CHRISTIAN FILIPINO-

MUSLIM RELATIONS
 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Three principalities existed in the southern part of the Philippine archipelago during the third quarter of
the 16th century - Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan. each of these three principalities represented "a unit
of scores of settlement under a paramount datu or chief.

Under the Sulu principality/sultanate were Jolo, Tawi-tawi, Kagayan, and Basilan including other
neighboring islands and points in Mindanao which included Zamboanga. The lower valley of Pulangi and
the Iranum settlements araond Illana and Sibugay Bays were under the principality/sultanate of
Maguindanao, while the upper vally of Pulangi and part of Talayan were controlled by the Buayan
principality/sultanate
 PHASES OF THE “MORO” WARS
Phase One: Brunei Cut-Off
The conflict between Spaniards and Muslims in the Philippines began in 1565 and ended in
1578 and 1881 with the Spanish invasion of Brunei. This phase focused on the competition
between Brunei and Spain for religious and commercial dominance in the region. The
Spaniards initiated the war by capturing a Bornean trading vessel in 1565 and engaging in
battles with Borneans and Sulu. The Spaniards were concerned about the Bornean aristocracy
seeking aid from Brunei and the infringement of their sovereignty by Brunei and Sulu in
certain areas. To secure their hold on the acquired territories, the Spaniards interfered in a
dynastic dispute in Brunei by invading in 1578 and forcing Sultan Set ur-Rijal to flee. Although
the Sultan eventually regained power, the Spaniards successfully eliminated Bornean influence
in the Philippines. This led the Spaniards to believe that Sulu, Magindanao, and Buayan would
eventually submit to Spanish rule without Brunei’s support.
Phase Two: Strongholds
The second phase of the conflict between the Spaniards and Muslims involved the
establishment of forts in Muslim lands. The Spaniards aimed to extract tribute from the
Muslims and end their alliance with Ternate. The Sulu sultan and some chieftains paid tribute
during this phase, while a conspiracy led by Tondo chieftains failed. In 1591, the Spaniards tried
to colonize Mindanao and use it as a base for conquering the Moluccas and intimidating Borneo
and Java. The newly-designated governor of Mindanao, Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, failed
to contact the Magindanao sultan and was killed. Although the Spaniards built a fort between
Magindanao and Buayan, they were eventually forced to retreat due to lack of supplies and
continuous harassment. Ternate assisted the Muslims because they realized losing Mindanao
would make them vulnerable to Spanish attacks.
Phase three: Counterattacks

From 1599-1600, the Magindanao launched attacks against the Spanish forces in the Bisayas, competing with Spain in collecting
tribute. Initial Spanish counter offensives failed, but they later succeeded in conquering Ternate and establishing a fort in Zamboanga.
During this phase, the Sulu, Magindanao, and Buayanon often allied in raids, with Sulu receiving help from Brunei and Magindanao
and Buayanon receiving aid from Ternate. The Dutch also appeared in the area, potentially encouraging the Muslims to create
difficulties for the Spanish.

In 1599-1600, the rajas of Magindanao and Buayan conducted devastating raids on the Bisayas, capturing captives and loot. In 1602,
with Sulu’s help, they raided coastal towns in Southern Luzon and captured more captives. A Spanish attack on Jolo prevented full
cooperation between Sulu and the Muslims in subsequent raids. In 1603, Buisan, the rajah of Magindanao, attacked Bisayan towns,
burnt a church, and intimidated the Leyte datus. The piratical inhabitants of Kuran followed the Muslim raids, complicating their
plans. In 1616, Dutch ships encouraged the Sulu to attack settlements in Cavite and Camarines. They burned Cavite shipyards and
captured Spaniards for ransom, potentially with aid from Brunei and encouragement from the Dutch.

