GENERAL PHILOSOPHY

LECTURE 5: PERSONAL IDENTITY

Dr. Alex Kaiserman

The Problem(s) of Personal Identity
Some interesting questions about people:
1. When do we start to exist?
2. When do we cease to exist?
3. What sorts of changes can we survive?
4. How many people are there?
The Problem(s) of Personal Identity
Luckily, these questions can be reduced to one, simpler question:

What makes this person… …the very same person as this one?

More generally: Under what conditions is a person P1 at time t1 numerically

identical to a person P2 at time t2?
The Problem(s) of Personal Identity
Hang on: how could these people be
identical? After all, don’t they have different
properties?
The Indiscernibility of Identicals: If a is
numerically identical to b, then a is
qualitatively identical to b.

Response: There is just one thing here, which has the property of being-a-
child-at-t1 and the property of being-an-adult-at-t2 (and these are compatible
properties!)
I am now qualitatively different to how I was, but that doesn’t mean I’m not
identical to myself.
The Problem(s) of Personal Identity
Hang on: how could these people be
identical? After all, don’t they have different
properties?
The Indiscernibility of Identicals: If a is
numerically identical to b, then a is
qualitatively identical to b.

Don’t say: “Under what conditions are two people identical?”

Do say: “Under what conditions is a person P1 identical to a person P2?”

Don’t say: “Am I the same person as I was back then?”

Do say: “Am I the same person as the person in that photograph?”
The Problem(s) of Personal Identity
Some interesting questions about people:
1. When do we start to exist?
 Is this person at t1 numerically identical to this foetus at time t0?
2. When do we cease to exist?
 Is this person at t1 numerically identical to this comatose body at time t2?
3. What sorts of changes can we survive?
 If every part of my body was replaced with a functionally identical
inorganic replica, would the resulting being after the operation be
numerically identical to me now?
4. How many people are there?
 Is this DID sufferer numerically identical to the one I saw earlier?
A Thought Experiment
Suppose Professor Farnsworth succeeds in copying
his entire brain pattern onto Amy’s brain and vice
versa.

Question: Is this a mind transplant or a body

transplant?

Possibility 1: Amy and Farnsworth wake up in their old bodies, but with each
others’ beliefs, memories, personalities, etc.

Possibility 2: Amy and Farnsworth wake up with their old beliefs, memories,
personalities, etc, but in each others’ bodies.

I think Possibility 2 is what actually happens. So that means personal identity

must be a psychological relation, not a physical one.
The Memory Criterion
But what kind of psychological relation?
The memory criterion: Person P1 at time t1 is numerically identical to person
P2 at time t2 if and only if P2 at t2 can remember experiences had by P1 at t1
(or vice versa).
Objection 1:

can remember the can remember the

experiences of experiences of
The Memory Criterion
By the memory criterion:
 Old man = Young officer
 Young officer = Boy
 Old man ≠ Boy.
But this is a contradiction!
 Numerical identity is a transitive relation.
 The remembers experiences had by relation is not transitive.
 So the memory criterion cannot be right.
The Memory Criterion
Maybe we could tweak the memory criterion:
Revised memory criterion: Person P1 at time t1 is numerically identical to
person P2 at time t2 if and only if there is a chain of memory relations linking
P1 at t1 and P2 at t2.
Objection 2: By definition, I can only remember my own experiences –
otherwise I’m not really ‘remembering’ at all!
So the memory criterion is trivial.
Response: Let’s say that P quasi-remembers the experiences of Q if and only if
it seems to P as if she is remembering those experience.
Objection 3: A madman might quasi-remember the experiences of Napoleon,
but that doesn’t mean he is identical to Napoleon!
The Memory Criterion
A better approach:
Let’s say that P1 at t1 is psychologically connected to P2 at t2 if and only if
 P2’s psychological state at t2 is very similar to P1’s psychological state at t1,
and
 P2 is in the psychological state she is in at t2 in large part because of the
psychological state P1 was in at t1.
And let’s say that P1 at t1 is psychologically continuous with P2 at t2 if and
only if there is a chain of relations of psychological connectedness leading
from P1 at t1 to P2 at t2 (or vice versa).

The Psychological Criterion: P1 at t1 is numerically identical with P2 at t2 if

and only if they are psychologically continuous with one another.
TITLE WITH
PICTURE LAYOUT
Subtitle
The ‘Transporter’
The ‘Transporter’
The ‘Transporter’
The ‘Transporter’
The ‘Transporter’

Wow, that was quick! I

didn’t feel a thing!
The ‘Transporter’
The ‘Transporter’
The ‘Transporter’
Is the person at the other end you?
Wow, that was quick!
I didn’t feel a thing!
If so – great! The transporter works.

If not – oops. The ‘transporter’ is really just an

expensive killing (+cloning) machine.

The person at the other end is psychologically

connected to the person who walks in.

So according to the psychological criterion, you will

survive the transportation process.

So there’s nothing to fear! (Right?)

A Problem for the Psychological Criterion
But suppose something goes wrong with the transporter…
A Problem for the Psychological Criterion
But suppose something goes wrong with the transporter…
…
A Problem for the Psychological Criterion
But suppose something goes wrong with the transporter…
A Problem for the Psychological Criterion
But suppose something goes wrong with the transporter…
A Problem for the Psychological Criterion
But suppose something goes wrong with the transporter…
A Problem for the Psychological Criterion
Both of these people – call them P1 and P2 – are
psychologically continuous with you.
So according to the psychological criterion:
 You = P1
 You = P2
 But P1 ≠ P2
But this is a contradiction!
 Numerical identity is a transitive relation.
 Psychological continuity is not a transitive relation.
 So the psychological criterion can’t be right.
Response 1: Parfit

Identity is not what matters.1

What we care about is whether we will survive the transportation process.

