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The Export Boom of the Mexican Revolution: Characteristics and Contributing Factors

Author(s): Sandra Kuntz Ficker


Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 2004), pp. 267-296
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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j. Lat.Amer.Stud36, 267-296 ? 2004 CambridgeUniversityPress 267
DOI: Io.Io 7/Soo22216Xo4007436 Printedin the United Kingdom

The ExportBoom of the Mexican


Revolution: Characteristics and
Contributing Factors*

SANDRA KUNTZ FICKER

Abstract. This article explores the performance of Mexico's exports in the early
twentieth century, and particularly the so-called 'export boom' that took place
during the Mexican Revolution (1910-17). By compiling the official trade figures
from major trading partners, the article overcomes the deficiency of Mexican stat-
istics that previously limited detailed analysis. Armed with more reliable data, this
article defines the extent of the export boom and identifies its main contributing
factors in terms of price, quantity and structure.

Introduction
The impactof the MexicanRevolution(I910-17) on Mexico'seconomyhas
long been the subjectof debate.1Althoughwe do not have a comprehensive
and conclusive interpretation,historians generallyagree that while the

SandraKuntz Fickeris a HistoryProfessorat the UniversidadAut6nomaMetropolitana


and El Colegiode Mexico.
* A
previous version of this articlewas presentedat the conference Desarrollo econdmico
comparado,Mixico-Expa)ia, siglosXLiy XX, CIDE-El Colegiode Mexico,MexicoCity,July
2001; and at the weeklyseminarof the SocialScience
HistoryWorkshop at StanfordUniversity
(November2ooi). I wish to thankthe valuableremarksI receivedin those events from
John Coatsworth,StephenHaber,AntonioTena,GabrielTortellaand GavinWright.Luis
Aboites, EnriqueCirdenas,CorneliusConover,CarlosMarichaland Paolo Riguzziread
and provideduseful commentson the paper,for which I am grateful.CoryConoveralso
helped improvingthe style of the manuscriptin English, for which I am indebted.I am
particularlygratefulfor the thoroughreadingand suggestionsofferedby Alan Knight.
1 The classiccriticof the conventionalpictureof chaos anddestructionis John Womack,Jr.,
'The MexicanEconomy Duringthe Revolution,1910-1920: Historiography& Analysis,'
MarxistPerspectives,
i, no. 4 (Winter1978),pp. 8o-i 23. More recently,other scholarshave
followed this revisionisttrend,dealingwith the impactof the revolutionupon particular
sectors of economic activity.For the industrialsector, see Stephen Haber,Industry and
Underdevelopment.TheIndustrialization
ofMexico,189o-194o(Stanford,I989), chapter8; Stephen
Haber and ArmandoRazo, 'PoliticalInstabilityand Economic Performance.Evidence
from Revolutionary Mexico,' World Politics, vol. I, no. I (October 1998), pp. 99-143. The
first study on the impact of political instability upon economic growth in revolutionary
Mexico is Stephen Haber et al., The Politics of PropertyRights: PoliticalInstability,Credible
Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 5876-z929 (Cambridge, 2003).

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268 Sandra
KuntzFicker
transport network and the monetary system suffered deeply as a result of
the war, an important upsurge in Mexican exports took place during the
years of the Revolution.2 The historiography has only speculated as to the
causes and features of this boom with little or no attempt to explain or even
characterise the phenomenon. The most frequently cited causal factor is a
surge in oil exports, which, according to the common view, would have
constituted the largest share of Mexico's export revenue during the civil war
years.3A second possible factor is the international price boom for certain
strategic products during World War One. According to this view, soaring
prices would have more than compensated for the decline in quantity of
exports as the revolution interfered with production and disrupted normal
commerce.4 Consistent with these two explanations is the idea of a sub-
stantial reduction in the variety of exports and the absolute predominance of
oil as a characteristicfeature of the revolutionary export boom. The evidence
commonly provided here is the prominent place occupied by oil exports at
the beginning of the I92Os.5 Only rarely have some authors added a third
element to the two preceding factors: the fact that production continued
uninterruptedly throughout the civil war years within some of the export
enclaves, particularlyin the peripheryof Mexico.6 Even though this interpret-
ation acknowledges the role of both the oil boom and international demand,
the idea that a drastic reduction took place in the composition of exports
during the war seems implicitly to be questioned.
Despite the suggestion of these hypotheses, no systematic analysis on
the performance of the export sector has hitherto been undertaken. In fact,
most work dealing with this period includes little quantitative information
about production in export activities, exports, or prices during the civil war

2 BertaUlloa,Historiadela Revoluciddn La Constitucidn


de1917(Mexico,
Mexicana,
g9y4-1iQ7.
1983);JeanMeyer,La revolucidnmexicana (Mexico,I99i); LeopoldoSolis,La realidadeco-
ndmicamexicana: (Mexico,199i); ClarkW. Reynolds,TheMexican
y perspectivas
retrovisidn
Economy. Structure
Twentieth-Century andGrowth(New Havenand London,1970); Alan
Knight,TheMexican Revolution.
Vol.2. Counter-Revolution
andReconstruction
(Lincoln, NE, and
London,1986),pp. 412, 428-9. Regarding the financialsector,see EnriqueCirdenas
andCarlosManns,'Inflaci6ny estabilizaci6n
monetaria en Mexicodurante la revoluci6n,'
in EnriqueCardenas(ed.),HistoriaecondmicadeMixico,Lecturas,vol. 3 (Mexico,1989),
pp.447-70. Fortherailway sector,seeSandraKuntzFickerandPaoloRiguzzi,'El triunfo
de la politicasobre la tecnica:ferrocarriles,
Estadoy economnia en el Mexicore-
volucionario,1910-1950,'in SandraKuntzFickerandPaoloRiguzzi(eds.),Ferrocarrilesy
vidaecondmica
enMixico(I8/o-sg9o).
Delsurgimiento
tardio al decaimiento
precoz(Mexico,1996),
pp. 289-364.
3 Ulloa, Historia,pp. 244, 249; Hans Werner Tobler, La revolucidn mexicana. social
Tran•formacidn
y cambio politico,1876-I94o(Mexico,1997), P. 527.
4 Solis, Realidad, pp. 77-8; Meyer, Revolucidn, p. ix 2.
s Solis, Realidad,p. 78; G. Butler Sherwell, Mexico'sCapacidty to Pay. A GeneralAnalysisof the
PresentInternational EconomicPositionof Mexico(Washington, DC, 1929), p. 28.
6 Reynolds, Mexican Economy, p. 27; Meyer, Revolucidn, p. I 2.

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TheExport Boomof theMexicanRevolution 269

years.7In some cases, the few figures provided correspondonly to the


beginningand end of the decade, implyingthat change duringthe inter-
mediateyearswas linear,or thatthe situationin i920 could be consideredas
the naturalprogressionfrom the previousdecade.8In any event, these types
of dataare used as circumstantial evidence,alongwith more qualitativeand
impressionisticassessmentson the unevenimpactof the war.The reluctance
to use quantitativeevidenceis to some extentjustifiedby the factthat,during
the years of heaviest fighting,the regularcollectionof economic statistics
was interruptedas regional factions and militarychiefs took over many
customs houses. As a result, the official statisticsavailablefrom Mexican
sources are incomplete and woefully inadequate.To compensatefor this
deficiency, the present study uses foreign trade statistics published by
Mexico's main tradingpartners.9These sources have been used with two
main aims: to presenta completeseriesof yearlyexportvalues and to con-
structseriesby productthatallowobservationof the compositionof export
trade,its evolution,andthe relativeeffectof changesin priceandquantityon
its behaviour.
The data include nearlycomplete annualseries of trade statisticsfrom
the United States,GreatBritainand France,and a few scatteredyearsfrom
Germany as well.1oAlthough the analysisconcentrateson the Mexican

7 Some generalworks dealingwith the Mexicanrevolutiondo incorporatesome statistical


information,althoughit usuallyplaysa secondaryrole in the interpretation.Besides,such
informationfrequentlystems from sources of dubiousreliability.See, for instance,John
Womack,Jr.,'The MexicanRevolution,1910o-92o,' andJeanMeyer,'Mexico,Revolution
and Reconstructionin the 920zos,'both in LeslieBethell(ed.),TheCambridge HistoryofLatin
America.j. c. I87o-y93o(Cambridge,1986),chaptersz and 3, respectively.For export series
see Meyer,'Mexico,Revolution,'pp. 88 and 176-7. Some quantitativeevidenceon exports
may also be found in works dealing with particularsectors, as well as in works that
approachthe period from perspectivesother than economic history.Among the former
areJonathanBrown, OilandRevolution inMexico(Berkeley,Oxford, 1993);LorenzoMeyer,
MexicoylosEstadosUnidosenel conflictopetrolero(I917-i942)(Mexico,1972),table I. As for the
latter,see for instanceLindaHall and Don M. Coerver,Revolution ontheBorder.TheUnited
StatesandMexico,1910-920o(Albuquerque,1988), chapter9; EsperanzaDurain,Guerra y
Lasgrandespotendasy
revoludcin. Mixico,i9gn--I98(Mexico,1985), pp. 58-68. In this case, the
authoruses the same statisticalsourcesthat form my own study.
8 As happensin Solis,Realidad, pp. 77-84; and Reynolds,MexicanEconomy.
9 A preliminaryapproachto Mexico'sforeigntradeduringthe 1910os basedon these sources
is SandraKuntzFicker,'El comercioexteriorde Mexicodurantela decadarevolucionaria:
un acercamientopreliminar,'PoliticayCultura, no. 16 (2oo01), pp. 235-73.
10 Completeannualseries of importsfrom Mexico into the United Stateswere taken from
United StatesTreasuryDepartment,TheForeignCommerce andNavigation oftheUnitedStates
(Washington,1893-1930). Withregardto GreatBritain,yearlyfigureswere obtainedfrom
Great BritainCustoms Establishment,StatisticalOffice, AnnualStatement of the Tradeand
Navigationof the UnitedKingdom withForeignCountries andBritishPossessions in the Year...
(London, 1900-1930).For France,the data also covers the entireperiod,except for the
years cI91oand 1912, and stem from DirectionGnetraledes Douanes, Tableau Geniraldu
Commerce de la Franceavecses Colonieset les PuissancesEtrangeres Pendantl'Annie... (Paris,

