicide.
 There is still robbery with homicide even if the
person killed is another robber or an innocent
bystander. Thus, the person killed need not be the
person robbed.
 An accessory to robbery with homicide must have knowledge
and complicity as to the homicide as well in order to be
charged with the same offence. Otherwise, if the accessory
had no knowledge of the homicide, he may only be charged
with robbery.
 It is immaterial that aside from the homicide, rape, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. The
felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide
is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery
are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide (People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3,
2013).
People v. Buenamer
802 SCRA 37, G.R. No. 206227, 31 August 2016
FACTS: Mandane and Landero committed a hold-up in a
passenger FX where Oallesma was a passenger. Oallesma
chased the accused but was punched which caused him to
slip and be hit by the jeepney’s rear tires, causing his death.
HELD:
ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
The elements of robbery with homicide are:

a. The taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons;
b. The property taken belongs to another;
c. The taking is with animo lucrandi; and
d. By reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed.
All the elements mentioned above are present in this
case. In point of fact, the prosecution succeeded in showing
that the primary aim or objective of the malefactors
Buenamer and Lambada was to rob the passengers of the
FX taxi. Prosecution witness David, a passenger of the FX
taxi in which the two robbers staged the heinous felony,
was herself a victim of the robbery that was staged by the
malefactors that afternoon of October 20, 2009 along
España Boulevard in Sampaloc, Manila. David positively
identified Buenamer as the very perpetrator of the crime
together with his co-accused Lambada.
David testified that she saw the faces of these two
malefactors when these two boarded the FX taxi at the
Pantranco terminal in Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that
Buenamer and Lambada, then armed with firearms, declared a
hold-up on board the moving vehicle, after which these; two
divested the passengers of their personal belongings, while
threatening the passengers that they would blow off their heads
("pasabugin ang ulo namin") should the passengers resist the
robbery. By taking the personal belongings and valuables of the
passengers, employing force, violence, and intimidation, end
motivated moreover by animus lucrandi or intent to gain or
profit, and thereafter hitting Ferrarie causing him to fall from the
passenger jeepney resulting to his death, there can be no
question that Buenamer did commit robbery with homicide.
Traffic enforcer Mendez saw Buenamer punched or
strike Ferrarie who, in consequence of such a blow, lost his
grip on the estribo (or the handle bar) of the moving
vehicle, and fell off that vehicle, and at once ran over by
the vehicles right rear tire, resulting in Ferrarie’s sustaining
lacerated wounds, and numerous abrasions in various parts
of his body that ultimately led to his death. In the face of
these actual, incontrovertible facts, there can be no doubt
that all the elements of robbery with homecide are present
in this case.
People v. Peralta
792 SCRA 80, G.R. No. 208524, 1 June 2016
FACTS: Peralta and Ambas were charged with the crime

of Robbery with Homicide for shooting Bocalbos in the
head during an armed robbery committed inside the latter’s
own passenger van.
HELD: [T]he prosecution established the identities] of two
(2) of the perpetrators through prosecution witness
Norberto Olitan. Olitan identified one Michael Ambas
(herein accused) as the person who was beside him inside
the van and took his belongings; and one Bernardino
Peralta (herein accused) as the person who took control of
the van from the driver, victim Joven Bocalbos and drove
it; and the person/driver of the van' whom he replaced in
driving the van at Shaw Boulevard.
The taking of Olitan's property was committed with
violence and intimidation. This taking happened after
Peralta and Ambas announced a hold-up in order to rob the
passengers of the van of their valuables. Olitan had no
choice but to hand over his cellphone, silver ring,
sunglasses, and cash money to Ambas who was pointing a
gun at him. And undoubtedly, homicide was also
committed when Bocalbos was shot in the head on the
occasion of that robbery.
From the above discussion, there is no doubt that the
crime of Robbery with. Homicide was indeed committed
by the accused. It can be conclusively drawn from the
actions of the accused that their main intention was to rob
the [van's] driver and his passengers, and that on the
occasion of the robbery, a homicide was committed.
People v. Torres
FACTS: Espino was driving in Divisoria when Ronnie

suddenly blocked his path causing Espino to alight from his
vehicle and approach Ronnie who tried to grab his belt-bag.
When Espino resisted, Ronnie’s brothers and an unidentified
companion suddenly appeared and joined Ronnie in stabbing
Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified
companion held him by the neck. When Espino was already
sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet, and
jewelries and immediately fled.
HELD: Robbery with homicide exists ‘when a homicide is
committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property belonging to
another;
(2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing
is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery’.
In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond

reasonable doubt that the primary intention of appellant and
his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and Macapar, the
eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, testified that at
around 10:00 p.m. of 21 September 2001, appellant’s brother
and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked Espino’s car at the corner of
C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street.
When Espino alighted from his vehicle, Ronnie
attempted to grab his beltbag. A struggle for possession of
the belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant
and the other co-accused joined the fray and stabbed
Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino
fell to the pavement from his stab wounds, appellant,
Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the victim’s wallet,
beltbag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together.
It is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and
his companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily
intended to kill Espino, they would have immediately
stabbed him to death. However, the fact that Ronnie
initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the belt-
bag clearly shows that the central aim was to commit
robbery against Espino. This intention was confirmed by
the accused’s taking of Espino’s belt-bag, wallet, wrist-
watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The
killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason
or on occasion of the robbery.
Crisostomo v. People
FACTS: Rodelio Pangilinan was working at a gasoline

station owned by Jose Buencamino when three armed men
on board a motorcycle arrived who fired a shot at the
cashier Janet Ramos, forcibly took the money in the cash
register, and fired a second shot that fatally hit Janet in the
right side of her head.
HELD: Robbery with homicide exists ‘when a homicide is
committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property belonging to
another;
(2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing
is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery.
In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof

beyond reasonable doubt that the genuine intention of the
petitioner and his companions was to rob the gasoline
station. Rodelio testified that at around 12:20 in the
afternoon of 12 February 2001, the petitioner and his
companions arrived on board a motorcycle at the gas station
located at Buliran, San Miguel, Bulacan.
While the petitioner stayed on the
motorcycle, his companions entered the cashiers
office. One of them pulled out a fan knife while the other
fired his gun at Janet. After divesting the amount
of P40,000.00, the man with the gun fired a fatal shot to the
head of Janet. The petitioners companions returned to and
boarded their motorcycle, and sped away together.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the overriding

intention of the petitioner and his cohorts was to rob the
gasoline station. The killing was merely incidental,
resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
People v. Baron
621 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 185209, 28 June 2010
the victim.
HELD: A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery.
In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof

beyond reasonable doubt that the real intention of the appellant
and his companions was to rob the victim. The appellant and his
companions boarded the tricycle of the victim pretending to be
passengers. Midway to their destination, one of the accused
declared a hold-up and at gun point, tied the hands of the victim
and brought him towards the sugarcane field where he was
stabbed to death.
The victim was divested of his wallet containing
P1,250.00, a wrist watch and ring. Emerging from the
sugarcane plantation, they boarded the tricycle of the
victim, detached the sidecar and dumped the same in a
canal beside the Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of
one of the accused. They proceeded to Barangay Oringao,
Kabankalan and hid the motorcycle in the house of
Villatimas aunt, Natividad.
16. BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG.
22
VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
Two (2) modes of violating B.P. Blg. 22 (Section 1)
First mode:
a. Person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or
on value;
b. Maker/Drawer knows at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
c. Check is subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
Second mode:
d. A person has sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
when he makes or draws and issues a check;
e. He fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover
the full amount of the check if presented within 90 days from the
date appearing;
f. The check is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Rule of evidence #1:
There is a prima facie evidence of knowledge of

insufficient funds when the check was presented
within ninety (90) days from the date appearing on
the check and was dishonored (Sec. 3).
Exceptions:
a. When the check was presented after 90 days
from date;
b. When the maker or drawer pays the holder of the
check the amount due or makes arrangements
for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Rule of evidence #2:
The prima facie evidence of making and issuance

of a check, due presentment and dishonor thereof
arises when the dishonored check, duly stamped
as “dishonored for __________” or “dishonored for
insufficient credit” by the drawee bank, is
presented as evidence (Sec. 4).
N.B.: Sections 3 and 4 in B.P. Blg. 22 prosecutions

relate to evidentiary rules and presumptions. These
do not relate to the elements per se of B.P. Blg. 22
violations.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Duque
A corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check

can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. The civil
liability of a corporate officer in a BP 22 case is extinguished with
the criminal liability."
The above rule is reiterated in the recent case of Navarra v.
People, et al., where the petitioner, the Chief Finance Officer of a
corporation, who was the signatory of the dishonored corporate
checks, was convicted of the offense of violation of BP 22 and
was ordered to pay the private complainant civil indemnity in an
amount equivalent to the value of the checks which bounced.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
It is clear that the civil liability of the corporate officer
for the issuance of a bouncing corporate check attaches
only if he is convicted. Conversely, therefore, it will follow
that once acquitted of the offense of violating BP 22, a
corporate officer is discharged from any civil liability
arising from the issuance of the worthless check in the
name of the corporation he represents. This is without
regard as to whether his acquittal was based on reasonable
doubt or that there was a pronouncement by the trial court
that the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
Chua v. People
762 SCRA 523, G.R. No. 196853, 13 July 2015
FACTS: Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of
varying amounts to See. However, the checks bounced
either because of insufficiency of funds or closed account.
HELD: The essential elements of violation of B.P. 22 are:
a. The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value;
b. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at
the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and
c. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
The hardest to prove is the 2nd element because it
involves a state of mind. Thus, Sec. 2 of BP 22 creates a
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which
arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
written notice of dishonor and that within five days from
receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or
to make arrangements for its payment.

The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of the
notice of dishonor because the fact of service provided for
in the law is to be reckoned from the receipt of such notice
of dishonor by the accused.
In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of
the second element. Chua asserts that the absence of the date
of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated 31
November 1993 prevented the legal presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. On the
other hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua’s
actual receipt of the subject demand letter is not affixed
thereon, it is presumed that he received the same on the date
of the demand letter (31 November 1993). Moreover, the
lower courts banked on the stipulation entered into by Chua’s
counsel as to the existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s
signature thereon. By reason of such stipulation, they all held
that Chua could no longer impugn the said demand letter.
Given Chua’s denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to
present proof of his actual receipt of the 30 November 1993
demand letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to
present it without, however, adducing any evidence as to the
date of Chua’s actual receipt thereof. It must be stressed that
‘[t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt of [the notice
of dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the law
is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the
accused. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the
quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of
notice which the Court finds wanting in this case.
17. PARRICIDE
PARRICIDE
Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants,
or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusión perpetua to death.
(Restored by Section 5, Republic Act No. 7659.)
PARRICIDE
Elements:
1. A person is killed;
2. The deceased is killed by the accused;
3. The deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate; or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse,
of the accused
PARRICIDE
 Relationship of the offender with the victim is an
essential element of this crime.
 GENERAL RULE: only relatives by blood and in

the direct line are considered in parricide.
EXCEPTION: spouse
 The father, mother or child may be legitimate or

illegitimate. However, the other ascendants or
descendants must be legitimate.
PARRICIDE
 The spouse must be legitimate.
 The best proof of marriage is the marriage

certificate.
 The best proof of filiation is the birth certificate of

the child or any other evidence accepted for
proving filiation.
 Relationship must be alleged in order that the

accused may be convicted of parricide.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN PARRICIDE
People v. Umapas
G.R. No. 215742, 22 March 2017, J. Peralta
In the instant case, the fact of Gemma's death is

incontestable. The fact that Gemma died on 5 December 5,
1998 was established by witnesses from both the
prosecution and defense. As additional proof of Gemma's
demise, the prosecution presented her Certificate of Death
which was admitted by the RTC. Also, the spousal
relationship between Gemma and the appellant is
undisputed. Appellant already admitted that Gemma was
his legitimate wife in the course of the trial of the case.
HELD: In the crime of parricide, only the following
elements need to be satisfactorily established:
a. the death of the deceased;
b. that he or she was killed by the accused; and
c. that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. All
these elements have been proven beyond doubt.
In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the
relationship between the offender and victim is their
marriage certificate. However, oral evidence may also be
considered in proving the relationship between the two as
long as such proof is not contested, as in this case. Thus,
having established the fact of death and the spousal
relationship between Gemma and the appellant, the
remaining element to be proved is whether the deceased is
killed by the accused.
PARRICIDE
People v. Zapata
730 SCRA 312, G.R. No. 197046, 21 July 2014
FACTS: George Zapata was having a drinking spree with

