54

Gerry van Klinken

Interface 4/1 May 2001

developmentalist model. l Falk went on to place his hope in 'a new climate of postmodern religiosity that is ecologically sensitive and culturally inclusive'. That hope is certainly shared by many within the religious communities of Indonesia. The new emphasis would be antiauthoritarian, anti-violence, pro-social justice, pro-human rights, and pro-sustainable development. It would be in touch with the local and would re-establish trust and openness. Clearly, this is not an easy road to follow, and some of the contradictions it faces have been discussed above. But neither is it an impossible one. The elements for it are there in Indonesia today. Accepting, even welcoming, the more religious polity that Indonesia is likely becoming has two important implications. One is that state elites should abandon the idea that they can suppress religious phenomena, by violent means if necessary, in order to maintain or restore the secular developmentalist compact of the Golkar era. Where the New Order feared the emergence of all religious sentiment it could not coopt, leaders of a democratic Indonesia need to accept that Indonesia is more religious than the Golkar compact envisaged. Indonesia's overseas friends need to make the same adjustment in outlook. A second implication is that Indonesia needs to grow its democratic institutions, at all levels from the local to the national, such that elites who wish to mobilise followers along religious (or ethnic) lines will have the ground cut from under them. The 'crisis' mode is dangerous to human life. In its worst manifestations it produces religious fascism. Of course the stability of the 'civil' mode can also be dangerous if it is an authoritarian stability, and there is a valuable constructive urge in the crisis mode. That is why the present crisis must lead to a viable democracy.

The Dead End of Religious Dialogue in Indonesia

Sunardi Yogyakarta

'From m y mouth you will hear Arabic, Turkish, Castilian, Berber, Hebrew, Latin and vulgar Italian, because all tongues and all prayers belong to me. But I belong to none of them. I belong only to God and to the earth, and it is to them that I will one day return.ll

Indonesia is often regarded as an icon of a pluralistic society where people from different religious backgrounds can live together in harmony. In the last two years, however, this honourable icon has been changed completely. Since the collapse of Suharto's government in 1998, religious harmony seems to have collapsed as well. Seemingly endless religious violence such as in Maluku, Jepara (Central Java), Pontianak (West Kalimantan), and Poso (Central Sulawesi) bring Indonesia with a new, sad stigma: a jungle of religious believers. Harmony has turned to tragedy, solidarity to violence, and dialogue to suspicion. This situation reminds us of the famous warning of Mukti Ali, the Minister of Religious Affairs between 1-971 and 1978: when there is a religious conflict, we know only when it starts but not when it will stop. In this country, religion now often means nothing except either the path to killing or being killed. If this is the case, then Indonesia is really destroying itself
Arnin Maalouf, Leo the African (London: Abacus, 1988), 1.

18. Richard Falk, 'Secularism, Globalization, and the Role of the State: A Plea for

Renewal', (unpublished manuscript, 1999).

1.

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The Dead End of Religious Dialogue in Indonesia

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from within, using religion as its weapon. It is in this context that I want briefly to evaluate the quality of religious harmony during Suharto's era and to see the present state of religious dialogue in Indonesia.
1 Religious Dialogue: the Government's or Society's Agenda? . In 1967 the newlv founded Suharto government held an 'Interreligious Dialogue' (Musyawarah Antar Agama) to which all religious leaders were invited. It is notable that the meeting was held in the context of religious mission (penyebaran agama). A consensus was promoted among the religious leaders to protect religious believers from the danger of proselytism by other religions. The government realised that this danger could damage the national stability, even create a national catastrophe (bencana nasional)? unless religious leaders made an agreement among themselves on this sensitive issue. Since then, the notion of penyebaran agama has become a dominant context or dominant orientation of religious relations in Indonesia: it determines what activities of religious mission are or are not permitted. This model of inter-reli~ous relations is based essentiallv on two assumptions: " (a) the task of inter-religious relations is in the hands of religious leaders, (b) this task consists of protecting their believers and augmenting the number of their adherents. In the long term, this model of inter-religious communication undoubtedly imprisoned the inter-religious dialogue in a labyrinth of unproductive communication. The religious notion is reduced to penyebaran agama, and the sense of harmony is reduced to a lack of conflict rather than a sense of mutual responsibility. Gradually it became clear that the government's policy of interreligious dialogue was directed not only to protecting national

