Offshore Safety

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety
MASTER HSE&Q - M7 Industrial Safety
HSE in OFFSHORE Oil&Gas and Petrochemical Projects

INTRODUCTION
5 FEBRUARY 2009
TABLE OF CONTENT MODULE 0 - INTRODUCTION - General concepts - Safety in Design (Offshore)

MODULE 1 - DROPPED OBJECT STUDY MODULE 2 - MARINE HAZARD ANALYSIS (SHIP IMPACT / COLLISION STUDY) MODULE 3 - ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE ANALYSIS (EERA) MODULE 4 - TEMPORARY REFUGE (T.R.) INTEGRITY MODULE 5 (EXTRA) - HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION (HAC)
Oil&Gas, Chemical, Petrochemical Onshore and Offshore Plants:
Hazardous?
Hazards
Fire
Hazards
Explosion
Hazards
Dispersion of Toxic Substances
Hazards
Where does the hazard originate?
Hazards
Example of Check List for identification of Hazards
Hazards
In broad terms, we can identify two types of Hazards: - Occupational Hazards (impact on the health of the worker/s) - Major Hazards (possible impact on population, environment, Major asset)
Major Hazards
Hazardous Substances
NFPA Diamond
European Symbols (Dir 67/548)
Hazard Scenarios
Release of Hazardous substance can cause:

Flammable material
- Jet Fire - Pool Fire - BLEVE - UVCE/CVE
Toxic Material
- Toxic Dispersion
But also: Release of Energy/Pressure
- Physical explosion
Hazard Scenarios
How an accident scenario is generated? generated?

(Example Event Tree) Tree)
How are hazards controlled?
Risk Control Legislation
Incidents that define Process Safety
WHEN 1966 1974 1976 1979 1982 1984 1984 1986 1986 1986 1987 1987 1988 1988 1989 1992 1994 1998 2001 2001 2003 2004 2005 2005 2005
WHERE WHAT FATALITIES Feyzin, France LPG Bleve 18 Flixborough, UK Cyclohexane 28 Seveso, Italy Dioxin 1 Bantry Bay, Ireland Crude ship 50 Ocean Ranger, Canada Platform 84 Mexico LPG Bleve 600+ Bhopal, India Methyl isocyanate 20000+ Challenger Space shuttle 7 Chernobyl, USSR Nuclear powerplant 100+ Sandoz, Bale, Switzerland Warehouse 0 Texas City, USA HF 0 Grangemouth, UK HCK HP/LP interface 1 Piper Alpha Platform 167 Norco, USA Propane FCCU 7 Pasadena TX, USA Ethylene/isobutane 23 La Mde, France Gasoline/LPG FCCU 6 Milford Haven, UK FCCU feedstock 0 Longford, Australia LPG, brittle fracture 2 Toulouse, France Ammonium Nitrate 30 Petrobras Platform 11 Columbia Space shuttle 7 Skikda, Algeria LNG 27 Texas City, US Gasoline ISOM 15 Buncefield, UK Gasoline 0 Bombay High, India Platform 13
REGULATIONS First LPG prescriptive regulations EU Seveso I Directive1982 US Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program 1985 US Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 1986 US Chemical Accident Prevention Program 1986 US Chemical Safety Audit Program 1986 EU Seveso I Directive update 1987 US Clean Air Act Amendments 1990 UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992 US OSHA 1910-119 Process Safety Management 1992 US EPA Risk Management Program1996 EU Seveso II Directive 1996 UK Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 EU Seveso II update 2002 (SEVESO III) UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 API RPs on occupied buildings and vents OSHA Refinery National Emphasis Program
How is Plant Safety ensured in a Project? HSE Management
Safety in Design - HSE
GOOD DESIGN
LOW RISKS (FOR POPULATION, OPERATORS, ENVIRONMENT)
HIGH PRODUCTIVITY
PROBLEMS: How can we demonstrate safety of design? How good? (i.e. up to which point the system shall be optimized?)
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Integrated HSE Management

SAFETY
ENVIRONMENT
To assess the level of safety towards environment
To assess the level of safety wrt exposed people
MACHINERY CERTIFICATION (EU)

To identify and certify the machinery systems according to the provisions of the EU Directive
F&G DETECTION RELIABILITY

Optimisation of Localisation of detectors To assess the level of productivity of plant
PRESSURE EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION (PED, EU) To certify safety of pressure equipment
AUDITS/REVIEW
To verify, in all phases of production process, the correct implementation of Rules, Standards and SE requirements
HAZARDOUS AREAS CLASSIFICATION

Control of explosion risk
SIL
To assess the level of reliability required to Safety Loops
HSE MANAGEMENT FLOW CHART

CONTRACT & LAW REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTORS HSE POLICY PROJECT GENERAL HSE PLAN HSE PLAN FOR ENGINEERING & PROCUREMENT HSE PLAN FOR WORKS AT SITE
WORK ENV. STUDY JOB HAZARD ANASLYSIS ETC. (STUDIES) WORKS HSE STUDY HSE WORKING PROCEDURE PROCEDURE HSE STUDY HSE WORKING PROCEDURE PROCEDURE HSE STUDY HSE WORKING PROCEDURE PROCEDURE
APPLICABLE CODES & STANDARDS
CONTRACTORS HSE AUDIT PLANS
HSE STUDY PROCEDURE HSE STUDY HSE STUDY PROCEDURE PROCEDURE
HSE DESIGN CRITERIA HSE DESIGN HSE DESIGN CRITERIA CRITERIA

