Regional Organizations

 Jon C. Pevehouse (2002), “With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the
Consolidation of Democracy”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 611-626.
 Fredrik Soederbaum (2010), ““With a Little Help from My Friends”: How Regional Organizations in
Africa Sustain Clientelism, Corruption and Discrimination”, Working Paper.
 Amitav Acharya (2004), “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and
Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism”, International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 239-275.
Universal/ global organizations • Membership open to almost all states
• Could be multi-purpose (UN) or single purpose
(WHO)

Regional Organizations • Membership is limited to specific regions (EU,

SAARC, OAS)
• Mostly multi-purpose

Pluralistic Organizations  Membership not restricted to regions but based

on other common ties (Commonwealth of
Nations, BRICS)

Non-governmental Organizations  Membership includes non-state actors (individuals

& groups)
 Mostly issue-based organizations, global in scope
(Amnesty International, PETA, Human Rights
Watch)
 Key Pointers

 A regional organization can be defined “as an international organization composed of

three or more geographically proximate states having a continuous institutional
framework” (Marks et al., 2014: 7).
 Regional organizations can pursue a wide array of membership models. The most inclusive
choice is a ―convoy model, which allows all regional states to participate. Such
organizations have low admission and participation criteria. They may still debate the
admission of a given state, but the state is not asked to meet a set of formalized criteria as a
standard condition of entry. At the other extreme, organizations may choose a ―club
model, enforcing strict admission criteria.
 There have been two waves of regionalism in the post-World War II period thus far. The
more recent one of these started in the 1990s, and has been characterized by a
proliferation of regional and sub-regional organizations. Most regions feature more than
one regional organization. Often, these are complementary and perform different
functions. Some are sub-organizations of other or broader regional organizations.
However, regional organizations can also overlap with regard to mandates and
membership.
 The core challenge for interstate cooperation and hence regional integration is heterogeneity
among regional members. This heterogeneity takes three forms:
(1) The first is preference divergence: states in the region may prefer different political solutions to
their common problems, or they may disagree about how to distribute the costs and benefits
of cooperation among themselves.
(2) Second, states may differ in their capacities to implement regional polices. Less economically
developed states may have less administrative capacity, or their economic or political
fundamentals may not be conducive to stable coordination with other states in the region.
(3) Finally, states may vary in their information and beliefs. For example, they may have different
political norms about domestic governance, sovereignty, and interstate interaction. These
divergent beliefs create normative and distributional struggles, and make it difficult to adopt
policies and enforce agreements.
Thus, heterogeneity among regional states in the form of divergent preferences, capacities, and
beliefs is the core challenge of intergovernmental cooperation and regional integration.
 Questions:

 What type of heterogeneity matters for regional integration efforts?

 What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different membership models with respect
to influencing this heterogeneity among states in a region and building regional integration?
 How does membership in regional international organizations influence the process of
democratic consolidation?
 How do regional organizations sustain clientelism, corruption and discrimination?
 Jon C. Pevehouse (2002)

Key Question: How does membership in regional international organizations influence the process
of democratic consolidation?

Requirements for democratic consolidation

- Rebuilding institutions
- Legitimizing democracy for elites and masses
- Overcoming opposition to democracy
- Socio-economic factors
- Democracy in the neighborhood
 Challenges to Democratic Consolidation
Losers
• Who? Distributional losers (usually military/
business)
• Why? Focus on short-term deprivations
rather than future gains
• How? Military: going against reforms;
intervention to protect “the state”;
opposition to civilian supremacy; collusion
with other groups- especially, business elites
• Low cost of altering transitional institutions
means low risk for distributional losers;
perception of loss enough for action
Winners
• Who? New governing elites
• Why? Lack of credible commitment to new
institutions
• How? Canceling elections, suspending
reform, cracking down on opposition
• Sources of political credibility problems-
uncertainty over intentions of new
government can limit benefits of reform; new
regime’s lack of reputation for self-restraint
and honoring commitments
 Regional Organizations: Binding Winners & Losers through Commitments

“Regional international organizations can assist reformers in making a credible

commitment to political reform when their own domestic options for credible
commitments are limited.”
Why are external commitments via RIOs more credible than domestic ones?