. ,

stability from the danger of religious conflict but also to obtain support from the religious leaders for the government's 'programs ,of development' (program pepbangunan) such as family planning. It should be noted that not all religious leaders agreed to this kind of religious dialogue. Yet the Suharto government terrorised these leaders so as not to express their disagreement, implying that it would create trouble for the believers. In the 1990s a different approach emerged as a reaction to the alienating and alienated religious dialogue sponsored by the government. This approach, which I would call 'religious dialogue as social critique', was mostly pioneered by young intellectuals who are concerned with the role of religion in relation to social justice and democracy. They include figures such as-just to mention a handful-Abdurrahman Wahid (from traditionalist Javanese Islam), Y B Mangunwidjaja and Banawiratrna (from the Catholic Church) and Th Sumartana (from the Protestant church). Different from the orientation of the official dialogue, the dialogue promoted by these people is oriented to-roughly speaking-social justice and democracy. Abdurrahman Wahid, for instance, founded Fordem or Forum Demokrasi (Forum for Democracy), the members of which consist of intellectuals from different religious backgrounds. Fordem is a kind of reaction to the formation of ICMI (founded in 1990~) that, according to Wahid, is sectarian. In Yogyakarta, Th Sumartana founded INTERFIDEI (Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesia) in 1992. A similar group, MADIA (Masyarakat Dialog Antar Agama, Society for Interreligious Dialogue), was founded in Jakarta in 1995. In the development of religious relations in Indonesia, this kind of religious dialogue is undo;btedlvt - i in that it has attracted many people who want to approach religion _ .. differently: That is to say, it has inspired many people who want to search for the liberating power of religion in a society where

3.

2.

Suharto 'Pidato Sambutan' [Speech of Welcome] on 30 November 1967, in Umar Hasyim, Toleransi dun Kemerdekaan Beragama dalam Islam (Surabaya: PT Bina Ilmu, 1991), 393.

On the formation of the Muslim modernist or scriptualist ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) see Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, second edition 1999), 175-193.

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Sunardi

The Dead End of Religious Dialogue in Indonesia

59

repression has been excessive. Thus, the movement of religious dialogue could be integrated into a m t that was growing at that time.4 It is interesting to note that the leaders of these two interreligious groups (INTERFIDEI and MADIA ) were in the 1980s the ones who were interested in liberation theology as practised by Helder Camara. leading pedagogues suchmoa as P Freire and Camara became a point o ~ m m u n i c a t i o n their effort in to fight against social injustice or, using Camara's expression, 'internal colonialism'. Their effort to promote i n t e e b e a r d e d as a part of their strategy for the d c a n promotion of justice. The practice of inter-religious dialogue is o r i e n m a r d s the creation of harmony at any price but rather towards the promotion of justice. For it is unthinkable to maintain harmony without touching on the notion of justice. As has happened in third world countries such as in Latin America, the - main social problem in Indonesia is the problem of poverty and injustice. Helder Camara, an archbishop from Brazil, emerged as the model of religious authority (hierarchy) who courageously stood on the side of the poor rather than support a repressive government. He reminded the church about her responsibility to defend the poor instead of the state. The vision of this 'red bishop' was described beautifully by both the well-known activist priest and social critic, the late Y B ~ a n ~ u n w i j a ~ a leading and ~ Protestant thinker Th ~ u m a r t a n aLooked at retrospectively, these .~

--

fl

articles in fact express the dream of the religious elite for the role of religions in defending the people face to face with the terrorising ideology of 'national stability', military government, alienated and alienating education, and greedy multinational corporations. Specifically, these articles reminded religious leaders at the time of their responsibility for the lives of their people and warn of the danger of cooptation by the state. As for Paolo Freire, he inspired a reorientation of the practice of education that so far tends to train children to be ~ i l e n t . ~ B Mangunwijaya's program of DED Y (Dinamika Edukasi Dasar, The Dynamics of Basic Education) in Yogyakarta is widely regarded as the Indonesian actualisation of Freire's vision in education. Inspired by the spirit of liberation theology, the idea of interreligious dialogue of the 1990s was thus practised in the context of the promotion of justice. What the practitioners tried to do was not only conduct religious dialogue (the aim of which is usually connected with the mutual understanding of religious doctrines) but also inter-religious cooperation, the aim of which is a shared commitment in the promotion of j ~ s t i c e Even more, they reorient .~ the activities of da'wah or Islamic religious mission. Understood in

7.

