What are the two distinct causes of action comprised by accion interdictal,

give their differences and their similarities, if any.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahucio).
Their differences are as follows: In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth.
The possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession.
The action must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land.

In unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied.
Possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand.
Their similarities are as follows: The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature,
lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.
The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
(Heirs of Yusingco v. Busilak, et. al., G.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018).
Maria filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Parcel of Land against Mario.
Mario filed an Answer with Counterclaim seeking to be reimbursed with the value of the improvements he had
introduced on the land and the payment of damages he had sustained.

What is the nature of Mario’s Counterclaim?

Mario’s counterclaim is one that is compulsory.
Under Section 7, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a compulsory counterclaim is one which,
being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof,
except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount.
In this case, the reliefs being sought, which are the reimbursement for improvements and payments of damages,
by Mario arise out of or are connected with the subject matter of Maria’s claim for recovery of property.
Thus, the counterclaim of Mario is compulsory.
Andrea, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York City, filed with the RTC of Lipa City a Complaint for
Rescission of Contract of Sale of Land against Bea, a resident of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
The subject property, located in Lipa City, has an assessed value of ₱19,700.00.
Appended to the complaint is Andrea’s verification and certification of non-forum shopping executed in New York City,
duly notarized by Mr. John Buster, Esq., a notary public in the State of New York.
Bea filed an answer raising the following affirmative defenses:
(a) The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Andrea because she is not a resident of the Philippines;
(b) The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action involving real property with an assessed
value of ₱19,700.00; exclusive and original jurisdiction is with the Municipal Trial Court where the defendant resides;
and
(c) The verification and certification of non-forum shopping are fatally defective because there is no accompanying
certification issued by the Philippine Consulate in New York, authenticating that Mr. Buster is duly authorized to
notarize the document.
Rule on the foregoing grounds with reasons.
 (a) The affirmative defense that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over Andrea’s person because she is not a
Philippine resident is without merit.
The Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the filing of the complaint.

(b) The affirmative defense that the RTC does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the action involving real
property with an assessed value of ₱19,700.00 is without merit.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC has subject-matter jurisdiction over an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the action for rescission of the contract for sale of land is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Hence, the affirmative defense that the RTC does not have subject-matter jurisdiction is without merit.

(c) The affirmative defense that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping are fatally defective because
there is no accompanying certification issued by the Philippine Consulate in New York is without merit.
The Supreme Court has held that the requirement of a consular certification applies only to an official record and not to
an acknowledged or notarial document, such as the verification and certification against forum-shopping.
[Heirs of Arcilla v. Teodoro, 11 August 2008, Austria-Martinez, J.; Tujan-Militante v. Nustad, 19 June 2017, Tijam, J.]
In the court settlement of the estate of X, one of the claimants, Y, testified that before X died,
He acknowledged his debt of Php 2 million.

Is Y’s testimony as to what X told him admissible?

Yes. Under Section 39, Rule 130 the 2019 Rules on Evidence, in an action against an executor of a deceased person,
the statement of the deceased prior to his death may be received in evidence if the statement was made upon the personal
knowledge of the deceased.
(NB: Prior to the 2019 Rules on Evidence, the testimony would have been inadmissible.)
In a case, the petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies, because Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review
brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from receipt
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.

Is the fresh period rule applied under Rule 42 also applicable in a Certiorari Petition under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure? Explain.
No.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
The Fresh Period Rule applies only to appeals in civil and criminal cases, and in special proceedings filed
under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45,41 and Rule 12242 of the Rules of Court.
(See Fortune Life Insurance Company Inc. vs. (COA) Proper, 845 SCRA 599, 21 November 2017)
Bill Pinto engaged your legal services as counsel and informed you that he extended a Php1,000,000 loan to
Mang Donald covered by a promissory note. The promissory note stated that Mang Donald will pay the loan on
June 1, 2020 with interest of 15% per annum. June 1, 2020 came and went, but Mang Donald did not pay.
Bill Pinto sent a demand letter requiring him to pay within 10 days from receipt.
Mang Donald received the demand letter on June 15, 2020 but still did not pay.
Bill Pinto would now like to bring an action for sum of money based on the promissory note.

As his legal counsel, what procedural rules should you observe in preparing the complaint on Bill Pinto’s behalf, considering that
the complaint is based on the promissory note signed by Mang Donald?

If you were counsel for Mang Donald, what should be included in his Answer if he seeks to deny the genuineness and due
execution of the promissory note?
If such is not included in his Answer, can Mang Donald still raise other defenses?

