CASTRO’S RISE

TO POWER
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDeKySs_nxw&t=342s (40min)
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
 Cuba is a small Carribean island situated about 145km off the coast of Florida.
 It was Spanish colony for several centuries until 1898 when, with the help of US, the Cubans
forced the Spanish to remove all their troops and officials.
 Despite officialy gaining independence in 1902, Cuba took almost another 60 years to
become a truly self-governing state.
 After the revolution of 1959, when Fidel Castro gained power from the puppet government
of Batista, the USA saw Cuba as a dangerous enemy that needed to be crushed.
 After 1959 the Soviet Union saw Cuba as a valuable ally (from 1961 to 1962) and then, after
the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, as a dangerous and uncontrollable maverick.
KEY QUESTIONS
 What were the main social, economic, and political factors that created the situation in
which Castro could come to power.
 To what extent was Castro’s rise to power due to his own traits and actions (as opposed
to pre-existing socio-economic or sociopolitical factors)?
HOW DID
CASTRO TAKE
CONTROL OF
CUBA?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1wURV75MkJo (What was the
Cuban Revolution? 28min)
UNDERSTANDING THE
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
 During the 19th century, the country’s economy was almost entirely dependent on slave-
produced goods and trade with the USA.
 US corporations owned many Cuban plantations.

 By the late 19th century, there was a marked ethnic division in Cuba with most black Cubans
living in the east and those of mainly Spanish descent in the west, where they enjoyed socio-
economic advantages.
 Oriente, the easternmost province, was the poorest and most rebellious of the island’s six provinces,
witnessing many slave revolts.
 In 1886 the Spanish government finally abolished slavery in Cuba.
 This social division continued to influence Cuban politics in the 20th century.
 By the 1950s, Oriente province still had the lowest literace rates in Cuba and accounted for almost 30%
of Cuba’s unemployed.
 It isn’t surprising that Fidel Castro chose, in July 1953, to start his revolution in Oriente province.
CUBAN
PROVINCES
1879 TO 1976
CUBAN INDEPENDENCE
FROM SPAIN
 From 1868 to 1898, the Cuban independence movement fought three wars to force Spanish
to leave the island.
 The third and final was inspired by José Martí (1853-1895), the man who would become
celebrated as Cuba’s greatest national hero – „the Apostle of Cuban independence“.
 Despite not being a military man, Martí was killed in action and his martyrdom inspired his followers
to accept nothing less than the complete removal of the Spanish.
 When the USA joined the war on the Cuban side, the Spanish finally left Cuba in December
1898.
 But their troops were immediately replaced by US troops, heralding the First US occupation.
THE AMERICAN
CARTOON
PUBLISHED A
MONTH AFTER
THE PLATT
AMENDMENT OF
MARCH 1901. THE
CAPTION READS:
„GOOD
GOVERNANCE VS
REVOLUTION…
AN EASY
CHOICE.“
JOSÉ MARTÍ
1892
CUBA AND THE USA
 US bussineses had been closely involved with Cuba since the early 19th century.
 American military intervention in 1898 was mainly to protect american interests.

 In 1902 the USA formally gave Cuba its independence, but the 1901 Platt Amendment
gave the USA right to intervene militarily in Cuba whenever it wanted.
 Elections were rigged in favour of pro-US candidates.
 US corporations dominated the Cuban economy.
 The only Cuban governments that survived were noticeably corrupt.

 Naturally, this fostered the anti-Americanism already present in Cuba and set the stage for the
Cuban political movements of the 20th century.
THE PLATT
AMENDEMEN
T
THE PLATT
AMENDMENT
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
(1933-1934) AND THE PUPPET
PRESIDENTS (1934-1940)
 The corrupt and brutal dictatorship of Gerardo Machado of the 1920s was eventually
overthrown in 1933.
 The turning point was the „Sergeant’s Revolt“ of September 1933 led by Sergeant Fulgencio
Batista y Zaldívar.
 Batista was de-facto military leader of the country in the period 1933-1940.