INPUT TO DESIGN
HSE DESIGN REVIEW PROCEDURE

DESIGN CONTRACTORS HSE CONTRACTORS CONTRACTORS
HAZOP QRA EIA SIL STUDY ETC. (STUDIES)
PLOT PLAN ESD GAS DET. FIRE PROT. DOCS TO REVIEW ETC. (REVIEWS)
AUDIT HSE AUDIT HSE AUDIT
SITE HSE MANUAL

PRE-STARTUP REVIEW PROCEDURE
CONSTRUCTION
PROJECT MOC PROCEDURE
PRE-STARTUP HSE REVIEW
REV IEW FEED BACK
INPUT TO DESIGN
ENGINEERING & PROCUREMENT
COMMISSIONING & STARTUP

APPROVED CHANGES
HSE REVIEW OF CHANGES
PROPOSED CHANGES
Safety in Design - Offshore
OFFSHORE PLANTS
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Specific Hazards in offshore environment? Hazardous substances (as onshore); External events: collisions (ship, helicopter..), extreme weather; Worsening factors:
equipment congestion; process/safety/living areas on same structure in close proximity; repair/escape and rescue is difficult; mitigation is difficult.
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Safety in Design Offshore Example of HSE Plan
ACTIVITY 1 1.1 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 PROJECT HSE MANAGEMENT HSE/Risk Assessment Plan HAZARD IDENTIFICATION HAZID Review HAZOP Review - Process Systems HAZOP Review - Utility Systems HAZOP Review - Vendor Package SIL (Safety Integrity Level) Analysis FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENTS Hazard Register Hazardous Inventory Report Fire Protection Analysis Fire Risk Analysis Fire Resistance Analysis Explosion Risk Analysis
3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 4. 4.1 4.2 4.3 5. 5.1 5.2
Explosion Resistance Analysis Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) Study Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA) Ship Collision Risk Analysis Occupational Risk Assessment Temporary Refuge Impairments Assessment (TRIA) Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) Smoke and Gas Dispersion Study Exhaust Gas Dispersion Study Dropped Object Study PERFORMANCE STANDARDS Safety Critical Element (SCE) List Performance Standards for SCEs RAM for Safety Critical Elements SAFETY CASE Design Safety Case Operational Safety Case
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6. 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7. 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8
DESIGN CRITERIA & PHILOSOPHIES HSE/Safety/Loss Prevention Philosophy Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy Project Environmental Criteria Noise/Vibration Criteria DESIGN SAFETY ACTIVITIES Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study Vent Dispersion and Radiation Study Fire and Gas Detection Layout Hazardous Area Classification Report & Layout Escape Way Layouts Safety and Lifesaving Equipment Layouts Fire-fighting Equipment Layouts Safety Sign Layouts
8.
RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY STUDIES
8.1
HIPPS Reliability Study
8.2
Failure, Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)
8.3
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Study
9.
HUMAN FACTORS & MATERIAL HANDLING
9.1
Human Factors Philosophy
9.2
Human Factors / 3D Model Review
9.3
Human Factors Verification
9.4
Material Handling Philosophy
9.5
Material Handling Review
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10. 10.1
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES Environmental Impact Study
10.2
Emissions List
10.3
Noise Study
10.4
Field Abandonment Report
11. 11.1
VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS Hazardous Area Class. Compliance Review
11.2
API RP 14J Compliance Review
Some References
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Skelton B., Process Safety Analysis - An Introduction, IChemE, UK. F.P. Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, ButterworthHeinnemann. "Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E Purple Book, 1999, TNO The Netherlands. AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), 1992, "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures", USA, 2nd edition. ISO Petroleum and natural gas industries Offshore production installations Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment Vinnem, J. E., Offshore Risk Assessment . Principles, modelling and Applications of QRA studies Springer, 2007 .. and many others
6. 7.
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Headquarters:
Via San Nazaro, 19 - 16145 Genova Italy
National Offices:
Via Martiri di Cefalonia, 2 - 20097 San Donato Milanese Largo C. Salinari, 18/19 - 00142 Roma Via S. Pasquale a Chiaia, 62B - 80121 Napoli SS 7 km 7,3 c/o Cetma - 72100 Brindisi Via S. Maria dellArco, 19 - 98121 Messina
URL: www.dappolonia.it
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Module 1 Dropped Object Study
5 February 2009
Module 1 - TABLE OF CONTENT

