CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS 1 American insurance association et al. v. GARAMENDI, INSURANCE CO MMISSIONER 2 Holy See V.

Del Rosario Jr., 3 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION [GR No. 139465 January 18, 2000.] 4 International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon Leonardo A. Qu isumbing 5 Carino vs. Commission on Human Rights 6 Francisco. Et. Al. vs The House of Representatives G. R. No. 160 261. November 10, 2003 7 Ebranilag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu. 8 Aguirre vs Aguirre (GRN L-33080 August 15, 1974) 58 SCRA 461 9 People v. Mamstedt 10 Barnes v. Glen theatre, Inc. 501 U.D. 560 11 CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE VS. CITY OF HIALEAH 12 DOUGHERTY vs. EVANGELISTA 13 HELVERING v. HALLOCK, 309 U.S. 106 (1940) 14 M TUASON & CO., INC., VS. MARIANO (L-33140 October 23, 1978) 85 15 AYER PROD PTY. LTD v. JUDGE CAPULONG 16 Lawrence v. Texas 17 Johnson, petitioner vs. Texas, respondent (509 U.S. 350) 18 Morales vs Paredes, 55 Phil 565, [G. R. No. L-34428 December 29, 1930] 20 VITA UY LEE and HENRY LEE, petitioners 21 ULEP v The Legal Clinic 22 IN RE: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent 23 NIELSON & COMPANY, INC., v. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY 25 Valmonte v. De Villa, [G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990.] 26 Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA 27 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 655 28 MARION REYNOLDS STOGNER, PETITIONER v.CALIFORNIA 29 Andresons Group, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 30 ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CA 31 Villanueva v. CA, 32 South Central Bell Telephone Company (Petitioners) Vs. Alabama 33 People of The Philippines vs. Dioscoro Pinuila, Et Al., Absalon Bignay, defendant and appellant. 34 Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading CO., 35 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine B looming Mills Co., Inc., 36 ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE 37 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO 38 Tecson, et al v. Comelec, GR No. 161434 39 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dept 40 Clinton v. Jones 41 Freedman v State of Maryland 42 Near v Sate of Minnesota 43 People v. Cayat 44 PEOPLE v. MARTI 45 Zulueta v. CA 46 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 US 404 47 O SULLIVAN v. BOERCKEL 48 EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES OF OREGON v SMITH 49 Webb v. de Leon 51 Secretary of Justice v. Estrada, A.M. 52 People v. Rodrigueza 11 Missing Cases:

19 50 CASE # 1 American insurance association et al. v. GARAMENDI, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 02-722. June 23 2003 FACTS California s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA or Act), requires any insurer doing business in that State to disclose information about all poli cies sold in Europe between 1920-1945 by the company itself or any one related to it. Life policies issued during and during the Second Wolrd Ware were confiscated by the Nazi Government of Germany. GFA (German Foundation Agreement) was a result of negotiations at the national l evel. President agreed that whenever a German company was sued on a holocaust era clai m in an American court the Government would : submit a statement that it be in this country s foreign policy interests for the foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for such claims try to get state and local governments to respect the foundation as the exclusiv e mechanism. ICHEIC was established to follow claims. Will negotiate with European insurers t o provide information about and settlement of unpaid insurance policies, and whi ch has setup procedures. California made state legislation designed to force payment by defaulting insure rs (HVIRA 1999) HVIRA required any insurer doing business on the State of California to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the comp any or anyone related to it upon penalty of loss of its state business license. Upon HVIRA s enactment, the State of California issued administrative sub poenas a gainst several subsidiaries of European Insurance Companies participating in ICH EIC. Federal Government informed California officials that HVIRA would damage ICHEIC, the only effective means to process quickly and completely unpaid Holocaust era insurance claims, and that this would derail the GFA. State Commisioner refused and continued to enact. Petitioner insurance entities therefore filed this suit challenging the constitu tionality of HVIRA. District Court issued preliminary injunction against enforcing HVIRA, and grante d petitioners summary judgement Ninth Court reversed holding that HVIRA did not violate Federal foreign policy ISSUE WON HVIRA interferes with the National Government s conduct of foreign relations. W/N The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal foreign policy HELD Yes, The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal Foreign policy The decision was penned by Souter, J. The judgement of the CA for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. HVIRA is preempted or blocked. Reasons At the moment there is conflict in the interest of State power against policies on foreign relations, the State must yield. There is sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the president s foreign pol icy, as expressed both in the executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and Fr ance, and in statements by high level Executive Branch officials to require pree mption here even without any consideration of the State s interest.

NOTES: california wanted to help victims of holocaust by passing a law called HVIRA HVIRA forces insurance companies to disclose information on all transactions mad e during 1920-1945 Why pass this law? What happened? American insurance companies were asking the courts to put a stop to HVIRA and s ay the HVIRA was in conflict with the foreign policy of the president. the holy see vs Eriberto u. rosario, jr. GRN 101949, December 1, 1994. 238 SCRA 524 Nature of the Case: This is a petition for certiorari to reverse and set aside t he Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court , Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183. Facts On April 17, 1988, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf the petitioner, the Holy See, and Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), agreed to sell to Ramon Licup a parcel of land (Lot 5-A located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner) and lots 5-B and 5-D registered under PRC with the following conditions: earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters. In the sa me month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent, Sta rbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. and informed them of the assignment. Thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos the fulfillment of the assignmen t; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake t he eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter. Private respond ent counter-proposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, t he purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the or iginal purchase price in cash. Private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PR C, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana Properties a nd Development Corporation (Tropicana), as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sa le, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' t ransfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and regis tered in the name of Tropicana. Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent. P rivate respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the recon veyance of the lots, to no avail and private respondent is willing and able to c omply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to deve lop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lo st profits of not less than P30,000,000.00. ISSUE W/n tHE HOLY SEE HAS SOVEREiGN IMMUNITY in the sale of the parcel of land (lot 5 -a). HELD YES. The Holy See has sovereign immunity in the sale of the parcel of land (lot 5-A). Claim to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is stated in the Public International Law. When state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomati c immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

The Department of Foreign Affairs was allowed by the Court to intervene on the s ide of petitioner by filing a memorandum of support for the petitioner s claim of sovereign immunity. The Holy See exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. The petitioner is, therefore , a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or a cts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure ge stionis. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereo f, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. The petitioner s sale of the land is a commercial transaction that is an act jure imperii. The petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary co urse of a real estate business, the said transaction can be categorized as an ac t jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subseq uent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippi nes. The petition for certiorari was granted and the complaint against petitioner was dismissed. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION GR No. 139465 January 18, 2000. FACTS Petitioner is the secretary of justice who has in his possession the extradition papers to be filed against private respondent Mark Jimenez. Private respondent requested the petitioner for copies of such documents against him and asks for a mple time for him to submit a response to it. Petitioner declined to grant such a request in line with article 7 of the RP-US Extradition treaty. Private respon dent filed a petition against the petitioner at the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, with an application f or the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. His defense is th at the petitioner's actions violate his basic due process rights upheld by the C onstitution's due process clause. Respondent judge issued an order on August 10, 1999 favoring the side of the private respondent. Thus, the petitioner elevated its case to the Supreme Court for certiorari. ISSUE W/N UPHOLD A CITIZEN'S BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OR THE GOVERNMENTS IRONCLAD DUTI ES UNDER A TREATY HELD THE PETITION IS DISMISSED for lack of merit. The court grants that the right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the cont rol of the government. But in the case at hand, the invocation of this right by the petitioner is premature since no official action of our own government has y et been done. Only when such formal action is present that the court will favor the interests necessary for the proper functioning of government The court also argues that there is no conflict between the RP-US treaty and the Constitution. All they see is a void in the provisions of the treaty as regards to the basic d ue process rights of the extraditee. The court disagrees with such provisions of the treaty. The court also rejects the petitioner's confidentiality argument as it is overtu rned by the petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at that time will be obtainable in trial. The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that the essence of due p rocess in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side or to

seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of. The Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. THE COURT UPHELD THE BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. The pet itioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition paper s against him and to provide ample time for him to submit his comment with suppo rting evidence.

International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon Leonardo A. Quisumbing GR # 128845, June 1, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner questioned the difference in salary rates between foreignand loca l hires during the collective bargaining agreement held June 1995. Another issue i s whether foreign hires should be included in the approptiate bargaining unit. On Sept. 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. June 10,1996, DOLE issu esolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the school. Motion for reconsideration was also denied by DOLE Sec. Quisumbing. ISSUE: 1.WON the difference in salary rates between foreign and local hires constitutes racial discrimination and contrary to the principle of "equal pay for equal wor k". 2. WON foreign hires be included in the apprpriate bargaining unit. HELD: YES on the first issue. Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications , skill, effort and responsiblity, under similar conditions, should be paid simi lar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" not hwithstanding. NO, on the second issue. It does not appear that foreign hires have indicated th eir intention to be grouped together with local hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining in this school also shows that these grou ps were always treated separately.Foreign hires have limited tenure, local hires enjoy security of tenure. WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN P ART. The orders of the Sec. of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and Marc h 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as they uphold the practi ce of respondent School of according foreign hires higher salaries than local hi res. Carino vs. Commission on Human Rights FACTS: On Sept. 14, 1990, members of the Manila Public School Teachers Associat ion (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), staged a protest rally at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the government t o negotiate the granting of demands. This action elicited no response from the Se cretary of Education thus provoking some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA and ACT to undertake "mass concerted actions" in Liwasang Bonif acio to "dramatize and highlight" their plight. The "mass actions" consisted in s waying away from their classes. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions we re served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hr s. or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire the

ir replacements. The directives notwithstanding, the mass actions proceeded with more teachers jo ining in the next few days, among them were the 8 respondents (teachers at the R amon Magsaysay High School in Manila). The teachers failed to heed the return-to-work order and were subsequently charg ed on the principal's report, given 5 days to answer the charges and preventivel y suspended for ninety days. Respondents Budoy, Babaran del Castillo and Esber filed separate answers and opt ed for a formal investigation, and also moved for "suspension of the administrat ive proceedings pending resolution.| Their motion for suspension was denied in November of 1990 as well as their moti on for reconsideration and due to this, "the respondents led by their counsel st aged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." After evaluation of the evidence, Esber was dismissed and Babaran, Budoy and del Casti llo were suspended for nine months. MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC against Carino which was dismissed and later went to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the respondent teachers proceeded to the Commission on Human Ri ghts to complain the fact that while they were participating in "mass actions, t hey learned of their replacements as teachers (allegedly without notice and for reasons unknown to them). Consequently, the Commission scheduled a dialogue on Oc t. 11, 1990 and sent a subpoena to Sec. Carino requiring his attendance. In the said dialogue , the Commission issued an Order and expressed its intention to try and decide o r hear and exercise its jurisdiction. Sec. Carino filed a motion to ismiss the sa id Order but the Commission denied. Thus, this case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Cons titution to determine with character of finality and definiteness the same issue s which have been passed upon and decided by the DECS Secretary and whether or n ot, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdictio n over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases. HELD: NO for both issues. REASONS: The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicati ve power is that it may investigate and fact-finding is not adjudication. It cann ot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.

PARAS, J., Concurring. The Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also co responding "human obligations." Francisco. Et. Al. vs The House of Representatives G. R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003 Facts: On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complai nt (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for culpable violation of the Constitutio n, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilang alen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in ac cordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads: Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within t en session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Mem

bers, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such r eferral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be ca lendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt the reof. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachm ent complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the sai d Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first compla int or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary Genera l of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarl ac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chi ef Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legisla tive inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachm ent complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Issue: These petitions raise five substantial issues: I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constit ute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution. II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Se ction 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution. III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into t he Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitu tionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Secti on 3, Article XI of the Constitution. V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. HELD: WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint again st Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilbe rto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secr etary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred unde r paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. RATIO: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the imp eachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial a ction taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, anothe r may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former P resident Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Comm ittee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Re presentatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition again st the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable office r within a one-year period.

Ebranilag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu. FACTS: Petitioners are 43 high school students and elementary school students of public schools in the towns around Cebu as represented by their parents. The parents and consequently the children are affiliated in a religious sect kno w as Jehovah's Witness. J.W. admittedly teach their children not so salute the flag, sing the national a nthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or religious devotion, which they cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God." On the above ceremonies in their respective schools, the children does not raise their hand nor sing nor pledge but only stand attention during the ceremony. The Schools of Cebu expelled these students based on R.A 1265 and Department ord er No. 8 series of 1955 which govern rules and regulations for conducting the fl ag ceremony in all educational institutions. This is also called the Flag Salute Law. ISSUE: Does the State have the right to impose its will on a religious belief on the co ntext that the ceremony in question is not an act of worship? HELD: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights for it involves the relat ionship of man to his Creator. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of law to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted auth orities. something that the ceremony is supposed to foster. Also, standing attention and not disturbing the ceremony could not possibly dist urb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of serious evil to public safe ty, public morals, health or any other legitimate public interest.

