The Human Factor

• This chapter is based on the

questionnaires that have been
helpfully filled out by
• the participating Mærsk Captains.

• More than 220 years of ship

masters’ experience is represented.
 Human Error

• 80% of all accidents occur due to human error?

 But what is non-human error?

Factors outside Other factors

Areas shaded in red
ship
14,1%
show factors that are
18,8% Factors related to generally recognised
communication,
organisation and
as “human error”…
Ship Design
procedures
2,2%
12,6% but in what sense are
Technical
the remaining factors
equipment failure
or wrong use
non-human?
13,8%

Handling of cargo

2,2% Factors related to

individual on board

36,7%

Adapted from:
Navigare, july 1998
 Underlying Causes of Accidents

ENVIRONMENTAL
FACTORS
•Seastate LOCAL •Safeguards.
FACTORS •Defences.
•Visibility
Fatigue ACTIVE
•Wind FAILURES
Procedures
•Current Slips
Equipment Accident/
ORGANISATIONAL Lapses Incident
Workload
FACTORS
Supervision Mistakes
•Communication
Lack of Violations
•Incompatible goals
knowledge
•Management
•Org. processes
 What causes loss of containers

Damage reports indicate the following causes:

• Green water on deck

• Heavy sea
• Freak waves
• Excessive rolling and
pitching
• Structural collapse of
containers
• Poor lashings
 Avoiding rough weather is preferable.

Weather routing and meteorological information helps achieving that.

 But sometimes it cannot be avoided

- then what? • Prepare and use a “Rough

Weather Checklist”

• Double check all lashings

• It is of utmost importance that

duty officers are aware of what
means he/she must consider to
make use of in case the weather
deteriorates (Change of speed/
heading or call for the master
etc.).

• Countermeasures, such as
speed or course change, should
be carried out in due time.
• The constant focus on efficiency, fuel economy and schedules might add some
extra pressure on the captains decisions regarding reduction in speed or
deviation from the planned route.
• But
• “It is always better to arrive later than not at all”

• The vessels have today grown to a size where damage to ship or cargo might
actually already have happened even before you realise that the
weathercondition impose a possible danger.
• Therefore extended and thorough knowledge of the forces affecting ships in
rough weather is essential.
 Safety versus commercial needs

• Mærsk procedures
underlines that safety
always comes before
Commercial
Safety maintaining the schedule!
interests

• This attitude is also

thoroughly reflected in the
answers given in the
questionnaires.
 Stowage related problems

• Can we trust the information

that is fed into the loadstar?

• Does container weights, stack

weights and actual positioning
of the containers always
correspond with the loading
plans?

• Is cargo inside containers

properly stowed?

• We don´t really know - do we?

 Before departure-

• following items must be checked!

• All lashings. Including

bays in which no work
has been carried out!
• Basetwistlocks as well as
all other twistlocks.
• Final loading and lashing
condition!
• Integrated ship management systems are common
in many ships today, offering a long range of
information from all over the ship.

• In a not so far future we can expect these systems

to feed us information regarding hull stress, lashing
forces etc.

• Hopefully this will be another step towards a safer

maritime environment