DROPPED OBJECT STUDY 1. The concept of Dropped Object Analysis, 2. The Best Practices, 3. The methodologies, 4. Examples of results.
Dropped Object Study
Dropped Object (DO) analysis is aimed at the evaluation of the risk associated to a load falling onto sensitive objects. DO analysis is mainly applied to offshore platforms to assess the risk from dropped crane/monorails loads onto equipment (on the platform decks) and onto pipelines (subsea, risers, onboard). A result of the study is the subsea, identification of protections required to mitigate the risk.
Methodology The Dropped Object Analysis is done to assess the risk of damage to process areas, subsea pipelines and safety critical elements due to falling objects. The approach for the Dropped Object Analysis is typically as follows:
- Review crane facilities and operations associated with the facilities; - Identify the main hazards associated with the cranes and their operations and define the expected scenarios associated with these hazards; - Undertake frequency analysis and assess the associated impact energy and subsequently determine the expected risk associated with the hazards identified; - Discuss the risk associated with dropped objects and subsequently identify engineering and operational safeguards that are in place to either control or mitigate them; - Determine if protection is required for the topside equipment, subsea pipelines and structures.
Dropped Object (DO) is essentially a very specialized "Risk Analysis" where: Likelihood of the Event is given by the expected Frequency of the Dropped Load, Consequence of the Event is given by the expected damage to equipment following the Impact with the dropped object.
Frequency is typically evaluated by applying international standardized methods (e.g. DNV-RP-F107) DNV- RPand engineering considerations. Consequence is evaluated by assessing the type of damage to the pipeline (again by the application of DNVDNVRP-F107 methodology or similar). RP
Dropped Object Study HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Dropped Object Study - INPUT DATA
Platform configuration (operational, drilling, work-over) Platform crane(s) location, characteristics and lifts/year Barge crane (if any) location, characteristics and lifts/year Assisting barge dimension and location Platform and jacket layouts and sections Topsides configuration and process data Bathymetry Sealine data (route, mechanical data, transported fluid composition and operational data)
ASSUMPTIONS (1/3)
Loads divided in load classes as applied in DNV Recommended Practices. Dropped object frequency as in DNV RP:
2.2x10-5 drops/lift, for loads less than 20 tons 3.0x10-5 drops/lift, for loads greater than 20 tons
Lift frequencies given by load classes. Definition of Initial drop points. Definition Receptor points on the seabed. The objects excursions on the seabed are normal distributed with angular deviations (gliding angle). Jacket is considered as a solid obstacle due to the low probability of objects passing through the legs . The presence of a barge on the boat landing side is considered as an obstacle for the objects to drop into the sea .
ASSUMPTIONS (2/3)
Dropped Object Study for Sealines- ASSUMPTIONS (3/3) Sealines-
FREQUENCY (1/6)
For each drop point vertical projection onto the sea bed, a normal distribution of the load is given, as follows:
p( x ) =
x 1 e 2 2
2 2
The probability that a sinking object will hit the seabed within a distance r from the vertical line through the r drop point is :
P( x r ) = p( x ) dx
r
The probability of impacting on the seabed within two circles around the drop point with inner radius rj-1 and outer radius rj is: P(rj 1 < x rj ) = P( x rj ) P( x rj 1 ) This probability may be expressed per m2 by dividing the value on the actual circle area:
P (rj 1 < x rj ) = P(rj 1 < x rj ) A j 1, j
FREQUENCY (2/6)
The breadth of each ring is taken at a constant value interval.
FREQUENCY (3/6) For the considered load class LC, the frequency FLC, with which the associated dropped objects hits the sea bottom, can be evaluated as (drop/year/m2):
fd fl pdi pij
dropped object frequency (drop/lift); i j lift frequency (lift/year); probability that the object drops on the vertical of the dropped point i; probability per m2 that the object drops into the j-th annular ring with i as centre point.
FLC = fd fl (p di pij )
Pdi is considered the same for each dropped point detected. The frequency FLC is evaluated on the sea bottom for a discrete number of points (receptor points equally spaced and sealine simulating points).
FREQUENCY (4/6)
FREQUENCY (5/6)
For the considered load class LC, the frequency FLC, with which the associated dropped objects hits the deck, can be evaluated as (drop/year/m2):
FLC =
where:
fd fl ALC
fd=dropped object frequency (drop/lift); fl=lift frequency (lift/year); ALC=area (m2) of the footprint of the crane trajectory over the deck, during the movement of objects belongs to load class LC.
FREQUENCY (6/6) - example on a 10" condensate line
CONSEQUENCE (1)
Kinetic energy for each drop points and for each load class LC is evaluated with the formula of objects dropping in air (first) and into water (after) and compared with the kinetic energy capable to produce a sealine OR topside Equipment damage. Kinetic energy that could damage pipeline is evaluated according to DNV-RP-F107 :
2 2 D 2 2 E D = 16 m p D 9 t D
1 1 3
and damage criteria is expressed by DNV as:
CONSEQUENCE (2)
Each level shall be compared with the applicable Risk Management Standard criteria! SEE EXAMPLE OF ACTUAL CALCULATION FOR DO KINETIC ENERGY
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EXAMPLES
Dropped Objects:
EXAMPLES
2.5E-006 2.3E-006 Platform North
Jacket Deck +19.500
2.1E-006 1.9E-006 1.7E-006 1.5E-006 1.3E-006 1.1E-006 9E-007 7E-007
Impact Frequency:
SCALE
0m 5m 10m 15m 20m
5E-007 3E-007 1E-007
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EXAMPLES
3E-006 2.8E-006 2.6E-006 Platform North 2.4E-006 2.2E-006 2E-006 jacket deck +24.000 1.8E-006 1.6E-006 1.4E-006 1.2E-006 1E-006 4'' gas lift sealine 12'' separation gas sealine 6'' oil sealine SCALE
0m 5m 10m 15m 20m
8E-007 6E-007 4E-007 2E-007
EXAMPLES
2.3E-006 2.1E-006 1.9E-006
Deck +3.400
1.7E-006 1.5E-006
Sealine
1.3E-006 1.1E-006 9E-007 7E-007 5E-007 3E-007 1E-007 SCALE

0m 5m 10m 15m 20m
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EXAMPLES
EXAMPLES
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Module 2 Marine Hazard Analysis (Ship Impact / Collision Study)
5 February 2009