 Mechanisms to increase cost of anti-regime behavior through conditionality imposed by the IO

on members (threat of sanctions, expulsion); membership conditional upon domestic
liberalization
 Lock-in policies/ reforms due to external enforcement
 Membership costs- additional bureaucracy, dues, economic/ monetary reform
 Specific policies of IOs that ease tensions among competing groups
 Reputation/ audience cost (association with IO also a break with past)
 Positive incentives- direct material resources; side payments in the form of new policies
 Which IOs are more likely to provide credible commitments & increase cost?

i. Political will to set conditions on membership; agreement among members on what conditions
should be made conditional
ii. Political will to enforce conditions (enforcement may be costly)
iii. Means to enforce political conditions

Hypothesis: The higher the average level of democracy within a regional IO, the more likely it is to
set and enforce conditions.
 Why are democratic IOs more likely to act as enforcers?

 Commonality of interests within the IO (especially, democracy promotion)

 Transparency and lower risk of cheating increases chances of enforcement
 High audience cost and low policymaking flexibility
 Democracies more likely to possess resources to bribe domestic actors; pay for enforcement;
absorb opportunity costs of enforcement

Results: certain regional IOs assist democratic consolidation and this influence is strongest when
states join these organizations.
 Fredrik Soederbaum (2010)

Key Question: How Do Regional Organizations in Africa Sustain Clientelism, Corruption and
Discrimination?

Main Argument: Two kinds of regionalism are prevalent in Africa- regime boosting regionalism &
shadow regionalism. Regionalizing actors engage in a well-calculated strategy to produce the two
kinds of regionalisms that are highly suited for themselves and detrimental to others. This is ignored
in the mainstream literature.

Research strategy: Move away from rationalist/ positivist frameworks into a critical/ reflectivist one,
which is concerned with formal & informal regionalisms , engagement of state & non-state actors,
and historical context.
Failure of regionalism scholarship:

 Regionalism in Africa is multifaceted; not primitive & weak but rather quite sophisticated and successful
 Dominance of mainstream theories of regionalism leads to specific mode of knowledge production & asks some
questions at the expense of others
 Eurocentric focus; ignorance about Africa
 Scholarship on Africa underdeveloped; merely reflection of mainstream view

Limits of mainstream schools

 Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, regional economic integration

 Narrow focus on states as aggregated, unitary units, or formal state-led projects (informed by European notions)
 Readings of European integration influence the description & prescription in the rest of the world
 Discursive hegemony of rationalist approaches; critical approaches considered ‘non-scientific’ & speculative
 The New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

 Rejection of mainstream knowledge production & “key” research questions; challenge to notion that regionalism is
driven through formal supranational or intergovernmental regional frameworks & that it is happening mainly in Europe,
North America and the Asia Pacific.
 Emphasis on placing regionalism within its particular historical context- old regionalism in 1950s- 1960s emphasized on
the bipolar world & nation states, new regionalism on economic globalisation, interdependence. Move away from
Eurocentricism to global nature of new regionalism.
 Emphasis on structured nature of regions- regions always “in the making”, created & recreated through global
transformation, not self-evident.
 Emphasis on a variety of state, market, & society actors and covers economic, developmental, cultural, political,
security & environmental aspects.
 Emphasis on the need to ‘unpack’ the state & the state-society complex – role of “weak state” and “strong
regimes”, personal leaders & the “privatization of the public” (political power as personal power & politics as
business strategy); therefore, regionalism as business strategy.
 Emphasis on regionalism as more complex than enhancing collective “national interest” (realism) or procure
“trade” (liberalism).
 Regime Boosting Regionalism

 Seeks to strengthen the status, legitimacy and interests of the political regime (rather than the nation-state),
domestically & internationally. Many ruling regimes praise goals of regionalism & ROs without bearing costs
of policy implementation.
 Nature of states in Africa crucial- weak states placing heavy emphasis on formal & absolute sovereignty-
because it enhances the power of the governing elite & its ability to stay in power.
 Looks similar to conventional regionalism but is different because doesn’t promote either public
goods or national interest; instead used for image-boosting to raise the profile, status, & formal
sovereignty of their authoritarian regimes. This isn’t a failure/ absence of collective action or regional
integration but a successful type of collective action without formal regional integration (creates
discourses on sovereignty). Regional institutions help with domestic problems.
 Regime-boosting regionalism through ‘summitry’ & high-profile conferences. They are important in
discursive constructions of Ros.
 Large number of overlapping and competing intergovernmental regional organizations a deliberate
strategy for verbal regionalism & regime-boosting.
 Shadow Regionalism

 Shadow regionalism, or trans-state regionalization, suggests that regime actors use their power positions
within the state to erect a complex mode of regionalism characterised by informality and driven by rent-
seeking and personal self-interest.
 It grows from below and is built upon rent-seeking and patron-client relations; undermines the regulatory
capacity of the state and formal regionalism.
 Profits are highly inequitable; accumulation of power and resources at the top.
 Shadow networks arise in the context of shadow states or in larger border disparities & depend on the failure
of the formal economy and of policy-led regionalism.
 Shadow regionalism now extended to criminal activities- trade in drugs, arms, resources- “networks of
plunder”- active in promoting & profiting from war, chaos & warlord politics.