Suppose that Mang Donald received the complaint of Bill Pinto, and hired you as his legal counsel. Upon reading the complaint,
you find that the allegations are not very clear so that you could not intelligently prepare an Answer on Mang Donald’s behalf.
What remedy is available to Mang Donald?
What are the requirements in order for him to avail of this remedy?
As his legal counsel, what procedural rules should you observe in preparing the complaint on Bill Pinto’s behalf, considering that
the complaint is based on the promissory note signed by Mang Donald?
The complaint will be based on the promissory note as an actionable document.
Therefore, I should set forth the substance of the promissory note in the complaint and attach a copy,
which will form part of the complaint.

If you were counsel for Mang Donald, what should be included in his Answer if he seeks to deny the genuineness and due
execution of the promissory note?
If such is not included in his Answer, can Mang Donald still raise other defenses?

If Mang Donald were my client, and if he seeks to deny the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note,
he should do under oath in his Answer. If there is no oath, he will be deemed to have admitted the same.
However, he can still raise other defenses which are not inconsistent with genuineness and due execution,
Such as payment or prescription. (Rule 8, Section 7 and 8)

Suppose that Mang Donald received the complaint of Bill Pinto, and hired you as his legal counsel.
Upon reading the complaint, you find that the allegations are not very clear so that you could not intelligently prepare an Answer
on Mang Donald’s behalf.
What remedy is available to Mang Donald? What are the requirements in order for him to avail of this remedy?

On Mang Donald’s behalf, I will file a motion for a bill of particulars.

In the motion, I will move for a more definite statement of specific matters to enable us to prepare his Answer.
I should point out the defects referred to, the specific paragraphs in the Complaint, and the details desired.
Raymond owns a car repair shop and registered the same with the Department of Trade and Industry in Brgy. Kalumpang,
Marikina. In May 2021, due to the restricted movements implemented by the IATF, Patricia, a resident of Kalumpang, Marikina,
brought her SUV to the said shop and asked Raymond to repaint the SUV.
Raymond agreed and promised that the SUV would be ready by 15 June 2021.
When Patricia returned on June 15th, she discovered that the SUV was only half-way done and had the windshield destroyed.
Raymond explained that an accident took place in his shop which resulted in the delay and damage to the SUV,
Raymond then asked for additional time to deliver the SUV.
Patricia, irate, complained before the Barangay and filed a complaint against Raymond.
When called by the Barangay for conciliation proceedings, Raymond insisted that the Complaint should be dismissed
as the Barangay has no jurisdiction over cases involving juridical entities as Patricia’s complaint is against the
car repair shop of Raymond.

Is Raymond Correct? Why or why not?

Raymond is incorrect. The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law is a condition precedent in filing a case,
except if it involves a complaint by or against corporations, partnerships, or juridical entities.
Raymond’s business is a sole proprietorship, and a sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the personality of the owner of the enterprise.
The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization.
As such, the Lupon has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Patricia against Raymond.
During his incumbency as President, Ferdie and his family had amassed ill-gotten wealth.
Hence, some Senate hearings were called to determine their liabilities. During the Senate Hearings,
the Senators were able to procure photocopies of a notarized Memoranda of Agreement between Ferdie’s family and Maria, President
of ABC Bus Corporation, stating that Ferdie’s family are the true owners of said Bus Corporation. Moreover, the Senators also got
hold of photocopies of a notarized Memorandum of Understanding from Pedro, President of DEF Television Network, showing that
Ferdie’s Family are the true owners of said TV Network.
During the Senate Hearings, Jose and Mario also provided their Affidavits stating that they are dummies of the family of Ferdie in the
latter’s dollar salting activities.
Based thereon, the Senators recommended that the members of the family of Ferdie be charged for graft and corruption, before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Senators also recommended the forfeiture of their ill-gotten wealth in favor of the government.
During the Sandiganbayan hearing, the Ombudsman Prosecutors presented the photocopies of the notarized Memoranda of
Agreement between Ferdie’s family and Maria; the photocopies of the notarized Memorandum of Understanding between Ferdie’s
family and Pedro; and photocopies of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) of the Senate Hearings. Moreover, the
Ombudsman Prosecutors also presented the Affidavits of Jose and Mario, who are based in the United States of America and Hong
Kong, respectively. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Jose and Mario, were not able to testify before the Sandiganbayan.
All the foregoing pieces of evidence and TSNs, were testified upon before the Sandiganbayan,
by Lourdes Magno, the records officer of the Senate.

