A Realist Reply

Author(s): John J. Mearsheimer

Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 82-93
Published by: The MIT Press
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 A Realist Reply J.Mearsheimer
John

appreciate the oppor- I

tunityto respond to the rejoindersto my article on "The False Promise of
InternationalInstitutions."'I begin with a briefrestatementof what is at issue
between my criticsand me. Then I deal in turnwith each response.

The CoreIssue

The centralquestion raised in "False Promise" is straightforward and widely

recognizedin theinternationalrelationsliterature:can internationalinstitutions
prevent war by changing state behavior? Specifically,can institutionspush
statesaway fromwar by gettingthemto eschew balance-of-powerlogic, and
to refrainfromcalculatingeach importantmove according to how it affects
theirrelativepower position?
Realists answer no. They believe that institutionscannot get states to stop
behavingas short-term power maximizers.For realists,institutionsreflectstate
calculationsof self-interest based primarilyon concernsabout relativepower;
as a result, institutionaloutcomes invariably reflectthe balance of power.
Institutions,realistsmaintain,do not have significantindependenteffectson
state behavior. However, realistsrecognize that great powers sometimesfind
institutions-especiallyalliances-useful for maintainingor even increasing
theirshare of world power. For example, it was more efficient forthe United
Statesand its allies to balance against the Soviets throughNATO than through
a less formaland more ad hoc alliance. But NATO did not forceits member
statesto behave contraryto balance-of-powerlogic.
Institutionalistsanswer yes. Theybelieve thatinstitutionscan independently
change state behavior.Institutionscan cause peace, so the argumentgoes, by
convincingstatesto rejectpower-maximizingbehavior,and to accept outcomes
thatmightweaken theirrelativepower position.In short,the debate between
the institutionalists and me is about whetherinstitutionscan have an inde-
pendent effecton state behavior,or whetherinstead institutionaloutcomes
JohnJ.Mearsheimer
is a professor
in thePoliticalScienceDepartment
at theUniversity
ofChicago.

1. JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"The False Promiseof InternationalInstitutions," Security,

International Vol.
19, No. 3 (Winter1994/95),pp. 5-49.

International
Security,Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer'1995), pp. 82-93
? 1995 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology.

82

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 A RealistReply| 83

reflectgreatpower interests,and are essentiallytools thatgreatpowers employ

fortheirown selfishpurposes.
The responses to "False Promise" promptme to make a briefbut important
point about the role of alliances in institutionaltheory.Institutionalists tradi-
tionallyhave focusedon what mightbe called "inner-directed" institutions, i.e.,
those designed to manage and resolve conflictsamong the memberstates,and
to facilitatecooperationamong them.Inner-directed institutionsseek to cause
peace by influencingthe behavior of the memberstates. Thus, the largerthe
membership,the betterthe prospectsforpeace. A collectivesecuritysystemis
a good example of an inner-directed institution.At the same time,institution-
alists have paid littleattentionto alliances,which are "outer-directed"institu-
tions. Alliances are not primarilyconcerned with keeping peace among the
memberstates,much less with coaxing themto violate balance-of-powerlogic
in theirbehavior.Instead,thetargetof an alliance's attentionis an outside state,
or coalitionof states,which the alliance aims to deter,coerce,or defeatin war.
To the extentthat alliances cause peace, they do so by deterrence,which is
straightforward realistbehavior.Not surprisingly, institutionalists have largely
ignored NATO in theirwritings,and have focused instead on inner-directed
institutionssuch as the European Community (EC) and the International
EnergyAgency
I raise this point because the responses by Ruggie and by Keohane and
Martinsuggest thata crucialchange may be occurringin theirthinkingabout
institutions.They make frequentreferenceto NATO in theirresponses,which
implies thatalliances are now a centralelementin institutionalist theoryThus,
the factthatNATO helped deter the Soviet threatis invoked as evidence that
institutionscause peace. However,NATO's success in the Cold War cannotbe
cited as support for institutionalisttheory,because deterrencehas virtually
nothingto do withthelong-standingclaims ofinstitutionalists. In essence,both
Ruggie and Keohane and Martinare shiftingthe termsof debate, and making
realistclaims under the guise of institutionalism. This point's significancewill
become apparentin the followingdiscussion of theirresponses.

