CONFESSIONS

"All confessions are admissions but all admissions are not confessions." Every
confession must be an admission, but every admission in a criminal case need not be
a confession. A statement may be irrelevant as a confession, but it may be relevant
as an admission. A statement is not admissible as a confession, but the same
statement may yet for the other purposes be admissible as an admission as against
the person who made it. Hence it is well known as "All confessions are admissions but
all admissions are not confessions
 CONFESSIONS
MEANING:
Confession. = Confession or acknowledgment of a fault, wrong doing, a sin to a priest, etc.
DEFINITION: 'Confession' is not defined in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Stephen in his
Digest on the Law of Evidence defines “confession is an admission made at any time by a
person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that
crime."
Privy Council explained : the concept of 'Confession' in the following words:
"A confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the
facts which constitute the offence. An admission a gravely incriminating fact, even a
conclusively incriminating fact is not itself a confession, e.g. an admission that the accused
is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused death
with no explanation of any other man's possession."
The same view has been followed by the Supreme Court.
SCOPE: Admissions are dealt with in Sections from 17 to 31. Confessions are dealt with in
Sections from 24 to 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
IMPORTANT POINTS:
A. Kinds of confessions: There are two kinds of confessions --- (i) Judicial Confessions;
and
(ii) Extra-Judicial Confessions.
Judicial Confessions are made to the Magistrates, and are recorded by the Magistrates. The
provisions of Section 164 CrPC regulate the judicial confessions.
Extra-Judicial Confessions are those, which are made to the non-Magistrates. If an accused
makes a confession before a priest or village elder, friend, etc., it is an extra-judicial
confession. If an accused makes a confession before the police, such a confession is not valid.
All the extra-judicial confessions, except certain portions made by the accused to the police,
are admissions only.
Extra-judicial confession is not equal with that of judicial confession. Therefore an extra-
judicial confession is considered only as an admission. Such an extra-judicial confession can be
considered along with other evidence. [Refer to Topic "Confessions".]
B. Duty of the Court: When a confession is made the foundation for a conviction, the Court
must be satisfied that it is true. In law it is open to the Court to give effect to the sound
presumption that what a person wilfully states against his interest is likely to be true and to
convict him on his confession alone. But in practice, Courts following the English system try to
ground themselves particularly in cases of serious offences against the danger demonstrated
by experience of persons falsely implicating themselves for reasons which may not be
apparent. The truth for falsity of a confession has, therefore, to be weighed in by the Court in
the light of all the facts and surrounding circumstances.
D. Statement: Statement is a genus, admission is the species and confession is the sub-
species. A statement, whether communicated or not, admitting guilt amounts to a confession
of guilt. Admissions and confessions are exceptions to the hearsay rule. They are placed in the
category of relevant evidence by Sections 17 to 31, presumably on the ground that,
being
declarations against the interest of the person making them, they are probably true. Their
probative value does not depend upon their communication to another, though, just like any
other piece of evidence, they can be admitted in evidence only on proof. This proof in the case
of oral admission or confession can be offered only by witnesses who heard the admission or
confession, as the case may be.
E. The word confession has not been defined in the Evidence Act. Stephen in his Digest
of the Law of Evidence defined it as an admission made at any time by a person charged with
crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. The language used in
the definition given by Stephen is too wide and it includes non-plenary confessions also as
confessions. The acid test which distinguishes a confession from an admission is that where a
conviction can be based on the statement alone, it is a confession and where some
supplementary evidence is needed to authorize a conviction, then it is an admission. No
statement that contains self-exculpatory matter can amount to a confession, if the exculpatory
statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed.
Moreover a confession must either admitin terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all
the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact even a
conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself a confession.
F. Exculpatory Statements and Inculpatory Statements: We have already read about
these two types in the previous topic on admission. In Palvinder Kaur vs. State of Punjab
case, the Supreme Court held: "A confession must either admit in terms the offence or at any
rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely
incriminating fact (inculpatory statement), even a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself
a confession. A statement that contains selfexculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession,
if the exculpatory statement is of some fact, which if true, would negative the offence alleged
to be confessed. A statement which read as a whole is of an exculpatory character and in
which the prisoner denies his guilt is not a confession and cannot be used in evidence to prove
his guilt." ·
G. The confession must relate to the offence: The word confession used in this Act cannot
be construed as meaning a statement by the accused suggesting the inference that he
committed the crime. A confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate
substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating
fact is not a confession. A statement that contains self-exculpatory matter cannot amount to a
confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the
offence alleged to be confessed.
Evidence of a collateral offence cannot be received as substantive evidence of the offence on
trial, though under Section 14, Evidence Act may be given of intention and like matters where
the factum of such intention or like matter is relevant
Example
1.A is charged for criminal misappropriation of the company, where he is employed, during 1-
1-2000 to 31-12-2001. A makes a confession statement that he did not commit any criminal
misappropriation during 1-1-2000 to 31-12-2001, but he did criminal misappropriation during
1-1-1999 to 31-12-1999. Can A's admission be considered as the confession?
No. A had expressly stated in his confession that he did not misappropriate during 1-1-2000 to
31-12-2001, the admission about his criminal misappropriation during other period, i.e., 1-1-
1999 to 31-12-1999, cannot be treated as confession of the charge relating to the period from
1-1-2000 to 31-12-2001. (Case-law: Radha kishen Appellant v The State (AIR 1951
Ajmer 15)
2.An accused gave a statement to the Sub-Inspector of Police about an offence. Is the
statement of that accused an admission or confession?
In AIR 960 SC 1116, the Supreme Court gave the answer as follows: "The accused,
immediately after he had committed a crime, appeared before an officer in charge of a police
thana and made a statement to him which disclosed the facts that led to and the actual
commission of the crime and his subsequent conduct. It was treated as the first information
report by the prosecution.
On the question of admissibility of the statement in evidence, this Court held that if the
statement be treated as a statement made by an accused to a police officer during the course
of an investigation it could not be used as evidence in view of the provisions of Section 162
CrPC; but there was no bar to the use of such a statement made by the accused to a police
officer before the investigation of the case had commenced as an admission under Section 17,
Evidence Act, unless it was hit by the provisions of Sections 24 and 25 of the Evidence Act.
There was no bar to splitting up of the first information report where the confessional part was
separable from the rest of the statements which were otherwise admissible and to exclude
from it any of the inadmissible parts and admitting the rest of it. The statement read as a
whole did not appear to have been made as a result of any inducement, promise or threat of
any person in authority or otherwise, as was clear from the fact that the accused appeared at
the thana of his own accord and made his statement voluntarily.
Basing upon the above case, in the case dealing with the similar problem, Lachhuman
Munda, Appellant v. The State of Bihar, Respondent (AIR 1964 Pat 210), the Patna
High Court held: "The statement of the accused in the instant case examined in the light of
the provisions of Sections 17, 21, 25, and 27 of the Evidence Act, divided itself into three
parts:---
First part was introductory to the relevant fact referring to the motive, opportunity and
description leading to the crime.
Second part related to the commission of the actual crime.
Third part related to the after events as to his conduct and his confessional statement leading
to the discovery of certain facts.
Thus it was only the second part dealing with the actual commission of the crime that became
inadmissible in evidence under Section 25, and the whole first information report need not be
excluded from consideration.
J. Exculpatory part and inculpatory part: (exculpatory= clearing or tending to clear from
alleged fault or guilt; excusing) (inculpatory= incriminatory; accusing) It is true that whenever
there is a statement amounting to an admission or a confession, then the statement should
be
read as a whole. But it is open to the Court to accept the inculpatory part and reject the
exculpatory part, provided,---
(a) there is other evidence on ·the record to show the falsity of the exculpatory part; and
(b)besides the confession, there are other materials on the record establishing or indicating
the guilt of the accused.
Thus, the inculpatory part by itself cannot form the sole basis for conviction even if there are
other materials on the record to show the falsity of the exculpatory part.