Marine Hazard Analysis 1. The concept of Marine Hazard, 2. The main methodological approach, 3. The calculations and Results, 4. Examples.
Ship Impact / Collision Study
MARINE HAZARD Are those Hazards related to Marine and Vessel Operations These Hazards have high potential consequences SHIPS IMPACT
SHIP COLLISION
HEAVY LIFTS/D.O.
Methodology - Ship impact study The Analysis is performed in the following steps: 1. Identify the risks associated to the facilities due to marine activities e.g. ship collision with the platforms, fishing vessels and other traffic hazards to pipelines and supporting vessels; 2. Quantify the expected frequency of occurrence of these events; 3. Assess the expected consequences, on the basis of the applicable severity classification given in the Project Risk Criteria.
Typical Input Data Input data needed for the Marine Hazard Analysis are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Platform and field layouts; Data on the commercial marine traffic in the area; Data on the fishing traffic in the area; Operational Data and Frequencies of the Plant; Typical Meteo-marine data (wind intensity and Meteodirection, marine currents, ect.). ect.).
METHODOLOGY FOR FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT The expected frequency of occurrence of collision events are calculated starting from the available maritime traffic data. The models used in the analysis consider the real intensity of the ship traffic in the area, the time of exposure to the hazard of collision and the real interaction between vessels and installation. Two cases are typically considered: vessel impact with fixed obstacles (vessel/platform); vessel impact with moving obstacles (vessel/vessel).
Impact of moving vessel with Fixed Obstacles The following scenarios are typically considered to evaluate the expected frequency of collision between with a fixed object such as the platform (or a moored vessel such as a FPSO) and a moving vessel: impact of powered passing vessels; impact of drifting vessels; impact of dedicated/supporting vessels.
The model is based on a geometric approach and on two premises: a) ships normally travel in predictable "lanes"; b) vessels normally keeps an effective monitoring of the movements (also visual) which shall avoid collision with an obstacle unless there is an emergency situation. However it is not totally excluded that a certain fraction of vessels could fail to keep an effective monitoring. There will be reasonable navigation uncertainties as well as the effect of wind and waves on the vessels: these will possibly cause vessels to stray from the lanes centerline. Vessels traveling on a lane will be normally more likely to be near the centre line but a distribution of vessel traffic across the lane must be defined.
Collision Frequency for Powered Passing Vessels The collision probability between powered passing vessels (commercial vessels, fishing boats, pleasure crafts) along a shipping shipping lane and a fixed obstacle is evaluated considering standard navigation navigation conditions and a standard level of instrumental assistance. With these With assumptions, the frequency of collision with the Platform/moored vessel for each ship class is: Fpi = Nif P1i P2i P3i Ni where:
Fpi = annual collision frequency for a class "i" powered vessel (event/year); (event/year); Ni = total vessel traffic in the shipping lane for a class i vessel (vessel movement/year); vessel f = fraction of vessels in direct collision route with the obstacle; obstacle; P1i = Planning failure factor: Probability that a vessel fails to plan its approaching route to adequately so as to avoid an obstacle; P2i = Watchkeeping failure factor: Probability that in the vessel it is not kept an adequate monitoring of the movements (so to recover in time a bad maneuvering); bad P3i = Obstacle initiated recovery factor: Probability that external monitoring (e.g. from external the "obstacle" point of view) fails to take some action to recover the failures and/or recover prevent a collision.
Collision Frequency for Drifting Vessels The frequency of collision between drifting vessels (passing vessels or vessels fishing boats or pleasure crafts) and a fixed obstacle is evaluated evaluated using the following formula: D Fdi = Fdij = N ij Pwj Pfi i Lj j j where:
j = is the considered "block" or "section" of the shipping lane; I = is the vessel class; Fdi = annual collision frequency for a class i drifting vessel (event/year); (event/year); Fdij = annual collision frequency with an obstacle for a class i drifting vessel whose drifting initial location is block j (event/year); Nij = number of class i vessels per year in block j (vessel/year); Pwj = probability that wind from block j is directed towards the obstacle; obstacle; Pfi = failure probability for vessels of class i causing vessel to drift - (events/vessel); Di = collision diameter of a class i vessel; Lj = is the length of block j.
Collision Frequency for Dedicated/Supporting Vessels Dedicated and supporting vessels could be considered both powered powered passing and drifting vessels. Therefore the collision frequency of these vessels against an obstacle is given by the sum of the collision collision frequency of drifting vessels plus the collision frequency of powered powered passing vessels. Fc = (Fc1+Fc2) Pred Fc1 = N Pr Pc/r Pna Pc/r = /2 = 1/ arcsin[(D1+D2)/2L] /2 1/ Fc2 = N Pf Pc/f Pna
L=
D1 + D 2 +H 2
Fc = (Fc1+Fc2) Pred; Fc1 = N Pr Pc/r Pna Pred; Pc/r = /2 = 1/ arcsin[(D1+D2)/2L]; /2 1/ Fc2 = N Pf Pc/f Pna
L=
Fc Fc1 Fc2 Pred N Pr Pc/r Pna D1,2 H L Pf Pc/f = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
D1 + D 2 +H 2
annual collision frequency with a fixed obstacle for dedicated and powered passing vessels (event/year); annual collision frequency with a fixed obstacle for powered passing vessels (event/year); annual collision frequency with a fixed obstacle for drifting vessels (event/year); reduction factor for approaching vessels supported by assistance vessels; number of vessels per year (vessel/year); probability of uncontrolled navigation inside Minimum Safety Operational Distance MSOD; probability that the route leads to collision with the fixed obstacle conditioned to the entrance inside the MSOD zone, it is calculated using geometrical models; probability of failure of safety procedures to avoid impact; is the collision angle; equivalent diameters (obstacle/vessel) meters; is the net distance between the vessel and the fixed obstacle (m); is the average distance between vessel and the obstacle (m); is the failure probability for vessels with the potential to cause vessel to drift (events/vessel); probability that the route leads to collision with the fixed obstacle conditioned to propulsion loss.
Impact of moving vessel with Moving Obstacles (vessel/vessel) The carrier approach routes are subdivided into two or more parts. It is then assumed that the ship movements along each route fraction are developed with a simplified profile with the vessel axis constant within each portion of the route. For each selected position, the same methodology reported for fixed obstacles shall be applied considering, as reduction factor, the fraction of time spent in a year by the vessel to cover the relevant route fraction.
METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATION OF EXPECTED IMPACT ENERGY The effect of a potential collision between a ship and a Platform, or between ships has been analyzed in the literature with structural simulations of impacts under the most serious conditions, namely for perpendicular impacts (most severe impact). From previous studies, the "limit" for serious damages can be identified for different conditions, vessels and structures, in terms of Maximum Impact Energy (MJ).
The expected impact energies, as a function of the tonnage of the striking vessel and for different speed of impact, can be calculated (e.g. with the following formula):
E=
E MTot v
1 M Tot 1000 (v 0.514 ) 2 1000000
= expected impact energy (MJ); = vessel total mass (tons); = vessel speed (knots).
The calculated impact energies can be compared for each ship class with the "limit" available from literature or from project-specific data. project-
E=
E MTot v = = =
1 M Tot 1000 (v 0.514 ) 2 1000000
expected impact energy (MJ); vessel total mass (tons); vessel speed (knots).
Suezmax Tanker Typical DWT: 150,000 Tons Typical Service speed: 15 knots Expected Impact Energy is is Approximately: 5,000 MJ
Event Mt. St. Helens Eruption Of 1980 "Little Boy" Nuclear Bomb Typical Lightning Bolt Chemical Energy In 1 Gallon Of Gasoline Electrical Energy In 1 AA Battery Hidraulic Hammer (per stroke) 1 Ton of TNT Earthquake Ritcher Scale 3.0 Suezmax impact 150,000 DWT - 15 knots
Energy (MegaJoule) 1.90E+12 6.28E+07 5000 132 0.001 0.004 4185 2000 5000
Example of calculated Impact Energy for Vessels in Function of Tonnage and Speed Total Mass(b) (tons) 1,000 3,000 14,500 80,000 140,000 Energy (MJ)(a)
1.7 kn 2.9 kn 5 kn 6.5 kn 10 kn 15 kn 20 kn
Ship Class 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 6 31 54
1 3 16 89 155
3 10 49 270 473
5 16 79 436 762
13 40 192 1,057 1,849
30 89 432
53 159 768
2,384 4,235 4,172 7,412
(a) the impact energies expected to have the potential to cause a loss of integrity for perpendicular collision are highlighted. (b) Total Mass is calculated as ship dwt plus ship weight.
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References:
Technica, 1987, Report, "RABL - Risk Assessment of Buoyancy Technica, Loss, Project PP4, Assessment of Module Collision Frequencies", London, U.K. Pitblado, 2004, Consequences of LNG Marine Incidents, CCPS Pitblado, Incidents Conference, June 2004. SikteC, 1987, Report, Zeepipe Riser Platform, Ship Collision SikteC, Study, Trondheim, Norway Study
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Module 3 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)
5 February 2009

