U_se of forlg Standar.

ds for pSece Of$cersD

iby: Susan Ouo.*^y,4r"rf$tCounrf Attomey

Introduction T'bisitttelligence addresset; brie,f thelegalstandards applied by the courtsin useof forceclairns brought by ment.irlly or emotionally disturbed threats against law enforcement or corrections deputies. Duringtlie last f(,wyearsthe courtshavebecorne increasingly concemed aboutlaw enforcement and conections offict,:rs usingfor,:eto controltheactions of emotionally ancl mentallydisturbed arrestees andinmates, Althoughthecr:ufts havenot yetmandated thatlaw enforcement agencies implement different useof li;rcepolicier; for dealing with mentally ill arrestees or inmates thanthe policies used for de-aling generally with arrest,:res or inmates, thecourts haveindicated thatthementdlstate of thethreat is oneof ths factors thatmusttreconsidered undera totality of tlie circumstances test, Forpurposes of this menlo, tlueats havebeencategorized justicepr{)cess b),thleestages in thecriminal eachof whichcarries its own respectil'r: constitutional rights:(l) thethleaton thestreet in an arrestsiruation, (2) the threat in custody post-anest, but pre-a.r:raignment eitherpre-or post , and(3) thetlueatpost-an'aignrnent, conviction.Gene,r6lly, thesaLme legalstandard applies on the street andduringpost-arrest, preanaignment custody, thatis, lawful forceis thatforcewhichis objectively reasonable fl'omthepeace officer'sperspective at thetime the forceis use<l. . In thepost-arraignment stage, Iawful forceis that forcethal. doesn<t sliocktheconscience andis not rnalicious or sadistic, but ratheris usedin a good faitheffortto ma;rintain orderancl restore discipline. Receirt c0urtdecisions makeit clear tliat onelbctoraffecting the courts'decisions regarding whether theuseof forceis otrjectively reasonable peace is whether the officer knew or shouldhave knolvnthat the lhreat was rnentally or emotionally disturbedat thetirnetheforcewasusedand whether in light r:1'that knowledge, the peace officershould havetakendifferentactions. In theNinth Circuit, thecourl couldfind thatan emotionaliy person's disturbed levelof lesistance mightbefter be metwith counselrng, thanwith physical controltactics.I-Iowever, thementaland/orernotional state of thethreat haslesssignificance in cases arising post-arraignment with pre-sentence or convicted inmates. ts: On the Str a n d Arraisnment TileNintir Circuithasnot adopted aper serule establishing two differentclassifications of suspects: persons mentall'/ disabled andserious criminals, Nor hastheNinth Clircuitadopted a requirement for t\v'o differentuseof forcepolicies for those two classifications. lnstead, theNinth Circuit hasmphat izedthatlv,[tere it is or shouldbe apparent to the officersthattheindividual involved in a rtserf forceis r:nentally or emotionally disturbecf thethreat's mentalor emotional state is a factorthatntustb': considered. in determining'rxt the.reasonableness of the forceemployed." (Emphasis added) Deorlev. ,t\utherfdyd,'272F.3d (9th 1Z7Z,l2B3 Cir.2001). TheCourtreasoned ttratwhile pliysical controltactics canbe successfully usedin subduing ,e,motionally criminalthreats, disfurbed threats mightbecome moreagitated with the useof thosesame tactic;s:
tionallv D

.c
I I

lt

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT

(u-ro. Ma r3sB.
I

Page2 rlJse of force: ,. Emotionaily or Mentalry Disturbed rtu.eats 'l'he problem.s posed by, andthusthetactics to be employed against, an unamted, errrotionally distraught individual wlro is creating u disrurbun.. cr resisting anestareordinariiy different frornthose involvedin law tlnforcement effortsto subdue an armed anddangerous criminalwho has rocently committed a serious offense. In theformerinstance, increasing tlteuseof forcemay,in some circumstances at least, exacerbate the sri tuation;in drelatter,a heightened useof less-than-lethal forc;e will ttliuallybe helpfulin bringing a dangerous situation to a swift end.ln the crseof mentrilly unbalanced persons, theuseof officersandothersfrained irr the.art_ofc,ounseiing is ordinarily advisable, wherefeasible, andmay of ending lri ovidethe bestmeans a crisis.(citationomifted)