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270 SandraKuntzFicker

revolution, some attention is paid to the entire export boom cycle, which
started in the last decades of the nineteenth century and suffered a premature
decline in the 1920s, before the 1929 international economic crisis brought
it to its end. This time-span constitutes a departure from the strictly political
time division usually adopted in the literature,in which the accepted bench-
mark is the 1911 overthrow of Porfirio Diaz. The purpose of considering
this broader period is to provide some elements to assess the relative
performance of exports during the civil war in terms of the level as well as of
the composition of trade.
A more careful analysis of the available evidence should lead us to modify
the traditionalview of the revolutionary export boom at least in three main
aspects. First, oil exports were not the only factor responsible for the surge
of Mexican exports during the Revolution (1910-17); in fact, they did not
even represent the dominant share of the export basket during these years.
Secondly, the price factor did indeed counteract the temporary decline in
the volume of exports, but this was only the case for mineral exports,
whereas agriculturalproducts experienced growth in the quantities exported.
Thirdly, therefore, the overall composition of Mexican export basket did
experience temporary adjustments during the Revolution, but not a sub-
stantial impoverishment. Mexican exports did become more concentrated
in the first two years of the 920s, but this trend was due to the confluence
of the post-war depression and the surge of Mexico's oil sales abroad, not
Mexican revolutionary activity.
The article is divided into three sections. The first part presents an overall
view of the performance of Mexico's export sector in the first decades of the
twentieth century. The second section analyses the structure of exports and
examines changes during and after the Revolution. The third part focuses
on how price and quantity affected the performance of the main individual
components of the export basket. The study closes with some concluding
remarks.

Mexico'sexportperformance,
1900oo-1929

of thequantitative
(a) Construction series
The analysis of Mexico's exports presented in the following pages relies on a
reconstruction of Mexico's foreign trade statistics based on the official

1900-1931). Unfortunately,complete Germanfiguresare only availableuntil 1911. This


does not represent a serious limitation for the purposes of this paper, though, as trade
between the two countries practically ceased during World War One. The primary source
for German trade is Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amt, StatistikdesDeutschenReichs.Auswartiger
Handel deutschenZollgebiets imJahre ... (Berlin, I900-191 2).

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TheExportBoomoftheMexicanRevolution 271
450
MX
400 --o--SK

350

300

21-50-

E 200 -

150
100

- 4 0 " -- "
O 4L D I0-
- 0)
a) 0 C Lm D - 00 0) O
r- N
04 0N
04 N
04 04 04 04 04 C)
0) -- 0) 0) 0) -0) 0)-- 0) 0) 0) 0) 0)- 0)- 0)- 0) 0) 0) 0) 0)- 0)- 0)- 0)
r.- •. •- I- v- i- v- v- v- •- •- -

Sources: For the MX series: 1910-1920: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, M6xico exportador
(Mdxico, 1939), taken from Womack, 'Revoluci6n', p. 86; 1921-1930: Direcci6n General de Estadistica,
Anuario Estadistico 1938 (Mexico, 1939), p. 247. In the latter, original figures in pesos were
converted into dollars using Mood, Handbook, p. 114.
For the SK series, see Kuntz Ficker, 'Nuevas series', table 2.

Fig. I. TwoSeriesofMexico'sTotalExports, Valuein Current


Dollars).
i9po-193o(FOB

sources producedby Mexico's main tradepartners."This is an important


featureto bearin mind becausethere are significantdiscrepanciesbetween
this series(henceforthdesignatedas SK) and the variouspossibleseriesthat
can be derived from the availableMexican sources (designatedas MX).
Althoughit is unlikelythat any series providesthe exact values of the real
tradeflows, the qualityof the sourcesmake the formermuch more reliable
than the latter.12
Needless to say, the two series give ratherdifferentpicturesof export
performancethroughoutthe period.In orderto show the magnitudeof the
disparities between them, Figure i illustrates the evolution of the total yearly

1 The procedurefollowedin the reconstruction,as well as a discussionabout the qualityof


the seriesand on the availableliteratureon the topic is providedin SandraKuntz Ficker,
'Nuevas seriesdel comercioexteriorde Mexico, 1870-1929,' RevistadeHistoriaEcondmica
vol. XX, no. 2 (2002), pp. 2z3-70. The main primarysources employed are listed in
footnote io.
12 Whileone can doubt of the
reliabilityof, say,Frenchstatisticsduringthe WorldWaryears,
the statisticsproducedby Mexico'sdominantpartner,namelythe United States,were not
affectedby any contingencythat could have reducedtheir quality.On the other hand,
Mexico'sstatisticswere not compiledon a regularbasisduringthe I91os, and even when
they were, the data are incompletedue to the lack of centralisedcontrol upon all the
customshouses.

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272 SandraKuntzFicker
value of exports (including specie) from 190o to 1929 based on the SK series
on the one hand, and on one of the most widely used MX series on the other.
In the first and last years of the period, both series show similarbehaviour,
despite some differences in absolute terms. The largest discrepancies are seen
from 1916 to 1922, as the MX series for these years is erratic and exhibits
wide and random fluctuations that are hard to explain. The disparities in one
direction or the other with respect to the SK series range from $50 to I
50
million, equivalent to one third of the estimated total value of exports. Their
magnitude and direction suggest some strong distortions in the apparent
behaviour of the export sector. Two differences stand out. The MX series
grossly underestimates the growth of exports from 1917 to 1919, and then
abruptly jumps by more than $200 million in 1920. Neither of these move-
ments is confirmed in the SK series, constructed from alternate sources.
Another major difference is that the MX series downplays the importance
of the 1921 economic crisis and later recovery. The MX numbers suggest
only a gradual three-year declining trend that is not consistent either with
the SK series or with the international economy's situation at the time.13
In contrast, the series built from foreign sources shows accelerated growth
in the value of exports starting from 1914 to 1920, interrupted by a severe,
but short contraction in 1921, which in turn was followed by a slow recovery
that held until 1925. From their peak in 1925, exports experienced a gradual
decline culminating in the crash of i929.
As mentioned before, the alternative (SK) series of the total value
of exports was constructed based on official sources from Mexico's main
trading partners, which are considered reasonably reliable. Moreover, the
behaviour it shows is consistent with the international economic trajectory
and, as we shall see later, it is also consistent with what we know about
Mexico's domestic conditions at the time. For these reasons, the following
analysis dispenses with the most commonly used figures (generally from
Mexican sources) and relies solely on the figures taken from the records of
Mexico's main trading partners. The latter have been adjusted in order to
present uniform FOB values in current dollars.14Total yearly values are

13
Although the impact of the post-war economic crisis varied in duration and intensity
among the developed countries, studies on the subject agree that there was a severe con-
traction around 1921 and recovery was fast in the case of the United States, Mexico's most
important market. The SK export series is consistent with this description. See Charles
PoorKindleberger,
Manias,Panics A History
andCrashes: Crisis(London,1978),
ofFinancial
p.I35andappendix;
ErnstWagemann, ritmo
Estructuray dela economia
mundial(Barcelona-
Madrid-Buenos
Aires,1933),pp. 288-92.
14 The conversion of original values in pounds sterling, francs and marks into dollarswas
basedon the equivalencesprovidedby JamesMood,Handbook of Foreign
Currencgand
Exchange of Gold(Chicago,
(Washington,930o),p. I4; andMelchiorPalyi,TheTwilzght
1972), pp. 38-9.

