NIFT, Gandhinagar

GAME THEORY
HAWK AND DOVE GAME

By – Anahat Kaur Wadhera

 GAME THEORY
All intelligent beings make decisions all the time. We can look at market situations with
two players (typically firms). Game Theory is the science of strategy. It attempts to
determine actions of other players - mathematically and logically.

Concepts aimed at decision making at several stages and situation

• Competition (business to business, gain more customers)

• Conflict (politics, war)
• Cooperation (supplier, same team, middle ground)
• Interdependence (single player)

Game theory employs games of strategies such as chess but not of chance such as
rolling a dice.
In A Strategic Game

 Two or more participants

 Gains/losses depends on what others choose to do or not do
 Outcome determined jointly by the strategies chosen by all participants
 Uncertainty is past if the equation

The Game – Hawk And Dove

The basic Hawk-Dove model imagines a scenario where two alternative strategies
for contesting resources are subject to selection. The hawk strategy is to always
fight and only retreat if an injury is received. The dove strategy is to use an
agonistic signal against other doves and to always retreat from hawks.
In this game, each animal has a choice between a Hawk strategy (in which it escalates
the conflict) and a Dove strategy (in which it retreats from an escalated conflict). If
two Doves encounter each other, they share a resource equally. If a Hawk and a Dove
encounter each other, the Hawk takes the entire resource.

As with any game model, our central question is whether or not DOVE and HAWK can
coexist and if so, at what frequencies.

Assumptions -

Two sides are competing over a good valued at V > 0, V < C

Each chooses to be a "Hawk" or "Dove" simultaneously
 Characteristics of both players, Hawk and Dove

The hawk is always aggressive and fights in any case. The dove is never aggressive and never
escalates. When a hawk encounters a dove, it is always the winner and keeps the prey. When two
hawks encounter, they fight. One of them is the winner and keeps the prey. However, both of them
can receive injuries due to fighting. When two doves meet, they never fight and in average they share
the prey. We assume that each individual predator can use both tactics along its life. In this way, the
same predator is not always hawk or dove but it can change tactics. At the occasion of an encounter, a
predator could use the hawk tactic, but in some other occasion, it could use the dove tactic. After a
certain number of encounters, we assume that, on the average, predators are using the tactic that gives
them the better payoff.

Possible Outcomes -
• If both are hawks they fight a war each wins with probability 1/2 and they both pay a cost C > 0

• If both are doves then they split the good (profit) V < C

• If one chooses hawk and the other chooses dove, the hawk wins all and the dove receives nothing.
 Hawk and Dove Model – Cost of fighting over resources

Two Players, Two strategies

4 possible outcomes; payoff matrix

Two Pure Nash Equilibrium

One Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

V = value of winning resources in light

D = cost of injury
T = costs of wasting
 Case 1 Hawk – Hawk Strategy
Here :
V = profit
(V < C) Player 2 C = cost
• Fights between hawks are brutal affairs with
the loser being the one who first sustains
injury. The winner takes sole possession of the
resource.

Player 1
• Although hawks that lose a contest are
injured, the mathematics of the game requires
that they not die and in fact are fully mended
before their next expected contest

• For simplicity, we will assume that all hawks

are equal in fighting ability; that is, each hawk
has a 50% chance of winning a Hawk - Hawk
conflict. Another way of saying this is
that Hawk vs. Hawk contests are symmetrical.
If V/2 – C > 0
Hawk strictly dominates dove for both players. But,
as V > C, Hawk incurs losses even after winning.
Thus, if both players play strategy 1, Hawk-Hawk is
not in equilibrium.
 Case 2 Hawk – Dove Strategy

Hawk always wins, Dove retreats

Here :
V = profit
If V/2-C < 0 Player 2 C = cost

Here, there are two Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium :

<Dove, Hawk> and <Hawk, Dove>

Player 1
1. For Player 1 - When Player 1 plays strategy 1
and Player 2 plays strategy 2; NE for P1
2. For Player 2 - When Player 1 plays strategy 2
and Player 2 plays strategy 1; NE for P2
 Case 3 Dove – Dove Strategy

Player 2
.
If V/2-C > 0

Player 1
• As Dove – Dove are both submissive players, the
Profit (prey) is equally divided between the two

• Here, Dove-Dove strategy lets both players stay

alive, sharing profit (V) and surviving in harmony

• This is the safest strategy for both players to reap

 If V/2 – C > 0
maximum profit while suffering no harm.
 Both players have 50% chance of getting the profit
with least amount of harm.
 Thus, if both players play strategy 4, Dove-Dove is a
mixed strategy equilibrium in this case.
 Example 1 Siblings – Brother & Sister

Assumptions – SISTER
Hawk Dove
• Brother is older and more physically powerful.
• Sister is younger and physically weaker.
• Fixed TV time for both

V, 0

Hawk
(V/2)-C,

BROTHER
Hawk-Hawk: If both fight over the remote and
1. involve parents to the fight, parents choose the
tv show for them
(V/2)-C

Dove
Hawk, Dove strategy: Who ever choses to be
2. aggressive will take the remote as the other 0, V V/2, V/2
won’t retaliate

Dove-Dove: If both come together and find a

3. show both like, the can maximize their TV time
V = TV Time
C = Complaining to parents and
getting them to choose a a show.
 Example 2 Iran – Iraq Oil War

Assumptions :
Countries are evenly matched militarily
The total cost of fighting a war is = C
We can model this situation as a non-zero sum game with the following payoff table

Iraq
Possible Outcomes :
They decide to share the oil field 50-50 without fighting a war
Country A threatens war and country B surrenders

Iran
Country B threatens war and country A surrenders
They both fight a war.

We can simplify the strategy choice for each country as (1)

fight a war or be willing to fight a war (Hawk), or (2) not be
willing to fight a war (Dove). V = value of oil field
C = cost of war
 Hawk-Hawk Strategy
•The entry corresponding to the
Hawk-Hawk combination is (V –
C) / 2 for both countries.
• This assumes that if both
countries play the Hawk strategy
then they will fight a war with
cost C and then they still end up
splitting the resources after the
war.
• Here we are assuming the cost
of war was more than the profit
either country would make off the
oil.
Dove-Dove Strategy
• •The entry corresponding to
the Dove-Dove strategy is
V/2,V/2 for both countries.
• This assumes that if both
countries play the Dove-Dove
stratergy then they will take
the passive approach and form
an understanding and split the
profit instead of fighting for it.
• This could be interpreted as a
both countries maximizing their
profits by coming together and
forming an alli.
Example 3 Suzuki-Toyota Merger
Dove-Dove Strategy

Here, instead of Toyota fighting directly with it’s competitors such as Suzuki and
Hyundai Motor India, decided to form a partnership with the company with the
biggest market share in the automobile industry in India.
Toyota
Toyota having only less than 5% market share. Hawk Dove

Suzuki capturing a massive 46% market share.

(V/2)-C,

Hawk
V, 0
(V/2)-C

Suzuki
Barter deal; both companies benefiting.

Dove
Suzuki is getting the Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV) 0, V V/2, V/2
technology from Toyota.
Toyota gets 2 compact vehicles developed on Suzuki’s
platform underpinning Ciaz and Ertiga. V = Profit
C = Cost of advertisements
S.no. Name of Publication Author Links

1. The National News Robin M. Mills How the Iran-Iraq war shaped oil markets regi
onally and globally (thenationalnews.com)

2. IPleaders Shreya Pandey Maruti Suzuki : the story behind the merger -
iPleaders

3. Economic Times Mainak Das Toyota Suzuki Partnership: What pans out for Maruti S
uzuki from Toyota-Suzuki partnership?, Auto News, ET
Auto (indiatimes.com)