RFC 4949

RFC 4949 defines user authentication as:

“The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a
system entity.”
 Authentication Process
• Fundamental • Identification step
building block  Presenting an identifier
to the security system
and primary line
of defense • Verification step
 Presenting or generating
authentication
• Basis for access information that
corroborates the binding
control and user between the entity
accountability and the identifier
 The four means of authenticating user
identity are based on:
Something the Something the Something the Something the
individual individual has individual is individual does
knows (token) (static (dynamic
• Password, PIN, • Smartcard, biometrics) biometrics)
answers to electronic • Fingerprint, • Voice pattern,
prearranged keycard, physical retina, face handwriting,
questions key typing rhythm
 Risk Assessment for
User Authentication

• There are three Assuranc

e Level
separate
concepts:
Potential
impact

Areas of
risk
 Assurance Level
More
specifically is
Four levels of
defined as: assurance
Describes an
organization’s
Level 1
degree of • Little or no confidence in the
The degree of confidence in
certainty that a the vetting process used to
asserted identity's validity

user has establish the identity of the

individual to whom the
presented a credential was issued
credential that
refers to his or
her identity The degree of confidence that
the individual who uses the
credential is the individual to
whom the credential was
issued
Level 2
• Some confidence in the asserted
identity’s validity
Level 3
• High confidence in the asserted
identity's validity
Level 4
• Very high confidence in the asserted
identity’s validity
 Potential Impact
• FIPS 199 defines three levels of potential impact on
organizations or individuals should there be a breach
of security:
o Low
• An authentication error could be expected to have a limited adverse
effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or
individuals
o Moderate
• An authentication error could be expected to have a serious adverse
effect
o High
• An authentication error could be expected to have a severe or
catastrophic adverse effect
 Table 3.1

Maximum Potential Impacts for Each

Assurance Level
 Password Authentication
• Widely used line of defense against intruders
o User provides name/login and password
o System compares password with the one stored for that specified login

• The Security provided by user ID:

o Determines that the user is authorized (able) to access the system
o Determines the user’s privileges
o Is used in discretionary access control
Password Vulnerabilities
Offline Password
guessing Workstation Electronic
dictionary against hijacking monitoring
attack single user

Exploiting
Specific Popular Exploiting
multiple
account password user
password
attack attack mistakes
use
UNIX Implementation
Original scheme
• Up to eight printable characters in length
• 12-bit salt used to modify DES encryption into a
one-way hash function
• Zero value repeatedly encrypted 25 times
• Output translated to 11 character sequence

Now regarded as inadequate

• Still often required for compatibility with existing
account management software or multivendor
environments
 Improved
Implementations
OpenBSD uses Blowfish
block cipher based hash
algorithm called Bcrypt
• Most secure version of Unix
hash/salt scheme
Much stronger hash/salt • Uses 128-bit salt to create 192-bit
schemes available for Unix hash value

Recommended hash function

is based on MD5
• Salt of up to 48-bits
• Password length is unlimited
• Produces 128-bit hash
• Uses an inner loop with 1000
iterations to achieve slowdown
 Password Cracking

Dictionary attacks
• Develop a large dictionary of
possible passwords and try each
against the password file
• Each password must be hashed
using each salt value and then
compared to stored hash values
Rainbow table attacks (trade off space for time )
• the attacker generates a large dictionary of possible
passwords
• For each Password Pre-compute tables of hash values for
all salts
• A mammoth table of hash values
• Can be countered by using a sufficiently large salt value
and a sufficiently large hash length

John the Ripper

Password crackers exploit the
fact that people choose easily • Open-source password cracker first
developed in in 1996
guessable passwords
• Uses a combination of brute-force and
• Shorter password lengths dictionary techniques
are also easier to crack
 Modern Approaches
• Complex password policy
o Forcing users to pick stronger passwords

• However password-cracking techniques have also

improved
o The processing capacity available for password cracking has increased
dramatically
o The use of sophisticated algorithms to generate potential passwords
o Studying examples and structures of actual passwords in use
Password File Access Control
Can block offline guessing attacks by denying access to
encrypted passwords

Vulnerabilities
Make
available
only to
privileged
users

Weakness Accident Users with

Access Sniff
in the OS with same
from passwords
Shadow that allows permission password
backup in network
password access to s making it on other
media traffic
file the file readable systems
 Password Selection Strategies
User education
Users can be told the importance of using hard to guess passwords and can be provided with guidelines for selecting strong passwords