 These changes worried the corporations and the US government threatened military action.
 Renewed student protests and workers’ strikes were again met with police and army brutality and the
governments of the 1930s (often referred to as the „puppet presidents“) found that the real power lay
with Batista and the armed forces.
 This played into Batista’s hands by continuing to show the weaknesses of the „puppet
presidents“, thus paving the way for his own electoral success in 1940.
GERRARDO
MACHADO
The dictator of Cuba until 1933
BATISTA’S PRESIDENCY, 1940-
1944
 Batista was able to gain support from a wide cross-section of Cuban society.
 His humble origins certainly helped (he learned how to read and write after he joined the army)
 He was the first Cuba’s non-white ruler which secure him the support of the non-white population.

 He was pro-American and pro-capitalism.

 Batista’s Cuba began to resemble „a modern corporate state“.

 The Second World War (1939-1945) proved a blessing for Batista’s government as demands
for Cuba’s exports (especially sugar) skyrocketed, thus boosting the economy.
FULGENCIO
BATISTA
DURING THE
1950S.
- Despite restoring to increasingly
dictatorial methods. Batista was still
convinced that he enjoyed the same
popularity with the average Cuban people
as he had during his first presidency of
1940-1944.
THE AUTÉNTICO
PRESIDENCIES, 1944-1948 AND
1948-1952
 In 1944 Batista was constitutionally obliged to step down as a president.
 He emigrated to the USA with a large portion of the Cuban treasury.

 Auténtico = The Cuban Revolutionary party.

 Ramón Grau was a president of Cuba from 1944 to 1948.
 The traditional Cuban political methods of corruption, violence, intimidation, and bribery continued.

 His successor, the Auténtico president Carlos Prío Socarrás, ruled from 1948 to 1952 in the
same vein.
 The administration of the Auténtico presidents became „the most polarized, corrupt, violent
and undemocratic“ since 1901.
RAMÓN GRAU
Cuban physician who served as President
of Cuba from 1933 to 1934 and from
1944 to 1948.
CARLOS
PRÍOS
SOCARRAS
He served as the President of Cuba from
1948 until he was deposed by a
military coup led by Fulgencio Batista on
March 10, 1952, three months before new
elections were to be held.
BATISTA’S COUP, MARCH 1952
 In August 1951, during his weekly radio show, Eddy Chibás announced his suspicions of a
coup by Batista, then shot himself live on air.
 Unfortunately for Chibás, his shockingly dramatic act occurred during a commercial break and was
not broadcast live as he had intended.
 Seven months later, on 10 March 1952, he was proved correct when Batista used the army
(whose loyalty he had commanded since the 1930s) to stage a coup.
 The coup met little resistance from the main political parties for the following reasons:
 Batista claimed (falsely) that Socarrás had been ploting a coup of his own.
 Batista promised to hold fair and free elections in 1954.
 The Cuban public was weary of the corruption of the Auténticos and all politicians.
 Batista enjoyed the support of the military, the police and the secret police (the BRAC).
 Batista was also helped by the emerging Cold War because of his pro-business rhetoric.
EDDY CHIBÁS
- In 1947 he formed the Orthodox Party,
a strongly anti-imperialist group, which
had the goal of exposing government
corruption and bringing about
revolutionary change through
constitutional means.
FIDEL
CASTRO IN
1950S
- Fidel Castro was a son of a Spanish
immigrant who had become a
wealthy planter.
- He grew up among the children of the
labourers on his father’s plantations.
- His father’s wealth and connections
helped the young Fidel to access the
prestigious, Jesuit-run Belén college
in Havana.
- He was not an ideal student,
preferring sport to academia, but
Castro went on to study Law at
University of Havana in 1945.
- At university, he quickly became
involved in the student activist
movements that formed a major part
of university life.
THE EMERGENCE OF FIDEL
CASTRO
 He finished his law studies in 1950 and set up a legal practice with his friends in Old Havana.
 From 1950 to 1952 they barely made enough money to cover their rent.
 Throughout this time, Castro remained a vocal critic of the corruption and Auténtico
government.
 Castro launched a legal challenge to Batista’s undemocratic regime but realized that the
court system is corrupted.
 Later, he was declared an „enemy of the state“ and therefore a target for arrest or assasination
by BRAC.
 Castro went into hiding and began planning the armed revolution that he felt was now
essential to liberate his country.
CASTRO, SECOND
FROM LEFT,
AT COLEGIO DE
BELÉN 1943,
HAVANA, CUBA
CASTRO’S ATTACK ON THE
MONCADA BARRACKS, 26
JULY 1953.
 In 1953, Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl planned an uprising against the Batista regime.
 With approximately 160 young rebels, mostly drawn form the Ortodoxo movement, Castro attacked
the Moncada Baracks near Santiago de Cuba.
 The plan was to quickly capture the barracks, capture military weapons and supplies to equip the masses, thus
spreading the revolution to all of Cuba.
 Bloodshed was to be avoided if at all possible.