JohnRuggie:A ShipPassingin theNight

Ruggie's response does not provide a strongdefenseof institutionalist theory,

because it simply does not address the core issue about institutionsraised in
"False Promise." Furthermore, his fourmain argumentsabout institutionsare
consistentwithrealism.He argues thatduringtheearlyCold Warsome realists

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 Security20:1 | 84
International

like George Kennan sometimes gave bad advice about such mattersas "the
creation of NATO and European unification,"and that policymakerswisely
ignored thatadvice. This argumentis correctbut irrelevant,as it says nothing
about whetherinstitutionscause peace by independentlyaffecting statebehav-
ior.
Ruggie also makes the realist claim that "postwar America pursued its
interestsand sought to manage the changinginternationalbalance of power,"
but he adds that"U.S. policymakersalso had certaininstitutionalobjectivesin
mind (p. 62)," such as the establishmentof NATO. This may be true,but this
argumenttoo has littleto do with whetherinstitutionscause peace by inde-
pendentlyaffectingstate behavior.Ruggie then argues that the United States
faredbetterwaging the Cold War with institutionslike NATO than it would
have withoutthem.I agree. I believe greatpowers sometimesuse institutions
to furthertheirinterests.Yet once again, thispoint does not address the central
issue raised in "False Promise": can institutionscause peace by independently
affectingstatebehavior?
Finally,Ruggie occasionally hints that American policymakersproposed
ideas thatcontradictrealistlogic. But he does not push these argumentsvery
far,and ultimatelyconcedes thatthose policymakerswere motivatedby "geo-
politicalfact,not idealism."For example,he argues that,"In creatingNATO ...
Trumanchose the institutionalformthatmost closely approximatedcollective
securitycommitments."Ruggie makes it sound like Truman was behaving
accordingto thedictatesofCharles and CliffordKupchan. However,he quickly
reverseshimselfin the subsequent footnote(p. 65), where he writes:"[Arnold]
Wolferspointed out the differencebetween collectiveself-defenseand fully-
fledgedcollectivesecuritysystems.... NATO, to be sure,is an instanceof the
former, not the latter."
He also claims that the Eisenhower administration'ssupport of European
unification"deviated sharply" from realism. This claim is incorrect.Eisen-
hower believed that the United States had a securityinterestin seeing the
Soviet Union contained,but he also believed thatAmerica's militarypresence
in Europe would be temporary, and thatthe Europeans would eventuallyhave
to fend forthemselvesagainst the Soviet threat.He feltthata united Western
Europe would achieve thiscontainmentbetterthana divided WesternEurope;
this policy perspectiveis consistentwith realism. These cases aside, Ruggie
gives away the storewhen he concludes that"the views of Roosevelt,Truman,
Eisenhower,or Dulles . . . toward the institutionaldimensions of security
policy had less to do with mushy thinkingthan with geopolitical realities."

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 A RealistReply| 85

This conclusioncorrespondsto a realistview of institutions:

U.S. policymakers
used NATO and other institutionsto improve theirrelative power position
vis-a-vistheirmain adversary,the Soviet Union.