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TheExport Boomof theMexicanRevolution 273

presented in fiscal years up to 1917 and in calendar years thereafter.15The


yearly value of specie exports (gold coins and ingots, and silver coins) has
been removed from each year's total in order to concentrate the analysis on
the commodity trade.16

(b) Export trade gycles


Around the mid-i 88os Mexican exports began to grow consistently, perhaps
for the first time since independence (1821). The initial phase of this first
export boom cycle took place between 1885 and 1892, when commodity
exports grew at an average rate of 15 per cent per year. This prosperity was
interrupted by a brief, but severe 18 per cent contraction due to the I893
domestic and international economic crisis. Recovery was swift, though, and
beginning in 1895, Mexico's exports entered the more lasting expansion
phase of the overall period, which was to persist (save for a very slight
decline in 1900) until 1907. During these twelve years, the value of com-
modity exports grew at an average rate of 9 per cent per year. Even the
international recession of 1907 provoked just a 4 per cent decrease and only
lasted until 1908, after which the upward trend continued for another four
years at an annual average rate of 7 per cent.17
The civil war that broke out at the end of 191o had an immediate but
rather moderate impact on the export sector by slowing down its growth
pace, but it took its largest toll in 1913 and especially 1914, when the accu-
mulated value of exports fell by almost 22zper cent with respect to the 1912
level. As in previous declines, this drop may have been in part associated with
an international recession, the one that, according to some authors, preceded

15 All partners'originaldata until 1917 were convertedinto fiscal years accordingto the
Mexicanconvention (i.e. startingon I July).This procedurewas used to build the yearly
series presentedin the first section of this paper. However, the analysisof exports by
classesandproductsin the second andthirdsectionsis carriedout with the originalfigures.
Discrepanciesare not serious,though, due to the high concentrationof tradewith the
UnitedStatesfrom 1910 to 1917,andto the factthatafter1917all sourcesbeganto use the
calendaryear.
16 The issue of specietransfersis a complexone, and cannotbe dealtwith here.Sufficeto say
that,except for the years 1910-12, these movementswere relativelymodest, representing
in average3.5 per cent of the total value of exports between 1913 and 1920 (about$six
millionper year).As for 1910-12, they averaged$26 millionper year.Consideringthatthe
sum exceeds the amountthatwas usualfor this kind of transfersin the previousdecade,
andthatin these threeyearsit consistedmainlyof gold bullion,it shouldbe consideredas a
capitalflightcausedby the outbreakof the armedconflict.Specietransfersdid not recover
theirformerimportancein the followingdecade.The discussionaboutspeciemovements
and the definitionthathas been provisionallyadopted,as well as theiryearlyvalue,maybe
found in Kuntz Ficker,'Nuevas series,'pp. 232-6 and table 2.
17 For the annualseriesused to estimatethis growthratessee KuntzFicker,'Nuevas series,'
table 2.

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274 Sandra Ficker
Kuntz
the FirstWorldWar."1Althoughthis declinewas indeed deeperthan those
that had taken place in 1893 and 1907, it was not as long lasting;in 1915
exportsgrew 23 per cent, almostrecoveringtheir 1912value,anda yearlater
theygrewfurther,this timeby 12 per cent,whichled them to a historicpeak.
The years from 191 5 to 1920 witnessed the continuinggrowth of sales
abroadon the order of 18 per cent per year,the fastest export surge ever
achievedin Mexico'sindependenthistory.This expansionwas broughtto an
end againby an internationalcontraction,the post-war1921 economiccrisis.
This recession affectedthe Mexicanexport sector more severely;exports
plummeted29 per cent in a single year,placingtheirvalue below the 1918
level, althoughwell aboveanyof the precedingyears.This time recoverywas
slower than on any of the previousoccasions; exportsregainedtheir 1920
valueonly brieflyin 1925, but decreasedconsistentlyafterthatyear(savefor
a slightupturnin 1929), and ended the periodwith an abruptdrop in 1930.
This is the picturegiven by our reconstructionof Mexico'sexportvalues
in currentdollars.As we know, however,internationalprices experienced
severe fluctuationsduringthis period;they rose significantlyfrom 1916 to
1920 andplummetedin 1921. Unfortunately, thereis no availablepriceindex
for Mexico'sexportsof merchandise,and we must rely on some imperfect
substitutein orderto reduceMexicanexportvaluesto realterms.Figure2
uses two such substitutesfrom US import price indexes to estimate the
impact of price movements upon the total value of Mexico's commodity
exports.
The figureincludes three series of total commodityexport values. The
first one is SK in currentdollars.The other two lines representthe same
series deflatedby two differentpriceindexes for US imports;SKreali uses
the totalUS importpriceindex,whilethe thirdline,SKreal2,also employsan
index of US imports,but composed only by those groups which include
18
There is no agreementas to whetheror not therewas an economic recessionjust before
the WorldWar.Some classicalstudieson economiccyclesidentifya downwardturnin the
internationaleconomy around 1913-14. See, for instance,James ArthurEstey, Business
Cycles:TheirNature,Cause,andControl (New York, 1941),p. 24, and Wagemann,Estructura,
p. 247. In fact,growthratessloweddown or werenegativein severalindustrialcountriesin
these years(aftera very robustperiod,in 1913GDP declinedby o.62%in France,and by
4.9% in Germany,while it grew only 1.2 per cent in the United Kingdom;in 1914, GNP
droppedby 4.4% in the United States.BrianR. Mitchell,International Statistics:
Historical
Europe,r70o-p993(London,1998),pp. 909-13, and BrianR. Mitchell,International Historical
Statistics:
TheAmericas,17yo-2ooo(New York,2003),p. 766. Exceptfor the UnitedKingdom,
all percentagesare calculatedupon constantvalues).However,more recentstudieson the
subjectfail to recognisethe existenceof a pre-warinternationalslump,and some of them
utterlydeny it. Among the former,see, for instance,W. ArthurLewis, Growth andFluctu-
ations,I17o-1913(Boston, 1978),passim; as for the latter,see Paul Bairoch,Economics and
World History.MythsandParadoxes (Chicago,1995), pp. 138-40. In any event,in Mexicothe
earlyslowdownin the growthof exportsand the magnitudeof the 1913-14 drop indicate
that the crucialcomponentwas an internalone, associatedwith the civilwar.

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TheExportBoomoftheMexicanRevolution 275
250

- SKcurrent
S-- SKreall
- a- SKreal2
200

100

50

50
1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Notes:
nominalfobvalueof Mexicancommodity
SKcurrent: exportsaccordingto myreconstruction.
SKreall:SKcurrentseriesdeflatedby the priceindexof totalUS imports.
SKreal2:SKcurrentseriesdeflatedbythe composedpriceindexof US importsof rawfoods,rawmaterials,andsemi-manufactured
goods,andweightedbythe composition of Mexico'sexportsineach year.
Sources:Forthe SKcurrent Priceand
series see KuntzFicker'Nuevasseries',table2; forthe priceindexesof US importssee Lipsey,
QuantityTrends,tableA-3,pp. 146-7.

Exports,NominalandReal Values,19oo-93o. IndexofFOB Valuein


Fig. 2. MexicanCommodity
Dollars = Ioo).
(9pl3

most of the productsin Mexico'sexportmix, and has been weightedby the


compositionof the Mexicanbasketin each year.19Both seriesprovideonly
an approximateview of the real value of Mexico's exports. Nevertheless,
becausepricesfor manufactured goods grewmore thanpricesfor the mix of
productsthat Mexico exported,the seriesdesignatedSKrealzrepresents,in
my opinion, a better adjustmentfor the composition of Mexicanexports
throughoutthe period. If we rely on this series, the 191os export boom
appearsmore modest thanit does in currentvalues,but it is still noticeable.
These numbersindicatethat a stableincreasein exports was not to begin
until 1916, and that the ascendingtrendheld (save for 1919) until i922. In
those six years,the realvalueof Mexico'sexportsgrewan averageof 8.4 per
cent per year.
Another means to evaluate Mexico's export performanceduring the
revolutionis by placingit within the context of LatinAmerica.Argentina,
Chileand Colombiawere to some extentcomparableto Mexicoin thatthey

19 The second index includesraw


foods, rawmaterials,and semi-manufactured goods. Price
indexes for US importswere taken from RobertE. Lipsey,PriceandQuantityTrends in the
ForeignTradeoftheUnitedStates(Princeton,1963),TableA-3, pp. 146-7. The yearlyweights
used here are my own, calculatedby groupingthe main Mexicanexportsinto one of the
threeclassesmentioned.For the sampleof Mexicanexportsused, see section 3, below.

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276 Sandra
KuntzFicker
were all engaged in a process of export-led growth, except that they did not
undergo a revolution during the 1910Os.Some reservations should be kept
in mind when comparing nations. The data for each country frequently vary
from one source to another and currency exchange rates and price indexes
pose additional difficulties. Notwithstanding this, the comparison throws up
some interesting findings. The decline in the real value of Mexico's exports
in 1913 did precede that of Argentina, Chile and Colombia, which only fell in
1914, perhaps as a consequence of the international recession. If we take
1913 as the base year, however, it appears that Mexico outperformed
Argentina and Colombia throughout the rest of the 191os and until the late
1920os,and did better than Chile startingin 1919.20Mexico's export sector did
quite well during the 1910os by Latin American standards. With respect to
the performance of exports, the Mexican Revolution does not seem to have
placed Mexico clearly apart from other similar countries within the Latin
American context.
This new information allows us to revise Mexican historiography, which
has usually considered 910o as a turning point which affected virtually all
facets of Mexican life and economy. The 19io political rupture produced
effects of varying degrees and duration on the economic activity, but it was
far from having a shattering impact upon the export performance of the
country. First, the export sector displayed an upward trend from the begin-
ning of the boom in the mid i88os until the mid 1920s, a performance that
seems more closely associated with the expansion of world trade than with
domestic political affairs.In fact, as mentioned above, with the exception of

20
ForArgentina, datacomefromgovernment sources,whichgiveconstantvaluesof exports
ingoldpesosat 1910o prices (that is to the
say, quantum Chile'sserieswastaken
of exports).
froma Leagueof Nationspublication, whichprovidesthetotalvalueof commodity trade
in 'i 8dpesos,'whichwereconverted intodollarsandthendeflatedusinga priceindexfor
USimportsof crudematerials, themaincomponent of Chileanexports.Colombia's export
figuresrepresent the sumof exportsto its maintradepartners(theUnitedStates,Great
Britain,FranceandGermany) according to theirsources,andweredeflatedby the price
index of US crudefoods imports,the maincomponentof Colombianexports.For
Argentina's tradefiguressee Rep6iblica Argentina,Direcci6nGeneralde Estadistica de la
Naci6n,Anuario delcomercio exterior dela Reptiblica
Argentina.Afios1921,1922y z9239ynoticia
sumaria delperiodo,
19O-1923, vol.I (BuenosAires, 92z4),p. XLVIII.FortheChileanexport
seriesand exchangeratesee Leagueof Nations,Memorandum onInternationalTrade and
BalancesofPayments,I9I2-i926, vol.II (Geneva, 1928),pp.169and'73. Thecomposition of
Chileanexportswas takenfromVictorBulmer-Thomas, TheEconomic Historyof Latin
America since
Independence(NewYorkandMelbourne, I996),p. 59,table3.2.ForColombian
figuresseeMiguelUrrutia M.andMarioArrubla (eds.),Compendiodeestadisticas de
histdricas
Colombia (Bogota,1970),pp. 85-6. For the compositionof Colombia'sexportssee
Rosemary Thorp and Carlos Londoflo, 'El efecto de la Gran Depresi6n de 2929 en las
economias de Peri y Colombia,' in Rosemary Thorp (ed.), Amirica Latina en los adostreinta.
Elpapel de la periferiaen la crisismundial(Mexico, 1988), p. io6. For the price indexes see
Lipsey, PriceandQuantity Trends,pp. 46-7.

