NEBOSH HSE PSM Important Resume

NEBOSH / HSE
Certificate in Process
Safety Management
PP/HSE/NEB255/005/NEBOSH (Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)

Element 1
PROCESS SAFETY LEADERSHIP
PP/HSE/NEB255/005/NEBOSH (Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)

Element 1: Summary
1.1 Process safety management meaning.
1.2 Process safety leadership.
1.3 Organisational learning.
1.4 Management of change.
1.5 Worker engagement.
1.6 Competence.
PP/HSE/NEB255/005/NEBOSH
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Personal Safety vs Process Safety
Personal Safety
– Prevention of incidents causing injuries
to individuals.
– Applicable in all workplaces.
Process Safety
– Blend of engineering and management
skills.
– Prevention or mitigation of catastrophic
failures.
– High-hazard industries.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Process Safety Objectives and Targets
1. Establish overall
objectives
2. Set targets
4. Review regularly
(stepping stones)
3. Monitor progress
of indicators
Leading  Success
PP/HSE/NEB255/005/NEBOSH Lagging  Failure
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Lessons Learnt and Benchmarking
Findings of accident and incident investigations.

Lessons learnt
Striving for continual improvement.
Comparing an organisation against:

• Another organisation.
Benchmarking • A national standard, e.g. HSE accident
statistics publication.
• An operational standard.
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Why Include Workers
Its necessary:
‒ Better understanding and involvement results in better
solutions.
Engagement should be a priority:
‒ Don’t allow it to fall by the
wayside.
‒ Schedule meetings and
activities.
‒ Hold people accountable.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Element 2: Management of Process Risk
2.1 Establishing a process safety management system.

2.2 Risk management techniques used within the process
industries.
2.3 Asset management and maintenance strategies.
2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system.
2.5 Safe shift handover.
2.6 Contractor management.

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Key Elements of PSMS
Strong leadership Hazard analysis MOC
Detailed Understand
Sets direction and
understanding of consequences
determines
process hazards before changes
culture.
and risks. are made.
Operation within Competence

design intent management
Under all
conditions
Ongoing training.
including start-up
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and maintenance. (Continued)
Key Elements of PSMS
Control of Emergency
Asset integrity
contractors response
Control of Maintenance Foreseeable

selection and (planned and incidents, e.g. loss
activities. breakdown). of containment.
Performance
Incident recording
monitoring and
and investigation management review
Leading and
Investigation to
lagging indicators
learn lessons.
reviewed.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Key Elements of PSMS - PDCA
PLAN
• Policy.
• Planning.
DO
• Implementation and operation.
CHECK
• Checking and corrective action.
ACT
• Management review.
• Continual improvement.
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Leading and Lagging Process Safety Performance
Indicators (PSIs)
Checks and balances to determine how well the site is managing

process safety. Effective indicators of process safety:
Leading indicators: Lagging indicators:
– Proactive measures of – Measures of
conditions. failure.
– Identify problems – e.g. accident,
before harm occurs. incident, near-
– e.g. testing of miss data.
emergency systems vs
plan.
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Qualitative, Semi-Quantitative and Quantitative Risk
Assessments
Qualitative
– Determined as low, medium or
high.
Semi-Quantitative
– Determined within ranges.
Quantitative
– Fully calculated based on data.
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Hierarchy of Risk Controls
Inherent safety
Build safety in at design stage.
Elimination
Remove a hazard, minimise inventories.
Substitution
Lower hazard alternative.
Engineering controls
Segregation/spacing of process plant.
Administrative controls
Procedural/behavioural.
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Purpose and Effective Use of a
Permit-to-Work (PTW)
• Part of a safe system of work.

• Communicates hazards and controls to user.
• Used in high-risk activities.
• Links to:
‒ Risk assessment and task analysis (job safety analysis) –
which can be used to identify hazards and plan
precautions.
‒ Method statement – which describes how the work will
be done safely (step-by-step).
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Key Features of a Permit-to-Work
• Assesses and controls interfaces with adjacent plant and workers.
• Usually a triplicate form containing:
‒ Scope of work.
‒ Duration of the work.
‒ Identification of hazards.
‒ Isolations and other controls.
‒ Links to other permits.
‒ Emergency controls and specific controls.
‒ Permit acceptance and cancellations – issue; receipt; clearance/return
to service; cancellation.
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Importance of Shift Handover
Safe shift handover:
• Transfer of critical information to the incoming shift.
• Failure to do so can have devastating consequences as in Piper
Alpha.
Two-way communication and joint responsibility:
• Joint responsibility of both outgoing and incoming shift leaders.
• Needs time to be done properly.
Competence:
• People need competence (have the right level of knowledge and
expertise).
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Typical Information Shared at Shift Handover
• Permit to work details, especially those still open.