RobertKeohaneand Lisa Martin:RealistsbyAny OtherName

When liberalinstitutionalism was firstarticulatedin themid-1980sby Keohane

and others,it was a ratherstraightforward theorythatpresenteda clear alter-
native to realism. The original theoryargued that institutionscould inde-
pendentlyease cooperation among states by helping states overcome certain
collective action dilemmas. In 1988, however,Joseph Grieco (a realist) pub-
lished an articlein International
Organization thatcalled into question the origi-
nal theory'scausal logic.2Empiricalworkthenbegan appearing thatsupported
Grieco's claims.StephenKrasner(anotherrealist)published an articleon global
communicationsin WorldPolitics(1991) thatwas an especiallydamningindict-
mentof liberalinstitutionalism.3
Liberal institutionalists
scrambledto repairtheirtheoryin the wake of this
realist challenge. Keohane and Martin's response is an attemptto describe
post-Griecoliberal institutionalism and contrastit with realism.Their bottom
line is thatrealismis a deeply flawed theory,and thatmodifiedliberalinstitu-
tionalismis a superiortheoryof internationalpolitics.However,a carefullook
at Keohane and Martin's response reveals that liberal institutionalismin its
latest formis no longer a clear alternativeto realism,but has, in fact,been
swallowed up by it. The most recent variant of liberal institutionalismis
realismby anothername.
There are three principal dimensions to Keohane and Martin's response.
First,theybuild much oftheircase around thenebulous claim that"institutions
matter,"a phrase theyinvoke at least fourtimes.At the same time,theyimply
thatI thinkinstitutions are simplyirrelevant.This line ofargumentallows them
to ask why states would devote "resourcesto structuresthat will make no
difference."They claim that my answer must be thatit is the resultof some
"collectivedelusion." It is fruitlessto argue about whetherinstitutions"mat-
ter," since the claim is so vague that it has no real meaning. In the end,

2. JosephM. Grieco, "Anarchyand the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism," International
Organization,Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507.
3. StephenD. Krasner,"Global Communicationsand National Power: Lifeon the ParetoFrontier,"
WorldPolitics,Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991),pp. 336-366.Also see Baldev Raj Nayar,"Regimes,Power,
and InternationalAviation,"International Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter1995), pp. 139-170.
Organization,

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 International
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everythingmatters.The real question,as describedin "False Promise,"is how,

and how much, do institutionsaffectstate behavior? For what it is worth,I
believe institutionssometimesmatter.Afterall, great powers use institutions
to furthertheirinterests.Thus, I findit neithersurprisingnor inconsistentwith
realismto discoverthatstatesinvestmodest resourcesin institutions.But that
point hardly addresses the main issue: can institutionsget states to eschew
short-term gains forlong-termbenefits?
The second dimension of Keohane and Martin's response is an unsparing
criticismof realism,followedby theclaim thatinstitutionsaffectstatebehavior
in ways that contradictrealism. They begin theirresponse by going on the
offenseagainst realism, suggesting that this "purportedlyscientifictheory"
may not even deserve to be called social science.Nevertheless,theirsubsequent
discussion of institutionsis repletewith realistarguments.For example, they
write,"liberalinstitutionalists, who see institutionsas rootedin the realitiesof
power and interest,do not argue thatNATO could have maintainedstability
under any imaginable conditions.What we argue is that institutionsmake a
significantdifference in conjunctionwith power realities(p. 42)." Later (p. 47)
theywrite,"institutionalist theory. . . afterall, posits thatinternationalinsti-
tutions are created in response to state interests,and that theircharacteris
structuredby the prevailingdistributionof capabilities."Both of these quota-
tions could have been taken straightfroma Realism 101 lecture.Furthermore,
Keohane and Martinhardlymentionthe argumentthatinstitutionscan have
an independent effecton state behavior. Indeed they write (p. 48) that "the
difference between realismand liberalinstitutionalism does not lie in whether
institutionsare independentor dependent variables." If thatis the case, then
it is difficultto see how this latestversion of liberal institutionalism presents
much of a challenge to realism.
Keohane and Martinmake some argumentsthatmightappear to contradict
realism,but on close inspection,do not. Regardingthe issue of relativegains,
for example, they emphasize that "institutionscan facilitatecooperation by
helpingto settledistributionalconflicts."Thereis no question thatinstitutions
mighthelp two states divide the gains of cooperationin a way that satisfies
both parties. But that task is compatible with realism, because it does not
requirestatesto violatebalance-of-powerlogic. In fact,institutions are working
in such cases to ensure that agreementsreflectthe balance of power. Grieco
made preciselythispoint in his 1988 article.4Nevertheless,as I emphasized in
"False Promise," cooperationand peace are not the same thing.Afterall, the

