NAVAL OPERATIONAL DECISION-

MAKING AND PLANNING

By
DR M. VEGO
JMO DEPARTMENT,
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
NEWPORT, R.I.
USA
• OPERATIONAL COMMANDER‘S
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND
THE DECISION

• OPERATIONAL PLANNING
 OPERATIONAL PLANNING
(IN GENERIC TERMS)
MAJOR OPERATIONS STRATEGIC CAMPAIGNS
COMMAND ECHELON LEADERSHIP
•SERVICE/FUNCTIONAL COMMAND ECHELON
• COMPONENT COMMANDER •CINC, THEATER (OF WAR)
•THEATER/NUMBERED •CINC, THEATER OF
ARMY
•ARMY CORPS STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
•DIVISION? GUIDANCE
•THEATER/NUMBERED
AIR FORCE
•THEATER/NUMBERED FLEET
•JOINT/COMBINED TASK
•FORCE.

OPERATIONAL
GUIDANCE

COMMANDER’S
STAFF
ESTIMATE OF THE
ESTIMATES
OPERATIONAL SITUATION

THE DECISION PLAN FOR A MAJOR

•THE DECISION STATEMENT OPERATION (LAND,
•OPERATIONAL IDEA (SCHEME) NAVAL, AIR/SPACE,
•COMMANDER’S INTENT SPECIAL FORCES)

PPT-97VEGO15 (PFR)
 COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE AND THE
LEVELS OF COMMAND

• TACTICAL
• OPERATIONAL
• STRATEGIC
 OPERATIONAL COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND THE
DECISION
SOURCE OF
THE MISSION MISSION
ANALYSIS
STAFF ESTIMATES
• PERSONNEL
• INTELLIGENCE
• OPERATIONS THE SITUATION
• LOGISTICS
• CIVIL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS
ESTIMATE OF ESTIMATE OF ESTIMATE OF
• INFORMATION
THE ENEMY ESTIMATE OF THE FRIENDLY THE SITUATION
OPERATIONS (IO) THE PHYSICAL
SITUATION SITUATION OF THE
• C4 (HUMAN)
• OTHER NEUTRALS
ENVIRONMENT

SPACE – TIME – FORCE

ANALYSIS OF THE OPPOSING

COURSES OF ACTION

COMPARISON OF
FRIENDLY COURSES OF
ACTION

THE DECISION
COMMANDER’S INTENT
COMMANDER’S INTENT

Elaboration of the
Mission Expressed in a
Free-Form

Effect Effect
The Mission

• Military Situation After the Mission

Is Accomplished (Military “Landscape”)
• Minimum Success Expected
• Limitations on Subordinate Courses
Of Action

Issued Two Command

Echelons Down
THE DECISION
 ON DECISIONS

“ARRIVE AT A DEFINITE DECISION… I WARN

YOU AGAINST HALF-MEASURES. IF YOU HAVE
DECIDED TO ATTACK, DO SO WITH ALL YOUR
TROOPS; IF YOU WISH TO RETREAT DO NOT
COME TO A HALT AGAIN AFTER A FEW MILES
WITHOUT THE WEIGHTIEST REASONS. BE
PERFECTLY CLEAR IN YOUR OWN MIND WHAT
YOU WANT TO DO AND THEN CARRY IT OUT TO
THE LETTER.”
ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL
GRIPPENKERLE
 DECISION
STATEMENT

Who OPERATIONAL
• What IDEA (SCHEME)
• When THE
• Where
• Why DECISION
• How
COMMANDER’s
INTENT
NAVAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING
NO PLAN OF OPERATIONS EXTENDS WITH
CERTAINTY BEYOND THE FIRST CONTACT WITH
THE MAIN HOSTILE FORCE. ONLY THE LAYMAN
SEES IN THE COURSE OF A CAMPAIGN A
CONSISTENT EXECUTION OF A PRECONCEIVED
AND HIGHLY DETAILED ORIGINAL CONCEPT
CONCEPT PURSUED CONSISTENTLY TO THE
END.

FIELD MARSHAL HELMUTH VON

MOLTKE, SR.
PLANNING FRAMEWORK
 CAMPAIGN PLANNING FRAMEWORK
STRATEGY & POLICY
MILITARY POLITICAL
CONFLICT
PRE-HOSTILITIES TERMINATION
VICTORY
CONFLICT
VICTORY
CONFLICT
CRISIS RESOLUTION/ STARTS RESOLUTION
DETERRENCE HOSTILITIES POST-HOSTILITIES

USE OF NON-MILITARY
INSTRUMENTS OF
•STABILIZATION &
NATIONAL POWER DEFENSE-OFFENSIVE
•RECONSTRUCTION
MAJOR OPERATIONS • TRANSITION (HANDOVER
GROUND(LAND)
OF AUTHORITY)
AIR(SPACE)
MOBILIZATION NAVAL(MARITIME)
• REDEPLOYMENT
PRE-DEPLOYMENT SPECIAL FORCES

STRATEGIC/ TACTICAL ACTIONS

OPERATIONAL
ACCOMPLISHMENT CONSOLIDATION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF THE THE STRATEGIC
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE

PRE-(MAJOR) COMBAT (MAJOR) COMBAT POST-(MAJOR) COMBAT

CAMPAIGN PHASES
MAJOR PHASES OF A MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION
MAJOR COMBAT
DEPLOYMENT PHASE POST-COMBAT

STRATEGIC REGENERATION OF
SERIES OF RELATED COMBAT POTENTIAL
DEPLOYMENT TACTICAL ACTIONS
(BATTLES,
ENGAGEMENTS,
STRIKES, RAIDS,
ATTACKS, ETC.)
OPERATIONAL SMALL-SCALE
DEPLOYMENT TACTICAL ACTIONS

ACCOMPLISHMENT CONSOLIDATION/
EXPLOITATION

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
 TYPE OF PLANNING

• SEQUENTIAL PLANNING
• PARALLEL PLANNING
• COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
 PLANNING METHOD

• PROGRESSIVE PLANNING
• REGRESSIVE
(BACKWARD OR
INVERSE) PLANNING
 OBJECTIVE-BASED OPERATIONAL PLANNING

MAJOR OPERATIONS/CAMPAIGNS

INTERMEDIATE (OPERATIONAL OR TACTICAL) OBJECTIVES

1

STARTING OBJ
OBJ OBJ OBJ OBJ
POINT

ULTIMATE (STRATEGIC OR OPERATIONAL) OBJECTIVE

1 ACCOMPLISHED SEQUENTALLY AND/OR SIMULTANEOUSLY

PPT-01-VEGO-42(JMP)040901
 OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE

Factor of Space

Effect
Accomplishment Consolidation
Effect
Of Operational Of Operational
Objective Success

Combat Phase & Post-Combat Phase

Factor of Time
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

• NON-MILITARY

• MILITARY (OPERATIONAL)
 NON-MILITARY
CONSIDERATIONS

• POLITICAL
• DIPLOMATIC
• ECONOMIC
• LEGAL
• ETHNIC
• RELIGIOUS
• ENVIRONMENTAL
• INFORMATIONAL
• POLITICAL
• DIPLOMATIC
• ECONOMIC
• LEGAL
• ETHNIC
• RELIGIOUS
• ENVIRONMENTAL
• INFORMATIONAL
• ENVIRONMENTAL
• OTHER
• OPERATIONAL DESIGN
• MAJOR PHASES
• TARGETING
• TIME AND TIMING
• CONTROL AND COORDINATION
OPERATIONAL DESIGN
 DESIGN FOR A MAJOR OPERATION

