The Early Ages of Cold War Containment

USFP Lecture 2 – Dr Stephen McGlinchey

Today: 1946–1953
1. A period of transition
2. The United Nations was established
3. Global decolonisation underway
4. But UK (and others to a lesser
extent) still had stabilising, or
colonial roles overseas
• France in Indochina / Vietnam
• UK in Middle East (Suez, Gulf etc..)
5. And another but, Europe (and
especially Germany) divided
1. In hindsight, the first
confrontation of the Cold War
• For that reason, Iran forms a spine
of this module, and we will revisit
it at various points
2. From 1941 Soviet troops in Iran
• There to protect a vital allied
supply line of equipment into the
USSR to fight the Nazis
3. 1946, Stalin refused to remove
them
4. Also moving more troops into
Northern Iran
5. And, manipulating local politics
(with results)
The Soviet ‘Menace’
Arises
1. Iran pleads to the UN
2. UK and US supports them
3. Stalin agrees to withdraw
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) draft a report confirming
that Iran was a frontier state
5. CIA analysis goes further reporting that the Soviets
desired ‘complete domination’ over Iran
‘If Iran came under the control of a hostile power, the
independence of all other countries in the Middle East
would be threatened, and the interests of the US would
be jeopardized throughout the entire area.’
– ‘The Current Situation in Iran’, CIA Report, October 20 1947. DNSA:
SE0016
The Truman ‘Doctrine’
1. Quickly overshadowed events in Iran
2. Greek government under attack by communist
guerillas
3. UK decides not to help Greece; US steps in
4. Forms part of an emerging policy of containment
of communism
5. Influenced in 1946 by George Kennan and his
Long Telegram
6. The Truman doctrine then forms by 1947 (adding
to the earlier Marshall Plan)
‘we support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or
outside pressures’
– Harry S. Truman. Address Before a Joint Session of
Congress, March 12 1947
NATO
1. April 1949, after
2 weeks heated
debate in US
Congress

2. Formalises
Collective
Security for Cold
War containment

3. Notice the buffer

/ satellite zone
1949: A new era awaits
1. China goes communist in October 1949
2. USSR tests a nuke in August 1949
3. USSR builds alternatives to NATO (Warsaw Pact) and the
Marshall plan (Comecon)
4. Germany is formally partitioned in 2 halves in October
1949
5. Led to internal shifts in the US
• Rise of the ‘Soviet alarmists’ in the Truman administration
• Not satisfied that in this new, more dangerous era, that Kennan’s
original version of ‘slow, patient, containment’ would suffice
• Red army still in Eastern Europe, and Germany after all…
• The Iron curtain idea gains critical mass
By 1950…

• Germany’s
partition
would mark
the spot that
Europe found
itself carved in
half between
East and West

• The so-called
‘Iron Curtain’
becomes real
Asymmetric Containment
1. Was George Kennan inspired (Long Telegram and ‘X article’)
2. The Soviet Union could not foresee “permanent peaceful
coexistence” with the West. This “neurotic view of world
affairs” was a manifestation of the “instinctive Russian sense
of insecurity.” See here
3. No point matching the Soviets move for move, and
attempting to balance them exactly
• Instead, counter them with US strength in other areas by
thinking asymmetrically
• Economic power, technology, political influence etc…
4. Went together with an opposition to a build up of US forces
and defence spending that dominated until 1949
• And, set the US on a path that raised sustained critique
NSC-68
1. Top secret paper, April 1950 (on blackboard)
2. Declassified in 1975
3. Truman initially rejected it as too expensive – but he was
persuaded by alarmism over the USSR and China
4. Most famous quote:
"The issues that face us are momentous…involving
the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic
but of civilization itself.”
5. If the USSR is allowed to grow unchecked, it will get so
powerful as to make a balance of power impossible
6. So, the US must not sit back and allow that to happen.
Pessimism must be institutionalised
7. Raised even more alarm than the Long Telegram
Towards ‘Symmetric’
Containment
1. More aggressive, military focus to
containment
2. Meet force with equal force where it
occurs
3. Invest in a massive defence build up
4. Installed a deep structural pessimism
in the US over the USSR’s intentions.
5. The ‘alarmists’ took over
6. One of the most important policy
papers of the Cold War
The Korean War 1950–
53(?)
1. Quickly validated the alarmists’ fears, and NSC-68’s
logic
2. South Korea and North Korea – divided by temporary
agreement after WW2 by the allies
3. North invades South – backed by China (troops) and
USSR (arms, economic support)
4. US decided to engage symmetrically and deploy in the
war to support the South as NSC-68 recommended
5. The first ‘Cold War’ – no Soviet-US troops met on the
battlefield.
• Though there were discussions about using nuclear weapons
Dissecting the Korean War
1. Containment policy going into flux again
2. Some US Generals (with support across other areas including
Congress) wanted to deploy nukes, and go to direct war with
China as the war headed to stalemate
• Showed the tension of the time
• Truman refused – as this would be asymmetrical and went
against the NSC-68 policy package he had backed
• Certain high-level figures fired because of their ‘asymmetric’
views on strategy (General Douglas MacArthur)
3. 5 million dead (40,000 US dead) – Korean war ends a
stalemate
4. Proved that (like Iran) containment would not just be focused
in Europe
• And, indicated symmetrical containment was problematic
“In 1959, during a conversation of Khrushchev with a Chinese diplomat, the Soviet politician
referred to Mao as an “old boot”, which was a mild insult in Russian. In Chinese however, the
word for boot and prostitute are the same. Therefore the Chinese diplomat thought Mao was
being called an old whore.  In the years after, the Chinese and Soviet relations would cool off and
result in the split of the coalition” – AKA the ‘Sino Soviet Split’. See here and here
Back to the Middle East
1. Remember, where the Cold War
began
2. But Europe (Germany, Greece) and
Korea left it on the back burner in
US policymaking
3. An ad-hoc approach developed
pre 1953
• Reflected an area in flux
• And the neo-colonial / colonial
presence of the UK in the area
• And a reluctance for the US to have to
focus on so many theatres
Truman’s 5 Middle East Policies
1. Nurturing direct American economic interests and
expanding political influence
2. Cold War containment (Iran 1946)
3. On-going support for colonial powers such as Britain and
France
4. Official recognition and support of the newly formed State
of Israel
5. Championing Arab nationalist movements

Deeply contradictory on multiple levels

Would require a wholesale rethink as the Cold War headed
South
1953: Eisenhower Enters
1. Truman too soft on communism
• Lost China to the red menace
• Failed to secure victory in Korea etc…
2. Also, unhappy with the cost of symmetric
containment as prescribed in NSC-68
3. Turned focus to an issue that had festered
for over two years: Iran
• Iran’s left leaning nationalist government
• Approves a coup in tandem with British
4. The idea of containment used for regime
change becomes a ‘normalcy’ in the US
Next week, More on ‘Ike’
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s evolution
of containment

2. His focus on the Middle East (Iran,

Lebanon, Egypt)

3. The ‘Eisenhower doctrine’

4. And… nuclear weapons go into

permanent state of readiness as
strategic tools of deterrence
 NSC-68
Workshop task
Analyse and discuss George Kennan’s Long
Telegram and NSC-68

Consider these three questions:

1. Why was it ‘asymmetric’

2. Can you see why the more ‘symmetric’
viewpoint of NSC-68 clashed with this?
3. Which of the two views do you think are
more appropriate for dealing with crises
in a Cold War context?