"All confessions are admissions but all admissions are not confessions." Every confession
must be an admission, but every admission in a criminal case need not be a confession. A
statement may be irrelevant as a confession, but it may be relevant as an admission. A
statement is not admissible as a confession, but the same statement may yet for the other
purposes be admissible as an admission as against the person who made it. Hence it
is well known as "All confessions are admissions but all admissions are not confessions".
 WHEN CONFESSIONS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE/ NOT ADMISSIBLE
Sections 24 to 30 explain the provisions about "Confessions".

Sections 24 to 26 lay down the provisions about "when confessions are not admissible".
Sections 27 to 30 lay down the provisions about "when confessions are admissible".
PROVISIONS
24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal
proceeding.—A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding,
if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement,
threat or promise32, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding
from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused
person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he
would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the
proceedings against him.
A. INGREDIENTS:
1. The confession must be made by the accused voluntarily.
2. A confession given by an accused under the police restraint is not valid.
3. A confession given under any inducement, threat or promise is inadmissible.
4. The voluntary confession must be made before a Magistrate. It Section 24
means only the judicial confessions.
recognises
5. The Magistrate must follow the rules framed under Section 164 CrPC.
6.Confession must be taken into consideration as a whole. It is against the principle of justice
to accept part of the confession into consideration, and to exclude the other part of it. A
confession must be used either as a whole or not at all.

B. Confession is really a very valuable piece of evidence. By the confession, the innocence of
the accused is rebutted. Being the confession is made by the accused himself, he is estopped
to contradict it. At the same time, it reduces the burden of proof from the prosecution. It
also
reduces work load of the Court, and lengthy procedure. But at the same time, as a principle of
natural justice, two conditions must be satisfied by the Court:---
(i) The Accused must give the confession voluntarily;
(ii)The facts of the confession and the material relevant facts of the prosecution must be
coincided and true.

If the Court found that the accused gave the confession by inducement, threat or coercion, the
confession must be inadmissible. If the facts of the confession and the relevant facts are
inconsistent with each other, then also the confession given by the accused must be
inadmissible.
Palvindar Kaur vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1953 SC 1 07)
Brief Facts: Palvindar Kaur was an accused and she was charged under Section 302 (murder)
and 201 (destruction of evidence) I.P.C. for having committed murder of her husband by
administering potassium cyanide poison and for causing destruction of her husband's dead
body. During investigation and trial, she stated "My husband was fond of hunting as well as of
photography. Some material for washing photos was purchased and kept in an almirah. My
husband developed abdominal trouble. He sent for medicine. I placed that medicine in the
same almirah. By mistake my husband took the liquid which was meant for washing the
photos. He fell down and died. Due to fear I put his body in a trunk and threw it into a well.”
The lower Court relied upon the later part of her statement and convicted her under Sec. 201
I.P.C. for destroying the evidence of an offence by throwing the body into a well. The High
Court upheld the conviction passed by the trial Court. The accused appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that the statement of Palvinder Kaur did not amount to
confession.
D. Section 24 provides that confession caused by inducement, threat or promise is irrelevant
and inadmissible. The Court must satisfy that the confession is given voluntarily. The principal
reasoning and logic of Section 24 is that no person voluntarily makes a statementwhich is
against his interest unless it is true.
E. Inducement, threat or promise must have reference to the charge.
F. Inducement, threat or promise must come from a person in authority.
G.CLASSIFICATION OF CONFESSIONS: (i) Judicial Confession; and (ii) Extra-Judicial
Confession.
A confessional statement made by an accused before the Magistrate or such competent
judicial authority is called Judicial Confession. For a judicial confession, according to the
provisions of Section. is further proved by the witnesses who heard the speaker's words
constituting the confession. It may be made to any person or body of persons. It should not
be acted upon unless it is proved by evidence of a most reliable character. Any how it is weak
evidence.
It does not mean that extra-judicial confession is not at all considered. An extra-judicial
confession can also be relied upon, if it is corroborated by other evidence, and the Court
satisfies that it is true. Where the main foundation for the conviction is the confession alleged
to have been made by the accused, there are three things which the prosecution must
establish. They are:---
1. that a confession was made;
2. that evidence of it can be given; and
3. that it is true.
Where there is conflict of evidence as to the manner and the time of it, the accused would be
justified in asking the Court to reject it. An extra-judicial confession must be corroborated by
circumstances proved by the independent evidence.
H. DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION: The fact that a
confession is extra-judicial and non-judicial, does not really make any difference. The only
material difference between a judicial and an extra-judicial confession is that the former is
recorded by a Magistrate with all the formalities provided by Section 164 CrPC in order to
facilitate ascertainment of the confession having been given voluntarily, the aid of these
formalities and the evidence of the Magistrate are not available in the case of an extra-judicial
confession.
All the same, if it could otherwise be ascertained that the extra-judicial confession has been
made voluntarily and it was true, its probative value would be the same as that of a
confession duly recorded under Section 164 CrPC.
Further, when an extra-judicial confession is found to be both true and voluntary, there would,
strictly speaking be no bar to the conviction on the basis of that confession alone even though
it was retracted by the accused subsequently.
In an extra-judicial confession, exact words uttered by accused should be proved. It is not
safe to rely upon impression. Mere general statement that the accused confessed is
insufficient. Finally. the evidence of oral extra-judicial confession is undoubtedly a very weak
piece of evidence a,nd it would be dangerous to convict a person solely ori its basis. But it can
be taken into consideration along with other evidence.
It is not the law that extra-judicial confessions cannot be accepted and acted upon or that
they are to be classed under some inferior category of admission or confession. Where
they are made voluntarily by the accused immediately after the crime to strangers visiting the
accused with every token of truthfulness and repentance, even if momentary, the Court would
definitely be justified in accepting and acting upon such confessional statement.
Extra-judicial confession must be accepted and acted upon as a whole. It is not permissible for
the Court acting upon this evidence to do so only with regard to a part of a confession and to
reject some part of it because the accused may not be able to offer further proof. It is the
duty of the Court to scrutinise the evidence and circumstances carefully in order to ascertain
whether the confession was voluntarily made. If the Court feels that it is impossible to hold,
on the basis of that circumstance alone, that it may come to conclusion that the confession
was not freely made
I. Value of extra-judicial confession: An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary, can be relied
upon by the Court, along with other evidence in convicting the accused. The confession will
have to be proved just like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to the confession just
like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. It is for
the Court having regard to the credibility of the witness and his capacity to understand the
language in which the accused made the confession, to accept the evidence or not. Usually
and as a matter of caution, Courts require some material corroboration to an extra-judicial
confessional statement, corroboration which connects the accused person with the crime in
question.
J.It is unsafe to base the conviction on a retracted confession, unless it is corroborated by
trustworthy evidence.
K.PROBLEM: P. a maid servant of Q confesses before Q on being threatened by Q that she
has stolen Rs. 1000 from the bag of Q. Examine the admissibility of the confession.
SOLUTION: No. P's confession made to Q is extra-judicial confession, that too was made on
being threatened. Section 24 forbids admissibility of the confession obtained by threat,
compulsion, force or inducement. Therefore, P's confession made to Q is not admissible.
L.Section 25 provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a
person accused of any offence.
M.Section 26 provides that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a
police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as
against such person.
Case Law
►Confession, Meaning and interpretation.—A statement, whether communicated or not,
admitting guilt amounts to a confession of guilt. The probative value of confessions does not
depend upon their communication to another, though, just like any other piece of evidence,
they can be admitted in evidence only on proof. This proof is the case of oral admissions and a
confession can be offered only by witnesses who heard the admission or confession, as the
case may be, Sahoo v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 40 : 1966 Cri LJ 68.