Aguirre vs Aguirre GRN L-33080 August 15, 1974. 58 SCRA 461 FACTS Leoncia, Luis, and Luningning Aguirre filed a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that was actually in favor of them but the petitioners c laimed that it was short of what they should be entitled to under the law. Respondents were Vicenta, Felipe, Andrea, Caridad, Soccoro, Severino (substitute to deceased father Dominador), Luis Aguirre Jr. and Cristeta Lamahang, and the CA. The Court of First Instance of Batangas acted favorably on the partition and dam ages of the properties among the descendants of the spouses Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin. But petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals because of the failure of the trial court to award them damages on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. But the CA said this was an error and found out that the damages suffered by the petitioners amounted to P1,000 yearly since 1955. But the dispositive (transfer of ownership) portion of CA s decision simply says P1,000 without qualification; hence the petition for review. The P1,000 represents the value of corn, rice, mangoes copras, salt, among other s which the plaintiffs were entitled to but were not able to received because of unjustified acts of the defendants. P800 was supposed to have originated from the properties of Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin while P200 was supposed to ha ve come from properties of Melencio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez. Properties of Melecio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez included unsurveyed coconut la

nds with an area of 500 hectares. The coconut plantation in Jaybanga, Lobo, Bata ngas has 3,000 fruit bearing coconut tress while the rice lands were cultivated by about 50 families, residing as permanent tenants. Petitioners received shares of palay, salt, mangoes, corn only until 1954. In 19 55, Felipe, Dominador, Caridad and Socorro divided the 1/6 of the share due the petitioners and gave these to a certain Cristeta Lamahang. Aside from the P1,000 yearly damage, the CA also awarded attorney s fees of P5,000 ; moral damages of P2,000; exemplary damages of P1,000 and even fees for expert witness of P500. ISSUES Whether the CA erred in Whether the CA erred in sts and costs; Whether petitioners are ted to them as a result failing to qualify the yearly damages to petitioners failing to sentence defendants to pay petitioners intere entitled to corresponding adjustment of the amounts gran of the rise in the dollar exchange rate;

HELD CA s decision was affirmed with modification: Yes. The dispositive portion of its decision simply says P1,000 without qualific ation, which is a manifest ambiguity, if not inconsistency. There can be hardly any doubt that it was the intention of the CA to allow the recovery of the yearl y damages it found out to have suffered by the petitioners. We must admit that th e delays in the administration of justice could be avoided if greater care were taken in the drafting of the dispositive portions of decisions Yes. Petitioners were entitled to interest at the legal rate from the date of th e judgment of the trial court. No. There is no sufficient legal basis for this. People vs. Malmstedt GR No. 91107 June 19, 1991 Facts: 1. Accused is Mikael Malmstedt 2. Upon information that illegal drugs were being transported from Sagada, NARCO M official setup a checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province to check all in coming vehicles from the Cordillera Region. A bus was stopped at about 130 in th e afternon where the accused was riding. A routine inspection was conducted by officers of NARCOM and accused was questioned by officers when his waist was not iced to be sporting a bulge. Officer's asked for accused passport and when the accused failed to comply, officers asked him to bring out whatever was causing t he bulge. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag that contained what w as suspected to be hashish. Thereafter the suspect was invited outside the bus for questioning. Accused stopped to get two travelling bags and when officers op ened the bag they found two teddy bears. It was only after the officers opened the bag that the accused finally presented his passport. The officers noticed th at the two teddy bears also had bulges which did not appear to be foam stuffing. It was later when the suspect was brought to NARCOM headquarters at Camp Dangw a, La Trinidad, Benguet that the officers confirmed that all the bulges were pac kets of hashish. Issue: W/N search without warrant is legal when searchis made pursuantto a lawful arres t? W/N the search that led to Malmstedt's arrest was legal. Held: Yes. The officers search fall under warrantless search incident to lawful arres t. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting illegal drugs (hashish)

. The crime of transporting was actually being committed when the search was ma de. The accused was caught flagrante delicto. The receipt of information that a foreigner from Sagada had illegal drugs in his possession and the fact that the accused failed to produce his passport gave ri se to probable cause which justified the warrantless search. Dissenting opinion: (minority opinion) The fruits of the search (illegal drugs) retroactively established probable caus e or in other words justified the illegal search made by the officers. In essenc e the officers were fishing for evidence illegally but since their actions produ ced a successful arrest it gave them the probable cause they needed to justify t he search. The drugs are inadmissible in evidence since the search was made ill egally. Barnes v. Glen theatre, Inc. 501 U.D. 560 Facts: Glen theatre, Inc. and Kitty Kat lounge as represented by Ms. Darlene Millier, a n employee, would like to have complete nudity dancing/performances in their est ablishments located in the state of Indiana. The state has a public indecency statute w/c prohibits complete nudity in public places and requires dancers to wear pastiesa or G-strings, thus petitioners can not hold their performances. The petitioners claim that the indecency statute is contrary or is an infringeme nt on their First Amendment right on freedom of statement and that complete nudi ty is an expressive activity protected by the Amendment. Lower court rule in favor of petitioner saying that statute is facially overbroa d. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision back to lower court saying t hat the type of dancing the petitioners are pursuing is not expressive activity coveret by the Amendment. Appealed once more, C.A. reversed the decision saying that it is an activity pro tected by the First Amendment for it impedes the extending of the message of ero ticism by the dancers. Supreme court now has the case as granted certiorari. Issues: whether or not complete nudity dancing is expressive activity covered by the Fir st Amendment on freedom of statement. whether or not the Indiana public indecency statute is an infringement on the pe titioners First Amendment rights. Holding: Issue 1- C.A. decision affirmed (nude dancing is a protected activity) Issue 2 C.A. decision reversed (indecency statute is not an infringement of the First Amendment) Reasons Issue 1 Jurisprudence supports or says so: Doran v. Salem Inc, California v. Largue, Sch ad v. borough of Mt. Ephraimm. ( nude dancing is not without the First Amendment) Issue 2 - O Brien Test (U.S. v O brien) The indecency statute is a general law regulating conduct and not specifically d irected at expression(nude dancing) Govt regulation is sufficiently justified if within constitutional powers of gov t(Le roy v. Sidley) govt interest is unrelated to suppression of free statement. Wearing of pasties or G-strings does not suppress statement as ruled by the court. Nudity is target ed by the statute, not eroticism or expression.

Incidental restriction on First Amendment rights to freedom of statement should be no greater than is essential for furtherance of govt. interest. CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE VS. CITY OF HIALEAH 91-948. Decided June 11, 1993 FACTS: In April, 1987, the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye leased land in the city of Hiale ah, Florida and announced plans to establish a church, school, cultural center a nd a museum. According to its president and priest, petitioner Ernesto Pichardo, the Church s g oal was to bring the practice of the Santeria religion, including its ritual of animal sacrifice, out into the open. The Church began the process of obtaining utility service and receiving the nece ssary licensing, inspection and zoning approvals, which it all received by early August, 1987. The announcement of plans to establish a Santeria Church in Hialeah prompted the city council to hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. Resolutions and ordinances passed at this and later meetings are the following: first, Resolution 87-66, which expressed the city residents concern that certain rel igions may propose to engage in practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety and declared that the City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition a gainst any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent w ith public morals, peace or safety; second, Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated in full, except as to penalty, Florida s animal cruelty laws; third, Resolution 87 -90, which noted the city residents great concern regarding the possibility of pub lic ritualistic animal sacrifices and the state-law prohibition and declared the city policy to oppose the ritualistic sacrifices of animals within Hialeah, and an nounced that any person or organization practicing animal sacrifice will be prose cuted ; fourth, Ordinance 87-52, which defined sacrifice as to unnecessarily kill, to rment, torture or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony n ot for the primary purpose of food consumption and prohibited the owning or posse ssing of an animal intending to use such animal for food purposes with the restric tion to any individual or group that kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the anima l is to be consumed, exempting slaughtering by licensed establishment(s) of animals specifically raised for food purposes ; fifth, Ordinance 87-71, which defined sacr ifice as had Ordinance 87-52, and provided that it shall be unlawful for any pers on, persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice any animals within the co rporate limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida ; and sixth, Ordinance 87-72, which defined slaughter : as the killing of animals for food and prohibited slaughter outs ide of areas zoned for slaughterhouse use, with the exemption for the slaughter and processing for sale of small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accord ance with an exemption provided by state law. All these ordinances and resolution s passed the city council by unanimous vote. Violations of each of the four ordi nances were punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, or both. Following the enactment of these ordinances, the Church and Pichardo filed this action, alleged violations of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause and so ught for a declaratory judgment and monetary relief, against the City of Hialeah and its mayor and members of the city council in their individual capacities. The District Court ruled for the City. Upon the elevation of the case to the Cou rt of Appeals, the said body affirmed and concluded that the ordinances were con sistent with the Constitution. The case was then petitioned to the US Supreme Co urt. ISSUE whether or not the resolutions and ordinances passed by the city council of Hial eah violated the rights of the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye and its congregants u

nder the Free Exercise Clause. HELD The SC reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding the decision of th e inferior tribunals incompatible with the Free Exercise Clause. The laws passed were neither neutral nor of general applicability. The SC further presented ind icators of bias against the religion and its practice of animal sacrifice in the process of the formulation of the pieces of legislation stated above. The laws were also not deemed necessary in attaining a compelling governmental interest, the only exemption to the requirements of neutrality and general applicability. DOUGHERTY vs. EVANGELISTA G.R. No. L-2644, Nov. 24, 1906 FACTS: In 1895, Jose Evangelista, defendant, borrowed 2,000 pesos, at 6 per cent interest from the R.C. bishop of the diocese of Nueva Segovia. Defendant gave a receipt reciting that the money came from the funds of Cofradia de las Animas of the Cathedral of Vigan. He did not state in the receipt the fact that he borrowe d the money from the bishop. After a year, the defendant signed a document acknowledging that 120 pesos (the amount of the unpaid) interest be advanced to him by the bishop and a dded to his preexisting loan. Evangelista contests the right of Dennis J. Dougher ty, R.C. bishop of the diocese, to recover the money loaned by his predecessor c laiming that the administration of funds of a Cofradia did not rest with the bis hop. ISSUE: Whether the bishop has the right to recover from Evangelista. HELD: Yes. From the RC bishop of Nueva Segovia he took the money, and to the RC bis hop of Nueva Segovia he must repay it. (Verbatim from the decision)

RATIO: Whatever relations the bishop held with the Cofradia, it is plain that he ma the loan as administrator in behalf of the Cofradia. Barlin vs. Ramirez 1 (5 Off. Gaz., 130) Court holds that the defendant should not challenge at the due of his payment, the same right he didn't question at the time of borrowing.*note that the lower court judgment was for the plaintiff without specifying Philippine or other currency. This is the basis for the defendant to appeal. (See Facts 2) FACTS 2: The defendant was asked by the court to serve his answer to a previously overruled demurrer. He was notified of this on Jan.7, bound within 5 days therea fter to serve his answer, but he neglected to except to the order. He duly made o ut and verified on Jan. 12. He served it on March 2, deposited it in the post off ice of Laoag, expecting it to reach Vigan before the opening of the term of cour t on March 7. It was delayed. The service was received by the clerk on March 13. Ju dgment against him was entered by default. He then moved for a new trial under Su bsec. 1 of Sec. 145 of Code of Civil Procedure on ground of accident of surprise . ISSUE 2: Whether there should be a new trial HELD: The decision of the lower court was held valid. Costs against the defendant. REASON: The delay of post was not the only reason for the non-arrival of the answ er. The defendant offered no excuse for neglecting to answer 6 weeks after the ex piration of the legal time. Rule of stare decisis was enforced Gaspar vs. Molina 1 (3,) Off. Gaz., 651). The Court held that the word pesos must be understood as the established currency of the country at the time it was rendered. Since the de fendant did not move for a new trial on grounds that it was against the weight o f evidence, the court assumes that the proofs were sufficient to justify it.

DISSENTING OPINION: CARSON J., dissenting Carson agrees with the decision save for particularly the part where the judgmen t seems to hold that when the judgment is rendered in pesos it should be interpr eted as pesos Philippine currency. He states that while this may be the general r ule, this court has no right to give a wholly different meaning from the court's (from which the case originated from) intention. He believes that there is "no d oubt that the pesos mentioned in the disposing part of the judgment of the trial court were of the same class as those mentioned in the decision and findings an d the original contract, and not pesos Philippine currency". (Verbatim from disse nting opinion) He believes that the case should be sent back for the taking of fu rther evidence as to the relative value of pesos de plata in the cotract vs. pes os Philippine currency with instructions to the lower court to render judgment a ccordingly. HELVERING v. HALLOCK et al. (two cases). SAME v. SQUIRE. ROTHENSIES v. HUSTON. BRYANT et al. v. HELVERING. Nos. 110-112, 183, and 399. 309 U.S. 106, Jan. 29, 1940. This case covers 5 subcases (110-112, 183 and 399) These cases raise the same question, namely, transfers of property inter vivos m ade in trust, the particulars of which will later appear, are within the provisi ons of 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including t he value at the time of his death of all property, rent or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated. To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or enjoyment at or after his death, or of which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwis e, under which he has retained his life or for any period not ascertainable with out reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before h is death (1) the possession or enjoyment o, or the right to the income from the property, or (2) the right either alone or in conjunction with any person, to de signate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income theref rom: except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considerati on in money or money s worth. Any transfer of a material part of his property in t he nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the decedent w ithin two years prior to his death without such consideration, shall, unless sho wn to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this title. (subchapter) (Section 302c of the Revenue Act of 1926 ) [placed this for reference] HELVERING v. HALLOCK et al. (two cases). Henry Hallock in 1919 created a trust under a separation agreement, giving the i ncome to his wife for life, with the provision that if and when Anne Lamson Hall ock should die and in such event, the trust shall terminate and said Trustee sha ll pay Henry if he is living any accrued income, then remaining in said trust fu nd. If Henry is not living then and in such event payment and delivery over shal l be made to the son and daughter Levitt Hallock and Helen Hallock. Settlor died in 1932, his divorced wife, the life beneficiary, survived him. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trust instrument had conveyed (transf erred) the 'whole interest' of the decedent, subject only to a 'condition subseq uent,' which left him nothing 'except a mere possibility of reverter.'