In 1627, a Spanish retaliation ended in the burning of Jolo and the destruction of the Sulu fleet. A Spanish expedition in 1630 failed,
and the Sulu, led by Qudarat, retaliated, causing the Spanish and their allies to retreat. Qudarat rose as a leader around 1619, allied
with the Dutch, attacked the Bisayas, and resented the Spanish presence encroaching on Mindanao. In 1635, the Spaniards built a fort
in Zamboanga to protect their missions in Mindanao and watch the movements of the Muslim fleet.
Phase Four: Fortress War
The fourth phase of the “Moro” wars, known as the Fortress War, took place from 1635 to 1663.
The Spanish aimed to conquer the sultanates in Mindanao and establish missions among them.
Governor Corcuera had three objectives: to capture Qudarat and place a Spanish puppet in the
Magindanao sultanate, conquer the Sulu sultan’s cotta and establish colonies in Sulu, and secure
Spanish sovereignty over Brunei. They achieved some victories, capturing Lamitan and the Sulu
sultan’s cotta. However, Qudarat raised an army to resist the invaders. In 1645, a treaty was
made with Qudarat, but the peace was broken in 1655 when the Spanish ambassador was
assassinated. The Spanish faced difficulties pacifying the Maranao and the Buayanun due to the
opposition led by Qudarat. In 1663, due to the threat from Koxinga, Zamboanga was abandoned.
The next 50 years saw an interlude of peace between Spaniards and Muslims. The sultanates
tried to regain their prosperity and formed relations with China and the Dutch. The Spanish king
ordered the refortification of Zamboanga in 1718, leading to the beginning of the fifth phase of
the “Moro” wars.
Phase Five

In the 1720-1721 attack, the Sulu and Iranun failed to dislodge the Spaniards from the fort despite using
war vessels and warriors. The Sulu then sought peace treaties with their enemies and turned to the Dutch
for arms and ammunition. The Spaniards changed their evangelization methods, offering commercial
relations and alliances in exchange for the acceptance of Christianity by the sultanates. The Sulu sultan
‘Azim ud-Din visited Manila, was baptized, imprisoned, and eventually returned to Sulu. The Spaniards
attempted to conquer Jolo but failed due to the strong resistance led by Sulu sultan Mu’izz-ud-Din. The
wars during this phase resulted in loss of lives and destruction. Muslims and Christian natives were
captured and enslaved. The British invasion in 1762 paused the fighting, and the Muslims turned their
focus to British trade. In the 19th century, the Spanish aimed to conquer the Muslim sultanates to counter
British and Dutch influence. The Spanish accused the Samal subjects and Iranun of being pirates allied
with the sultan. The Balangingi expedition in 1848 depopulated the Samales islands and relocated
survivors to Luzon for conversion, marking the start of the sixth phase of the wars.
Phase Six
The Spanish expedition to Sulu in 1851 resulted in a treaty, which the Spaniards saw
as accepting their sovereignty, but the sultan viewed as a friendly treaty between equal
powers. In 1876, another Spanish campaign aimed to force foreign powers to recognize
Spanish territorial claims. The excuse was that the sultan had disregarded previous
treaties. The Spanish government sought public support by framing it as a just cause
against the “wicked sons of the Qur’an.” The campaign received significant
contributions, and Jolo was eventually abandoned by the Sulu, with the sultan leasing
his Sabah territory to a British company. A treaty involving Britain, Germany, and
Spain granted Spanish sovereignty over Sulu. The treaty of 1878 established a Spanish
protectorate over Sulu while granting the sultan autonomy. However, tensions
persisted, and the Spaniards faced opposition from datu and their followers, leading to
frequent attacks on juramentados. Meanwhile, the Spaniards aimed to strengthen
their presence in Mindanao through expeditions and fortifications. By the time the
Americans arrived in 1898, the Spanish forces in Muslim lands were confined to
guarded outposts. The “Moro” wars had lasting consequences, including the
2. No Longer Kins but Enemies
The Spaniards failed in their vigorous attempts to dislodge Islam in Mindanao. Islamic culture
prevailed in the island. The Muslims maintained their independence. However, their material and
human resources suffered due to the Spanish expeditions which they have to fight in order to
remain free. Although the Spaniards failed in conquering them, they were able to isolate them from
the neighboring countries which were the sources of their prosperity prior to the series of wars they
engaged in with the Spaniards. As a result, the Muslim communities suffered regression and
stagnation.
 3. A Never-Ending Search for Peace

As a result of the discrimination and marginalization felt by the indigenous Muslim population in this
southern Philippine island of Mindanao, an independence movement was founded in Mindanao aimed at
separating the Muslim majority-Moro areas from the rest of the country. In 1969, the Moro National
Liberation Front was founded by Nur Misuari. Its armed resistance aimed at establishing a self-
determining Moro identity in the Bangsamoro or a Muslim Nation, started in 1972.
 THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation
Front with the participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic
Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference.

