Chapter 1:

Article 2-
The Voluntariness
of Human Act
Rev. Fr. Anthony George Bergonio
Article 2:
The Voluntariness of
Human Act

a. Kinds or Degrees
of Voluntariness
b. Indirect
Voluntariness

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 KINDS OR
DEGREES OF
INDIRECT
VOLUNTARINESS
1. Perfect and Imperfect
Perfect voluntariness is present in
the human act when the agent fully
knows and fully intend the act.
Imperfect voluntariness is present when
there is some defect in the agent's
knowledge, intention, or in both

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 2. Simple and Conditional
Simple Voluntariness is present in a
human act performed, whether the agent
likes it or dislikes doing it. Conditional
Voluntariness is present in the agent’s
wish to do something other than that
wish he is actually doing, but doing with
repugnance or dislike.
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 3. Direct and Indirect
Direct voluntariness is present in a
human act willed itself. Indirect
Voluntariness is present in that human
act which is the foreseen result (or a
result that could and should have been
foreseen) of another act directly willed.

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 4. Positive and Negative
Positive voluntariness is present
in a human act of doing,
performing. Negative
Voluntariness is present in a
human act of omitting, refraining
from doing.
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Actual, Virtual,
Habitual, and
Interpretative
Voluntariness
 Actual Voluntariness
Actual voluntariness (or actual
intention) is present in a human act
willed here and now.

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 Virtual Voluntariness
Virtual voluntariness (or
virtual intention) is present in a
human act done as a result of (or in
virtue of) a formerly elicited actual
intention, even if that intention be
here and now forgotten.
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 Habitual Voluntariness
Habitual voluntariness (or
habitual intention) is present in a
human act done in harmony with,
but not as a result of, a formerly
elicited and unrevoked actual
intention.
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 Interpretative Voluntariness
Interpretative voluntariness (or
interpretative intention) is that
voluntariness which, in the
judgment of prudence and common-
sense, would be actually present if
opportunity or ability for it were
given. 12
 Indirect Voluntariness
Indirect Voluntariness, or voluntariness in
cause, is present in that human act which is an
effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act
deliberately willed.
Human acts are acts under the free control of
the will. It is clear that, since the will controls such
acts, the will is responsible for them. In other
words, human acts are imputable (as worthy of
praise or blame, reward or punishment to their
author or doer. 13
 Indirect Voluntariness
Now the moment we bring together the
matters of indirect voluntariness and
imputability, two supremely impartial ethical
questions present themselves. The questions are:
1. When did the agent responsible for the evil
effect of a cause directly willed?
2. When may one perform an act, not evil in
itself, which has two effects, one good, one evil?

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The First Question: When is an agent responsible
for the evil effect of a cause dırectly willed ? The
agent is responsible for such an effect when three
conditions are fulfilled,
(1) The agent must be able to foresee the evil
effect, at least in a general way.
(2) (2) The agent must be free to refrain from
doing that which is the cause of the evil
effect.
(3) (3)) The agent must be morally bound not to
do that which is the cause of the evil effect.
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 Consider some Cases
Michael knows that if he drinks liquor, he
will drink to excess, and will use blasphemous
language, which will scandalize those that hear
it. He declares, and truly enough, that he hates
intemperance, and that he dreads the evils of
blasphemy and scandal. Nevertheless he drinks
liquor, and the foreseen evils occur How far is
Michael responsible for these evil effects? When
does he incur their guilt ?
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 Consider some Cases
John says, "If I go to the meeting and
bear Jones say sharp things about our party,
I now I' lose my head and reveal some very
damaging facts about Jones' career that I
alone know." John goes to the meeting; the
evil of detraction follows. Determine John's
responsibility, and the moment at which his
guilt is imputed to him.
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The Second Question: When may one perform an
act, not evil in itself, from which flow-two effects,
one good, one evil? - One may perform such an act
when three conditions are fulfilled:
(1) The evil effect must not precede the good effect.
(2) The must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for
the act in its good effect.
(3) The intention of the agent t be honest, that is, the
agent must directly intend the good effect and merely
permit the evil effect as a regrettable incident or
"side issue.
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 (1) The evil effect must not precede the good
effect. If the evil effect comes ahead of the
good effect, then it is a means of achieving
the good effect, and is directly willed as
such a means. Now it is a fundamental
principle of Ethics a clear dictate of sound
reason-that evil may never be willed
directly, whether it be a means or an end to
be achieved. We cannot do evil that good
may come of it. The end does not justify the
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 (2) The must be a reason sufficiently
grave calling for the act in its good
effect. If this condition be not
fulfilled, there is not adequate
reason for the act at all, and
the act is prohibited in the
view of its evil effect.
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(3) The intention of the agent t be
honest. If the agent really wills the
evil effect, there is no possibility of
the act being permissible. Direct
willing of evil as we have seen, is
always against reason, and hence
against the principle of Ethics.
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 Consider some Cases
The general of an army storms an enemy
city. He foresees that many non-combatants
will be killed. Yet to take the city will be a
big step towards winning a just war. ls the
general's act allowable? Notice two effects
here: that taking of the city as a towards
ending the war with victory for the just
cause good effect; and the killing of non-
combatants an evil effect.
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 Consider some Cases
The general of an army knows that by laying waste
the farms of the enemy's country, he will seriously
inconvenience the enemy by cutting off the source
of supplies. At the present time the enemy is well
supplied, but destruction of the crops will destroy
future supplies. Such destruction will mean present
starvation to many a farmer and his family, but
ultimately it will help win a just war. May the gene
lay waste the fam-lands?
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Thank you

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