SAME v. SQUIRE. Nature of the Case: To review a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 102 F.2d 1, affirming a decision of Board of Tax Appeal, commiss ioner brings certiorari. ROTHENSIES v. HOUSTON. Decedent by an ante-nuptial agreement in 1925 conveyed property in trust, the in come to be paid to his prospective wife during her life, subject to the followin g disposition of the principal: 'In trust if the said Rae Spektor shall die during the lifetime of said George F . Uber to pay over the principal and all accumulated income thereof unto the sai d George F. Uber in fee, free and clear of any trust. 'In trust if the said Rae Spektor after the marriage shall survive the said George F. Uber to pay over the principal and all accumulated income unto the said Rae Spektor-then Rae Uber-in fee, free and clear of any trust.' Mrs. Uber outlived her husband, who died in 1934. The Circuit Court of Appeals deemed Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, contro lling against the inclusion of the trust corpus in the gross estate. Nature of the Case: To review a judgment if Circuit Court of Appeals for thr Thi d Circuit, affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the collector brings certiorari . BRYANT v. HELVERING. Testator provided for the payment of trust income to his wife during her life an d upon her death to the settlor himself if he should survive her. The instrument, which was executed in 1917, continued: 'Upon the death of the su rvivor of said Ida Bryant and the party of the first part, unless this trust sha ll have been modified or revoked as hereinafter provided, to convey, transfer, a nd pay over the principal of the trust fund to the executors or administrators o f the estate of the party hereto of the first part.' There was a further provisi on giving to the decedent and his wife jointly during their lives, and to either of them after the death of the other, power to modify, alter or revoke the inst rument. The wife survived the husband, who died in 1930. The Board of Tax Appeals allowed the Commissioner to include in the decedent's g ross estate only the value of a 'vested reversionary interest' which the Board h eld the grantor had reserved to himself. On appeal by the taxpayer, the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this determination. Nature of the Case: To review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 104 F. 2d 1011, affirming the decision of the board, the execut ors bring certiori. ISSUE WON the doctrine of stare decisis compel us to accept the distinctions made in t he St. Louis Trust cases as starting points for still finer distinctions spun ou t of the tenuosities of surviving feudal law. WON a principle shall prevail over its later misapplications. HELD NO, the Court thinks not. The Klein case rejected the presupposition of such dis tinctions for the fiscal judgments which 302(c) demands. NO, The Court holds that they are not bound by reason or by the considerations t hat underlie stare decisis to persevere in distinctions taken in the application of a statute which, on further examination, appear consonant neither with the p urposes of the statute nor with this Court's own conception of it. They therefor e reject as untenable the diversities taken in the St. Louis Trust cases in appl ying the Klein doctrine-untenable because they drastically eat into the principl

e which those cases professed to accept and to which we adhere. In Nos. 110, 111, 112 and 183, the judgments are REVERSED. In No. 399, the judgm ent is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concurs in the result upon the ground that each of these c ases is controlled by our decision in Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 , 51 S.Ct. 398. [309 U.S. 106, 123] ADDITIONAL This case covers 5 cases (110-112, 183 and 399) They raise the same question, na mely, whether transfers of property inter vivos made in trust, are within the pr ovisions of 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926.[2] All involve dispositions of pr operty by way of trust in which the settlement provides for return or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon a contingency terminable at his death. Whether t he transfer made by the decedent in his lifetime is 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death' by reason of that which he retain ed, is the crux of the problem. We must put to one side questions that arise und er sections of the estate tax law other than 302(c)-sections, that is, relating to transfers taking place at death. Section 302(c) deals with property not techn ically passing at death but with interests theretofore created. The taxable even t is a transfer inter vivos. But the measure of the tax is the value of the tran sferred property at the time when death brings it into enjoyment. In each case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the trust property in the decedent's gross estate. In deciding these cases, the lower courts came ac ross three recent decisions (Klein v. US where the court rejected formal distinct ions pertaining to real property as irrelevant criteria in this field of taxatio n that the death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which br ought the larger estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living, thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and ju stifying the tax imposed. , Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co. a nd Becker v. St. L ouis Trust Co. which had distinctions from the Klein doctrine.) In none of the t hree cases did the dominion over property which finally came to the beneficiary fall by virtue of the grantor's will, except by his provision that his own death should establish such final and complete dominion. And yet a mere difference in phrasing the circumstance by which identic interests in property were brought i nto being-varying forms of words in the creation of the same worldly interests-w as found sufficient to exclude the St. Louis Trust settlements from the applicat ion of the Klein doctrine. Because of the difficulties the lower courts found in applying the distinctions made by these cases and the seeming disharmony of the ir results, when judged by the controlling purposes of estate tax law, it was br ought to the higher court. M TUASON & CO., INC., VS. MARIANO (L-33140 October 23, 1978) 85 SCRA 644 FACTS: Manuela and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of Fir st Instance of Rizal, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a certain parcel of land. They claimed that the land was acquired by their father b y Spanish title. The Aquials alleged that J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon th e land. They further alleged that the land in question had been fraudulently or e rroneously included in OCT No. 735, and was registered in the names of the petit ioners Tuason. The Aquials also claimed that the TCT were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and the National Waterwor ks and Sewerage System (NAWASA). The Aquials prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to irregularities in the land registration proceedings. J.M. Tuason and

Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, imp roper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The lower court denied the motion ISSUE: W/N OCT NO. 735 AND THE TITLES DERIVED THEREFROM CAN BE QUESTIONED AT THIS LATE HOUR BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HELD/RULING: NO. The court noted that the supposed irregularities in the land registration pro ceedings were the same issues raised n the civil cases decided by Judge Eulogio Mencras. In that case, Judge Mencias ruled that OCT 735 was invalid. On the appeal to the Supreme Court, that decision was reversed, and the validity of OCT No. 7 35 was once more upheld. The court underscored the governing principle of Stare Decisis et non quieta mov ere. The holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid should no longer be open to attack. AYER PROD PTY. LTD v. JUDGE CAPULONG 160 SCRA 865 (1988) FACTS: Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Pr oductions Pty. Ltd. envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the historic E DSA revolution. The proposed motion picture would essentially be a reenactment of the events that made possible the revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a 6-hour mini-series television play, presented in a docu-drama style, creating 4 fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documenta ry footage as background. In a letter dated 16 Dec 1987, Hal McElroy informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture. Enrile replied that he would not approve of the use, a ppropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema, film, or other medium of commercial exp loitation. Enrile further advised McElroy that in the production, showing, or d istribution of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, v erbal or visual) should be made to him or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to him. McElroy acceded to this demand, deleted Enr ile s name from the movie script, and proceeded with the project. On 23 Feb 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint alleging that the production of the min i-series film without his consent and over his objection constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. The RTC ruled for Enrile and ordered the Aye r Prod to cease and desist from producing and filming The Four Day Revolution . ISSUE: Whether Ayer Prod., in filming The Four Day Revolution , is validly exercising its freedom of speech and of expression protected under the Constitution. HELD: YES. The right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in he hei rarchy of civil liberties (Phil Blooming Mills). It is not, however, without l imitations. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limi tation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television

and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle requires a cou rt to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests ob servable in a given situation or type of situation. Here, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by Enrile and t he right of freedom of expression invoked by Ayer Prod. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, the SC holds that under the particular circumstan ces presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreemen t entered into by Ayer Prod., the validity of such agreement will have to be uph eld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when ex pression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. Whether the balancing-of-interests test or the clear and present danger test be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that the product ion and filming by Ayer Prod. of the projected motion picture does not, in the c ircumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon Enrile s right to privacy. Note: The Court also put into consideration that the portrayal of Enrile in the movie was as a public figure. Public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a public personage . Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent, their right of privacy for 3 reasons: they had sought publicity and consented to it their personalities and their affairs had already become public the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about th ose who have become legitimate matters of public interests. In the case at bar, film was not intrusive of Enrile s right to privacy because he was a public figure. The court defined public figure as a person who, by his a ccomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a public personage. It includes anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. As a public person, Enrile had lost, to some extent, their right to privacy. Aside from tha t, the EDSA Revolution was clearly a subject matter of public interest. It was not about the personal life of Enrile. It merely included Enrile as a public fi gure and not as a private person. Since only his actions as a public figure are referred to in the film, a license from Enrile was not needed to show such acti ons. Lawrence v. Texas On June 30, 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled1 that a Georgia s tate law which specified that sodomy was a crime punishable by between one month and twenty years in prison was constitutionally permissable, dismissing claims that such a law violated the privacy rights of those engaging in sodomy as being obviously invalid on the grounds that "Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots." On June 26, 2003. the Supreme Court of the United States, ruling in a similar ca se involving a law in the state of Texas which criminalized sodomy between membe rs of the same sex (while not banning sodomy between members of the opposite sex , or between humans and animals), held that the "right to privacy" was violated by the law and that laws banning sodomy are invalid. Justice Byron White, who had been appointed by President Kennedy, wrote the majo rity opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick. The centerpiece of his argument was that the right-to-privacy cases, notably Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird , had all been focused on family issues: child rearing and education, procreatio n, marriage, and the like, and that it was "evident that none of the rights anno unced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right o f homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy", and that it was the province of the

courts to protect those rights which were "implicit in the concept of ordered li berty", which sodomy was not. Seventeen years later, in the case Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court consider ed the case of two men who were arrested when police, responding to a weapons co mplaint, entered their home and found them having sex. In the oral arguments for the case, lawyers for the arrested men made two arguments: There is a constitutional right to privacy that encompasses sodomy, and Bowers s hould be overturned. A law which bans homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy is an unconstitut ional violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore this law should be overturned. The majority opinion handed down by Justice Anthony Kennedy (who was appointed b y President Reagan) threw out the Bowers decision wholesale, arguing that there is some validity to the equal protection argument but that the current case requ ires a re-assessment of Bowers. It agreed with the dissent in Bowers that "The s tatutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose wi thout being punished as criminals." Moreover, the community's moral disapprobati on of homosexuality does not justify the use of the power of the State to enforc e those views. This should have been obvious when Bowers was decided, Kennedy's opinion says. Moreover, case law since then has undermined what little validity the decision had; in particular, the decision in Romer v. Evans that Colorado co uld not name homosexuals as a solitary class of persons who were deprived of pro tection under state antidiscrimination laws seriously undermined much of the arg ument in Bowers. It concluded that "the rationale of Bowers does not withstand c areful analysis ... Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not co rrect today. It ought not to remain binding precedent." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, another Reagan appointee, who was in the majority i n Bowers, declined to overrule it, but would overturn the Texas law on equal pro tection grounds. Justice Antonin Scalia, in dissent, complains that the overturning of Bowers is a reckless disregard for precedent, and that the argument for overturning it cou ld just as reasonably be made about Roe. In addition, he accuses the majority of unveiling the decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which was marked by "ext raordinary deference to precedent" as being, in essence, a lie. Scalia's opinion proceeds to insist that (a) there is no emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult decisions regarding sex, and that even if there were, an emerging awareness cannot possibly be deeply rooted in t he nation's legal tradition, and therefore emerging awareness cannot uncover a n ew fundamental right. Moreover, it is right for a state to "further the belief o f its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are immoral and unacceptabl e". He dismisses out of hand the equal protection claim on the grounds that if p rohibiting same-sex marriage doesn't violate equal protection, criminalizing hom osexual sodomy without criminalizing heterosexual sodomy can't possibly do so ei ther. He concludes with a denunciation of the decision as "the product of a law-profes sion culture that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda", add ing "It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war," a nd insisting that laws protecting gay people from discrimination deprive many am ericans of their right to "[protect] themselves and their families from a lifest yle that they believe to be immoral and destructive." He warns that gay marriage will be next. Justice Thomas joined the dissent but added a shot of his own, echoing one of th e dissenters in Griswold: he would vote to repeal the sodomy law, were he a legi slator, on the grounds that ti is "uncommonly silly". But as a Justice, his job is to interpret the Constitution, and he can see no Constitutional bar to this l aw. Johnson vs. Texas

(509 U.S. 350) CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS Facts: On March 23, 1986, Dorsie Lee Johnson Jr., then 19 and along with Amanda Miles d ecided to rob Allup s convenience store in Synder, Texas after some planning and s urveying the area. Johnson announced the holdup and ordered the store attendant, Jack Huddleston to lie on the floor. After Huddleston complied with the order, Johnson shot him in the back of the ne ck, killing him. The pair had emptied the cash registers of about $160 and each grabbed a carton of cigarettes. A few weeks after the commission of the crime, Johnson was arrested for another robbery and attempted murder in Colorado City, Texas. Johnson confessed to the murder of Huddleston and the robbery of Allsup s and was tried and convicted of capital murder. Two issues were raised to the jury: Whether the conduct of Johnson which caused the death of Huddleston could result to another death Whether there is a probability that Johnson would commit crimes that would pose as a continuing threat or danger to society in the future Jury answered yes to both questions. The trial court sentenced Johnson to death. Johnson appealed the decision, stating that the jury did not take into tion his youth in deciding the verdict. He contends that petitioner s considered as a mitigating factor in the decision. Defense presented r s father to strengthen the claim, painting him as still immature and e to his youth. considera age must be petitione reckless du