OPERATIONAL
SUSTAINMENT
BALANCING OPERATIONAL
ULTIMATE
FACTORS VS. OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL
OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE

IDENTIFICATION
INTERMEDIATE OF CRITICAL FACTORS
(MAJOR TACTICAL) AND OPERATIONAL
OBJECTIVE KEY
CENTER OF GRAVITY
ELEMENTS

FORCES’
REQUIREMENTS
OPERATIONAL/
TACTICAL
DIRECTION(S)
(AXES)
INITIAL
LINES OF OPERATIONAL
OPERATION IDEA (SCHEME)
ULTIMATE AND INTERMEDIATE
OBJECTIVES
 ULTIMATE AND INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION

INTERMEDIATE--MAJOR TACTICAL
OBJECTIVES

HERE
AND
NOW

ULTIMATE--OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE

PPT-01-VEGO-42(JMP)110502
FORCE REQUIREMENTS
BALANCING OPERATIONAL
FACTORS VS. THE
OBJECTIVE
 OPERATIONAL FACTORS

STRATEGIC/
OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
FACTORS

SPACE- FORCE

SPACE TIME FORCE

TIME-SPACE TIME-FORCE

BAL
ANC
ING SPA
CE - TIME - FORCE

INFORMATION
PPT-96VEG040B
 BALANCING OPERATIONAL
FACTORS VS. OBJECTIVES-NAVAL WARFARE

SPACE—FORCE SPACE—TIME FORCE—TIME

• REDUCE NUMBER OF OBJECTIVES • OPERATE FROM THE • DEPLOY FORCES CLOSER TO

• OPERATE FROM THE EXTERIOR INTERIOR LOOs THE SCENE OF POTENTIAL
LOOs •APPLY A NOVEL CONFLICT
• INCREASE SIZE OF NAVAL FORCES OPERATIONAL IDEA •OPERATE FROM SHORT LOOs
• ABANDON CURRENTLY HELD
• USE OF HIGHLY MOBILE •EMPLOY SMALLER BUT
•BASING ARES
FORCES HIGHLY MOBILE FORCES
•CONDUCT STRATEGIC DIVERSION
•TEMPORARY VS. PERMANENT •ETC.
• LOCAL VS. GENERAL SEA
CONTROL SEA CONTROL
•LIMIT SEA CONTROL TO CERTAIN •PREPOSITIONING OF
MEDIUM (E.G. SURFACE OR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
SUBSURFACE OR AIR) •AVOID ENCOUNTER WITH THE
•REDUCE NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE
ENEMY FORCES
SECONDARY THEATERS
•ETC.
•USE DECEPTION
•ETC.
INTERIOR VS. EXTERIOR
LINES OF OPERATIONS
 A p p r o a c h o f A llie d a n d J a p a n e s e N a v a l F o r c e s
to L e y te G u lf, 1 8 -2 4 O c t 1 9 4 4
(U n le s s o t h e r w is e in d ic a te d , th e d a ily p o s itio n s a r e a s o f 1 2 0 0 h o u r s (N o o n ))

KOREA To kyo
HONSHU

KU
LEGEND SH
IK O M a in B o d y
( M o b ile F o r c e )

SHU
1930
A L L IE D JA PA N E S E 20 O ct
B u n g o S u id o (V A D M J . O z a w a )

KYU
SU RFAC E FO R CES
Shanghai
1C V
C A R R IE R G R O U P S 3 C VLs
S
C A R R IE R U N I T S
YU 2 X C V -B B s
K 3 CLs
East 0530 R YU
C h in a S e a 18 O ct 21 O ct 8 D D s B o n in Is .
18 O ct A n a m i o S h im a

19 O ct 16 O ct
O k in a w a

osa
22 O ct

m
Is
es

For
Hong Kong

or
ad
sc
23 O ct

Pe
2 n d S t r i k in g F o r c e L u z o n S t r a it

( V A D M K . S h im a ) N OR TH ER N
FO RCE

an
(O Z A W A )
2 C As
H a in 1 C L
24 O ct
TF 34 Ta s k F o rc e 3 8
22 O ct C . Engano (L E E )
4 D Ds T H IR D F L E E T
(H A L S E Y ) TG 38 ( A D M W .F . H a ls e y )
( M IT S C H E R )
N 5 CVs
ZO
LU

S HERM AN
5 C VLs

D A V IS O N
B OGA N
C la r k
F i e ld

M a n ila
6 BBs
T G 3 8 .3
IN D O C H IN A 2 CAs
7 C Ls
N ic h o ls it
F ie ld ra
St
23 O ct in o
S o u th Be
rn
ad
49 D D s
n
C h in a S e a Sa
BO G AN
D A V IS O N M C C A IN
3 r d S e c tio n 1 s t S t r ik in g
F o rc e
( V A D M S . N i s h im u r a 23 O ct
4 BBs
2 BBs 6 CAs
an

1 C A
w

2 C Ls
la

4 D Ds
Pa

11 D D s
M in d a n a o
23 O ct
P a la u
S u lu
Sea U .S . S e v e n th F le e t
( V A D M T . K IN K A ID )
B ru n e i T a w i ta w i 6 B B s ( o ld )
M ALAY
P E N IN S U L A Ta ra k a n T a la u d Is . 18 C VEs
19 O ct
1 1 C r u is e r s
C e le b e s S e v e n th 36 D D s
Sae A m p h i b io u s
S in g a p o r e M o ro ta i F o r c e fr o m T h ir d
H o lla n d i a A m p h i b io u s
BO RNEO
0100
18 Oct H a lm a h e ra
F o rc e a n d
s u p p o r t fr o m
SU

M anus
M

B a t ja n
1 s t S t rik in g F o r c e
AT

B a lik a p a n
( V A D M T . K u r ita )
RA

C e le b e s
H o lla n d ia
5 BBs
6 CAs C e ra m N E W G U IN E A
2 CLs
15 D Ds
Java S ea
JAVA

9 8 -C D -V E G O -4 7 (P F R )
 DIRECTION / AXIS FOR A MAJOR
BASE OF OPERATIONS NAVAL OPERATION

LEGEND
MAJOR TACTICAL TACTICAL AXIS
OBJECTIVE
OPERATIONAL AXIS
OPERATIONAL
OBJECTIVE

PPT-01-VEGO-51(JMP)041101
 TACTICAL DIRECTION (AXIS)

• SWATH OF PHYSICAL SPACE

EXTENDING FROM ONE’S BASE OF
OPERATIONS TO THE ASSIGNED
TACTICAL OBJECTIVE IN A GIVEN
COMBAT SECTOR (ZONE).
 OPERATIONAL DIRECTION (AXIS)

• SWATH OF PHYSICAL SPACE

EXTENDING FROM ONE’S BASE OF
OPERATIONS TO THE ASSIGNED
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE IN A
GIVEN THEATER (OR AREA) OF
OPERATIONS.
 A L L IE D O F F E N S IV E IN T H E P A C IF IC , N O V 1 9 4 3 - A U G 1 9 4 5

O -4
SH

To kyo

-3
O
SH
B o n in Is . M id w a y
O k in a w a -2 XXXXX
O PO A
H
a
m os

S GRA
N IM IT Z
For

PEARL HARBOR
N IT E
II M a r ia n a s
W ake
J o h n s to n
GR
AN
IT E
S H

M a n ila S a ip a n I
G uam M a r s h a ll
O - 1

P h ilip p in e s E n iw e to k
Is la n d s
P a la u
SW PA POA TRUK
C a r o lin e Is la n d s
R
FO
EM
O
N