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis 1. Why EERA, 2. The main methodological approach, 3. The Analysis and Results, 4. Examples.
EERA
WHY EERA ?
To ensure that offshore installations be as safe as reasonably practicable (ALARP) for personnel in the event of a situation which requires abandonment of the installation.
EERA
The overall objective of the EERA is to assess the potential for impairment of the Plant Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) arrangements and associated goals and objectives. EERA is performed on the basis of the results arising from QRA and, together with the Emergency Systems Survivability Assessment (ESSA), assesses in detail the potential for key safety related arrangements to be impaired by the major accident hazards, hence potentially resulting in escalation of an event.
EERA
DEFINITIONS
Escape = Movement of personnel from their location at the time of the alarm to a Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR). Evacuation = Movement from the TSR to a lifeboat or other safety craft, and its launch and movement to a safe distance from the installation. Rescue = Transfer of personnel from safety craft, water, or platform to a safe haven.
EERA
EERA focuses on assessing the vulnerability of emergency response related arrangements (e.g. escape routes, muster points etc)
Steps: - Identification of scenarios (MAE, Major Accidental Events) - Identification of the systems/equipment required for E, E & R - Definition of performance criteria for E,E & R systems - Analysis of the mechanisms that can impair the E, E & R systems/ functions
EERA
EERA
IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS

Essentially the MAEs are: Hydrocarbon jet fires and pool fires; Explosions and flash fires; Gas (flammable / toxic) and Smoke dispersion; Non-hydrocarbon fires (e.g. Electrical); Dropped objects; Helicopter crash onto facility (helideck); Ship or boat collision;
EERA
EERA
EERA
IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA
EERA
IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA (CONTINUATION)
EERA
Major Incident
Overview of EER Process
1.0 Alarm
2.0 Access 3.0 Muster
4.0 Egress
5.0 Evacuation
6.0 Escape
7.0 Rescue
Place of Safety
PATH 1 PATH 2 PATH 3 PATH 4
EERA
IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA (CONTINUATION)