4.

5.

6.

In his article 'Islam, Anti-kekerasan dan Transformasi Nasional,' Wahid insisted on the necessity of Muslims cooperating with non-government organisations such as Legal Aid Institutes. Glenn D Paige et a1 (ed), Islam tanpa Kekerasan [Islam without Violence] (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1998). Y B Mangunwijaya, 'Gereja antara Yesus dari Nasaret dan Caesar' [The Church between Jesus of Nazareth and Caesar] in Prisma, No. 9, 1982: 2639. Th Sumartana, 'Teologi Pembebasan Kepalan Tangan Sang Uskup' [Liberation Theology a weapon of the Bishop], Prisma No. 9, 1982: 51-60. See also St Sunardi, 'Dom Helder Camara dan Cita-cita Humaniora' (Dom Helder Camara and the Ideals of Humanities) in Basis, June 1988.

8.

Some of his works are translated into Indonesian, such as Pendidikan sebagai Praktek Pembebasan (orig Education: The Practice of Freedom), tr Alois A Nugroho (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1984); Pendidikan Kaum Tertindas (orig Pedagogy of the Oppressed), tr Utomo Dananjaya, Jakarta: LP3ES; Dialog Bareng Paolo Freire: Sekolah Kapitalisme yang Licik, tr Mundi Rahayu (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1999); and Pendidikan sebagai Proses, Surat-menyurat Pedagogis dengan Para Pendidik Guineas-Bissau, tr Agung Prihantoro (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2000). The notion of inter-religious dialogue in relation to the promotion of justice can be seen, for instance, in a declaration issued by the committee of the 100th Anniversary of the Assembly of Religions in Yogyakarta on 13 October 1993. The declaration includes six items: (a) Man, society and religion; (b) Religion as the hope in the midst of the dilemma of the history of humankind, (c) Indonesia: to build a nation and religions, (d) Religion as a transformative power, (e) Religion and steps to the future, and (f) Toward a religious community of dialogue.

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the spirit of the promotion of justice, da'wah is first of all not intended to increase the number of religious adherents but rather to increase the quality of their religious life. In the context of Indonesian society, the quality of one's religious life has to be measured by one's commitment to and participation in the If promotion of justice in a pluralistic ~ o c i e t y . ~ this is the case, religion has to be understood as social ethics that will open up one's social solidarity with the poor (regardless of their religious or ideological background) rather than as a set of doctrines that tends to exclude other religious believers.1 This kind of inter-religious dialogue as social critique, indeed, attracted many people. As mentioned above, in a short time the movement of religious dialogue became integrated into other social movements for justice, and later human rights. Even further, we could say that the interreligious movement gave a dimension of religiosity-in the broadest sense of the word-to social movements for justice. Thus Y B Mangunwijaya speaks about 'religiosity for the sake of the poor' (religiositasdemi para miskin).l l Unfortunately, as we shall see, recently the voice of this promising inter-religious movement seems to be too weak to hear above the noise of religious radicalism and the uproar of the agitating jargon of political parties.
2. Religious Dialogue vis-A-vis Religious Radicalism

As mentioned above, Abdurrahman Wahid is known as one of the leading figures of religious dialogue. Understandably, since

9.

10. 11.