• Operational issues for the incoming shift (e.g. production
plans).
• Planned receipt of hazardous material deliveries.
• Any drills or exercises planned.
• Physical demonstration of plant state.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Element 3: Summary
1.1 Process safety management meaning.
1.2 Process safety leadership.
1.3 Organisational learning.
1.4 Management of change.
1.5 Worker engagement.
1.6 Competence.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Types of Start-Up and Shut-Down
• Follows pre-determined, controlled sequence
Planned • Includes a risk assessment
• Partial or complete
Unplanned • Can be dangerous in any event
• Type of unplanned shut-down

Emergency • Whenever a hazardous situation develops
• Usually a type of planned start-up/shut-down

Staged that requires staged processes
• When an issue has been raised, but an assessment is
Delayed made to control the situation until shut-down is
allowed to proceed
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Alarms
• Assist the operator to identify abnormal, hazardous and
unsafe plant and process conditions.
• Operators must be able to identify, understand and respond
to alarms appropriately.
• Consider:
‒ Do they require an operator response?
‒ How are they presented to the operator?
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The FARSI Model for Defining Performance
Standards
• Functionality
• Availability
• Reliability
• Survivability
• Interdependence
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Uses of Steam within the Processing
Industries
As a source of heating (direct or indirect) for spaces and processes:
• Steam for heating at positive pressure used in food processing

factories, refineries and chemical plants.
• Saturated steam: heating source for process fluid heat

exchangers, reboilers, reactors, combustion air pre-heaters and
other types of heat transfer equipment.
• Steam humidification is also used in space heating systems.

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Properties of Superheated Steam
• Made from saturated steam subjected to further pressure
and heat.
• An invisible gas.
• Temperature of > 200°C.
• Rapidly releases heat.
• Does not produce condensate when it meets air or surfaces.
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Water Hazards
• Cooling towers – Legionella and water-fog:
‒ Legionella bacteria exists in water.
‒ Grows between 20°C and 55°C (37°C is ideal).
‒ Feeds on nutrients in water.
‒ Risk of disease if water droplets
containing viable bacteria are inhaled.
‒ Cooling towers - hot water/high air flow
generates aerosols (‘water-fog’).
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Exothermic and Endothermic Reactions
Exothermic (very common):

• Produces heat, e.g. combustion reaction.
Endothermic (less common):

• Takes in heat from the surroundings, e.g. reaction
between ‘vinegar’ and ‘washing soda’.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Thermal Runaway Reaction - Causes
• Incorrect vessel charging:
‒ Incorrect reactants.
‒ Incorrect volumes of reactants.
‒ Wrong specification of raw materials (impurities).
• Incorrect use of catalysts.
• Poor/failed temperature control.
• Poor/failed mixing.
• Loss of power (which affects critical controls).
• Maintenance failures.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015) (Continued)
Thermal Runaway Reaction - Causes
• Instrumentation failures.
• Variations in operation:
‒ result of the failure to apply MOC procedures; or
‒ a basic lack of understanding of the reaction chemistry.
• Design failure resulting in insufficient controls, e.g. heat cooling.
• Insufficient operator training or familiarisation.
• Inadvertent addition of compressed air, nitrogen, steam, etc.
(increases pressure).
• Exposure of the vessel to fire.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Thermal Runaway Reaction -
Consequences
• Venting or dumping of product and materials.
• Loss of production and probably damage to equipment.
• Unintended chemical reactions, such as decomposition or

other runaway reactions.
• Vessel over-pressure:
‒ Catastrophic rupture – missiles, etc.
‒ Loss of containment – toxics, flammables (fire/explosion).
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Exothermic and Endothermic Reactions
Exothermic (very common):

• Produces heat, e.g. combustion reaction.
Endothermic (less common):

• Takes in heat from the surroundings, e.g. reaction
between ‘vinegar’ and ‘washing soda’.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Thermal Runaway Reaction
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Failure Modes for Tank Shells and Associated Pipe
Work
Metals used for tanks and pipelines may fail, for

example:
• Creep.
• Stress.
• Thermal shock.
• Brittle fracture.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Work
Creep failure
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Work
Stress:
Stress (loading on a material)
causes strain (deformation of
material).
Materials fall into two

categories:
• Ductile - moves under strain.
• Brittle - breaks under strain.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Work
Stress/loading exerted by:

• The contents.
• Temperature changes.
• Variations in loading.
Stress failure also due to:

• Stress corrosion - failure which occurs when a metal
corrodes.
• Hydrogen embrittlement - incursion of hydrogen atoms.
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Work
Thermal shock:
• Rapid and extreme temperature changes.
• Different parts of the material expand and heat by different

amounts.
• Causes cracking to develop - failure.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Filling of Tanks
Overfilling:
• Continuous monitoring to prevent overfilling.
• Volume of vessel and content should be known before filling.
Alarms:
• Two alarm trip systems:
‒ High level alarm (LAH) - normal operational level exceeded. Not a
reference point for filling operation.
‒ High high level alarm (LAHH) - maximum design capacity of the tank.
• If LAHH is exceeded the tank will overpressurise and overflow.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Element 4: Fire and Explosion Protection
4.1 Fire hazards.

