The Legislative Branch: Internationalism Vs Isolationism (The Cold War)

Part II
The Legislative Branch: Internationalism vs

Isolationism (the Cold War)
The Cold War Consensus
After the end of WWII and the “Rally behind the Flag”
effect dominated the reordering of the national
priorities for a new national interest based on security
and containment. A majority of Congressmen gave a
mandate to the president to act after immediate and
clear international threats to the stability and security
of the country.
Unlike post WWI era, post WWII debate was
dominated by the executive branch with Congress
acquiescing to all decisions and public opinion rallying
behind their president. After WWII, the national
interest of the United States would be exclusively
decided by the executive branch with the legislative
branch with its two houses ratifying the foreign policy
measures suggested by the president
The idea of a "bipartisan foreign policy consensus"
came eventually to describe the domestic context of
American foreign policy during the Cold War years
McCormick and Wittkopt define “bipartisanship as
the percentage of foreign policy votes on which a
majority of Democrats and a majority of Republicans
agree with the president's position in a given year.
(1082).
A bipartisan consensus about the means and ends of
American foreign policy is generally thought to have
been part of the American political environment
during the Cold War era.
For Peppers, presidential Support in Congress that
marked the period from 1945 to 1973, was based on
"implicit premises, most of them resting on
assumptions about the exigencies of the Cold War and
a basically trusting public, now have been drastically
affected by subsequent events"
because of the real and immediate threat to the
American way of life and security, members of
Congress in the Senate and House had little choice but
to go along with the proposal of the president and
demonstrate their unity and solidarity in face of
serious Soviet aggression.
Congress and the UN Charter
In the United States, the ratification of the United
Nations’ Charter clearly demonstrated the
overwhelming support for the organization among
legislators.
Learning from Woodrow Wilson’s failure to have the
support of two thirds of senators for the League of
Nations, President Roosevelt and his administration
worked closely with many elected officials to establish
the proposed charter of the United Nations which led
to an overwhelming support among senators for the
establishment of this international organization and
for American membership.
While the Senate that had debated the League of
Nations for eight months finally rejected it in the
absence of the required two thirds, senators debated
the UN charter and possible membership for only six
days. The ratification process did not witness any
heated debate or conflicting positions.
On July 28, 1945, eighty-nine (89), senators voted for
joining the international organization while only two
Senators (2) voted against it
Congress and the Truman Doctrine
Thanks to the persuasive skills of Acheson and the
influence of Senator Vanderburgh, on 22 April 1947,
62 Senators (30 Republicans and 32 Democrats) voted
for Greek-Turkish aid and 23 (16 Republicans and 7
Democrat) voted against. The vote did not reveal a
landslide vote for the bill with nearly one third of the
senators voted against its passage
The Secretary defended the program as a “defense of
democracies,” Rather than “ an ideological crusade.”
(qtd. in Edwards 134-135). He added that the United
States would not intervene everywhere and that the
Truman program would be limited to countries and
regions with vital American interests.
With the help of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a former
isolationist and the Republican Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and with an
alarming rhetoric, President Truman won enough
support in the Senate to get his financial assitance bill
to Greece and Turkey passed in May 1947. Congress,
with the power of the purse, approved this reversal of
national interest.
Not all congressmen approved Truman’s overblown
description of the situation in Greece and Turkey
strategy and request for aid since this aid would go to
autocratic regimes and other argued that the United
Alone did not all have the financial, human and
military resources to stop communist intrusion all over
the world and to temptation to police the globe.
This would embroil the United States in disputes
around the world. Despite this criticism emanating
from a minority of congressmen who may or may not
be called isolationist or non interventionist President
Truman committed the United to defending all
countries around the world against the threat of
communism.
Congress and the Marshall Plan
Some congressmen opposed the Marshall Plan. They
argued that the USA should not spread its financial
resources too thin.
However, bipartisan support for this ambitious
program developed in the Congress and the necessary
congressional authorizations and appropriations were
approved.
Congressional debate on the Plan ran for nearly six
months from January to June in 1948 and was marked
by a variety of arguments on both sides. In this regard,
Hitchens states “Proponents of the plan saw it as a
bulwark against communism, an economic measure
which would help maintain the conditions of
prosperity, a device to continue America’s booming
export trade, and as aid to others in the tradition of
American charity and generosity ”
While some opponents raised the issue of the
financial cost of the plan, others argued the plan
would not help Western European countries stop the
spread of communism, while some members of
Congress argued that the Marshall Plan would be just
another misconceived and miscalculated foreign
policy by the Truman administration. Other members
of Congress criticized the socialist aspects of the Plan
while other members went even further and “objected
to it as American economic and political imperialism”
They finally endorsed the bill once it was amended
limiting its scope without placing more financial
sacrifices on American taxpayers.
Although the administration suggested a total aid
package amounting to about $17 billion for a period of
4 year and a half, the bill authorized $5.3 billion over a
one-year period. By restricting the authorization to
one year, Congress gave itself ample opportunity to
oversee the implementation of the European Recovery
Program and consider additional funding.