Issue: Whether the age of the petitioner should be considered by the jury in han dling out a decision Decision: Yes. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. Reasons: Youth was considered by the jury in handling out a sentence. Petitione r s age is considered as a mitigating factor. He may change as he grows older. H owever, the possibility of him committing dangerous acts in the future partly du e to his present actions cannot be ignored. Dissent: His youth must not be taken against him. Reasons: Youth is more than chronological fact. The emotional and mental immatu rity of young people may cause them to respond to events in ways that adult woul d not. The jurors could not give effect to this aspect of Johnson s youth. Morales vs Paredes 55 Phil 565, G. R. No. L-34428. December 29, 1930] Facts Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for the registration of a parcel of land situated in the poblacion of the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, and on June 23, 1930, the application was granted and a decision to that effect rendered. Baltazar Morales, the petitioner, now claims to be the owner of the la nd but was not advised on the registration proceedings until the early part of S eptember 1930. He eventually filed a motion, through his counsel Nicolas Belmont e, on September 18 in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan for the re

consideration of the June 23 decision and as the record shows, the motion may st ill be pending. Without dismissal of the motion mentioned, the movant brought th e present action before the Supreme Court (SC) praying that the aforesaid decisi on be set aside and that a new trial be granted in accordance with Section 513 o f the Code of Civil Procedure. Issue Whether Mr. Morales has legal contention in his petition filed at the SC. Held No. The plaintiff has unfortunately mistaken his remedy. Assuming without decidi ng that the allegations of fraud in his complaint are true, the proper remedy is to petition for a review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (LRA). T he plaintiff s contention that such review cannot be made until the final decree h as been issued is not in accordance with the view adopted by the SC as can be gl eaned in the case of Rivera vs. Moran (48 Phil., 836), wherein it was pointed ou t by the court that Sec. 38 of the LRA, which provides that a petition for revie w of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed within one year after en try of the decree , be given further reflection and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented before th e expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the co mplaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his clai m of fraud. The plaintiff s view of the extent of actions under Sec. 513 of the Co de of Civil Procedure is erroneous. The SC had no jurisdiction to reopen judgmen ts under that section if other adequate remedies are available, and such remedie s are not lacking in the present case. The case is therefore dismissed by the SC with the costs against the plaintiff. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENCIO VDA. DE SIMEON G.R. No. L-28126 November 28, 1975 Facts of the Case: On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brough t an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Le e and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an area of about 2 .7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. Defendants filed in due time their answer with affirmative defens es. After trial, the court decided in favor of Simeon and Vicencio. The counterc laim of the defendants are dismissed. Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motio n for new trial and later an urgent motion for reconsideration which were both d enied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964 and June 25, 1964. The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of F irst Instance of Rizal was affirmed in toto. A timely motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no avail. Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient a nd complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law. before i t." More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to inc lude in its decision the complete text of the three letters sent by respondent ( now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee b efore the expiration of the period within which redemption could be made petitio ners intimating that such omission has impaired their position on appeal as anot her question is raised by them on the basis of the terminology of the three lett ers.

Issues: Whether or not the period to reconvey the property, subject of this case, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 has prescribed (expired or lapsed).. Ruling: Yes it has prescribed (expired or lapsed). The rule that tender of payment of th e repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds suppor t in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absenc e of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, t o wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without retur ning to the vendee the price of the sale ...". It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his des ire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of redemption pric e fell short of the requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of redemption within the statutory five-year period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to compel redempti on after the lapse of the period. Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignori ng the letters sent her by respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention t herein of respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender o f payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule that ten der of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to pe rmit the repurchase is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the v endee will also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence whic h we have shown above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a f lat refusal, her silence did not close the door to respondent Simeon's subsequen t tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the same was made wit hin five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender payment and, instead, merely fi led an action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period. The Supreme Court, therefore, in the light of the above ruling reversed the deci sion oif the Court of Appeals. Mariano Ulep vs. Legal Clinic GR. No. 553, June 17, 1993 FACTS: Petitioner is a member of the legal profession. He claims that he is offended a nd ashamed by the advertisements issued by The Legal Clinic as they are _champer tous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confiden ce of the community in the integrity_ of lawyers. Respondent meanwhile admits t he publication and issuance of said advertisements but claims that it is not eng aged in the practice of law. The Legal Clinic renders support services through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. ISSUE: Whether or not the services offered by respondent (The Legal Clinic) as advertis ed constitutes practice of law. In either case, whether the same can properly be suspect of advertisements herei n complained. HELD: YES. The Court agrees with the observations of the various bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute the practice of law. Th e use of the name _The Legal Clinic_ gives the impression that respondent corpor ation is being operated by lawyers and thus renders legal services. While some o f the services being offered merely involve mechanical and technical know how, t hese will not suffice to justify an exception. Though respondent corporation do es not represent clients in court, it is still engaged in the practice of law as this is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, g

iving legal advice and contract drafting. Moreover, the advertisements in quest ion (annex B)are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals , public order and public policy. What is important is that respondent corporation is engaged in the practice of l aw by the nature of the services it offers (though rendered by paralegals) which thereby brings it within the statutory prohibitions against the publication of such advertisements. _It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his ta lents or skills_law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himsel f and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by a dvertising his services or offering them in public._ The Court resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN respondent from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the s ame tenor and purpose as Annexes a and B. IN RE: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES Case No. 350 August 7, 1959 FACTS: Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two year s, four months and one day of destierro and to pay a fine of P2300, with subsidi ary destierro in case of insolvency. ISSUES: Under Section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred. In written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court consi dering that he has six children to support. He made manifest to the court that if he ever committed what is attributed to hi m, it was merely due to an error of judgment. DECISION: He was disbarred from the roll of attorneys. Under Section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office a s attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason be hind this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbar ment. And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude, this court i s constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 21 of Rule 127. NIELSON & COMPANY, INC. vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY. 26 SCRA 540 GRN L-21601 December 28, 1968 Facts: Operating agreement between Nielson and Co., Inc and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, whereby the former operated and managed the latter s mining property. Contract was entered into on Jan. 30, 1937, for five years, with an option to re new for the same term on the same basis. Contract was renewed in 1941. Dec. 1941 WW II Jan. 1942 mining operations ceased. Feb. 1942 mills, plants and other property were destroyed and occupied by the Ja panese Army. 1945 Japanese forces are ousted and parties regain control of the property. 1945 disagreement between Nielson and Lepanto as to w/n contract is to expire in 1947. June 26, 1948 mining operations officially resumed under Lepanto. Terms of the contract: Both parties to this agreement fully recognize that the t

erms of this Agreement are made possible only because of the faith or confidence that the Officials of each company have in the other; therefore, in order to as sure that such confidence and faith shall abide and continue, NIELSON agrees tha t LEPANTO may cancel this Agreement at any time upon ninety (90) days written no tice, in the event that NIELSON for any reason whatsoever, except acts of God, s trike and other causes beyond its control, shall cease to prosecute the operatio n and development of the properties herein described, in good faith and in accor dance with approved mining practice. Nielson contends that the contract was suspended and should be extended. Lepanto contends that the contract expired in 1947 and that period of suspension did not extend the contract. The Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila held for the defendant, Lepanto. Nielsen appealed to the Supreme Court (SC) and the SC reversed the decision of t he CFI; It held that the contract was suspended until Jan. 26, 1948, when mining operations resumed. Lepanto seeks for motion for reconsideration based on the ff grounds: 1. That the contract entered into was a contract of agency which was effect ively revoked and terminated in 1945; 2. That the court erred in holding that the period of suspension extended t he life of the management contract. 3. The court erred in reversing the ruling of the trial judge that the mana gement agreement was only suspended but not extended on account of the war. 4. The court erred in reversing the finding of the trial judge that Nielson 's action had prescribed, but considering only the first claim and ignoring the prescriptibility of the other claims. 5. The court erred in holding that the period of suspension of the contract on account of the war lasted from February 1942 to June 26, 1948. 6. Assuming arguendo that Nielson is entitled to any relief, the court erre d in awarding as damages (a) 10% of the cash dividends declared and paid in Dece mber, 1941; (b) the management fee of P2,500.00 for the month of January, 1942; and (c) the full contract price for the extended period of sixty months, since t hese damages were neither demanded nor proved and, in any case, not allowable un der the general law of damages. 7. Assuming arguendo that appellant is entitled to any relief, the court er red in ordering appellee to issue and deliver to appellant share's of stock toge ther with fruits thereof. 8. The court erred in awarding to appellant an undetermined amount of share s of stock and/or cash, which award cannot be ascertained and executed without f urther litigation. 9. The court erred in rendering judgment for attorney's fees. Issue 1: W/N management contract be considered a contract of agency and t herefore effectively revoked and terminated. Held: No, the SC held that this ground of the motion for reconsideration be br ushed aside. It is the rule, and the settled doctrine of this Court, that a party cannot chan ge his theory on appeal-that is, that a party cannot raise in the appellate cour t any question of law or of fact that was not raised in the court below or which was not within the issue made by the parties in their pleadings (Obiter) Even if allowed, it cannot be sustained. It is the SC s view that the man agement contract is not a contract of agency but a contract of lease of services hence cannot be unilaterally revoked. Issue 2: W/N the contract was actually suspended and extended until 1948, on account of the war and its aftermath. Held: Yes, the contract was suspended and extended until 1948. The management contract provides as follows: In the event of inundation, flooding of the mine, typhoon, earthquake or any other force majeure, war, insur

rection, civil commotion, organized strike, riot, fire, injury to the machinery or other event or cause reasonably beyond the control of NIELSON and which adver sely affects the work of mining and milling; NIELSON shall report such fact to L EPANTO and without liability or breach of the terms of this Agreement, the same shall remain in suspense, wholly or partially during the terms of such inability . Also, since damages caused by the war were severe, rebuilding of the mines had to be undergone and thus causing the operations to officially resume on June 26, 1948. Issue 3: W/N damages awarded to Nielson is proper; (a) 10% of the cash di vidends declared and paid in December, 1941; (b) the management fee of P2,500.00 for the month of January, 1942; and (c) the full contract price for the extende d period of sixty months; (d) to issue and deliver to appellant share's of stock together with fruits thereof; (e) an undetermined amount of shares of stock and /or cash, and; (f) attorney's fees. Held: Awards (a), (b), (c), and (f), with proper discretion of the court, are granted. Awards (d), and (c), however, are not granted. Awards (a), (b), (c) are awarded because it is based on the stipulations stated in the contract agreed upon by both parties. Award (f), is granted since attorney s fees are given to the discretion of the court. Award (d) and (c) is not granted because it is under the Corporation Law that st ock dividends can only be given to stockholders of the said corporation, of whic h, Nielson and Co., Inc., is not a part of. Valmonte v. De Villa G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990. 185 SCRA 665 Facts: Petitioners are members of the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People s Rights. Their petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of checkpoints as uncon stitutional was dismissed. Petitioners filed the instant motion and supplementa l motion for reconsideration. Respondents are General Renato de Villa and the N ational Capital region District Command. Checkpoints may be allowed and install ed by the government. In its decision, the Court does not legalize all checkpoi nts, declaring instead that checkpoints are not illegal per se. In fact, checkp oints are used as security measure in order to entrap criminals, considering rec ent and on-going events such as the sixth attempted coup d etat staged last Decemb er 1, 1989, the NPA move against the armed forces, murders, sex crimes and smugg ling. As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual s right again st unreasonable search. A routine checkpoint stop involves only a brief detenti on of travelers, answering a brief question or two. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies reas onable belief that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Issue: W/n checkpoints are constitutional. Held: Yes. Completely banning checkpoints is to lose sight of the fact that the real objective behind their use is necessary. The government has the equal right, un der its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achiev ing them. Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude on the motoring public and ca nnot be considered as violative of an individual s right against unreasonable sear ch. Potential interference is minimal and checkpoint operations involve less di

scretionary enforcement activity. The Court s decision was concerned with power, on whether the government employing the military has the power to install said c heckpoints, and does not validate nor condone abuses committed by the military m anning the checkpoints. The Court assumes that the men in uniform are assigned to the checkpoints to protect the citizenry. Motion for reconsideration is denied. COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996. FACTS Petitioners are foreign corporations that lodged a formal complaint with the NBI for violation of PD No. 49,as amended, a.k.a. Decree on the Protection of Intell ectual Property and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Survei llance operations of various video establishments in Metro Manila were then made , including that of Sunshine Home Video Inc. in Magallanes, Makati. On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warra nt with the court a quo against Sunshine. Agent Reyes and other witnesses, Mr. R ene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, provided affidavits and depositions d uring the hearing of the application for the warrant. Search Warrant No. 87-053 for violation of sec. 56 of PD No. 49 was then issued. On December 14, 1987, at 1:45 p.m., the warrant was served and a receipt of properties tendered to Mr. Da nilo A. Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine. On December 16, 1987, A Return of Search Warrant was filed with the Court. Then, a Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant was filed but was later denied for lack of merit. A Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed and then granted b y the court, citing the fact that master tapes of copyrighted films were never p resented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants in question. Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the Trial Court granting private re spondents motion for reconsideration, to the Court of Appeals. Said appeal was di smissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof denied. Hence. This petition was brought to Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent court s r etroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Co urt of Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19, 1988 (long after hearing of ap plication for search warrant of Sunshine) in dismissing petitioner s appeal and up holding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court. ISSUE Whether or not the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appe als, et al., ordering that for the determination of probable cause to support th e issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videogr ams, the production of the master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirated copies is necessary, should be retroactively applied as grounds for quashal of a search warrant previously issued. HELD NO. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant c ase because there was satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for determination of probable cause. The lower court could not ha ve possibly expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a s earch warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judic ially accepted, required with respect to finding of probable cause. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are neverthele ss evidence of what the laws mean. According to the Article 8 of the New Civil C ode, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution sh all form part of the legal system. The settled rule supported by numerous author ities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet e interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force