►Extra-judicial confession.—Extrajudicial confession appears to have been treated as a

weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted
upon unless corroborated, State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505 : 1985 SCC (Cri)
105.

►It is not open to any court to start with a presumption that extrajudicial confession is a weak
type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the
confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak about such a confession,
Narayan Singh v. State of M.P., (1985) 4 SCC 26 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 460.

►The evidence about an extra-judicial confession is in the nature of things a weak piece of
evidence. If the same is lacking in probability there would be no difficulty in rejecting the
same, Jagta v. State of Haryana, (1974) 4 SCC 747 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 657. See also
Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 146.

► Extra-judicial confession recorded by doctor while recording history of injuries is reliable,

M.A. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2009) 6 SCC 220.

►Confession — What is and when admissible.—Law of confession is embodied in Sections

24 to 30, Evidence Act. Confession is a form of admission, consisting of direct
acknowledgment of guilt in a criminal charge. A confession, which is not free from doubt about
its voluntariness, is not admissible in evidence. Confession caused by inducement, threat
or
promise cannot be termed as voluntary confession. Whether a confession is voluntary or not is
essentially a question of fact, Raja v. State of T.N., (2020) 5 SCC 118.

►Retracted confession.—A retracted confession by an accused may form the basis of a

conviction of that accused if it receives some general corroboration from other independent
sources. It cannot however, be the basis for convicting a co-accused though it may be taken
into consideration against a co-accused also, Shrishail Nageshi Pare v. State of
Maharashtra, (1985) 2 SCC 341 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 235.

►A retracted extra-judicial confession can form the basis of a conviction, though as a matter
of prudence the courts try to look for corroboration from some independent source so as to
satisfy their conscience that the confession is true, Abdul Ghani v. State of U.P., (1973) 4
SCC 17 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 658. See also AIR 1963 SC 1094.

►The written statement which the accused gave and the court made it as an exhibit must be
treated as part of his statement under Section 313 CrPC. It is true that when an extra-judicial
confession is retracted by the accused, there is no inflexible rule that the court must accept
the retraction. But if the court wants to reject the retraction, the court must give cogent
reasons before such rejection, Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat,
(2009) 5 SCC 740.

►In case of retraction, probative value of original confession is not discarded but may be
reduced. Even if a confession is treated as retracted, still the conviction can be on the strength
of original confession, if there are corroborating evidence, Manoharan v. State, (2020) 5
SCC 782.

►Mentality of accused.—Words “appear to him” in the last part of the section-refer to the
mentality of the accused, State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1965.
 CONFESSIONS TO POLICE OFFICERS SCOPE:
Section 24 lays down the confession which is made by inducement. threat or promise is
inadmissible. Section 25 excludes a confession made to a police officer. Section 26 says down
that if a person while in custody of a policeman, confesses his guilty to any other person not
being a Magistrate, his statement will not be proved against him. Section 27 lays down that
when at any trial evidence is led to the effect that some fact was discovered in consequence of
the information given by the accused of an offence in custody of the police officer, so much of
the information as relates to the facts discovered by that information, may be proved
irrespective of the facts whether that information amounts of confession or not.

Section 25 merely forbids the use of a confession made to a police officer in a trial of the
accused person for having committed an offence. The statement would be admissible in a civil
case brought against the accused for recovery of the article or for damages for trespass and
the like. However, the statements made in and for the criminal proceedings and investigations
to a police officer are covered by Section 25, and are not admissible.
Section 25. Confession to police officernot to be proved.—No confession made to
a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.

IMPORTANT POINTS:
A. INGREDIENTS:
1.A confession made to a police officer is not valid. Hence such a confession need not be
proved.
2.Under Section 25 only confessions made to police officers are excluded. All the statements
forming admissions made to the police officer are not excluded.
3.Statement made to a pollice officer by one accused is admissible against a co-accused, as
an admission. However, such a statement cannot be valid as a confession.
B. Who are the police officers?
He is a police officer, having all the powers of investigation of offences including the powers to
initiate prosecution by submitting charge-sheet under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. In general, the
law relating to confession or admission, a statement forming a confession or admission is
admissible against the maker, unless excluded by some provisions of law. Section 25 is one of
exceptions excluding the confession made to a police officer. A confession made to a police
officer is not admissible, but any information relating to offence given by an accused to an
investigating police officer is admissible within the meaning of Section 27.
(a)An Excise Officer invested with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station for
investigation of offences under Section 20-A of the Opium Act is a police officer.
(b) A Forest Range Officer under the Forest Act is not a police officer.
(c) An officer under the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 is a police officer.
(d) A Ward Rationing Officer is a police officer.
(e)A few categories of customs officers invested with police duties under the Central Excise
and Salt Act, 1944 are police officers .
(f) A village assistant and police patel are not police officers.
C. Confession of one guilt during the inquiry of another is too excluded under this Section.
D.Where an accused makes extra-judicial confession in the presence of the villagers after
appearance of police in village for investigation, is of little value.
E.The prohibition enjoined by Section 25 is directed against proof of confessions made to a
police officer. However, this Section does not prohibit the proof of any other matter
unconnected with the confession of the crime.
F.Time: A person making confession need not be an accused when making it. Section 25
applies to such a person who made a confession before the starting investigation itself.
H. The part of the statement confessing to the murder by A is not admissible under Section
25. However, the part of the statement revealing the secret place of bloodstained clothes and
knife is admissible within the purview of Section 27
CASE LAW
►Nature.—Section 25 covers a confession made to a police officer before any investigation
has begun or otherwise not in the course of an investigation, P.N. Swami v. Emperor, AIR
1939 PC 47 : 40 Cri LJ 364.