Top Level Hierarchical Task Analysis
0.0 EER PROCESS
1.0 ALARM
2.0 ACCESS
3.0 MUSTER
4.0 EGRESS
5.0 EVACUATION
6.0 ESCAPE
7.0 RESCUE
1.1 Detect Alarm
2.1 Choose Access Route
3.1 Register at Muster Point
4.1 Choose Egress Route
5.1 Evacuate Via Bridge Link
6.1 Escape by Sea
7.1 Approach survivors
1.2 Interpret alarm
2.2 Move Along Access Route
3.2 Communicate with Cellule de Crise
4.2 Move Along Egress Route
5.2 Evacuate by helicopter
6.2 Escape directly into sea
7.2 Help Survivors to Board
1.3 Act accordingly
3.3 Receive Instructions
5.3 Evacuate by Sea
EERA (Evacuation, Escape and Rescue) Analysis The study is typically performed in the following steps: - The Evacuation, Escape and Rescue (EER) arrangements and facilities are described (considering both existing CPP and new facilities); - The loss of integrity criteria for the EER arrangements is defined, in accordance to Client Criteria (and EERA ToR). - Identification of MAEs that could potentially affect the EER devices (derived from QRA); - Assessment of escape means availability during MAE occurrence. The EERA Report demonstrates that the impairment of the key EER arrangements is within Client criteria.
Typical EERA Results (top events)
Flame EER Top Overpress Heat Flash Impingem Arrangement Events ure Radiation Fire ent
Flamma Overall EER Goal ble Gas Impaired
1 Escape routes 4 5 9 1 Emergency Gates 4 5 9
N N N N N N N N
P P P P P N N P
P P P P P P P P
P P P P P N P P
P P P P P N P P
N N N N N N N N
example of EERA results
References:
A methodology for hazard identification on EER Assessments OTH 95 466 RM Consultants Health and Safety Executive SOLAS International Maritime Organization (IMO). Consolidated text of the IMO international convention for the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) 2004 and subsequent amendments ISO 13702:1999 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production Installations Requirements and Guidelines

Module 4 Temporary Refuge (T.R.) Integrity
5 February 2009

Temporary Refuge Integrity 1. Definition of T.R. 2. The main issues.
T.R. T.R.
T. R. - TEMPORARY REFUGE
Temporary Refuge (TR): (Also: Temporary Safe Refuge - TSR): One or more locations where personnel are adequately protected from explosion, fire, heat, smoke, toxic gas, or fumes while an emergency incident is brought under control or the decision is made to abandon the facility.
T.R. T.R.
The TR needs: to be accessible, to provide physical protection for personnel from the immediate effects of the emergency incident, to maintain its structural integrity, to allow communication with people outside involved in controlling the incident or organising rescue services, and to provide egress to the means of evacuation.
T.R. T.R.
This applies offshore to temporary refuges and in general to any facilities that need to operate during an emergency. In the context of MAE, four main types of failure need to be considered: Loss of structural support (collapse of jacket or supporting structure; loss of buoyancy or stability of floating unit; collapse of walls or roof or floor; etc) Loss of availability of means of evacuation
T.R. T.R.
Deterioration of conditions at temporary refuge locations ingress of smoke, fumes, gas, or heat; lack of oxygen; toxic fumes generated internally; effects of internal fire; etc) to the point where this may be expected to lead to loss of life or other serious harm to the workforce Loss of command functions (communications; power; control systems; lighting; etc) which will effect the information available for decisionmaking, and the capacity to mitigate or fight the incident and/or organise safe evacuation if appropriate
T.R. T.R.
T.R. T.R.
There are two main Risk drivers to TR impairment Risk of Gas Explosion the overpressure could damage platform protection systems, damage escape routes and ultimately damage the integrity of the T.R. Risk of smoke and Gas ingress Smoke and Gas could impair the systems that maintain the quality of environment inside the T.R.
T.R. T.R.
The TR impairments
Failure of firewalls, allowing entry of fire, smoke, flammable vapours, toxic fumes or flood water Fire inside the TR (modelled as a separate event) Explosion Deterioration of internal conditions due to external fire, smoke, gases or flooding Structural, foundation or buoyancy failure Loss of command support and communications systems (this should be covered by a separate emergency systems survivability assessment) Escape from the TR is prevented at all exits due to a deterioration of external conditions
T.R. T.R.
The TR impairments
A risk-based approach shall be set out in the Temporary riskRefuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) in which the impairment criteria shall be assessed for hazards identified by all credible Major Accident Events (MAEs) (MAEs) discussed in the following; Fire and Explosion Analysis (FERA); Toxic Gas Dispersion Analysis; Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA); Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA); Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA); Impact analysis (Dropped object, Boat impact and Missile impact); Environmental analysis (Seismic and Extreme weather conditions). helicopter crash
References:
A methodology for hazard identification on EER Assessments OTH 95 466 RM Consultants Health and Safety Executive ISO 13702:1999 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production Installations Requirements and Guidelines ISO15544:2000 Petroleum and natural gas industries-Offshore industriesproduction installation-Requirements and guidelines for installationemergency response
MASTER PROGETTAZIONE IMPIANTI OIL&GAS
HSE in Oil&Gas and Petrochemical Projects

Module 5 (Extra) Hazardous Area Classification
5 February 2009
Safety Engineering
A life without adventure is likely to be unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is allowed to take whatever form it will, is likely to be short. Bertrand Russell
In the latest years, design and operating procedures to eliminate or control process hazards have evolved and been incorporated into codes and standards. The sequence and series of control tools and techniques normally applied in a modern Process Project is referred to as "Safety Engineering". One of the most widely used and important (for its influence in the design) technique is the Hazardous Area Classification (HAC).