th

of law. But when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is a dopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply t o parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court dated Nov. 22, 1988, a re hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of September 5, 1 988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED and said court is DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble costs are further assessed against private respondents. NOTES PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVITY o Applies not only to original or amendatory statutes and administrative r ulings and circulars, but also, and properly so to judicial decisions. o Lex prospicit, non respicit the law looks forward not backward 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 164 SCRA 655 Facts: The petitioner sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NB I) to conduct searches and seizures in connection with the latter s anti-film pira cy campaign. Through a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, the petitioner a lleged that certain videotape outlets all over the Metro Manila were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films, in video tape form w hich constitutes a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (Decree on t he Protection of Intellectual Property) Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) ap plications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private re spondents. These applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132. On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants on the basis of probable cause. After the raids occurred, respondents then filed for a Motion to Lift Search War rants. Acting on the Motion to Lift Search Warrants, the lower court issued an order li fting the warrants issued earlier. The petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner fo r certiorari likewise filed by the petitioner. Issue: W/N the search warrants were properly lifter by the judge for want of pro bably cause. Ruling: Yes, Based on Sec. 2 Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant sh all be issued except upon probable cause. This constitutional guarantee is a ti me-honored precept, which circumscribes governmental action with regard to the p rocurement of a search warrant. In the case of Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, the Court had occasion to de fine probably cause for a valid search as such facts and circumstances which woul d lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It was likewise held by the Court that this consti tutional provision demands no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be ju stified in order to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit a nd seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.

In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the questioned search warrants agains t the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations o f applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. The lower court ruled that there was no probable cause that the private respondents violated PD No. 49. As found by the lower court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowle dge of the subject matter of their testimony which has the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner s counsel who was al so a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stat ed that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the privat e respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petiti oner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in v iew of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not sh own to the court during the application. It was thus ruled that the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted f ilms which the pirated films allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reprodu ced from master tapes that it owns. The essence of copyright infringement is the similarity or at least the substant ial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, t he applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them wit h the purchased evidence of the videotapes allegedly pirated to determine whethe r the latter is unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the co pyrighted films to the probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant . Moreover, the Court ruled that the questioned warrants were in the nature of gen eral warrants, against citing the case of Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, w herein the search warrants in question were declared void by the Supreme Court. The articles described in the search warrants television sets, video cassette r ecorders, rewinders, and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a vide o tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out of vid eo tapes. MARION REYNOLDS STOGNER v. CALIFORNIA US Supreme Court No. 01-1757, June 26, 2003 Overview. California enacted a criminal statute of limitations in 1993 which exp anded the time to prosecute a child sex abuse case if the original statute of li mitations period had expired and the prosecution of the child sex abuse case was initiated within one year of the victim s report to the police. Facts. The defendant Stogner was charged with child occurred between 1955 and 1973, and at the time the e occurred the statute of limitations in California f California prosecuted Stogner under a new statute sex abuse for offenses that offenses were alleged to hav was three years. The state o of limitations.

Issue. Does the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution permit th e prosecution of a criminal offense which has been previously time-barred by a s tatute of limitations. Held. The United States Supreme Court held that the California law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court stated that th e California law threatens the kinds of harm that the Clause seeks to avoid, for the Clause protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes wit h manifestly unjust and oppressive retroactive effects. The Court also emphasized that California s new statute of limitations inflicts punishment in cases that we

re not subject to punishment because the original statute of limitations had run . Finally, the Court stated that numerous courts have concluded that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids resurrection of a time-barred prosecution. Andresons Group, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 114928. January 21, 1997 FACTS: Petitioner questions the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the tw o orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan City, Branch 122 which de nied private respondents Motion to Dismiss petitioner s complaint on the ground of lis pendens. Private respondent Willy Denate entered into an agency agreement with petitioner as its commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits in Davao City. November 8, 1991 Denate filed a civil action for collection of sum of money agai nst petitioner in RTC of Davao City. Denate alleged he was entitled to the amoun t of P882,107.95, representing commissions that petitioner failed and refused to pay. December 19, 1991 Petitioner filed complaint for collection of money from Denate amounting to P1,618,467.98 after deducting commissions and remittances in RTC o f Kalookan. February 5, 1992 Denate filed a Motion to Dismiss the case filed against him by petitioner on the ground of lis pendens, citing the case filed earlier in RTC of Davao. February 14, 1992 petitioner filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. April 24, 1992 RTC of Kalookan decides that the instant motion was without merit since jurisdiction has already been acquired by the RTC of Kalookan. May 29, 1992 Denate filed Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC on July 1, 1992. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which set a side the order of the trial court. ISSUE: Should the action in the Kalookan RTC be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens? HELD: Yes. To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action an d relief sought. It is also required that the identity be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successf ul, amount to res judicata on the case on hand. All these requisites are present in the instant case. Petitioner s argument that t he Davao Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties while the Kalo okan Court already did is untenable. A civil action is commenced by filing a com plaint with the court. (Investors Finance Corp. v. Elarde, 163 SCRA 60 1988) Nei ther is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens sho uld apply. (Salacup v. Maddela 91 SCRA 275,279 1979) In conceptualizing lis pendens, litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy a gainst multiplicity of suits. The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatio us. The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case yield to th e earlier. The criterion used in determining which case should be abated is the more appropriate action or which court would be in a better position to serve the interests of justice. Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to hear and try the case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said a rea.

ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CA GR No. 117897, May 14, 1997. SCRA 272 FACTS: In 1971, Islamic leaders organized and incorporated the ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF T HE PHILIPPINES (IDP). In the same year, IDP purchased property in Culiat, Tandang Sora, Q.C. In 1972, Martial Law was declared and most members fled to escape political pros ecution. Thereafter, two Muslim groups came about, the Carpizo Group and the Abbas/Tamano group. Both claim to be the legitimate IDP. In 1986, SEC declared that neither were legitimate IDP. Both were prescribed to prepare and adopt by-laws for submission. Once approved, elections can occur but neither adhered In 1989, with no properly concluded Board of Trustees of the IDP, the Caprizo Gr oup, sold two lands to private respondent Inglesia Ni Cristo (INC) authorizing M s Ligon as the mortgagee. In 1991, the Tamano Group, filed a petition (SEC case No.4012) before the SEC se eking to declare null and void the sale of property by the Caprizo Group. Tamana won the case in 1993. Meanwhile, the INC filed a civil case no. Q-90-6937 against Ms. Ligon, to comply with Caprizo s obligations, which was ruled in 1991 in favor of the INC despite t he judge being informed of the SEC case No. 4012. Tamano Group sought to intervene in the civil case no. Q-90-6937, but was denied on grounds of lack of juridical personality of the IDP-Tamano Group. Ligon,then filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari in GRN SP-279 73 which was dismissed so she further petitioned it for review before the Suprem e Court docketed as GRN 107751. In 1993, INC filed a Motion of Intervention in SEC case No. 4012 but was denied because the cause had been final and executory. INC filed it in the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari docketed as CA-C.G. SP No. 33295. The petition was granted in 1993. IDP-Tamano Group then filed for instant petition for review in 1994 stating the Court of Appeals gravely erred in: Not upholding the jurisdiction of the SEC to declare nullity of the sale. Encouraging multiplicity of suits Not applying the principles of estoppel and laches. While this pended, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in GRN 107751. Ms. Ligon s petition denied and affirmed the 1992 decision in CA-G.R No. SP-27973. ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata applies in the Court of Appeals decision for grantin g INC s petition in CA-C.G. SP No. 33295. Whether or not the Courts of Appeal commit reversible error in setting aside tha t portion of the SEC s Decision in SEC case no. 4012 which declared the sale of la nd between the IDP-Caprizo group and INC, null and void. HELD: NO. Res judicata basically means that the case before the court has already been resolved by another court, with the same parties, therefore the court at hand s hould be dismissed. There are two concepts by which res judicata is known. The f irst being bar by prior judgment where between the first case where the judgment w as rendered and the second case the judgment was invoked, there is identity in p arties, subject matters, and cause of action. When the three identities are pres ent the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. The other concept which is conclusive of judgment , wher ein there is identity of parties in both cases but no identity of cause of actio n, then the judgment is conclusive in the second case only as to those matters a ctually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely in volve d therein.

Neither of these cases find res judicata because while there is identity in the subject matter (the IDP property), there is no identity in the parties of both c ases. YES. The CA committed reversible error as according to Sec 3 and 5 of the Presid ential Decree No. 902-A, there can be no question as to the authority of the SEC to pass ruling on who the legitimate Board of Trustees are within a corporation . Based on this reasoning that they can declare who the Board are, it can also b e said that they can declare those that are not on the Board or are considered i llegitimate. Since it was found that no correct elections occurred nor any rulin g was passed on as to who was the legitimate IDP, Caprizo had no right, under th e IDP s name to sell any land that belonged to the IDP. This is found in Article 1 318 of the New Civil Code which states that to constitute a valid contract all t hree elements must be present: consent of the contracting parties, object certai n which is the subject matter of the contract and cause of obligation which is e stablished. Clearly, there was no consent of the contracting parties since the C aprizo group is not the legitimate owner. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals G.R No. 110921. January 28, 1998 Facts: On March 16, 1989, petitioner Baltazar Villanueva filed a complaint for reconvey ance of property with damages against Grace Villanueva and Francisco Villanueva. The complaint was dismissed on October 29, 2990 for failure of the plaintiff and his counsel to appear during the pre-trial and trial. A motion for reconsideration was filed to reinstate the complaint but was denied by the Court finding the motion not well taken and not meritorious. On November 26, 1991, petitioner filed another complaint at the Regional Trial C ourt, OC, for annulment of title and damages with prayer for a temporary restrai ning order and/or writ of preliminary injunction involving the same real propert y. A motion to dismiss was file by private respondent on the ground that the petiti oner s cause of action is barred by prior judgment to which petitioner filed an op position. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court, in the exerci se of its equity jurisdiction would not disregard the fundamental principle that the rules of procedure are not to be applied with rigidity since they are desig ned to help secure justice, not to override the same. Furthermore, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint. The same was admitte d by the trial court. The private respondents moved to dismiss raising once again the reasons for foru m-shopping, res judicata and estoppel. The trial court denied said motion to dismiss. The private respondents filed a petiotion for certiorari with the Court of Appea ls assailing the orders of the lower court. The C.A rendered a decision upholding the ground for dismissal but urge private respondents there to elevate this decision to the Supreme Court who alone has po wer to suspend the rules. ISSUES Whether or not res judicata applies to the two complaints filed by the petitione r? If res judicata is applicable, whether or not the facts and circumstances are ju stifiable for the relaxation or suspension of res judicata in favor of obtaining substantial justice? HELD Yes, res judicata applies to both cases since all four elements for res judicata are present. These are:

a) The former judgment or order must be final b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered a fter a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case. c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the sueje ct matter and the parties d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties , of subject matter and of cause of action. No, because the facts and circumstances are not justifiable for the relaxation o f res judicata. The records show no reason for petitioner s failure to prosecute. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for not being well-taken and not meritorious. Moreover, if petitioner felt aggrieved by the order of denial h e should have filed an appeal, therefrom, instead of allowing said order to beco me final and executory. The fact that petitioner did not further pursue the matt er signifies that either he acknowledged the correctness of the order or he real ized that it was not worth continuing the case. Moreover, it took him ten months to file the second case after the dismissal of the first, exhibiting a lackadai sical attitude unworthy of judicial sympathy. For his fault and complacence, pet itioner cannot now take refuge under the rule that justice should not be sacrifi ce to technicality. Therefore the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. South Central Bell Telephone Company vs. Alabama Facts: 1. The state (Alabama) requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based upon the firm s capital. Domestic firm (organized under the laws of Alabama) must pay tax in an a mt. Equal to 1% of the par value of the firm s stock Foreign firm (organized under the laws of a state other than Alabama) mu st pay tax in an amt. Equal to 0.3% of the value of the actual amount of capital employed in Alabama Alabama law grants domestic firms considerable leeway in controlling their own t ax base and liability as the firm can set its stock s value at a level well below its book or market value. Alabama law does not grant a foreign firm the same ben efits. In 1986, the Reynolds company and 3 other foreign corporations sued Alabama s tax authorities because they wanted a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had p aid on the reason that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations. Thoug h this tax law may benefit the foreign companies, it was more beneficial for loc al companies because the latter can shrink its tax base significantly simply by setting the par value of its stock at a low level. As a result, accdg to Reynold s, the tax burden that the foreign corps. has was much higher than the burden on domestic corporations and the tax thus violated both the Commerce and Equal pro tection clauses (see reference). The Alabama Supreme court rejected the claims. W/o denying that the franchise ta x imposed a special burden upon foreign corps. While the Supreme Court was deciding on that, a different foreign corp, South Ce ntral Bell (SCB) brought this lawsuit. They had the same claim as Reynolds thoug h in different tax years. They agreed to wait for the outcome of the former clai m before filing the suit. The evidence they presented showed that the Reynolds were wrong, that the tax th e domestic corps pay does not offset discrimination in the franchise tax. The tr ial court agreed with the Bell plaintiffs that their evidence, taken together wi th the recent Com. Clause cases, clearly and abundantly demonstrates that the fra nchise tax on foreign corps. Discriminates against them for no other reason than the state of their incorporation. The state, argued that the Alabama SC s decision rested upon an adequate state gro und namely state-law principles. The SC rejected its plaintiffs claims on the mer