NE
W G
U IN
EA

S o lo m o n s

B R IS B A N E XXXXX
M ACARTHUR SW P
C D -9 7 V E G O 1 0
 DETERMINING THE
ENEMY’S/FRIENDLY OPERATIONAL
CENTER OF GRAVITY
CRITICAL FACTORS
• CUMULATIVE TERM FOR CRITICAL
STRENGTHS AND CRITICAL
WEAKNESSES OF A MILITARY OR
NONMILITARY SOURCE OF POWER; THEY
CAN BE QUANTIFIABLE (TANGIBLE) OR
UNQUANTIFIABLE (INTANGIBLE)
• CRITICAL FACTORS ARE PRESENT AT
EACH LEVEL OF WAR
• THEY REQUIRE CONSTANT ATTENTION
BECAUSE THEY ARE RELATIVE AND
SUBJECT TO CHANGES RESULTING
FROM THE ACTIONS OF ONE’S FORCES
OR OF THE ENEMY’S ACTIONS.
 CRITICAL FACTORS
CRITICAL
“PHYSICAL” FACTORS
(TANGIBLE)
“ABSTRACT”
GEOGRAPHIC
(INTANGIBLE)
GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION
GEOPOLITICAL POSITION  POLITICAL
 POSITIONS  DIPLOMATIC
NON-MILITARY
BASE OF OPERATIONS  PSYCHOLOGICAL
LINES OF OPERATIONS  STATE ORGANIZATION
 ECONOMY  WILL TO FIGHT
LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS  LEADERSHIP
ETC.  MINERAL RESOURCES
 AGRICULTURE  ALLIANCE/COALITION
MILITARY
 ARMED FORCES  FINANCES COHESION
INDIVIDUAL SERVICES (ARMY, NAVY, AIR  BANKING  ALLIANCE / COALITION’S
FORCE)  ENERGY RESOURCES COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS
THEATER ARMY, FLEET, AIR FORCE  COMPUTER  PUBLIC SUPPORT
 NUMBERED ARMY, FLEET, AIR FORCE  UNITY OF COMMAND
NETWORKS
 MAJOR FORCE ELEMENTS (AIR CORPS, NAVAL  SERVICE / JOINT DOCTRINE
TASK FORCES, AIR TASK FORCES)  ETC.
 MORALE
 TACTICAL UNITS (DIVISIONS, BRIGADES,  DISCIPLINE
REGIMENTS, NAVAL SQUADRONS / GROUPS,
 COMBAT TRAINING
AIR DIVISIONS / REGIMENTS / SQUADRONS)
 INTELLIGENCE  COMBAT READINESS
 C3I NODES  ETC.
 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND SUSTAINMENT
 BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE
INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING (I&W)
 COMPUTER NETWORKS
 ETC.
97-VEG030.PPT
 CONCEPT OF CRITICAL FACTORS AND CENTER OF
GRAVITY
MILITARY SITUATION
MILITARY OBJECTIVE
• TACTICAL • STRATEGIC
• OPERATIONAL • OPERATIONAL
• STRATEGIC • TACTICAL

CRITICAL
LY N
D
N IO FACTORS
I E AT
FR TU “PHYSICAL
SI “ABSTRACT”
” ENEMY
(INTANGIBLE) SITUATION
(TANGIBLE)

CRITICAL CRITICAL
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
CRITICAL
VULNERABILITIES
(CVs)

CENTER OF
GRAVITY
SITUATION OF THE
NEUTRALS

VEGO-PPT-2006-COG--
REV 2/16/06
 CRITICAL STRENGTHS

• THOSE MILITARY AND NONMILITARY

CAPABILITIES CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL
TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ONE’S OR
THE ENEMY’S MILITARY OBJECTIVE(S)
• THE MOST IMPORTANT AMONG THE
CRITICAL FACTORS OF A FORCE IS THE
CENTER OF GRAVITY (COG).
 CRITICAL WEAKNESSES

• MILITARY AND NONMILITARY

CAPABILITIES CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL
TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ONE’S OR
THE ENEMY’S MILITARY OBJECTIVES,
BUT ARE IN TERMS OF QUANTITY OR
QUALITY OR BOTH, INSUFFICIENT TO
PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCTIONS
• THEY MAY OR MAY NOT BE CRITICAL
VULNERABILITIES.
 CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

• THOSE WEAKNESSES (AND

SOMETIMES STRENGTHS) OPEN TO
THE ENEMY’S ATTACK OR CAN BE
EXPLOITED BY THE ENEMY.
CENTER OF GRAVITY
 CENTER OF GRAVITY
(IN GENERIC TERMS)

“IS A SOURCE OF ‘MASSED STRENGTH’

--PHYSICAL OR MORAL OR A SOURCE OF
LEVERAGE WHOSE SERIOUS
DEGRADATION, DISLOCATION,
NEUTRALIZATION, OR DESTRUCTION
WILL HAVE THE MOST DECISIVE IMPACT
ON THE ENEMY’S OR ONE’S OWN
ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH A GIVEN
MILITARY OBJECTIVE.”
 MILITARY RELATED CENTER OF GRAVITY

OUTER CORE
N
ATI O
EGR
INT
• COMMAND STRUCTURE
• C4 SYSTEMS
• MILITARY/SERVICE CULTURE
INTA PROTECTION
• WAY OF WARFARE
I BLE NGI
• COMMON DOCTRINE
NG RANK & FILE BLE
• COMMON TRAINING TA • FORCE PROTECTION
• OTHER • AIR DEFENSE
FIREPOWER LEADERSHIP • TACTICAL BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSE (TBMD)
• DEFENSIVE MINE COUNTER
MANEUVER INFORMATION • MEASURES (MCM)
• OPERATIONS SECURITY
INNER CORE (OPSEC)
• COVER, CONCEALMENT,
AND DECEPTION (CCD)
SUPPORT • OTHER

• INTELLIGENCE • FIRE SUPPORT

• LOGISTICS • AIR SUPPORT
• OTHER

PPT-98-VEG0-4 (PFR) REV 2/28/06

 CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTER OF GRAVITY
THE HIGHER THE
IT IS DIRECTLY LEVEL OF WAR
RELATED THE FEWER CENTES ETC.
TO THE DERIVED OF GRAVITY
OR REAL OBJETIVES
IT IS NEVER A SOURCE
OF WEAKNESS
OR VULNERABILITY
THE OBJECTIVE ALWAYS
DOMINATES CENTER
OF GRAVITY
OPERATIONAL OR
TACTICAL CENTER OF
GRAVITY CAN PHYSICALLY
ENDANGER ONE’S
OWN CENTER OF
GRAVITY
CHARACTERISTICS
FOR EACH OBJECTIVE THERE IS
A CORRESPONDING CENTER
IT IS RELATED TO
OF GRAVITY
THE FACTORS OF TIME
AND SPACE