his brother and cousin when a gunshot was heard from the
bedroom of George and his wife Queeny where it appears
that George killed his wife Queeny using his .45 caliber
pistol. George brought Queeny’s bloodied body to the sala
and fled without seeking help for his wife.
PARRICIDE
HELD: Appellant’s claim that he accidentally pulled the
trigger while attempting to catch the same when it fell from
the cabinet is incredible. First, as correctly noted by the
CA, appellant was a former Corporal in the Philippine
Marines and is thus "assumed to know and undertake all
safety precautions in storing his firearm.“ In this case,
appellant apparently threw caution to the wind when he
placed the gun on top of a cabinet and not inside a locked
drawer or cabinet. Second, the gun was loaded. Third, the
gun is equipped with several safety measures. Interestingly,
all these safety measures were not in place at the time of
the shooting making appellant’s claim of accident highly
unbelievable.
PARRICIDE
Moreover, appellant’s actions immediately after the
shooting is contrary to his assertion that he did not intend
to harm his wife. Indeed, if the shooting was accidental,
appellant would have immediately sought help from his
relatives and neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital.
Instead, he just left her sitting on a chair soaked in her
blood. Appellant would not have become alarmed by the
arrival of the police authorities. Instead, he fled from the
crime scene leaving his neighbors to tend to his bleeding
wife.
PARRICIDE
People v. Sales
FACTS: Sales was whipping his son while his son was tied
to a coconut tree when his son slipped, lost consciousness,
and subsequently died. Sales argues that he had no
intention of killing his son as he only meant to discipline
him.
PARRICIDE
HELD: The imposition of parental discipline on children
of tender years must always be with the view of correcting
their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must
gxercise restraint and caution in administering the proper
punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their
parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is
incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from
being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended
punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.
PARRICIDE
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already
furious with them because they left the family dwelling
without permission and that was already preceded by three
other similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a
report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in
disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that
he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the
children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore
clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire
to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil
intent of venting his anger.
PARRICIDE
This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of
Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when
Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he
was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the
beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant
would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act.
His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for
Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to
save the child’s life. It bears stressing that a decent and
responsible parent would never subject a minor child to
sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.
18. FALSIFICATION
OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or
notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of
prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed One million
pesos (₱1,000,000) shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of
his of position shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated
in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an
act or proceeding statements other than those in
fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to
be a copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to,
or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the

issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any

ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses
enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with
respect to any record or document of such character that its
falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer, employee, or notary
public;
2. He takes advantage of his official position;
3. He falsifies a document by committing any of
the following acts:
a. Counterfeiting or imitating any
handwriting, signature or rubric;
b. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
c. Attributing to persons who have participated in
an act or proceeding statements other than those
in fact made by them;
d. Making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts;
e. Altering true dates;
f. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its meaning;
g. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in such
a copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original; or
h. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to
the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book; and
4. In case the offender is an ecclesiastical minister who
shall commit any of the offenses enumerated, with
respect to any record or document of such
character that its falsification may affect the civil
status of persons.
 Even if the offender is a public officer but the
falsification committed by him is upon a document
which does not pertain to his office, it was
committed without abuse of his office. Thus it will
not fall under Art 171 but Art 172.
 A private person who cooperates with a public

officer in the falsification of public documents is
guilty under Art 171 and incurs the same liability
and penalty as the public officer as there is
conspiracy.
FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use
of falsified documents. — The penalty of prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000) shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of

the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of
exchange or any other kind of commercial document;
and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party,
or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
3. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in

evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage
of another or who, with the intent to cause such
damage, shall use any of the false documents
embraced in the next preceding article, or in any of
the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be
punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
Acts punished
1. Falsification of public, official or commercial

document by a private individual;
2. Falsification of private document by any person;
and
3. Use of falsified document.
Elements under paragraph 1:
1. Offender is a private individual or public officer

or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position;
2. He committed any act of falsification under Art
171;
3. The falsification was committed in a public,
official, or commercial document or letter of
exchange.
Four kinds of documents:
a. Public document in the execution of which, a

person in authority or notary public has taken part;
b. Official document in the execution of which a
public official takes part;
c. Commercial document or any document
recognized by the Code of Commerce or any
commercial law; and
d. Private document in the execution of which only
private individuals take part.
 Private document may acquire the character of a
public document when it becomes part of an official
record and is certified by a public officer duly
authorized by law.
Elements under paragraph 2
a. Offender committed any of the acts of falsification
except Article 171(7), that is, issuing in an
authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such a copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original;
b. Falsification was committed in any private
document;
c. Falsification causes damage to a third party or at
least the falsification was committed with intent to
cause such damage.
 There is no complex crime of estafa through
falsification of a private document because the
immediate effect of falsification of a private
document is the same as that of estafa.
 The crime is falsification of a public document,

even if the falsification took place before the
private document becomes part of the public
records, if the document is intended by law to be
part of the public or official record.
Falsification of a Public Falsification of a Private

document document
Mere falsification is enough Prejudice/damage to 3rd
person or intent to cause it is
enough
Committed by any of the 8 Cannot be committed by the

means under Art 171 ways in par 7 & 8 of Art 171
Principal thing punished is

violation of public faith and
destruction of truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed
Elements under the last paragraph:

In introducing in a judicial proceeding -
1. Offender knew that the document was falsified by another person;
2. The false document is in Articles 171 or 172 (1 or 2); and
3. He introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.

In use in any other transaction -
4. Offender knew that a document was falsified by another person;
5. The false document is embraced in Articles 171 or 172 (1 or 2);
6. He used such document; and
7. The use caused damage to another or at least used with intent to
cause damage.
 Damage is not necessary in the crime of introducing in
judicial proceeding a false document.
 Use of falsified document in a proceeding which is not

judicial requires at least intent to cause damage.
 If the one who used the falsified document is the same

person who falsified it, the crime is only falsification and
the use of the same is not a separate crime.
 Use of false document is not necessarily included in the

crime of falsification.
People v. Go
732 SCRA 216, G.R. No. 191015, 6 August 2014
FACTS: BSP issued a resolution ordering the closure of
Orient Commercial Banking Corp. and placed the PDIC as
receiver. The PDIC, upon investigation, discovered that Go
converted OCBC funds to his own personal use and
benefit.
HELD:
ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC,

OFFICIAL, OR COMMERICAL DOCUMENTS
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial

document may be a means of committing estafa, because
before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being
an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial document.
In other words, the crime of falsification has already
existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the
damage is caused by the commission of Estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of
the public, official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is
found in possession of a forged document and who used or
uttered it is presumed to be the forger.
Certainly, the channeling of the subject payments via

false remittances to his savings account, his subsequent
withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained
flight at the height of the bank’s inquiry into the matter
more than sufficiently establish x x x involvement in the
falsification.
19. RAPE
RAPE
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How committed. — Rape is
committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a

woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
RAPE
2. By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis
into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. (As added by Republic Act No. 8353,
approved 30 September 1997.)
RAPE
When and How Rape is Committed

1. Offender is a man;
2. Offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
3. Such act is accomplished under any of the following
circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation;
b. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; or
d. When the woman is under 12 years of age or
demented.
RAPE
1. Offender commits an act of sexual assault;
2. The act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
a. By inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice,
or
b. By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person; and
3. The act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following
circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
or
d. When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.
RAPE
− Force employed against the victim of the rape need not
be of such character as could be resisted. It is enough
that the force used is sufficient to consummate the
purpose of copulating with the offended woman.
− When the offender in rape has an ascendancy or

influence over the girl, it is not necessary that she put
up a determined resistance.
− There is no crime of frustrated rape (see Orita case).
− Character of the offended woman is immaterial in rape.

RAPE
Art. 266-C. Effect of pardon
 Subsequent valid marriage between the offender

and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty imposed.
 In case it is the legal husband who is the offender,

the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action
or the penalty, provided that their marriage is not
void ab initio.
RAPE
266-D. Presumptions
Evidence which may be accepted in the prosecution

of rape:
− any physical overt act manifesting resistance

against the act of rape in any degree from the
offended party.
− where the offended party is so situated as to render
him/her incapable of giving consent.
J. DEL CASTILLO’S PONENCIA ON RAPE
People v. Gabriel
G.R. No. 213390, 15 March 2017
FACTS: "AAA" is a 17-year old first-year nursing student

who temporarily resides at the boarding house of appellant
in Dagupan City. "AAA" testified that she went to the
room of the co-boarder "BBB," regarding an accusation of
theft. But “AAA” was then raped by appellant. RTC and
CA convicted appellant of the crime of rape.
HELD: Gabriel is guilty of the crime of rape. SC finds no
reason to disturb the CA's findings and conclusion,
especially so because in the case at bench the CA and the
RTC have uniformly given short shrift to appellant's bare
denial. In the 1901 case of United States v. Ramos, the
Supreme Court had already declared that when a woman
testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect, that all
that is necessary to constitute the commission of this crime
has been committed. It is merely a question then, whether
or not this court accepts her statement. Jurisprudence has
clung with unrelenting grasp to this precept.
People v. Tionloc
G.R. No. 212193, 15 February 2017
FACTS: Juan Richard Tionloc was found guilty of the crime of

Rape “AAA” testified that she was having a drinking session
with Tionloc and Meneses in the house of Tionloc. After some
time, she felt dizzy so she took a nap and was roused from her
sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his
penis into her vagina. CA affirmed the ruling of RTC and held
that discrepancies between the affidavit and testimony of
“AAA” did not impair her credibility since the former is taken
ex parte and is often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or
absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.
HELD: Tionloc is aquitted.
The prosecution had to overcome the presumption of

innocence of Tionloc by presenting evidence that would
establish the elements of rape by sexual intercourse under
paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the
offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of
a woman; (3) such act was accomplished by using force,
threat or intimidation.
Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to
consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind.
On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if
the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the
accused, something would happen to her at that moment or
even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she
reports the incident. Intimidation includes the moral kind
as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or
pistol.
The fact that “AAA” was tipsy or drunk at that time
cannot be held against Tionloc. There is authority to the
effect that where consent is induced by the administration
of drugs or liquor, which incites her passion but does not
deprive her of her will power, the accused is not guilty of
rape.
The accused was acquitted because there was no resistance
from the alleged victim during the commission of the crime.
The Supreme Court said that the resistance should be made
before the rape is committed. Citing the case of People vs.
Amogis, the Court held that resistance must be manifested and
tenacious. A mere attempt to resist is not the resistance required
and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor and
chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should
have done it earlier or the moment appellant's evil design
became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict
a man of rape committed against a woman who, after giving
him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit
consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her,
changed her mind in the middle and charged him with rape.
People v. Caga
801 SCRA 231, G.R. No. 206878, 22 August 2016
FACTS: Caga was charged with the crime of rape. “AAA” and
her boyfriend Randy, went to Caga’s residence for a drinking
spree and “AAA” and Randy decided to spend the night at
Caga’s house since they were both very intoxicated. While still
intoxicated and asleep, “AAA” felt someone kiss her vagina.
At first, she thought it was her boyfriend Randy who did it.
When “AAA” slowly opened her eyes it was revealed that it
was Caga who had copulated with her while she was in a
drunken stupor. “AAA” then became hysterical and started
hitting and slapping Caga and accused him of violating her.
HELD: Caga is guilty of Rape.
Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed by having

carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: 1) By using force, threat, or intimidation; 2) When
the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; 3) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and 4) When the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. The Supreme Court
finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with “AAA” when she
was asleep and still under the influence of alcohol. The case thus
falls under the second paragraph of rape: when the offended party
is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious.
It is immaterial that the prosecution’s evidence failed to
establish the presence of physical force, threat, or
intimidation because the evidence showed that the accused
raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman –
a fact that was duly alleged in the Information and duly
established by the prosecution’s evidence during the trial.
Thus, physical force, threat, or intimidation is not
necessary, for the simple reason that an unconscious and
extremely intoxicated woman, cannot freely and
voluntarily give her consent to engaging in sexual
intercourse.
People v. Lagangga
777 SCRA 363, GR No. 207633, 9 December 2015
FACTS: Private complainant (AAA), and her three

children were sleeping inside the room of their house when
she was awakened by the presence of a man wearing black
clothes and a mask being the appellant Johnlie Lagangga.
AAA was boxed rendering her unconscious and later found
out that she was used that night. RTC finds the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
HELD: Lagangga is guilty of the crime charged. Appellant
admitted having sexual intercourse with "AAA" at the latter's
house although he claimed that the sexual intercourse was
consensual since they were lovers. The Court cannot subscribe
to appellant's "sweetheart" theory and exculpate him from the
charge. For one, such claim is self-serving since it was not
substantiated by the evidence on record. And even if "AAA" and
appellant were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate
rape. As has been consistently ruled, "a love affair does not
justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against
her will." Love is not a license for lust. More importantly, what
destroyed the veracity of appellant's "sweetheart" defense are
"AAA's" credible declaration that he is not her sweetheart and
her vehement denial that he courted her.
People v. Colentava
FACTS: Colentava was charged with qualified rape

against his daughter, “AAA.” Appellant pointed his .357
magnum pistol at her and took off her clothes then
positioned himself on top of "AAA" and inserted his penis
into her vagina. Once satiated, he threatened "AAA" not to
tell "BBB" or else he would kill her. Out of fear, "AAA"
kept to her herself what appellant did to her. RTC found the
accused guilty of three counts of qualified rape.
HELD: All the elements of qualified rape are present in
this case. The elements therefore of qualified rape are: a)
sexual congress; b) with a woman; c) done by force and
without consent; d) the victim is under 18 years of age at
the time of the rape; and e) the offender is a parent
(whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.
The decision of the lower courts was affirmed. According
to the Court, “settled is the rule that in incestuous rape, the
father’s moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter
substitutes for violence and intimidation.
People v. Delfin
FACTS: Francisco Delfin was charged with the crime of statutory

rape for raping “AAA”, an 11-year old girl. Delfin suddenly
grabbed “AAA’s” hand and dragged her to the second floor of a
commercial building facing the public market. When they were
already in a secluded portion, Delfin undressed “AAA,” spread
her thighs, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her pain
and horror. Delfin gave “AAA” P100.00 and told her not to tell
anyone about the incident or her family will be harmed. RTC of
Naval, Biliran finds the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of simple rape instead of statutory rape.
HELD: Delfin is guilty of simple rape. The elements of rape are
the following under par. 1(a) Article 266-A of the RPC are the
following: a) that the offender is a man; b) that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and c) that such act is
accomplished by using force or intimidation. “AAA’s” testimony
established that Delfin, a man, had carnal knowledge of her, a
young lass. She positively identified Delfin as the one who raped
her. Aside from being clear and straightforward, her recollection
of the material details of her harrowing experience at the hands
of the Delfin is consistent. There is sufficient basis, therefore, to
conclude that carnal knowledge in fact took place. Further,
Delfin, in committing the crime used force, threat, and
intimidation. Per “AAA’s” testimony, she was forced to approach
Delfin because he threatened to shoot her with his slingshot.
Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-A (1) (a) of the
RPC provides that the penalty for simple rape is reclusion
perpetua. There being no qualifying circumstances, the CA
is correct in imposing the said penalty. "It must be
emphasized, however, that [appellant] shall not be eligible
for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346
which states that 'persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall
not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
People v. Prodenciado
FACTS: Prodenciado was charged with two counts each of