4.2 Fire and explosion control.
4.3 Dust explosions.
4.4 Emergency preparedness.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Filling of Tanks
Overfilling:
• Continuous monitoring to prevent overfilling.
• Volume of vessel and content should be known before filling.
Alarms:
• Two alarm trip systems:
‒ High level alarm (LAH) - normal operational level exceeded. Not a
reference point for filling operation.
‒ High high level alarm (LAHH) - maximum design capacity of the tank.
• If LAHH is exceeded the tank will overpressurise and overflow.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Jet Fires
Mechanism:
• Continuous, directed, spray of
fuel ignited immediately.
• Gas, liquid or vapour.
Consequences:
• ‘Blowtorch’ jet of flame.
• Radiated heat.
• Can explode.
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Pool Fires
Mechanism:
• Spillage of liquid fuel.
• Can be on water.
• Vapour ignites above pool.
Consequences:
• May flow if not contained.
• Unburnt fuel may form a vapour cloud which can explode.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Cloud Explosion
(BLEVE)
Typical mechanism:
• External jet fire attack - tank walls heat up.
• Liquid boils - PRV operates.
• Vessel weakens - crack develops.
• Catastrophic vessel rupture.
• Rapid depressurisation of superheated contents - cloud of fine
droplets formed.
Consequences:
• Missiles, fireball, secondary explosion.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Confined Vapour Cloud Explosion (CVCE)
Mechanism:
• Flammable vapour builds up within building, vessel, etc.
• Ignition occurs.
Consequences:
• Shockwave.
• Overpressure.
• Heat.
• Missiles.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE)
Mechanism:
• Flammable vapour.
• Ignited before it disperses.
Consequences:
• Shock waves.
• Overpressure.
• Heat.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Active and Passive Systems
Active fire protection:
“Equipment, systems and methods, which, following initiation, may be
used to control, mitigate and extinguish fires.”

Passive fire protection:
“coating or cladding arrangement..., which, in the event of fire, will
provide thermal protection to restrict the rate at which heat is
transmitted to the object or area being protected”.
BS EN ISO 13702:1999
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Passive Fire Protection
Preformed boards, cladding, wall linings, etc.
• Fire resistant materials bound into cement, etc.
Prefabricated walls, partitions, fire doors:
• Structures made in a factory to be assembled on site.
Spray coatings:
• Intumescent coatings sprayed onto structural steelwork, etc.
Seals and sealants:
• Intumescent seals prevent the spread of smoke and fire.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Hazardous Area Classification
and Zoning
Flammable Vapours
• Zone 0 – present continuously.
• Zone 1 – present occasionally in normal operations.
• Zone 2 – present for short durations and not in normal operations.
Flammable Dusts
• Zone 20 – present continuously.
• Zone 21 – present occasionally in normal operations.
• Zone 22 – present for short durations and not in normal operations.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)
Primary and Secondary Explosions
Primary Explosion
• Initial explosion within the process.
• May disturb lying dust in the room.
Secondary Explosion
• Often much larger.
• Involves dust stirred up by primary explosion.
(Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)

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NEBOSH / HSE

PP/HSE/NEB255/005/NEBOSH (Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)

PP/HSE/NEB255/005/NEBOSH (Rev.0 – 19.04.2015)

Findings of accident and incident investigations.

Comparing an organisation against:

2.1 Establishing a process safety management system.

2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system.

2.5 Safe shift handover.

2.6 Contractor management.

Operation within Competence

Control of Maintenance Foreseeable

Checks and balances to determine how well the site is managing

• Part of a safe system of work.

• Permit to work details, especially those still open.

• Type of unplanned shut-down

• Usually a type of planned start-up/shut-down

• When an issue has been raised, but an assessment is

• Steam for heating at positive pressure used in food processing

• Saturated steam: heating source for process fluid heat

• Steam humidification is also used in space heating systems.

Exothermic (very common):

Endothermic (less common):

• Loss of production and probably damage to equipment.

• Unintended chemical reactions, such as decomposition or

Exothermic (very common):

Endothermic (less common):

Metals used for tanks and pipelines may fail, for

Materials fall into two

Stress/loading exerted by:

Stress failure also due to:

• Different parts of the material expand and heat by different

• Causes cracking to develop - failure.

4.1 Fire hazards.

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