IT CONTAINS BOTH IT CAN

TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE
ELEMENTS
IT IS A SOURCE OF THE
GREATEST
STRENGTH (PHYSICAL OR
MORAL) OR LEVERAGE
SHIFT IN THE COURSE OF
CONFLICT/WAR THE UTILITY OF
OR COMBAT
TACTICAL COG
IS DOUBTFUL
SHIFT IN CENTER OF GRAVITY CAN OCCUR DUE TO:
•CHANGE OF THE OBJECTIVE
•THE INITIAL CENTER OF GRAVITY IS
MIX OF TANGIBLE AND
DEFEATED/NEUTRALIZED
• INTRODUCTION OF A NEW WEAPON INTANGIBLE FACTORS
• TRANSITION FROM ONE TO ANTHER PHASE IS DIRECTLY RELATED
OF A MAJOR OPERATION/CAMPAIGN TO THE NATURE
• CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY
OF THE ALLIANCE/COALITION OBJECTIVE
• A NEW SOURCE OF POWER EMERGES
•HIGHER THAN EXPECTED ATTRITION
SHIFT IN A CENTER OF GRAVITY IN A MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDING
OPERATION

SEA TRANSIT PHASE INITIAL LANDING PHASE

INITIAL MAIN TASK SUCCESSIVE MAIN TASK
•DEFENSE AND PROTECTION OF •OVERCOMING BEACH DEFENSES
AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF)
•SEIZING THE INITIAL LODGMENT
•CARRIER
GROUP
•SURFACE
ACTION
(STRIKE)
GROUP
•LAND-
BASED AIR
•OTHER
 PROCESS OF DETERMINING CENTER OF GRAVITY

DETERMINE DETERMINE MILITARY ANALYSE RESPECTIVE

THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION MILITARY SITUATION
STEP • TACTICAL STEP • TACTICAL STEP
IN TERMS OF THE
1 • OPERATIONAL 2 • OPERATIONAL 3
FACTORS OF SPACE
• STRATEGIC • STRATEGIC AND FORCE

ELIMINATE FROM
STEP FURTHER CONSIDERATION
DERIVE A LIST
4 FRIENDLY STEP CRITICAL STRENGTHS THAT
OF CRITICAL STEP
FACTORS 6 LACK ATTRIBUTES OF FIRE
5 DETERMINE DETERMINE POWER/MOBILITY OR SOURCE
CRITICAL CRITICAL OF AUTHORITY/WILL TO FIGHT/
LIST SEPARATELY FOR STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES LEVERAGE
FRIENDLY AND • GEOGRAPHY/LOCATION
ENEMY SIDE ENEMY • THEATER GEOMETRY
THOSE CRITICAL STRENGTHS • COMMAND
THAT IN SOME WAY CAN STRUCTURE
PREVENT THE ENEMY OR • INTELLIGENCE
FRIENDLY SIDE • LOGISTICS
COMMANDER’S QUESTIONS FROM ACCOMPLISHING • PROTECTION
ON CENTER OF GRAVITY THEIR ASSIGNED OR STEP • OTHER
•WOULD ITS SERIOUS DEGRADATION, ASSUMED OBJECTIVE 7
NEUTRALIZATION OR DESTRUCTION
LEAD TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MY
•ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE?
STEP
•CAN IT PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY
8
ENDANGER MY FORCES FROM
FRIENDLY
ACCOMPLISHING THEIR ASSIGNED
OBJECTIVE?
MAKE A FINAL LIST
•CAN IT PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY
DETERMINATION POTENTIAL
COMPLICATE MY FORCES
OF THE MOST CRITICAL
FROM CONSOLIDATING THEIR
CRITICAL STRENGTH VULNERABILITIES
OPERATIONAL
OR STRATEGIC SUCCESS? FOR ACCOMPLISHING
ASSIGNED (OR ASSUMED) ENEMY
OBJECTIVE FOR
THE ENEMY AND
FRIENDLY SIDE FRIENDLY
TO ATTACK ENEMY CENTER TO PROTECT
CENTER
OF GRAVITY
OF GRAVITY

04 JMO VEGO DCG

 COMMANDER’S QUESTIONS ON
CENTER OF GRAVITY

• WOULD ITS SERIOUS DEGRADATION,

NEUTRALIZATION OR DESTRUCTION LEAD TO
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MY OWN ASSIGNED
OBJECTIVE?
• CAN IT PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY ENDANGER
FRIENDLY FORCES FROM ACCOMPLISHING
THEIR ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE?
• CAN IT PREVENT FRIENDLY FORCES FROM
CONSOLIDATING THEIR OPERATIONAL OR
STRATEGIC SUCCESS?
 ULTIMATE/INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES-CENTERS OF GRAVITY

MAJOR OPERATIONS/CAMPAIGNS

INTERMEDIATE (OPERATION OR TACTICAL) OBJECTIVES

1

2
STARTING OBJ
OBJ OBJ OBJ OBJ
POINT
COG

ULTIMATE (STRATEGIC OR OPERATIONAL) OBJECTIVE

FIRST PHASE
ACCOMPLISHED SEQUENTALLY AND/OR SIMULTANEOUSLY. COG
1
FIRST PHASE OF A CAMPAIGN/MAJOR OPERATION CAN
2 ENCOMPASS SEVERAL INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED
SEQUENTIALLY AND/OR SIMULTANEOUSLY.
OPERATIONAL
SUSTAINMENT
OPERATIONAL IDEA
(SCHEME)
• AN OVERACHING FRAMEWORK FOR A
SEQUENCED AND SYNCHRONIZED
EMPLOYMENT FOR EACH COMBAT ARM
OR SERVICE/FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT
TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE
• A COMPLETE IDEA SHOULD PROVIDE
ANSWERS ON WHO, WHERE, WHY, AND
WHEN.
 OPERATIONAL IDEA (SCHEME): CAMPAIGN VS. MAJOR OPERATION

OPERATIONAL
IDEA
MAJOR
CAMPAIGN OPERATION

OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL
IDEA
IDEA

MAJOR LAND MAJOR NAVAL

OPERATION OPERATION MARITIME AIR (SPACE)
ELEMENTS ELEMENTS

MAJOR AIR
(SPACE)
OPERATION GROUND SPECIAL
FORCES
ELEMENTS ELEMENTS

PPT-96VEG017 (PFR)
 OPERATIONAL IDEA (SCHEME)

FULL USE CREATIVE

OF DECEPTION AND NOVEL

MAIN NO
DISCERNIBLE
SPEED IN FEATURES PATTERNS
EXECUTION

FULL USE
MULTIPLE OF AMBIGUITY
OPTIONS

PPT-96VEG021
 JAPANESE OPERATION MO MAY1942: OPERATIONAL IDEA

TRUK 150 miles

KAVIENG

RABAUL

NE N
W GU CEA
I NE to
O
U
A A UR
LAE N
SHOR &
T LAND
TUL
AG
I

PT. MORESBY DEB OY

N
DAY

E
sink
RS

USN
TH U

h ere

CO RAL S E A
CO EN

COOKTOWN
I nvasion Groups
Support & Co vering Gr oups
Carrier Strikin g Force
TOWNSVILL E Air Stri kes

QUEENSLAND

CD-96VEGO37
 J a p a n e s e P la n fo r O p e r a tio n M I, M a y 1 9 4 2
160° 180° 160°

A
K

A
S

T K
A K O D IA K
L

H A
A

M C
C O LD B AY

K A
D UTCH HAR BO R
UNA LASKA
ATTU U M NA K

K IS K A
S A K H A L IN

o rt F o rc e
ADAK
A ttu S u p p
K is k a a n d

.
s
I
E
L
I
R
U
e
K F o rc
c u p a tio n
O c
A dak
O
K A ID
HO K
S e c o n d M o b ile F o r c e
N