4. Grieco, "Anarchyand the Limitsof Cooperation,"pp. 506-507.

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 A RealistReply| 87

Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was a case of internationalcooperation,but hardlya

source of peace.
Finally,virtuallyall of the tasks thatKeohane and Martinassign to institu-
tions can be accomplishedwithoutthem.For example, thereis no reason why
two states cannot bargain with each other and use side payments to help
alleviate the relative-gainsproblem. Institutionsare not necessaryto accom-
plish this task,althoughtheymay sometimeshelp distributegains so thatthe
final outcome reflectsthe balance of power. Keohane and Martin also make
much of the factthat institutionsfacilitate"issue linkage," which sometimes
enhances the prospects of cooperation. Martin argues in her study of EC
sanctionsagainst Argentinaduringthe Falklands War thatBritainwas able to
securethecooperationof otherEuropean statesby linkingissues in the context
of the EC. This is true,but issue linkagewas a commonplacepracticein world
politics well beforeinstitutionscame on the scene; moreover,Britainand the
other European states could have used other diplomatic tacticsto solve the
problem. Afterall, Britainand America managed to cooperate on sanctions
even thoughthe United States was not a memberof the EC.
The thirddimensionof Keohane and Martin'sresponse is to offerevidence
thatinstitutionscan cause peace. However, the evidence theyprovide to sup-
port their claim is especially weak. Studies of oil pollution at sea and the
European Court of Justicesimply do not tell us much about war and peace.
JohnDuffield'swork on NATO is insightful, but it is largelyconsistentwith a
realist understandingof that alliance. Duffieldcertainlydoes not argue that
NATO was formedfornon-realistreasons or that it forcedmember states to
violate balance-of-powerlogic. Keohane and Martintryto excuse the dearth
of empiricalsupport forliberal institutionalism by claimingthat it is a "new
theory"This defenseis not persuasive. Liberal institutionalism has been at the
centerofinternationalrelationsdebates forwell over a decade, a lengthyperiod
by academic standards. If there were strong empirical support for liberal
institutionalism, some of it should have surfacedby now. In fact,considerable
empiricalresearchhas been done on the theory.However, most of it under-
mines liberal institutionalism and supports realism.Thus, it is not surprising
that the liberal institutionalistsare now convertingto realism,but it would
clarify matters if theywould admit it.

CharlesKupchanand Clifford
Kupchan:Mixing Oil and Water

In "False Promise"I examined the standardtheoryof collectivesecurity,which

has been in the internationalrelationsliteraturefordecades. That theorypre-

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 International
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sents a starkalternativeand directchallengeto realism.Statesbehave accord-

ing to different logics in each theory,and thereforethe predictionsof each for
lifein theinternationalsystemvarygreatlyas well. I argued in "False Promise"
that thereare flaws in the logic of collectivesecurity,and that thereis much
historicalevidence thatit is unworkablein practice.I also argued thatconcerts,
in contrast,are institutionsthatare compatiblewithrealism,and therefore they
work according to a differentlogic than collective securityThus, collective
securitysystems and concerts should be regarded as distinctinstitutional
forms.
The Kupchans, for the most part, do not challenge the assessment of the
standardversionof collectivesecuritylaid out in "False Promise."They argue
instead thatI employ a verynarrowdefinitionof collectivesecurityThe claim
is that I set up a straw man by focusingon what theylabel "ideal collective
security."This charge is incorrect.I described and analyzed the standard
version of the theory,which has long served as the basis of discussion when
scholars debate the meritsof collectivesecurityIn fact,I consideredthe same
theorythat Inis Claude examined in his pathbreakingworks on collective
security,and not surprisingly, I came to many of the same conclusionsthathe
did.5
The Kupchans' response focuses on defendinga new version of collective
security,which theyinventedand firstarticulatedin a Summer 1991 Interna-
tionalSecurityarticle,and which incorporatesbalance-of-powerlogic.6 In es-
sence, they attemptedto devise a theoryof collective securitythat marries
realism with the standard version of collectivesecurity.I did not pay much
attentionto the Kupchans' new theoryin "False Promises" because it has a
fatal flaw: realism and collective securityare incompatible theories which
cannot be mixed togetherto produce a coherenttheory of state behavior,
because these two theoriesargue thatstatesbehave in fundamentallydifferent
and contradictory ways.
The Kupchans have claimed thatcollectivesecuritycan take "many different
institutionalformsalong a continuumrangingfromideal collectivesecurityto
concerts,"7and thattheirgoal in theircurrentarticleis to defendconcertsand