Statutory Rape and Simple Rape committed against his
own daughter, "AAA." Prodenciado, however, makes much
of "AAA's" failure to pinpoint the dates when she was
raped. According to Prodenciado, this does not only render
"AAA's" credibility suspect, but likewise deprived him of
the full opportunity to defend himself thereby violating his
right to due process.
HELD: SC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of one count of STATUTORY RAPE and three
counts of QUALIFIED RAPE. It ruled that time and again,
the Court has repeatedly held that it is not incumbent upon
the victim to establish the date when she was raped for
purposes of convicting the perpetrator. This is because in
rape cases, the date of commission is not an essential
element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence.
People v. Sato
FACTS: Nine-year old "AAA" and her six-year old cousin

"BBB" were invited by Sato, who was their neighbor, to an
abandoned nipa hut. Sato told "AAA" and "BBB" to
undress then he started playing with the private parts of
"AAA." The RTC found appellant Raul Sato guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape committed
against “AAA.”
HELD: The decision of the lower courts was affirmed.
Statutory rape is provided under Art. 266-A(1)(d) of the
RPC. When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the
crime committed is termed statutory rape as it departs from
the usual modes of committing rape. What the law
punished is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years
of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of
her own on the account of her tender years.
People v. Lujeco
721 SCRA 37, G.R. No. 198059, 7 April 2014
FACTS: Lujeco was charged with the crime of rape

against “AAA,” a seven-year old minor. After her
playmates left, Lujeco suddenly grabbed "AAA" and
dragged her to the house of his granddaughter which was
located nearby. Inside the house, Lujeco forcibly undressed
"AAA," poked a knife at her, and then had carnal
knowledge of her. After satiating his lust, appellant told
"AAA" to go home. Appellant was found guilty of
statutory rape by the lower courts.
HELD: Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
properly convicted appellant of statutory rape defined
under Article 266-A26 of the Revised Penal Code. "The
elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is
below 12 years of age or is demented."
In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established
that appellant had carnal knowledge of "AAA." It was also
established beyond reasonable doubt that "AAA" was
below 12 years of age. The sentence of reclusion perpetua
imposed upon accused-appellant by the trial court,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, for the crime of statutory
rape is in accordance with Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended." However, appellant is not
eligible for parole.
People v. Santiago
720 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 196970, April 2, 2014
FACTS: Santiago was found guilty with two counts of

rape. He raped “AAA,” who was then an eleven-year old
girl by inserting his penis into her vagina against her will
and consent and effectively prejudicing her development as
a child.
HELD: Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly convicted appellant of simple rape, instead of
statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape are: (1) that
the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
the woman is below 12 years of age. In this case, although
the Informations alleged that "AAA" was 11 years of age
when the rape incidents transpired, she was actually 13
years of age when the rape incidents transpired on 25
December 2004 and 31 January 2005, as her Certificate of
Birth showed that she was born on March 10, 1991.
Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple, not statutory
rape for which he was properly imposed the sentence of
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. However, it must be mentioned that
appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 320
of Republic Act No. 9346.
People v. Obogne
719 SCRA 696, GR No. 199740, 24 March 2014
FACTS: Obogne was charged with the crime of rape

against “AAA,” a 12-year old mentally retarded person.
Obogne was found guilty. The trial court did not consider
"AAA's" mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance
considering that the Information failed to allege that
appellant knew of "AAA's" mental disability. Obogne
argues that the testimony of "AAA" deserves no credence
because she was incapable of intelligently making known
her perception to others by reason of her mental disability.
HELD: SC finds the appellant Jerry Obogne guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape. The Supreme
Court held that the mental disability could not be
considered as a qualifying circumstance because the
information failed to allege that appellant knew of such
mental condition at the time of the commission of the
crime. Thus, the trial court and the CA correctly found
appellant guilty of simple rape. This holds true even if it
was specifically alleged in the Information that appellant
knew of AAA’s “mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap,” but no proof was presented that
appellant indeed knew AAA’s alleged mental deficiency.
As held in People v. Limio, by itself, the fact that the
offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not
call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless
knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is
specifically alleged and adequately proved by the
prosecution. For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now
embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) expressly provides that the death penalty shall also
be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the
qualifying circumstance of '(10) when the offender knew of
the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime.'
People v. Crisostomo

FACTS: Crisostomo was held to be guilty of two counts of
rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape.
“AAA’s” father owned a vulcanizing shop and Crisostomo was
employed therein. "AAA" testified that her clothes were taken
off by the accused who also took his clothes off after which he
allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis and
proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge of the then six (6)
year old girl. RTC found the appellant Joel Crisostomo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual
assault and one count of statutory rape.
HELD: The case was dismissed. Rape by sexual assault
committed against a child below seven years old is
punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no other
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty shall be prision mayor as minimum, to
reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA thus correctly
imposed the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for
each count of sexual assault.
In any event, inconsistencies in a rape victim's testimony do
not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer
to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape. It was held in People v. Piosang that —
testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and
credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended
party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only
her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would
be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
People v. Manigo
G.R. No. 194612, G.R. No. 194612, 27 January 2014
FACTS: Manigo was held to be guilty of raping “AAA.”

He was a tricycle driver and “AAA” was a passenger.
Instead of taking her to her desired route, he detoured to a
banana plantation and took “AAA’s” underwear off and
forced his penis inside her vagina and made a pumping
motion.
HELD: The appeal is bereft of merit and SC finds the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. Under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed whenever the
crime of rape is committed through the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons. It was sufficiently
alleged in the Information and established during trial that
appellant used a knife, a deadly weapon, in the commission
of rape. Since no other circumstance, whether aggravating
or mitigating, attended the commission of the crime, the
lesser of the two indivisible penalties which is reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed pwrsuant to Article 63 of the
same Code.
Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed by the CA. "It must be
emphasized, however, that [appellant] shall not be eligible
for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346
which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced
by reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
People v. Guillen
FACTS: When "AAA" opened the door, Guillen, who was

her neighbor, entered the room and suddenly poked a
balisong on her neck. Guillen then turned off the lights,
removed his clothes, placed himself on top of "AAA," and
inserted his penis inside her private parts. RTC and CA find
appellant Jonas Guillen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape. Appellant insists that "AAA’s" healed
lacerations do not prove that he indeed raped "AAA."
HELD: SC dismissed the case. Hymenal laceration,
whether fresh or healed, is not an element of the crime of
rape. Even a medical examination is not necessary as it is
merely corroborative. As we mentioned before, the fact of
rape in this case was satisfactorily established by the
testimony of "AAA" alone.
People v. Gaduyon
FACTS: This is a case of a father defiling his 12-year old

daughter on three separate occasions. Doney Gaduyon was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by RTC and CA of
qualified rape, qualified object rape and sexual abuse
committed against his own daughter, a 12-year old minor.
The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that he
committed the crimes attributed to him.
HELD: SC found the appeal unmeritorious. Appellant is guilty of the
two kinds of rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC and of sexual abuse
under RA 7610.

Under RPC, Rape can now be committed either through sexual
intercourse or through sexual assault. In rape under paragraph 1 or
rape through sexual intercourse, carnal knowledge is the crucial
element which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This is also
referred to as “organ rape” or “penile rape” and must be attended by
any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of
paragraph 1. There must be evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the perpetrator’s penis touched the labia of the victim or
slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of the
above-quoted article is commonly known as rape by sexual
assault. The perpetrator, under any of the attendant
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind
of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital
or anal orifice of another person. It is also called
“instrument or object rape”, also “gender-free rape”, or the
narrower “homosexual rape.”
On the other hand, R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act", defines and
penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuse. “Sexual
abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in,
or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children.
Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of
any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.”
Our examination of the testimony of "AAA" reveals
that there was carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse
through force, threat and intimidation on August 22, 2002.
Appellant also committed rape by sexual assault when he
inserted his finger into the genitalia of "AAA" on October
9, 2002. He also subjected "AAA," a minor at 12 years of
age, to sexual abuse by means of lascivious conduct
through intimidation or influence, when he mashed her
breasts and stroked her arms on August 21, 2002. "AAA"
gave detailed accounts of these acts of perversion
People v. Cial
FACTS: "AAA", then thirteen (13) years old, calls Cial

"Papa." Cial called "AAA" and told her to go to the
bedroom inside their house and Cial took off "AAA's"
shorts and panty and spread her legs and he inserted his
penis into the little girl's vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain
but she did not try to struggle because Cial had a bolo on
his waist. “AAA”’s grandmother was in the same house
when she was being raped by Cial. RTC rendered a
decision finding the appellant guilty of qualified rape.
HELD: Cial is guilty of rape. It is settled jurisprudence
that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate. As held by the CA, "lust is no respecter of time
and place." Thus, the presence of "AAA's" grandmother
would not negate the commission of the rape; neither
would it prove appellant's innocence.
People v. De Jesus
FACTS: 11-year old "AAA" went to the Pasig public

market to buy a pair of slippers. However, "AAA" was not
able to buy her pair of slippers because appellant suddenly
grabbed her left arm and performed carnal knowledge
against her. RTC and CA find appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Defense insists that
appellant could not have raped "AAA" considering that
"AAA’s" hymenal lacerations were already old and healed.
HELD: De Jesus is guilty of the crime charged. The
absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyn’s hymen does not
prove that appellant did not rape her. A freshly broken
hymen is not an essential element of rape and healed
lacerations do not negate rape. In addition, a medical
examination and a medical certificate are merely
corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution
of a rape case. The credible disclosure of a minor that the
accused raped her is the most important proof of sexual
abuse.
People v. Suansing
FACTS: Suansing was found guilty of the crime of rape

against “AAA,” a mental retardate. “AAA” confided to
“FFF” that appellant pulled her inside a room, removed her
shoes and panty, told her to lie down on the floor, and
inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent.
HELD: Appeal lacks merit. Carnal knowledge of a woman
who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of
retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct
to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood.
For this reaons, sexual intercourse with one who is
intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of
giving consent to the carnal act already consummates rape,
without requiring proof that the accused used force and
intimidation in committing the act. Only the facts of sexual
congress between the accused and the victim and the
latter’s mental retardation need to be proved.
People v. Lomaque
697 SCRA 383, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013
FACTS: Lomaque was charged under separate Informations

for 13 counts of Rape by Sexual Intercourse allegedly
committed against his stepdaughter "AAA." To avert any
further incident, AAA decided to sleep more often in the house
of her aunt DDD. When her mother, BBB, inquired why she
often slept in her Aunt's house, AAA told her mother that
accused-appellant touched her private parts. RTC found the
accused-appellant guilty of seven counts of Rape by Sexual
Intercourse, one count of Rape by Sexual Assault, and one
count of Acts of Lasciviousness.
HELD: The Court does not agree with the position of
appellant that "AAA's" silence and failure to divulge her
alleged horrifying ordeal to immediate relatives despite the
claim that it happened for several times run counter to the
natural reaction of an outraged maiden despoiled of her
honor. "AAA's" momentary inaction will neither diminish
nor affect her credibility.
The filing of complaints of rape months, even years,

after their commission may or may not dent the credibility
of witness and of testimony, depending on the
circumstances attendant thereto.
It does not diminish the complainant's credibility or
undermine the charges of rape when the delay can be
attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of
bodily harm, specially by one who exercises moral
ascendancy over the victim. In People v. Domingo, we
ruled that the effect of fear and intimidation instilled in the
victim's mind cannot be measured against any given hard-
and-fast rule such that it is viewed in the context of the
victim's perception and judgment not only at the time of
the commission of the crime but also at the time
immediately thereafter. In any event, "the failure of the
victim to immediately report the rape is not necessarily an
indication of a fabricated charge."
People v. Soria
FACTS: Soria was charged with the crime of rape against

his daughter, “AAA.” After eating, "AAA" went to the
bedroom to rest then appellant went inside the room and
positioned himself on top of "AAA", took off her clothes
and inserted his penis into her vagina. This whole incident
was witnessed by "AAA's" brother, "BBB". RTC and CA
found the appellant guilty of rape.
HELD: In the instant case, it was clearly established that
appellant committed an act of sexual assault on "AAA" by
inserting an instrument or object into her genital. We find it
inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify
the particular instrument or object that was inserted into
her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA"
to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into
her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of
due process. It would be akin to requiring "AAA" to
establish something that is not even required by law.
Moreover, it might create problems later on in the
application of the law if the victim is blind or otherwise
unconscious. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily
established that appellant accomplished the act of sexual
assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over
"AAA" which substituted for violence and intimidation.
Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped "AAA" by
sexual assault.
People v. Ending
FACTS: Ending was indicted for raping his own daughter,