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TheExportBoomoftheMexican RevolutionZ77
the drop caused by domestic factorsin 1913 and 1914, the fluctuationin
exportswas stronglydeterminedby internationaleconomic cycles,showing
periodicalcontractionsof varyingintensityin 1893, 1900, 1907, 1913, and
1921. In the last instance,recoverywas slower and was truncatedby the
end of the export cycle, which became evident in I926 in the form of a
consistentdeclinethat continueduntilthe 1929crash.
Secondly,the conventionalcut-offpoint madeby Mexicanhistoriography
at the end of the Porfirianregime (1876--19i1) conceals the surprising
continuityof export growth, a phenomenonthat startedin the I88os and
continuedat an even higherrateduringpartof the 1910os.Thus,althoughthe
impactof the civilwarwas perceptiblein 1913and 1914,this briefdropwas
followed by a phase of intense expansion,which left exports at a much
higherlevel thanin the precedingperiod.The nominalvalueof salesabroad
(SKcurrentin figurez), which amountedto $120 millionin 1910,surpassed
$200 millionin 1917and reached$300 millionin 1920, threetimes the level
of fifteenyearsearlier.Even in realterms(SKrealz)exportsgrewfrom 130to
$217 million between I913 and i922, a 67 per cent increasein only nine
years.Accordingto these figures,the yearsof the Revolutionappearmore as
the climaxof the Porfirianexportboom thanas a turningpointin the growth
patternof the Mexicaneconomy. Before reachingthe conclusionthat the
exportboom of the MexicanRevolutionwas a continuationof the Porfirian
boom, however,it is necessaryto examinethe structureof Mexico'sexports,
in orderto assesswhetherit is consistentwith the continuityapparentin the
generalpicture.

Thestructure
ofMexico's
exports,
I9oo-i929
In the previoussection a briefanalysisof overalltrendshas been presented,
basedon an estimateof the totalvalueof commodityexports.In this section,
Mexico'ssalesabroadarebrokendown into groups,and in the next section,
into products. In these two parts the analysisis no longer based on an
estimateof total exportvalues,but on the recordof actualsalesof the most
importantcomponents of the export basket destined for Mexico's main
tradingpartners.21 The point of departurewas a sampleof individualitems,
which then were added togetherto form genericproductsor mergedinto

21 The criterion for selection of the main articles was that


exports to any of the partners were
over US$ 500,000 in any of the years considered. When this was the case, the exports
directed to the rest of the partners were also recorded in order to cover a larger proportion
of the total. Nevertheless, some articles that did not reach that figure were included in the
sample because of their importance in the traditional export basket of Mexico. The pur-
pose of this was twofold; on the one hand, to broaden the coverage of the sample; on the
other, to reflect the changes in the export mix throughout the period.

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278 SandraKuntzFicker

more general categories.Thus, for example,when I refer to generically


designatedproducts(suchas 'hides and skins'), it shouldbe understoodthat
only the most importantitems within this headingare comprised(namely,
includingcattle hides and goat and kid skins, but excludingless important
items suchas deer,alligatoror wild boarskins).I haveproceededin the same
mannereven when items are furtheraggregatedto form broadercategories
(for instance,animalproducts).This means that coverage,while it usually
representsa majorshareof the productmix, is never exhaustive.22 For the
same reasons,sample coverageis not uniformacross time either.It tends
to be high in the yearsthat most concern us (averaging87 per cent from
1910 to 1920), but declinessubstantially in the last half of the 1920s (an
averageof 72 per cent between 1925 and 1930).23 In summary,both the
absolute figuresand relativeproportionsused in the following should be
consideredas approximationsthat neverthelesssignalthe more significant
featuresand changesin the compositionof exporttradewith an acceptable
degreeof precision.
Porfirianexports took their characteristicform only in the 189os, when
the exportof silver-leadores intensified.As shown in Table i, by the middle
of that decade agriculturalexports could no longer match growth rates of
mineralexports.The processcontinuedat leastuntilthe end of the Porfirian
period (1911),when miningproductsrepresented48 per cent of the export
mix in terms of value,while agricultural productshad fallento 23 per cent
of the total.Table i shows the compositionof exportsin each yearof the
I91os decade,in order to trace changesthat occurredduringthe civil war
years.
The compositionof commodityexportswas not seriouslyaffectedduring
the earlyyearsof the Revolution,althoughthereweresome changes.In 1912
the value and share of mining exports declined slightlyand oil products
emergedas a new categoryin Mexico'sexport basket.The first significant
changeoccurredin 1913,when the shareheld by miningexportsdeclinedby
Io per centwith respectto the previousyearwhile thatof oil salesgrewfrom
6 to 10 per cent of the totalvalue.Yet the main causeof this redistribution
of the basketwas not the growthof oil exports,stillrelativelymodest,but a
considerableincreasein the value of agricultural and animalexports,which

22
The reason for adopting this procedurewas twofold: first, that it is preciselyin the
product-by-productlisting (sometimes individualitems, sometimes generic products)
where the highest uniformityis to be found between the differentcountries'statistics;
second,thatit is the only procedurethatallowsthe studyof pricesandquantitiesas carried
out in the last section.
23 TWOreasonsexplainthis decline:on the one hand,the diversificationof the exportbasket;
on the other,the broadeningof the markets.Indeed,Mexico'sthreemaintradingpartners
took on averageless than 75 per cent of its exportsfrom I3925to 2930.

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ofMexico's
Table i. Composition Exportsto itsMainTrading Partners.
Selec
value
(nominal in million
dollars
and of
percentage total
commodityexpo
1890 1895 19o00 1905 1910 191I 1912

% of % of % of % of % of % of %
Groups value total value total value total value total value total value total value tot

Agricultural 14 40 12 30 15 26 27 29 24 31 23 31 2
26
Animal 2 5 3 7 4 7 5 5 8 6 11 8 12
Forest 2 6 2 5 2 3 I
I I I 0.7 I 0.2

Mineral (except oil) 12 34 19 47 33 59 61 58 57 46 62 48 58 4


()il and byproducts o o o o0 0 0o o o 0.3 o 2 2 8
Total sample 29 84 37 89 53 95 94 90 95 78 io6 82 109 7
Total commodity 35 100 41 100
56 100oo 104 100oo
122 100 130100o oo 138 ioo
exports (SK)
1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922

% of % of % of % of
%( of % of %o
value total value total value total value total value total value total value total

Agricultural 39 26 64 31 66 27 71 28 68 22 28 13 27 11
Animal 15 10 9 5 9 4 12 5 6 2 0.9 o 2 I
Forest oo0
o 0o 0o 0o 0o 0o 0 0 0.1 0o 0.4 0 0.4o 0
Mineral (except oil) 59 40 81 40 103 42 94 37 87 29 51 24 67 28
Oil and byproducts 22 15 32 i6 50 2zi 57 22 114 38 119 56 125 51
Total sample 135 91 186 91 228 93 229 92 275 91 198 93 222 91
Total commodity 149 o100 205 o100 245 100oo 253 i10oo 303 100oo 214 100 243 o100
exports (SK)

Sources:Own elaborationbased on the commercialstatisticsof the United States,Great Britain,Franceand Germany.For complete sourc
For the total value of commodity exports (designatedas SK) see Kuntz Ficker,'Nuevas series', table 2.
Notes:The table presentsthe groupingby classesof the main export items. The items includedare:
Agriculturalproducts: coffee, ixtle, henequen,sugar,dyes (indigo and jalapa),vanillaand vanillabeans, india rubber,guayulegum, tobac
bananas.
Animalproducts:cattle,hides and skins.
Forest products:mahoganyand dye woods.
Mineralproducts: copper (ore, matte, and regulus;concentrates;pigs, ingots, bars, plates, and old (unrefined));lead (ore, bullion and ba
(ore, regulus,metal),zinc ore.
Oil products:crude, semi-refinedand refined,lubricating,topped oils (includingfuel).