 The plan failed dismally with 19 dead soldiers and 27 wounded.

 In contrast, six attackers were killed.

 Commanding officer told his soldiers to capture the remaining attackers, torture and killed them.
 According to Castro, 56 of the attackers were tortured to death, but Castro survived.

 The simplicity of Castro’s plan has been described as naive, „reckless“, and „somewhat over-
ambitious“
 The failure of the attack could well have the end of Castro’s revolution, but wasn’t 
CUBA'S MONCADA
BARRACKS
ATTACK

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-hj2
CcpBZY
(1min)
THE MONCADA
BARRACKS IN 2013
AFTER EXTENSIVE
RENOVATION
CASTRO’S TRIAL AND
MONCADA PROGRAMME,
OCTOBER 1953
 The evidence of soldiers torturing captured rebels to death created a scandal that forced Batista to
bring the surviving rebels (incliuding Castro brothers) to trial.
 The trial gave Castro a national platform to deliver his manifesto – the famous „history will absolve
me“ speech.
 Another crucial effect of the trial was that it gave Castro the chance to outline his vision for a new
Cuba, in what became known as the Moncada Programme.
 It was his desire for a more open, fairer society and the end of the corruption.

 Castro and his brother were sentenced to 15 and 13 years, thus removing their threat to the regime.
 They received an amnesty from Batista in May 1955.

 As the only candidate, Batista won the 1954 elections but this did not signal the end of his problems.

 Castro used the date of the failed attack on the Moncada Barracks as the name of his revolutionary
group: Movimiento 26 de Julio, or M-26-7.
FIDEL CASTRO
UNDER ARREST
AFTER THE
MONCADA
ATTACK.
FIDEL
CASTRO
BEFORE HIS
TRIAL
MOVIMIENTO
26 DE JULIO
MOVIMIENTO
26 DE JULIO
THE MONCADA PROGRAMME
 This was Castro’s programme for social reform, comprising five „Revolutionary Laws“:
 1. Return power to the people by reinstating the 1940 constitution
 2. Land reform: giving rights to those living or squatting on small plots (less than 165 acres)
 3. Profit sharing for industrial workers (30% of the company’s profit)
 4. Profit sharing for sugar workers (55% of the company’s profits)
 5.End corruption: those found guilty of fraud to have their property confiscated – this would then be
used to pay for workers’ pensions, schools, hospitals and charities.
CASTRO’S EXILE IN MEXICO
AND RETURN TO CUBA, 1955-
1956
 Following his release from prison in May 1955, Fidel Castro attempted to re-enter the political arena
but, within six weeks, he and his brother Raúl had fled to Mexico.
 Their growing popularity made them likely targets for re-arrest or assasination by BRAC agents.

 In Mexico, Castro organised the M-26-7 group in preparation for their return to Cuba.
 M-26-7 members in Cuba formed secret underground cells to help support Castro’s return.

 During his time in Mexico, Castro met Ernesto „Che“ Guevara, an idealistic young Argentinian
doctor.
 Both of them were commited to the cause of ridding Latin America of American corporate imperialism.
 Castro was less commited to Marxist or communist ideals than Guevara and more interested in Cuban
nationalism.
 Castro had secretly recruited, armed, and trained a fighting force of 82 volunteers who would
sail with him on his mission to liberate Cuba.
 Castro had purchased an old yacht (the Granma) and as he promised he returned to Cuba before the end of
1956.
ERNESTO
„CHE“
GUEVARA
- Argentine Marxist revolutionary,
physician, writer, guerrilla leader,
diplomat, and military theorist.
- A major figure of the Cuban
Revolution, his stylized visage has
become a
ubiquitous countercultural symbol of
rebellion and global insignia in popular
culture.
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tjrv
KA4w9-Y
(History vs. Che Guevara, 6min)
THE GRANMA EXPEDITION
AND SANTIAGO UPRISING,
NOVEMBER 1956
 Due to their lack of funds and the need to maintain secrecy, the rebels were ill equipped and
the Granma was a leaky, ageing yacht in terrible condition.
 Bad weather and conditions in overcrowded boat (designed for 25) and mechanical problems caused
two days longer journey than planned.
 The plan also called for a popular uprising in Santiago de Cuba and simultaneous attack on
the Moncada Barracks once the Granma expedition had landed.
 However, the delayed journey and poor communication caused that attack was launched two days
earlier.
 Without Castro’s support, attack on Moncada Barracks could not hope to win.
 After 30 hours of fighting, they withdrew, pursued by Batista’s army and a number of planes.