►Police Officer.—The words „police officer‟ are not to be construed in a narrow way, but
have to be construed in a wide and popular sense. However, the expression “police officer”
does not have a wide meaning as to include persons on whom certain police powers are
conferred. The Customs Officer is not primarily concerned with the detection and punishment
of crime committed by a person but is mainly interested in the detection and prevention of
smuggling of goods and safeguarding the recovery of the customs duties. He is more
concerned with the goods and customs duty than with the offender, he is not a police officer
within the meaning of Section 25, State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, AIR 1962 SC 276 :
(1962) 1 Cri LJ 217.

►Distinction between Section 25 and 26.—Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act

although seek to achieve the same purpose but they operate in somewhat two different fields.
Section 25 raises an embargo as regards proof of confession before a police officer. The same
need not be in police custody, whereas Section 26 raises a bar as regards admissibility of such
confession if made by an accused in the custody of a police officer although such a confession
might have been made before a person who was not a police officer. The policy underlying
Sections 25 and 26 is to make it a substantive rule of law that confessions whenever and
wherever made to the police, or while in the custody of the police to any person whomsoever,
unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be presumed to have been
obtained under the circumstances mentioned in Section 24 and, therefore, inadmissible except
so far as is provided by Section 27 of the Act, Commr. of Police v. Narender Singh,
(2006) 4 SCC 265 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 686.

►Statement made by accused to police.—A statement in order to be treated as a

confession, must either admit in terms an offence, or at any rate, substantially all facts which
constitute the offence, Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521 : (2011) 1
SCC (Cri) 1191.

►Confession before Customs/Excise official.—Confession made by an accused in custody

of Customs officials for the purpose of enquiry pursuant to Magistrate's order is not barred,
Assistant Collector, Banglore v. C. Fernandez, 1983 SCC (Cri) 109 : (1982) 3 SCC
512.

Excise officer is not a police officer. Hence, Section 25 of Evidence Act, 1872 is not applicable,
Om Prakash v. Union of India, (2011) 14 SCC 1 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1249.

►Admissibility of confession made to police officer.—Confession made to a police officer

is made inadmissible by Section 25. Section 25 of Evidence Act declares in fact that no
confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
Confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami, 1939 SCC OnLine PC
1 and as accepted by the Supreme Court, may still be used as admission under Section 21 of
Evidence Act, subject to bar of admissibility under Section 162 CrPC. However, in case a
statement containing not a confession but admission, which is otherwise relevant and which is
made before investigation commences, may be admissible, Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra
Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547.
►Bar against admissibility of confession made to police officer.— Where a person who
is not a police officer properly so called is invested with all powers of investigation, and, the
power of filing of a police report under Section 173 CrPC, such person can be said to be a
police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Where limited powers of
investigation are given to officers primarily or predominantly for some purpose other than the
prevention and detection of crime, such persons cannot be said to be police officers under
Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Hence, officers empowered under Section 53 of the NDPS Act
satisfy this test, and thus are police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence
Act. TOFAN SINGH V. STATE OF T.N., (2021) 4 SCC 1.

►Facts disclosed by accused in police custody.—Principles summarised regarding scope

of admissibility of facts disclosed by accused in police custody, RAHUL V. STATE (NCT OF
DELHI), (2023) 1 SCC 83.
Section 26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved
against him.—No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police
officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as
against such person.

Explanation.—In this section “Magistrate” does not include the head of a village discharging
magisterial functions in the Presidency of Fort St. George or elsewhere, unless such headman
is a Magistrate exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1882 (10 of 1882)

A. INGREDIENTS:
1.A person in the police custody is presumed to be tortured and the police used the "Third
Degree" on the victim. Hence the confession in the 'Police Custody' is discarded.
2.One exception to the above rule is given under this Section is, if in the immediate
presence of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, or any other competent judicial officer, the
accused gives his confession, it may be relied upon.
A.OBJECT: The object of the Sections from 25 to 27 is to prevent the abuse of the powers of
the police. The custody of a police officer provides easy opportunity of coercion, undue
influence, threat, promise, etc., forgetting confession from the accused person. In India, the
nick names of these police atrocities are called "Third Degree Methods" or "Police Julum". In
India, Lockup Deaths also frequently occur. Hence the Courts do not believe the confessions of
the accused given under Police Custody.
B.Any confession made by any person while he is in custody of the police officer cannot be
proved against such person unless it is made in the immediate presence of the Magistrate by
virtue of the provisions contained in Section 26.
C.Police custody: Where a person goes to a police officer and makes a statement which
shows that an offence has been committed by him, he accuses himself and though he is
formally not arrested since he is not free to move wherever he likes after disclosure of the
information to the police, he must be deemed to be in custody of the police. The fact that the
accused was interrogated and that he made a statement and led the panchas and police
officer to a field and thereafter produced certain articles ' which were the subject-matter of
dacoity was sufficient to establish that there was submission on his part to police custody. The
word custody in Sec. 26 or Section 27, does not mean formal custody but includes such state
of affairs in which the accused can be said to have come into the hands of a police officer or
can be said to have been under some sort of surveillance or restriction. Thus the police
custody is deemed to extend even when the accused was deemed to have submitted to.such
custody of a police officer by submitting to the interrogation and by making statements about
discovery and who could not thereafter be said to be a free man.
E. Example: An accused is arrested and sent to the medical officer for medical examination
with escorting police. While the doctor examining, the accused confesses that he
committed the offence. The police are outside the room. Will such a confession made to a
doctor admissible as an extra judicial confession?
No. The circumstances are covered within the purview of Section 26.

