Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Sessions 6-7
Framework
Where do I stand?
• Economic Axis = -5.38
• Social Axis = -6.15
PGP 20
Authoritarian
9
1
L
E -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
R
F -1 I
T G
H
-3
T
-5
-7
-9
Libertarian
PGP 21
PGP 22
8
AUTHORITARIAN
6
0
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
L
E -2 R
F I
T G
-4
H
T
-6
-8
lIBERTARIAN
-10
PGP 23
6
AUTHORITARIAN
5
-10
L
-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 R
10
E I
-1
F G
T -2 H
T
-3
-4
-5
LIBERTARIAN
-6
PGP 24
AUTHORITARIAN
6
0
-8 L -6 -4 -2 0 2
R4
E
F
-2
T I
G
H
-4
T
-6
-8
LIBERTARIAN
PGP 25
AUTHORITARIAN
0 RI
-12 LE -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 GH 2
FT T
-2
-4
-6
-8
LIBERTARIAN
-10
Voting systems
Three or More Candidates
First Choice A B C
Second Choice B C B
Third Choice C A A
Three or More Candidates
• The system we typically use is called plurality voting
• Each voter casts a single vote for their top preference, and the
candidate that gets more votes than any other is the winner
Three or More Candidates
• The winner A is the least preferred choice for majority of the voters
• C would beat A if they were the only two candidates in the race
• Here we run several rounds of a plurality election, removing the loser in each round,
and moving the voters who supported them to the next choice on their ballot
• The Borda count is a system that takes that into account. In this system, each
position on the ballot is given a score. With only three candidates it would be like
this: first choice gets 3 points; second choice gets 2 point; third choice gets 1
points. The population weighted average score determines the winner
• Once all of the ballots are submitted, we consider all of the different pairings
of two candidates against one another
• If there are three candidates, there are three pairings: A vs. B, A vs. C, and B
vs. C
• If there are four candidates, there are six pairings: A&B, A&C, A&D, B&C,
B&D, C&D
Finding the Winner of a Pairwise Election
• Using the preference ballots, we determine the winner of each pairwise election
• Recall the voter (in Group 1) who submitted the ballot with preference A > B > C
• In the A vs. B election, this vote would count toward A’s total, since it lists A higher
than B
• The Condorcet winner is the candidate who would beat every other candidate in a
head-to-head majority vote
• However, the Condorcet method has a major flaw, which was known
to Condorcet even as he was advocating its use
The “Condorcet Paradox”
• Consider this voter profile Number
Preference Order
of Voters
with three candidates
10 A>B>C
9 B>C>A
8 C>A>B
The “Condorcet Paradox”
• Consider this voter profile Number
Preference Order
of Voters
with three candidates
10 A>B>C
9 B>C>A
8 C>A>B
A B A C B C
10 10 10
9 9 9
8 8 8
Total: 18 Total: 9 Total: 10 Total: 17 Total: 19 Total: 8
Using Condorcet as a Guide
• The major flaw of Condorcet’s method is that it sometimes doesn’t
determine a winner
• Imagine the chaos that would result if this occurred during a national
election
• However, if there is a Condorcet winner, it is natural to think that the
Condorcet winner should be the winner of an election
• Borda count does not, in general, pick the Condorcet winner
• Now we may understand why plural voting system is the most
practical choice, despite its limitations