5. See Inis L. Claude, Jr.,SwordsIntoPlowshares:The Problemsand ProgressofInternational

Organi-
zation,4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971); and Claude, PowerAnd International Relations
(New York:Random House, 1966).
6. Charles A. Kupchan and CliffordA. Kupchan, "Concerts,CollectiveSecurity,and the Futureof
Europe," International Vol. 16,'No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161.
Security,
7. Ibid., p. 119.

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 A RealistReply| 89

everythingbetween the two ends of the continuum.It is not clear,however,

what institutionalformslie between standardcollectivesecurityand concerts.
The Kupchans provide no descriptionof these otherinstitutionalforms,and
do not distinguishthemfromconcerts.I will simplyreferto themas nameless
institutionalforms(NIFs). Thus, when theKupchans defendcollectivesecurity,
theyare specificallynot defendingstandardcollectivesecurity, but are instead
defendingNIFs and concerts.The distinguishingfeatureof NIFs and concerts,
according to the Kupchans, is that they contain elements of both standard
collective securityand realism. In essence, the Kupchans mix those polar
opposite theoriestogetherand claim that the resultis a theorythatprovides
the best of both worlds. Not only do "states agree to abide by certainnorms
and rules to maintain stabilityand, when necessary,band togetherto stop
aggression,"but theworld ofNIFs and concertsis also one where "thebehavior
of major statesis heavily influencedby balance-of-powerconsiderations."
The Kupchans' effortsnotwithstanding, realism and standard collectivese-
curitycannot be marriedto each otherbecause the two theoriesare mutually
exclusive. States that are "heavily influencedby balance-of-powerconsidera-
tions" are, by definition,going to be mainly concerned about the balance of
power, not about maintainingpeace. Some of those states will pursue both
offensiveand defensive strategiesaimed at improvingtheirrelative power
position. Some states will initiatewars forsecurityreasons. Other times they
will be content-forbalance-of-powerreasons- to remainon the sidelinesand
let two or more rivals fighta war. Thereis not going to be a lot of trustin such
a world, and statesoperatingin it will oftenformalliances. Yet the Kupchans
also claim that states can act in the spiritof standard collectivesecurity,and
"abide by certainnorms and rules to maintain stability,"and that when an
aggressorappears on the scene, all of the otherstates are supposed to "band
togetherto stop aggression."This kind of behavior,howeverdesirable,directly
contradictsrealism.Contraryto what theKupchans argue,balancingin a realist
world cannotbe equated with theirnotion of balancing under collectivesecu-
rity These two differentkinds of balancing behavior are contradictoryand
incompatible.
Thereare otherproblemswiththeKupchans' argument.Consider theirclaim
thatconcertsand NIFs are likelyto failin stages,givingthreatenedstatesample
warning time. There is no reason to assume that a collectivesecuritysystem
will fail long beforea state is attacked,ratherthan at the moment of attack.
And if it fails in stages,the stateattackedat the firststage stillgets clobbered.
The Kupchans,of course,allow statesto hedge againstthisdanger,by behaving

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like realists.But that concession leaves one wonderingif maybe theytoo are
realistsin disguise.