Computer generated passwords

Users have trouble remembering them

Reactive password checking

System periodically runs its own password cracker to find guessable passwords

Complex password policy

User is allowed to select their own password, however the system Goal is to eliminate guessable passwords while allowing the user to
checks to see if the password is allowable, and if not, rejects it select a password that is memorable
 Proactive Password
Checking

Password cracker
Rule enforcement
• Compile a large dictionary of
passwords not to use( Bad • Specific rules that passwords
Passwords) must adhere to

Bloom filter
• Used to build a table based on dictionary
using hashes
• Check desired password against this
table ( rejecting words on a list that has
been implemented on a number of
systems)
 Table 3.2

Types of Cards Used as Tokens

 Memory Cards
• Can store but do not process data
• The most common is the magnetic stripe card
• Can include an internal electronic memory
• Can be used alone for physical access
o Hotel room
o ATM
• Provides significantly greater security when combined with a
password or PIN
• Drawbacks of memory cards include:
o Requires a special reader
o Loss of token
o User dissatisfaction
 Smart Tokens
• Physical characteristics:
o Include an embedded microprocessor
o A smart token that looks like a bank card
o Can look like calculators, keys, small portable objects
• Interface:
o Manual interfaces include a keypad and display for interaction
o Electronic interfaces communicate with a compatible reader/writer
• Authentication protocol:
o Classified into three categories:
• Static
• Dynamic password generator
• Challenge-response
 Smart Cards
• Most important category of smart token
o Has the appearance of a credit card
o Has an electronic interface or wireless
o May use any of the smart token protocols

• Contain:
o An entire microprocessor
• Processor
• Memory
• I/O ports
• Typically include three types of memory:
o Read-only memory (ROM)
• Stores data that does not change during the card’s life (card number, holder name)
o Electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM)
• Holds application data and programs (executed protocols , in telephone card remaining talk
time)
o Random access memory (RAM)
• Holds temporary data generated when applications are executed
 Electronic Identity Cards
(eID)
Use of a smart card as a national Most advanced deployment is the
identity card for citizens German card neuer Personalausweis

Can serve the same purposes as other national

ID cards, and similar cards such as a driver’s
license, for access to government and
commercial services
Has human-readable data printed on its surface include the
following:
• Personal data name, date of birth, and address
• Document number alphanumerical nine-character unique
Can provide stronger proof of identity and can
be used in a wider variety of applications identifier of each card
• Card access number (CAN) six-digit decimal random number
printed on the face of the card
• Machine readable zone (MRZ) (: Three lines of human- and
machine-readable text on the back of the card This may
In effect, is a smart card that has been verified by also be used as a password
the national government as valid and authentic
 Table 3.3

Electronic
Functions
and Data
for
eID Cards

CAN = card access number

MRZ = machine readable zone
PACE = password authenticated connection establishment
PIN = personal identification number
 Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment (PACE)

For offline applications,

either the MRZ printed
on the back of the card
For online applications, or the six-digit card
access is established by access number (CAN)
the user entering the 6- printed on the front is
Ensures that the digit PIN (which should used
contactless RF chip in only be known to the
the eID card cannot be holder of the card)
read without explicit
access control
 Biometric Authentication
• Attempts to authenticate an individual based on unique physical
characteristics
• Based on pattern recognition
• Is technically complex and expensive when compared to
passwords and tokens
• Physical characteristics used include:
o Facial characteristics
o Fingerprints
o Hand geometry
o Retinal pattern
o Iris
o Signature
o Voice
Remote User Authentication
• Authentication over a network, the Internet, or a
communications link is more complex
• Additional security threats such as:
o Eavesdropping, capturing a password, replaying an authentication
sequence that has been observed

• Generally rely on some form of a challenge-response protocol

to counter threats
Table 3.4
Some Potential
Attacks,
Susceptible
Authenticators,
and
Typical
Defenses
 Eavesdropping
Adversary attempts to
learn the password by
some sort of attack that
Denial-of-Service involves the physical Host Attacks
proximity of user and
Directed at the user
adversary
file at the host where
Attempts to disable a passwords, token
user authentication passcodes, or
service by flooding the biometric templates
service with numerous are stored
authentication AUTHENTICATI
attempts
ON
SECURITY
Trojan Horse ISSUES
An Replay
application or physical Adversary repeats a
device masquerades as Client Attacks previously captured
an authentic user response
application or device Adversary attempts to
for the purpose of achieve user
capturing a user authentication
password, passcode, or without access to the
biometric remote host or the
intervening
communications path