"AAA." AAA" recounted that after taking a bath at a well
near their house, she went inside her room to dress up.
Shortly thereafter, her father (appellant) entered the room,
embraced her and forcibly pulled the towel wrapped
around her naked body. Appellant then pushed her to the
floor, lowered his pants to his thigh, straddled her and
inserted his penis into her vagina.
HELD: Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 8353 or The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the concurrence of minority and
relationship qualifies the crime of rape. To warrant the
imposition of the death penalty however, both the minority
and the relationship must be alleged in the Information and
proved during the trial. In the instant case, both
circumstances were properly alleged in the Informations
and proved during trial. The Informations alleged that
"AAA" was 15 years old when the crimes were committed.
Her minority was established not only by her Certificate of
Live Birth but also by her testimony that she was born on
November 6, 1985.
People v. Dumadag
710 SCRA 535, G.R. No. 176740, 22 June 2011
FACTS: Carlo Dumadag was charged with the crime of

rape. Carlo approached “AAA” from behind and poked a
Batangas knife on her threatening to stab her if she shouts.
Pointing the knife at the left portion of her abdomen,
appellant ordered her to hold his penis against her vagina.
Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.
RTC ruled appellant to be guilty of rape. CA affirmed.
Appellant contends that they were lovers and that there was
no force or intimidation on the victim.
HELD: Appellant is guilty of rape. The gravamen of the
offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against
her will or without her consent. On the basis of the records,
the Court finds "AAA" candidly and categorically
recounted the manner appellant threatened her and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her
will. Also, a sweetheart defense, to be credible, should be
substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of
relationship [such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos and
the like.]
People v. Asetre
651 SCRA 441, G.R. No. 175834, 8 June 2011
FACTS: Asestre was charged with the rape of AAA. Asestre

was the common-law husband of DDD, who is the aunt of
AAA. According to AAA, she started living with DDD and
Asestre when she was still small. Asestre took off AAA’s
clothes then inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain in
her private parts and she struggled against the advances of
Asestre but to no avail. Asestre even threatened AAA that she
and DDD would be killed if she would report the incident.
RTC and CA found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of rape.
HELD: Asestre is acquitted of three counts of rape and
found guilty of one count of rape. The Informations
charged appellant with having raped "AAA" on the first
week, second week, and third week, of March 2001, and on
March 23, 2001. However, as argued by the defense, the
testimony of "AAA" with regard to the first three incidents
particularly on the dates when and the places where the
offenses were supposedly committed contains disturbing
discrepancies. The Court could not agree with the findings
of the trial court and the CA that the inconsistencies in the
testimony of "AAA" regarding the first three rape incidents
are inconsequential.
People v. Nachor
FACTS: Nachor was charged with the crime of rape

against “AAA,” his daughter. The lower courts convicted
the accused of the crime charged. Appellant claims that the
conduct of AAA after being raped, i.e., not reporting the
incident to anyone despite the absence of threats from him
and acting like nothing happened, was incredible and
contrary to human experience.
RULING: The appeal lacks merit. In incestuous rape, the
father's moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter
sufficiently substitutes for force and intimidation. He takes
advantage of his blood relationship, proximity, ascendancy,
and moral influence over his victim both to commit the
rape and to intimidate the victim into silence.
In determining the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape
cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while
the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that
in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense. Guided by these legal precepts, the Court finds the
testimony of "AAA," who was 14 years old when the two
incidents of rape occurred, credible and untainted by any hint
of falsehood or prevarication.
People v. Barcela
FACTS: The mother of "AAA", then pregnant, was

hospitalized. Barcela was left behind to take care of “AAA”
and the other two children. "AAA" was awakened due to a pain
in her vagina then noticed that she was naked with her hands
tied above her head. Barcela was on top of her, inserting his
penis into her vagina and making a push and pull movement.
"AAA" told her mother about Barcela’s beastly sexual
aggression. It was confirmed that “AAA” had hymenal
lacerations after a medical check-up. Appellant claims that
"AAA" failed to resist the alleged sexual aggression.
HELD: Barcela is guilty of qualifed rape. Even if it were
true that "AAA" did not seriously resist appellant's offense,
her failure cannot be considered to diminish the credibility
of her testimony. It must be stressed that the resistance of
the victim is not an element of the crime of rape, and the
law does not impose on the prosecution the burden of
establishing the same. As long as the force or intimidation
is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside
the point.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the four
well-established principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility;
(2) it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(3) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and,
(4) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Thus,
the primordial consideration in a determination concerning
the crime of rape is the credibility of the private
complainant's testimony.
In this case, the trial court gave complete credence to

"AAA's" testimony. She positively identified the appellant
as her sexual aggressor and never wavered in her
declaration on the details of the horrible experience she
suffered in the hands of her father.
People v. Pojo
FACTS: Pojo was charged with the crime of statutory rape.

"AAA" testified that appellant is the common-law husband of
her mother. Her mother sent her to bring food to the appellant
who was working at the camote plantation of a certain Tuason.
While thereat, appellant made her lie on the ground which he
covered with banana leaves. After ordering "AAA" to remove
her shorts and panty, he also removed his undergarments and
inserted his penis into the vagina of "AAA." Pojo contends that
the testimony of “AAA” is not credible because of her delay in
reporting the incident.
HELD: The appeal was denied. The Court considers a
lapse of 27 days reasonable for "AAA" to prepare and sign
her affidavit. In several cases where the delay consisted of
years and months, we still considered the same reasonable
and did not in any way diminish the credibility of the
complaining witness. Said "delay" was inconsequential and
did not touch on the elements of the crime.

FACTS: Villanueva was found guilty of three counts of
qualified rape. "AAA" narrated that when she was about 4
years old, her mother left her in the care of her father,
herein appellant. Since then, she had been living with her
father. "AAA" claimed that appellant sexually abused her.
After the presentation of "AAA's" testimony, the
prosecution rested its case.
HELD: Villanueva is guilty of three counts of simple rape.
In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim, provided the testimony is credible,
natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things." The Court found "AAA's"
testimony as credible and convincing. As such, appellant's
conviction could rest solely on it. The medical certificate
would only serve as corroborative evidence.
People v. Alfonso
628 SCRA 431, G.R. No. 182094, 18 August 2010
FACTS: Two informations of Rape by Sexual Assault and

Statutory Rape were filed against Alfonso for raping his
two minor daughters. Dr. Quilon explained that "AAA's"
hymen was intact but her labia majora bore reddish marks
which could possibly be caused by the insertion of a finger.
"BBB," on the other hand, had superficial lacerations in her
hymen which could possibly be caused by sexual contact
or insertion of a foreign object. RTC convicted the
appellant of the crimes charged.
HELD: Alfonso is guilty of crimes charged. Under Article
266-A (2) of the RPC, rape by sexual assault is committed
"by any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person." In the present
case, there is no doubt that appellant inserted his finger
into the genital of AAA. The claim of the appellant that
disease or scratching caused the reddening of AAAs genital
lacks factual basis.
Both the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant
guilty of statutory rape. Under Art. 266-A(1)(d) of the
RPC, statutory rape is committed by a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman who is under twelve (12)
years of age. In the instant case, the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had carnal
knowledge of BBB who was only 5 years of age at the
time.
People v. Asis
618 SCRA 436, G.R. No. 179935, 19 April 2010
FACTS: Two Informations were filed charging appellant

with two counts of rape committed against his own
daughter, "AAA". “AAA" tried to resist but she
subsequently succumbed to appellant's orders when the
latter threatened to kill her if she refused where the
appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.
RTC and CA found the appellant Rogelio Asis guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
HELD: RTC and CA decisions are affirmed. The Supreme
Court reiterated the guidelines set forth in People v. Pruna
in appreciating the age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance, viz.:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party
is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of
birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding
as to the age of the victim.
Diega v. Court of Appeals
615 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 173510, 15 March 2010
FACTS: Erpascual Diega was found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape with
homicide for having carnal knowledge and killing AAA, a
13-year old girl. The appellant argued that CA erred and
gravely abused its discretion in upholding the findings of
the RTC that circumstantial evidence are strong enough to
convict the accused and sentenced him to death.
HELD: SC found the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of rape with homicide and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In a
special complex crime of rape with homicide, the
following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had
carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a
woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such
carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation,
the appellant killed a woman.
Both rape and homicide must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Considering that there were no witnesses
to the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of
the prosecution's evidence must then be appreciated in light
of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even
in the absence of an eyewitness, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence are presented by the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed
the crime. Here, the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellant committed the complex crime of rape with
homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point
to the appellant as the culprit to the exclusion of all others.
People v. Villarino
614 SCRA 372, G.R. No. 185012, 5 March 2010
FACTS: An information was filed charging appellant

Villarino with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide for having carnal knowledge against AAA, a 10-
year old minor, and inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds that led to her death. Appellant pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape with
homicide while CA found the appellant guilty of homicide
only.
HELD: In the special complex crime of rape with
homicide, the following elements must concur:
1. the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman;
2. carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by
means of force, threat or intimidation; and
3. by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge
by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant
killed a woman.
When the victim is a minor, however, it is sufficient

that the evidence proves that the appellant had sexual
intercourse or sexual bodily connections with the victim.
In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping
and killing "AAA" to SPO4 Genoguin. He even offered to give
the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is thrown into the
sea. The appellant did not deny this accusation nor assail its
truthfulness.
At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still

be convicted of the complex crime of rape with homicide. The
prosecution established his complicity in the crime through
circumstantial evidence which were credible and sufficient, and
led to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed
the complex crime of rape with homicide. When considered
together, the circumstances point to the appellant as the culprit.
People v. Estrada
FACTS: Two similarly-worded Informations were filed

against appellant Edgardo Estrada charging him with two
counts of Rape. AAA was only 12-years old when defiled
by his uncle, herein appellant. RTC found appellant guilty
of qualified rape on two counts and sentenced him to suffer
the supreme penalty of death. It also ruled that the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were
both satisfactorily established by the prosecution.
HELD: Applying the guiding principles that
1. an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to
prove and even more difficult to disprove;
2. in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
utmost caution; and
3. the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its
own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense", the Supreme Court affirms
the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding herein
appellant guilty of two counts of simple rape.
People v. Albalate
FACTS: Albalate was charged with two counts of rape

committed against his niece "Maria". RTC and CA both
held that Albalate is guilty, but it was not established that
the victim is a minor.
HELD: The Informations alleged that "Maria" was a 12-year
old minor when she was ravished by her uncle, a relative by
consanguinity within the 3rd civil degree. The prosecution's
evidence as to the age of the victim constituted merely of the
victim's testimony. We find this bare testimony insufficient
proof of her age. As the Court held in People v. Manalili, "the
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender
must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and
proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself".
Thus, the prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish the
minority of the victim. But, SC finds the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People v. Madeo
FACTS: An information was filed charging Madeo with

the crime of Rape against “AAA”, whom he is fully aware
has mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap. “AAA” testified that her classmate invited her to
the house of her uncle, herein appellant. Appellant forcibly
pulled her inside the room and proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of her. RTC finds the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
HELD: Madeo is guilty of the crime charged. Anent
AAA's state of mind, The Court found that they cannot
subscribe to the findings that AAA's mental age is that of a
5 1/2 years old, or even a seven year-old. The prosecution
is burdened to prove conclusively and indubitably not only
that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA but also that
she was a mental retardate. The conviction of an accused of
rape based on the mental retardation of AAA must be
anchored on proof beyond reasonable doubt of her mental
retardation.
The Supreme Court explained that said knowledge, qualifies
rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance, which must
be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the
conviction of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266-B (10),
RPC, could not be sustained, although the offender may be held
liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take

precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he
must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time.
20. QUALIFIED
THEFT
QUALIFIED THEFT
Art. 310. Qualified Theft. – Theft is qualified if:
1. Committed by a domestic servant;

2. Committed with grave abuse of confidence;
3. The property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter, or
large cattle;
4. The property stolen consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation;
5. The property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery; or
6. If property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident, or civil disturbance.
QUALIFIED THEFT
 Penalties for qualified theft are now next HIGHER
BY 2 DEGREES.
 Theft by domestic servant is always qualified. it is
not necessary to prove grave abuse of confidence.
 The abuse of confidence must be grave.
 There must be allegation in the information and
proof of a relation, by reason of dependence,
guardianship or vigilance, between the accused and
the offended party, that has created a high degree
of confidence between them, which the accused
abused.
QUALIFIED THEFT
 New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016 (R.A. No. 10883)
 Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974 (P.D. No. 533)
 Heavier Penalties for Thefts by Employees and
Laborers (P.D. No. 133)
 Anti-Electricity Pilferage Act (R.A. No. 7832)
N.B.: Some LGUs have Anti-Cable Television
Theft Ordinances.
 Theft of Forestry Products (P.D. No. 330)
 Theft of Minerals/Ores (P.D. No. 581)
QUALIFIED THEFT
People v. Tanchanco
670 SCRA 130, G.R. No. 177761, 18 April 2012
FACTS: Rebecca hired Tanchanco to work in her office as

a legal secretary and liaison officer. Tanchanco suddenly
abandoned her job. Rebecca reviewed documents and she
discovered that Tanchanco betrayed her trust and
confidence on several occasions by stealing sums of money
entrusted to her as payment for expenses intended for the
transfer of the titles of properties from their previous
owners to Rebecca’s clients.
QUALIFIED THEFT
HELD: Tanchanco was convicted for Qualified Theft.
Under Article 310 of the RPC, theft becomes qualified

when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of
confidence.
The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the

relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or
vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party
that might create a high degree of confidence between
them which the appellant abused.
QUALIFIED THEFT
Villarin v. People
656 SCRA 500, G.R. No. 175289, 31 August 2011
FACTS: Villarin, the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan,

requisitioned 63 pieces flitches of Apitong specie wood
without the necessary documents. The alleged purpose of
such wood was for the supposed repair of the Batinay
bridge.
QUALIFIED THEFT
HELD: There are two distinct and separate offenses
punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:
a. Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber

or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authorization; and
b. Possession of timber or other forest products without
the legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.”
QUALIFIED THEFT
The second offense is consummated by the mere
possession of forest products without the proper
documents.
Violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is

malum prohibitum— criminal intent is not an essential
element but the prosecution must prove that the accused
had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the timber.
21. IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. – Criminal liability shall
be incurred:
… … …
2. By any person performing an act which would be
an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment
or an account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 Requisites:
1. That the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property.
 Felonies against persons: Parricide, Murder,

Homicide, Infanticide, Abortion, Duel, Physical
Injuries, Rape
 Felonies against property: Robbery, Brigandage,

Theft, Usurpation, Culpable Insolvency, Swindling
and other deceits, Chattel Mortgage, Arson and other
crimes involving destruction, Malicious Mischief
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 Requisites:
2. That the act was done with evil intent.