See, for instance, Sahal Mahfudh, 'Da'wah dan Transformasi Sosial' ['Da'wah and Social Transformation'] in Suara Merdeka, 26-10-1990.'The increase of the number of Muslims [ . . . ] does not always mean that the Islamic teaching is substantially practiced'. The similar notion is dealt with in Hamid Abdullah, 'Dakwah dan Perubahan Sosial' [Da'wah and Social Y Change'] in Kompas, 11-4-1990. B Mangunwijaya, 'Nasrani' [Christian] in Kompas, 30-12-1993:5. Abdurrahman Wahid, op cit, 74. Y B Mangunwijaya, 'Religiositas demi Para Miskin' ('Religiosity for the sake of the poor') in Kompas, 11-4-1990.

his appointment as president in October 1999, he was supposed to save the country from social disintegration because of religious conflicts. From the notion of religious dialogue, he was supposed to inspire people from different groups to join together to solve the crisis. But the expectation of the people seems to have ended in delusion. The violence in the Moluccas (Maluku) that exploded for the first time on the occasion of the feast of Idul Fitri in January 1999, has not been getting better, particularly since the Laskar Jihad (Holy War Brigade) declared that what is happening in Maluku is really a religious war (jihdd). That is why they sent 'Muslim soldiers' to that area from Java to protect their cobelievers to face sonfrontations with Christian Ambonese. Since then, the conflict in Maluku has become like a civil war. It is notable that both sides have complained that Wahid's government is incapable of resolving the conflict. It is even reported that some Christian leaders have appealed for international intervention in Maluku. Thus we see that nobody knows when this catastrophe will end. Why does President Abdurrahman Wahid seem to be slow in handling this conflict? In regard to the policy of religious conflict resolution, Wahid has insisted repeatedly that the government will not intervene but merely support the consensus supposedly taken by the groups involved. This means that religious conflicts in some areas have to be resolved in the spirit of autonomy instead of the imposition of government policy upon the people. This principle, indeed, sounds wonderful but has dissatisfied both Muslims and Christians in places like Maluku and has become the target of his political enemies. In fact, generally speaking, nobody in Indonesia believes that the violence in Maluku is only a religious conflict, although religious identity in important there. It is a conflict among the local political elites that takes a religious form. In July 2000 Juwono Sudarsono, the defence minister, said: 'Actually both Muslim and Christian sides have agreed to search for peaceful steps [in resolving the conflict]. They have been fighting for two years. However, any peaceful agreement is always torpedoed by

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outsiders [orang luar]'.12 In other words, the violence in Maluku appears as the model of the way the political elite or 'outsiders' can use religious sentiment for political advantage. It may be a part of the now discredited 'New Order' regime politicians' attempt to create chaos in Indonesia. Understandably Hasyim Muzadi, the leader of Nahdlatul ulama,13 warned this political elite saying: 'Actually there is no problem with the relationship between religious believers [in Ambon]. The problem is the fact that religious harmony is being destroyed by the political elite.'14 If it is the case, religious believers then became the victims of their own

12.

As quoted in 'Mana Prioritas dan "Greget" untuk Menyelesaikan Konflik di Maluku' in Kompas, 17-7-2000. See also 'Menhan Juwono Sudarsono: Pejabat Orba Danai Dalang Kerusuhan' in Kedaulatan Rakyat, 22-6-2000. Wahid's anatomy of the conflict in Maluku can be seen also in 'Maluku Rusuh, Gus Dur (lagi-lagi) Menuding' in Detak, 27-6-2000. In this article there is a report on the chronology of the conflict in Maluku and the suspected persons who have been involved in the creation of the conflict. Detak said that the conflict is a part of the strategy of the 'Cendana' (Suharto) groups to destabilise the social and political life after the collapse of Suharto's regime. It is then a part of the manifestation of the war between the old and the new regimes. It is reported that Cendana provided no less than Rp 750 billion to fund the violence in different parts in Indonesia. This report sounds very exaggerated. However, it is difficult not to believe that the quantity and the quality of the violence in Indonesia is not without 'funding'. . Further information on the religious violence in Indonesia can be seen in Th Sumartana's 'Sara: An Unfinished Process of National Integration', where the author studied the religious violence in Indonesia between 1995 and 1997. Religiosa, No. 4, 1997: 102-118. 13. The Nahdlatul Ulama or NU (Union of Scholars) is the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, representing more than thirty million traditionally minded (or syncretic) Javanese Muslims. For a recent study of the NU in Indonesian politics see Susaina Kadiar, 'Contested Visions of State and Society in Indonesian Islam: the Nadlatul Ulama in Perspective' in Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (eds), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Refomasi and Crisis (Singapore: Insitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 319-335. 14. As quoted in 'Kerukunan Beragama Dirusak Elit' \the elite are destroying religious harmony] in the Yogyakarta daily Bemas, 7-8-2000.

