Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

tabulates failure modes of equipment and their effects

leaks thru
rupture
on a system or plant. The failure mode describes how

sticks
equipment fails (open, closed, on, off, leaks, etc.).
The effect of the failure mode is determined by the
system’s response to the equipment failure. An
FMEA identifies single failure modes that either open closed
directly result in or contribute significantly to an
accident. Human operator error are usually not
FC
examined directly in an FMEA; however, the effects
of a misoperation as a result of human error are
usually indicated by an equipment failure mode. An FMEA is not efficient for
identifying an exhaustive list of combinations of equipment failures that lead to
accidents.
 Purpose
The purpose of an FMEA is to identify single equipment and system failure
modes and each failure mode’s potential effect(s) on the system or plant. This
analysis typically generates recommendations for increasing equipment reliability,
thus improving process safety.

Types of Results
An FMEA generates a qualitative, systematic reference list of equipment,
failure modes, and effects. A worst-case estimate of consequences resulting from
single failure is included. The FMEA may be easily updated for design changes or
system/plant modifications. FMEA results are usually documented in a column-
format table. Hazard analysts usually include suggestions for improving safety in
appropriate items in the table.
 Failure and Failure Mode
• Failure: The termination of an item’s
ability to perform a required function.
• Failure Mode: The effects by which a
failure is observed on the failed item. All
technical items are designed to fulfill one
or more functions. A failure mode is thus
defined as non-fulfillment of one of these
functions.
 Classification of Failures
• Sudden versus gradual failures
• Hidden versus evident failures
• According to effects (critical, degraded or i
ncipient)
• According to severity (catastrophic, critical,
marginal or negligible)
• Primary failure, secondary failure and com
mand fault
Classification of Failure Modes
1. Demanded change of • Fail to open on
state is not achieved. command
• Fail to close on
command
2. Change of conditions • Leakage through the
or states. valve in closed
position
• Leakage to the
environment
 Examples of Equipment Failure Modes Used in an FMEA

Equipment Description Example Failure Modes

Pump, normally operating • Fails on (fails to stop when required)

• Transfers off (stops when required to run)
• Seal leak/rupture
• Pump casing leak/rupture

Heat exchanger, high pressure on • Leak/rupture, tube side to shell side

tube side • Leak/rupture, shell side to external
environment
• Tube side, plugged
• Shell side, plugged
• Fouling
 Resource Requirements
Using the FMEA approach requires the following data and information s
ources: (1) a system or plant equipment list or P&ID, (2) knowledge of equipm
ent function and failure modes, and (3) knowledge of system or plant function
and responses to equipment failures.
FMEAs can be performed by single analysts, but these analyses should be
reviewed by others to help ensure completeness. Staff requirements will vary w
ith the size and complexity of equipment functions and failure modes and how
the failures might affect other portions of the system or plant.
The time and cost of an FMEA is proportional to the size of the process a
nd number of components analyzed. On the average, an hour is sufficient for a
nalyzing two to four equipment items. As with any HE study of systems with si
milar equipment performing similar functions, the time requirements are reduc
ed significantly due to the repetitive nature of the evaluations. Table 4.8 lists es
timates of the time needed to perform an HE study using the FMEA technique.
 Time Estimates for Using the FMEA Technique

Scope Perparation Evaluation Documentation

Simple/Small
System 2 to 6 hr 1 to 3 days 1 to 3 days

Complex/Large
Process 1 to 3 days 1 to 3 days 2 to 4 weeks
Analysis Procedure

(1)defining the study problem,

(2)performing the review, and

(3)documenting the results.

STEP 1 :
Defining the study problem. This step identifies the
specific items to be included in the FMEA and the conditions
under which they are analyzed. Defining the problem
involves (1)establishing an appropriate level of resolution for
the study and (2)defining the boundary conditions for the
analysis. A detailed problem definition is a necessary
ingredient to performing a thorough and efficient FMEA.
(2)Defining the analysis boundary conditions includes:
• Identifying the plant and/or systems that are the subject of the analysis.
• Establishing the physical system boundaries for the FMEA. This includes the
interfaces with other processes and utility/support systems. One way to indicate the
physical system boundaries is to mark them on a system drawing that encompasses all
equipment within the scope of the FMEA. These boundary conditions should also state
the operating conditions at the interfaces.
• Establishing the system analytical boundaries, including: (1)the failure modes,
operating consequences, causes, or existing safeguards that will not be considered and
(2)the initial operating condition or position of equipment. As an example of effects
beyond the scope of the study, an analyst may choose not to consider airplane crashes,
earthquakes, or tornadoes as causes of failure modes. An example of an initial
condition is specifying whether a valve is normally open or closed.
• Collecting up-to-date reference information that identifies the equipment and its
functional relationship to the plant/system. This information is needed for all
equipment included within the system boundary and appropriate interfaces with the
rest of the plant.
Table 6.19 Typical Format for an FMEA Worksheet

DATE: PAGE: of
PLANT: SYSTEM:
REFERENCE: ANALYST(S):
Item Identification Description Failure Modes Effects Safeguards Actions
FMEA-PC
(Primatech, Inc, Columbus, Ohio)

HAZOOPtimizer
(A. D. Little, Cambridge, Massachusetts)

SAFEPLAN
(Du Pont, Westlake Village, California)
Standard word processing and spreadsheet software programs can also help a
nalysts document the results of FMEA studies.
 Example
An FMEA study is performed to address safety hazards to plant
personnel in a DAP process. The DAP process schematic is
presented in Figure 6.7. Each component of the reaction system
is evaluated with the relevant information recorded in an
FMEA table. The section of the FMEA table for Control Valve
B in the phosphoric acid solution line is presented in Table
6.21.
UNLOADING

UNLOADING
STATIONS

STATIONS
~

~
AMMONIA PHOSPHORIC
SOLUTION ACID STORAGE
STORAGE TANK TANK L1
L1

F1 F1

ENCLOSED OUTDOORS
WORK AREA

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

STATIONS
LOADING
DAP STORAGE TANK

Figure 6.7 DAP process schemativ for the FMEA example.

Diammonium phosphate (DAP)
PHOS. ACID excess off-spec. Product

NH3 excess residual NH 3 release

BOTH excess T P
 Table 6.21 Sample Pages from the FMEA Table for the DAP Process Example
DATE: 1/21/91 PAGE: 5 of 20
PLANT: DAP Plant SYSTEM: Figure 6.7
REFERENCE: Reaction System ANALYST(S): Mr. Ray Johnson
Item Identification Description Failure Effects Safeguards Actions
Modes
Consider
4.1 Valve B on the Motor-operated, Fails open Excess flow of Flow indicator alarm/shutdown
of the system for
phosphoric Normally open, phosphoric acid to the in the high phosphoric
acid solution Phosphoric acid reactor phosphoric acid acid flow
line service line
High pressure and high Consider
alarm/shutdown
temperature in the Reactor relief of the system for
reactor if the ammonia valve vented to high
feed rate is also high the atmosphere pressureand
high
temperature in
May cause a high level Operator the reactor
in the reactor or the observation of
DAP storage tank the DAP storage Consider
tank Alarm/shutdown
Off-specification of the System
for high level in
Production (i.e., high the DAP
Acid concentration) storage tank
 Table 6.21 (cont’d)

DATE: 1/21/91 PAGE: 6 of 20

PLANT: DAP Plant REFERENCE: Figure 6.7
SYSTEM: Reaction System ANALYST(s): Mr. Ray Johnson
Failure
Item Identification Description Modes

4.2 Valve B on the phosphoric Motor-operated, normally open, Falis closed

acid solution line phosphoric acid service

4.3 Valve B on the phosphoric Motor-operated, normally open, Leak (external)

acid solution line phosphoric acid service

4.4 Valve B on the phosphoric Motor-operated, normally open, Rupture

acid solution line phosphoric acid service
 Table 6.21 (cont’d) ( 續 )

Effects Safeguards Actions

No flow of phosphoric Flow indicator in the Consider

acid to the reactor phosphoric acid line alarm/shutdown of the system for
low phosphoric acid flow
Ammonia carry-over to Ammonia detector and
the DAP storage tank alarm Consider using a closed tank for
and release to the DAP storage and/or ensure
enclosed work area adequate ventilation of the enclosed
work area

Small release of Periodic maintenance Verify periodic maintenance and

phosphoric acid to the Inspection is adequate for this
enclosed work area Valve designed for acid valve
service

Large release of Periodic maintenance Verify periodic maintenance and

phosphoric acid to the Inspection is adequate for this
enclosed work area Valve designed for acid valve
service