1. If you were the Sandiganbayan would you admit the photocopies of the notarized Memorandum of Understanding and of the
notarized Memorandum of Agreement, as evidence against the accused? (4%)

2. May the photocopies of the notarized Memorandum of Understanding and of the notarized Memorandum of Agreement be admitted
as public records, considering that they were identified and testified upon by Lourdes Magno,
the records officer of the Senate, whom the Ombudsman called as credible witness?
1. No.
The photocopies of the documents fall under Section 8, Rule 130 of the 2019 Revised Rules of Evidence which states: “When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.”
Here, the Ombudsman Prosecutors did not provide any plausible reason why the originals of the Memorandum of Understanding and
Memorandum of Agreement were not presented, or any compelling ground why the Sandiganbayan should admit these documents as
secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them.
Accordingly, the Memorandum of Understanding and Memorandum of Agreement should be excluded in evidence.
(See Republic of the Philippines vs. Ma. Imelda “Imee” R. Marcos-Manotoc, et al., G. R. No. 171701,
February 8, 2012)

2. No.
If the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.
Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge;
that is, those derived from their own perception.
The fact that photocopies of the notarized Memorandum of Understanding and of the notarized Memorandum of Agreement were
collected by the Senate in the course of its hearings does not make them per se public records.
Thus, Lourdes Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.
Given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Lourdes Magno was not a credible witness
who could testify as to their contents.
(See Republic of the Philippines vs. Ma. Imelda “Imee” R. Marcos-Manotoc, et al., G. R. No. 171701,
February 8, 2012)
Punky filed a torts case for damages Dinky.
Punky will offer in evidence a medical certificate executed by Dr. No concerning the physical injuries suffered by Punky.
Dr. No however was not presented as a witness in court.

(a) May the affidavit be admitted in evidence over the relevant objection of Dinky?

(b) Would your answer to (a) be the same if Dr. No had been presented in court as a witness to testify regarding his
medical certificate?
(a) No, the affidavit may not be admitted in evidence over objection that it is hearsay.
Under the Rules on Evidence, hearsay is inadmissible in evidence.
Here, the medical certificate is an out-of-court statement of Dr. No which is offered to prove the truth of the fact stated
therein, i.e., the physical injuries suffered by Punky.
Hence, the medical certificate may not be admitted over hearsay objection.

(b) Yes, my answer to (a) would be the same even if Dr. No had been presented in court as a witness to testify
regarding his medical certificate.
Under the Rules on Evidence, an out-of-court statement is still considered as hearsay even if the declarant testifies
in court and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.
[See S37 R130, 2nd paragraph]
A bank filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against X who allegedly defaulted on his loan.
The promissory note signed by X was attached to the bank’s complaint.
X filed an unverified answer where he argued that he had a verbal agreement with the bank’s manager to extend the period of the
loan. X did not dispute the terms of the promissory note. During trial,
the bank presented a photocopy of the promissory note and did not lay the basis for admission of secondary evidence.
As such, X objected to the admission of the promissory note, citing the Original Document Rule under the Rules on Evidence.

Rule on the objection of X.

The objections should be overruled. The Original Document Rule (then “best evidence rule” applies only when the content of the
document is the subject of the inquiry.
Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the Original Document Rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original.
In this case, the Original Document is not applicable, since there was not dispute as to the terms of the promissory note. Moreover,
X impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note by his failure to specifically deny them under oath
when he filed his answer.
(Gaw vs. Chua, G.R. No. 160855, 16 April 2008)
“A” filed a case for recovery of possession against “B” with the RTC of Manila.
Due to non-compliance with prior barangay conciliation, “B” filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The RTC at first dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
However, on Motion for Reconsideration of “A”, the case was reinstated and referred the case to the Barangay
concerned to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings in accordance with the 1991 Local Government Code.
“B” went to the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC,
when his Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
The CA reversed the RTC and ordered the Dismissal of the Recovery of Possession case.

Is the CA correct? Explain.