AlexanderWendt:MissingtheCriticalIssues

Critical theory,unlike Keohane and Martin's latest version of liberal institu-

tionalismand the Kupchans' versionof collectivesecurity,offersa distinctand
bold challengeto realism.Criticaltheoristslike Wendtmake no concessionsto
realism,and theymake no bones about theirdesire to replace it with a more
communitarianand peaceful discourse. That clarityof purpose is all forthe
good, as it makes it easier to assess the relative merits of the competing
theories.Nevertheless,Wendt's response is disappointing,not so much for
what it says, as forwhat it does not say. Specifically,he does not answer the
criticismsleveled againstcriticaltheoryin "False Promise."Instead,he concen-
trateson describingcriticaltheory,and showing how it differsfromrealism.
This task is necessary,he argues, because I misrepresentedcriticaltheoryin
"False Promise."But,as I discuss below,thatchargeis false.The keydifferences
between the two theoriesare not in dispute; ratherthe debate is over which
theoryprovides the best guide to understandingstatebehavior.
Wendt begins his response with the charge that my discussion of critical
theoryin "False Promise" is "full of conflations,half-truths, and misunder-
standings."Thus, his response is an opportunityto set the recordstraightby
accuratelydescribingcriticaltheoryand showing how it differsfromrealism.
However, thereare no importantdifferences between us regardingthe essen-
tials of criticaltheoryand realism.Consider two of his examples about how I
supposedly distortcriticaltheory
WendtmaintainsthatI was wrongto treatcriticaltheoryas a "singletheory,"
because "it is a familyof theoriesthatincludes postmodernists,constructivists,
neo-Marxists,feminists,and others." I recognize that there are differences
among criticaltheorists(as thereare among realists),and I pointedout thisfact
in "False Promise" (p. 37). When comparing criticaltheorywith realism, I
focused on the common elementswithinthe criticaltheoryliterature,because
it was neitherpracticalnor necessaryto take into account every differencein
this large body of scholarship.The question is whethersmoothingover the
differencesresulted in a caricatureof criticaltheory.It does not because, as
Wendt acknowledges, criticaltheoristsare united on the key issue at stake
between themselves and realists: whether "world politics is socially con-
structed."

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 A RealistReply| 91

Wendtnextargues thatI "obscure" thefactthatcriticaltheorists,like realists,

are structuralists.In fact,he argues thatthe problemwith realismis that "it is
not structuralenough." Confusionarises,however,out of different uses of the
term "structure."There is no question that in "False Promise" I described
realism,but not criticaltheory,as a structuraltheory.Wendt,however,prefers
to call themboth structuraltheories,althoughit is clear fromhis discussion of
realismand criticaltheorythat"structure"has a completelydifferent meaning
for each, and that labeling both theories"structural"does not challenge my
descriptionof criticaltheoryin any meaningfulway A briefdescriptionof the
two theories-using his language about structure-shows that there is no
significantdisagreementbetween Wendt and me regardingthe essentials of
criticaltheoryand realism.
Realistsbelieve thatstatebehavioris largelyshaped by the materialstructure
of the internationalsystem. The distributionof material capabilities among
statesis thekey factorforunderstandingworld politics.For realists,some level
of securitycompetitionamong greatpowers is inevitablebecause of the mate-
rial structureof the internationalsystem.Individuals are freeto adopt non-re-
alist discourses, but in the final analysis, the systemforcesstates to behave
according to the dictates of realism,or risk destruction.Criticaltheorists,on
the otherhand, focus on the socialstructure of the internationalsystem.They
believe that "world politics is socially constructed,"which is anotherway of
sayingthatshared discourse,or how communitiesofindividualsthinkand talk
about the world, largely shapes the world. Wendt recognizes that "material
resourceslike gold and tanks exist,"but he argues that "such capabilities ...
only acquire meaningforhuman actionthroughthe structureof shared knowl-
edge in whichtheyare embedded." Significantly forcriticaltheorists,discourse
can change,whichmeans thatrealismis not forever, and thattherefore it might
be possible to move beyond realismto a world where institutionalizednorms
cause statesto behave in more communitarianand peaceful ways.
The most revealingaspect of Wendt's discussion is thathe did not respond
to the two main chargesleveled against criticaltheoryin "False Promise."The
firstproblem with criticaltheoryis that although the theoryis deeply con-
cerned with radicallychangingstatebehavior,it says littleabout how change
comes about. The theorydoes not tell us why particulardiscourses become
dominant,and othersfallby the wayside. Specifically, Wendtdoes not explain
why realism has been the dominantdiscourse in world politics forwell over
a thousand years,althoughI explicitlyraised thisquestion in "False Promise"
(p. 42). Moreover,he sheds no light on why the time is ripe for unseating

