FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.

FILOIL
SUPERVISORY & CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, Respondents., G.R. No. L-26736, 46 SCRA 512,
August 18, 1972
 

Topic: Determining Agency- Agency and Finality Order

Briñez, Michelle O.
FACTS OF THE CASE
 The industrial court dismissed petitioner’s objection against the composition of respondent association in that it included as
members technical men and confidential employees in this wise: (A)t this point, it may be stressed that supervisors as a
general rule should form an association of their own and should exclude all other types of personnel unless a special
consideration exists, like for example, that they are so few in number and that there are other technical men or
confidential men equally few in number. In the latter case, the supervisors, technical men and confidential
employees may be constituted into one unit.

 Respondent court in its order of May 26, 1965 denied the dismissal motion. However, no appeal having been taken from
the resolution, the petition was accordingly set for hearing and the parties submitted their stipulation of facts, stipulating
inter alia that respondent association has forty-seven (47) members among the supervisory, technical men and confidential
employees of the company. Evidence was received by respondent court and it was satisfied that executive personnel
handling personnel matters for the employer were duly excluded from respondent association
FACTS OF THE CASE
 Respondent court in its order of July 23, 1966 consequently cast aside petitioner’s sedulous objections against the
inclusion of the confidential employees in the supervisors’ respondent association. Since the confidential employees are
very few and are, by practice and tradition, identified with management, the NLRB, because of such ‘identity of interest’
(Wilson & Co., 68 NLRB 84), has allowed their inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors who are likewise identified
with management. This Court, a counterpart of the NLRB, for the same reason, should also allow the inclusion of the
confidential employees in the bargaining unit of supervisors

 Respondent court per its resolution en banc dismissed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, holding that "as to the
question of the right of supervisors and confidential employees to compel their employer to bargain collectively, this
has already been passed upon by the Trial Court in its Order which Order was affirmed by the Court en banc. The
Company did not appeal this resolution to the Supreme Court. Hence, this matter, as far as we are concerned, has
already been resolved. We find it, therefore, unnecessary to pass upon the same again," and that it found no
sufficient justification to alter or modify the trial court’s order upholding the appropriateness of the bargaining unit
ISSUE(S)

 Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has a wide discretion in adopting
procedure to determine appropriate bargaining unit.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has a wide
discretion in adopting procedure to determine appropriate
RULING bargaining unit. YES

 Yes, the Court of Industrial Relations has a wide

discretion in adopting procedure to determine
appropriate bargaining unit.
Article 226-Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional  The industrial court enjoys a wide discretion in
offices of the Department of Labor, shall have original and determining the procedure necessary to insure the
exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon fair and free choice of bargaining representations
request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra- by employees, and that its action in deciding upon
union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems an appropriate unit for collective bargaining
arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all purposes is discretionary and its judgment in this
workplaces, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except respect is entitled to almost complete finality,
those arising from the implementation or interpretation of
unless its action is arbitrary or capricious.
collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject
of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on
labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the
parties.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has a wide
discretion in adopting procedure to determine appropriate
RULING bargaining unit. YES

 No arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can

Article 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers’
participation in policy and decision-making. The labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However,
an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have
the right, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-
making processes of the establishment where they are employed insofar as
said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For
this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management
councils: Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor-
management councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all
employees in said establishment.
be attributed against respondent court’s allowing
the inclusion of the confidential employees in the
supervisors’ association for as admitted by
petitioner itself, supra, the supervisors and
confidential employees enjoy its trust and
confidence This identity of interest logically calls
for their inclusion in the same bargaining unit and
at the same time fulfills the law’s objective of
insuring to them the full benefit of their right to
self-organization and to collective bargaining,
which could hardly be accomplished if the
respondent association’s membership were to be
broken up into five separate ineffective tiny units,
as urged by petitioner.
END OF CASE