Yes. The CA was correct.
R.A. No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991,
provides that barangay conciliation proceedings is a pre-condition to filing a complaint in court between persons
actually residing in the same barangay to explore possible amicable settlement.
(See Ngo vs. Gabelo et al., G.R. No. 207707, 24 August 2020, citing Sections 409 and 412 of the Local Government
Code of 1991)
Police officer Les Foo was convicted of bribery by the RTC involving the amount of ₱1,000,000.
Foo appealed his judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals, which issued an order dismissing his appeal
stating that the appeal should have been taken to the Sandiganbayan and ruling that his conviction had become
final and executory.
If you were the lawyer of Les Foo, what legal remedies and arguments would you invoke in behalf of your client?
If I were the lawyer of Les Foo, the legal remedy I would invoke in behalf of my client is to file a motion for
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals (CA), and if denied, to go to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari.
I would argue that the Supreme Court has held that if an appeal by an accused public officer is wrongly taken to the CA
rather than the Sandiganbayan, the CA should, instead of dismissing the appeal, forward or endorse it to the
Sandiganbayan.
[Dizon v. People, 24 January 2018, Perlas-Bernabe, J.; overturning Quilesete v. People, 18 February 2009].
May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity,
when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?
Yes, Philippine courts have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 in relation to
Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, provided that the victim is a resident of the place in the
Philippines where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense.
A complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is
conducted abroad.
Even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad,
the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
(AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018).
Petitioner filed an Action for Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage against the respondent,
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.
The complaint alleged that the respondent borrowed P250,000.00 in 2008 from the petitioner and executed in his favor
a real estate mortgage over the subject land, which has an assessed value of P13,380.00.
The RTC dismissed the action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
On appeal, the petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case, since foreclosure is an action,
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Was the dismissal proper?

Yes, the dismissal was proper.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC has jurisdiction in civil cases,
outside Metro Manila, involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00; if it is below P20,000.00,
it is the first level court which has jurisdiction.
As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, being that it involves title to, or possession of,
real property or any interest in it, it is the assessed value of the property which determines the court's jurisdiction.
Considering that the assessed value of the mortgaged property in this case is only P13,380.00,
the RTC correctly found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the first level court.
Thus, it was proper for the RTC to dismiss the action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(See Alona G. Roldan vs. Spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios, G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018)
Jason, Kimberly, Zack, Trini, Billy, and Tommy, concerned residents of Laguna De Bay, filed a complaint for mandamus against
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the
Department of Public Work and Highways (DPWH), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of
Agriculture (DA), Department of Budget (DBM), and Philippine National Police (PNP) before the RTC of Laguna alleging that
the continued neglect of defendants in performing their duties has resulted in serious deterioration of the water quality of the lake
and the degradation of the marine life in the lake.

The plaintiffs prayed that said government agencies be ordered to clean up Laguna de Bay and restore its water quality to Class C
waters as prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 1152, otherwise known as the Philippine Environment Code.
Defendants raise the defense that the clean-up of the lake is not a ministerial function and they cannot be compelled by mandamus
to perform the same.
The RTC of Laguna rendered a decision declaring that it is the duty of the agencies to clean up Laguna de Bay and issued a
permanent writ of mandamus ordering the said agencies to perform their duties described by law relating to the clean-up of
Laguna de Bay.

Is the RTC correct in issuing the Writ of Mandamus? Explain.

The RTC is correct. In MMDA s. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, the SC held that the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila
Bay can be compelled by Mandamus.
The ruling in MMDA may be applied by analogy to the clean up of the Laguna de Bay.
The term permanent writ of mandamus should be considered only as a semantic error and that what the RTC really meant is a
writ of continuing mandamus.
There is no such thing as a permanent writ of mandamus since the writ shall cease to be effective once the judgment
is fully satisfied.
Nonoy won an ejectment suit before the MTC against Celia. Celia appealed the Decision of the MTC to the RTC.
The RTC affirmed the Decision. Thereafter, Celia filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the Decision of the RTC.
Subsequently, Celia filed a Motion to Withdraw her Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC and filed a Petition for
Review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, instead.
Nonoy has accused Celia of forum shopping in view of the filing of Celia’s Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals, even when Celia’s Motion for Reconsideration is allegedly still pending with the RTC. Celia argued that she
cannot be accused of forum shopping, as she already withdrew her Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC,
and she stated such fact in her Verification and Certification against Non-Forum Shopping in her Petition for Review
with the Court of Appeals.

Is Celia guilty of forum shopping?

