DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

IRB 00103
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

HANDOUT 4

The Security Dilemma and Offense

INTRODUCTION
The security dilemma or the spiral
model, is an IR term refers to a
situation in which actions by a state
intended to heighten its security e.g.
 Increasing its military strength or
Making alliances
INTRODUCTION
As a result, such action can lead
other states to respond with
similar measures, and it can lead
to increase tensions that create
conflict, even with no intention of
such from neither side
INTRODUCTION
 The term Security Dilemma (SD) was coined by John H.
Herz, the German scholar in his 1951 book Political
Realism and Political Idealism.

 Similarly,Herbert Butterfield, a British historian described

the same situation in his History and Human Relations, as
the absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma

 He argued that the security dilemma can drive states to war

even though they may not want to harm each other:
INTRODUCTION
 John H. Herz defined the security dilemma as "A
structural notion in which the self-help attempts of
states to look after their security needs tend,
regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity
for others as each interprets its own measures as
defensive and measures of others as potentially
threatening”
INTRODUCTION
 WWI was considered as a good example of SD,
that the major European powers felt forced to go to
war by feelings of insecurity over the alliances of
their neighbors, despite not actually desiring the
war

 Germany's fear of fighting war on two fronts led it

to the formulation of the infamous Schlieffen Plan
INTRODUCTION

 In turn, Germany action put pressure on other

states to start mobilizing early as well

 However, other scholars disagree on this

interpretation of the origins of the war, they
contended that some of the states involved really
determined to have want the conflict.
Aspects of Security Dilemma
 According to Herz there are six aspects of the security dilemma:

 (1) The ultimate source of the security dilemma is anarchy-the lack of

“a higher unity”

 (2) An immediate cause of the security dilemma is states’ uncertainty

and fears about each other’s intentions to do harm under anarchy

 (3) States’ means of self-help-trying to escape from the security

dilemma by accumulating more and more power-generates a cycle of
power competition
Aspects of Security Dilemma
 (4)States’ attempt to escape from the security dilemma by
accumulating more and more power may not increase their
security at all, becoming self-defeating and even tragic

 (5)The security dilemma can cause war, but is not the

cause of all wars; and

 (6) The dynamic of the security dilemma is a self-

reinforcing “vicious cycle.
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
Defensive realism
 Defensive realism is an umbrella term for several
theories of international politics and foreign policy
that build upon Robert Jervis's writings on the
security dilemma and Kenneth Waltz.
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 This security dilemma causes states to worry about
one another's future intentions and relative power.
Pairs of states may pursue purely security seeking
strategies, but inadvertently generate spirals of
mutual hostility or conflict
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 Defensive realism holds that the international
system provides incentives for expansion only
under certain conditions.
 Anarchy (the absence of a universal sovereign or
worldwide government) creates situations where
by the tools that one state uses to increase it
security decreases the security of other states
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 Kenneth Waltz argued that because the world does
not have a common government, therefore states
tend to distrustful of other states' intentions
 As a consequence, state will try to maximize their
own security and it will result in the situation of
the security dilemma
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 Defensive realists regard the success of the United States
in WWI as being a result of the defensive approach taken
by the United States

 They believed that the United States would not have been
secured if it takes offensive measure

 Defensive realists contended that in certain circumstances

security can be balanced and will lead states to escape the
security dilemma
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 The scholars of defensive theory believed that in
anarchic system each State must independently
seek its own survival

 Therefore, weaker states try to find a balance with

their rivals and to form an alliance with a stronger
state to obtain a guarantee of security against
offensive action by an enemy state e.g. the
bipolarity and their alliances.
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 Offensive realism
 Offensive realism regards states as aggressive power maximizers
and not as security maximizers

 John Mearsheimer is one of the leading scholars of this view he

held that;

 "Uncertainty about the intentions of other states is unavoidable,

which means that states can never be sure that other states do not
have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive
capabilities
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 John believed that though it is unlikely for state to
achieve hegemony in today's international system,
there is no such thing as a status quo and "the world
is condemned to perpetual great power competition