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280 Sandra Kuntz
Ficker
togethermade up 46 per cent of the total.This phenomenonintensifiedin
1914,when these two groups accountedfor more than half of total export
income while miningsales fell to 25 per cent of the total.Althoughsignifi-
cant, the surge of animalexportswas short-lived,while that in agricultural
saleslastedfor the rest of the decade.In absoluteterms,exportsof this kind
grew from about$30 to 40 millionbetween 19 11 and 1913,and remainedat
that level until 1916. In the followingyear,however,they reacheda record
value of $64 million, which solidified their rank as the second highest
categorywith 31 per cent of total exportvalue.Between I913 and I918 the
mining sector suddenlyrecoveredand togetherwith the robust figuresin
the agriculturalsector produced the most important export surge that
Mexicohad experiencedup untilthattime.Fromthatpoint miningproducts
remainedas the top groupin Mexico'sexports,settingrecordsfrom 1917to
1920 with sales above $80 millionper year.
The most surprisingfeatureof this developmentis the relativelysecondary
role playedby oil exports.The value of oil salesin all categoriesgrew from
$13 to 22 million between 1913 and 1916. Although significant from the
point of view of the sectoritself,this performancewas not enoughto give oil
exports the importancethat is usuallyattributedto them in the Mexican
exportbasket.In fact,until 1917, oil exportsaccountedfor 16per cent of the
totalvalueof commodityexportsat most. Even more surprising(becausewe
have been largelyunawareof it) is the fact that animaland animalproduct
exportscontributeda largershareof exportearningsthan oil until 1914.
Oil exportscontinuedgrowingthroughoutthe 19ios, but theirtrueclimax
in absolute as well as in relativeterms took place somewhatlater in that
decade,when the more acutephaseof the civilwarin Mexicohad concluded
and World War One in Europe was nearingits end. In 1918 oil exports
(includingoil-derivedproducts)amountedto over $5o million,andprovided
more than 20 per cent of total exportincome.The realleap occurredat the
beginning of the 19zo20s, when oil sales surpassed$ioo million and rep-
resentedmore than 35 per cent of Mexico'stotal sales abroad.It must be
pointedout, however,thatin this first'oil era',the dominantplacegainedby
oil in totalexportswas due both to its dynamicgrowthand to the temporary
declinein agricultural and miningexports.As a matterof fact, the spurtin
foreignoil saleswas a short-livedphenomenon;oil exportsgrew by almost
60oper cent between 1917 and 1918, and more than doubled from 1919 to
1920, but then reacheda ceiling (around$zo20million)that was not to be
surpassedin the remainderof the period.After 1921, the increasein relative
importanceof oil saleswas due more due to decliningagricultural and min-
eral exports than continued high growth.
These figures lead us to reconsider the role of the various sectors of
the economy in the change in export structure between 1910o and i925.

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TheExportBoomoftheMexican Revolutionz8
It confirmsthe idea that, until 1912,politicalinstabilityassociatedwith the
Maderorebelliondid not produce any perceptibleimpact upon the value
and compositionof exports.From 1913onward,however,the figurespaint
quitea differentpictureto the one usuallypresented.
In the firstplace,the dropin exportsin 1914 and 1915was basicallydue to
a severedeclinein the valueof miningexports.This declinewas ameliorated
more by increasesin animaland agricultural exportsthan a surgein oil sales
abroad.Those two sectors retainedtheir value, in fact at a higher level
than near the end of the Potfiriato,duringthe worst yearsof the civil war
(1913-16). This phenomenon does not have an easy explanation. In some
cases it is apparentthat economic activitiescontinuedin spite of the revol-
utionaryviolence, either because they were located far from the armed
conflicts or because they were preservedby some kind of understanding
betweenproducersand militarychiefs.The two best examplesof this unin-
terruptedactivityare henequen(sisal)and oil production,althoughdue to
differentreasons.Henequenplantationswerelocatedin the remotepeninsula
of Yucatan,which remainedpracticallyunaffectedby the warfare.24Oil
productionwas also locatedin an areathat was relativelyperipheralto the
revolution- the Gulf states of Tamaulipasand Veracruz.Companieswere
successfulin overcomingharassmentand compulsorytaxingfrom the out-
side and strikesin the inside becausewarlordsbenefited from production
and oil companieswere adept negotiators.25On the other hand, there is
reasonto believethat for some animaland agricultural products(cattleand
ixtle fibre, for instance)the export surge reflectedthe commandeeringof
these resourcesratherthan increasesin production.Seized productswere
exportedin returnfor war materiel.26What took place in these instances
was the appropriationand confiscationof resourcesby a rationalemore
militarythan economic, frequentlyresultingin their depletion.27Finally,
24 About affairsin Yucatin see AllenWellsandGilbertM.Joseph,Summer Seasons
ofDiscontent,
25
of Upheaval(Stanford,1996),partII; Knight,MexicanRevolution, pp. 247-5 I.
In Alan Knight'swords:'... the oil industryhad alreadybegun to show its capacityto
insulateitself from interferenceand disruption,despiteits proximityto the revolutionary
north'. Knight, MexicanRevolution, p. 131. Regardingwarfareand strikes affectingoil
companiessee Womack,'MexicanRevolution,'pp. 103-49.
26 Thereis plentyof evidenceaboutthis type of practices.Among others,see HectorAguilar
Camin,Lafrontera ndmada. Sonorayla Revolucion
Mexicana(Mexico,1985),pp. 3z1-3 and429;
FriedrichKatz, TheLife and Timesof PanchoVilla (Stanford,1998), pp. 415-17; Hall y
Coerver,Revolution, pp. 15I-2; Alicia HernandezChfivez,'Militaresy negocios en la Re-
voluci6nMexicana,'HistoriaMexicana, vol. XXXIV, no. 2 (Oct.-Dec. 1984), pp. 181-2z12;
Aida LermanAlperstein,Comercio enMixico,190o-192o
dela transformacidn
e industria
exterior
(Mexico, 1989), p. 35.
27 Indeed, depletion of cattle herds as a result of the recurring confiscations by revolutionary
factions seems to explain the drop in cattle exports during the first years of the following
decade. Manuel A. Machado, Jr., TheNorth MexicanCattleIndustry,Is9o-I97y.Ideology,Conflict,
and Change (College Station, 1981), pp. 8, 29.

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282 Sandra Ficker
Kuntz
disruptionsin the internaltransportationnetworkmay have fostered the
redirectionof output from the domestic to the internationalmarket,as
seems to have happenedwith the coffeeproductionin the stateof Veracruz.
In these, as in other cases, the export boom was likely accompaniedby
shortagesin the domestic market,and thus was more the reflectionof a
disarticulatedeconomy and decliningwelfarethan of a buoyanteconomic
situation.28
In the secondplace,the growthof exportsstartingin 915 was due to the
powerfulrecoveryof the miningsectoranda new risein agricultural exports,
which largelycounteractedthe decline in animal exports from that time
onward. In 1917, when commodity sales abroad surpassed$200 million,
the agricultural and miningsectors- the traditionalsourcesof the Mexican
export basket- provided more than 70 per cent of their total value. In
contrast,oil sales, which have been creditedwith the leadingrole in the
revolutionaryexportboom, representedbarely16per cent of the totalvalue
in that year.
As for datareferringto the decadeafterthe revolution,it mustbe pointed
out that in the last five yearsof the period,the sampleprovidedin Table I
graduallybecomes less and less representative.There are two reasons for
this; first,becauseduringthose yearsthe sharewhich the threecommercial
tradingpartnersin the sample had in Mexico's foreign trade decreased,
as Mexico was diversifyingits marketsabroad. Secondly, new products
emergedin Mexico'sexportmix, particularly in the categoryof agricultural
exports.For instance,accordingto Mexicansources,exports of vegetables
and legumesto the United Statesamountedto $io millionon averagefrom
1926 to 1929.29 As my samplefor this categoryincludessome of the vege-
tablesandlegumesbut not the total,the grouptendsto be under-represented
as new productsadd to it.
With these reservationsin mind, the patternshown by Mexico'sexports
by the end of the period exhibits a noteworthycontinuity:in 1929 the
composition of exports was not very differentfrom that of 1911.30How
is it possible that it had changed so little after thirtyyears, a world war,
and a revolution?What had changed and what had stayed the same in
Mexico'sexport sector?To find the answer,it will be necessaryto narrow
our focus and examinethe main articlesof the export basket duringthis
period.

28 I thank Alan Knight for


pointing out this paradox,in which, as he said, 'hard times
correlate (in some cases) with export "success".'
29 Departamento de la Estadistica Nacional, Anuario estadistico.Comerdcio
exteriory navegacidn.
Ado de (192y a 1928) (Mexico, 19z6-1930).
30 This idea is pointed out in Reynolds, MexicanEconomy,p. 205.