Hazardous Area Classification 1. The concept of Hazardous Area. Purpose of the classification, 2. The main standards for HAC: API, European Standards, 3. The methods for the definition of the extension of classified area, 4. Workshop.
Hazardous Area Classification
Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) is a method of analysing and classifying the environment where explosive gas atmospheres may occur to allow the proper selection of electrical apparatus to be installed in that environment. There are several kind of methods to determine the hazardous area according to different national regulation. Among all: API 500 / 505 IEC 60079-10 60079-
These recommended practices are applicable to many type of Plant (e.g. Chemical Plant, Refinery, Oil&Gas Plant, Offshore Installations, etc), with exception for mines (none is applicable), explosives plant (IEC is not applicable), hospitals and houses (IEC is not applicable).
References:
API Recommended Practice 505, Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2, First Edition, November 1997. 2 IEC EN 60079-10. Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas 60079Atmospheres - Part 10 - Classification of Hazardous Areas. Fourth Ed. 2002 - 6.
Explosive Gas Atmosphere: A mixture with air, under Atmosphere: atmospheric conditions, of a flammable material in the form of gas or vapour in which, after ignition, the combustion spreads throughout the unconsumed mixture. mixture. Hazardous Area: A three-dimensional space in which an Area: threeexplosive gas atmosphere is present, or may be expected present, to be present, in quantities such as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of apparatuses. Non-hazardous Area: A three-dimensional space in which NonArea: threean explosive gas atmosphere is not expected to be present, in quantities such as to require special present, precautions for the construction, installation and use of apparatuses.
example Grades of Release: Release: Continuous (C): A release which is continuous or is expected to occur for long periods, or that occurs frequently and for short periods. Primary (P): A release which can be expected to occur periodically or occasionally during normal operation. Secondary (S): A release which is not expected to occur during normal operation and if it does occur, it is likely to do so only infrequently and for short periods. Normal Operation: Operation: The situation when the equipment is operating within its design parameters.
Zones: Hazardous areas are classified into zones on the Zones: basis of the frequency of the occurrence and duration of an explosive gas atmosphere, as follows: Zone 0: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere 0: is present continuously or for long periods. Zone 1: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere 1: is likely to occur in normal operation. Zone 2: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere 2: is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if it does occur, it is likely to do so only infrequently and will exist for a short period only.
Type of Ventilation: Ventilation: Natural (N): This is a type of ventilation, which is accomplished by the movement of air caused by the wind and/or by temperature gradients. Artificial (A): The air movement required for ventilation is provided by artificial means, for example fans or extractors.
Availability of Ventilation: Ventilation: Good (G): Ventilation is present virtually continuously. Fair (F): Ventilation is expected to be present during normal operation. Discontinuities are permitted, provided they occur infrequently and for short periods. Poor (P): Ventilation which does not meet the standard of fair or good and whose discontinuities are however not expected to occur for long periods.
Degree of Ventilation [1]: High ventilation (VH): Can reduce concentration at the source of release virtually instantaneously, resulting in a concentration below the lower explosive limit (LEL). Medium ventilation (VM): Can control the concentration, resulting in a stable situation in which the concentration beyond the zone boundary is below the LEL whilst release is in progress and where the explosive atmosphere does not unduly persist after the release has stopped. Low ventilation (VL): Cannot control the concentration whilst the release is in progress and/or cannot prevent undue persistence of a flammable atmosphere after the release has stopped.
Fluid Category: Category: Fluid Category A: A flammable liquid that, on release, A: would vaporize rapidly and substantially. This category includes: .
a) b) Any liquefied petroleum gas or lighter flammable liquid. Any flammable liquid at a temperature sufficient to produce, on release, more than about 40% vol vaporization with no heat input other than from the surroundings.
Fluid Category B: A flammable liquid, not in Category A, B: but at a temperature sufficient for the boiling to occur on release. Fluid Category C: A flammable liquid, not in Category A C: or B, but which can, on release, be at a temperature above its flashpoint, or form a flammable mist or spray.
Temperature Classes: According to the auto-ignition Classes: autotemperature, for every flammable fluid is associated a Temperature Class
Hazardous Area Classification API 505

The procedure to classify the plant is as follow: Identify the hazardous materials; Identify for each material, its chemical-physical chemicalproperties, such as LFL, UFL, Flash Point, Auto-ignition AutoTemperature; Identify the Emission Sources and their probability of occurrence; Evaluate the availability of ventilation; Apply the typical examples present on the standard to each emission source identified according to the ventilation and the plant layout.
Hazardous Area Classification API 505 Example
Example: Launching Trap of an Offshore Platform INPUT Max air temperature: 38C Relative Humidity: 77% Environment: Open structure, naturally ventilated Material: Natural Gas (99,47% mol CH4) Chemical-Phisical Properties: Boiling point: -162C Density gas/air: 0,694 LEL: 5,3 Ignition Temperature: >500C Group: IIA Temperature Class: T1 Vapour Pressure: N/A (gas) Flash Point: N/A (gas)
OUTPUT
Launching Trap Example