40°
P A

40°
SHU

rc h e s
i r Sea
HON

.A

ES
J A

.S

M IL
A le u t ia n S tr ik in g F o r c e U
TO K YO

700
Yokoham a

e
o rc
b ile F e
o o rc
B O N IN I.
M
n F
M ai

S S in e
M ID W A Y

L
u
S econ

ts
d F le e

O
7
V O L C A N O I. t
e
rc

K O L in e
Fo

3 -4 S S
M A R C U S I.

t i on O AH U

u pa 20°
20° c
Oc H A W A II
M A R IA N A S
ay G ro u p W A K E I.
dw e e p in g
Mi M i n e s w
J O H N S T O N I.
S A IP A N

C D -9 9 -V E G O -4 5 (P F R )
160° 180° 160° 140°
ELEMENTS OF THE
OPERATIONAL IDEA
(SCHEME)
 OPERATIONAL IDEA (SCHEME)

SELECTED
OPERATIONAL
PRINCIPLES SEQUELS
RESERVE
OF WAR

METHOD OF
DEFEATING ENEMY
CENTER OF GRAVITY
OPERATIONAL
SEQUENCING

SECTORS OF EFFORT/
POINT OF MAIN ATTACK
(DEFENSE)
OPERATIONAL
SYNCHRONIZATION MAIN
ELEMENTS

BRANCHES

OPERATIONAL
MANEUVER
& FIRES REGENERATION
OF COMBAT
POTENTIAL

PROTECTION
STRATEGIC/
OF FRIENDLY
OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL CENTER OF
DECEPTION
PAUSES GRAVITY
METHOD OF DEFEATING THE
ENEMY’S CENTER OF
GRAVITY
 METHODS OF DEFEATING AN
ENEMY’S CENTER OF GRAVITY

OBJECTIVE
ENEMY’S CENTER
OF GRAVITY
(C0G)

HOD INNER
E T
M CORE
E CT
D IR
IN

APPLICATION
ECT D
OF AVAILABLE R O OUTER
DI TH
COMBAT M
E CORE
POTENTIAL LEGEND
DECISIVE POINT

04-JMO-VEGO- ENEMEY’S GRAVITY

SECTOR OF MAIN EFFORT
(THRUST)
• PART OF A MARITIME THEATER OR
MARITIME AREA OF OPERATIONS
WHERE A MAJOR PART OF ONE’S
NAVAL FORCES IS DEPLOYED TO
ACCOMPLISH THE PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE(S) OF A MAJOR NAVAL
OPERATION.
SECTOR OF SECONDARY
EFFORT (THRUST)
• PART OF A MARITIME THEATER OR
MARITIME OR AREA OF
OPERATIONS WHOSE IMPORTANCE
IS SUBSIDIARY OR ANCILLARY TO
THE SECTOR OF MAIN EFFORT
• THERE COULD BE ONE OR
SEVERAL SECTORS OF
SECONDARY EFFORTS.
POINT OF MAIN ATTACK
(DEFENSE)
A SMALL PART OF A GIVEN SECTOR OF
MAIN EFFORT WHERE THE MAJOR PART
OF COMBAT POTENTIAL OF ONE’S
NAVAL FORCES IS CONCENTRATED TO
ACCOMPLISH THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF
THE ENTIRE OPERATION.
COMBAT FORCE
CONCENTRATION
 CONCENTRATION OF FORCES

OFF THE BATTLEFIELD ON THE BATTLEFIELD

PPT-98-VEGO-57 (PFR)
 A p p r o a c h o f A llie d a n d J a p a n e s e N a v a l F o r c e s
to L e y te G u lf, 1 8 -2 4 O c t 1 9 4 4
(U n le s s o t h e r w is e in d ic a te d , th e d a ily p o s itio n s a r e a s o f 1 2 0 0 h o u r s (N o o n ))

KOREA To kyo
HONSHU

KU
LEGEND SH
IK O M a in B o d y
( M o b ile F o r c e )

SHU
1930
A L L IE D JA PA N E S E 20 O ct
B u n g o S u id o (V A D M J . O z a w a )

KYU
SU RFAC E FO R CES
Shanghai
1C V
C A R R IE R G R O U P S 3 C VLs
S
C A R R IE R U N I T S
YU 2 X C V -B B s
K 3 CLs
East 0530 R YU
C h in a S e a 18 O ct 21 O ct 8 D D s B o n in Is .
18 O ct A n a m i o S h im a

19 O ct 16 O ct
O k in a w a

osa
22 O ct

m
Is
es

For
Hong Kong

or
ad
sc
23 O ct

Pe
2 n d S t r i k in g F o r c e L u z o n S t r a it

( V A D M K . S h im a ) N OR TH ER N
FO RCE

an
(O Z A W A )
2 C As
H a in 1 C L
24 O ct
TF 34 Ta s k F o rc e 3 8
22 O ct C . Engano (L E E )
4 D Ds T H IR D F L E E T
(H A L S E Y ) TG 38 ( A D M W .F . H a ls e y )
( M IT S C H E R )
N 5 CVs
ZO
LU

S HERM AN
5 C VLs

D A V IS O N
B OGA N
C la r k
F i e ld

M a n ila
6 BBs
T G 3 8 .3
IN D O C H IN A 2 CAs
7 C Ls
N ic h o ls it
F ie ld ra
St
23 O ct in o
S o u th Be
rn
ad
49 D D s
n
C h in a S e a Sa
BO G AN
D A V IS O N M C C A IN
3 r d S e c tio n 1 s t S t r ik in g
F o rc e
( V A D M S . N i s h im u r a 23 O ct
4 BBs
2 BBs 6 CAs
an

1 C A
w

2 C Ls
la

4 D Ds
Pa

11 D D s
M in d a n a o
23 O ct
P a la u
S u lu
Sea U .S . S e v e n th F le e t
( V A D M T . K IN K A ID )
B ru n e i T a w i ta w i 6 B B s ( o ld )
M ALAY
P E N IN S U L A Ta ra k a n T a la u d Is . 18 C VEs
19 O ct
1 1 C r u is e r s
C e le b e s S e v e n th 36 D D s
Sae A m p h i b io u s
S in g a p o r e M o ro ta i F o r c e fr o m T h ir d
H o lla n d i a A m p h i b io u s
BO RNEO
0100
18 Oct H a lm a h e ra
F o rc e a n d
s u p p o r t fr o m
SU

M anus
M

B a t ja n
1 s t S t rik in g F o r c e
AT

B a lik a p a n
( V A D M T . K u r ita )
RA

C e le b e s
H o lla n d ia
5 BBs
6 CAs C e ra m N E W G U IN E A
2 CLs
15 D Ds
Java S ea
JAVA

9 8 -C D -V E G O -4 7 (P F R )
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER
& FIRES
 ONE-SIDED ENVELOPMENT MANEUVER

ENEMY’S
COG

ENEMY FORCE

MOBILE FORCE

FIXING FORCE

9 7-VEGO-11 9 (JRN )
 TURNING MANEUVER (WIDE MOVEMENT)
ENEMY’S OPERATIONAL
DEPTH

ENEMY
SUPPLY
LINES

ENEMY’S
OPERATIONAL
COG

MOBILE FORCE
SUPPORTING ATTACK
OR
FIXING FORCE
97 -VEGO-1 20 (JRN)
 UN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT INCHON,
(OPERATION CHROMITE), 15-16 SEPT 1950