 Interesting was that 67 soldiers refused to fight the rebels during the attack which was an
indication of growing support for Castro’s revolution.
THE GRANMA
Cuba Celebrates 60 Years Since Granma
Landing with Epic Parade
JOURNEY TO THE SIERRA
MAESTRA, NOVEMBER 1956
 Two days after the Santiago uprising, the Granma eventually arrived.
 Batista’s air force soon spotted them and they were attacked by planes and warships.

 They were forced to leave most of their weapons, ammunition, food, and medical supplies as
they fled through what Castro later described as „that hellish swamp“ and into the forests
of the Sierra Maestra mountain range.
 Only about 18 of the original 82 revolutionaries survived the trek into the Sierra Maestra.
 Castro later claimed that the majority of his men who died were murdered after capture.
SIERRA
MAESTRA
MAP OF CUBA
REVOLUTION
ARY
HEADQUATER
S
THE SIERRA MAESTRA
CAMPAIGN, 1956-1959
 The survivors (including Castro brothers and Che Guevara) regrouped deep in the Sierra
Maestra mountains to form the core of the guerilla army.
 As planned, they would wage a hit-and-run campaign against Batista’s forces in Oriente province.

 Even in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds, Castro remained (at least publicaly)
positive.
 In addition to Castro’s morale-boosting leadership, the rebels were also helped by a number of
other factors – most importantly support from the peasants.
FIDEL CASTRO
AND HIS MEN IN
THE SIERRA
MAESTRA, 2
DECEMBER 1956
FIDEL CASTRO
WITH A HUNTING
RIFLE IN SIERRA
MAESTRE
MOUNTAINS, 1957
GAINING THE SUPPORT OF
THE PEASANTS
 The Fidelistas, as Castro’s rebels were known, were instructed to treat the long-mistreated
peasants of the region with kindness and respect, paying for whatever they needed.
 Castro and Guevara insisted that they should educate the peasants whose iliteracy was more than
80%.
 They also provided medical assistence wherever they went.
 For many of these peasants, Guevara was the first trained doctor that they had ever seen.
 The Fidelistas also helped the peasants with physically demanding tasks such as gathering the harvest.
 Abusive landlords and corrupt officials were tried and punished by Castro’s men.

 Through these methods, Castro managed to turn the peasant’s passively sympathetic attitude
into active support by mid-1957.
GAINING THE SUPPORT OF
THE PEASANTS
 The rebels often attacked army patrols to grab weapons and ammunition before
disappearing back into the dense forests.
 It led to an increasingly demoralized Batista’s army.

 The Fidelistas were under strict instructions to avoid brutality with civilians or captured
enemy soldiers.
 The torture or murder of prisoners was forbidden.

 Herbert Matthews from the New York Times publishes the first of several articles after
interviewing Castro in the Sierra Maestra.
 These were followed by a number of television interviews which raised his profile in the USA.
CHE GUEVARA
RELAXING WITH
FRIEND AND
FELLOW
FIDELISTA
CAMILIO
CIENFUEGOS
DURING THE
LAST DAYS OF
THE SIERRA
MAESTRA
CAMPAING
THE RURAL CAMPAIGN
 Castro had not intended to wage the war from a rural base, but the failure of the Santiago
uprising and his own disastrous landing two days later meant that he had to adjust his plans.
 He changed the strategy to rural guerilla campaign.
 This shows one of the factors that led to Castro’s success – his movement’s flexibility and his
willingness to adapt to the situation.
 Other anti-Batista organisations had also tried to use force against the regime but had failed to
overcome the army and police.
THE ROLE OF THE URBAN
REVOLUTIONARY
MOVEMENTS
 Often overlooked in descriptions of the Cuban Revolution is the invaluable role of the
urban revolutionaries.
 The underground cells of the M-26-7 movement coordinated with middle-class
professionals and Ortodoxos, organized strikes, anti-regime graffiti and the dissemination of
information to counter the government’s own propaganda.
 As Balfour states „the war in the Sierra could not be described in any sense as a peasant war.“
 Over 30 000 acts of sabotage were commited during the two-year campaign.