 John and other offensive realists argued that

Anarchy encourages all states to always increase
their own power because one state can never be sure
of other states' intentions
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 they contended that if states can gain an advantage
over other states then they will do so.
 As a result, since states want to maximize their
power in this anarchic system and since states
cannot trust one another, the security dilemma is
inescapable
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
Offense-defense theory
This Theory is championed by Robert Jervis who
helps decide the intensity of the security dilemma.
Jervis uses four scenarios to describe the intensity of
the security dilemma.
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
1- In the situation when offensive and defensive
behavior are not distinguishable but offense has an
advantage. Then the security dilemma will be very
intense and as a result, the environment is doubly
dangerous
It will lead a status quo states to behave in an
aggressive manner and there will arise the possibility
of an arms race. In such situation, there will be no
chances of cooperation between states
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
2- Where offensive and defensive behavior are not
distinguishable but defense has an advantage
The security dilemma is intense in explaining states'
behavior but not as intense as in the first case.
In such situation, a state might be able to increase its
security without being a threat to other states and
without endangering the security of other states
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
3- Where offensive and defensive behavior are
distinguishable but offense has an advantage then the
security dilemma is not intense though security issues
do exist. Though the environment is safe, offensive
behavior has an advantage which might result in
aggression at some future time
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
4- Where offensive and defensive behavior are
distinguishable and defense has advantage
The security dilemma has little or no intensity. The
environment is "doubly safe". Since there is little
danger of offensive action by other states, a state
would be able to expend some of its defense budget
and other resources on useful development within the
state
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 Robert argued that the technical capabilities of a
state and its geographical position are two
essential factors in deciding whether offensive or
defensive action is advantageous
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
Arms race
 Hence the world is anarchic, a state might for defensive
purposes, build its military capability

 However, since states intentions can not be known, other states

might interpret a defensive buildup as offensive

 In such situation, if such offensive action against the state which

is actually only building its defenses is advantageous, then those
other states might prefer to take an aggressive stance
THEORY OF SECURITY
DILEMMA
 According to Robert Jervis, it may result in an arm
race between state e.g. Germany and Britain
before WWI. Much of the behavior in this period
was the product of technology and beliefs that
magnified the security dilemma

 Strategistsbelieved that offense would be more

advantageous than defense, even though this
ultimately turned out to not be the case
THEORY SECURITY
DILEMMA
 Alliance formation
 The security dilemma might force states to form
new alliances or to strengthen existing alliances. "If
offense has less advantage, stability and cooperation
are likely“

 Glen H. Snyder, believed that for a security

dilemma to present, there are two reasons that
alliances will form:
THEORY SECURITY
DILEMMA
1- a state that is dissatisfied with the amount of
security it has forms alliances in order to bolster its
security

2- a state is in doubt about the reliability of existing

allies in coming to its aid, and thus decides to court
another ally or allies.
THEORY SECURITY
DILEMMA
 According to Thomas Christensen and Jack
Snyder, in a multipolar world, there are two types
of alliance dilemma contrary in nature;

 Chain Ganging and

 Buck Passing
THEORY SECURITY
DILEMMA
Chain Ganging
 That is, when one ally decides to participate in
war, it pulls its alliance partners into the war too,
which is referred to as Chain Ganging

 This situation arises in a multipolar world, that is

to say alliance security is interconnected.
THEORY SECURITY
DILEMMA
 If the partner does not participate in the war fully,
it will endanger the security of its ally.
 For example, in WWI due to the alliance between
Austria-Hungary and Germany, according to
Waltz, "If Austria-Hungary marched,
THEORY SECURITY
DILEMMA
 Buck-Passing
 In the face of a rising threat, balancing alignments fail to
form in a timely fashion because states try to ride free on
other states.

 States might do this to avoid the expense of war for

themselves.

 Uncertainties about...who will gain or lose from the action

of other states accelerate as number of states increases
Conclusion
 Security Dilemma or the Spiral Model, will
remain issue to be discussed as far as the
world remained living in a state anarchic

 State will not comfortably live or have rest

of mind, as far as its neighbor intends to
acquire more confiscated weapons for
strengthening her security.
Conclusion

Therefore, security of a state will

continue to be interpreted into
insecurity of another, due to lack
of knowledge on intention,
mistrust and probability of
misperception of their actions.