In accordance with the Resolution No. 4 Para. 5 adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Islamic
Conference in its Fourth Session held in Benghazi, Libyan Arab Republic during the month of Safar 1393
H. Corresponding to March 1973, calling for the formation of Quadripartite Ministerial Commission
representing the Libyan Arab Republic, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Senegal, and the
Republic of Somalia, to enter into discussions with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
concerning the situation of the Muslims in the South of the Philippines.
And in accordance with the Resolution No. (18) adopted by the Islamic conference held in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia in Jumada Alakhir 1393 H. Corresponding to June 1974 A.D. which recommends the searching
for a just and peaceful political solution to the problem of the Muslims in the South of the Philippines
through the negotiations.
And in accordance with the Resolution No. 12/7/5 adopted by the Islamic conference held in Istanbul in
Jumada El-Ula 1396 H. Corresponding to May 1976 A.D. empowering the Quadripartite Ministerial
Commission and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference to take the necessary steps for the
resumption of negotiations.
And following the task undertaken by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the Secreatry
General of the Islamic Conference and the discussions held with H.E. President Marcos,President of the
republic of the Philippines.
And in realization of the contents of Para. 6 of the Joint Communiqué issued in Tripoli on the 25th
Zulgeda 1396 H. Corresponding to 17th November 1976 A.D. following the official visit paid by the
delegation of the Government of the Philippines, headed by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, to the Libyan Arab
Republic and which calls for the resumption of negotiations between the two parties concerned in Tripoli
on the 15th of December 1976 A.D.
Negotiations were held in the City of Tripoli during the period between 24th Zulhjia 1396 H. To Second
to Moharram 1397 H. Corresponding to the period from 15th to 23rd December 1976 A.D. at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs presided over by Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs of the Libyan Arab Republic, and comprising of the Delegations of:
1. Government of the Republic of the Philippines, led by Honorable Carmelo Z. Barbero,
Undersecretary of National Defense for Civilian Relations.
2. Moro National Liberation Front, lead by Mr. Nur Misuari Chief of the Front. And with the
participation of the representatives of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission:
The Libyan Arab Republic represented by Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia -H.E. Salah Abdalla El-Fadl, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, Libyan Arab Republic.
The Republic of Denegal - Mr. Abubakar Othman Si, Representative of the Republic of Senegal and
Charge d' Affairs of Senegal in Cairo.
Democratic Republic of Somalia, Libyan Arab Republic
During these negotiations which were marked by a spirit of conciliation and understanding, it
has been agreed on the following:
First, the establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Second, the areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines shall comprise the
following:
1. BASILAN
2. SULU
3. TAWI TAWI
4. ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR
5. ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE
6. NORTH COTABATO
7. MAGUINDANAO
8. SULTAN KUDARAT
9. LANAO DEL NORTE
10. LANAO DEL SUR
11. DAVAO DEL SUR
12. SOUTH COTABATO
13. PALAWAN
Third:
1. Foreign policy should be of the competence of the central Government of the Philippines.
2. The National Defense Affairs shall be the concern of the Central Authority provided that the
arrangements for the joining of the forces of the Moro National Liberation Front with the Philippine
Armed Forces be discussed later.
3. In the area of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have the right to set up their own Courts
which implement the Islamic Shari'ah laws. The Muslims shall be represented in all Courts including the
Supreme Court. The representation of the Muslims in the Supreme Court shall be upon the
recommendation from the authorities of the Autonomy and the Supreme Court. Decrees will be issued by
the President of the Republic of their appointments taking into consideration all necessary qualifications of
the candidates.
4. Authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have the right to set up schools,
colleges, and universities, provided that matters pertaining to the relationship between these educational
and scientific organs and the general education system in the state shall be subject of discussion later on.
5. The Muslims shall have their own administrative system in compliance with the objectives of the
autonomy and its institutions. The relationship between this administrative system and the Central
administrative system shall be discussed later.
6. The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have their own economic and
financial system. The relationship between this system and the Central economic and financial system
shall be discussed later.
7. The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall enjoy the right of representation
and participation in the Central Government and in all other organs of the State. The number of
representatives and ways of participation shall be fixed later.
8. Special Regional Security Forces are to be set up in the area of the Autonomy for the Muslims in the
South of the Philippines. The relationship between these forces and the Central Security forces shall be
fixed later.
9. A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council shall be formed in the areas of the Autonomy for the
Muslims. The setting up of the Legislative Assembly shall be constituted through a direct election, and the
formation of the Executive Council shall take place through appointments by the Legislative Assembly. A
decree for their formation shall be enacted by the President of the
Republic respectively. The number of members of each assembly shall be determined later on.
10. Mines and mineral resources fall within the competence of the Central Government and a
reasonable percentage deriving from the revenues of the mines and minerals be fixed for the benefit of the
areas of the autonomy.
11. A Mixed Committee shall be composed of the representatives of the Central Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front. The Mixed
Committee shall meet in Tripoli during the period from the Fifth of February to a date not later than the
Third of March 1977. The task of said Committee shall be charged to study in detail the points left for
discussion in order to reach a solution thereof in conformity with the provision of this agreement.
12. Ceasefire shall be declared immediately after the signature of this agreement, provided that its coming
into effect should not exceed the 20th January 1977. A Joint Committee shall be composed of the two
parties with the help of the Organization of the Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite
Ministerial Commission to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire.
The Joint Committee shall also be charged with supervising the following:
a. A complete amnesty in the areas of the autonomy and the renunciation of all legal claims and codes
resulting from the events which took place in the South of the Philippines. b. The release of all the political
prisoners who had relations with the events in the South of
the Philippines.
c. The return of all refugees who have abandoned their areas in the South of the Philippines.
d. To guarantee the freedom of movements and meetings.
13. A joint meeting be held in Jeddah during the first week of the month of March 1977 to initial what has
been concluded by the Committee referred to in Para. 11.
14. The final agreement concerning the setting up of the autonomy referred to in the first
and second paragraphs shall be signed in the City of Manila, Republic of the Philippines,
between the Government of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front, and the
Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the
Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference.
15. Immediately after the signature of the Agreement in Manila, a Provisional
Government shall be established in the areas of the autonomy to be appointed by the
President of the Philippines and be charged, with the task of preparing for the elections
of the Legislative Assembly in the territories of the Autonomy, and administer the areas
in accordance with the [provisions of this agreement until a Government is formed by the
elected Legislative Assembly.
16. The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the
implementation of the entire agreement.
Fourth: This Agreement shall come into force with effect from the date of its signature.
Done in the City of Tripoli on 2nd Muharram 1397 H. Corresponding to 23rd December 1976 A.D.
in three original copies in Arabic, English, French languages, all equal in legal power.
For the Government of the Republic of the Philippines:
Hon. Carmelo Z. Barbero
Undersecretary of National Defense for Civilian Relations
For the Moro National Liberation Front:
Professor Nur Misuari
Chairman of the Front
Dr. Ali Abdusaalam Treki
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Libyan Arab Republic and Chairman of the Negotiations
Dr. Amadou Karim Gaye Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
FEDERALIZING THE REPUBLIC:
The ultimate basis for a just and lasting peace in central and southern Mindanao Paper presented
by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. before a forum organized by the U.P. Department of Political
Science on August 24, 2000.