F. Example: An accused makes a confession to the police during his police custody in the
presence of a Second Class Magistrate. Is it vafid?
No. The Magistrate must be a competent person to record a confession of an accused
under Section 164 CrPC. The Second Class Magistrate has no such power. Hence the accused's
confession to a Second Class Magistrate is not valid.
G. Example: X, who is alleged to have committed theft, is arrested by the police. X confesses
to the police that he has committed theft; A, Magistrate, who has come to visit the police
station as per the orders of the High Court, is present atthat time, can this confession be
relied upon against X in his prosecution?
Yes. The confession made by X in the presence of A is valid within the meaning of Section
26. However, the Magistrate must follow the rules laid down urider Section 164 CrPC. If A
does not follow those rules, and simply allows the police to record the confession of X, it is not
admissible.
 RETRACTED CONFESSION
MEANING: retract. (v.t.) = to withdraw or revoke a statement or undertaking.
Retracted Confession: Generally when a serious offence occurs, the Police Officer of the
concerned police station investigates and arrests the accused suspected. The accused, if he
wants to admit the offence, he says to the police officer that he wants to give his confession.
The police officer sends that accused to the Judicial First Class Magistrate or such competent
Judicial Officer, who records the confession of the accused after confirming that the accused is
giving his confession voluntarily under Sec. 164 of Cr.P.C. When the trial of the case begins,
the accused may deny to have made the statement at all or he may say that he made that
statement due to undue influence of the police. It is called "Retracted confession".
Value of the retracted confession: The Privy Council and the Supreme Court laid down
the principle that it is always wise not to convict an accused on the sole testimony of the
retracted confession and 99.9% recurring cases retracted confession cannot form the basis of
conviction.
 SOME IMPORTANT POINTS:

A A retracted confession is a confession voluntarily made by an accused person first,

but subsequently retracted.
B. A confession is not to be regarded as involuntary merely because it is retracted.
C. It is a weak evidence.
D.As against the maker of the confession, the confession retracted may form the basis of a
conviction, if the Court believes the confession to be true and voluntarily made and is
supported by corroborative evidence.
E.As against the co-accused, the confession of a co-accused cannot be treated as substantive
evidence and can be pressed into service only when the Court is inclined to accept other
evidence and feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its conclusions
deductible from the said evidence.
F.The retraction of a confession by itself does not require corroboration before the confession
can be made the basis of conviction. If the confession is found to be voluntary and genuine,·
the retraction is wholly immaterial. If it is found that the confession was genuine, it means
that the retraction or subsequent statement about its being false has no value. If the Court is
not satisfied that the confession was genuine, it cannot be used in evidence, whether
corroborated or not. In that case, in order to justify the conviction, there must be evidence of
such a nature as to justify conviction without any confession.
G. Retraction of extra-judicial confession: A retracted extra-judicial confession is at best a
weak kind of evidence and cannot be in the absence of independent corroboration, be
made the sole basis of an order of conviction.
H. Unless a confession is free and voluntary in the sense that it did not flow from any hope or
fear of a temporal nature, exacted directly or indirectly by a person in authority, it is not
admissible in evidence and cannot be taken into consideration against an accused at all. The
Court has to determine in the first .instance whether a retracted confession is voluntary or has
been improperly induced. If upon weighing all the circumstances, the accused's denial and the
probabilities, it appears to the Judge that the confession has been improperly induced, no
matter how true it may be, he is bound to exclude it. If he comes to the conclusion that the
confession was not improperly induced, and admits it, then it becomes evidence in the usual
way.
I. Corroboration: Where a confession is retracted subsequently, the proper approach is to
consider ' each confession as a whole on its merits and use it against the maker thereof,
provided the Court is in a position to come to an unhesitating conclusion that the confession
was voluntary and true; and though a retracted confession if believed to be true and
voluntarily made may form the basis of a conviction the rule of practice and prudence requires
that it should be corroborated by independent evidence. The evidence in corroboration must
be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him
with the crime.
In other words it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some
material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed but also that the
accused committed it. The test applicable to determine the nature and extent of the
corroboration is thus the same whether the case falls within the rule of practice at common
law or within that class of offences for which corroboration is required by statute.
The nature of the corroboration will necessarily vary according to the particular circumstances
of the offence charged. The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused
committed the crime it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with
the crime. Thus a retracted confession cannot be used against a co-accused without
substantial and independent corroboration both as to substantial and
independent corroboration both as to the crime and the criminal.
J. A confession though retracted can be used to corroborate the evidence of the approver.
 WHEN CONFESSIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE

Sections 24 to 26 provide the general rules making the confessions made to the police officers

in the police custody as inadmissible. Section 26 contains an exception to this general rule, a

confession made in the police custody in the presence of a Magistrate is admissible. Section 27

is another exception to the above general rule stating that information received from an

accused during the investigation can be admissible, except his confession of the offence.

Section 28 is another exception to the above general rule that a confession made to police

may be considered if the threat, inducement, coercion are fully removed. Section 29 is

another exception to the above general rule that a confession otherwise relevant not to

become irrelevant because of promise of secrecy, etc. Section 30 is the last exception to the

above general rule that a confession of a co-accused is admissible against the other co-
 Section 27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.—
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much
of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
IMPORTANT POINTS:
A INGREDIENTS :
1. The person giving the information must be accused of an offence.
2. He must be in the custody of the police officer.
3.A fact must have been discovered in the consequence of the information received from the
accused.
4.Only that portion of the information which relates distinctly to the fact discovered can be
proved. The rest is inadmissible.
5.Before the statement is proved somebody must depose that some articles were discovered
in consequence of the information received from the accused.
6. The fact discovered must be a relevant fact that is to say it must relate to the commission
of the crime in question.
B. EXAMPLE: A person in police custody confesses to the police officer--- "I stabbed X with my
knife. I threw my knife in the well of my house.” Out of this statement, the first part, "I
stabbed X with my knife" is inadmissible. Whereas the second part, "I threw my knife in the
well of my house" is admissible.
C. EXAMPLE: An accused stated to a Police Officer--- "I stabbed X with a knife. I kept the knife
in a cupboard in my house." The Police Officer recovered the knife from the cupboard. On the
basis of the above statement, the accused was convicted. Is the conviction right?
No. The statement of the accused contains two parts. The first part consisting confession
that he murdered the deceased cannot be considered as confession. The second part
consisting the Discovery of the fact, i.e., discovery of knife, is admissible under Section 27.
Therefore, the statement of the accused, "I kept the knife in a cupboard in my house" is only
admissible, because it leads to the Discovery of the knife. The rest of the portion, i.e., "I
stabbed X with a knife" is inadmissible.
 Kotayya vs. Emperor (AIR 1947 PC 67)
Brief Facts: The accused was arrested by the police on the charge of a murder. In the
police custody one of the accused gave the information and statement like this: "About 14
days ago, I, Kotayya and people of my party lay in wait for Sivayya and others at about
sunset time at the corner of Pull Pak tank. We all beat Baddupati, Chinna, Sivayya and
Subbayya to death. The remaining persons Pullayya, Kotayya and Narayana ran away
Donapati Ramayya who was in our party received blows on his hand. He had a spear in his
hand. He gave it to me then. I hid did spear and my stick in the rick of Venkata Narsu in the
village. I will show if you come. We did all this on the instigation of Pulukuri Kotayya."
Basing upon this statement, the trial Court convicted the accused. The conviction was
upheld by the High Court. The accused appealed to the Privy Council.
The Privy Council set aside the conviction holding that out of this whole of the above
mentioned statement, "I hid the spear and my stick in the rick of Venkata Narsu in the village.
I will show if you come" is only admissible. Because this part only leads to the discovery of
stick and spear. The other part of the statement cannot be taken into consideration.
 D. "Distinctly": Any confession made by any person while he is in custody of the police
officer cannot be proved against such person unless it is made in the immediate presence of
the Magistrate by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 26. The language of Section 27,
which is a proviso to Section 26 is by no means clear. But what it says is that where an
accused is in the custody of a police officer and furnishes some information, in consequence of
which some material fact is discovered then so much of such information as relates distinctly
to the fact so discovered can be proved, and it would not matter whether such information
amounts to a confession or not. This Section is based on the doctrine of confirmation by
subsequent facts. That doctrine is that where, in consequence of a confession otherwise
inadmissible, search is made and facts are discovered which confirm if in material points then
such discovery is a guarantee that the confession made was true. But what is important to
note is that only that portion of the information can be proved which relates distinctly or
strictly to the facts discovered.
The word distinctly used in the Section is intended to confine the information which may
be proved within certain strict limits and would not permit the inclusion of everything which
may relate to that information. The expression distinctly means clearly or positively.
 It therefore follows that where the accused makes a compound statement, it would be the
duty of the Court to divide it into its component parts and only admit that part which has
distinctly led to the discovery of the particular fact and reject the rest. The view that the entire
statement accompanying the discovery was admissible even though it contained an
acknowledgment of guilt or other incriminatory statements can no longer be or other
incriminatory statements can no longer be sustained as correct after the pronouncement of
the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya & others vs. Emperor (AIR 1947 PC 67).
E.Stolen property cases: Where an accused points and shows the place from where property
was stolen after its recovery from the accused, is relevant under Section 27.
F. When a statement made by an accused person while in custody of a police officer is
tendered in evidence under the provisions of Section 27, on the ground that an article which is
concealed and the accused's knowledge of its whereabouts are discovered in consequence of
the· statement words included in the staterrj$nt with regard to the authorship of concealment,
for example, "I have concealed," "I have hidden," or "I have kept", are admissible in evidence.
G."so much of such information" and "distinctly": The words "so much of such information"
and "distinctly" in Section 27 are very important. They limit what may be proved against the
accused. The whole of the statement of the accused made while in police custody is, therefore,
not admissible under this Section, but only that portion of it can be proved against him
which has led to the discovery of the fact deposed to and which relates distinctly to the fact
discovered that is to say only that portion of the accused's statement can be admitted which
was the direct or immediate cause of the discovery of the fact deposed to. Anything which is
not directly or clearly connected with or which is not the immediate cause of the discovery is
not admissible.

CASE LAWS
►Scope.—Joint disclosures, to be more accurate, simultaneous disclosures, per se, are not
inadmissible under Section 27. “A person accused” need not necessarily be a single person,
but it could be a plurality of the accused. It seems that the real reason for not acting
upon joint disclosures by taking resort to Section 27 is the inherent difficulty in placing
reliance on such information supposed to have emerged from the mouths of two or more
accused at a time. In fact, joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more
accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in a chorus, State (NCT of
Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715.
►Under Section 27, it is not the discovery of every fact that is admissible but discovery of
relevant fact is alone admissible. Relevancy is nothing but connection or link between facts
discovered with the crime, Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 4 SCC
522.

►Ambit and scope.—It is a settled legal position that facts need not be self-probatory and
word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27, is not limited to “actual physical material object”.
Discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact, that information given by accused exhibited the
knowledge or the mental awareness of informant as to its existence at a particular place. It
includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of
accused as to its existence, Asar Mohd. v. State of U.P., (2019) 12 SCC 253.

►Ingredients.—The essential ingredient of Section 27 is that the information given by the

accused must lead to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information.
Secondly, only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said
discovery is admissible against the accused. Thirdly, the discovery of the fact must relate to
the commission of some offence, Jaffar Husain Dastgir v. State of Maharashtra, (1969)
2 SCC 872.

►Relevance.—Relevance of confessional statements would depend upon discovery of

unknown facts based on information supplied by accused. If any fresh facts have been
discovered on basis of confessional statement made by accused, the same would be
relevant. If not, confessional statement cannot be proved against accused, to the detriment of
accused, Madhu v. State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 892.

►Duty of Investigating Officer.—If evidence otherwise confessional in character is

admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is obligatory upon the Investigating
Officer to state and record who gave the information; when he is dealing with more than one
accused, what words were used by him so that a recovery pursuant to the information
received may be connected to the person giving the information so as to provide incriminating
evidence against that person, Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of A.P., (1983) 1 SCC 143 :
1983 SCC (Cri) 139.
►Disclosure by multiple accused persons.—Where there are several accused persons and
several recovery dates, relationship between accused persons as well as process of arrest
must be examined prior to examining conditions for applicability of Section 27, Mukesh v.
State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1.

►“Fast discovered” as envisaged under.—It embraces the place from which object was
produced and knowledge of accused as to it, but information given must relate distinctly to
that effect. Hence, the accused herein simply denying their role without proper explanation as
to the knowledge about the incriminating material recovered on the basis of their statements
in police custody, would justify the presumption drawn by the courts below as to the
involvement of the accused in the crime, Pawan Kumar v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC
148.

►“Fact” discovered pursuant to disclosure, Scope of.—Facts discovered pursuant to

disclosure made by accused need not be self-probatory and word “fact” contemplated by
Section 27 is not limited to “actual physical material object”, Charandas Swami v. State of
Gujarat, (2017) 7 SCC 177.

►Joint/Simultaneous/Similar disclosures.—Joint/Simultaneous/Similar disclosures

leading to discovery of same fact(s) are not inadmissible under Section 27, as there can
always be more than one accused. A joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because
two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in chorus. When two
persons in custody are interrogated separately and simultaneously and both of them furnish
similar information leading to discovery of fact which was reduced into writing, such
disclosures by two or more persons in police custody do not go out of the purview of Section
27 altogether. What is relevant is, when information is given by one accused after other
without any break, almost simultaneously (but separately), and such information is followed
up by pointing out of material things by both of accused, then there is no good reason to
eschew such evidence from regime of Section 27, and would be admissible against all such
accused. Whether that information is credible is a matter of evaluation of evidence, Kishore
Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 3 SCC 760
►Power of arrest.—Power of arrest under Section 41 CrPC is not governed by Section 27 of
Evidence Act, 1872. Section 27 of Evidence Act may be invoked only if arrest is otherwise
permissible. If exercise of power of arrest is not otherwise permissible or warranted, factum of
admissibility of confession under Section 27 of Evidence Act cannot facilitate such exercise,
Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439.

►Recovery of weapons.—Relevant facts discovered on basis of common memorandum of

recovery prepared on basis of disclosures made by different accused, held, admissible,
Mahendran v. State of T.N., (2019) 5 SCC 67.

►Proof of recovery of incriminating evidence.—It is fairly well settled that the evidence
of the investigating officer can be relied upon to prove the recovery even when the panch
witnesses turned hostile, Mallikarjun v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 8 SCC 359.
►Recovery evidence.—Principles summarized regarding nature of Section 27, scope
of admissibility under Section 27 and duty of prosecution and court in the matter,
Jafarudheen
v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440.
 WHEN CONFESSIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE

Section 28. Confession made after removal of impression caused by inducement,

threat or promise, relevant.—If such a confession as is referred to in Section 24 is made
after the impression caused by any such inducement, threat or promise has, in the opinion of
the Court, been fully removed, it is relevant.

IMPORTANT POINTS:
A INGREDIENTS:
1.Section 24 imposes restriction that confession caused by inducement, threat or promise is
irrelevant and is not admissible. Section 28 is the exception to Section 24.
2.According to Section 28, a confession made after removal of impression caused
by inducement, threat or promise is admissible and becomes relevant fact.
3.The time required for the removal of the impression caused by inducement, threat
or promise is not mentioned in this Section. It is left to the discretion and opinion of the
Court.
B.In Naran Tulsidas and another-Accused Appellants v. The Kutch Government (AIR 1951
Kutch 27) case, the accused was in police custody for 12 days. After his release he made a
confession to the Magistrate. However, during the trial, he retracted his confession stating that
he was compelled to give his confession by police beating and threat. The prosecution sought
the help of Section 28. The Court rejected the confession and held that the fact that the
accused had been 12 days in police custody after the police beating or threats and had time to
reflect would not necessarily lessen the effect of the influence which had been brought to bear
on him.
C.When once the existence of improper inducement, threat or promise has been established
so as to bring the case within the provisions of Section 24, there is a presumption of its
continuance, and the prosecution has to prove that the impression caused by the original
inducement, threat or promise was fully removed when the prisoner made the confession.
D.The word fully in Section 28 means thoroughly, completely or entirely, so as not to leave
any trace of the impression created by the torture of fear; for, a confession forced from the
mind by the flattery of hope or by the torture of fear comes in so questionable a shape that no
credit can be given to it. A free and voluntary confession is presumed to flow from the
strongest sense of guilt and, therefore, it is admitted as proof of the crime.
 CONFESSION OTHERWISE RELEVANT NOT TO BECOME IRRELEVANT BECAUSE OF
PROMISE OF SECRECY
Section 29. Confession otherwise relevant not to become irrelevant because of
promise of secrecy, etc.—If such a confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become
irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a
deception practised on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was
drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he need not have answered,
whatever may have been the form of those questions, or because he was not warned that he
was not bound to make such confession, and that evidence of it might be given against him.
IMPORTANT POINTS:
A INGREDIENTS:
1.Section 24 imposes restriction that confession caused by inducement, threat or promise is
irrelevant and is not admissible. Section 29 is the exception to Section 24.
2.As a rule, the information or confession obtained by promise of secrecy, deception and
drunkenness, is not admrssible under Section 24. However, according to Section 29, for the
purpose of obtaining information of the offence, if a person plays tricks, such as,---
(a) promise of secrecy; or
(b) deception; or
(c) drunkenness
on the accused, and believing such tricks the accused reveals the information of the offence or
confesses, such information or confession is admissible.
3. The object of Section 29 is not to incriminate the accused, but to find out truth.
 CONFESSION TO CO-ACCUSED SCOPE:

When a confession is made by an accused voluntarily and consistent with the material facts of
the case, and the Court believes that the confession is true, it becomes a strong evidence and
conviction may be given to the accused. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that
when two or more persons are tried jointly for the same offence, and the confession made by
one of them is proved at the trial, the Court may take into consideration that confession
against the other accused as well as the accused confessing the guilt.
Section 30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others
jointly under trial for same offence.—When more persons than one are being tried jointly
for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and
some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession
as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.
Explanation.—“Offence” as used in this section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to
commit, the offence.