Kumchon
Haeju
Kaesong
Ongün Chunchon

SEOUL Yanpyong
Chongson Samchok
15 Sept. W
onju
Chuksa1
nni Chechon
50 Ulchin
M
Chonan IL Chungju Yongju
ES
Chongju Yechon
)
OK

Andong
0R

Kongsa Uisong Yongdok

Taejon
9,00

Nonsan
Kumchon P'ohang
Yongchon
R
.S.;

Kunsan Chenju
EUVE

TAEGU FIXING
,000 U

Kochang
FORCE
Mirvang
TURNI NG MAN

Namwon YongsanSamnangjin
X C orps (70

Changwon
Kwangju Chinju Masan Chinhae
Hapong Sachon Chindong'-ni Pusan
Yonsanpo Kusong
Mokpo

CD-99-VEGO-03(PFR)
 TACTICAL FIRES

USE OF FIREPOWER TO SUPPORT ONE’S

MANEUVER FORCES IN DIRECT
CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY FORCE BY
SUPPRESSING OR DESTROYING THE
ENEMY’S DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE
SYSTEMS AND AIR DEFENSES; THEY ARE
DESIGNED TO HAVE A DECISIVE IMPACT
ON THE OUTCOME OF A BATTLE OR AN
ENGAGEMENT.
OPERATIONAL DECEPTION
 SCALE OF DECEPTION EFFORT

METHOD OF COMBAT
LEVELS OF WAR LEVEL OF COMMAND SCALE FORCE EMPLOYMENT

NATIONAL-STRATEGIC
NATIONAL-STRATEGIC OR ALLIANCE COALITION
LEADERSHIP

STRATEGIC
THEATER-STRATEGIC DECEPTION CAMPAIGNS
THEATER-STRATEGIC COMMANDER
INITIAL
MAJOR OPERATION
IN A CAMPAIGN

THEATER OF OPERATIONAL A MAJOR OPERATION

OPERATIONAL OPERATIONS DECEPTION
COMMANDER

TACTICAL TACTICAL COMMANDER TACTICAL TACTICAL ACTIONS

DECEPTION (BATTLES, ENGAGEMENTS,
STRIKES, ATTACKS, ETC.)

PPT-96VEG028 (PFR)
 TACTICAL DECEPTION

PASSIVE AND ACTIVE MEASURES AND

ACTIONS AIMED TO MISLEAD THE
ENEMY’S TACTICAL COMMANDER AS TO
THE CAPABILITIES, INTENTIONS, AND
ACTIONS OF ONE’S FORCES AND
THEREBY ENHANCE OR ENSURE THE
SUCCESS OF A BATTLE OR
ENGAGEMENT
IT IS CONDUCTED IN A GIVEN AREA OF
OPERATIONS.
 OPERATIONAL DECEPTION

• PASSIVE AND ACTIVE MEASURES AND

ACTIONS AIMED TO MISLEAD THE
ENEMY’S OPERATIONAL COMMANDER
AS TO THE CAPABILITIES, INTENTIONS,
AND ACTIONS OF ONE’S FORCES AND
THEREBY ENHANCE OR ENSURE THE
SUCCESS OF A MAJOR OPERATION
• IT IS CONDUCTED IN A GIVEN THEATER
OF OPERATIONS.
 DECEPTION METHODS
Simulating
Exaggerating / Minimizing Radio Traffic
One’s Own Successes
Creating Fictional
Headquarters or Forces

Spreading Rumors
Use of
Controlled Agents
Demonstrations

Deception
Denial of
Feeding / Planting Methods
Information
False Information

Ruses Conditioning the

Feints Enemy to a Certain
Repetitive Behavior

Creating Dummy Reinforcing the

Installations Displays Enemy’s Biases
And Predilections Other
 TACTICAL DECEPTION PLANS IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIED LANDING IN NORMAND
(OPERATION NEPTUNE), JUNE 1944

GLIMMER 3
DIVERSION

E N G L A N D
6 HDML
6 AIRCRAFT (WINDOW)
6 AIRCRAFT (SIMULATION)

LONDON

DUNKIRK
CALAIS GERMAN
RADAR STATIONS

TITANIC-4 BOULOGNE
MAIN LINE
TOTAL DUMMIES, ETC. - 200 OF TAXABLE 2
S.A.S. PARTIES - 2 ASSAULT DIVERSION
8 HDML & 1 DIV MTB
5 YACHTS
6 AIRCRAFT (WINDOW)
BIG DRUM Number
6 AIRCRAFT (SIMULATION)
1 1
Channel (ATTD FORCE “S”)
ANTI RADAR TITANIC-1
DIVERSION
4 HDML
(ATTD FORCE “U”) TOTAL DUMMIES, PINTAILS,
ETC. - 200
D’ANTIFER S.A.S. PARTIES - 3

GERMAN RADAR
CHERBOURG STATIONS
TITANIC-2
GERMAN RADAR
STATIONS
LE HAVRE TOTAL DUMMIES, ETC. - 50
S.A.S. PARTIES - 0

DIVES-SUR-MER
TITANIC-3
CAEN
TOTAL DUMMIES, ETC. - 50
ST. LO S.A.S. PARTIES - 0

00-VEGO-31(gma)
Map A-17: ALLIED STRATEGIC DECEPTION PLAN BLUEBIRD DECEMBER 1944 - APRIL 1945

U .S . S . R .

M A N C H U R IA

1 DIV

S
EN T
C E M

- J U L Y 4 4
F O R

N
R E IN

9 T H D IV
K

A
O
S E

P
E
A NE

A
A

JA P
J

C H I N A

IO N
AT
E R RG
R YU K YU S
OP EBE
REAL STRENGTH IC
N
IO N T
DEC 44 - 67,000 AT M E
APR 45 - 16 1,000 OKINAWA ER CH
DEC 44-

JIMA
JAN 45 OP TA
REAL STRENGTH DE
D IV JAN 45 - 70,000

IWO
9 TH APR 45 - 70,000 19 FEB 45
AMOY
F O R M O S A
BL
UE

H o n g
BI

REAL STRENGTH
R

K o n g
D

DEC 44 - 85,000
M a r ia n a
APR 45 - 240,000
Is la n d s

S O U TH
A

P H IL IP P IN E S
H
IN

C H IN A
C
H
N

S E A
C
E
D O
F R
IN

00-VEGO-33(gma)
OPERATIONAL SEQUENCING

• IS THE ORDER, IN TERMS OF TIME,

OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
MAJOR TACTICAL OR
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES/TASKS
IN THE COURSE OF A MAJOR
OPERATION OR CAMPAIGN
 OPERATIONAL SEQUENCING: OBJECTIVE-ORIENTED METHOD

INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES
(TACTICAL - FOR A MAJOR OPERATION
OPERATIONAL - FOR A CAMPAIGN)

ULTIMATE
OBJECTIVE

TACTICAL ACTIONS
(IN A MAJOR OPERATION)

MAJOR OPERATIONS (IN A CAMPAIGN)

PPT-96VEG052A (PFR) 06/05/21

 OPERATIONAL
SYNCHRONIZATION

• IS THE ARRANGEMENT OF ACTIONS

OF MULTISERVICE (AND OFTEN
MULTINATIONAL) FORCES AND THE
USE OF NONMILITARY SOURCES OF
POWER IN TERMS OF TIME, SPACE,
AND OBJECTIVE IN A CAMPAIGN OR
MAJOR OPERATION.
 SYNCHRONIZATION DYNAMICS
• MANEUVER
• FIRES
• LEADERSHIP
• INFORMATION
COMBAT • INTEGRATION
POWER • PROTECTION
• SUPPORT
• SUSTAINMENT
MILITARY
MEANS MEDIUM DE
C
• GROUND COORDINATION PL ISIVE
AC
• AIR E
MANEUVER

e
SIMULTANEOUS • SEA

nc
is e
e/D nc
ta
SEQUENTIAL • SPACE

im a
O =OverT oAf dv
COORDINATION

SPACE
COORDINATION

Rate
ACTIONS EFFECTS MASS CONCENTRATION SYNERGISTIC
EFFECT

TEMP
TIME
SYMMETRICAL
ASYMMETRICAL • PHYSICAL SIMULTANEITY
• MORAL M
TU VE
• POLITICAL MEN ISI
TEMPO X MASS = MO C
• ECONOMIC DE IME
NON-
•
T
PSYCHOLOGICAL
MILITARY
MEANS • ETC.

