POWERS OF CONGRESS

STATUTORY-MAKING POWER

FORMAL LIMITATIONS

1. All legislative enactments start as a bill which is defined as a proposed law

which is submitted for consideration by Congress. A bill is required to
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
However, the “one-subject-one-bill” rule does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
There is a sufficient compliance with such rule if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.
2. A bill may be presented by any member of either House. However, all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments
 STATUTORY-MAKING POWER

FORMAL LIMITATIONS

3. In order to transform the bill into a statute, it shall undergo

the following legislative process:
a. First reading
b. Referral to appropriate committee
c. Second reading
d. Printing and Distribution
e. Third Reading
f. Referral to Other House
g. Submission to the President
 STATUTORY-MAKING POWER

SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS

1. It cannot pass laws granting a title of royalty or nobility.

2. It cannot pass laws that will impair the obligations of
contracts.
3. It cannot pass ex-post facto law and bill of attainder
4. An inherent and practical limitation on the statutory power
of Congress is that it cannot pass irrepealable laws.
5. In general, it cannot pass laws, which are contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution.
POWER OF APPROPRIATION
 Constitutional basis: Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that “No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuant of an
appropriation made by law.”
 Kinds of appropriation law: General and special
 Major phases of government budgeting
1. Budget preparation
2. Legislative authorization
3. Budget execution
4. Budget accountability
GENERAL APPROPRIATION ACT
POWER OF APPROPRIATION
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF THE PURSE

1. “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or

employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or
of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary
as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.” However, “if a public expenditure would
benefit the government directly, such an expenditure would be
constitutional even if it would result to ‘incidental benefit’ to religion.”
2. An appropriation bill must originate from the House of Representatives
POWER OF APPROPRIATION
3. The President prepares the budget for the operation
of the Government which shall serve as the basis of
Congress in enacting the general appropriations law.
In the passage of a general appropriation law,
Congress cannot increase the “budget” recommended
by the President.
4. Congress is not allowed to insert “riders” (non-
appropriation items inserted in an appropriation
measure) unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation in the appropriation general
appropriation bill.
POWER OF APPROPRIATION
3. The President prepares the budget for the operation
of the Government which shall serve as the basis of
Congress in enacting the general appropriations law.
In the passage of a general appropriation law,
Congress cannot increase the “budget” recommended
by the President.
4. Congress is not allowed to insert “riders” (non-
appropriation items inserted in an appropriation
measure) unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation in the appropriation general
appropriation bill.
POWER OF APPROPRIATION
5. The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies.
6. The State shall assign the highest budgetary
priority to education and ensure that teaching will
attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate remuneration
and other means of job satisfaction and fulfilment
 POWER OF APPROPRIATION
“As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled
to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of
teachers has been doubled. The amount of 29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act
(R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets.
This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according
highest priority to education.”

 “Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any

power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited
from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy
is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds
that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.”
(GUINGONA v. CARAGUE, G.R. No. 94571, 22 April 1991, 196 SCRA 221)
POWER OF APPROPRIATION
7. Congress is prohibited from passing a law that will
authorize the transfer of appropriation from one
department to another. However, the President, the
Senate President, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
maybe authorized by law to augment any item in the
general appropriation law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. (Doctrine of Augmentation)
POWER OF APPROPRIATION
 Effect of failure to general appropriations law for
the succeeding fiscal year before the end of the
current year: Application of the DOCTRINE OF
AUTOMATIC APPROPRIATION which means
that the general appropriation law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted
and shall remain in full force and effect until the
general appropriation bill for the succeeding fiscal
year is passed by Congress
2023 Proposed Budget
2023 Proposed Budget
SPECIAL APPROPRIATION LAW

A special appropriation bill shall specify the purpose

for which it is intended, and shall be supported by
funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein.
 The Disbursement Acceleration Program, as embodied in the
National Budget Circular No. 541 and related documents issued
by the DBM Secretary, was designed by the administration of
President Aquino in 2011 to ramp up public spending and to
accelerate economic growth by investing on high-impact
budgetary program, activity, or project (PAP).