its and relied upon Reynolds Metals. There is no valid defense that could be mad e. Turning to the merits, it is concluded that this court s commerce clause precedent requires the Court to hold Alabama s franchise tax unconstitutional. Issue: The basic question of this case is whether the franchise tax Alabama assesses on foreign corporations violates the Commerce Clause Whether the Alabama courts refusal to permit the Bell s plaintiffs to raise their c onstitutional claims because of res judicata (a matter not open to controversy) d eprived the plaintiffs of the due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth ame ndment Whether the franchise tax discriminates against interstate commerce, in violati on of the commerce clause HELD: The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded f or further proceedings not inconsistent the following opinion. Rather than dispute any of these matters, the State says that the flaw in the pet itioners claim lies not in the application to the Alabama s corporate franchise tax of this Court s recent negative CC cases. The flaw lies rather in the negative CC cases themselves. The State adds that the Court should formally reconsider and aba ndon its negative CC THUS answered the court, We will not entertain this invitation however because t he State did not make clear it intended to make this argument until it filed its brief on the merits. Turning to the merits, it is concluded that this court s commerce clause precedent requires us to hold Alabama s franchise tax unconstitutional. Justice Connor, concurring the state s failure to properly raise its challenge to o ur negative commerce clause supports a decision not to pass on the merits of thi s claim. Justice Thomas, concurring I agree it would be inappropriate to take up the Stat e s invitation to reconsider our negative CC doctrine in this case because the Stat e did not make clear it intended to make this argument until it filed its brief on the merits. REFERENCE: The Commerce Clause is a grant of power to Congress, not an express limitation o n the power of the states to regulate the economy. At least four possible interpr etations of the Commerce Clause have been proposed. First, it has been suggested that the Clause gives Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce. Under th is interpretation, states are divested of all power to regulate interstate comme rce. Second, it has been suggested that the Clause gives Congress and the states concurrent power to regulate commerce. Under this view, state regulation of comme rce is invalid only when it is preempted by federal law. Third, it has been sugge sted that the Clause assumes that Congress and the states each have their own mu tually exclusive zones of regulatory power. Under this interpretation, it becomes the job of the courts to determine whether one sovereign has invaded the exclus ive regulatory zone of the other. Finally, it has been suggested that the Clause by its own force divests states of the power to regulate commerce in certain way s, but the states and Congress retain concurrent power to regulate commerce in m any other ways. This fourth interpretation, a complicated hybrid of two others, t urns out to be the approach taken by the Court in its decisions interpreting the Commerce Clause. People of The Philippines vs. Dioscoro Pinuila No. L-11374. May 30, 1958 Facts:

The defendant A. Bignay, along with co-accused D.Pinuila and Conrado Diaz, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, with the murder of th e sleeping Buenaventura Dideroy in the early morning of October 20,1948 aboard B arge No. 560 of the Visayan Stevedoring Company, which was at that time anchored offshore from the mouth of the Victorias River in the municipality of Victorias in the province of Negros Oriental. The mastermind of the crime was D.Pinuila, who had a grudge against the victim, and it was he who paid the other two an amo unt of two pesos each for their help in killing B.Dideroy. They were witnessed b y Bonifacio del Cano, a shipmate of the victim, who awoke and managed to survive the attack; he positive ly identified them later at the trial. A motion for dismissal was filed by the d efense on the grounds that the jurisdiction of the Court had not yet been establ ished as the scene of the crime was on a boat floating offshore and not actually on the grounds of the municipality of Victorias. The motion was sustained by th e Court and the case dismissed, but this was appealed by the Government. Despite the objections of the defense who invoked the principle of double-jeopardy, the Court of Appeals decided on March 28,1952 that the jurisdiction of the trial co urt had indeed been proven, therefore the appeal of the Government did not invol ve double-jeopardy and remanded the case for further proceedings. In the interim however, the accused were released due to a court order by a petition fo r habeas corpus, and only A.Bignay was able to be reapprehended for a resumption of criminal proceedings. During the retrial, the defense no longer raised the i ssue of double jeopardy, and concentrated on the issue of the validity of eviden ce beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant was found guilty of having committed m urder, but after taking into consideration the time he had already spent incarce rated before his release and after his rearrest, a total of 7 years, as well as his voluntary surrender and other factors, the court became inclined to be lenie nt to the defendant. By applying the law on indeterminate sentence, the court th en found him entitled to the minimum degree of the penalty for the crime reclusi on temporal, thus sentencing him to a term of not less than 12 years of prsion m ajor and not more than 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Howe ver, while the case was discussed and before it was voted upon, Chief Justice Pa ras raised the question of double-jeopardy and claimed that the defendant should now be acquitted, having been placed in jeopardy already once. Issue: Whether or not the defendant is indeed in double-jeopardy, and should therefore be acquitted. Held: No. In the opinion of the Court, with 9 justices concurring and 2 dissenting, th e defendant has already been proven guilty indeed beyond reasonable doubt, and t he question of double-jeopardy had already been answered when the Court revoked the original order for dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for fu rther proceedings, in the process ruling that appeal did not violate prohibition against double-jeopardy. Since the ruling had already long been decided, it sho uld have already become "the law of the case", meaning that it could not be modi fied or changed anymore, especially since the defense failed to raise the questi on of double-jeopardy in the retrial, and this failure may be regarded as a waiv er of that particular defense. Furthermore, while the "law of the case" rule is subject to judicial discretion, this discretion is supposed to be used wisely wi th the objective of helping justice by punishing the guilty, not thwarting it by letting the guilty escape unpunished. Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co. G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991 Facts: Solid Manila Corp. owned a parcel of land in the vicinity of another parcel owne

d by Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. The private respondent (i.e., Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.) acquired the land from a prior owner who, in the deed of sale, indicated an easement of way (covering approximately 914 sq. m. of private respondent s lot) for the construction of a pr ivate alley In consideration for the easement, the prior owner decreased the selling price b y Php 287,200 The construction of the private alley was annotated in the private respondent s ti tle. The pertinent provisions were: alley shall not be closed alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be pla ced thereon shall allow the public to use the same Sometime in 1983, private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unha mpered use of the alley While the appeal of the private respondent at the Court of Appeals (CA) was in p rogress for the original case, the private respondent filed for a petition at th e Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the annotation. The court granted such p etition. Issues: Whether or not the CA erroneously reversed the trial court s summary judgement? Whether or not the CA erroneously held that merger had extinguished the easement ? Held: The Supreme Court (SC) ruled in favor of the petitioner on both counts. The dec ision of the CA was set aside; the RTC s decision was however reinstated. Additio nally, the private respondent and its counsel were asked to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court. The counsel was also facing admin istrative charges for forum shopping. Rationale: The Supreme Court found merit on the petition with regard to the summary judgmen t rendered by the RTC. The SC invalidated the private respondent s defense of mer ger because of the defense s impossibility. Also, the SC ruled that the sale undo ubtedly preserved the existing easement which affirmed the RTC s decision to rende r a summary judgment. Further, the decision of the CA on the case referred to a t the last bullet point of the case facts concerning the nullification of the ea sement (i.e., the annotation) became the LAW OF THE CASE. By the CA s decision, t he rights of the parties regarding the easement were established. This was used by the SC to render a favorable holding to the petitioner. The SC ruled that there was no merger since there was no full ownership of both lands. Besides, the SC pointed out that the servitude was a personal one. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION VS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO . INC. 51 SCRA 189. NO. L-31195, JUNE 5, 1973 FACTS Petitioner/s is a legitimate labor union composed of employees of the respondent . Petitioners (Tolentino, Padgrigano, Roxas, de Leon, Paciente, Vacuna, Pagcu, M unsod are officers of PBMEO That on March 1, 1969, the union decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malaca nang on March 4 to protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Those par ticipating in the demonstration are workers in the 1st shift, regular 2nd and 3r d shifts. The unions informed the Company of their planned demonstration On March 2, the Company learned of the demonstration and on March 3 at 11 am, it

called for a meeting where the union confirmed the demonstration. The Company warned the union that the workers of the 1st shift, without leave of absence approved by the company who fail to report on March 4 shall be dismisse d because it is a violation of the NO LOCKOUT, NO STRIKE in the existing Collect ive Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Another meeting was convoked at 5 pm reiterating the same and appealing to the P BMEO but the union countered that it was too late to change their plans. March 4, at 950 am, PBMEO adviser Wilfred Ariston sent a cablegram to the compan y containing REITERATING REQUEST EXCSUE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMO MARCH 4, 1969 Company filed charges against petitioner in the 1st shit with violation of the C BA Under the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), PBMEO was found guilty of bargain ing in bad faith and the officers of PBMEO, as a consequence, were considered to have lost their status as employees in PBMCI On Sept 19, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said order dated S ep 15 on the grounds that it is contrary to law and evidence as well asked for 1 0 days within which to file their arguments Their motion was 2 days late according to the rules of CIR and accordingly DISMI SSED. ISSUES W/N the of the motion for reconsideration filed by PBMEO which was DISMISSED be reversed and the officers of the PBMEO who were removed from employment be reins tated. HELD Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on technicality (bein g 2 days late) was rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have domin ance over procedural rules.) And, the company was directed to reinstate the eigh t officers with full backpay from date of separation minus the one day s pay and w hatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separa tion from service. (The removal from employment of the officers were deemed too harsh a punishment for their actions) ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999. FACTS: LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents. Motion for Reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme Court. Theodore O. Te f or petitioner, Adviento, Mallonga, Adviento Law Offices for private complainant Rodessa Baby R. Echegaray. The decision in this case which was death penalty through lethal injection has b een declared final and executory by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC Br. 104, Que zon City. The Secretary of Justice compelled the Judge Ponferrada to give him a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated Nov. 17, 1998 bearing the date of ex ecution of convice Leo Echegaray for there was no exact date published. The date of execution was set at 3:00 p.m. of January 4, 1999. A Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order was filed by pe titioner on December 28, 1998 due to supervening events about the review and rep eal of R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) and R.A. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law). The Supreme Court held a special session on January 4, 1999 to deliberate on pet itioner s Very Urgent Motion. The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order and suspended the executi on until June 15, 1999. The Solicitor General filed a Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconside ration stating that the Congress would reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659.

The Supreme Court granted the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifted the Temporary Restrainin g Order issued January 4, 1999. ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on finality of judgment has deprived the Supreme Court o f its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. HELD: No. The finality of judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powe rs over the case. According to the well established jurisprudence of Retired Ju stice Camilo Quiason on this issue: the finality of a judgment does not mean tha t the court has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of a judgmen t, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains jurisdiction to exec ute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same . The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes fin al. G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001 ESTRADA vs. Ombudsman G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001 Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was el ected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-Presid ent. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. On October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singso n went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving mi llions of pesos from jueteng lords. October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, accused the pet itioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson fr om November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from G overnor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. This led to the resign ation of economic advisers, department heads, etc. on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment. This caused political convulsio ns in both houses of Congress. On November 20, the Senate formally opened the im peachment trial of the petitioner. On December 7, the impeachment trial started. Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank, testified that sh e was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their b ank on February 4, 2000. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as pet itioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petit ioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing c harges of insider trading. January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judge s ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evi dence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under t he name "Jose Velarde." By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven senators. On J anuary 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. January 20 , at 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly tr ansfer of power started at Malacaang Mabini Hall. Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resul ted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all m orning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the o

ath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon, C hief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of t he Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immed iately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On February 7, the Se nate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus of ficio and has been terminated. After his fall, the petitioner's legal problems a ppeared in clusters. The ombudsman, to investigate the charges, created a specia l panel. The petitioner filed for a petition with a prayer of preliminary injunc tion. Issues: 1. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question 2. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Held: 1. No. The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. 2. No. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character . They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. These crimes, especially plunder which carries the dea th penalty, are not covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting p resident. The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macap agal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. Tecson, et al vs. Comelec GR 161434, March 3, 2004 FACTS: On December 31, 2003, Ronald Allan Kelley, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., file d his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party at the Commis sion on Elections. On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify the said candidate as he had misrepresented hi mself in his COC for he was not a natural born Filipino. He was able to produce several public documents that supported his petition to the COMELEC. On January 23, 2004, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petitioner s oon after filed for reconsideration but it was denied on February 6, 2004. Four days after, February 10, 2004, the petitioner assailed the decision of the COMEL EC to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/n Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr. is a natural born Filipino c itizen or not. HELD: YES. FPJ is a natural-born Filipino as it was proven that his father was also a Filipino citizen. This statement in turn was proven as documents were able to sh ow that Lorenzo Pou, FPJ s grandfather, was a Filipino. The death certificate of P uo presented by the respondent shows that Pou died at the age of 84 in 1954 in P angasinan. By taking into account Pou s age at the year of his death, he would hav e been born in 1870. Furthermore, the petitioner was not able to show that Pou w as not in the Philippines during this period of time. It would then have to be a ssumed that Pou was in the Philippine Islands all this time. This would make Pou a Filipino citizen by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which declared that Filipino citizens are those who resided in the Philippine Islands. Pou s citizens hip would then extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of FPJ. By the time FPJ w as born, the 1935 Constitution had taken into effect and it had declared that ch ildren, regardless of whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, are considere