Take away: Regionalism arises for a host of complex reasons. State actors create regionalization to achieve
private goals & promote neopatrimonialism. ROs can act as means of “resource capture” & international
patronage. This results in regionalization without the implementation of formal regional integration.
 Acharya (2004)

 Previously, we had talked about international organizations as “norm promoters”. But why do
some transnational norms find greater acceptance in a particular contexts than in others?
: In this article, Acharya builds a framework for “norm localization” & uses the framework to study
how transnational norms have shaped regional institutions in Southeast Asia and the role of Asian
regional institutions and processes—specifically the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)
—in transnational norm diffusion.
 Perspectives on Norm Diffusion:

 Moral cosmopolitanism: these are mostly “universal norms” (ban on chemical weapons, protection of whales, struggle
against racism etc.) & the key actors are agents (whether they are individuals or social movements/ international
organizations). However, there is an implicit “moral proselytism” in this approach & an implicit assumption that universal
norms are “good” and local norms are “bad”. Additionally, this approach does not appreciate the role/ agency of local
actors in norm diffusion.
 Norm congruence: explores the “fit” between transnational & local norms (scholarship on “cultural match” or
“organizational culture”); this literature often explores resistance to transnational norms. However, this perspective can
be too static.
 Framing: this perspective is more dynamic than the previous two; there is a focus on framing because the linkages
between existing norms and emergent norms are not often obvious and must be actively constructed by proponents of
new norms- through framing, norm advocates highlight and “create” issues by using language that names, interprets,
and dramatizes them. For example, framing the civil rights discourse in the United States in light of the global norm of
racial equality and the global anti-apartheid campaign . Framing canthus make a global norm appear local.
 Grafting: “Grafting” (or “incremental norm transplantation”) is a tactic norm entrepreneurs employ to institutionalize a
new norm by associating it with a preexisting norm in the same issue area, which makes a similar prohibition or
injunction. For example, the campaign to develop a norm against chemical weapons was helped by invoking the prior
norm against poison.
Note: Framing & grafting are not necessarily local; norm localization seeks to go beyond all the four pe
 ASEAN & Norm Diffusion

 In the 1990s, ASEAN faced two sets of proposals to redefine its agenda and reshape its institutional
machinery. The first proposal, emerging in the early1990s, sought the creation of a multilateral
security institution for the Asia Pacific on the basis of the “common security” norm. Originating in
Cold War Europe, this norm had been reframed in Asia Pacific discourses as “cooperative security.”
 The second proposal, in the late 1990s, sought to develop ASEAN’s role in addressing transnational
problems that would require it to go beyond its traditional adherence to the norm of
noninterference in the internal affairs of its members. This effort had its normative roots in the
post-Cold War notions of humanitarian intervention and democratic assistance, albeit modified in
the regional context as “constructive intervention” and “flexible engagement.”
 After a period of contestation, the first proposal led ASEAN to formalize security dialogues, adopt a
more inclusive posture toward outside powers’ role in regional order, and anchor a new security
institution for the wider Asia Pacific region. In contrast, the attempt to dilute the noninterference
norm on the basis of the flexible engagement idea failed, producing only some weak policy
instruments.
 But why did proposals underpinned by a reframed global norm (humanitarian intervention)
that was more convergent with the policies of powerful actors, and that was conceived as an
answer to the severe economic crisis facing the region, fare poorly with ASEAN com-pared to
proposals underpinned by a reframed European norm (common security), which had been
initially rejected by the powerful actors (especially the United States)?
 Acharya argues that the answer lies in the relative scope of localization for the two norms.
Instead of just assessing the existential fit between domestic and outside identity norms and
institutions, and explaining strictly dichotomous outcomes of acceptance or rejection,
localization describes a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence
between transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalized in a region) and
local beliefs and practices. In this process, foreign norms, which may not initially cohere with
the latter, are incorporated into local norms. The success of norm diffusion strategies and
processes depends on the extent to which they provide opportunities for localization.
 Localization may start with a reinterpretation of the outside norm, including framing and
grafting, but may extend into more complex processes of reconstitution to make an outside
norm congruent with a preexisting local normative order. It is also a process in which the role
of local actors is more crucial than that of outside actors.
 Case 1: ASEAN and Cooperative Security

Toward the end of the Cold War (1986-90), leaders from the Soviet Union, Canada, and Australia advanced proposals toward
multilateral security cooperation in the Asia Pacific similar to the European ideas about “common security”. These proposals had a
few common features:
(1) rejection of adversarial or balance of power approaches to security;
(2) rejection of unilateralism and preference for an “inclusive” approach to security through multilateral security measures to manage
the security dilemma; (
3) emphasis on reassurance through confidence-building measures (CBMs), arms control, multilateral cooperation, and the
enhancement of the collective security functions of the United Nations; and
(4) establishing a link between domestic and regional and international security.