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TheExportBoomoftheMexicanRevolution 283
Mexico'sexportbasket:products,quantitiesandprices
In this section, the analysis is further narrowed to focus on products, based
on a sample of the main export items destined for Mexico's most important
trading partners.31First, the share of these products in the total export value
is presented in order to assess how diversified the Mexican export basket
was, and to what extent this diversification was affected by the revolution.
Then, the main exports are taken individually to analyse their evolution in
terms of quantity and price. Instead of market prices, the analysis is based
on unit values, which are calculated from the commercial statistics of each
of the trading partners.32As we know, unit values often differ to some extent
from market prices.33 The main difference is that the unit values capture
only 'changes in the average value of imports or exports per physical unit
regardless of whether the change in value is due to a change in price per se
or to some other circumstance such as a change in the size or quality of
the item being exported or imported'.34 Even though this problem has
more effect on longer-span time series, in which substantial changes in the
quality of the traded goods are to be expected,35 we cannot discount the
possibility that it also affects some of the products considered here. This is
especially true since we are dealing with quantitative data compiled by dif-
ferent countries and organised according to varying criteria. In fact, certain
price (unit value) series used here diverge from those proposed by some
scholars for Mexican exports during the I91os.36
During World War One the unit value of some products (particularlyoil)
varied considerably according to whether they were sold in the United States
or in British markets. Since the comparison of internationalprices is beyond
the scope of this work, I have estimated the average unit value (weighted
by the quantity sold to each country) of each article's exports, and then used
this average as price. Finally, in the case of some products for which the
trading partner's sources do not break down uniformly (copper or oil), or
which were exported in various forms or degrees of manufacture, the per
unit values were calculated using each country's unit values and categories,

31 Sometimestheseitemshavebeengroupedinto genericproducts,due especially to the


natureof thesources.
32
The unitvalueis obtainedby dividingthetotalvaluebythequantity
of thearticletraded.
33 Lipsey,PriceandQuantity pp. 93-roz.As theauthorexplains,thedegreeof diver-
Trends,
gencevariesfromone articleto another,andthusit is not possibleto applya 'general
adjustment'in orderto matchbothtypesof data.
34PriceStatisticsReviewCommittee,ThePriceStatistics of theFederalGovernment.Review,
andRecommendations
Appraisal, (Washington,DC, 196i),p. 79. 35 Ibid.,p. 32 andff.
36 Meyer provides a series of unit values in pesos for oil output from 19I to 1927. If this
seriesis converted
intodollarsatthemarketexchangerate,theresultsdifferseverelyfrom
theunitvaluescalculatedhereup until1917,andget closerto themstarting in 1918.See
Meyer,'Mexico,Revolution,'table3. FortheconversionI usedMood,Handbook, p. I14.

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284 Sandra Ficker
Kuntz
100

90 ........
.... ..........
9
.............. ......... ....... ..........
80-
............ ...............

00 ...........................................

.4.. ....... ...... o 12 top products


....... .. .......... . ...............
o,,- [] 3 top products
70.

30 .... :.
2 0....... 0 ~)0L0~-
NO'~ LOmN 3Ctop productso0
40- 00 CJ J JCI'

0
0 M
to 0U) 0)0)) 0C0O0)0) ) ) 00)0)0)W 0)NM ;f0)0 W0)0) )M00

Notes:Productsrepresentedhereare amongthe 16 productsthatmade up the largestpartof Mexico'sexport


basketthroughout the period.These products(some of themtypes of products)are coffee, fibres,sugar,dyes,
venilla,gums, tobacco,rawcotton,cattle,hides and skins,woods, copper,lead, silverores, gold ores, oil and
oil products.
Sources:See footnote10.

Fig. 3. Concentration ofExportstoMainPartners,


(byProducts) Ipo-I92p.
uponTotalCommodity
Percentage ExportsValue.

thenweightedaccordingto volumeandfinallyaggregatedtogether.It is clear


thata procedureof this kinddoes not leadto the constructionof priceseries
for specificproductseitherin the nationalor in the internationalmarket;but
it allowsus to follow the movementsin sellingpricesof the particularmix of
productsthat madeup the Mexicanexportbasket.
Comparedto other Latin Americancountries,Mexico had a relatively
diversifiedexport mix at the beginningof the twentiethcentury.Between
i 890 and 1924, to reach 8o per cent of commodityexport value the top
twelve most importantexports had to be added together (see Figure 3).37
This diversityis understatedby the figuresbecausesome of them are,in fact,
broadclassesof products,such as fibres- which includeixtleand henequen.
Concentrationwas higher,however,in the leadingexportproducts,as just
three of them providedabout 50 per cent of the total value of sales abroad
duringthe period (as much as 70 to 8o per cent in the early192os).
Two aspectsof the evolutionof export diversificationdeservemention.
The firstis that,contraryto what has been believed,8 the civilwaryearsdid
not increaseconcentrationin a few sets of productsas comparedto the

7 Bulmer-Thomasoffers a concentrationindex for a list of 2- countries.In 13 of them,


70 per cent of total exports is accounted for by just the two main products.Bulmer-
Thomas,Economic Histor, p. 59, table 3.2.
38 See, for instance,Ulloa,Historia,p. 249, and Solis, Realidad,
pp. 78, 83.

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TheExportBoomoftheMexicanRevolution 285

average level of the Porfirianperiod. There was no decrease in the number of


products that provided the bulk of the export mix; also, the share of the top
three articles in the total did not grow. In some years, in fact, the contrary
was the case; the contribution of these products decreased from about
6o per cent to 5o per cent of total value between 191o and 1916, mainly due
to the decline in mining exports. The second point is that the oil boom
brought about a considerable increase in concentration in the three top
export products in the early 1920s, but this was a temporary phenomenon
that should not hide another much more important one. I refer to the re-
markable diversification in the export basket throughout this decade; in the
late 1920s, the twelve top products (directed to the three main markets) were
barely 70 per cent of the total value of exports, and the top three provided
just 40 per cent of that total. As pointed out above, this diversification
involved both products and trading partners.
Based on these figures it may be suggested that, beyond a temporary
decline in 1913 and 1914, the Mexican Revolution did not have a marked
impact upon export behaviour, either in terms of value or of product diver-
sification. It has been implied, however, that this behaviour was mainly
the effect of growing export earnings, rather than increasing exports. More
specifically, it has been stated that the volume of exports declined during the
civil war years, and that this poor performance in actual sales was compen-
sated by the price effect in the foreign market."9To test this idea it is
necessary to look at the changes in price and volume components for the
main articles exported during the 191os. In order to do so, I have chosen the
seven articles that, taken together, contributed between 60oand 8o per cent
of the total value of exports between 1911 and 1920 (see Figure 4). Some
of these are homogeneous items that presumably suffered only slight varia-
tions in qualitywithin this period; coffee, ixtle, and henequen. Certain others
are generic products, as each one includes items of uniform composition
but with different degrees of processing; copper, lead, silver (ore and bars),
and oil.
We start by considering agriculturalproducts. Coffee and fibres increased
their share in the total value of commodity exports from 13 per cent to 27
per cent between 191o and 1913, held steady at about 25 per cent of the total
until 1918, fell to 18 per cent, and then dropped further to i 2 per cent
by 1920. Together they contributed one fourth of export income during
the civil war years when fighting was most intense. In order to remove the
price effect, the graphs in Figure 5 illustrate changes in the quantum of
coffee, henequen, and ixtle exported from 1900 to i930. This picture is

39 Meyer, Revoludcidn,
p. I i2.

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286 Sandra
KuntzFicker
90

80

70

o
650

40

.. 30.....

20

10

O) 0 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0)O 0) 0)
•) 0) 0) t )
0)•

Soiland oil products Qcopper

I silverores and ingots 0 fibres(ixtleand henequen)


lead I coffee

Note:Aboutthe compositionof genericproducts,see table 1.


Sources:See footnote10.

Fig. 4. TheStructureof MexicanExports: SelectedProductsI9ro-9z28.


upon TotalCommodity
Percentage Exports Value.

supplemented with indexes for price (unit value) and quantity presented in
Figure 6.
Here of course, we deal with crops cultivated in different geographic and,
in the civil war context, political conditions, and whose productive cycles
are affected by a variety of factors. The contribution of each of these articles
to the export mix also varies widely, as may be observed by the absolute
figures shown in Figure 5. Henequen was by far the most important agri-
cultural export throughout the period, followed by coffee and farther down
in third place, by ixtle. What is striking about these figures, however, is that,
in spite of the specific characteristics of each article and of their differing
relative importance, the three agriculturalproducts actually experienced a
surge in export volumes precisely during the years of heaviest fighting
(slightly later in the case of ixtle).Moreover, as seen in Figure 6, from 1913 to
1916 international prices did not show any marked rise, which means that
any increase in the value of exports came from increases in volume. Price rises
did become an important factor in the subsequent period (1917-20), when
they mitigated the impact of decreasing export volume. Looking more closely
at coffee and henequen will give a better idea of the dynamics at work.

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TheExport Boomof theMexicanRevolution 287

A. Coffee
9
8
7
6
5

2
1

0
o
o D
C0C
0- . N
DC.4
r-
C)
m0e
r-
~
W-1-
C
V-
O
.-coN C,Cq
- N,
4 1C4 , N
3) le
C4 ,
COw
N4
N04
-
C-4
C00 Dm
N C4
a) oC
m oD om a) om a m ("a
m
Ca a) a•D• m oD
a) oa) o) o)oD o oC o oD

B. Henequen
25

20
15

10

o 0 " NC4 m • LO CO r-- 0Co 0 N- 0C


4C1 m le 0"D D - C 0
.)
o0
m
o0
a)
(V-1
m o)
VN
m
T-
mCD D
CD)Cm
T-Nr"NW-
CD0 CD)C C
oNT-
C)C
N)C4
mD a
C%4-C%
No
)CD CD
C4
CD
04
CD
N
CD o)
CD) o'C
CD ) CD
T- r- r- r- r- r- V- V r T r V1 - - - - - - - -1 r" W- r

C. Ixtle
2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5 _ _ _
_--
-_ --_-- "
5---
0.0
CLn 0 N cv) "t U) D r- CD CD 0 c-)v . ) ,c- C
CN4 CO( mCD 0
0 r VN N- N- 4iNN N 0N 0N N N Ct)
o)D a)CD C m CD
a) a)DCD CD CD CD aCD CD CD CD aCD aCD CD CDm CD CD CD CD
V- r" r- r- T- r- T- r- r- r- T- r- W. r r r T r r r r T

Sources:see footnote 10.

Fig. 5.Quantumofselected
agricultural
exportsto maintrading
partners,
igoo-i93o
(millions
of Ip9odollars).