− The offender must have intent to do injury to
another.
3. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible,

or that the means employed is either inadequate or
ineffectual.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 “That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the
means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual.”
 a. the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of

accomplishment
− The act intended by the offender is by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment.
− There must either 1) LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY, or 2)
PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY
 Examples:
i. when one tries to kill another by putting in his drink a

substance which he believes to be arsenic when in fact
it is common salt;
ii. when one tries to murder a corpse.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility
would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire
and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2)
there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent
the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man
who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention
to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. (Intod v.
Court of Appeals, 21 October 1992)
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 “That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that
the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual.”
 b. the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual
 Example: when one tries to poison another but the quantity

of arsenic added in his substance was not sufficient to kill
a person.
 However: where the means employed is adequate and the

result expected is not produced, it is not an impossible
crime, but a frustrated felony.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
ATTEMPTED OR IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
FRUSTRATED
The evil intent of the offender is not accomplished
The evil intent of the offender is The evil intent of the offender
possible of accomplishment cannot be accomplished
The evil intent cannot be The evil intent of the offender

accomplished because of the cannot be accomplished
intervention of certain cause or because it is inherently
accident in which the offender impossible of accomplishment
had no part or because the means
employed by the offender is
inadequate or ineffectual
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Intod v. CA
G.R. No. 103119, 21 October 1992
Facts: Intod et al. went to Palangpangan’s house, all armed

with firearms. They went to the bedroom and began firing
their weapons. However, Palangpangan was in another city
and her home was occupied by her son-in-law and his family.
No one was in the room when the accused fired their
weapons. RTC convicted the accused of attempted murder.
Held: The accused is guilty of an impossible crime. The factual

situation in the case presents a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of performance.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 Why is an impossible crime punishable?
It is punishable in order to suppress criminal

tendencies. Objectively, the offender has not
committed a felony, but subjectively, he is a
criminal (Reyes, p. 85).
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime
because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible
 When the person intending to commit an offense has

already performed the acts for the execution of the same
but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of
the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment or because the means
employed by such person are essentially inadequate to
produce the result desired by him, the court, having in
mind the social danger and the degree of criminality
shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos
(Article 59).
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Jacinto v. People
592 SCRA 426 (2009)
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the

crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's
evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the
check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would
have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken
by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check
was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to
replace the value of said dishonored check.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner
took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it
not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The
circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed
replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for
the consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the
plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the
check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the
drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense,
petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely
corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
22. CONSPIRACY
CONSPIRACY
Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. —
Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are
punishable only in the cases in which the law
specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons

come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has

decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to
some other person or persons.
CONSPIRACY
First requisite – Participation in the criminal
resolution
 Two or more persons are said to have participated

in the criminal resolution when they were in
conspiracy at the time of the commission of the
crime.
 It is well settled that a person may be convicted for

the criminal act of another where, between them,
there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of the crime charged.
CONSPIRACY
 A conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.
 In order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by

reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he
performed an over act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
either by actively participating in the actual commission
of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy.
CONSPIRACY
 When there is no conspiracy, each of the offenders
is liable only for the act performed by him (i.e.
degree of participation under Articles 16 to 19, RPC)
 When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act

of all. There is collective criminal responsibility.
CONSPIRACY
Second requisite – that the culprits “carried out
their plan and personally took part in its
execution, by acts which directly tended to the
same end.”
 The principals by direct participation must be at

the scene of the crime, personally taking part in its
execution.
 The acts of each offender must directly tend to the

same end.
CONSPIRACY
People v. Alvarez
FACTS: The RTC and CA found Edgar Alvarez and Rodel

Caballero guilty of the crime of Murder for the fatal
shooting of Nicanor Agon. Appellants insist that the
evidence was insufficient to warrant their conviction. But
the SC was not convinced.
CONSPIRACY
HELD: The lower courts’ finding of conspiracy was sustained.
There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly
or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it.
Clearly, there was unity of action and purpose among the

members of "Black Shark," which include appellants in killing
Agon. Conspiracy having been established, evidence as to who
delivered the fatal blow is no longer indispensable. Hence, it is
immaterial if Caballero’s role was merely to signal the gunmen and
Alvarez’s, to act as back-up. Each of the offender is equally guilty
of the criminal act since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
CONSPIRACY
People v. Sumilhig
731 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 178115, 28 July 2014
FACTS: Jojo and Carding Sumilhig with Pasot Saloli were

charged with double murder and double frustrated murder.
Witnesses saw the accused as the assailants. Jojo and
Carding interposed the defense of an alibi.
CONSPIRACY
HELD: Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the
acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interests. However, in determining whether conspiracy
exists, it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and
simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself
demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and
purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the
assailants. What is determinative is proof of establishing
that the accused were animated by one and the same
purpose.
CONSPIRACY
There was conspiracy in this case. Here, there is no
proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there
is a series of events that clearly established conspiracy
among them. First, they were all armed with firearms.
Second, they surreptitiously approached the crime scene.
Third, when they were within close range of the intended
victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms.
Fourth, they ceased firing at the same time and fled
together. Undoubtedly, their acts before, during and
immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio evince
their unanimity in design, intent and execution.
CONSPIRACY
Castillo v. Prudential Life Plans
720 SCRA 129, G.R. No. 196142, 26 March 2014
FACTS: Petitioners were regular employees of Prudential

Life which was flooded with requests for reimbursement
for eyeglasses the employees supposedly purchased from a
single outfit/supplier, Alavera Optical. It began an
investigation into the matter and sent notices for
explanation relative to acts of dishonesty and fraud which
they may have committed in connivance with Alavera
Optical. Then the company issued individual Notices of
Termination to petitioners and other employees.
CONSPIRACY
HELD: Conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a
joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.
To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail
of the execution nor take part in every act and may not
even know the exact part to be performed by the others in
the execution of the conspiracy. But once conspiracy is
shown, as in this case, the act of one is the act of all.
CONSPIRACY
There was conspiracy in this case. It is elementary that
"when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all
the conspirators, and a conspirator may be held as a
principal even if he did not participate in the actual
commission of every act constituting the offense. In
conspiracy, all those who in one way or another helped and
cooperated in the consummation of the crime are
considered co-principals since the degree or character of
the individual participation of each conspirator in the
commission of the crime becomes immaterial."
CONSPIRACY
In proving complicity, direct evidence is not necessary,
as it can be clearly deduced from the acts of the
conspirators; it may be proved through a series of acts done
in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose. From the
evidence on record, it has been sufficiently shown that
petitioners actually took part in the commission of the acts
complained of, which makes them co-conspirators to the
scheme.
CONSPIRACY
People v. Alawig
FACTS: SPO1 Alawig and PO3 Ventinilla were initially

charged with homicide for the killing of PO3 Miel de
Ocampo Café (victim). A witness saw what happened who
was called by the victim to seek help. The RTC considered
the killing of the victim as attended by the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.
CONSPIRACY
HELD: There is conspiracy in this case. The record of the
case shows that the acts of the accused, before, during, and
after the killing of Cafe are indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Before
the victim was fetched by Alawig, Ventinilla, as witnessed
by Reyes, accused Alawig and Ventenilla made it appear in
the Dispatch Log Book that they were dispatched to an
unnamed place to conduct surveillance on a suspect
involved in drugs. The entries on the Dispatch Log Book
are nothing but falsehood and are part of the grand design
where each of the accused are made to appear doing acts
that are independent of each other in order to muddle the
events that actually transpired when Cafe was killed.
CONSPIRACY
People v. Agacer
662 SCRA 461, GR. No. 177751, 14 December 2011
FACTS: Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eric and Eddie, all

surnamed Agacer were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of Cesario
Agacer. Appellants contend that both lower courts erred in
finding that they conspired to kill Cesario as there was no
evidence sufficient to establish their intentional
participation
CONSPIRACY
HELD: There is conspiracy in this case. In conspiracy, it is
not necessary to adduce direct evidence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime. It may be shown through
circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to
a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest. Proof of a previous agreement and
decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact
that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same
objective suffices.
CONSPIRACY
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement
among appellants to commit the crime and while it was
established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of
all appellants before, during and after the incident establish the
existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt.
Having established conspiracy, the assertion that each of

them can only be made liable for his own acts deserves no merit.
Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the fatal
blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a
person may be convicted for the criminal act of another. In a
conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of
one is deemed the act of all.
CONSPIRACY
Ho Wai Pang v. People
FACTS: Ho Wai Pang and his co-accused were found to be

guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. They arrived from a
flight from Hong Kong. There were chocolate boxes
containing white crystalline substance contained in a white
transparent plastic that were found in their baggage. RTC
and CA found them all guilty of the crime charged.
CONSPIRACY
HELD: There is conspiracy in this case. Conspiracy is the
common design to commit a felony. Conspiracy which
determines criminal culpability need not entail a close
personal association or at least an acquaintance between or
among the participants to a crime. It need not be shown
that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.
CONSPIRACY
The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy
of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are
parts of some complete whole as we ruled in People v.
Mateo, Jr. Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his
co-accused’s collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that
there was a common design, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime
committed.
CONSPIRACY
Bug-atan v. People
FACTS: Manatad, Bug-ata, and Labandero were charged

of Murder. Manatad and Bug-atan met with Maramara
whom they instructed to go to Mandaue City and kill
Pastor Papauran. Maramara was arrested by the police
and implicated the other as co-conspirators.
CONSPIRACY
HELD: There is conspiracy in this case. As attested by
Maramara, accused-appellants asked him to kill Pastor
Papauran in exchange for money. They also accompanied
him on the day of the shooting to see to it that the job was
done. The concerted acts of accused-appellants reveal a
consciously adopted plan and clearly demonstrate their
joint design to exterminate Pastor Papauran. Conspiracy
having been established, the act of one is the act of all.
CONSPIRACY
Quidet v. People
618 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 170289, 8 April 2010

FACTS: Quidet (petitioner), Taban, and Tubo were
charged with Homicide for killing Jimmy Tagada. RTC
ruled that petitioner and Tubo guilty of homicide and all
three accused (petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty of
frustrated homicide.
CONSPIRACY
HELD: The existence of conspiracy was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner is criminally
liable only for his individual acts. First, there is no
evidence that petitioner, Taban or Tubo had any grudge or
enmity against Jimmy or Andrew. The prosecution
eyewitnesses (Andrew and Balani) as well as the three
accused were one in testifying that there was no
misunderstanding between the two groups prior to the
stabbing incident.
CONSPIRACY
Second, the stabbing incident appears to have arisen from a
purely accidental encounter between Taban’s and Andrew’s
groups with both having had a drinking session. Third,
unlike Taban and Tubo, petitioner was unarmed during the
incident, thus, negating his intent to kill the victims. Taken
together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the
test of moral certainty in order to establish that petitioner
conspired with Taban and Tubo to commit the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide.
CONSPIRACY
People v. Bustamante
616 SCRA 203, G.R. No. 172357, 19 March 2010
FACTS: Marcelo Bustamante and several others were

charged of the crime of Murder an Arbitrary Detention for
feloniously detaining and killing Romeleo A. Quintos. The
RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of the crimes
charged. The appellants raised the issues whether
conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt and
whether appellants should be held liable only for homicide,
and not for murder.
CONSPIRACY
HELD: SC finds the appeal unmeritorious. It is not
required for conspiracy to exist that there be an agreement
for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is
sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense,
the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. Direct proof of such agreement is not necessary.
It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused which point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.
23. DEATH/PHYSICAL
INJURIES UNDER
EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
DEATH/PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Art. 247 Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person,
shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of
destierro
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of

any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same
circumstances, to parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducers, while the daughters are living with their
parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the

prostitution of his wife or daughters, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this
article.
 Art. 247 does not define a crime but grants a

singular mitigating circumstance specifically for the
crimes of parricide, homicide or serious physical
injuries which may have been committed under the
exceptional situation therein.
 The sexual intercourse must be voluntary on the

part of the offending spouse who was therefore in
the act of adultery.
Requisites for application:
1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his
spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18 years of
age and living with him, in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person;
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts
upon any or both of them any serious physical injury,
in the act or immediately thereafter; and
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that he or she
has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
“Surprise” – to come upon suddenly and unexpectedly

24. PHYSICAL
INJURIES
PHYSICAL INJURIES
Art. 263. Serious Physical Injuries. -
• shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind
• Shall have lost the use of speech or power to hear or to smell, or
shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, or shall
have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become
incapacitated for work in which he was therefore habitually
engaged
• Shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part
of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been
ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he
was habitually engaged for a period of more than 90 days
• Shall have caused illness or incapacity for labor for more than
30 days
PHYSICAL INJURIES
Art. 264. Administering injurious substances or beverages.
Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. -

• Shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days of
more or shall require medical attendance for the same period
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.