In its initial reaction, ASEAN feared that these proposals could undermine its existing norms and practices:
1)ASEAN’s avoidance of military-security cooperation- this itself was because of fears of provoking its Cold War adversaries, Vietnam
and China, which had denounced ASEAN as a new front for the now-defunct American-backed Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.
ASEAN also felt that attention to military security issues would be divisive and undermine economic and political cooperation.
2)The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality(ZOPFAN) framework, articulated in 1972, was geared to minimizing the role of external
powers in regional affairs. ZOPFAN was thus an “exclusionary” framework. A common security institution, in contrast, would bring
together ASEAN and the so-called outside powers within a single security framework, allowing them a legitimate role in regional
security.
3)The “ASEAN Way,” a short-hand for organizational minimalism and preference for informal non-legalistic approaches to cooperation.”
Challenging this tradition were common security mechanisms, which imposed formal, reciprocal, and binding obligations, and
allowed intrusive verification.
 However, a think tank- the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS)- reframed
the common security norm was as “cooperative security” & retained two key elements of the original
common security idea—the principle of “inclusiveness” and the rejection of deterrence-based security
systems—but rejected the legalistic measures of security cooperation as well as the link between
domestic politics and regional security.
 An equally important factor behind ASEAN’s more receptive attitude toward cooperative security was its
recognition of some important common ground between this norm and the existing ASEAN principles and
processes. The rejection of deterrence fitted well into ASEAN’s existing policy of not organizing itself into a
regional collective defense system.
 Additionally, an official Japanese initiative for a new regional security institution based on the ASEAN
model led to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). As the first Asia Pacific institution
dedicated to security issues, the ARF represents a significant expansion of ASEAN’s security agenda. It is
the most inclusive regional institution: counting among its members all the major powers (including the
EU) of the contemporary international system. Its creation marked a significant break with ASEAN’s
ZOPFAN norm.
 To sum up, the cooperative security norm contributed to two institutional outcomes: new tasks (security
cooperation) for an existing regional institution (ASEAN) that displaced a long-standing norm (ZOPFAN),
and the creation of a new institution, the ARF, closely modeled on ASEAN. For the first time in history,
Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific acquired a permanent regional security organization.
 Case 2: ASEAN and Flexible Engagement

 The establishment of the ARF in 1994 boosted ASEAN’s international prestige. But ASEAN suffered a major setback in the
wake of the Asian economic crisis that began in mid-1997. The failure of ASEAN to respond to the crisis with a united
front drew considerable criticism. A key fallout was proposals for reforming ASEAN to make it more responsive to
transnational challenges. Leading the reformist camp was Surin Pitsuwan, who became the foreign minister of a new Thai
government in 1997. He urged ASEAN to look beyond its “cherished principle of non-intervention . . . to allow it to play a
constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic issues with regional implications.”
 Pitsuwan’s ideas, known as “Flexible Engagement,” became a focal point of debate in Southeast Asian regional dialogues.
Although ostensibly geared to an economic crisis, Pitsuwan’s real aim was to promote greater political openness and
transparency in ASEAN, both at domestic and regional levels. Among the ideational underpinnings of flexible
engagement were emerging post-Westphalian concepts of collective action, including the norm of humanitarian
intervention (HI)and the advocacy of human rights and democratization by the international community.
 In Southeast Asia, the HI norm had attracted no insider advocacy, only suspicion and rejection. Malaysia’s Foreign
Minister Syed Hamid Albar urged the region “to be wary all the time of new concepts and new philosophies that will
compromise sovereignty in the name of humanitarian intervention.” Neither had the norm received backing from the
local epistemic community. ASEAN-ISIS was too divided over this norm to play an advocacy role.
 In this case, Pitsuwan’s intrusive regionalism was not backed by any prior regional tradition. ASEAN was founded as a
grouping of illiberal regimes with no record of collectively promoting human rights and democratic governance. Success
in localization depends on the insider proponents being seen as upholders of local values and identity. But ASEAN leaders
saw Pitsuwan as an “agent” of the West, promoting the latter’s agenda of human rights promotion and democratic
assistance. Though local in persona, he was insufficiently local in his inspiration and motivation.