As shownin Figure6, coffeebenefitedfromrisingpricesuntil1913, but its


remarkableshare in agriculturalexports (and in total exports, in which it
went from threeper cent to eightper cent between 191oand 1914) was due
also to considerableincreasesin the quantityexported.It is difficultto tell
whetherthe crucialfactorhere was an actualgrowth in output or reorien-
tation towardsthe foreignmarket,and it is likelythat both factorswere at

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288 SandraKuntzFicker
A. Coffee
250

200

150 -index
quantity
S150
S. - - - price index

.-4--

50

0
0 0 - ,•MIt D 0 -. 00 r-- N M Rt M WD w 0M
m0 0 0) a 0)0)a0)a) 0a 04 04 0 0) 0 0M 0 0 0)

B. Henequen (Sisal)
400
350
300

8250
20
200 -a - quantity
o index
150 - - - price index
100 - ,
50

0O 0M0 0 0 W 0
04 0O3 O 0 0 03 0 03
0 O3 O 3 3
O3 O
O3 O3 3 3 O 0O O3 O3 O 3
_ ,- ,.. .- •- •- - ,- ,- ,

C. Ixtle(TampicoFibre)
500
450
400
350
300
250 ---- quantity
index
- - price index

-
150
100
50
0 Co 0
No - N4 C-D CD Cr-00 D--CD 0 N N C'D CD r- D 0 0
_ -
T-- -
-- -
-
_
- _
T-
- - - _ _ - -1

0
- - -
T- T1 V- V r
00-- 0 0- 0-0 0 04 04 04 0N 04 0 04 04 0

Sources: see footnote 10.

Fig. 6. SelectedAgricultural
ExportstoMainTrading Partners,
19oo-193o.
PriceandQuantityIndexes.

work. Coffee is a perennialplant,40and in the main producingregion in


Mexico it had a four-yearproductioncycle; 'a good harvestis followedby
a bad one and then by two averageones'.41This suggests that, excluding

40 'It is not possible,evenif desired,to increaseproductionfromone yearto another... Like-


wise,it is not possibleto suddenlydiminishproductionfromone yearto anotheras happens
with yearlycrops, in which they just stop sowing'. Secretariade la Economia Nacional,
El cafi.Aspectos desuproduccidn
economicos enMixicoy enelextranjero
(Mexico,1933),P-.48.
41 This is the cycle describedby agriculturalists in C6rdoba,Veracruz,the main coffee pro-
ducingregionof the country.However,conditionsvaryaccordingto the regionandtypeof
cultivation.Ibid.,p. 42.

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TheExportBoomoftheMexicanRevolution 289

extraordinarycircumstances (such the destruction of the plants, which, as far


as we know, did not take place on any notable scale), production in the short
term was governed more by the natural cycle than by political and market
conditions. Nonetheless, it is likely that the severe disturbances of inland
transportationand high prices abroad reoriented coffee beans from domestic
to external markets. The quantity of coffee exports rose considerably in 1913
and held until 1916, during a period in which international prices moved
slightly downwards. After 1916 no similar surge is to be observed, even
though international demand pushed prices up considerably in the last half
of the 1920S.
Henequen was by far the most important single component of the
export basket, and the one that showed the best performance throughout
the 191os. It benefited from a peripherallocation within Mexico, a monopoly
in the internationalmarket, and favourable prices abroad.42As may be seen in
the figures, the quantityexported grew considerably from 1911 to 191 5, within
a context of relatively stable prices in the foreign market.43Starting in 1916,
the price effect began to have a significant impact on the value of sales,
producing extraordinary earnings in spite of declining quantities exported.
The contraction of exports was not the result of diminishing production,
but the means employed by an agency controlled by the revolutionary
government (the Comisi6n Reguladora del Mercado del Henequen) in order
to impose a monopoly price for the fibre. This situation could last while
sales from East Africa, Java, New Zealand and the Philippines were sus-
pended due to the World War, but as soon as the war ended, led to the
demise of Yucatnn's predominance over the fibres market.44
Next, we briefly consider the case of oil. Although this is the best-known
and most abundantly studied sector,45the export series presented in Figure 7
show some features that deserve comment. Even though exports began in
1912 and registered immediate and consistent growth, it was after 1917 that
oil sales abroad became outstanding in absolute as well as relative terms.
International demand represented an important stimulus to expand pro-
duction, but there is agreement that domestic conditions also favoured this

42WellsandJoseph,Summer
chapter9 andpassim.
ofDiscontent,
43As explainedbefore,the'prices'I referarein realityunitvaluesof Mexico'sactualsalesof
henequento its mainpartners. Althoughsimilarin theiroverallbehaviour, theydifferin
absolutetermsfromthe averageyearlypricesprovidedby GilbertM.Joseph,Revoludcidn
desdeafuera. Mixico
Yucatan, y losEstadosUnidos, IR8o-I24(Mexico,1992), pp. 69, 171.
Accordingto thissource,priceswereless stablein the earlyi 90os thanwhatthe com-
mercialrecordsindicate.
44 Richard NormanGlendening,'MarketPowerin the HenequenIndustryof
Yucat.n,
Mexico,' unpubl. PhD diss., Iowa State University, 3993,pp. 18-21.
45 Among the better known works are Lorenzo Meyer and Isidro Morales Petrdleo y nacidn
Lapoliticapetroleraen Mixico (Mexico, 990) ; Brown, Oil and Revolution.
(I0oo-9gg7).

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290 SandraKuntZPicker
A. Quantum (millions of 1913 dollars)
120

100

80

60

40

20

0 0 -- 14 0C
) "I ) 0
oo ( 0) 0 - CN4 rt t
LO C 0), 0
0) 0)-- 0) 0)- 0) 0).-1 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0)- 0) 0 0) 0) 0) 03) 0)
rl"r- r- --r V- r-- r- r- r-- I- r- r-- r- r r- W"- -r - V- r,-

B. Price and Quantity Indexes (1913=100)


800 250

700
- - 0 - -quantity
200 index
600 l '---- price
E index

x
500
"150 x

& 400

100
300--

200 "

100 N0 .-r- 0 0 0

0 - - 0

Sources: See footnote 10.

Fig. 7. Exportsof OilandOil-Derived toMainTrading


Products Partners,
zii-i.pjo.

outcome. Apart from the location of the oil camps, a relativelyprotected


environmentand low taxescontributeto explainthe surgein oil production
and salesduringthe 19Ios.46As for pricebehaviour,it is importantto point
out that in these yearsit followeddifferentpatternsin Europewith respect
to the United States.Whereasthe price of oil in Great Britainreachedits

46 Meyerand
Morales,Petrdleoy
nacidn,
pp. 33-7.

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TheExportBoomoftheMexicanRevolution291
peakin 1918 (whenit was five times higherthanin 1913)and then declined
steadilyin the followingyears,in the USA importpriceswererelativelystable
duringthe 191os and showed importantincreasesduringthe 1920s, with a
peak between 1925 and 1927 (when they were 130 per cent higher with
respectto 1913).47 As the UnitedStateswas the mainmarketfor Mexicanoil,
this means that increasesin the value of oil exports duringthe 1910osrep-
resented growth in the quantitiesexported. Up until 1918 Mexican pro-
duction and sale prices moved in the same direction;from 1919 on, these
two variablestook opposite ways; from 1919 to 1922 the volume exported
grew despite decliningprices,whereas from 1923 to 1927, soaringexport
pricescould not counteractthe declinein exports,which persisteduntilthe
end of the 1920s.
Finally,the performanceof miningexportswas very differentfrom that
of the products analysedthus far. The geographicand productiondiver-
sificationof this sector, along with changinginternationaldemandfor the
variousminingproducts,createddiverseconditionsfor the developmentof
the differentbranchesof the sector.At the sametime, the directconnection
of some mining sites with the foreign marketand the increasein inter-
nationalprices during the First World War favoureda certaindegree of
continuityin productionand a swift recoveryin the total value of external
sales after the drop that had occurredin the worst years of revolutionary
fighting.
Miningactivitieswere probablythe most widelyaffectedby the civil war.
A largepartof the exploitationswas locatedin centraland northernMexico,
in areaswhere severe fightingtook place. Moreover,mining firms were a
naturaltarget for revolutionaries,who, dependingon the circumstances,
seized production,levied forced taxes, and even, althoughless frequently,
droveout the management- often composedby foreigners- andappointed
their own administration.For the same reasons,however,only rarelywere
mining assets destroyedby the rebels, as functioningfirms were always

47 Here, again,we dealwith the unitvalueof Mexico'smix of oil exportsto each country.In
the case of the United States, the unit values for oil that I have calculatedfrom the
commercialstatisticsarevery close to those recordedby the StatisticalAbstract
oftheUnited
Statesas partof a tabletitled'Unit values,annualaverage,of importantarticlesimported:
1909-1939'. This is consistentwith the fact that Mexico was the main origin of US oil
importsat the time and confirmsmy own calculations.These figuresdifferbroadly,how-
ever, from the unitvaluesof US oil exportsaccordingto the same source.An explanatory
note referringto the unit value of importsstates:'The averagesare obtainedby dividing
the total value of imports of the specified articleby the total quantity,and as in some
commodities there may be considerablevariationsin price between differentgrades,
methodsof packing,etc., and as the proportionof the grades,etc., mayvaryfrom yearto
year, the averagesin such cases may show the actualprice movements only roughly.'
US Departmentof Commerce,Statistical Abstractof the UnitedStatesI94o,62nd number
(Washington, 1941), PP. 333-5.

