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It refers to those bodily appetites or tendencies which are called the passions, viz.,
love, hatred, joy, grief, desire, horror, hope, despair, courage or daring, fear, and
anger.
It can be classified into:
a. Antecedent – when these passions spring into action unstimulated by the
will-act.
( Example: the automatic feeling of awe over a wonderful scenery )
b. Consequent – when these passions are directly or indirectly stirred up or
fostered by the will
( Example: getting angry on the teacher retained for a long time )
From descriptions mentioned, antecedent concupiscence is an act
of man, and not a human act; it is a non-voluntary act, and the
agent is not responsible for it while consequent concupiscence is the
fault of the agent, for it is willed, either directly or indirectly, i.e.,
either in se or in causa, and thus, the agent, as a result, is responsible
for it.
The Ethical Principles on Concupiscence
a. Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act.
Antecedent concupiscence disturbs the mind and hinders the calm
judgment of the mind upon the moral qualities of an act, thus, impairing
knowledge needed for perfect voluntariness.
It is a strong and sudden urge to action, and thus it lessens the full and
prompt control which the will must exercise perfectly, hence, it impairs
freedom.
Since knowledge and freedom are impaired by it, the voluntariness of an
act is thereby lessened, and in consequence, diminishes the responsibility
of the agent.
b. Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by it, they are not
destroyed; and the agent’s responsibility, while diminished, is not
cancelled.
If the antecedent passion is so great as to make control of the agent’s acts
impossible, then the agent is temporarily insane, and his acts are not
human acts but acts of man.
c. Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the
voluntariness of an act.
Consequent concupiscence is willed, directly or indirectly, thus, the acts
that proceed from it have their proper voluntariness.
3. Fear
It is the external force applied by a free cause (that is, by human beings) for the
purpose of compelling a person to perform an act which is against his will.
Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence; external acts caused by
violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the
agent.
5. Habit
This refers to operative habit, which is a lasting readiness and facility, born of
frequently repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner.
Habit does not destroy voluntariness; acts from habit are always voluntary, at
least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.