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realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful,

communitariandiscourse,althoughI explicitlyraised both questions.
Wendt'sfailureto answer thesequestionshas importantramifications forhis
own arguments.For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change
internationalpoliticaldiscourse and alterstatebehavior,"thenit is irresponsi-
ble to pursue policies that perpetuate destructiveold orders [i.e., realism],
especially if we care about the well-being of futuregenerations."The clear
implicationhere is thatrealistslike me are irresponsibleand do not care much
about thewelfareof futuregenerations.However,even ifwe change discourses
and move beyond realism, a fundamentalproblem with Wendt's argument
remains:because his theorycannotpredictthe future,he cannotknow whether
thediscoursethatultimatelyreplacesrealismwill be morebenignthanrealism.
He has no way of knowing whethera fascisticdiscourse more violent than
realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously
would like anotherGorbachev to come to power in Russia, but he cannot be
sure we will not get a Zhirinovskyinstead. So even froma criticaltheory
perspective,defendingrealismmightverywell be the more responsiblepolicy
choice.
The second major problem with criticaltheoryis that its proponentshave
offeredlittleempiricalsupportfortheirtheory.For example, I noted in "False
Promise" that criticaltheoristsconcede that realism has been the dominant
discourse in internationalpoliticsfromabout 1300 to 1989,a remarkablylong
period of time. Wendt does not challenge this descriptionof the historical
record by pointing to alternativediscourses that influencedstate behavior
duringthisperiod. In fact,Wendt'sdiscussionofhistoryis obscure.I also noted
in "False Promise" thatalthough criticaltheoristslargelyconcede the past to
realism, many believe that the end of the Cold War presents an excellent
opportunityto replace realism as the hegemonic discourse, and thus funda-
mentally change state behavior. I directlychallenged this assertion in my
article,but Wendtresponds with only a few vague words about this issue.
Wendtwritesin his responsethat"ifcriticaltheoriesfail,thiswill be because
theydo not explain how the world works,not because of theirvalues." I agree
completely,but criticaltheoristshave yet to provide evidence thattheirtheory
can explain verymuch. In fact,the distinguishingfeatureof the criticaltheory
Wendt'swork included,is its lack of empiricalcontent.Possiblythat
literature,
situationwill change over time,but untilit does, criticaltheorywill not topple
realismfromits commandingpositionin the internationalrelationsliterature.

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 A RealistReply| 93

Conclusion

The discussion of institutionsup to now has a distinctacademic flavor.How-

ever, the debate over whetherinstitutionscause peace is not just a dispute
about internationalrelationstheory;it also has significantreal-worldconse-
quences. For example, the Clintonadministrationand many European policy-
makers publicly maintain that states should not worryabout the balance of
power-that is "old thinking,"they say-but should instead rely on institu-
tions to protectthem.This perspectivemakes sense only if thereis evidence
that institutionscan get the job done. But so far,the evidence indicates that
institutionsdo not provide a sound basis forbuilding a stable post-Cold War
world. Institutionsfailed to preventor shut down the recentwars in Bosnia
and Transcaucasia, and failed to stop the carnage in Rwanda; thereis little
reason to thinkthatthose same institutionswould do betterin thenexttrouble
spot. The bottomline on institutionsseems clear: despite all the rhetoricabout
theirvirtues,thereis littleevidence thattheycan alterstatebehaviorand cause
peace.
States temporarilyled astrayby the false promise of institutionalistrhetoric
eventuallycome to theirsenses and startworryingabout thebalance of power.
Surely Bosnian policymakersnow recognize theirmistakein trustinginstitu-
tions like the UN and the EC to pull theirchestnutsout of the fire.In the
meantime,however,a state thatignoresthe balance of power can sufferenor-
mous damage. Thus, it would seem to make sense, fromboth a moral and a
strategicperspective,forinstitutionaliststo tone down theirclaims about the
peace-causing effectsof institutionsuntil theyhave solid evidence to support
theirposition.

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