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Lee
Longmire 4/30/04
BackgroundSee Team 7 Interview
9/11
Doesn't recall times, he was in his
office
on 3d floor doing a performance review withFran Lozito. Co-worker, Kay Payne, CoS to Mike
Cannavan,
came in and reported that
air
traffic
hadlost trackof an
aircraft,
notransponder,no
comms.
He had notheardtheword
hijack
before
he went to the 10
th
floor. He did not stop off at the WOC, but was
briefed
by his
folks.
He
didn't
recall
that he heard
about hijacking
in
those initial
moments. First trade center impact
had not
occurred when
he
arrived
on
10
th
floor.
All
his people were up there when they heard there was a crash into the World TradeCenter. Theysaw thesmokeon CNNwhichwas on ascreen aboveandbehindhisposition. At one point Monty Belger was with him on the dais and they saw the secondtower impact.
Went
to10
th
floor and his people were already setting up. He sat on the dais and had
Fran
Lozito on his right. Willy Gripper, his deputy was out of town. Pete Falconeassumed responsibility
for the
tactical net. Mike Weikert assumed responsibility
for the
primary net. Janet
Rife
was American Principal Security Inspector and was on the floor.
Jeff Griffith
was
there
and
after
the
decision
was
made
to get the
aircraft
down
he
took
Fran's
position.
It
is
difficult
to hear
from
the dais so he moved Fran to the number 1 position and he,Longmire, moved around. Lots of activity in the
SVTS—Belger,
Garvey.Primary net is for the stake
holders—air
carriers, ATA, FBI, State, NMCC—outside
stake
holders. Tactical
net is for
internal communications within FAA.
If
Jeff
Griffith
hadestablished a separate AT net he would have done that
from
the dais, position 2.Other people there. The list as provided to the commission was validated as being there.Mike
Morse
may
have
had the
primary
net. Mike Weikert
was the
lead
for
designing
the
facility.
He
didn't
recognize the name, Karen Pontius. ACI had a
mini-SCIF
next to the
ACC in a
separate
office.
Logs. ACI Watch log may have been kept by Darryl Smith, as initials indicate, but hewas not at all sure on that point.10
th
floor mini-watch log—they log on to primary netfrom inside their spaces. They should be on both primary and tactical nets. Log mayhave been kept by
AHS,
Amy Stovell, not Angela. MSH could be Matt
Hahn,
but hedidn't recall.
 
ACIrole was to gather information. They had secure lines and
faxes.
There were STUlines available to him on floor. But secure comms would be coming thru the mini-SCIF.
Doesn't
recall seeinga TSDdisplay,butrecalled theyhad acapabilityto putthaton one
of
the big screens. He thought there might have been a TSD display in the back, perhaps
on
an AT
screen.
Hijack
Procedures.
Traditionally, they would
set up
both nets, determine where
the
aircraft
departed
from
and
whereit washeaded. They would attempttocommunicate withthe
aircraft
todeterminesituational awarenessand to
find
outwhatthedemands were. They wouldbegoing through air
traffic
or the air carrier to gain awareness. That
comms
path would be
kept off of the
primary
and
tactical lines
and
separately handled
by the
duty
officer
in the
WOC.ACI
10
th
floor would be the
primary
element
for
ACI.
The 3d floor
would
monitor
and
support and could do so for both the primary and tactical nets.Miltary role. The procedure was the FAA contacted the NMCC. The military role was toprovide escort
aircraft.
NMCC stays in the background by monitoring the primary net
and
provided information,ifasked. Theyareautomatically includedinthat net.Ifthat
line
didn't
work they would go through the secure line in the ACI mini-watch. Theuniverse of people with authority to
notifiy
military was The Administrator, Deputy,ACS-1 and
ACO-1.
That notificationwasdone throughtheprimary
net—on
9/11
Weikert
or
Morse.
On
9/11.
At that point we didn't know what we had and where the planes were. We
didn't
know whattotell military.Attimeof 2dimpacthe
doesn't
recall that they heardword
"hijack."
The tactical net was either up or in the process of coming up. Allpositions in the ACC were
filled.
Concerning
"hijack"
he recalled getting reports from American Airlines.
Staff
then
walked
himthroughtheinitial
notification
from theCommand Centerand thequestionfrom the ACI watch. He agreed that he should have heard about a hijacking by that time
but
issurehe was
briefed
oneverythingthe
ACC/WOC
had.Hethoughtthelastofthreedocuments shown to him might have been the ACC log. He stated that Mike Weikert
would
best know the information we sought. The third document has the appearance of
an
incident log, but has no heading in the version held by the Commission.
He
was walked through the initial reporting at the Command Center which had the ACI
watch
in the net. He
doesn't
recall any discussions in the ACC about getting the military
involved.
He
isn't
sure what they would have asked them to do except to help search for
aircraft.
 
He doesn't recall when they heard that there were additional
aircraft
lostin thesystem.He does recall that at some point they were looking for multiple
aircraft.
He doesn'trecall having a location on a missing
aircraft.
If he had one he assumed they would have
reached
out to
communicate with
the
aircraft
and
perhaps
reached
out to the
military.
At
the time the
aircraft
went into the Pentagon he believes that the SVTS was up becauseof the incident and Dick Clarke wanted everyone on the line for continuity of operations.He was there and in it when SVTS was activated, sometime
after
the Pentagon was hit.
Information
concerning tactical information and other missing
aircraft
would have come
from
Jeff
Griffith
and his
folks.
Jeff
would also have
had the
lead
in
getting
aircraft
on
the ground.
He
was walked through the White-Griffith conversation on AA77 and
doesn't
recall
specifically
that report. He doesn't recall the sequence of events on lost
aircraft
at all.
He
did not have any independent recollection of AA77, UA93 or
D1989
except to say
that
he recalls the incidents but not what the individual circumstances were or the timing.He simply recalled them as part of events that occurred that morning.Concerning the report on an
aircraft
6 miles
from
the White House, he does recall thereports of an
aircraft
circling over the DC area.
He
recalled that a separate net was set up for the security
officers
at one point. That was
in
referenceto
Brussells
comingup on thetactical net.He was walked through the Falcone-Arroyo recap of the various
aircraft
and the report of
a
fast
moving
aircraft
approaching the White House. He said that information shouldhavecome to him through air
traffic.
At that point we discussed
Jeff
Griffith's positionon the
floor
and the air
traffic
input. His belief was the
Jeff
was using a cell phone andhe, Lee, brought him up to a position on the dais.Hewas also walked thru the NMCC/NOCC conversation and the need for the military to
get
involved. He said the WOC could have bridged the military into the tactical net.He was also shown the FBI,
Jeff
Bowers log entry that ties
Jeff
to the tactical net, not theprimary net. His advice was to ask Bowers if he was on both nets.His take. Partof theproblemisthat whoeverwas onprimary net, they were using headphones, wouldn't have know what
was
going
on on the
tactical net.
His
position
was
thatPete
Falcone
had the
experience
to
make
sure
that
NMCC
was on the
net.UA93. Unfortunately,hesaid,hecan't helpat all on thedisconnectonUA93 reporting.
He
made
the
observation that
the
information
we
pointed
out
from
air
traffic
might
not
have gotten into the ACC. The direction to bring aircraft out to monitor any
aircraft
did
not
come
from
him.
If it
came
from
someone higher
or
thru
the
SVTS
he
didn't
know
about
that.
of 00

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