• Shall incapacitate for labor from 1 to 9 days or shall require
medical attendance during the same period
• Does not prevent from engaging in his habitual work nor
require medical attendance
• Does not cause injury.
PHYSICAL INJURIES
Li v. People (2006)
Facts: Because of an altercation between Arugay and Li,

the latter armed himself with a baseball bat and used the
same to hit Arugay on the arm. Arugay armed with a bolo,
retaliated by hacking Li on the head causing the bat to fall
from his hand and leaving him unconscious or semi-
unconsious. At this point in time, Sangalang, who was also
present stabbed Arugay several times which resulted to the
latter’s death. The RTC found Li guilty on the tenuous
determination that a conspiracy between Li and Sangalang
existed.
PHYSICAL INJURIES
HELD: The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion
on the victim’s right arm that resulted from Li striking
Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victim’s
supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed
to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion
caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the
realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual
incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required
medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.
25. STAGES OF
COMMISSION
STAGES OF COMMISSION
Article 6, Revised Penal Code
 A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary
for its execution and accomplishment are present.
 it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
 There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
this own spontaneous desistance.
OVERT ACT – some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime,
more than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried to its complete termination following its natural
curse, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
(Reyes, p. 94).

INDETERMINATE OFFENSE – It is one where the
purpose of the offender in performing an act is not
certain. Its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous (Reyes, p. 97).
SUBJECTIVE PHASE
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting
the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime.

OBJECTIVE PHASE
− Period after the performance of all the acts which would
produce the crime

− the result of the acts of execution, that is, the
accomplishment of the crime.
− If the subjective and objective phases are present, there is
consummated felony. (U.S. v. Eduave, 2 February 1917)

ATTEMPTED FELONY
Elements:
1. The offender commences the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act is not stopped by his own
spontaneous desistance; and
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due
to cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
FRUSTRATED FELONY
Elements:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a

consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
In frustrated felony, the offender must perform all the acts of

execution. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because
he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.
FRUSTRATED FELONY v. ATTEMPTED FELONY

1. In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony as a
consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender
merely commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2. In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-

accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent
of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in
attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the
crime is a cause or accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance. (Cervantes v. People, 5 July 2010)
CONSUMMATED FELONY
Elements:
1. All the acts of execution are present; and
2. The result is achieved.

Every crime has its own elements which must all
be present to constitute a culpable violation of a
precept of law.
DETERMINING WHETHER THE FELONY IS ATTEMPTED,
FRUSTRATED OR CONSUMMATED
1. the nature of the offense

Example: In arson, it is not necessary that the property is totally
destroyed by fire. The crime of arson is therefore consummated
even if only a portion of the wall or any other part of the house is
burned.

2. the elements constituting the felony
Example: In theft, the mere removal of the personal property
belonging to another with intent to gain is sufficient to
consummate the offense.
In estafa, the offended party must actually be prejudiced or
damaged.

3. the manner of committing the crime
i. formal crimes – those which are consummated by a single

act (ex. Slander, adultery)
N.B. There can be no ATTEMPT in a formal crime.

ii. crimes consummated by mere attempt
ex. Attempt to flee to an enemy country, treason, crimes
enumerated under Section 26, R.A. No. 9165,
N.B. There is no ATTEMPTED crime because the overt
act in itself consummates the crime.

iii. feloniesby omission
There can be no attempted stage because the offender does not
execute acts. He omits to perform an act which the law requires
him to do.

iv. crimes committed by mere agreement
The offer made by one of the parties to the other constitutes
attempted felony, if the offer is rejected.
v. material crimes
There are three stages of consummation: attempted, frustrated and
consummated.
People v. Aca-ac (2001)
Rape is either attempted or consummated. There can be no

frustrated rape.
People v. Campuhan (2000)
Rape is consummated “by the slightest penetration of the

female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by
the penis”
Valenzuela v. People (2007)
There is no crime of frustrated theft. Theft is already “produced”

upon the “taking of personal property of another without the
latter’s consent.” There was no need for permanency in the taking
or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or
disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already
constituted apoderamiento
People v. Valledor (2002)
The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim
is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted
murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution
that would have brought about death
People v. Barra (2013)
Accused is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only

when he commenced the commission of robbery directly by
overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution which
would produce robbery by reason of some causes or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance
People v. Labiaga (2013)
If the evidence failed to convince the court that the wound

sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely
medical attention, accused should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder.
People v. Lamahang (1935)
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by

means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the
offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of
some personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there
is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may
reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the
decision, that the accused on the day in question was making an
opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may
only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to
enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his
final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to
cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense,
there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
Epifanio v. People (2007)
In homicide cases, the offender is said to have

performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the
death of the victim barring medical intervention or
attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another
but the latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted
homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if
the offender intends to kill the victim.
OTHER PONENCIAS
OF J. DEL CASTILLO
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
People v. Soria
G.R. No. 179031, 24 February 2014
FACTS: Soria was charged with the crime of rape against

his daughter, a minor. The RTC rendered its judgment
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, while the CA modified the penalty imposed
by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua.
LIABILITY
HELD: The Supreme Court reiterated its decision in
People v. Amistoso that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability,
as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
LIABILITY
People v. Agacer
662 SCRA 461, GR. No. 177751, 14 December 2011
FACTS: Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eric and Eddie, all

surnamed Agacer were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of Cesario
Agacer. Appellants contend that both lower courts erred in
finding that they conspired to kill Cesario as there was no
evidence sufficient to establish their intentional
parvicipation
LIABILITY
HELD: It is also settled that "upon the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."
J. DEL CASTILLO’S PONENCIA ON ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Lumauig v. People
G.R. No. 166680, 7 July 2014
FACTS: The Commission on Audit came across a disbursement

voucher which is originally for the purchase of buses and patrol
cars of the municipality of Alfonso Lita but was used to buy
motorcycles instead. Petitioner being the mayor of the town
claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the
amount advanced since the vehicles procured were already
turned over to the municipality. An Information was filed for
violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 against
petitioner for having allegedly utilized the cash advance for a
purpose other than for which it was obtained.
Sandiganbayan acquitted him of charges for violation
of Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 but convicted
him for the felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to
Render Accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal
Code.
HELD: SC upheld that the acquittal of petitioner in the

anti-graft case is not a bar to his conviction for failure to
render an account in the present case. Petitioner’s acquittal
in the anti-graft case provides no refuge for him in the
present case punishable as felony under RPC given the
differences between the elements of the two offenses.
Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 195011-19, 30 September 2013
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with nine counts of violation of

Section 3 (e), 7 and another nine counts of violation of Section 3
(g), 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Employees of PNB were charged by causing
undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to Integrated Shoes, Inc. (ISI), in which
petitioned was an officer, by accommodating and granting several
loans and advances to the latter, despite knowing that it lacked
sufficient capitalization, or failed to give adequate collateral or
raise its working capital to secure the government's interest in case
it failed to pay said loans, as in fact it failed to pay these loans.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that private persons,
such as petitioner in this case, may likewise be charged
with violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 if they
conspired with the public officer. Thus, if there is an
allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held
liable together with the public officer, in consonance with
the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act which is to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto.
Bustillo v. People
G.R. No. 160718, 12 May 2010
FACTS: Congressman Paredes used a portion of his

Countryside Development Fund (CDF) to purchase one
unit of Toyota Tamaraw FX and six units of Kawasaki
motorcycles. All vehicles were registered in the name of
the Municipality of Bunawan and were turned over to the
municipality through its mayor, herein petitioner Bustillo.
Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision 22 finding petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019.
HELD: The elements of the violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 are as follows:
a. that the accused are public officers or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
b. that said public officers commit the prohibited acts
during the performance of their official duties or in relation
to their public positions;
c. that they caused undue injury to any party, whether
the Government or a private party;
d. that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
e. that the public officers have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In this case, only the first element was proven. At the

time material to this case, all the petitioners are public
officers, namely, Bustillo as Municipal Mayor, Billedo as
Vice Mayor, and Sumilhig as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. All the other elements were not present.
The Supreme Court, in acquitting the accused, held that
petitioners have in their favor the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties which the records
failed to rebut. The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however,
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor
of its lawfulness.
J. DEL CASTILLO’S PONENCIA ON ACTS
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
People v. Lomaque
697 SCRA 383, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013
FACTS: Lomaque was charged under separate
informations for 13 counts of Rape by Sexual Intercourse
allegedly committed against his step-daughter. Lomaque
was also charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
HELD: The elements of Acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 are:
1. That the offender commits any acts of lasciviousness or
lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
Lascivious conduct is defined under Section 2(H) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610 as “a
crime committed through the kntentional touching, either
directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, knner thigh or buttocks with the kntention to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, among others.”
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
In this case, it is undisputed that appellant committed
lascivious conduct when he smelled "AAA’s" genital area
and inserted his finger inside her vagina to gratify or
arouse his sexual desire. At the time this happened on May
8, 1993, "AAA" was barely eight years old as established
through her birth certificate. Without a doubt, all the afore-
stated elements are obtaining in this case. We thus likewise
sustain the finding that appellant is guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness as defined and penalized under Article 336
of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610.
J. DEL CASTILLO’S PONENCIA ON LIBEL
Lagaya v. People
677 SCRA 478, G.R. No. 176251, 25 July 2012
FACTS: Dr. Marilyn Martinez had a misunderstanding with

one of the female resource speakers during the Mid-Year
Performance Evaluation Seminar conducted by McGimpers.
This led to the distribution of Memorandum No.6 Series of
2002 to be distributed which contained a statement that Dr.
Martinez needs to undergo psychological and psychiatric
treatment to prevent deterioration of her mental and
emotional stability as recommended by McGimpers which
was signed by McGimpers Director General Lagaya.
HELD: A libel is defined as “a public and malicious
imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a
natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.”
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites

must concur:
a. it must be defamatory;
b. it must be malicious;
c. it must be given publicity and
d. the victim must be identifiable.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should
be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as
they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood
in another sense.
In the present case, the subject memorandum dealt

more on the supposedly abnormal behavior of the private
respondent which to an ordinary reader automatically
means a judgment of mental deficiency.
Lopez v. People
FACTS: Lopez put up signboards on the fence of Cadiz

Hotel with the words CADIZ FOREVER, _______
NEVER and subsequently made the signboard appear as
stating: CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER. Mayor Salvador G. Escalante charged Lopez with
libel as he felt maligned and dishonored by the statement.
HELD: In determining whether a statement is defamatory,
the words used are to be construed in their entirety and
should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons
reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.
Tested under these established standards, we cannot
subscribe to the appellate courts finding that the phrase
CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER
tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character,
integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are
no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any
act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending,
directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does
the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language
or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on
private respondents integrity.
Obviously, the controversial word NEVER used by
petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the
word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents
integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he
was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with
nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government
service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider
it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private
respondents performance of official duty and not purposely
designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity
more so to deprive him of public confidence.
J. DEL CASTILLO’S PONENCIA ON CHILD
ABUSE
Pinlac v. People
FACTS: Nicanor Pinlac was charged for violation of Section

5(b), Article III of RA No. 7610 for forcibly performing oral
sex on a 14-year old boy who was persuaded to drink and
smoke marijuana while undergoing an initiation to join a
fraternity. RTC rendered its judgment finding the accused
guilty of the crime charged while CA affirmed with
modification on the sentence for the accused to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
ABUSE
HELD: It was held that: “Under Section 5, Article III of RA
7610, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on those who commit acts
of lasciviousness with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. Notwithstanding the fact that
RA 7610 is a special law, the petitioner in this case may enjoy
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree
is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period. Thus, the CA correctly imposed the
indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
ABUSE
People v. Gaduyon
FACTS: This is a case of a father defiling his 12-year old

daughter on three separate occasions. Doney Gaduyon was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by RTC and CA of
qualified rape, qualified object rape and sexual abuse
committed against his own daughter, a 12-year old minor.
The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that he
committed the crimes attributed to him.
ABUSE
HELD: SC found the appeal unmeritorious. Appellant is guilty of
the two kinds of rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC and of sexual
abuse under RA 7610. Under RA 7610, Sexual abuse includes the
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion
of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children. Lascivious conduct means
the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of
any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
ABUSE
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x x;
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape
or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
ABUSE
In paragraph (b), the following requisites must concur:
(1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and (3) the child, whether male or female is below eighteen
(18) years of age. This paragraph "punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to
other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit but also one in which a child,
through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
ABUSE
People v. Lomaque
697 SCRA 383, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013
FACTS: Guillermo Lomaque was charged for several counts

of rape by sexual intercourse committed against his own
stepdaughter, AAA, a 14-year old minor, as well as acts of
lasciviousness done against BBB, his 8-year old minor
stepdaughter. RTC found the 14-year old minor to be a
credible witness and rejected the defense of denial and alibi
proffered by the appellant. RTC and CA found the accused-
appellant guilty of seven counts of Rape by Sexual
Intercourse, one count of Rape by Sexual Assault, and one
count of Acts of Lasciviousness.
ABUSE
HELD: In this case, it is undisputed that appellant
committed lascivious conduct when he smelled “AAA’s”
genital area and inserted his finger inside her vagina to
gratify or arouse his sexual desire. At the time this
happened on May 8, 1993, “AAA” was barely eight years
old as established through her birth certificate. Without a
doubt, all the afore-stated elements are obtaining in this
case. We thus likewise sustain the finding that appellant is
guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness as defined and penalized
under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610.
OTHER UPDATES IN
CRIMINAL LAW
REPUBLIC ACT NO.
10951
An Act Adjusting the Amount or Value of Property and Damage on
which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal
Code.
Approved: 29 August 2017