d to be Filipino citizens if their fathers are Filipino citizens themselves. Thi s fact also erases any doubts that were raised by the petitioner that FPJ was al so illegitimate which would have prevented him from taking on the citizenship of his father. CRUZAN vs DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et. al. 497 US 261, 111 L Ed 2d 224, 110 S Ct 284 [No. 88-1503] FACTS Petitioners are the parents of Nancy Beth Cruzan who filed a certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. A car accident left Nancy Cruzan in a persistent vegetative state. After it beca me apparent that Nancy Cruzan had practically no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents asked the hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures keeping her alive. The employees refused to h onor the request without court approval. Her parents then sought judicial authorization of their request. A guardian ad l item was appointed for their daughter. Following the hearing, the Missouri trial court, directed the employees of the hospital to carry out the parent s request. Because based on the evidence, Nancy Cruzan will never recover because of the gr avity of the injuries she sustained. However, both the state and the guardian ad litem appealed the decision. The Sup reme Court of Missouri reversed the decision, expressing that: although the woman was in a persistent vegetative state, she was neither dead with in the meaning of Missouri statutory definition of death nor terminally ill; the woman s right to refuse treatment whether such right proceeded from a constitu tional right of privacy or common-law right to refuse treatment did not outweigh M issouri s strong policy favoring the preservation of life; the woman s conversation with her housemate was unreliable for the purpose of dete rmining her intent, and thus insufficient to support the parents claim to exercis e substituted judgment on the woman s behalf; no person could assume the choice of terminating medical treatment for an incomp etent person in the absence of either formalities required under the living will statute or clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence, which was absent i n the case at hand. ISSUE Whether or not, the Due Process Clause allows Missouri to require an incompetent patient in an irreversible persistent vegetative state to remain on life suppor t. HELD YES. Missouri requirement that incompetent s wishes as to withdrawal of life susta ining treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence held not violative of the due process. The due process clause of the Federal Constitution Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid a state from requiring that evidence of an incompetent individual s wishes as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be proved by clear and convinc ing evidence, and thus a state could apply such standard in proceedings where a guardian sought discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in persistent vegetative state. The Missouri Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error in deciding that the woman s desire to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn was not proved at tri al pursuant to the standard of clear and convincing evidence enunciated by the c ourt in its decision. Since the due process clause did not require a state to repose the right to judg e whether an incompetent patient wishes to have life-sustaining medical treatmen t withdrawn with anyone but the patient herself, a state was not required to rep ose a right of substituted judgment as to such decision with close family member

s of the patient, and it could choose to defer to only the patient s wishes. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON vs. PAULA COLE JONES FACTS: William Jefferson Clinton, was elected president in 1992 and re-elected in 1996. His term expires Jan. 20, 2001. In 1991 he was governor of State of Arkansas. Paul a Corbin Jones lived in Arkansas in 1991 and was employee of the Arkansas Indust rial Development Commission. On May 6, 1994, respondent filed a complaint in the US DC for the District of Arkansas by naming petitioner and Danny Ferguson, a fo rmer State Police officer, as defendants. The complaint alleges two federal claim s and two state claims. The allegations were that- on May 8, 1991 during an official conference held at the Excelsior Hotel in Arkansas, the petitioner alleges that Ferguson persuaded her to leave her desk and to visit the petitioner in a business suite at the hot el where petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances that respondent vehemently rejected. Respondent further claims that her superiors at work subsequently dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner and changed her duties to punish her for rejecting those advances. Finally, respondent alleges that after petitioner was e lected president, Ferguson defamed her by making a statement to a reported that implied she had accepted petitioner's alleged overtures and that various persons authorized to speak for the president publicly branded her a liar by denying th at incident had occurred. In response to complaint, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pre sidential immunity until he is no longer president at which time the respondent may refile the instant suit. DC Judge denied the motion on immunity grounds but o rdered any trial stayed until the ends of petitioner's presidency. Both parties a ppealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motio n to dismiss but reversed the order of postponing the trial. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of petitioner that he has immunity from suit groun ded purely in the identity of his office should be granted or not. HELD: Respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. An official's abso lute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office and not beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capaci ty. "The sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's jus tifying purposes." FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND 380 U.S. 51. March 1, 1965. FACTS: Freedman exhibited the film Revenge at Daybreak at his Baltimore theater without s ubmitting the film to the Maryland Board of censors. Freedman was convicted of exhibiting a motion picture without submitting it firs t to the Maryland State Board of Censors for their approval. He argued that censorship impaired freedom of expression. The conviction was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reverses. ISSUE: whether censorship of a film is a violation of the First and Fourteenth A mendments (Freedom of expression) HELD: 1. Submitting a film for review by the censors is not necessarily unconstit

utional. 2. A licensing statute can be challenged if it endangers freedom of express ion. NEAR v. STATE OF MINNESOTA No. 91. (283 U.S. 697) June 1, 1931 FACTS: In 1927, defendant J.M. Near, publisher of a periodical known as The Saturday Pre ss was tried by Floyd B. Olson, County Attorney of Hennepin County, in behalf of the State of Minnesota, Near was charged with violation of a state statute. Chapter 285 of the Session L aws of Minnesota for the year 1925 which provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical. Near invoked the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the US. Complainant alleged that The Saturday Press, on September 24, 1927 and on 8 subs equent dates until November 19, 1927, published articles which were malicious, sc andalous and defamatory concerning certain public officials the Minneapolis Tribu ne, the Jewish race and members of the grand jury impaneled in November, 1927. The district court found the defendant guilty. Judgment was entered that The Sat urday Press as a public nuisance and enjoined the defendants from producing, edit ing, publishing, circulating, having in their possession, selling or giving away any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newsp aper as defined by law and also from further conducting said nuisance under the name and title of said The Saturday Press or any other name or title. Near appealed from this judgment to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Court affir med the judgment. Near then appealed to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: whether a statute permitting suppression by injunction of business of pub lishing malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper or periodical, is an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment which protects press from previous rest raint on publication. HELD: a statute permitting suppression by injunction of business of publishing malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper or periodical, is an infringement of the liberty of the pre ss guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the public officers named i n the case and those associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be deemed impeccable, cannot affect the conclusion that the statute imposes an unc onstitutional restraint on publication. Judgment reversed People of the Philippines vs. Cayat [No. 45987 May 05, 1939] FACTS: Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was prosecuted for violat ing sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639. Cayat, a member of the non-Christian tribe s had willfully, unlawfully, and illegally received, acquired, and have in his p ossession and his control, a bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-caled native wines and liquors which the members of that tribes have accustomed themselves t make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial co urt have found him guilty of the crime and charged him to pay a fine of fifty pe sos or suffer imprisonment in case of solvency. Section 2 of Act No. 1639 states that it is unlawful for any native of the Phili ppine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, or have

in possesion or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or any intoxicating l iquors of any kind other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the m embers of such tribes have been accustomed themselves prior to the passage of th e Act and it is the duty of any police officer to seize and destroy any such liq uors found unlawfully possessed by the members of a non-Christian tribe Section 3 of Act No. 1639 states that any violation of the provisions of section s 1 and 2 of this Act shall be punishable by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months in the discretion of the court The Act was created because the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the n on-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes thereby hamper ing the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilizati on. The appellant challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the following grou nds: a.) that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; b.) that it is violative of the due process clause of the constitution; and c.) that it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state ISSUE: Whether or not Act 1639 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: a.) that i t is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; b.) that it is violative of the due process clause of the constitution; and c.) that it is an i mproper exercise of the police power of the state HELD: NO. Act number 1639 is not unconstitutional. 1. Act 1639 is not discriminatory and it does not deny the equal protection of t he laws. The counsel for the appellant mentioned that the Act causes discriminat ion among non-Christian tribes. Act 1639 was created to secure peace and harmony and not meant to mar the civilization and culture of these tribes. The guarante e of equal protection before the law is not violated by a legislation based on r easonable classification such as Act No. 1639. Under the constitution, for an Ac t to be reasonable, it must rest through substantial distinctions, must be germa ne to the purposes of the law, must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act 1639 rests on substantial distinctions because the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Chri stian tribes. Act 1639 is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to ensure peace a nd order in and among non-Christian tribes because in the past, as disclosed by the lower courts, the free use of highly intoxicating liquor by the non-Christia n tribes often resulted to lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering the Governme nt s effort to raise their standard of life and civilization Act 1639 is not limited to existing conditions only. The Act is intended to appl y for all times as long as those conditions exists. The legislature understood t hat civilization is a slow process and with it must go measures of security and protection Act 1639 apply equally to all members of the same class. 2. Act 1639 does not violate the due process clause of the constitution. The app ellant contends that the provision of law empowering any police officer to seize and destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possesion of a membe r of a non-Christian tribe is a violation of the due process of law provided by the Constitution. But Act No. 1639 is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, notices and hearings are not necessary to constitute the due process of law. The due process of law means simply: that there shall be a law prescribed in harmon y with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; that it should be reasonable in its operations; that it shall be enforced according t o the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and that it shall be applicable t o all citizens of the state or to all of a class. Thus, for example, a person s pr operty ay be seized by the government in payment for taxes w/o judicial hearing.

3. Act No. 1639 is not an improper exercise of the police power of the state. An y measure intended to promote health, peace, prosperity, harmony, and wealth is a legitimate exercise of the police power. Act No. 1639 is designed to promote p eace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to thei r moral and intellectual growth and eventually hasten their unification and equa lization with the rest of their Christian brothers. Act No. 1639 does not seek to mark non-Christian tribes as inferior. The Governm ent has endeavored to raise their culture and civilization to secure them the be nefits of their progress with the ultimate end of placing them with their other members of society on the basis of true equality. PEOPLE v. MARTI G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991 Facts: On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 AM, appellant Andre Marti and common -law wife Shirley Reyes went to the booth of the Manila Packaging and Export Serv ices in Pistang Pilipino Complex, Manila, to send 4 gift-wrapped packages to his friend Walter Fierz of Switzerland. The proprietress, Anita Reyes, asked for the packages to be examined and inspect ed, appellant refused. The supposed content of the packages were books, cigars and gloves. The proprietor, Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure before final d elivery to Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emanated from the glove box, his curiosity aroused, discovered dried leaves contained in the packages for the gloves. Mr. Reyes wrote a letter and sent samples of the dried leaves to the Narcotics S ection of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination at about 1:30 PM of the same day. After being interviewed by the Chief of the N arcotics Section, Mr. Reyes and 3 NBI agents and a photographer proceeded to Mr. Reyes office to inspect the remaining 3 other packages. The packages that supposed to contain cigars and books were opened by Mr. Reyes and was also discovered to contain dried leaves, which were dried marijuana leav es. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the boxes after signing Recei pt , acknowledging custody of the packages. On August 27, 1987, the appellant was invited by the NBI to shed light on the at tempted shipment of the dried marijuana leaves, which were examined by the Foren sic Chemistry section of the NBI. The appellant denied that the packages were his, instead he claimed that after a 30 minute conversation with a German national named Michael, the latter request ed him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000 for the cost of shipment because the German was about to leave the country the following day. The lower court convicted the appellant of violating RA 6425, or the Dangerous D rugs Act. The appellant appealed the decision. Issues: Whether the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched an d seized objects contained in the parcels. Whether the lower court erred in convicting appellant despite the undisputed fac t that his rights under the constitution while under custodial proceedings were not observed. Whether the lower court erred in not giving credence to the explanation of the a ppellant on how the four parcels came into his possession. HELD: No. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to

acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alle ged unlawful intrusion by the government. The constitutional proscription agains t unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus it can only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arb itrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If a search is made upon the request of the law enforcers, a warrant must be generally be first secured i f it to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at t he behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, and without the intervention of police authorities, the r ight of unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of pr ivate individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. Records show that there is nothing to indicate, an undisputed fact, that appellan t was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements witho ut assistance of counsel. The appellant s disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human expe rience. It can easily be fabricated. Evidence to be believed, must no only com e from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342[1968]..) Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 699 [GRN. 107383, February 20, 1996] FACTS:Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo M artin. That petitioner accused her husband of infidelity. That on March 26, 1982 , petitioner went to the clinic of private respondent, who is a doctor of medici ne, without the consent of the latter. That on the same date mentioned, petition er opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents and pape rs consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged param ours. The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in a cas e for legal separation filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this action below fo r recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, decided in favor of private respon dent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties described and orderin g petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal and mora l damages and attorney s fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, petitioner and h er attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:W/N the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence. HELD:NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are ina dmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of com munication and correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3,Par.1,Art.III,1987 Consti) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggriev ed by her husband s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional p rovision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision in the constitut ion is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order r equires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3,Par.1,Art.III,1987 Consti) Any violati on of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose i n any proceeding. (Sec.3,Par.2,Art.III,1987 Consti) A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right t o privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available t o him or to her. The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other wit