Congress and NATO
American senators both Republican and Democrats
who opposed Article ten (10) of the charter of the
League of Nations, wholeheartedly approved NATO
and its Article 5. This marked the first military treaty
with Europe ratified by the United States since the
treaty of Alliance and Friendship signed with France
during the war of Independence. NATO nullified the
two sphere world view with the United States and
Europe having diametrically different political
systems.
Congress and NATO
The debate was whether the NATO Treaty, like the
Treaty of Alliance with France in 1787, could be
classified as a temporary alliance to meet a short term
extraordinary situation. Once again, the ratification of
the treaty would infringe the constitutional power of
Congress to declare war.
Congress and NATO
However, post WWII circumstances were different
from those of post WWI. Experience showed that
American foreign policy should not be divorced from
the realities of world affairs. In other words,
isolationism was no longer the appropriate and
effective foreign policy approach to meet the threats
posed by an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union
Congress and NATO
Senators Forrest Donnell (R-MO ) and Arthur
Watkins (R-UT) repeatedly made the point in the
hearings on the Treaty that Article 5 considered the
cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) would entangle the United States in futile
wars to defend NATO member states. Moreover, this
article could engage the United States into wars
without the consent of Congress.
Congress and NATO
Senators Kenneth Wherry (R-Nebraska), Robert A.
Taft (R-OH) and Arthur V. Watkins (R-UT) raised the
issue of the link between Treaty ratification and the
commitments to provide assistance to European
countries, assistance should be authorized by a joint
resolution of Congress and that Article V, in the case of
an attack on a NATO member would not obligate the
Congress to declare war or authorize the deployment
of U.S. troops.
Congress and NATO
The Administration and Treaty supporters in the
Senate overcame the objections concerning cost and
commitments. On July21, 1949, the result of the roll
call vote produced 82 Yeas and 13 Nays. The Senate
finally gave its consent to ratification. A major reversal
of policy among American Senators who defeated the
Charter of the League of Nations in 1919 lest the
United States get entangled in other countries’ wars.
Congress and NATO
The overwhelming majority of senators who voted for
the Atlantic Pact may signify that the United States
had once for all abandoned the isolationism doctrine
that had guided American foreign policy since its
independence.
Congress and NATO
Joining NATO signified that the United States
explicitly had accepted that its own security was
inextricably linked with the security and well being of
other NATO members. Membership in NATO entailed
a profound change in American foreign policy and
national interest by making clear the determination of
the United States to fight beyond its own shores to
protect the security of other NATO members.
Congress and NATO
The Cold War challenges and commitments clearly
softened the position of the legislative branches
towards long standing American tradition of avoiding
meddling into European affairs.
Congress and NATO
The majority of Senator both Republican and
Democrat accepted the military alliance as they had
voted for the UN membership, the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall Plan “as part of the price for power in
the postwar world.” (Kaplan “United States” 222)
Explaining Post War Consensus?
foreign policy decisions required ratification and
approval by the Senate with its constitutional power to
ratify treaties and the House of Representative with its
power of the purse.
Despite the fact that in some instances, these
initiatives raised some debate among opponents and
proponents of these decisions, a perception existed
that, unlike the League of Nations ratification debate,
and the executive branch had succeeded to pass its
foreign policy initiatives while Congress was relegated
to a minor role.
This compliant position adopted by the majority of
members of Congress can be explained by rallying
round the president stance in times of crises, the
tactical skills of the American president either
withholding information from Congress on the
grounds of national security
or executive privilege or exploiting the communist
threat “through an oftentimes alarmist, hyperbolic,
anticommunist rhetoric, which he thought necessary
to insure favorable legislative votes, to disarm his
critics, and to parsimonious congressmen to
appropriate funds for Truman” (Paterson 4).
This idea was expressed by Robert Dahl who
contended that “Perhaps the single most important
fact about Congress and its role in foreign policy,
therefore, is that it rarely provides the initiative. Most
often initiatives spring from the executive-
administrative branch.” (1950, 58).
This executive dominance over foreign policy decision
making and the acquiescence of Congress was labeled
the postwar or Cold War consensus with Republicans
and Democrats in Congress near unanimously
supported President Truman’s far-reaching foreign
policy initiatives to implement the policy of
containment.
President Truman, Republican and Democrat
members of Congress were able to overcome their
political and institutional competition through
consultation, concessions and compromise to
reconcile their differences and establish the national
interest and the foreign policy initiatives to fulfill it
Meernik states that “bipartisanship in foreign policy is
ultimately a response to domestic and/or international
pressures that bring the two political parties and the
two branches of government together…. Consensus on
foreign policy issues is often created by perceived
threats to the nation’s security” (573-574).
Whether this consensus is genuine or just a matter of
political and electoral expediency is hard to tell. In
public, some members of Congress criticized some
legislative initiatives and they voted for them when the
roll votes were called.