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29z2 Sandra
KuntzFicker
A. Copper
25

20

15

10

N
0) CY 0)) QY C) a) a) 0) a) N N
a) )

B. Silver (Ores and Ingots)


45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10

5
U) 0 . C4 m) * LO (D0 I-- co 0) 0 C4 (m) e 1O co r- co 0
0- - - -N- -N4 N 4 N N
4 N CN N (N CN
0)
0a) 0 ) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) a) 0) 0) 0) 0)
r- - - V r r V- r- r" W-1 V- V1 V1 - - r r V

C. Lead
9
8
7
6
5-

2-

0
LO0
0
0 NC4
1 M 10 -t D r- a)0)N
N N--00 N e
a)•> 0
D 0
N 0
N C4 C C )
0) 0) 0)
Nces: NoNt
0) e0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) a) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0)

Sources: See footnote 10

Fig. 8. QuantumofSelected
MineralExportstoMainTrading
Partners,
iy9of-i3o
of prodollars).
(millions

more profitable.Amid these conditions,two factorscontributedto mitigate


the impactof the warupon the sector'sperformance.On the one hand,the
geographicdispersionof miningactivitieshelped to maintaincertainconti-
nuityin nationwidelevels of exploitationdespite temporarybreakdownsin
specificlocalities.On the otherhand,the diversificationof the miningsector

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TheExportBoomoftheMexicanRevolution 293
A. Copper
250

200

150 quantity
... - . . "A. a ------- index
1500
"
.
~~O r ' - -- - iprice index

50

LO") 0 -- N C M) 4 CD r- O
00 ) 0CD) C4 U OCD r- 0 0) 0
oD C Nr--N NT- NVr- 44 0 C4N N N C )
0) 0a 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0)
0m 0) 0) 0) 0) 0m
r- - " - - -1 r- r- r- r- V- r- r- r- r- T- V- T I r r r

B. Silver (Ores and Ingots)


250

200 -.

S
t- 150 o?
11 quantity
o --"-- , -- iindex
1~ - price index
-"-
0•0
50

0
0 N C) 1 CO W 0 M) ML) , CO r- C )
oLO) N.- U) Cr- 0
N4 N
C4
N N N
O
N CNN
00
N N
0
C'M
T--V---" r- r- r- --

C. Lead
300
300
250
u 200a
0 . quantity
S150 index
. ' index
100 / // -
-- --',price
--4
50. ----5-
~
0
CLC 0 C,- N4 M) It ) CO
ICo f- 00 0 .--- N C)
CM 1)
n CD r 0a) 0
oN NT N- Nr Nr NV N4 N4 N4 N4 C)
0) 0 0) 0) 0)
m 0 D
0) 0) VV-
0) 0) 0) 0)
0D 0) 0) 0) 0)
0a 0) 0) r0) -0)r -

Sources: see footnote 10.

MineralExports to Main TradingPartners,sgoy-s93o. PriceandQuantityIndexes.


Fig. 9. Selected

allowed minimum levels of overall performance to be maintained even when


one or another mining product plummeted.Thus, while copper exports
reachedtheirlowest point in 1914,silverexportsdid so in 1916,at the same
time as coppersalesalmostrecoveredtheir 1913level.48Quantum,priceand
quantityindicatorsfor the main miningexports are presentedin Figures8
and 9.
48 In fact, copperproductionin Cananeareacheda recordof 6z millionlbs. in 1916,despite
continuousrevolutionaryactivityin the area.Nicolis Cairdenas
Garcia,Empresasytrabaja-
mexicana,900oo-929(Mexico,1998),p. 84. Copperoutput figuresfor
doresenla granminenra
severalcompaniesareprovidedin Hall and Coerver,Revolution,p. I24. About Cananeasee
Ibid.,chapter2.

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294 SandraKuntzFicker

The graphsin Figure8 show that the exportquantumof the three main
products(copper,silver,and lead) experienceda sharpdrop from 1913 to
1916, and that theirrecoveryfolloweda differentpatternin each case; swift
in the case of silver, slower for lead, and ratherhesitantfor copper. The
graphsalso show that for miningproductsmore than any other, the effect
of price playeda crucialrole in maintainingor recoveringexportedvalues.
In fact, the surgeof internationalprices,clearlyassociatedwith WorldWar
One, was importantin severalways. The price effect valorisedparticularly
miningproduction,increasingprofit marginsand the value of sales abroad.
Copper prices soared in 1915 and remainedhigh until 1920, while silver
pricesrose continuouslyfrom 1916to 1919 andremainedhigh in the follow-
ing year.As well, high pricesabroadactedas an incentivefor entrepreneurs
to keepworkingin spite of adverseconditions.49 In fact,despitethe internal
fighting and the resultingreduction in the volumes exported,in the case of
copper there is some correlation between internationalprice movements
and export volume, a correlationthat can also be seen, though somewhat
later,in other mineralproducts.50A deeperanalysis,which lies beyond the
scope of this paper,would be necessaryin order to identifythe dynamics
behindthis connection.

remarks
Concluding
The upward trend of Mexican exports that started in the mid-I880s
weatheredthe internationaleconomic recessionsin 1893, 1907, 1914 and
1921 as well as the most severephaseof fightingin Mexico'scivilwarduring
1913-I 5. With the exceptionof 1921, the export sector proved resilientby
quicklyand successfullyrecovering,particularlyin the I91os. In the last half
of that decade,the (nominal)value of exportswent througha stage of fast
growth, increasingat an unprecedentedpace even in a generallyrobust
period. The post-war economic crisis in 1921 gave export value its most
dramaticshock. A progressiverecoveryfollowed up until 1925, when the
export cycle starteda decline that was to end up with the conclusion of
the first export-ledgrowth era in Mexico. Accordingto the evidence col-
lectedin this study,we can datethe exportboom of the MexicanRevolution
from 191o5or 1916 to 1920. Furthermore,despite cyclicalfluctuationsand
a temporarydrop broughton by the civil war, exports show a remarkable
continuityfrom the mid I88os up to the mid 1920s.

49 MarvinD. Bernstein,TheMexican 189o-syyo.A StudyoftheInteraction


MiningIndustry, ofPolitics,
Economics, and Technology(New York, 1964), p. soo; Womack, 'Mexican Revolution,' p. 13 1.
50 Cirdenas, Enmpresas,
pp. 74, 99.

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TheExportBoomoftheMexicanRevolution 295
The products that made up the export boom are indicative of this con-
tinuity. If, for the sake of simplicity, I restricted myself to a short list of the
most essential elements that made up this phenomenon, the list would
include: high and growing export volumes of henequen, ixtle, coffee, live-
stock, hides and skins, and, later on, price increases that compensated for
decreases in volume; high prices for copper, silver and lead, and the swift
recovery of these mining exports which began in 1916. In strict sense, the
boom associated with the revolutionary decade owed less to the novelty of
oil than to the structure of the export sector inherited from the Porfirian
period.
A more complex task is to identify reasons for continuity or growth in
each one of these components of the export boom. An important factor was
the location of some of the export activities in areas that were comparatively
less affected by the warfare and near the ocean, as in the case of henequen,
coffee and oil. This feature gave these activities a direct link with the inter-
national market without having to rely on the domestic railwaynetwork that
was severely disrupted by the armed conflict.51 Relative continuity in pro-
duction in spite of the civil war was also a factor in most cases, even though
fighting or distribution problems could cause temporary interruptions in
particular locations. World War One also played a crucial role, because it
increased enormously the value of the Mexican export mix starting in
191•5,
and created incentives to keep on with production in a difficult time. By and
large, the upsurge in total export value conceals a shifting pattern of export
products. In particular, changes in the value of agricultural-animalexports
and mining exports tended to offset each other between 1910o and 1918.
Likewise, export prosperity did not always reflect thriving production. In
the case of some agriculturaland animal products (ixtle and livestock), the
intensification of sales abroad represented a drain on productive resources
that would affect their performance negatively in the following years.
Moreover, products like cattle and coffee were probably redirected from the
domestic to the international market, and therefore experienced a surge of
sales abroad at the cost of shortage and inflation at home. In the end, even
though we agreed that exports were booming despite the disruptive effects of
the civil war, the balance would still be paradoxical; this surge did not result
in net growth for the Mexican economy as a whole, neither did it produce
better living standards for the Mexican people. By and large, as we know,
resources provided by exports had a limited impact upon the economy,

51 Which confirms the notion that the export sector developed during the Porfirian regime
could better withstand the break-up of the railway system than the sector oriented to the
domestic market, which, in turn, was much more dependent on the land transport network
to function.

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296 Sandra
KuntzFicker
although they offered substantialsupport for the government and might have
contributed to define the outcome of the war among the rival factions.52
As for oil, its significance in these years should not be underestimated, but
could, perhaps, be relocated. Even though its importance grew consistently
from the beginning of the decade, it was only in the late 1910osthat it became
crucial in Mexico's export basket. Oil exports intensified the export boom
that began in 1915 and prolonged it for two more years, softened the 1921
shock considerably, and supported the recovery in total export value up to
1925 despite the drop in agriculturalexports and the fluctuating behaviour
of mining exports. Oil did not create the export boom of the Mexican
Revolution, but certainly played a critical role in keeping the export sector
afloat during the first half of the 1920s.

52 Thisideais suggested
in Womack,'MexicanRevolution,'
pp. 1o8-15,andMeyer,Revolu-
idn,p. 112. About the importanceof henequendutiesand taxes for the Carranza
government, seeJamesC.Carey,TheMexican inYucatan,
Revolution 19y-.1924(Boulder,
1984),
p. 65.

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