Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BRITISH RAILWAYS
UNDER GUIDANCE OF :
PROF. D. ROY
SUBMITTED BY-
JACKSON CHRISTIAN (G04108)
DEEPAK KUMAR (G04110)
SAPTARSHI GHOSH (G04113)
ROHAN KAPLE (G04117)
HIREN PATEL (G04130)
KEYUR PATIDAR (GO4134)
KUNDAN RATHOD (G04138)
Overview
• In Britain, practically all the capital for
railway construction came from private
sources, overwhelmingly from
individuals. This was unlike everyplace
else in the world (including the U.S.),
where governments were heavily
involved in financing the construction of
this infrastructure.
• High Speed
In the 1970s, British Rail began investing in High Speed Trains and by
1990 both main coastal express routes, the East and West Coast Main Lines
had been electrified between London and central Scotland.
Key Events
• 1955 Modernisation Plan
The report latterly known as the "Modernisation Plan" was published in
December 1954. In 1955 the programme (costing £1.2 billion) was authorised
by the government. It was intended to bring the railway system into the 20th
century. The aim was to increase speed, reliability, safety, and line capacity
through a series of measures that would make services more attractive to
passengers and freight operators, thus recovering traffic lost to the roads.
Important areas included:
• Privatisation
In 1982, British Rail passenger services were split into three core sectors: InterCity,
NetworkSouthEast and Regional Railways. Then, between 1994 and 1997, British
Rail was privatised, as track and infrastructure passed to Railtrack in 1994 and,
later, passenger services were franchised in 25 blocks to private-sector operators.
Freight services were sold outright. Overall, ownership and operation of the
network became highly fragmented, as operations were split between more than
100 companies.
• Legacy: The BR Logo
The famous British Rail ‘double arrow’ logo, formed of two white arrows on a red
background, lives on to this day on street signs and railway tickets.
Train Operating Companies
• 24 train companies that serve the length and breadth of the UK
Franchise
Office of High Level
Agreements Rail Output
Regulation Statement
ATOC
UK Railway Organization
• Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) :
– Regulates Network Rail’s stewardship of the network
– Licenses the operators of railway assets and approves agreements and
charges for access to the network
– Following the enactment of the Railways Act 2005, ORR has also
taken over the safety regulation role of the industry
• Network Rail :
– Owns, maintains and develops the railway infrastructure, including its
track, signaling, electrification equipment and structures
(bridges/tunnels/level crossings)
– Successor organisation to original infrastructure manager, Railtrack
• Train Operating Companies (TOCs) :
– Manage the provision of day-to-day train services and champion
passengers’ interests
– They provide and run train services and the majority of railway stations
ATOC
• ATOC
– It stands for “Association of Train Operating Companies”
– It’s an unincorporated association owned by its members, set up in
1994 by the Train Operating Companies (TOC) formed during
privatization of the railways under the Railways Act 1993.
– It’s a body which represents around 24 train operating companies that
provide passenger railway services on the privatized British railway
system
• The domestic fare range is the same as the range offered in UK (with a few
exceptions : season tickets and discounted cards) and offers much more
competitive prices.
OBJECTIVES FOR PRIVATISATION
• Official objectives were:
– Provide greater incentives
– Allow choices through competition
– Give railway managers the freedom to manage
– Set clear and enforceable quality standards
– Reflect regional or local identities
– Improve efficiency and reduce costs
• Real objective was desire to use private sector funding and to reduce
subsidies
• Labour’s threats to re-nationalise increased risks of investing and led the
Government to moderate competition
• Political necessity made privatisation itself the objective rather than the
means
UK RAIL INDUSTRY STRUCTURE,
1997
Rail Regulators
(OPRAF AND ORR)
Twenty-five
passenger
train
Three rolling stock operating
Lease Provides
companies companies
rolling access
(ROSCOS) (TOCs)
stock to
Own rolling stock run passenger network Infrastructure
trains maintenance
Provides
Services companies
Maintain
infrastructure
Provide RAILTRACK
Services Manages the
railway Provide Track renewal
infrastructure Services companies
Renew track
Heavy Provides
maintenance access Other
suppliers Provide to Provide services
Six freight
Maintain rolling Services network Services providers
operators
stock
(TOCs)
freight trains
Regulators
Players
Activities
SOME WEAKNESSES OF THE
PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME
• There was no framework for strategic planning of the industry
as a whole
• Most franchises were for only seven years, inhibiting long-term
planning and investment by operators
• Performance standards generally were based on low historic
standards and failed to look forward to the rising expectations
of passengers
• The industry structure did not anticipate the need for significant
investment to cope with sharply increased passenger and freight
traffic
• There were no proper incentives for private companies to invest
in expansion
UNANTICIPATED DEMAND
• Railtrack sold with the expectation that rail traffic would remain
constant
• All 25 franchises forecast improving financial performance over time in
their bids
• As fares were controlled could only come through increase in traffic
• Lack of co-ordination in bid process
• Nobody did any work to see whether the aggregate of that growth could
be fitted onto the network
• In the event 21% growth in three years
STRUCTURE OF
• Monopoly
RAILTRACK
– “Lacks Competition”
– “Unable to benchmark performance”
• Overly-regulated
– “Government intervention through the regulators”
– “Access charges distort competition, which resulted in over 90% of Railtrack’s
income coming from fixed charges, and a lack of customer focus”
• Poorly incentivised
– “Not incentivised the right way, eg Railtrack is monitored on punctuality, but as
they estimate 1% increase in the amount of trains would lead to 2.5% increase in
congestion-related delays, there is little incentive on Railtrack to ease the
congestion by adding more trains”
FLAWED REGULATION
• Privatisation involved:
– Single regulator
– Investment funded by privatised companies