political leaders who use religious sentiment for political interests. They are victims not only in that they suffer from physical or psychological violence but also are trapped into a false consciousness of what is really happening. One task of interreligious movements today in Indonesia then is to empower the believers in such a way that they are trained to believe in their own opinions rather than just follow their political leaders blindly. Compared with other social movements (such as feminist and ecological movements), however, the inter-religious movement seems to be the most unprepared to participate in finding solutions to the present turmoil in Indonesia. It is most unprepared to initiate the New Indonesia (Indonesia Baru) which is characterised by an increasing consciousness of people's emancipation. Whereas thousands of innocent people risk their lives in religious conflicts, what we hear from the religious elite is nothing but rhetorical insistence on the importance of religious dialogue. There is no religion that gives bad teaching to its adherents; all religions demand their adherents do good. That is why, if every believer followed the teaching of his/her religion, there would be no conflict among religious believers. Who can deny the truth of this statement? Nobody! Yet, who can see the effectiveness of such a statement in resolving the present religious conflicts in Indonesia? Nobody! For such a truth is a part of the problem. That is to say, we do not need a kind of truth that is just deduced from religious doctrines but rather we need a standard of truth that can be used to measure our togetherness (kebersamaan). Togetherness would become the manifestation of truth or even truth itself as long as it is togetherness in friendship. Considering the present condition in Indonesia, inter-religious movements have to be directed to encourage their believers to be as companionable as possible. This -. means that religiosity is closer to companionability than to religious sentiment that often leads people into religious radicalism. In a wider context, the phenomenon of religious radicalism is certainly seriously threatening the process of democracy in this country. 'Indonesians', warned Y B Mangunwijaya, 'are being

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pushed to religious fundamentalism and to adopt "fascist" attitudes toward other societal groups because they are unable to express themselves through officially approved channels of comm~nication'.~~ A similar warning was given by Abdurrahman Wahid recently: 'In building democracy, we have to avoid physical power [in dealing with conflict] and it is time for us to develop dialogue and exchange of rational argumentation again'.16 Thus religious radicalism endangers the process of democracy in that it terrorises different social groups and prevents them improving the art of communication. That is why any effort to improve religious dialogue has to be put in the context of the crisis of democracy which in turn is a crisis of communication. From this perspective, the problem of democracy today is somehow different from that of the Suharto era. In the Suharto era, religious dialogue was part of the process of democratisation to encourage people from different religious backgrounds to fight against the tyrannical New Order government. (Belonging to this type of religious dialogue was the Forum Demokrasi which was mentioned earlier.) Now religious dialogue, as part of the process of democracy, has to be oriented towards fighting against the enemy of communication, ie terrorising religious radicalism. It is terrorising because communication-the essential element in democracy-is replaced by threats. In the context of this communication crisis in Indonesia, the problem of religious relations then touches on not only interreligious but also internal religious dialogue. That is to say, the process of democracy presupposes also the possible plurality inside religious communities (umrna). Religious radicalism, instead, tends to deny such a plurality. Religious radicalism usually tends to claim a single interpretation of religion.

15.

16.

As quoted in Adam Schwarz 1999, 263 Kompas, 6 November 2000.