Naïve view: To survive is to be numerically identical to someone (or something)
in the future.
Parfit’s view: To survive is to be psychologically continuous with someone in the
future, regardless of whether they are identical to you.
So you shouldn’t be worried about getting into the transporter – you will
survive, even if things go wrong. (And if there ends up being two people
psychologically continuous with you; well, all the better!)
1
D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1986), ch.12.
Response 1: Parfit
Parfit’s view has broader consequences too:
Are you responsible for an action performed in the past?
- The Naïve View: Only if it was you that performed the action.
- Parfit’s View: Only if (and to the extent that) you are psychologically
continuous with the person who performed the action.
Are you required to keep a promise made in the past?
- Only if it was you that made the promise.
- Only if (and to the extent that) you are psychologically continuous with the
person who made the promise.

Is it selfish for you to prefer the future wellbeing of one person over others?
- Only if that person is you.
- Only if (and to the extent that) you are psychologically continuous with that
future person.
Response 2: Lewis
What is it that matters in survival? […] What matters is mental
connectedness and…what matters is identity…the answers are
compatible and both are right.2

How could this be?

According to Lewis, ordinary objects, including people, are 4-dimensional
entities – they persist through time in the same way that they extend through
space, by having parts (call them ‘person-stages’) at different times.
t1

2
D. Lewis, ‘Survival and Identity’, in Philosophical Papers (Vol. 1), p.17 t2
Response 2: Lewis

Oh look, a train

Oh look, another train!

I wonder if it’s the same train

as the one I saw before?

Are we asking whether the locomotive is numerically identical to the carriage?

Of course not!
We want to know whether the locomotive and the carriage are parts of the
same train (or, in other words, whether the train of which the locomotive is a
part is numerically identical to the train of which the carriage is a part).
Response 2: Lewis

Oh look, a person

Oh look, another person!

I wonder if it’s the same person

as the one I saw before?

Are we asking whether the young person-stage is numerically identical to the

old person-stage? Of course not!
We want to know whether the young person-stage and the old person-stage
are parts of the same person (or, in other words, whether the person of which
the young person-stage is a part is numerically identical to the person of
which the old person-stage is a part).
Response 2: Lewis
The psychological criterion (Lewis version): Person-stages P1 and P2 are parts
of the same person if and only if they are psychologically continuous with one
another.

A continuant person…is a maximal R-interrelated* aggregate of

person-stages.3

*‘R-relation’ is Lewis’s name for the relation of psychological continuity.

3
D. Lewis, ‘Survival and Identity’, in Philosophical Papers (Vol. 1), p.22
Response 2: Lewis
So how does this help with ‘fission’ cases? P2

P1

t2

t1
P3
P1, P2 and P3 are distinct person-stages.
There are two maximal R-interrelated aggregates of
person-stages here:
Response 2: Lewis
So how does this help with ‘fission’ cases? P2

P1

t2

C1

t1
P3
P1, P2 and P3 are distinct person-stages.
There are two maximal R-interrelated aggregates of
person-stages here:
This one…
Response 2: Lewis
So how does this help with ‘fission’ cases? P2

P1
C2

t2

C1

t1
P3
P1, P2 and P3 are distinct person-stages.
There are two maximal R-interrelated aggregates of
person-stages here:
This one… …and this one.
Response 2: Lewis
So on Lewis’s version of the psychological criterion, there is no contradiction!
There are two continuant people, which overlap (i.e. share person-stages) for
parts of their lives.
Objection 1: On Lewis’s view, there are two people even before the fission
event! The transporter merely ‘separates’ them. Isn’t that weird?
Lewis’s response: It’s not so weird.
1
w ay
i gh
H

Inte
rsta
te 9
3
Response 2: Lewis
So on Lewis’s version of the psychological criterion, there is no contradiction!
There are two continuant people, which overlap (i.e. share person-stages) for
parts of their lives.
Objection 1: On Lewis’s view, there are two people even before the fission
event! The transporter merely ‘separates’ them. Isn’t that weird?
Lewis’s response: It’s not so weird.
1
w ay How many roads did I cross?
i gh
H
In one sense, just one – I only
Inte crossed one road-segment.
rsta
te 9
3 But in another sense, two – the
road-segment I crossed is a
part of two roads.
Response 2: Lewis
So on Lewis’s version of the psychological criterion, there is no contradiction!
There are two continuant people, which overlap (i.e. share person-stages) for
parts of their lives.
Objection 1: On Lewis’s view, there are two people even before the fission
event! The transporter merely ‘separates’ them. Isn’t that weird?
Lewis’s response: It’s not so weird.
How many people get into the
transporter?
In one sense, just one – only one
person-stage gets into the transporter.
But in another sense, two – the
person-stage that gets into the
transporter is a part of two people.
Response 2: Lewis
So on Lewis’s version of the psychological criterion, there is no contradiction!
There are two continuant people, which overlap (i.e. share person-stages) for parts
of their lives.
Objection 2: On Lewis’s view, how many people are getting into the transporter now
depends on whether it will work properly in the future. Isn’t that weird?
Lewis’s response: It’s not so weird.

How many roads I cross depends Similarly, how many people get into the transporter
on whether there is a fork ahead... depends on whether there is a fission event in the future.