INTERPRETATION OF

WORDS AND PHRASES

ASSOCIATED WORDS
 NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

• where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or equally susceptible of

various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated
• to remove doubt, refer to the meaning of associated or companion words
 APPLICATION OF THE RULE
Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier

Statute: Sec. 13(3), Art XI of the Constitution grants Ombudsman power to “Direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine censure or prosecution.

Facts: The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to
recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman
has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by
law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case.
Issue: W/O the Ombudsman have the power to directly suspend public officials.
Held: When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a
public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases,
e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should
be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering
the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

Statute: Sec. 458 of LGC authorized local government units to prevent or suppress “Gambling & other prohibited
games of chance.”

Facts: PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate
all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. They rented a property owned by Pryce Properties for the establishment of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Mayor Magtajas and the city councilors, issued ordinances to
cancel the project citing Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code which allows them to prevent
or suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance.
Issue: W/O Mayor Magtajas and his legislators is authorized to issue such ordinance by virtue
of Sec. 48 of the Local Government Code.
Held: No. “Gambling” – refers only to illegal gambling, like other prohibited games of chance,
must be prevented or suppressed & not to gambling authorized by specific statutes.
Carandang v. Santiago G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

Statute: ARTICLE 33 of the Civil Code. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Facts: The petitioner seeks the help of the Supreme Court to annul the order of Judge Vicente Santiago
suspending the civil case filed by the petitioner against Tomas Valenton, Sr. and Jr. to await the result of a criminal
case filed by said petitioner against the defendants. In his contention, Judge Santiago stated that trial of the civil
action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal.  The court anchored its decision on the contention of the
defendants that the plaintiff cannot invoke article 33 since the defendants were charged with frustrated homicide
and not for physical injuries.

Issue: W/O the CFI correctly interpreted Article 33 of the Civil Code.

Held: No.  The supreme court in its ruling decided in favor of the appellant, the term physical injuries just like the
words defamation and fraud mentioned in the aforementioned article were used in its generic sense.  It does not
pertain to the “physical injury” stated in the Revised Penal Code, since the defendant in his attempt to kill the
plaintiff caused him bodily injury the court deemed it proper for the plaintiff to invoke article 33 of the Civil Code.
 EJUSDEM GENERIS (THE SAME
KIND OF SPECIES)
 General rule: where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
same class or where the latter follows the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to
be restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.

 Purpose: give effect to both particular or general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class
and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the
particular words.

 Principle: based on the proposition that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their
generic and unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the specific words.

 Presumption: legislators addressed specifically to the particularization

 APPLICATION OF THE RULE
AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
Statute: Act makes unlawful to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin.
Facts: Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. His
candidacy was given due course by COMELEC which subsequently informed him via telegram
that the use of jingle in his campaign is prohibited by invoking the statute stated above.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action suit claiming that such prohibition is an
encroachment to his right to free speech.
Issue: W/O the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.

Held: The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things
of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a
candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit
the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in
the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance
to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable
but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.