3. Religious Dialogue As a Return to the People To make inter-religious relationships in Indonesia more effective, those involved should be able to courageously place religious dialogue firmly in the context of local society and culture. Outside or inside local society, any religious group (including the radical) should be measured in terms of its capacity to inspire both its adherents or adherents of other religions in widening and deepening their togetherness in the given situation and condition. Dialogue for its own sake is useless. What we need today is to see how religions open up a public space for people of different beliefs so that they can share similar languages in speaking about making a better future for the New Indonesia (Indonesia Baru). The term 'religious dialogue1 then means dialogue between religion and society rather than between believers from different religions. Does the discourse of religion in Indonesia today illuminate critically the present condition and inspire the people to create a better future for Indonesia? Does the discourse of religious dialogue inspire the people to imagine the culture of solidarity instead of the unproductive polemic about ethnic majorityminority issues? Does religious dialogue inspire the people to be more companionable? This is, I believe, the most important task of those who are concerned with religious life, otherwise the discourse of religion and religious dialogue becomes a kind of empty ritual. Indeed, we find ourselves in great difficulty in creating a new Indonesian social imagination (which is so desperately needed) because any discourse of the future of the country tends to be caught in party political calculations and sectarian religious understanding. Thus the capacity to imagine the -futureof the country seems to be dying. The discourse of tolerance towards the ideology of communism launched by President Abdurrahman Wahid was long overdue, although it involved the risky business of discussing the repeal of a 1967 act of the MPR (Peoples Consultative Assembly) banning communism. his political enemies responded in a negative, sterile way to this proposal, and the discourse degenerated into an antagonistic

ow ever,

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debate about theism and atheism. Wahid said that it is time for Indonesians to remove the ban on communism. Such a prohibition is against the spirit of democracy. Wahid said repeatedly that this does not mean he agrees with communist ideology. What he was insisting on was the fact that the process of democracy has to include the freedom to believe in any ideology. This means that democracy has to include the freedom to dream for a possible future. Recently, on the contrary, there is a strong tendency to treat political parties like a religion and to receive the statements of political leaders like fatwa or religious opinions which cannot be disputed. This phenomenon seems to have its root in the fact that there is no attempt by the religiously based political parties to make clear what their ideology is. What they call the party's ideology is nothing but a set of jargon statements deduced from religious doctrines. For the purpose of mass mobilisation, a piece of religious jargon might be more effective than something expressed in 'secular' terms. But even when there is a conflict between partisans from two different Islamic parties, it can develop like a conflict between two different religions with devastating effect. The pre-election campaign violence in the district of Jepara on Java's north coast, for instance, originally emerged from the conflict between partisans of two Islamic groups, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party) and the traditonalist NU (Union of Scholars). While Jepara district was regarded as an important political base of NU, during the Suharto era their Muslim vote went mostly to the PPP. Since the formation of the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Party of National Awakening) in the lead-up to the June 1999 national elections, the Muslim vote in Jepara was split between the two Islamic parties. Since the formation of the PKB, the contested Muslim vote has crystallised into an internal conflict between progressive and conservative members of NU. The partisans of the PPP also accused the PKB as being Marxist because the latter supported Abdurrahman Wahid's proposal to restore the political rights of the banned communists in Indonesia. The partisans of PPP began to mock the members of

PKB, saying that PKB now means Partai Komunis Baru (The New Communist Party) instead of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. On the other hand, nobody there believes that the conflict is really religious in that the people are ready to risk their life for the sake of religious ideology. The fact is they have been drawn into a circular conflict which takes religion as its form of expression-the conflict is expressed in religious language, using religious slogans and jargon. Its purpose is to mobilise followers for a political purpose, ie to support a particular religious teacher (kyai) who is either pro-PPP or p r o - ~ ~ ~In1other words, they are hijacked or-using an . 7 Althusserian expression-interpellated by religious form.l 8 It is in this context that religious dialogue-in the sense of dialogue between religion and society-would provide room for the political parties to make their ideologies more clearly defined. In conclusion, religious dialogue in Indonesia will be effective only as long as it rests upon the agenda of the society. What is the agenda of Indonesian society today? It can be summarised simply in the words of Arbi Sanit, a leading political scientist: a transformation from a patrimonial to a democratic society. Following the spirit of the times, religious dialogue will become part of the function of society as longas it is not only directed to the promotion of democracy but is also practised in a democratic way. In other words, dialogue is no longer a kind of religious movement conducted by central religious figures but a kind of emancipation of the believers.

17.

18.

In one sense the intra-religious conflict in Jepara does have religious significance because it is the more tolerant wing of NU that supports the PKB. See Louis Althusser, Essays on Ideology (London: Verso, 197 l), 44-5 1.