Pertinent Amendments:
Light felonies as defined under Article 9 of the Revised

Penal Code (RPC) are: (a) infractions of law or the
commission of which the penalty of arresto menor; or (b)
fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) or both
is provided.
Schedule of penalties under Article 26 of the RPC was
revised as follows:
Penalty Under old RPC Under R.A. No.
10951

Afflictive If it exceeds If it exceeds
Php6,000.00 Php1,200,000.00

Correctional Php200.00 to Php40,000.00 to
Php6,000.00 Php1,200,000.00

Light Less than Php200.00 Less than
Php40,000.00
Penalties for Robbery under Articles 299 and 302 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Article Felony Under old RPC Under R.A. No. 10951

Any armed person who Any armed person who
shall commit robbery in shall commit robbery in an
an inhabited house or inhabited house or public
public building or edifice building or edifice devoted
Robbery in an devoted to religious to religious worship, shall
inhabited house or worship, shall be be punished by reclusion
299 public building or punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the
edifice devoted to temporal, if the value of property taken shall exceed
worship. the property taken shall Php50,000.00 x x x
exceed Php250.00 x x x
Revised Penal Code:

When the offenders do When the offenders do

Robbery in an not carry arms, and not carry arms, and the
inhabited house the value of the value of the property
or public property taken taken exceeds
299
building or exceeds Php250.00, Php50,000.00, the
edifice devoted the penalty next lower penalty next lower in
to worship. in degree shall be degree shall be imposed.
imposed.
Revised Penal Code:
Under R.A. No. 10951
Article Felony Under old RPC

The same rule shall be

Robbery in an The same rule shall be
applied when the
inhabited house applied when the
offenders are armed,
or public offenders are armed, but
299 but the value of the
building or the value of the property
property taken does
edifice devoted taken does not exceed
not exceed
to worship. Php50,000.00.
Php250.00.
Revised Penal Code:
When said offenders

When said offenders do
do not carry arms and
not carry arms and the
the value of the
Robbery in an value of the property
property taken does
inhabited house taken does not exceed
not exceed
or public Php50,000.00, they shall
299 Php250.00, they shall
building or suffer the penalty
suffer the penalty
edifice devoted prescribed in the two (2)
prescribed in the two
to worship. next preceding
next preceding
paragraphs, in its
paragraphs, in its
minimum period.
minimum period.
Revised Penal Code:

Any robbery committed Any robbery committed in
in an uninhabited place an uninhabited place or in a
or in a building other building other than those
than those mentioned in mentioned in the first
the first paragraph of paragraph of Article 299, if
Robbery in an Article 299, if the value the value of the property
uninhabited place of the property taken taken exceeds
302
or in a private exceeds 250 pesos, shall Php50,000.00 shall be
building. be punished by prision punished by prisión
correccional if any of the correccional in its medium
following circumstances and maximum periods x x x
is present x x x
Revised Penal Code:

When the value of the

property takes does When the value of the
Robbery in an
not exceed property taken does not
uninhabited
302 Php250.00, the exceed Php50,000.00,
place or in a
penalty next lower in the penalty next lower in
private building.
degree shall be degree shall be imposed.
imposed.
Penal Code:
Penalty Value of Property under Value of Property under
Old RPC R.A. No. 10951
Prision mayor in its More than Php12,000.00 More than
minimum and medium but does not exceed Php1,200,000.00 but does
periods Php22,000.00 not exceed
Php2,200,000.00

If the value of the thing If the value of the thing
stolen exceeds stolen exceeds
Php22,000.00 amount the Php2,200,000.00, the
penalty shall be the penalty shall be the
maximum period of maximum period of
prision mayor, and one prision mayor, and one (1)
year for each additional year for each additional
Php10,000.00, but the Php1,000,000.00, but the
total of the penalty which total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not may be imposed shall not
exceed 20 years. exceed 20 years
Penal Code:

Prision correccional in More than Php6,000.00 More than
its medium and but does not exceed Php600,000.00 but
maximum periods Php12,000.00. does not exceed
Php1,200,00.00
Prision correccional in More than Php200.00 More than
its minimum and but does not exceed Php20,000.00 but does
medium periods Php6,000.00. not exceed
Php600,000.00
Arresto mayor in its Over Php50.00 but over Php5,000.00 but
medium period to does not exceed does not exceed
prision correccional in Php200.00. Php20,000.00
its minimum period

Penal Code:
under Old RPC under R.A. No.
10951

Arresto mayor to its Over Php5.00 but Over Php500.00 but
full extent does not exceed does not exceed
Php50.00 Php5,000.00
minimum and Php5.00 Php500.00
medium periods

Penal Code:
Penalty Value of Property under Old RPC Value of Property under R.A. No.
10951
If the theft is committed under
the circumstances enumerated in
Arresto menor or
a fine not
exceeding 200
such value exceeds said amount,
pesos
the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.
Arresto menor or
a fine not
exceeding
such value exceeds said amount, the
Php20,000.00
provisions of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
Penal Code:
Value of Property under Old Value of Property under R.A.
Penalty
RPC No. 10951
stolen is not over Php5.00, and
Arresto menor in the offender shall have acted
its minimum under the impulse of hunger,
period or a fine poverty, or the difficulty of
not exceeding earning a livelihood for the
Php50.00 support of himself or his
family.

stolen is not over Php500.00,
Arresto menor in
and the offender shall have
its minimum
acted under the impulse of
period or a fine
hunger, poverty, or the
of not exceeding
difficulty of earning a
Php5,000.00
livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.
Revised Penal Code:
Penalty
Prisión correccional in
its medium and does not exceed does not exceed
maximum periods Php200.00 Php40,000.00

Prisión mayor in its more than
more than Php200.00
minimum and Php40,000.00 but
but does not exceed
medium periods does not exceed
Php6,000.00.
Php1,200,000.00
Prision mayor in its
more than
maximum period to more than Php6,000.00
Php1,200,000.00 but
reclusion temporal but is less than
does not exceed
in its minimum Php12,000.00
Php2,400,000.00
period
Revised Penal Code:
Penalty
more than
Reclusion temporal in more than Php12,000.00
Php2,400,000.00 but
its medium and but is less than
does not exceed
maximum periods Php20,000.00
Php4,400,000.00
its maximum period exceeds Php20,000.00
to Reclusion perpetua
more than
Php4,400,000.00 but
does not exceed
its maximum period
Eight million
Php8,800,000.00.
exceeds
Reclusion perpetua
Php8,800,000.00
Amount of the Fraud under Amount of the Fraud
Penalty
Prision correccional in
Over Php12,000.00 but over Php2,400,000.00
its maximum period to
prision mayor in its
Php22,000.00 Php4,400,000.00
minimum period
Php4,400,000.00, the
Php22,000.00, the penalty
penalty provided in this
provided in this
paragraph shall be
paragraph shall be
imposed in its
imposed in its maximum
maximum period,
period, adding one year
adding one year for
for each additional 10,000
each additional
pesos; but the total penalty
Php2,000,000.00; but the
which may be imposed
total penalty which may
shall not exceed 20 years.
be imposed shall not

exceed 20 years.
Amount of the Fraud Amount of the Fraud

Penalty
Prision correccional in Over Php6,000.00 but Over Php1,200,000.00
its minimum and does not exceed but does not exceed
medium periods Php12,000.00 Php2,400,000.00
Arresto mayor in its
Over Php200.00 but Over Php40,000.00
maximum period to
prision correccional in
Php6,000.00 Php1,200,000.00
its minimum period
maximum period Php200.00 Php40,000.00
No. 10951

reclusion perpetua exceeds Eight million eight
(₱8,800,000)
reclusion temporal in its maximum over Four million four hundred
does not exceed Eight million
eight hundred thousand pesos
(₱8,800,000)
reclusion temporal in its minimum over Two million four hundred
and medium periods thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but
does not exceed Four million four
(₱4,400,000)
No. 10951

prisión mayor in its maximum over One million two hundred
does not exceed Two million four
(₱2,400,000)
prisión mayor in its medium over Forty thousand pesos
period (₱40,000) but does not exceed One
million two hundred thousand
pesos (₱1,200,000)
prisión mayor in its minimum does not exceed Forty thousand
period pesos (₱40,000)
The penalties and/or fines for the following crimes have been amended by
R.A. No. 10951:

1. Treason (Art. 114);
2. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason (Art. 115);
3. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained (Art. 129);
4. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion or insurrection (Art.
136);
5. Sedition (Art. 140);
6. Conspiracy to commit sedition (Art. 141);
7. Inciting to sedition (Art. 142)
8. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies (Art. 143);
9. Disturbance of proceedings (Art. 144);
10. Illegal associations (Art. 147);

11. Direct assaults (Art. 148);
12. Indirect assaults (Art. 149);
13. Disobedience to summons issued by Congress, its committees or
subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees,
subcommittees or divisions (Art. 150);
14. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such
person (Art. 151);
15. Tumults and other disturbances of public order; tumultuous disturbance or
interruption liable to cause disturbance (Art. 153);
16. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful detainer (Art 154);
17. Alarms and scandals (Art. 155);
18. Making and importing and uttering false coins (Art. 163);
19. Mutilation of coins; importation and utterance of mutilated coins (art. 164);
20. Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer;
importing and uttering such false or forged notes and documents (Art. 166);
21. Counterfeiting, importing and uttering instruments not payable to bearer
(Art. 167);
22. Falsification of legislative documents (Art. 170);
23. Falsification by public officer or employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister (Art.171);
24. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents (Art.
172);
25. False medical certificates, false certificates of merits or service, etc. (Art.
174);
26. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for
falsification (Art. 176);
27. Using fictitious name and concealing true name (Art. 178);
28. False testimony against a defendant (Art. 180);
29. False testimony favorable to the defendant (Art. 181);
30. False testimony in civil cases (Art. 182);
31. Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or
merchandise made of gold, silver, or other precious metals or their
alloys (Art. 187);
32. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows (Art. 201);
33. Prostitutes (Art. 202);
34. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor (Art. 209);
35. Frauds against the public treasury (Art. 213);
36. Prohibited transactions (Art. 215);
37. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (Art. 216);
38. Malversation of public funds or property (Art. 217);
39. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts (Art. 218);
40. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before
leaving the country (Art. 219);
41. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property (Art. 221);
42. Removal, concealment, or destruction of documents (Art. 226);
43. Officer breaking seal (Art. 227);
44. Opening of closed documents (Art. 228);
45. Revelation of secrets by an officer (Art. 229);
46. Public officer revealing secrets of private individuals (Art.
230);
47. Open disobedience (Art. 231);
48. Refusal of assistance (Art. 233);
49. Refusal to discharge elective office (Art. 234);
50. Maltreatment of prisoners (Art. 235);
51. Anticipation of duties of a public office (Art. 236);
52. Prolonging performance of duties and powers (Art. 237);
53. Usurpation of legislative powers (Art. 239);
54. Disobeying request for disqualification (Art. 242);
55. Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial
authority (Art. 243);
56. Unlawful appointments (Art. 244);
57. Abortion practiced by a physician (Art. 259);
58. Less serious physical injuries (Art. 265);
59. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment (Art. 266);
60. Slight illegal detention (Art. 268);
61. Unlawful arrest (Art. 269);
62. Inducing a minor to abandon his home (Art. 271);
63. Abandoning a minor (Art. 276);
64. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his
custody: indifference of parents (Art. 277);
65. Exploitation of minors (Art. 278);
66. Qualified trespass to dwelling (Art. 280);
67. Other forms of trespass (Art. 281);
68. Grave threats (Art. 282);
69. Other light threats (Art. 285);
70. Grave coercions (Art. 286);
71. Light coercions (Art. 287);
72. Other similar coercions (Art. 288);
73. Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital
or labor through violence or threats (Art. 289);
74. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence (Art. 290);
75. Revealing secrets with abuse of office (Art. 291);
76. Revelation of industrial secrets (Art. 292);
77. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted
to worship (Art. 299);
78. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building (Art. 302);
79. Theft (Art. 309);
80. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum
(Art. 311);
81. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property (Art. 312);
82. Altering boundaries or landmarks (Art. 313);
83. Swindling (Art. 315);
84. Other deceits (Art. 318);
85. Special cases of malicious mischief (Art. 328);
86. Other mischiefs (Art. 329);
87. Destroying or damaging statues (Art. 331);
88. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and
concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child (Art. 347);
89. Libel by means of writing or similar means (Art. 355);
90. Threatening to public and offer to prevent such publication for a
compensation (Art. 356);
91. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course
of official proceedings (Art. 357);
92. Slander (Art. 358);
93. Slander by deed (Art. 359);
94. Intriguing against honor (Art. 364); and
95. Imprudence and negligence (Art. 365).
Subsidiary Penalty
Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no

property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be
subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one
day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum
wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the
rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court,
subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision
correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under
confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and
in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no
fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the
prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine,
the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if
the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less
grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light
felony.
3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision

correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed
by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of
fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time
established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer
the same deprivations as those of which the principal
penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict
may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not
relieve him from the fine in case his financial
circumstances should improve. (As amended by R.A. No.
5465, which lapsed into law on April 21, 1969; As
amended by R.A. No. 10159, approved April 12, 2012)
REPUBLIC ACT NO.
10707
An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise
known as the “Probation Law of 1976,” as amended.
Approved: 26 November 2015

"Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant,
after conviction and sentence, is released subject to
conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a
probation officer.
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant for a probationable penalty and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a
judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is
appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through
the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be
allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision
before such decision becomes final.
The application for probation based on the modified
decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment
of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was
rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since
been re-raffled. In a case involving several defendants
where some have taken further appeal, the other defendants
may apply for probation by submitting a written
application and attaching thereto a certified true copy of
the judgment of conviction.
The trial court shall, upon receipt of the application
filed, suspend the execution of the sentence imposed in the
judgment.
This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit
of probation should he seek a review of the modified
decision which already imposes a probationable penalty.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. The filing
of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal
An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable.
Disqualified Offenders (Sec. 9)

The benefits of this law shall not extend to those:

(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six years;
(b) convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and
one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred (200) Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this law became applicable.
Arnel Colinares v. People
G.R. No. 182748, 13 December 2011

The accused was convicted by the RTC for Frustrated Homicide
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years. On appeal, the
Supreme Court found him guilty of Attempted Homicide which offense is
punishable by less than six (6) years imprisonment. The accused then applied
for probation. The Supreme Court held that the accused should be granted
probation although he appealed from the judgment of conviction. The
ruling in Francisco does not apply because Arnel Colinares has no right
to choose whether or not to appeal or apply for probation since the stiff
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. It was
only after he appealed the judgment of conviction that he was granted the right
to apply for probation. The ruling in Francisco remains that those who will
appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Period of Probation (Sec. 14)

(a) The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not more than one year shall not
exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period shall not
exceed six years.
(b) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender
is made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
the period of probation shall not be less than nor to be more
than twice the total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment
as computed at the rate established in the RPC.
Arrest of Probationer (Sec. 15)

At any time during probation, the court may issue a warrant
for the arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the
conditions of probation.
The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall
immediately be brought before the court for a hearing, which
may be informal and summary, of the violation charged.
The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such
hearing. In such a case, the provisions regarding release on bail
of persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to
probationers arrested.
If the violation is established, the court may revoke or
continue his probation and modify the conditions thereof.
If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the
sentence originally imposed.
An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying
the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.
Termination of Probation (Sec. 16)
After the period of probation and upon consideration of
the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the
court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon
finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspend as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be
furnished with a copy of such order.
REPUBLIC ACT NO.
10592
An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of the
Revised Penal Code
Approved: 29 May 2013

Preventive Imprisonment
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term

of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the
effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in
the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or
more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they
have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do
so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time
during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive
imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released
immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review.
Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of
immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual
period of detention with good conduct time
allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court
may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual
delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous
crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case
the maximum penalty to which the accused may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30)
days of preventive imprisonment.
Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability
Art. 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. —

Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may
earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or
serving his sentence (as amended by R.A. No. 10592).
1. Conditional Pardon
It is considered a contract between the sovereign power

and the convict that the former will release the latter upon
compliance with the condition (Reyes, p. 868).
In case of violation of the conditions:
1. Offender will be rearrested and reincarcerated

2. There shall be prosecution under Art. 159 of the Revised
Penal Code for evasion of service of sentence (Art. 95).
2. Commutation of Sentence
Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. — The

commutation of the original sentence for another of a
different length and nature shall have the legal effect of
substituting the latter in the place of the former.
Ways of Commuting a Sentence:

1. Reduction of degree of penalty
2. Decrease in the length of imprisonment
3. Reduction of the amount of fine

3. Good Conduct Allowance
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good conduct

of any offender qualified for credit for preventive
imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any
convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or
detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to
the following deductions from the period of his sentence:

1. During the first two (2) years of imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of twenty (20) days for each
month of good behavior during detention;

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-
three (23) days for each month of good behavior during
detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year,
inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of twenty-five (25) days for each month of good
behavior during detention;

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty
(30) days for each month of good behavior during
detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he
shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in
addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of
study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.

An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of
entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct. (As
amended by R.A. No. 10591)
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A
deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be
granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive
imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives
himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of
the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.
A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence
shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the
place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a
calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this
Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether

undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.
CASE UPDATES
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
People v. Valdez

government.
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ

matter of right.
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
exceeds P22,000.00.
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
in its maximum.
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Hernan v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017, J. Peralta

FACTS: The accused was convicted by the RTC of
Malversation of Public Funds. This was affirmed by the
Sandiganbayan. She filed a motion to reopen the case,
however, this was denied by the Sandiganbayan practically
being a second and third motion for reconsideration from
its decision. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court
grounded on the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
HELD: We have here a novel situation wherein the
judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has
already become final and executory and yet the penalty
imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage
of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's
sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the
retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being
favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation,
as long as she does not possess any ground for
disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation,
or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential
Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the “Probation Law
of 1976,” as amended, allowing an
accused to apply for probation in the event that she is
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or
reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the
imposition of a probationable penalty.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that

petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of
suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen
the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated
June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan.
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public
attorneys, private counsels, and such other officers of the
law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of
RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and
equity, called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said
recent legislation shall find application in cases where the
imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft,
qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things,
malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes,
the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the
object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in
the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of
existing circumstances attending its commission.
For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent
legislation shall find application regardless of whether its
effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of
conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has
already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances,
shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting
him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has
already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service
already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In
the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice
and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an
action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case
rather than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as
the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing
penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the
Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final
and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to
correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable
penalties to be imposed.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
Quimvel v. People
G.R. No. 214497, 18 April 2017, J. Velasco
FACTS: At 8 o’clock in the evening of 18 July 2007,

AAA, a seven (7) year-old girl, requested accused Eduardo
Quimvel (“Quimvel”) to stay with her and her siblings
when YYY, her father went out of the house to buy
kerosene. AAA and her siblings then went to sleep.
However, she was awakened when she felt Quimvel’s right
leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel
inserting his right hand insider her panty. In a trice, she felt
Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his hand.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
Later in the evening, BBB, AAA’s sister, told their
mother that Quimvel touched her Ate. When asked, AAA
recounted that Quimvel laid down beside her and touched
her vagina.

Based on these acts, an Information for Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
otherwise known as “Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act” was filed
against Quimvel. After trial, the court convicted accused of
Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610. Said ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
Issue: Whether or not the accused may be held convicted
of the crime lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 in view of the supposed failure of the
Information to allege all elements necessary in committing
said crime.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
HELD: Before an accused can be held criminally liable for
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the
requisites of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Art.
336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites of
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, to wit:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. That child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes acts
pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein
the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct committed on a child subjected to other sexual
abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused
for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion,
intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only
child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse
against children.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
To be sure, the original wording of Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7610 was expanded so as to cover abuses that are not
characterized by gain, monetary or otherwise. In the case at
bar, the abuse suffered by AAA squarely falls under the
expanded scope as there was no allegation of consideration
or profit in exchange for sexual favor. As stated in the
Information, Quimvel committed lascivious conduct
through the use of force and intimidation.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
Here, AAA was a child at the tender age of seven (7) when
the offense was committed. Quimvel, on the other hand, was
known to the victim and her siblings as the caretaker of their
grandmother's ducks. Thus, when Quimvel brought some
vegetables to the victim's house at the day the crime was
committed; he was requested by the children to stay with them
because they were afraid. AAA entrusted to Quimvel her safety
and that of her siblings, only to be betrayed. In this situation,
the Court finds that because of the relative seniority of Quimvel
and the trust reposed in him, Quimvel abused the full reliance
of AAA and misused his ascendancy over the victim. These
circumstances can be equated with "intimidation" or
"influence" exerted by an adult, covered by Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
J. Peralta, concurring opinion
In a charge for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336

of the RPC in relation to R.A. 7610, there is no need to
allege that the lascivious conduct was committed with a
"child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse." Such allegation is pertinent only when the charge is
for child prostitution or violation of the first clause of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 against "those who
commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse," i.e., the customer or patron.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
Violation of the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III
of R.A. 7610 is separate and distinct from acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. Aside from
being dissimilar in the sense that the former is an offense
under special law, while the latter is a felony under the
RPC, they also have different elements.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
To construe "other sexual abuse" as referring to any
other sexual abuse other than the acts of lasciviousness
complained of is wrong. The law did not use such phrase in
order to cover other forms of sexual abuse that a child
might have previously experienced, other than being
exploited in prostitution for profit, or for any other
consideration. Instead, the law clearly distinguishes those
children who indulged in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct for money, profit, or any other consideration, from
those children who, without money, profit, or any other
consideration, had sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group.
QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE
This is further bolstered by the use of the disjunctive
word "or" in separating the two contexts contemplated in
the law. Thus, it is erroneous to interpret that R.A. 7610
contemplates situations wherein a child, who was already
subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse, is again
subjected to another abuse or lascivious conduct. Note that
in the definition of "child abuse," the phrase "whether
habitual or not" is used to describe the frequency upon
which a maltreatment can be considered as an abuse. Thus,
a single act of abuse is enough for a perpetrator to be
considered as having violated the law.
PEOPLE V. CAOILI
People v. Noel Caoili
G.R. No. 196342, 8 August 2017, J. Tijam
FACTS: Accused committed the following acts against his

daughter, who at the time of the incident, was 14 years 1 month
and 10 days old: (a) kissed her lips; (b) touched and mashed her
breast; (c) inserted the fourth finger of his left hand into her
vagina, and made a push and pull movement into her vagina with
such finger for 30 minutes. Based on these acts, an Information
for rape by sexual intercourse was filed against accused. After
trial, the court convicted accused of rape by sexual intercourse.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecution
proved rape by sexual assault, and not rape by sexual intercourse.
PEOPLE V. CAOILI
HELD:
Accused may not be convicted for rape by sexual assault

in an Information which charges rape by sexual
intercourse.

An accused charged in the Information with rape by
sexual intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual
assault, even though the latter crime was proven during
trial. This is due to the substantial distinctions between
these two modes of rape, as follows:
PEOPLE V. CAOILI
Rape by sexual
Rape by sexual assault
intercourse
The offender is always a The offender may be a man
As to offender
man. or a woman.
The offended party is The offended party may be a

As to offended party
always a woman. man or a woman.
Rape is committed by
inserting the penis ·into
Rape is committed
another person's mouth or
through penile
As to punishable act anal orifice, or any
penetration of the
instrument or object into the
vagina.
genital or anal orifice of
another person.
As to imposable Penalty is reclusion The penalty is prision

penalty perpetua. mayor.
PEOPLE V. CAOILI
Accused can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
While accused cannot be convicted of rape by sexual assault

based on the Information which charges him of rape by sexual
intercourse, he may be convicted for the crime of lascivious conduct
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 which is subsumed in the crime
of rape by sexual intercourse. The elements of which are:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
PEOPLE V. CAOILI
The following are the guidelines in designating or charging the
proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under
Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable
penalty:

1. The age of the victim is into consideration in designating or
charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the

nomenclature of the crime should be “Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610.” Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
medium period.
PEOPLE V. CAOILI
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or
more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of
age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to
fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the
crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
PEOPLE V. CAOILI
J. Peralta, concurring opinion
Applicable laws and imposable penalties for acts of lasciviousness

committed against a child under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A.
No. 7610:

a. Under 12 years old - Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, in relation
to Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353, applies and the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, instead of
prision correccional.

b. 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances
under Section 3(a) of R.A. 7610 - Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 in
relation to Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, applies and the penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE V. CAOILI
This is because the proviso under Section 5(b) apply
only if the victim is under 12 years old, but silent as to
those 12 years old and below 18; hence, the main clause
thereof still applies in the absence of showing that the
legislature intended a wider scope to include those
belonging to the latter age bracket.
THANK YOU!
GOOD LUCK AND GOD BLESS ALL OF YOU!

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TOP 25 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra

Book I and II Complex Crimes Art. 48 15 6

Book II Malversation of Public Property Art. 217 15 2

Book II Robbery with Homicide 14 9

Book II Qualified Trespass to Dwelling Art. 280 6 4

Book II Concubinage Art. 334 6 2

RA 9231 Anti-Child Labor Law 1 1

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,

 First. Unlawful aggression.

 Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or

 Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done

Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful

6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers

1. There must be unlawful aggression. - This is an

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least

a. actual – that the danger must be present, that is,

b. imminent- that the danger is on the point of

Test: Does the person invoking the defense believe, in due

The reasonableness of the means used will depend upon

The Supreme Court stated in the case of People v. Lara,

d. When, even if provocation was given by the person

Under Section 28 of R.A. No. 9262, Victim-survivors

The Battered Woman Syndrome is characterized by a

Consanguinity refers to blood relatives. Brothers and

Unlawful aggression may not exist as a matter of fact, it

The gauge of reasonable necessity of the means

N.B. Like in self-defense, the motive of the person

N.B. Unlike in self-defense where motive of the person

Any person not included in the enumeration of relatives

Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,

Exception: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under this

N.B. Euthanasia is not a defense, thus, the accused may be

Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong materials. On

FACTS: Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila

Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing,

2. the injury caused or the offense committed be the

When two (2) police officers tasked to arrest a

FACTS: A jeepney containing several people who

1. That an order has been issued by a superior.

2. That such order must be for some lawful purpose.

3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out

The subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal

FACTS: Rogelio Ramos and Marissa Intero-Ramos were

The Supreme Court did not accept the defense of self-defense

FACTS: Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin and Eric, all

The Supreme Court did not entertain the defense of

FACTS: Edgar Concillado voluntarily surrendered himself

The Supreme Court did not entertain the defense of self-defense

FACTS: Romeo F. Abad died due to the attack made by

For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must

The Supreme Court did not accept the defense of self-

1. with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;

2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary a. estimation is

N.B. DECEIT is NOT an essential requisite of estafa with abuse of

N.B.: There is no estafa through negligence.

Article 315, Paragraph 1 (a): Estafa with unfaithfulness by

Even though such obligation be based on an immoral or

Offender acquires the Offender acquires only