SOURCES
OF POWER
• POLITICAL
• DIPLOMATIC
• ECONOMIC
• PSYCHOLOGICAL
• MORAL
• ETC.
PPT-96VEG048
 A p p r o a c h o f A llie d a n d J a p a n e s e N a v a l F o r c e s
to L e y te G u lf, 1 8 -2 4 O c t 1 9 4 4
(U n le s s o t h e r w is e in d ic a te d , th e d a ily p o s itio n s a r e a s o f 1 2 0 0 h o u r s (N o o n ))

KOREA To kyo
HONSHU

KU
LEGEND SH
IK O M a in B o d y
( M o b ile F o r c e )

SHU
1930
A L L IE D JA PA N E S E 20 O ct
B u n g o S u id o (V A D M J . O z a w a )

KYU
SU RFAC E FO R CES
Shanghai
1C V
C A R R IE R G R O U P S 3 C VLs
S
C A R R IE R U N I T S
YU 2 X C V -B B s
K 3 CLs
East 0530 R YU
C h in a S e a 18 O ct 21 O ct 8 D D s B o n in Is .
18 O ct A n a m i o S h im a

19 O ct 16 O ct
O k in a w a

osa
22 O ct

m
Is
es

For
Hong Kong

or
ad
sc
23 O ct

Pe
2 n d S t r i k in g F o r c e L u z o n S t r a it

( V A D M K . S h im a ) N OR TH ER N
FO RCE

an
(O Z A W A )
2 C As
H a in 1 C L
24 O ct
TF 34 Ta s k F o rc e 3 8
22 O ct C . Engano (L E E )
4 D Ds T H IR D F L E E T
(H A L S E Y ) TG 38 ( A D M W .F . H a ls e y )
( M IT S C H E R )
N 5 CVs
ZO
LU

S HERM AN
5 C VLs

D A V IS O N
B OGA N
C la r k
F i e ld

M a n ila
6 BBs
T G 3 8 .3
IN D O C H IN A 2 CAs
7 C Ls
N ic h o ls it
F ie ld ra
St
23 O ct in o
S o u th Be
rn
ad
49 D D s
n
C h in a S e a Sa
BO G AN
D A V IS O N M C C A IN
3 r d S e c tio n 1 s t S t r ik in g
F o rc e
( V A D M S . N i s h im u r a 23 O ct
4 BBs
2 BBs 6 CAs
an

1 C A
w

2 C Ls
la

4 D Ds
Pa

11 D D s
M in d a n a o
23 O ct
P a la u
S u lu
Sea U .S . S e v e n th F le e t
( V A D M T . K IN K A ID )
B ru n e i T a w i ta w i 6 B B s ( o ld )
M ALAY
P E N IN S U L A Ta ra k a n T a la u d Is . 18 C VEs
19 O ct
1 1 C r u is e r s
C e le b e s S e v e n th 36 D D s
Sae A m p h i b io u s
S in g a p o r e M o ro ta i F o r c e fr o m T h ir d
H o lla n d i a A m p h i b io u s
BO RNEO
0100
18 Oct H a lm a h e ra
F o rc e a n d
s u p p o r t fr o m
SU

M anus
M

B a t ja n
1 s t S t rik in g F o r c e
AT

B a lik a p a n
( V A D M T . K u r ita )
RA

C e le b e s
H o lla n d ia
5 BBs
6 CAs C e ra m N E W G U IN E A
2 CLs
15 D Ds
Java S ea
JAVA

9 8 -C D -V E G O -4 7 (P F R )
PROTECTION OF FRIENDLY
OPERATIONAL CENTER OF
GRAVITY
 A p p r o a c h o f A llie d a n d J a p a n e s e N a v a l F o r c e s
to L e y te G u lf, 1 8 -2 4 O c t 1 9 4 4
(U n le s s o t h e r w is e in d ic a te d , th e d a ily p o s itio n s a r e a s o f 1 2 0 0 h o u r s (N o o n ))

KOREA To kyo
HONSHU

KU
LEGEND SH
IK O M a in B o d y
( M o b ile F o r c e )

SHU
1930
A L L IE D JA PA N E S E 20 O ct
B u n g o S u id o (V A D M J . O z a w a )

KYU
SU RFAC E FO R CES
Shanghai
1C V
C A R R IE R G R O U P S 3 C VLs
S
C A R R IE R U N I T S
YU 2 X C V -B B s
K 3 CLs
East 0530 R YU
C h in a S e a 18 O ct 21 O ct 8 D D s B o n in Is .
18 O ct A n a m i o S h im a

19 O ct 16 O ct
O k in a w a

osa
22 O ct

m
Is
es

For
Hong Kong

or
ad
sc
23 O ct

Pe
2 n d S t r i k in g F o r c e L u z o n S t r a it

( V A D M K . S h im a ) N OR TH ER N
FO RCE

an
(O Z A W A )
2 C As
H a in 1 C L
24 O ct
TF 34 Ta s k F o rc e 3 8
22 O ct C . Engano (L E E )
4 D Ds T H IR D F L E E T
(H A L S E Y ) TG 38 ( A D M W .F . H a ls e y )
( M IT S C H E R )
N 5 CVs
ZO
LU

S HERM AN
5 C VLs

D A V IS O N
B OGA N
C la r k
F i e ld

M a n ila
6 BBs
T G 3 8 .3
IN D O C H IN A 2 CAs
7 C Ls
N ic h o ls it
F ie ld ra
St
23 O ct in o
S o u th Be
rn
ad
49 D D s
n
C h in a S e a Sa
BO G AN
D A V IS O N M C C A IN
3 r d S e c tio n 1 s t S t r ik in g
F o rc e
( V A D M S . N i s h im u r a 23 O ct
4 BBs
2 BBs 6 CAs
an

1 C A
w

2 C Ls
la

4 D Ds
Pa

11 D D s
M in d a n a o
23 O ct
P a la u
S u lu
Sea U .S . S e v e n th F le e t
( V A D M T . K IN K A ID )
B ru n e i T a w i ta w i 6 B B s ( o ld )
M ALAY
P E N IN S U L A Ta ra k a n T a la u d Is . 18 C VEs
19 O ct
1 1 C r u is e r s
C e le b e s S e v e n th 36 D D s
Sae A m p h i b io u s
S in g a p o r e M o ro ta i F o r c e fr o m T h ir d
H o lla n d i a A m p h i b io u s
BO RNEO
0100
18 Oct H a lm a h e ra
F o rc e a n d
s u p p o r t fr o m
SU

