[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview
Date: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

EVANNA DOWIS:
Minded by Mark A. DiPalmo, President, NATCA ZNY

Certified professional controller, ZNY

FAA since fall of 1997. Trained for 2.5 years, became certified controller, year later
trained as controller in charge. Prior to ZNY in us air force 89 94 as ATC at Edwin's air
force base California, after that Department of Defense at tower Buckley air force base.
Trained controller since 1990.

Area supervisor full time job with employees assigned to them to reprimand, give
awards, and oversee entire operation in their specific operation. Controller in charge
operational only.

9/11 controller in charge of area b ZNY. Came in am assigned as certified controller, not
in charge of area. Asked to take over for supervisor before events of morning occurred.
Signed on as CIC. To best of ability in recollection, first call remembered from sector 56
in Kennedy VOR (18k and up) notified from Boston center of aircraft hijacked AAl 1. No
radio communications. No transponder, no altitude readout. Boston attempted to let
controller sector 56 gain id on primary target. Hard to be sure of correct on primary. Hard
to verify if actual aircraft or not. Could be Ik feet or 30k, just a blip. Boston attempted to
point out to ZNY, and relayed that information to OMIC - Pete mulligan and Bruce
Barret. Relayed information in entirety. They informed Boston Central had already called
them. R56 was mark Merced. At that point looking with Merced and controller with
airspace west asked their aircraft to id aircraft at flight level 290. Some responses, (Dave
Bittiglia controller on west side). As responses gathered aircraft said had seen aircraft at
f!290, TCAS (traffic collision avoidance system - pilots have that radar, not ATC).
Relayed information to OMIC.

At that point all recall of AA11. Advised adjacent sectors of aircraft headed their way at
fl290. Mark advising them possible hijack.

UAL 175 had checked on normal operations with r42 and after second transmission
advised of hostile transmissions on Boston Central frequency. Seemed not to relay that
until he heard r42 asking about AA11. UAL 175 was concerned because of transmissions.
Very focused on AA11. Relaying to OMIC.

Received an ELT signal. Happens as test or accident. As CIC required to report ELT to
OMIC.

Shortly thereafter saw R42 noticed UAL 175 to enter coast track. Caused when aircraft
does not show assigned code. Appeared UA 175 code changed. R42 relayed no contact
with UAL175. Relayed information. R42 and Evonna observed turn off course. Pointed
out 3321 code not assigned, no radio, turn off course. At that time initial moment
confusion over if that was UAL 175 - especially because of AA11. Initially could have
confirmed reset transponder. Even though believed it was UAL 175, not certain, but did
assume it was UAL 175.

As UAL 175 turned eastbound to city, recall OMIC say fighters had been scrambled. Kept
observing target, other ATCs attempting to turn their crafts out of the way. At that point
Evonna believes the fighters were scrambled for UAL175.

Hijack came into mind once no radio, and drastic turn off course.

Seem to loose radio with aircraft on regular basis. Even if for only a few minutes.
Occasionally it seems we have a "blind spot" in certain areas. Sometimes need to go to
backup frequency. Not unusual. First step taken if an extended loss are a retrace of
aircraft whereabouts. Fairly quickly keep calling aircraft. Ask for IDENT. Means they
hear ATC, but ATC can't hear pilot. IDENT - three bars and a line - a visual on scope.
Ask other aircraft of can hear aircraft. Ask OMIC to call company. Go to guard
frequency. ATC notifies CIC or area supervisor quickly.

Transponder off or code change: Transponder changes not often. Could happen if pilot
confused and hears code change meant for another plane. Equipment failure (loss of
transponder) not frequent. Stretch to say once a month.

Deviation from course: very unusual. Very infrequent.

What would com and transponder loss indicate? Pilot may be crashing. One of the first
thoughts over UAL 175.

Those factors plus course change: immediately now hijack. Prior to 911, quickly think
hijack.

UAL175: two mode three code changes in short period of time: did not take long to think
he was probably being hijacked. Recall telling OMIC I think hijacked. Showed
transponder 3321. Had already heard from Boston Central that AA11 was hijacked.
Because of infrequency of hijack, it was surreal and unbelievable that there could be a
second ongoing hijack.

Awareness of first WTC collision was definitely AA11: don't think ZNY was sure AA11.
Many different reports. Don't think confirmed until news reported correctly. Probably not
aware until in cafeteria watching CNN.

Awareness of second tower definitely uas!75: assuming whole time it was united.
Thought he was going to crash into the city. Didn't have confirmation that he did until
relieved of duty. Thought process that it was going to crash in city - many things thought
in area. One person thought it was emergency and it was going to land. Point when
thought heard from talking - somebody yelled out I think he's going to crash in New
York City, and then thought same way.

Probably at least half hour or hour between when he was relieved and go to cafeteria.

Because of past us experience assumption was that hijacked aircraft would land and make
its demands. Thought never entered mind of 911 scenario.

When controller determines of hijack situation what steps are taken? In general, pre911,
first to conclude actual hijack. No com, route change, 7500 transponder code - ATC
specifically tells CIC know of possibilities. Those managers have contact responsibilities.
Specific rule looking for 7500 code. Also told not to make obvious of knowledge of
hijack. Taught to monitor and clear airplanes out of way. Just supposed to guard aircraft
and be discreet with pilot. Assumption before 911 that pilot is flying plane.

Training: at ZNY, military and Department of Defense hijack training of minimum once
a year. Computer based instruction. Sit and review procedures and rules. Scenarios
involve one airplane.

Military notification: ATC does not get involved. Operation manager of center takes care
of that. CIC responsible to notify OMIC.

During years as military controller, training essentially the same.

Recommendations: changes seen already at ZNY. Now have military blocks. Heard
rumor that OMIC has direct line to call military. Memorandums issued on basis
instructed controllers to be constantly aware of current procedures.
Relationship over airspace civilian and military. For most part military gets what it
requests. It can make an ATC's job harder, but for the most part military is
accommodated quickly on requests.

AA11: some reports within FAA and military sector that AA11 might still be airborne?
Don't know who source could be, but don't know, because of all the rumors, don't know
who the first person who identified definitely AA11 that hit WTC. Situational awareness
of whether of not that was AA11 or another aircraft that was part of ZNY airspace?
Awareness in area b wasn't confirmed until later. OMIC relayed "an aircraft", nothing
definitive. Couldn't see primary on radar any longer so didn't know what happened to
AA11. Not sure which sectors were speaking to TRACON.

UAL 175: assumed from code and altitude readout, which was unavailable for AA11,
took on assumption that UAL 175 was headed towards city. So assumed. News confirmed
in mind suspicion that something had happened to UAL 175. That was probably the same
instinct for most area b personnel.

Never observed personally two distinct codes. Looking over shoulder of ATCs. No loss
on continuity on UAL 175 and 3321 tracks. Assumed but still some doubt in mind.
Another thing heard yelled out "we don't know where UAL 175 is now", there was pretty
reliable continuity on the UAL 175 track.

When concluded UAL 175 probably hijacked, information of first WTC impact occurred
after hijack information. Probably would have concluded UAL 175 was hijacked absent
awareness on any AA11 factors.

Don't know if roc, fax headquarters or Herndon were notified.