No 4 Example 10.6.6.2.1 Location Main Deck Material Natural Gas Op. Temp C 34 Zone 1 Extension 1,5 m Zone 2 Extension 3,0 m Hazardous Zone ref. to examples Fig. 49
Hazardous Area Classification IEC 60079-10 60079The procedure to classify the plant is as follow: Identify the hazardous materials; Identify for each material, its chemical-physical properties, chemicalsuch as LFL, UFL, Flash Point, Auto-ignition Temperature; Auto Identify the Emission Sources and their probability of occurrence, evaluating the type of release (Continuous, Primary, Secondary); Evaluate the availability of ventilation; Evaluate the hole dimension according to the standard; Apply the all the equations given in the standard in order to evaluate the Flow rate of emission (Qg), the Hazardous (Qg), Volume (Vz) and the Hazardous Distances (dz) (Vz) (dz)
The IEC standards provide also the rules for classifying the areas areas with flammable powder and dust substances.
10
Hazardous Area Classification IEC 60079-10 60079-
Hazardous Volume Minimum ventilation flow Gas emission flow rate Two-phase emission flow rate Cryogenic emission flow rate Liquid emission flow rate Hazardous distance (high velocity of emission) Hazardous distance (low velocity of emission) Explosive Volume Average concentration
Hazardous Area Classification IEC 60079-10 Example 60079-
Example: Pressure Safety Valve

Material Flash Point Cp/Cv MW LEL Autoignition Temperature Group Temperature Class Natural Gas <0C 1.31 17.77 kg/kmol 4.43 %vol (0.0327kg/m3) 482C IIA T1 P atm T external Environment Air density Ventilation (type, availability, degree) Efficiency of Ventilation Wind Speed Safety Coefficient Operating Pressure Operating Temperature Max. Initial Gas Concentration 101325 Pa 313 K OPEN 1.127 kg/m3 GOOD, NATURAL, MEDIUM 1 0.5 m/s K = 0.35 Kdz = 0.35 25.013*E05 Pa 293 K 50%
11
Primary Grade Emission
with
(sonic release)
a = a1 = dz ~ 1 m
12
Secondary Grade Emission

with
(sonic release)
with
K0=1
a = a2 = dz ~ 10 m
Results
1 Grade 2 Grade
ai 1m 10 m
Qg kg/s 2.27*E-3 0.416
Vz m3 0.506 440
Vex m3 0.177 264
Group, Temp. Class IIA, T1 IIA, T1
13
Hazardous Area Classification IEC 60079-10 Exercise 60079-
EMISSION FROM FLANGES

(Secondary Grade Emission)
INPUT DATA
Material Flash Point Cp/Cv MW LEL Autoignition Temperature Group Temperature Class K , Kdz C (leak coefficient) A (leak area) Natural Gas <0C 1.31 17.77 kg/kmol 4.43 %vol (0.0327kg/m3) 482C IIA T1 0.6 0.8 25 mm2 P atm T external Environment Air density Ventilation (type, availability, degree) Efficiency of Ventilation Wind Speed Safety Coefficient Operating Pressure Operating Temperature Max. Initial Gas Concentration 101325 Pa 313 K OPEN (Kz=1) 1.127 kg/m3 GOOD, NATURAL, MEDIUM 1 0.5 m/s K = 0.35 Kdz = 0.35 25.013*E05 Pa 293 K 50%
14
Results:
a = 0.2 m
15
16

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MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

MASTER HSE&Q - M7 Industrial Safety

HSE in OFFSHORE Oil&Gas and Petrochemical Projects

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

TABLE OF CONTENT MODULE 0 - INTRODUCTION - General concepts - Safety in Design (Offshore)

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Oil&Gas, Chemical, Petrochemical Onshore and Offshore Plants:

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Dispersion of Toxic Substances

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Where does the hazard originate?

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Example of Check List for identification of Hazards

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

European Symbols (Dir 67/548)

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Release of Hazardous substance can cause:

But also: Release of Energy/Pressure

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

How an accident scenario is generated? generated?

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

How are hazards controlled?

Risk Control Legislation

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Incidents that define Process Safety

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

How is Plant Safety ensured in a Project? HSE Management

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Safety in Design - HSE

LOW RISKS (FOR POPULATION, OPERATORS, ENVIRONMENT)

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Safety in Design - HSE

Integrated HSE Management

To assess the level of safety wrt exposed people

MACHINERY CERTIFICATION (EU)

F&G DETECTION RELIABILITY

PRESSURE EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION (PED, EU) To certify safety of pressure equipment

HAZARDOUS AREAS CLASSIFICATION

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Safety in Design - HSE

HSE MANAGEMENT FLOW CHART

APPLICABLE CODES & STANDARDS

CONTRACTORS HSE AUDIT PLANS

HSE STUDY PROCEDURE HSE STUDY HSE STUDY PROCEDURE PROCEDURE

HSE DESIGN CRITERIA HSE DESIGN HSE DESIGN CRITERIA CRITERIA

HSE DESIGN REVIEW PROCEDURE

HAZOP QRA EIA SIL STUDY ETC. (STUDIES)

AUDIT HSE AUDIT HSE AUDIT

SITE HSE MANUAL

REV IEW FEED BACK

ENGINEERING & PROCUREMENT

COMMISSIONING & STARTUP

HSE REVIEW OF CHANGES

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Safety in Design - Offshore

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Safety in Design - Offshore

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

Safety in Design - Offshore

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety