Lecture 1e: The UN: Structure and

Organization – the UN Secretary

General
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d40412bbef1879
Key questions for this topic

• What is the United Nations? (UN)

• What are the aims of the UN?
• What are the key UN organs?
• How did the Cold War affect the functioning of these organs (and by
extension, the UN)?
 Outline of Lecture

1. The UNSG and its evolution due to

A) The Cold War
B) The post-Cold War period

BUT…As the UNSG is both an office

(position) as well as an actual person, the
individual character of each UNSG plays a
part.
The UN Secretary-Generals from 1946 to the
present are as follows:

• Trygve Lie (Norway) 1946-53

• Dag Hammarskjold (Sweden) 1953-61
• U Thant (Burma) 1961-71
• Kurt Waldheim (Austria) 1971-82
• Javier Perez de Cuellar (Peru) 1982-91
• Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt) 1992-96
• Kofi Annan (Ghana) 1996-2006
• Ban Ki Moon (South Korea) 2007-present
 Articles from the UN Charter UNSG

Article 99 (Link to the UNSC)

“The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any
matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and
security.”

Article 100 (Neutrality)

“1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not
seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority
external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect
on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively

international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff
and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.”
 The Phases of the Cold War (UNSC)

1947 – mid 1960s (post CMC) – The first Cold War

Mid-1960s – 1979 – Détente (thawing of tensions)

1979 – 1988 – The second Cold War

1989 – 1991 The Cold War started to come to an end

1991 onwards - Post-Cold War

 The Phases of the Cold War (UNGA)
1) 1945 – late 1950s – US dominated UNGA with
its allies
2a) Mid-1960s – UNGA grew in size. Now the
majority of members were ex-colonies who resented
the West (their ex-colonial masters) – see Congo
case study.
b) The US began to lose interest in the UNGA (and
the UN in general), culminating in Reagan’s anti-UN
stance in the 1980s.
3) 1991 onwards - Post-Cold War period. UNGA no
longer an arena for the superpowers to compete and
hence lost influence accordingly.
Key Phases (UNSG) :
• 1) From 1946 – 1961, the personalities of the two UNSGs were more
‘active’. They were operating under the Cold War climate which took its
toll on one of them.

• 2) Between 1961 – 1991, the personalities of the three UNSGs were more
‘passive’. They were also operating under the Cold War climate but
survived two terms of five years each without running afoul of the UNSC
permanent members.

• 3) 1991 – 1996, post-Cold War period but the UNSG offended the US,
which led to him being the only UNSG not to be reelected.

• 4) 1996 – 2006 post-Cold War period. This UNSG took care not to offend
the UNSC permanent members like what his immediate predecessor did.
Key Phases (1946 – 1953) : Trygve Lie

• 1) From 1946 – 1961, the personalities of the two UNSGs

were more ‘active’. They were operating under the Cold
War climate which took its toll on one of them.
• Lie’s nomination for a further term was vetoed by USSR in 1951,
boycotted by Soviet Union and allies (leading to the withdrawal of his
nomination in 1953) – outspoken support for UN intervention in the
Korean War in the defence of South Korea in 1950 and active role in
organising UN effort in Korea – accused of being complicit in anti-
communist crusade on behalf of USA (very clear pro-Western
tendencies)
Hammarskjöld (1953 – 1961)

• Saw initial success in the use of the good

offices function in the Peking formula (1955)
and the Suez Crisis (1956). In the Suez Crisis,
he pioneered the concept of peacekeeping.
• Note: while the Peking formula is the most
famous example of the usage of the UNSG’s
good offices function, Hammarskjöld’s
predecessor, Lie, also used it in various
instances.
Hammarskjöld (1953 – 1961)

• But in the Congo Crisis of 1960, he was perceived by the Soviets to be

anti-communist.
• Thus there was a Soviet attempt to replace Hammarskjöld with a
troika (triumvirate) proposal but this failed as Hammarskjöld was
popular with the other UN member-states (especially the Third
World/developing nations) as they saw him as a figure who was
committed to the UN rather than either of the 2 Cold War blocs
which sought to dominate it.
• In any case, he was killed in a plane crash in 1961 while trying to
mediate in the Congo Crisis.
The Good Offices Function

• Negotiator who is both neutral as well as

having sufficient prestige (representing the
world organisation that is the UN)
The Good Offices Function

• Article 98 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General, in

addition to acting in that capacity in all meetings of the General
Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social
Council and of the Trusteeship Council, ‘shall perform such other
functions as are entrusted to him by these organs’. These often
include functions in the field of the prevention and the peaceful
settlement of disputes.
• The role of the Secretary-General as an important peacemaking actor
has evolved through extensive practice. The range of activities carried
out by the Secretary-General has included good offices, mediation,
facilitation, dialogue processes and even arbitration.
• Source:
https://peacemaker.un.org/peacemaking-mandate/secretary-general
The good offices function and U Thant

• Secretary-General U Thant, too, expanded the scope

of the good offices function with some audacity. At
the end of 1962, he took steps to insert himself in
the negotiations to end the Cuban missile crisis,
initiatives .not particularly welcomed by the
principals. In 1963, acting entirely on his own
authority, he persuaded the parties to the Yemeni
civil war to request the posting of UN observers in a
demilitarized zone. The Security Council did not
actually authorize the force until several days after
it had been despatched.
The good offices function U Thant

• When a truce happened after the Indo-Pakistani

war of 1965, on his own authority, he spent $2
million to get that force, UNIPOM, promptly
underway, drawing on an account for unforeseen
peace-keeping contingencies. It was the first such
use by the Secretary-General of funds, without
specific budgetary authorization, to implement an
agreement reached as a result of his good offices.
Kurt Waldheim

• Waldheim acted on his own authority in 1979 to convene a

sixty-five-nation meeting to deal with the flood of
Vietnamese 'boat people'. This initiative ended in success
with agreement on an orderly exit and resettlement
scheme.
• A similar initiative followed on behalf of Cambodian
refugees.
Assessment

• By the mid-eighties, with the Security Council still constrained by

cold war politics, it was clear that the office of the Secretary-General
had gained in stature in relation to other UN organs.

BUT
That was the situation up to 1988. Thereafter, with the end of cold war
conflict between the superpowers, things began to change. Despite
the fact that the Secretary-General, together with the rest of the UN
system, undoubtedly has gained in stature since the easing of cold war
tensions, his capacity for independent initiatives has nevertheless been
affected - some might say diminished - by the increased activism of the
newly-reinvigorated Security Council and (to a lesser degree) the
General Assembly
The Good Offices Function after the Cold
War
• Prospects for the good offices function of the Secretary-General are
closely connected with prospects for the United Nations Organization
itself. The immediate aftermath of the cold war has witnessed a
remarkable expansion of UN activities. For example, in the five years
after 1988, as many peace-keeping operations were authorized as in
the previous forty-three years.
• The Security Council, finally unblocked, has been issuing a steady
stream of mandatory 'enforcement' resolutions. In this context it is to
be expected that the Secretary-General, too, would expand his
functions. Such an expansion appears to have been accepted quite
explicitly, in 1992, at the first meeting of the Security Council at the
level of the heads of State and government Those leaders formally
invited 'greater use ... of his good offices‘.
•The next five slides will detail what happened
to the UNSGs who operated in the period
1990 to 1992 and would show how they were
turned from relatively independent actors to
‘messenger boys’ despatched by the UNSC
who was no longer deadlocked.
•i.e. The Gulf War 1991 and Libya 1992
•All material is taken from Thomas M. Franc’s
reading.
The UNSG and the post-CW period
The Gulf War 1991 (1)
• The Kuwait crisis may be a case in point. The Secretary-General had
been a major factor in arranging the 1988 Iran-Iraq cease-fire.
However, two years later, when the Gulf was again in flames set by
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, he was essentially relegated to the side-
lines. The crisis was acted upon by the Security Council which, in
turn, subcontracted much of its responsibility for collective security
to a few powers willing to use force under US command in Operation
Desert Storm.
The UNSG and the post-CW period
The Gulf War 1991 (2)
• Shortly after the Iraqi invasion, the Council did authorize the
Secretary-General to meet in Jordan with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz. The terms of the authorizing resolution appeared to give him
great latitude. He was to make his good offices available 'as he
considers appropriate' and to 'undertake diplomatic efforts to reach
a peaceful solution'. In practice, however, he was little more than
an emissary for the Council, which had already demanded Iraq's
total and immediate withdrawal in its Resolution of 2 August 1990
and invoked sanctions under Chapter VII to enforce its demands.
The UNSG and the post-CW period
The Gulf War 1991 (3)
• In the circumstances, the Secretary-General could not invoke the
'Peking formula' or assume an independent mediating role, but felt
constrained to negotiate within the ambit of those essentially non-
negotiable terms. His impotence was underscored when the US
Government asked him to delay his mission to permit Secretary of
State James Baker to make his own attempt at direct negotiations in
Baghdad.
The UNSG and the post-CW period
Libya (1)
• Another example of a post-cold war good offices mission in which the
Secretary-General had little room for independent manoeuvre is his
role in the 1992 crisis concerning the British-French-American
demands on Libya for the extradition of suspected terrorists involved
in two airline bombings. In this instance, the Secretary-General was
asked, essentially, to be the Council's 'letter carrier'.
The UNSG and the post-CW period
Libya (2)
• Invited by that body 'to seek the cooperation of the Libyan
Government to provide a full and effective response' to the requests
by Britain, France and the United States for extradition of the
suspects, the Secretary-General sent Under-Secretary-General Vasily
Safronchuk to Tripoli, explaining that the purpose was not mediation,
but merely to 'take note' of Libya's 'preliminary response' to the
Council. When the Libyan Government offered to negotiate a
'mechanism' to implement the resolution, the Secretary-General felt
he had no option but to decline, his authority under the Council's
terms being too limited.
Post-Cold War UNSGs

• Boutros-Ghali was perhaps the most controversial Secretary-General as

he was determined to ensure that he played a significant and
meaningful role. He stood up to the big powers, particularly the USA by
criticizing them when he felt they deserved it. For instance, he publicly
admonished the USA for not paying their dues to the UN since the
1980s. As a result, the big powers had little fondness for Boutros-Ghali.
• His alienation of the USA meant that he was not allowed to serve his
second term. The USA vetoed his second term in 1996 as they declared
Boutros-Ghali to be unfit to serve as Secretary-General. Boutros-Ghali
remains the only Secretary-General to serve only one term.
• His successor, Kofi Annan, was a much more placid character who took
care not to offend the big powers, particularly the USA, the remaining
superpower.
Questions to consider

•How did the Cold War affect the

fortunes of the UNSG?
•Did the end of the Cold War bring about
a change in the fortunes and power of
the UNSG?
•What changed? What remained
constant?