Illustrations
(a)A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said—“B and I murdered
C”. The Court may consider the effect of this confession as against B.
(b)A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A
and B, and that B said—“A and I murdered C”.
This statement may not be taken into consideration by the Court against A, as B is not being
jointly tried.
IMPORTANT POINTS:
A INGREDIENTS:
1. The accused must be tried jointly.
2. They must be tried jointly for the same offence.
3. The confession of one accused is affecting himself and others.
4.Statement of one accused leading to discovery cannot be used against a co-accused under
Section 30.
5.Retracted confession of co-accused: Retracted confession is a weak evidence. However, in
the Evidence Act, it is no where scribed that the retracted confession cannot be taken into
consideration against the co-accused or the confessing accused. It depends upon the
discretion of the Court, and upon the particular circumstances of each case.
6.May take into consideration: Section 30 provides that the Court may take into consideration
of the confession of a co-accused. It does not say the confession of one accused shall be the
evidence against the other co-accused. It depends upon the discretion of the Court and on the
particular circumstances of the case.
B. Nathu vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1956 SC 56). Brief Facts: Nathu, Bhola and Ram Singh
were the accused of murdering Summer Singh, a boy aged 11 years. The prosecution alleged
that Nathu told Bhola and Ram Singh that they would get the boy Summer Singh in the
mango garden on 17-05-1952, and he would give them Rs. 5 to eacH of them, i.e., Bhola and
Ram Singh, for their work. Ram Singh and Bhola enticed the boy Summer Singh on 17-05-
1952 in the evening to the mango garden, where Nathu was awaiting. As soon as the boy was
brought into the mango garden, Nathu killed the boy, and threw fhe dead body in the well.
Bhola and Ram Singh confessed before the Court. The Court convicted Nathu, Bhola and Ram
Singh basir.g on the confession of the Bhola and Ram Singh. Nathu-the Appellant raised his
objection in the Supreme Court that the confessions of Bhola and Ram Singh were
inadmissible in evidence against him and the conviction based thereon was illegal, as they
were uncorroborated.
The Supreme Court held that such statements are not evidence as defined in Section 3 of tile
Evidence Act and no conviction could be founded thereon, but could be based if they refered to
as t lending assurance to the conclusion and fortifying it.
C. Confession against co-accused: A confession may subject to certain limitations be proved
against the maker of it but it is not evidence against the co-accused in the strict sense within
the contemplation of Section 3, Evidence Act. It can only be taken into consideration against
the co accused under Section 30, which requires that the confession must implicate the
maker substantially to the same extent as the other accused person against whom it is sought
to be taken into consideration. Section 30 appears to be based on the view that an admission
by an accused person of his or her guilt provides some kind of sanction in support of the truth
of the confession against the person making it as well as against others.
So far as confessional statement of one accused is
concerned, it may be taken into consideration against the other accused
persons if it fulfils the conditions laid down in Section
30. One of the conditions being that the confession must substantially implicate the
maker himself, to the same extent as the other accused person against whom it is sought to
be taken
into consideration. The position, however, would be different where while making the
alleged confession, an attempt is made by the maker of it to throw the blame on the other
accused
persons, making himself a mere unwilling spectator.
D. Value of confession of a co-accused under Section 30: Strictly speaking, the
confession of an accused is not evidence against his co-accused within the meaning of Section
3. But an exception is drafted on this general rule in Section 30. The law is well settled that
the confession of a co-accused is not substantive evidence. Section 30 has merely given the
Court
a discretion to call it in aid in appropriate cases. It can be used only for lending assurance and
is to be merely an element in considering the evidence in the case. It cannot be called in aid to
supplement evidence otherwise insufficient and in no case can it be used to fill gaps in the
prosecution evidence.
If there is independent evidence and sufficient corroborative evidence, an accused can be
convicted basing upon the confession of another co-accused. Where there is no independent
evidence of the offence against the accused, the confession of his co-accused cannot be
considered at all. It can serve only as corroborative material of other evidence, if it exists; but
standing alone it must be rejected altogether.
The confession of a co-accused is a very weak type of evidence because it is not taken in the
presence of the other accused against whom it is sought to be used and the latter has not
even the right or opportunity of testing the truth of the confession of co-accused by cross-
examining him. The evidence of confession of a co-accused being by its very nature and effect
tainted, the Courts have been reluctant to look to that evidence in order to seek corroboration
of the tainted evidence of an accomplice.
Since a confession is neither required to be given on oath nor is it required to be made in the
presence of the other accused persons whom it also implicates and also it cannot be tested by
cross-examination, it is not wrong to describe it as an extremely weak type of evidence which
should not be permitted to form the foundation of a conviction, but only be used in support of
other evidence. On this view, the confession of a co-accused would not be in itself substantive
evidence and can only be taken into consideration as provided by Section 30.
The confession of a co-accused is undoubtedly a very strong piece of evidence against himself,
provided it is voluntary, and the Court is satisfied that it is true. But it is a weak piece of
evidence as against the co-accused. The evidence or confession of one approver cannot be
corroborated by that of another approver. There must be independent corroboration.
E. Example: A is the wife of B. C is the paramour of A. The relations between A and B are
strained. There are evidence showing that A and B were regularly quarrelling in the issue of C.
B also quarrelled with C and warned him with dire consequences if C would not end his illicit
contact with A. B was murdered. The prosecution was that with the aid and instigation of A, C
murdered B. A confessed before the trial Court stating that she and her paramour C murdered
B, and her confession has been recorded under Section 164 CrPC. C challenges the said
confession. Decide.
Basing upon the corroborative evidence, and the strained relations between A and B, and
between B anq C, A's confession can be based for conviction of A and C.
 F. Corroboration: Under Section 30, in case of a confession of one of the accused against
himself and implicating the other co-accused, there must be corroborative evidence.
Confessions of accused, who are tried jointly implicating others, have to be taken into account
against the other accused as well. But by themselves they cannot be made use of, to convict
other accused. When along with such confessions there is, however, a strong evidence the
confessions go further in corroboration of such evidence. Section 30 shall be read with Section
114, illustration (b).
The general rule is that the evidence of an accomplice should not be accepted unless there
is adequate pieace corroborated in material particulars not only in respect of the commission
of the crime but also in respect of the participation of each of the accused in the
commission of that crime. It is also well settled that the corroboration need not be direct
evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial
evidence of his connection with the crime. As to what would be a material particular would
obviously depend on the facts of each case.
In Sidheswan Ganguly Appellant v. State of West Bengal, Respondent (AIR 1958 SC
143), the Supreme Court laid down the following rules:---
There is no rule of practice that there should be corroboration in every case but that the rule
which requires corroboration is one of the prudence which must be present to the mind of a
Judge. The nature and extent of such evidence must necessarily vary with the circumstances
of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged.
However following rules are to be followed:---
(i)It is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material
circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case should in itself be
sufficient to sustain conviction.
(ii)The independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the crime was
committed but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the accused with it,
by confirming in some material particular the testimony of the complainant that the accused
committed the crime.
(iii)The corroboration must come from independent sources and thus ordinarily the testimony
of one accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another.
(iv)The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is
sufficient ·if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime.
CASE LAW
►Interpretation.—Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act envisages that when more than
one persons are being tried jointly for the same offence and a confession made by one of such
persons if found to affect the maker and some other of such persons and stands sufficiently
proved, the court can take into consideration such confession as against such other person as
well as against the person who made such confession. This is what exactly seems to have
been done by the learned trial judge, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Jaspal Singh, (2003)
10 SCC 586.

►Confession of persons not co-accused.—A confessional statement is relevant only and

only if the author of confessional statement himself is an accused in a case where the
confessional statement is being proved. For such admissibility it is imperative that the person
making the confession besides implicating himself, also implicates others who are being jointly
tried with him. In that situation alone is, such a confessional statement relevant even against
the others who are accused/implicated. Hence, where authors of confessional statements are
arrayed as the accused in a particular case confessional statements made by them are
inadmissible as confessional statements, State of Maharashtra v. Kamal Ahmed
Mohammed Vakil Ansari, (2013) 12 SCC 17 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 202.

►Confession of co-accused.—Although confession of co-accused is not substantive

evidence, it can be relied on if it is voluntary and properly recorded and other evidence
sufficiently supports the prosecution case and if the confession has no non-corroborative factor
and no serious contradictions, Mohd. Jamiludin Nasir v. State of W.B., (2014) 7 SCC
443
: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 230.

►As a result of provisions contained in Section 30, confession has no doubt to be regarded as
amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by court is evidence;
circumstances which are considered by court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in
that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic
sense because of provisions of Section 30, fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by
Section 3. Result, therefore is, that in dealing with a case against an accused person, court
cannot start with confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence
adduced by prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to quality and effect of
said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to confession in order to receive assurance to the
conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. Law so
laid down has always been followed except in cases where there is a specific provision in law
making such confession of a co-accused admissible against another accused, Surinder
Kumar Khanna v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2018) 8 SCC 271.

►Confession recorded in custody.—A confession, recorded when accused is in custody,

even when admissible, is a weak piece of evidence and there must be some corroborative
evidence. Moreover, evidence of co-accused is also a very weak type of evidence which needs
to be corroborated by some other evidence. No such corroborative evidence has been led in
this case. Even if confession is admissible, court has to be satisfied that it is a voluntary
statement, free from any pressure and also that accused was apprised of his rights before
recording the confession. In this case, no such material has been brought on the record,
hence, conviction reversed, Mohd. Fasrin v. State, (2019) 8 SCC 811.
Section 31. Admissions not conclusive proof, but may estop.—Admissions are not
conclusive proof of the matters admitted but they may operate as estoppels under the
provisions hereinafter contained.