 To finance the Program, the Aquino Administration declared

“savings” out of the following: (1) withdrawn unobligated
allotments of the various departments and agencies of
government, (2) unreleased appropriations, and (3)
unprogrammed funds. These “savings” were then “realigned” in
order to “augment” the funds for existing PAPs or to support
other priority PAPs.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
 The constitutional basis of DAP as cited by DBM us Section 25
(5), Article VI of the Constitution which states: “No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.”

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
 Requisites for the application of Section 25 (5), Article VI of the
Constitution as cited in Araullo, et al. v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287,
1 July 2014
1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
 WHAT CONSTITUTES ”SAVINGS” UNDER THE LAW?

 The statutory definition of “savings” in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAA

◦ “Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in

this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still
available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of
the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii)
from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and
related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without
pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or
planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser
cost.”

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
 Unobligated allotments. The GAAs provide for a two-year
period of availability of the appropriations for the capital
outlay and MOOE. Thus, when the DBM declared them as
“savings” before the end of the fiscal year, in effect, it
shortened the availability of the appropriations for MOOE
and capital outlay. This is tantamount to forcing the
generation of savings in order for the President to have
larger fund available for discretionary spending under the
DAP, which effectively defeats the Congress’ power of the
purse.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
 Unreleased appropriations. Based on its statutory definition, there
could only be “savings” when the purpose for which the funds
have been allotted were already satisfied, or the need for such
funds had ceased to exist. This can only be determined when the
appropriation has reached the agency level. It is only when the
appropriation has reached the agency level may it be determined
whether (a) the PAP for which the appropriation had been
authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or
(b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence without
pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services
were realized at a lesser cost because of the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies. For the
President to declare as “savings” unreleased appropriations would
seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse, because
such appropriations had not even reached and been used by the
agency concerned vis-à-vis the PAPs for which Congress had
allocated them

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
 Unprogrammed funds. Under the GAA, the President has the
standby authority to incur additional obligations for priority PAPs
when revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets.
The original revenue targets pertain to the totality of all the
revenue targets as specified by the President in the BESF. Under
the Disbursement Acceleration Program, however, the President
dealt not with the whole revenue targets but individual revenue
targets. Hence, when the Executive exceeds its collection in one
source of revenue (say dividends from the shares of stocks of
GOCCs) but fails to meet its revenue target in other source (E.g.
tax revenues), it could not be said that the Executive exceeded its
original revenue targets. To allow the separate treatment of each
revenue to determine if the original revenue target is exceed
would result to the creation of artificial revenue surpluses.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
 PRINCIPLE OF IMPOUNDMENT

 “Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, usually for political or

ideological reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the
failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.” This finds basis
in Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code, by which
the President was granted the authority to suspend or otherwise stop
further expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his
judgment the public interest so required.

 Lessons from Arraullo:

1. The President can veto a specific item in the GAA. But once the President approves the
GAA or allows it to lapse into law, the President can no longer veto or cancel any item in the
GAA or impound the disbursement of funds authorized to be spent in the GAA.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
LESSONS FROM ARAULLO:
2. Section 38, Chapter V, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 which allows the
President "to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure" of appropriated funds
can be invoked for a legitimate purpose. It does not authorize the President to
permanently stop so as to cancel the implementation of a project in the GAA
because the President has no power to amend the law.
3. The President has no power to impound unobligated funds in the GAA for two
reasons: first, the GAA once it becomes law cannot be amended by the President
and an impoundment of unobligated funds is an amendment of the GAA since it
reverses the will of Congress; second, the Constitution gives the President the power
to prevent unsound appropriations by Congress only through his line item veto
power, which he can exercise only when the GAA is submitted to him by Congress for
approval.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
LESSONS FROM ARAULLO:
4. Once the President approves the GAA or allows it to lapse into law, he himself is bound by it. There
is no presidential power of impoundment in the Constitution and this Court cannot create
one. Any ordinary legislation giving the President the power to impound unobligated appropriations
is unconstitutional. The power to impound unobligated appropriations in the GAA, coupled with the
power to realign such funds to any project, whether existing or not in the GAA, is not only a
usurpation of the power of the purse of Congress and a violation of the constitutional separation of
powers, but also a substantial re-writing of the 1987 Constitution.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)
 POWER OF APPROPRIATION
“PORK BARREL”

 An appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured

solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district
 May be categorized into congressional “pork barrel” and presidential “pork barrel”
 Congressional “pork barrel” is basically a lump-sum budgetary allocation for each
member of Congress which is inserted in the General Appropriations Law. While the
allocation may be used for projects which were pre-determined by the Executive
Department (in the form of project list, program menu, priority list), the power to
determine to which project the fund may be used, including the authority to realign the
same, is lodged with the legislator/congressional committee. It is noteworthy to
mention that the identification of the project, the determination of its beneficiaries and
the realignment of the budgetary allocation take place after the enactment of the
appropriations law.
 POWER OF APPROPRIATION
“PORK BARREL”

 The validity of the “pork barrel” system was upheld in PHILCONSA v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 113105, 19 August 1994 (235 SCRA 506) where the Supreme Court ruled

“The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or activities under
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.”

“The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into account the
complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. Prior to
the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of
Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or who hold cards for ‘horse-trading,’
getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members of Congress also had to reckon with an
unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project
of a Representative or Senator.”

“The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.”
 POWER OF APPROPRIATION
“PORK BARREL”

 In the recent case of Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

208566, 19 November 2013, the Supreme Court declared the
congressional “pork barrel” system for violating the following
constitutional principles
1. Principle of separation of powers
2. Non-delegation of Legislative Power
3. System of Checks and Balances, particularly in (a) depriving the President of his power to
veto an item in the appropriation law, and (b) diluting the exercise of oversight function by
Congress.
4. State Policy on Local Autonomy
 POWER OF APPROPRIATION
“PORK BARREL”

 Presidential “pork barrel” consists of the Malampaya Fund and Presidential Social
Fund.
 The so-called Malampaya Fund (which was named after the “Malampaya Deep
Water Gas-to-Power Project” in Palawan) was created as a special fund under
Presidential Decree No. 910. Under Section 8 of P.D. 910, the special fund was
authorized to be used “to finance energy resource development and exploitation
program and projects of the government, and for such other purposes as may be
directed by the President.”
 Meanwhile, the Presidential Social Fund was created under Presidential Decree No.
1869 (Charter of PAGCOR), as amended. The Fund, which is derived from the
aggregate gross earning of PAGCOR, was authorized to be used “to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President.”
 POWER OF APPROPRIATION
“PORK BARREL”

 MALAMPAYA FUND. Insofar as the law authorized the President to use the Malampaya Fund
for financing “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government”, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality since it provides an adequate
limitation on the authority of the President in the use of the funds. However, as regards the
President’s authority to make use of the funds for “such other purposes as may be directed by
(him)”, the phrase gives the President unbridled discretion to use the funds for any purpose. It
also allows him “to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

 PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND. Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended,

was declared constitutional insofar as it allowed the President to make use of the Presidential
Social Fund “to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities.”
However, the Supreme Court struck down the power of the President to make use of the same
fund “to finance priority infrastructure development projects” since it “gives him carte blanche
authority to make use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as
‘priority.’ Verily, the law does not supply a definition of ‘priority infrastructure development
projects’ and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.”
 POWER OF APPROPRIATION
Does the Constitution proscribe lump-sum appropriation (vis-à-vis itemized
appropriation)?