The proposal to adopt a federal form of government is meant primarily to provide the foundation
for a just and lasting peace in central and southern Mindanao and secondary to provide an equal
opportunity for the development of the regions of the country to counter the perception, if not the
reality, that Metro Manila is favored over other regions in matters of development.

Vital Distinction
The search for a just and lasting peace in southern and central Mindanao has proven to be
intractable over the last five centuries. The Spanish and American colonizers had failed to bring
peace to the areas. Indeed, even our own government has not solved the recurrent Moro armed
uprisings in that part of Mindanao
Recognizing the Difference
If a meaningful solution is to be provided to the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF challenges, we must begin by
recognizing that the two groups are different from each other and should, thus, be treated differently

Gun-point policy, anathema to peace

There is, thus, a need to remind ourselves that the gun has never succeeded in establishing peace in
central and southern Mindanao. The historical experience of our country bears out this conclusion.

Dimakaling of Lanao
Let me now elaborate on the four incidents. As a boy in short pants, I remember a ballad about
Dimakaling who had led a rebellion against the American regime to demand a different treatment for the
Moros from that accorded to the rest of the people
Kamlon of Sulu
When I was in high school, I remember the uprising of Kamlon against our
government. Kamlon rallied his people to fight the government and assert the
differentness, if there is such a word, of Muslim people. The government had to
send battalion of soldiers to capture Kamlon

Udtog Matalam of Cotabato

Not so. For in my early years as a lawyer, I saw the eruption of another Moro
rebellion in Mindanao. This time the armed uprising was led by Datu Udtog
Matalam. Matalam's Mindanao Independence Movement said what his uprising
was all about. It was anchored mainly on his grievance that the Moros of
Mindanao and consequently Mindanao itself, were discriminated against by
"Imperial Manila.
Misuari of Sulu
Then, at the onset of the Marcos martial law years, another Moro armed uprising
challengedthe government. This time it was led by Misuari of the Moro National
Liberation Front The MNLF insurrection proved to be the longest lasting Moro led
armed uprising (1973-1996), we have thus far witnessed as a people