Deorle,272F'3c:l at 1282-1283. Theref,rre, usingphysical controlon an ernotionaliy disfurbed person whpis displafrL,r; static,active,or ontinous levJs oiresistance (in a forcecontinuum) withoutan imminent threatr:fphysical .harrn maybeunreasonable. Moreover, the Deorlecaseindicates thatpeace officers should ei.ther haves'ome skills ,ceveloped for dealing with mentally and e,notionatty distur-bed threats, othertharr theuseof'physical crlntrol iactics, or should haveready access to persons, e.g., counselors, who lo havesuchskills. Of course,, wherea split second decision mustbemade clue to a threat posedby an emotionally disturbed persont, the normaluseof f<rroe defensive tactics areappropriate regardiess of thetl:reat,s mental or emotio nal stability'. It tvill be theheatrnent of theemolionuily distu-rbed person by thepeace officerpriorto t):re point w}rern thethreat poses animminent threat of physical harmwhich mayieada courtto questiorr whether it wasreasonable to useforceor if theactions.iaken by thepeace officer provoked theerrL'r,ltionally disn"rrbed person thereby escalating thesituation an,ipr,rvoi<i'g a violent episode. Thesame oSjectively reasonable stanclard thatappiies duringan arrest, applies insidethejail stage of custody. P; erce v. Multnomai iiunty, 76 F.3d 1032, 9:Tg^tl.lost-amest,_-pre-anaignment 1042.(9'" Cir' l9!,16). The For:rth Amenclment protection against seirue thatbegils *iti, *n initiai stop continues untiltbe detainee receives ajudiciaidetermination on probable as in circumstances "uur"lJust ottthestreet, kno'wing that thetbreatis emotionally disturbed cunmakea peace officer"accountable for lravlng treated distrubed tlreat] asa dangerous [atrernotionality prisoner ratherthana sick one."Gibson 'Was'tioe,290 v. County of F,:id 1175,1198 (gtl'Cir.2002), As with street encounters, counsappear ro expe)ct a tactical <:iifference inL the levelof forceapplied to anemotionally disturbeci tLeat in p&ranest, pre-anailynnent cusf9rJy. turbed Post-ar rnent:Pre-sent Convic mates Auseofflr>rcethatsh.cckstlreconscienceis..condu.ti@'thut ***" based camotbejustifie,,J by anygo'r'emment interest on thetotalityof the circumstances at the time'County of {i,tcramento v. Lewis,523 U.S.833,849 (1986). Two excessive forceclaimsthatexistin ajail sefting area Fourteenth Amendment substantive dueprocrrsclaimby pre-triaidetainees, andan EighthAmendmt:,nt cruelandunusual punishment claimby inmates. The legalstandard for bothclaims is a shocks-the-cc nscience standard. Thelegalsigrrificance of themental or emotional stateof a postanaignment deta:iliee is lessened by the government's strong interest in jail securiry,.
ional

Page 3 (Jseof force., Emotionally or MentailyDisturbed rhreats In a use'f for:ce claim broughtby a post-anaignment detainee, theNinth circuit hasfoundthat "Fc'rc does not amount to a constifutional violationiiit is applied in a goodfaith effon to rest're 'maliciously discipline.and otder andsadistically foi iheverypurpose of causing harm.,,i Tdlgl Clgment r. QsTn:p2,298 F.3d898,90319'h Cir, 2002)(ciiing Wittey-v.-Al|ers,475 U.S.ltz,lzo-zt (1986)). Besider; theuseof fbrcecontinuum elements, addltional factors affecting whether theuseof force wasconstirutional include:
a a

the extenlof injury inflicted*** whether the useof fcrrce couldplausibly havebeenthoughtnecessary, *:** theextentof thetlueatto thesafety of staffandinmates, asreasonably perceived by theresponsible officialson thebasisof the factsknown

., to them, and

n at'y efforLs madeto temper theseverify of a foreeful response.. Witl ey,47:t U.S. zrt 32.1
o

Thereis :nocleardirection from the Ninth Circuitor the Supreme Court on exactlyhow the mental or emotional state of a ttrreat couldaffectlegalanalysis underthe"shocks-the-conscience" standard, if at ali I-Iowever, giventhel.linth Circuit'sgrowingconcern with the mentalstate of an'estees, it is failto assume thatthe emotional or mental state of a threatcould be considered by a court orjury to be a fac'tor in evaluating thegoodfaith of theuseof for'ce by peace officers. This is especially fruein light of th,t: factthatemotionally disfurbed, pre-sentence detainees havea right to restorative freatment. or. Aa'vocacy Ctr, v. Mink,322F.3d1101, I lzz (gth Cir.2003)("Becauie incapacitated criminaldefendants havenot beenconvicted of anycdme,theyliavean inierestin fi-eedom from incarceration. Tb.t:y alsohavea libertyinterest in receiving resiorative ffeatment to lto restore competency a per,son lbundunfit to proc:eed with theirlegaldefense].")(Citations ,rmitted)). GiventheNinth Circuit'sruling in Mink. usingphysical forceagainst an emotionally disturbed tbreat whohasnr:t received restorative heatment couldbe determined to-be"shoctring" if alternatives suchascounselin;g or persuacling thethreatto voluntarily submitto prescribed psychJropics were available, coui<l havebeenused,andwouldlial'ediffi.rsed thesituation rnoreefiectivelyihanphysicaf forci:,Therefore, m in cases involvingthe objectiveryreasonabie legalstandard, tbethreat'semotional or mental state couldtrea factorin the legalanalysis undera shocks-the_consbience legalstandard involvinga pre-seintence detainee.Ho[,ever, whether theuseof forcewasa split-second decision necessary because of a threatof an itnmediate threat of serious physical harm andwhetheror not ttreuse of forcewasnecer;sary to maintain orderanddiscipline arealsofactors thatwould be considered bv jury. counand