PANGILINAN VS

CAYETANO
G.R. NO. 238875/G.R. NO. 239483/G.R. NO. 240954.
MARCH 16, 2021
Bautista, Rachel Anne Z.
 FACTS: • ISSUE/S:
 The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty that established the International Criminal
1. Whether or not the Philippines
Court, where the gravest crimes under international law are prosecuted. complied with all the requisites
for withdrawal from the Rome
 Under Fidel V. Ramos's presidency, the Philippines has participated in the court's Statute
establishment. President Estrada, signed the Rome Statute of the International 2. Whether or not the executive
Criminal Court with Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute still pending, then
can unilaterally withdraw from
President Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known
as the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, a treaty.
and Other Crimes Against Humanity. Republic Act No.9851 replicated many of the 3. Whether or not the
Rome Statute's provisions. Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute was obtained Philippines' withdrawal from
following President Benigno Aquino Ill's. the Rome Statute places the
 On June 30, 2016, President Aquino's term ended and President Duterte took his oath
Philippines in breach of its
as chief executive. On April 24, 2017, Atty. Jude Sabio filed a complaint before the obligations under
International Criminal Court pertaining to alleged summary killings when President international law.
Duterte was the mayor of Davao City. On June 6, 2017, Senator Antonio Trillanes IV 4. Lastly, whether or not the
and Representative Gary Alejano filed a "supplemental communication" before the Philippines' withdrawal from
International Criminal Court with regard to President Duterte's drug war. the Rome statute will diminish
 On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced that it was withdrawing from the the Filipino people's protection
International Criminal Court. On March 16, 2018, the Philippines formally submitted under international law
its Notice of Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court to the United Nations.
 Petitioners-senators aver that the country's withdrawal from a treaty requires the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of the Senate. While, ptitioner Philippine Coalition
for the International Criminal Court and its members assert that their rights to life,
personal security, and dignity were impaired by the withdrawal from the Rome Statute
 RULING:
1. Yes, Article 127 (1) of the Rome Statute provides
mechanisms on how a state party may withdraw from it:
A State Party may, by written notification addressed to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from
this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the
date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification
specifies a later date
2. No. When such a statute is adopted, the president cannot
withdraw from the treaty being implemented unless the
statute itself is repealed. When a treaty was entered into
upon Congress's express will, the president may not
unilaterally abrogate that treaty. While the president
performed his or her function as primary architect of
international policy, it was in keeping with a statute. The
president had no sole authority, and the treaty negotiations
were premised not only upon. his or her own diplomatic
powers, but on the specific investiture made by Congress.
Here, Congress passed Republic Act No. 9851 well ahead
of the Senate's concurrence to the Rome Statute. Republic
Act No. 9851 is broader than the Rome Statute itself. This
reveals not only an independent, but even a more
encompassing legislative will-even overtaking the course-of
international relations.
3. No. The Philippines' withdrawal was submitted in
accordance with relevant provisions of the Rome Statute.
The President complied with the provisions of the
treaty from which the country withdrew. There cannot
be a violation of pacta sunt servanda when the executive
acted precisely in accordance with the procedure laid
out by that treaty. Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute
4. No. As listed by the Office of the Solicitor Genera~, the
Philippines also remained as state party to these
international conventions and human rights
instruments:
(a) The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights;
(b) The International Covenant on Economic, Social, an~
Cultural Rights;
(c) The Convention Against Torture;
(d) The Convention on the Discrimination Against Women;
and Elimination of Discrimination; and
(e) The Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination.
Thus, petltioners concern that the country’s withdrawal from
Rome Statute abjectly and reversibly subverts our basic human
rights appears to be baseless and purely speculative.
DANUBE DAM CASE
(HUNGARY VS
SLOVAKIA, 37 ILM,
1998)
FACTS: ISSUES:
 The case arose out of the signature, on 16 September 1977, by the Hungarian 1. Whether the Republic of Hungary
People's Republic and the Czechoslovak People's Republic, of a treaty concerning had been entitled to suspend and
the construction and operation of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros system of locks in subsequently abandon, in 1989,
order to further the utilization of the natural resources of the Bratislava- the works on the project
Budapest section of the Danube river. The project was essentially aimed at the 2. Whether the Czech and Slovak
production of hydroelectricity, the improvement of navigation Federal Republic had been entitled
 . It provided for the building of two series of locks, one at Gabcíkovo (in to proceed.
Czechoslovak territory) and the other at Nagymaros (in Hungarian territory). 3. Whether Slovakia had become a
Hungarian Government decided to suspend the works at Nagymaros pending the party to the 1977 Treaty as a
completion of various studies and later on decided to not continue the work any successor State of Czechoslovakia
further
 Czechoslovakia also started investigating alternative solutions. One of them, an
alternative solution subsequently known as "Variant C", entailed a unilateral diversion
of the Danube by Czechoslovakia on its territory. Slovak Government decided to begin
construction to put the Gabcíkovo Project into operation by the above-mentioned
alternative.
 Hungarian Government transmitted to the Czechoslovak Government a note
verbale unilaterally terminating the 1977 Treaty.
 Czechoslovakia began work to enable the Danube to be closed and, starting on 23
October, proceeded to the damming of the river, before Slovakia became an
independent State on 1 January 1993.
RULING:
1. No. State of necessity is a ground recognized by customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of
an act not in conformity with an international obligation. Such ground for precluding wrongfulness can only be
accepted on an exceptional basis. It acknowledged that the concerns expressed by Hungary for its natural
environment in the region related to an essential interest, but that the perils invoked by Hungary, without
prejudging their possible gravity, were not sufficiently established. The Court therefore concluded that, even if
it had been established that there was, in 1989, a state of necessity linked to the performance of the 1977 Treaty,
Hungary would not have been permitted to rely upon that state of necessity in order to justify its failure to
comply with its treaty obligations
2. Yes. The Court observed that the basic characteristic of the 1977 Treaty was to provide for the construction of
the system of locks as a joint investment constituting a single and indivisible operational system of works. The
Court accordingly concluded that Czechoslovakia, in unilaterally putting Variant C into operation and was not
applying the 1977 Treaty but, on the contrary, violated certain of its express provisions. But the Court found
that it had not yet done so when constructing the works which eventually led to the putting into operation of
Variant C. In the Court's view, therefore, the notification of termination by Hungary on 19 May 1992 had been
premature and Hungary had thus not been entitled to invoke any such breach of the treaty as a ground for
terminating it when it did.
3. The Court referred to the principle that treaties of a territorial character remain unaffected by a succession of
States, a principle which, according to the Court, is part of customary international law. The Court accordingly
concluded that the Treaty itself had not been affected by a succession of States and had thus become binding
upon Slovakia on 1 January 1993.