No, for as long as the RULE ON SINGLE CORRESPONDENCE (an

allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose) is
complied with. The singular purpose may be as general or specific as the
legislative department deems it to be, provided that such generality or
specificity does not negate the President’s proper exercise of his item veto
power. It does not matter even if the lump-sum amount is meant as a funding
source for multiple programs, projects or activities for as long as they are
clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose (Belgica
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 210503, 8 October 2019)
 POWER OF APPROPRIATION
Illustrative Examples

• Calamity Funds and Intelligence Funds

• Maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE)
• 2013 PDAF Article allocates the amount of Php24.79 billion for “scholarships, medical
mission, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of
roads and flood control”
• Contingency Fund where Php1 billion is allotted for the Office of the President to be
used exclusively to fund the requirement of new and/or urgent projects and activities
that need to be implemented during the year. It may likewise be used to augment the
existing appropriations for local and foreign travels of the President: Provided, that in
no case shall said Fund be used to for the purchase of motor vehicles
• E-Government Fund
 TAXATION POWER

The power of taxation is one of the inherent powers

of the State and it is vested in the legislature.
The power enables Congress to pass a law that will
raise revenue to defray public expenses and enable
the government to perform vital governmental
functions
 TAXATION POWER

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS

1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The

Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
2. Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convent
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and
all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable, educational or religious
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
3. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress.
 TAXATION POWER

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS

4. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit

educational institutions used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxes and duties.
5. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants,
endowments, donations or contributions used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from tax.
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

• Basis: Section 21, Article VI which states: “The Senate or the House
of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.”

• The SC characterized it as “essential and appropriate auxiliary to the

legislative function.” It pointed out, however, that the power of
legislative inquiry is “co-extensive with the range of the legislative
power,” which means that “the matters which may be a proper subject
of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation
are one.”
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE,

G.R. No. 89914, 20 November 1991, 203 SCRA 767:

“xxx the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which
jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted
by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue
already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's
judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence
being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.

In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.”

COMPARE: SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE v. MAJADUCON,

G.R. No. Nos. 136760 & 138378, 29 July 2003, 407 SCRA 356
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
REQUIREMENT RE DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE

• NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

INVESTIGATIONS/GARCILLANO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION: The phrase ‘duly published rules of procedure’ requires the Senate of
every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because
every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every
three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes
by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not
having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.”

• REASON: ‘The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative
body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years
for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less
than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the
1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to ‘constitute a quorum to do business.’ Applying
the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The
consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of
the term of twelve Senators.’”
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
• In the exercise of its power of legislative inquiry, both Houses of Congress are conferred
with contempt powers.

• For how long may a person cited in contempt be detained?

Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be
enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no
sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session
and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice
are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power
is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It
is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.”
(ARNAULT V. NAZARENO, G.R. No. L-3820, 18 July 1950, 87 Phil 29; BALAG V. SENATE, G.R.
No. 234608, 3 June 2018)
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

• Section 21, Article VI must be distinguished from Section 22 which

states

The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of
each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to
the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

• Section 22 pertains to the exercise of legislative oversight function. It is

synonymous to the ‘question hour’ in a parliamentary system thereby
making the constitutional provision “a deliberate introduction of a
practice in a parliamentary system into the presidential system as part
of the system of checks and balances.”

• While the contempt power is ordinarily not available, the exercise of

legislative ‘oversight’ function can still be facilitated by compulsory process
but “only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

May the President require Cabinet members to secure his consent before
appearing before Congress or any of its committees?

o Senate v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006

NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS
 “The Congress, by vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a state of
war”

 Certain presidential actions require the concurrence of

Congress. Particularly, the declaration of amnesty
must bear the approval of a majority of all the
members of Congress. Also, “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of Senate”
NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS

 Congress has the sole authority to canvass the

votes for the President and the Vice President
and to proclaim the winning candidate

 The power to call for a special election for

President and Vice-President in case of
simultaneous vacancy in those two offices, and
the power to determine the President’s physical
fitness if he is unable to discharge the functions
of his office
NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS
 The power of impeachment. In impeachment cases, the
House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate a complaint for impeachment, while the Senate shall
act as the impeachment tribunal

 The power to confirm presidential appointments

 The power to revoke or extend the suspension of the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law

 Congress may propose amendments or revision to the

Constitution as a constituent assembly on the basis of
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.