 Was the Cuban revolution really about the people of Cuba, or about Castro and his
followers imposing their view upon the nation?
 Overall, the urban campaigns did not enjoy the same degree of success as the rural
campaign and, by 1958, the resistance to Batista was centered around the liberated areas of
the Sierra Maestra mountains and Oriente province.
HAVANA
STREET ART
HAVANA
STREET ART
HAVANA
STREET ART
BATISTA’S COUNTER-ATTACK:
OPERATION VERANO
 In June 1958, Batista launched Operation Verano (Operation Summer) with 12 000
government troops, backed by air support, tanks, and artillery.
 Despite their overhelming superiority in numbers and equipment, the government forces were
handicaped by a number of weaknesses:
 1. More than half were conscripts with little training and even less incentive to fight.
 2. The operation command was divided between two rival generals.
 3. Castro’s forces knew the ground well and were able to prepare for the offensive by planting
minefields and planning ambushes.
 4. By mid-1958 the local population was firmly supportive of Castro and his men, providing them with
excellent intelligence about troop movements while doing the exact opposite for the government forces.
 The first major engagements were a disaster for the army, which suffered heavy causalities.
 Castro’s men often treated their enemies mercifully, sometimes even allowing them the choice to join
the rebels.
CASTRO’S VICTORY
 Following the failure of Operation Verano, Batista’s forces were aware that the end was
close.
 Castro immediately launched a counter-attack to capitalize on the situation.
 His forces now moved into central Cuba, their numbers swollen by peasants and army deserters.
 By December 1958 the Fidelistas numbered nearly 3000 (remarkable growth from the original 18
survivors of the Granma)
 Most of the captured weapons and ammunition came from Batista’s own forces, which had
surrendered them or left them behind as they fled.
 After bitter fighting in the cities of Santiago and Santa Clara and the defeat of the army
garrison at Yaguajay on 30 December 1958, Batista fled from Cuba to Dominican Republic,
Castro entered Havana in triumph on 2 January 1959.
BATISTA
FLEES CUBA
WHY DID THE BATISTA
REGIME COLLAPSE?
 According to Balfour, the main reason for the Batista regime’s collapse was „because it was
corrupt and barbarous“.
 Even Batista’s connections to the politically powerful US corporations and the Mafia could not hide
his regime’s corruption and brutality.
 Additionaly, Batista failed to retain the support of any social elites.

 Batista believed that he could recreate the popularity that he had enjoyed during his 1940-44
presidential term.
 However, the illegitimacy of his 1952 coup and his failure to adress the issues of social inequity and
corruption strenghtened the arguments of his opponents.
 In response to growing international awareness of Batista’s brutal regime through pro-Castro
articles the US government finally banned arms sales to both sides in Cuba.
WHY DID THE BATISTA
REGIME COLLAPSE?
 The Cuban plantation owners, industrialists and bankers seemed Batista’s pro-US economic
policy as no longer viable and they attempted to curry favour with the young, charismatic,
and increasingly successful rebel who promised an end to US corporate imperialism in
Cuba.
 The fact that Castro had openly declared that he was not a communist but a Cuban nationalist, helped
secure their support.
 It could be also argued that Batista was defeated by the ghost of José Martí, symbolically
reincarnated in Fidel Castro.
 In keeping with the Great Man Theory, Castro’s success was a result of his personal
qualities as well as the social conditions of the time.
 As he rode in triumph from Santiago to Havana in January 1959, Castro was greeted all along
his route by cheering crowds who hailed him as the last in the line of Cuban nationalist heroes.
CASTRO
LEADS HIS
VICTORIOUS
TROOPS
CASTRO
SPEAKING FROM
A MAKESHIFT
BALCONY
DRAPED WITH
CUBAN FLAGS IN
SANTA CLARA ON
THE ‘MARCH TO
HAVANA’, 1959
FIDEL
CASTRO
BEEING
CHEERED BY A
CROWD
FIDEL
CASTRO
BEEING
CHEERED BY A
CROWD
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wlJ
HCSnv0Q
(celebrations in Havana, 2 min)