Guns sprawling violence

Unfortunately, the applicability of the government peace agreement with the
MNLF, notwithstanding, the guns of rebellion in southern and central Mindanao
have not been silenced and are sprawling violence as the current situation shows.
FUNDAMENTAL GRIEVANCES
The position of the government is only partially correct and that is as far as the
Abu Sayyaf is concerned. Certainly not as far as the MNLF is concerned because
as discussed earlier, the two groups are miles apart in their objectives and methods
of challenging the government. Moreover, the lessons of history teach us that the
use of all out force against Moro arms has never brought and will never bring
peace to central and southern Mindanao without a comprehensive plan that
addresses. not the seasonal, tribal complaints of the Tausugs or the Maranaos or
the Maguindanaos or any other Moro group but the fundamental grievances of the
Bangsa Moro as a people
DIVIDE AND RULE POLICY, INEFFECTIVE
That the use of force has not solved the so-called Moro problem in Mindanao is plainly evident. In
all the Moro uprisings that I have witnessed vicariously or actually, I have seen the government fail
in bringing about just and lasting peace in central and southern Mindanao. As pointed out earlier,
the government killed Dimakaling of Lanao, subdued Kamlon of Sulu, pacified Matalam of
Cotabato, and alternately warred against and talked peace with Misuari of Sulu. A clearer case
against the use of force and of the tactic of divide-and-rule as a policy could hardly be established.
But what is abundantly clear is that the policy of force and of divide-and-rule has never worked to
achieve a just and lasting peace in central and southern Mindanao in the past. Neither will it work
today as against the MILF. Every day, the pages of the dailies and the air lanes of radio and
television report killings that are obviously spawned by the violence unleashed by extremists of
both sides of the war now raging in central and southern Mindanao.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

I suggest the following steps: (a) in the short run, we have to declare a cease-fire;
(b) at the middle run, we should negotiate with the MILF rebels, and bring
development to Mindanao, and (c) in the long run, we have to offer to the Bangsa
Moro a federal state of their own that will remain as a part of the federal republic.

Briefly, the proposal to adopt a federal form of government for the country will
establish federal states to cover the various parts of the country.
FEDERAL STATES
Luzon may have four federal states. One, the federal state of northern Luzon; two, the federal state
of central Luzon; three, the federal state of southern Tagalog; and four, the federal state of Bicol.
Metro Manila may be converted into a special federal administrative center, like Washington D.C.,
or Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia.

The Visayas may have three federal states. One, the federal state of eastern Visayas; two, the
federal state of Westen Visayas, and three, the federal state of central Visayas.

Mindanao may have three federal states. One, the federal state of northern Mindanao; two, the
federal state of northeastern Mindanao, and three, the federal state of the Bangsa Moro.
 SHARING OF POWERS
As for the powers of the government, the federal states may have powers over matters that are not
reserved to the federal republic. The powers of the federal republic may cover, among other things,
foreign affairs, national defense, federal taxes, customs and immigration, basic education curriculum,
basic justice.
Other powers may be assigned to the federal states including primacy in matters of development,
environment, local taxes and police.
The enumeration is not all-inclusive. In other words, the Constitution will be final repository of what
powers should be exercised by the federal republic itself, and those powers that should be exercised by the
federal states.
The Constitution may also provide that certain powers be placed under the concurrent jurisdiction of the
federal republic and the federal states. Whoever exercises a certain power first precludes the other from
exercising it.
EFFECT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
What will happen to the local governments if the federal form is
adopted?
It depends on the way the Constitution would deal with the matter. If
the Constitution would empower federal states to deal with local
government units as they please, then, the present structure and
powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays - as we now
know them-may be modified, retained or altogether abolished by the
federal states.
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION
It is important to state that the adoption of the federal form
of government needs the revision of the Constitution. And
that to my mind is the hardest obstacle that we have to
overcome. People are wary of attempts to amend or revise the
Constitution. Thus, it is safe to assume that even if we are able
to get the Senate to agree to push for the adoption of a federal
form of government, it will take a lot of time before that can
realistically be achieved.
BENEFITS OF FEDERALIZATION

Before we leave the matter of federalism, I would like to state

that the adoption of the federal form of government would
enable the Bangsa Moro a fuller opportunity to promote their
own identity and culture and their own economic
development at their own pace without the need of seceding
or declaring their independence from the republic.
Can Muslims and Christians co-exist?
My answer is why not?
LIVING TOGETHER AS NEIGHBORS

The fact that in those communities, Muslims and Christians

live together as neighbors, without killing one another shows
that, indeed, no religious divide categorizes our people into
irreconcilable hostile blocks