Yes.
A motion is not presumed to have already been acted upon by its mere filing.
Prudence dictated that Celia await the RTC’s action on her Motion to Withdraw before considering her Motion for
Reconsideration as withdrawn.
Here, Celia filed a Motion to Withdraw, effectively submitting the withdrawal of her Motion for Reconsideration to the
RTC’s sound discretion.
Accordingly, Celia, committed forum shopping when she filed her Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals
despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC.
(See Eversely Childs Sanitarium vs. Barbarona, 860 SCRA 283, G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018)
Ponty filed with the RTC an action to recover ₱1 million from Derick.
In his verified complaint, Ponty claimed that he had entrusted the money to Derick for safekeeping but the latter had
converted the same to his personal use.
Ponty included in his complaint an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Derick.
The application is supported by Ponty’s affidavit executed in accordance with Rule 57.

(a) May the RTC without notice and hearing issue an order granting the application for preliminary attachment against
Derick?

(b) The RTC subsequently issued a writ of preliminary attachment after Ponty had posted the attachment bond.
Derick then moved to discharge the writ of attachment on the ground that the money was delivered to him by way of
loan and not for safekeeping.

May the RTC grant Derick’s motion to discharge the attachment?

(a) Yes, the RTC may without notice and hearing issue an order granting the application for preliminary attachment
against Derick.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may issue ex parte or without notice and hearing an order granting the
application for preliminary attachment.

(b) No, the RTC may not grant Derick’s motion to discharge the attachment.
The Supreme Court has held that an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper
issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action in the main case.
Here, the ground for the issuance of the writ is fraud which is at the same time Ponty’s cause of action in the main
case. The presence of fraud is determinative of whether Ponty is entitled to the return of the money entrusted to
Derick.

Hence, the attachment may not be dissolved and thus the RTC may not grant Derick’s motion.
[See Davao Light & Power Co. v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 343]
X was charged for the murder of Y. X argued that the killing was made in self-defense.
During his testimony, X stated: “In my opinion, Y is a very violent person who easily loses temper.”

If an objection is raised by the prosecution, will you strike out X’s statement?
No, the objection is overruled. Under Section 54 (a), Rule 130 of the 2019 Rules on Evidence,
“the character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability
of the offense charged.”
Here, Y’s character as a violent person may establish the improbability of the offense charge,
since it would lend credence to X’s plea of self-defense.
Further, Section 54 (c) of the same provision provides that “in all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a
person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.”
Judge Susana Contrario received an Information in her sala against several accused for violation of the Anti-Hazing
Law, which resulted in the death of one of its neophytes in a well-known law school in Metro Manila.
Upon receipt thereof and finding probable cause thereon, Judge Contrario issued the warrant of arrest.
However, after the lapse of ten (10) days, Judge Contrario issued another order that recalled the warrant of arrest for
alleged inadvertence and eventually dismissed the criminal case against all the accused.

Is the disposition of Judge Susana Contrario correct? Explain.

No.
In Marcos vs. Cabrera-Faller (A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472 24 January 2017) [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4141-RTJ, Per
Curiam]), a case decided by the Supreme Court with the similar factual milieu in the problem, the High Court ruled:

On the hasty dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, Judge Cabrera-Faller should be held administratively
accountable for hastily dismissing the Criminal Case No. 11862-13.
The Court cannot ignore her lack of prudence for it is the Court's duty to protect and preserve public confidence
in our judicial system.
The well-settled rule that once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court
is not absolute.
Although a motion to dismiss the case or withdraw the Information is addressed to the court, its grant or denial must
always be in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative.
For the judge's action must neither impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and the
offended party to due process of law.
The car of Boris was stopped by armed policemen at a police checkpoint.
Boris was told to alight and to open the trunk of his car which he did. Illegal firearms were found inside.
Boris was subsequently convicted by the RTC, the key evidence against him being the seized firearms.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals,
Boris argued that the firearms were illegally seized and thus inadmissible in evidence.
The CA affirmed the RTC judgment stating that Boris had consented to the search and that Boris had waived the
ground of illegal seizure by not raising it in the trial court.
The conviction became final and Boris started serving his sentence.
You have just been engaged by Boris’ wife as his counsel.

What legal remedy or step would you take, if any, in behalf of Boris?
The legal remedy or step I would take in behalf of Boris is to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court has held that the writ of habeas corpus is available as a post-conviction remedy in cases where
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person.
[Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 22 May 1987]
Here, Boris was deprived of his constitutional right against unlawful searches when his car was searched without a
warrant and without probable cause and such deprivation resulted in his restraint or incarceration.
Being a fundamental constitutional right, it is not waived by failure to assert it during the trial.
Nor was there any consent since Boris opened the trunk only upon being directed to do so by the armed policemen.
Hence, a petition for habeas corpus is available to Boris as a post-conviction remedy.