M anus
M

B a t ja n
1 s t S t rik in g F o r c e
AT

B a lik a p a n
( V A D M T . K u r ita )
RA

C e le b e s
H o lla n d ia
5 BBs
6 CAs C e ra m N E W G U IN E A
2 CLs
15 D Ds
Java S ea
JAVA

9 8 -C D -V E G O -4 7 (P F R )
 BRANCHES

• OPTIONS BUILT INTO THE BASIC PLAN

FOR A CAMPAIGN OR MAJOR
OPERATION
• THEY MAY INCLUDE A SHIFT IN PRIORITY,
CHANGE OF COMMAND ORGANIZATION
AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, OR
CHANGES IN THE DIRECTION OF
MOVEMENT, AND THE ACCEPTANCE OR
REFUSAL OF COMBAT.
 SEQUELS

• SUBSEQUENT COMBAT ACTIONS BASED

ON THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF A
TACTICAL ACTION (IN A MAJOR
OPERATION) OR MAJOR OPERATION (IN
A CAMPAIGN) IN PROGRESS
• THE BEGINNING OF EACH SEQUEL
SIGNALS THE START OF A NEW PHASE
OF A MAJOR OPERATION OR CAMPAIGN.
BRANCHES AN SEQUELS FOR
A MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION
 OPERATIONAL PHASING

• THE TIME BETWEEN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF

ONE INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN A CAMPAIGN
OR MAJOR OPERATION AND THE BEGINNING OF
THE ACTIONS BY A MAJOR PART OF ONE’S
FORCES TO ACCOMPLISH THE NEXT
INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE
• THE MAIN PURPOSE OF PHASING IS TO DIVIDE A
CAMPAIGN OR MAJOR OPERATION INTO
MANAGEABLE PARTS AND AVOID REACHING A
POINT OF CULMINATION BEFORE THE ASSIGNED
INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS ACCOMPLISHED; A
PHASE CAN BE PLANNED OR UNPLANNED.
PHASING IN A MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION
PHASES OF THE PAPUAN (NEW GUINEA) CAMPAIGN, 1942 - 1943
LEGEND
WEST FORCE
EAST FORCE
I
SE II P A C I F I C
PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS
A PHASES OF OPERATIONS
PH
KAVIENG
ADMIRALTY IS.
PH NE
AS W
E IV
IR
EL
AN
S E II
D O C E A N
PHABISMARCK GREEN IS.
SEA RABAUL

BO
NEW BRITAIN

UG
SO

AI
NEW GUINEA PHA

NV
LO

IL
SE MO

LE
HUON GULF
I CHOISEUL
N
SALAMAUA
SA
NT ISL
S O L O M O N TH
A
IS AN
AB
E
SL ELDS
OT
G U L F
OF S E A
NEW GEORGIA
P A P U A OW
EN
MO STAN
UNT LEY
AIN

GUADALCANAL

LOUISIADE
ARCHIPELAGO
C O R A L
S E A

97-VEGO-116 (JRN)
ANTICIPATING FRIENDLY
POINT OF CULMINATION
 CULMINATION POINT

• A “POINT” IN TERMS OF TIME AND

SPACE REACHED BY THE ATTACKER OR
THE DEFENDER, AFTER WHICH THEIR
STATED OBJECTIVES CANNOT BE
ACCOMPLISHED AND CONTINUED
EFFORT TO REACH THEM WOULD
SIGNIFICANTLY HEIGHTEN THE
CHANCES OF FAILURE OR EVEN DEFEAT
• POINT OF CULMINATION IS REACHED
WHEN THE RELATIVE COMBAT POWER
BEGINS TO DECREASE RAPIDLY FOR
ONE SIDE IN COMBAT
• TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL, AND
STRATEGIC CULMINATION POINTS ARE
DIFFERENTIATED.
 THEORY OF CULMINATING POINT

FACTOR OF SPACE

EQUILIBRIUM CULMINATING
OF RELATIVE POINT
ATTACK
ER COMBAT POWER
COMBA
T POWE
RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

R
FACTOR OF FORCE

FACTOR OF FORCE
DEFENDER’S
OBJECTIVE ATTACKER’S
OBJECTIVE

AREA OF
UNCERTAINTY
R
BA T POWE
COM
E FE NDER
D

FACTOR OF TIME
PPT-00-VEG0-22 (PFR)
 CULMINATING POINT AND THE LEVELS OF WAR
LEVEL OF WAR FACTOR OF SPACE OCCURRENCE
WAR AS A WHOLE
CULMINATING POINT
OF VICTORY
NATIONAL-STRATEGIC (OR DEFEAT) IT OCCURS ONLY
ONCE IN A WAR

CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS IT COULD OCCUR

THEATER-STRATEGIC CULMINATING POINT SEVERAL TIMES
OF OFFENSIVE DURING A
(OR DEFENSIVE) CAMPAIGN AND
ONLY ONCE IN A
OPERATIONAL MAJOR OPERATION

OPERATIONAL- IT COULD OCCUR

TACTICAL A MAJOR OPERATION
ONLY ONCE

CULMINATING POINT
OF ATTACK IT OCCURS ONLY
(OR DEFENSE) ONCE IN A
TACTICAL
MAJOR BATTLE
OR AN
ENGAGEMENT
A MAJOR BATTLE OR AN ENGAGEMENT
PPT-00-VEG0-25 (PFR) FACTOR OF TIME
 OPERATIONAL RESERVE

• A FORCE OF A CERTAIN SIZE AND

COMPOSITION DESIGNED TO HAVE A DECISIVE
EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF A GIVEN
COMBAT ACTION
• IT IS USUALLY COMPOSED OF THE MOST
MOBILE AND COMBAT-READY FORCE,
PREPARED TO BE EMPLOYED AT SHORT
NOTICE ON ITS COMMANDER’S ORDER
• DEPENDING ON THEIR PURPOSE, TACTICAL,
OPERATIONAL, AND STRATEGIC RESERVES
ARE DIFFERENTIATED
 RESERVES

LEVEL OF COMMAND/ OBJECTIVE

LEVEL OF WAR SCALE

STRATEGIC
• NATIONAL-STRATEGIC MAJOR IMPACT ON
• THEATER-STRATEGIC STRATEGIC THE OUTCOME
RESERVE OF WAR

MAJOR IMPACT ON
THE OUTCOME OF
A MAJOR OPERATION
OPERATIONAL OR CAMPAIGN
OPERATIONAL
RESERVE

TACTICAL MAJOR IMPACT ON

THE OUTCOME OF A
BATTLE OR
ENGAGEMENT
TACTICAL
RESERVE

PPT-01-VEGO-68(JMP)041101
OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL RESERVES

• CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS (CSGS)

• EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUPS
(ESGs)
• MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS
(MEUs)
• LAND-BASED AIR SQUADRONS
• ETC.
 PLANS

• BASIC PLANS
• SUPPORTING PLANS
• DEPLOYMENT PLAN
• INTELLIGENCE PLAN
• LOGISTICS PLAN
• DECEPTION PLAN
• C4 PLAN
 SYNCHRONIZING OPERATIONAL
FUNCTIONS

• OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

• OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
• OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
WARFARE (C2W)
• OPERATIONAL FIRES
• OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS
• OPERATIONAL PROTECTION
QUESTIONS?