Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Outline
Some benefits
- Change the design and run sessions until you find what you want: The
importance of pre-registration
- Even worse: Outright data manipulation
- Are the amounts too small?
- External validity /vəˈlɪd.ə.ti/ hiệu lực?
- Differences within or across cultures?
III. A first simple game – and what we can learn from it
• Two individuals A and B are matched, but neither know nor see each other.
• Individuals A gets 10$ and can offer individual B any amount they want to.
• If B accepts, both get the respective amounts.
• If B rejects, both get nothing.
For instance:
• If A offers 2$ and B accepts, A goes home with 8$ and B with 2$.
• If A offers 2$ and B rejects, both go home with nothing.
• Which behavior and outcome would the simplest theory, which assumes that individuals care
only about money, predict?
• How would you interpret the results and how can we disentangle different motivations?
IV. A second simple game – and what we can learn from it
• Three individuals A, B and C are matched, and each of them gets 2$.
• They can submit their money to a common pool. If so, each amount is doubled, and then they
share the pool equally.
• Hence, if each of them submits their money, the pool consists of 12$, and each of them goes
home with 4$.
• However, if e.g. A and B submit their money, while C does not, then the pool consists of 8$, and
C gets 2+ 8/3 > 4.
• Which behavior and outcome would the simplest theory that assumes that individual care only
about money predict?
• People are less selfish than the simplest theory suggests, but many are at least to some degree.
The behavior of other people matters a lot.
• People are influenced by norms, but many violate them when it pays. They also tend to
rationalize their behavior.
• Cultural and gender differences do not matter as much as one might think.
VI. A typical example for nudging
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease which is expected to
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.
We will consider different hypothetical scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs
and ask you for your choice.
VI. A typical example for nudging
A:
Exactly 200 people will be saved.
B:
• With probability 2/3, all 600 will die
• With probability 1/3, no-one will die
VI. A typical example for nudging
A:
Exactly 400 people will be die.
B:
• With probability 1/3, all 600 will be saved
• With probability 2/3, no-one will be saved
VII. Another way of nudging: The relevance of irrelevant alternatives
The famous trust game: A gets e.g. 5$. If A gives the money to B, it is
tripled. If A doesn’t send the money, the game ends. If A sends, B
decides which part of the 15$ they give back, Then, the game ends.
Our “innovation”
B is first asked to decide how much money they return in case A sends
the money.
Then, B can opt-out, and then gets 5$.
Selfish lies:
• Observability & “expected” reputation matters
• Groups lie more
• Hardly any gender differences. BUT: Observability matters far more for women