Meernik states that:
Whether congressmen simply pay lip service to the
notion of a united front or they legitimately believe in
it, the idea that politics ought to stop at the water’s edge
has been a constant refrain in executive-legislative
relations in times of peril. Thus, even if members’
personal preferences would lead them to disagree with
the president, their operative preferences are likely to
be shaped by public support for the White House
during periods of international tension. (574)
The Korean War or the “police action” began a trend of
American presidents committing significant troop
deployments overseas without obtaining a declaration
of war from Congress. The fact that members of
Congress abdicated their constitutional
responsibilities set a precedent that short military
actions sanctioned by the commander in chief would
not require congressional approval which would give
free hand to American presidents in future “limited
wars” such as Vietnam.
The Fall of Consensus:Vietnam?
After the election of 1964, President Johnson was
convinced that in order to defeat North Vietnam and
to make Vietnam safe for democracy and free market
economics the United States should get involved in the
war through sending more ground troops. President
Johnson asserted that this intervention would be
based on bipartisan support. The test for this support
was the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1965.
With two dissenting votes in the Senate, the
overwhelming majority of senators and
representatives voted for the resolution which
provided the president with quasi-absolute authority
to conduct the war.
Senator Wayne Morse ( D-OR) ,one of only two
Senators to oppose the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and
one of the country’s most outspoken critics of the war,
defended a foreign policy that lived up to American
ideals of self determination and not getting involved in
the local affairs of countries. Senator Wayne Morse
( D-OR) and Senator Ernest Gruening (D-AK) voted
against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
As Johnson put it at Johns Hopkins University on April 7,
1965, “Let no one think for a moment that retreat from
Vietnam would bring an end to the conflict. The battle would
be renewed in one country and then another. The appetite of
aggression is never satisfied.” Initially, the President was able
to avert opposition among Congressional Democrats being
the party leader who had led the Democrats to their landslide
1964 electoral victory with a majority in both houses of
congress. Loyalty to President Johnson muted any form of
criticism stemming from Democrats. Public Papers of the
Presidents, Lyndon Johnson, 1965,1:395.

President Johnson succeeded in retaining a fair
measure of Republican Congressional support for his
Vietnam policies. In essence, Republicans urged the
president to rely on navy and air forces while
minimizing the use of American ground troops which
would in turn minimize American human losses.
Republicans questioned how the war was fought,
not whether to fight it or not
Republicans believed that the conduct of war was the
prerogative of the President while Congress retained
its right to control the prosecution of war through the
power of the purse which could be used whenever
members of the House of Representatives did not
endorse ground war and its conduct. Certainly,
neither opponents nor proponents of war would take
the responsibility for cutting financial resources to
American troops in combat
In February 1966, Senator Mayne Morse (D-
OR)introduced a motion to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution, which he argued was unconstitutional and
had been violated by President Johnson in conducting
the Vietnam War. If this motion was initially
unsuccessful given the “rally-round- the flag” and the
unconditional support for American combat troops in
addition to the arguments put forward by president
Johnson that the United States was at war and it was
unpatriotic to oppose the commander in chief, the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution was ultimately repealed in
1971 given the rising costs of the war and the
mounting public discontent. This repeal was
considered a fatal blow to bipartisan foreign policy or
Cold War consensus.
When President Nixon moved the war efforts from the
“Americanization” to the “Vietnamization” of war or
Nixon’s strategy that aimed to reduce American
involvement in the Vietnam War by transferring all
military responsibilities to South Vietnam in
November 1969, he faced a stronger, bipartisan and
mature criticism than Johnson had. As American
troops came home, anti-war members of Congress felt
they were free to vote down war appropriations without
being accused of recklessness or unpatriotic behavior.
Against mounting Congressional and public criticism
and protests against the Vietnam War, in January 1973,
the Nixon administration negotiated a peace
agreement with North Vietnamese leaders. The terms
of the settlement stipulated the withdrawal of
American troops, an immediate cease fire, the
liberation of American prisoners of war and the
peaceful settlement of future disputes between North
and South Vietnam.
Seeking to restore limits on presidential authority to
engage U.S. forces without a formal declaration of war
(Vietnam and Cambodia) and in an attempt to reassert
its constitutional role in foreign policy, Two thirds in
the House and the Senate passed the War Powers
Resolution in 1973, over Nixon’s veto
The War Powers Resolution, which is still in effect,
sets forth certain requirements for the President to
consult with Congress in regard to decisions that
engage U.S. forces in hostilities or imminent hostilities
within 48 hours. Additionally, it requires
congressional authorization for the president to
sustain commitments of US forces beyond 60 days and
a new authorization if the commitment extends
beyond 90 days.
Even though members of Congress attempted to assert
their constitutional foreign policy role after the end of
the Vietnam War, we have to admit that the resolution
was largely symbolic than effective. Successive
Presidents after the passage of the resolution ignored
it. For example, On April 14, 1986, the United States
launched air strikes against Libya in retaliation for the
Libyan sponsorship of terrorism against American
troops and citizens.
The quarrel between the executive and legislative
branches continued with presidents asserting their
constitutional powers as commander in chief of
American forces and the branch empowered by the
constitution and the American people to ensure the
security of Americans and a resurgent Congress,
especially in cases of divided government, to exercise
its oversight constitutional powers.

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