hout consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22,Rule130 ,Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marria ge, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24,Rule130,Rules of Court) PETITION DENIED. Goesaert v. Cleary 335 US 404 Facts: The case is an appeal from the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, actions by Valentine Goesaert, Margaret Goesaert, Gertrude Nadrosk i and Caroline McMahon against Owen J. Cleary and others to restrain the enforce ment of Pub.Acts Mich.1945, No. 133, 19a. from a judgment denying an injunction of the enforcement of the Michigan law. The particular public act is claimed to be in violation of the equal protection clause that the state of Michigan is pla ying favorites among women without rhyme and reason by making an exception in fa vor of the wives and daughters of the owners of the liquor establishment instead of denying to all women the opportunities for bartending. The judgment was affirmed with Justice Rutledge, Justice Douglas and Justice Mur phy dissenting. Issue: Whether or not the enforcement of Public Acts of Michigan 1945, No. 133, 19a is in violation of the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment* Pub.Acts Mich 1945, No. 133 19a: Michigan Statue requiring licensing of bartende rs in cities of 50,000 or more but providing that no female shall be licensed un less she is the wife or daughter of the male owner of licensed liquor establishm ent The equal protection clause precludes irrational discrimination as between perso ns or groups of persons in the incidence of a law, but does not require situatio ns which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they we re the same Held: No. Although Michigan cannot forbid females generally from being barmaids/barten ders and at the same time make an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of the owners of liquor establishments, the US Constitution does not require sit uations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though the y were the same. Michigan has not violated its duty to afford equal protection of its laws since bartending by women may, in allowable legislative judgment, give ri se to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if it believes th at as to a defined group of females other factors are operating to eliminate or reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition. The Michi gan law therefore believes that ownership of a bar by a barmaid s husband or fathe r minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid. Dissenting Judges: The statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal prote ction for the statute arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners o f liquor establishments. While a male owner may employ his wife or daughter as b armaids, a female bar owner may neither work as a barmaid herself nor employ her daughter in that position, even if a man is present in the establishment to kee p order. O SULLIVAN v. BOERCKEL No. 97-2048. June 30, 1999 FACTS: In 1977, respondent Darren Boerckel was tried in the Circuit of Montgomery Count

y, Illinois, for the rape, burglary, and aggravated battery of an 87-year-old wo man. Central evidence against him was his written confession. Jury convicted him on all three charges. Sentenced to 20-60 years in prison on r ape charge and shorter terms on the other two. Boerckel appealed to Appellate Court of Illinois. His claims were rejected. The court affirmed his convictions and sentences. Boerckel next filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court . The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for leave to appeal, and this C ourt denied Boerckel s subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari. In 94, Boerckel filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC S 2554 in the US Dictrict Court for the Central District of Illinois. The amende d petition asked for relief on 6 grounds: that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights that his confession was not voluntary that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal that his right to discovery of exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland (196 3) was violated Boerckel amended federal habeas petition raised three claims he had not included in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. ISSUE: whether a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requi rement. HELD: In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must pres ent his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review w hen that review is part of the State s ordinary appellate review procedure. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES OF OREGON v SMITH [No. 88-1213, April 17, 1990] FACTS Respondents Smith and Black were fired by a private drug rehabilitation organiza tion because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purpos es at a ceremony of their Native American Church. Their applications for unemplo yment compensation were denied by the State of Oregon under a state law disquali fying employees discharged for work-related misconduct . On grounds of violating th e respondent s First Amendment free exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals re versed. State Supreme Court affirmed but vacated judgment and remanded for a det ermination whether sacramental peyote use is proscribed by State s controlled subs tance law, which makes it felony to knowingly or intentionally possess the drug. Pending that determination, the Court refused to decide whether such use is pro tected in the Constitution. State Supreme Court held that sacramental peyote use violated, and was not excepted from the state law prohibition, but concluded th at prohibition was invalid under Free Exercise Clause ISSUE W/N FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE PERMITS STATE TO PROHIBIT SACRAMENTAL PEYOTE USE AND TH US ALLOW DENIAL OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS TO PERSONS DISCHARGED FOR SUCH USE HELD Free exercise of religion clause permits a state to include religiously inspired use of peyote within the reach of the state s general criminal prohibition on the use of that drug; where there is no contention that the state s drug law represen ts an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, or the raising of one s children in t hose beliefs

The free exercise of religion clause thus permitted Oregon to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspir ed use Generally applicable, religion-neutral criminal laws that have the effect of bu rdening a particular religious practice need not be justified, under free exerci se of religion clause, by a compelling government interest. Webb Vs. De Leon 95-404 Facts : Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with temporary restraining or der and preliminary injunction to annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respond ents Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Crim. Case No. 95-404 Enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned crim inal case dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused there in. On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitio ners Hubert Webb,Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano, Miguel Rodriguez, Joey F ilart, Hospicio Fernandez, Artemio Ventura, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong wit h RAPE and HOMICIDE. As a result, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief Sta te Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation of those c harged with rape and killing on June 30, 1991 Carmela N. Vizconde (19yrs), Estra llita Nicolas-Vizconde(51yrs./mom) and Anne Marie Jennifer(7yrs./sister) in thei r home at #80 W Vinzons, St.,B.F. Homes. During the preliminary Investigation, the NBI presented the following Sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness Maria Jessica M. A lfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime. Sworn statements of two of the former housemaids of the Webb Family in the perso ns of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S. Gaviola Sworn statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991, he was a passenger of UA Flt No. 808 bound for new york and who expressed doubt on whe ther petitioner Webb was his co passenger in the trip Sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime. Sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids , and statements of Normal White (security guard), and Manciano Gatmaitan (engr) . Autopsy reports showing that Carmela had 9 stab wounds, Estrellita 12, and Jenni fer 19. The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa . Petitioner Webb before submitting his counter-affidavit, filed with DOJ a Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the following. Certification issuede by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admissi on to and stay of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9,1991, to October 22,1992. Lab Report SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, M.D. Sworn statements of Gerardo C. Biong other than the S.S. dated Oct 7,1991 Photographs and fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde Residence taken during th e investigation Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al List of names of 135suspects investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated S ept. 2,1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent. Records of Arrest, Interview, and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro oth er than the May 22,1995 conducted by the NBI and other police agencies

Transmittal letter to the NBI, including the reports of investigation conducted by Supt. Rodolfo C. Sision, Regional D.D., NCRC Names of NBI officials/agents composing the task force Jecares, including their respective positions and duties. Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged. The DOJ granted the motion and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. N BI alleged that it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 S.S. of Alfaro. This compelled Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the RTC of Makati, Br,. 63 for t he purpose of obtaining the original said sworn statement. Later on, Atty. Artur o L. Mercader Jr produced a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena decus tecum. The Original was submitted by petitioner Webb to DOJ with other evi dence. Webb failed to receive the copy of BU Report despite his request for its production. Petitioner Webb claims that he didn t commit the crime since he left for the U.S.M arch 1,1991, and returned Oct. 27, 1992. This alibi was reinforced by Honesto Ar agon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo V entura and Pamela Francisco. Bought a bought a bicycle and a 1986 toyota during the period, and was issued by the state of California Driver s License No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991. Submitted a letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Atache of th e US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arriv al at San Francisco, Cali, on March 9,1991, as a passenger of UA flight 808. Hospicio Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ro driguez, and Gerardo Biong submitted S.S. and responses and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Joey Filart and Artemio Ventura failed to file their counter affidavits tho ugh they were served with subpoena in their last known address. Gatchalian, in his S.S.alleged that from 11p.m. of June 29, 1991 until 3a.m. of the following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syy ap, at New Alabang Village, watching video tapes. Also claims petitioner Lejano was with him. On Aug. 8, 1995, the DOJ panel issued a resolution finding Probable Cause to hol d respondents for Trial and recommended that an Information for rape with homici de be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents. This was filed in the RTC of Paranaque under CC No. 95-404 and raffled to branch 258 presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was however Judge Raul de Leon, pairing Judge of Judge Esc ano, who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Aug 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid an suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI befo re his appointment on the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino, who issued new warrants of arrest against petitioners and their co-accused. Aug 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police at Camp Ric ardo Papa Sr., Bicutan. The rest gave themselves up after filing their own petit ions before the court. ISSUE : If petition filed by appellants are of merit Petitioners state the Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest. DOJ panel also gravely abused in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with rape and homicide. DOJ panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their pre liminary investigation DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an Accused. HELD: These petitions were found to be bereft of merit. After going through the S.S., the DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evide

nce against the exculpatory evidence stating basically that.. The documents by respondent Webb to support his alibi can t outweigh the evidence submitted by complainant. Positive identification will outweigh any alibi. Just because he alleged that he was issued several documents in the US, this does not mean that he couldn t have been in the country. Just because a receipt was issued containing the respondents name does not guarantee that it was the actual buyer . Gatchalian s defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano. The procedure entailing the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest was completed. (se c 3,4,5 of rule 126) Judges Tolentino and Lejano did not gravely abuse since the issuance of the warr ant. The issuance of the warrant does not solely depend on their complete and pe rsonal determination of probable cause, but could be satisfied with documents su bmitted by the fiscal on the basis of probable cause. a. Clear insufficiency of evidence on record thus making it necessary for f urther personal examination b. There is an eye witness account given by Alfaro c. The alibi defense of Webb was disputed by the S.S. of their former maids . The respondents were not deprived of their rights, in fact they were proactive i n the preliminary investigations. There was a trial period of 27 days, Alfaro qualified under the qualifications of State Witness. (RA 6982 sec 10) d. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose disch arge is requested e. There is no other direct evidence available except the testimony of the said accused f. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its m aterial points. g. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty h. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protec t his constitutional right to life wHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of disc retion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. ESTRADA [A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001.] FACTS Petitioners are people who filed the request to the Sandiganbayan for this Court to allow the live television and radio coverage of the trial in the mentioned C ourt of the plunder cases against the former President Joseph E. Estrada. Their request is based on the purpose of assuring the public of full transparency in t he proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. It is obvious, for them, that the foregoing cases involve a matter of public concern and interest. Allow ing live radio and television coverage satisfies the constitutional right of eve ry citizen to be informed on matters of public concern. The accused, Mr. Estrada , and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines opposed such request. They contend t hat live radio and television coverage is contrary to what jurisprudence tells u s, wherein the fundamental rights of the accused is to be preferred over the rig ht to public information. They argue that such coverage will not only affect the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine crim inal justice system. They say that live radio and television coverage will not s ubserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. ISSUE W/N THE PETITION FOR THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO ALLOW LIVE TELEVISION AND RADIO COVERA

GE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SAID COURT OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA. HELD THE PETITION IS DENIED. The Sandiganbayan should not allow live television and r adio coverage of the trial in the mentioned Court of the plunder cases against t he former President Joseph E. Estrada. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. This is why the coverage is not totally restricted but is limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. Neverthe less, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process. An accused has a right to public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, mo re than anyone else. Moreover, a public trial is not synonymous to a publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to co me, sit in available seats, conduct with decorum and observe the trial process. Although it is difficult to quantify, it is a fact, nonetheless, that live telev ision and radio coverage indeed has an influence the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges. It can also serve as a form of mental harassment to the defendant. These effects cannot be evaluated but it is farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of pu blic opinion. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof bu t it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a tria l such as we know it now.

People vs. Rodrigueza Facts: NARCOM agent Ciriaco Taduran got a tip from an informerof an on-goingillegalt raffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Taduran posed as a buyer and paid Don Rodrigueza (accused/appelant) P200 in marke for 100 gms. of marijuana in a buy-bust operation but let the accused go. Subsequently,NARCOM agents raided the house of the accused without a search warra arrested his two companions without a warrant of arrest. When accused showed up at the headquarters, he was arrested and told to sign a w counsel without the presence of counsel. RTC convicted accused under the Dangerous Drug Act. Accused appealed. Issue: Did the RTC err and was the Arrest and Seizure violative of the constitut ional rights of the accused? Decision: Judgement Reversed. Reasons: 1. Prosecution erred in using evidence illegally obtained. There was no search and arrest warrant. 2. Sworn statement of the accused waiving counsel was without the presence o ation of Sec. 12(1),Art.II ofthe Phil. Constitution. Agent Taduran, by letting Accused go after the buy-bust, violated the buy-bust p rinciple. Marcos v. Manglapus

Daza v. Singson Bondoc vs. Pineda September 26, 1991, 201 SCRA 792 Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus. Facts: In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M . Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Represe ntative for the fourth district of the province of Pampanga. On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bond oc filed a protest (HRET no. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribu nal (HRET). By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won ove r Pineda by margin of twenty-three (23) votes. The reexamination and reappreciat ion of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc s lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Ceril les to proclaim the winner of the case. Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991 to his Chief Congressman Jose S. Co juangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also but also that he voted for Bondoc consistent with justice and self-resp ect , and to honor gentlemen s agreement among the members of the HRET that they would abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot. Congressman Cojuangco notified the chairman of the tribunal to withdraw the nomi nation and to rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and seeks to cancel t he promulgation of the tribunal s decision in Bondoc v. Pineda case. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its representati ve in House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal at the request of the dominant political party. Ruling: No. If the House Electoral Tribunal would serve the interest of the part y in power, the independence of the Electoral Tribunal as embodied in the Consti tution, will no longer be protected. The resolution of the House of Representati ves removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyal ty to the LDP, because he cast his votes in favor of the Nacionalista Party s cand idate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the Ho use Electoral Tribunal to the Sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which tree justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member woul d be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the treshold of the tribunal. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence-even i ndependence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to p arty and breach of the party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from HRET for hav inf cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion an injustice, and a violation of the constitution. It s resolution of expulsion agai nst Congressman Camasura is therefore, null and void. Alejandrino vs. Quezon

Osmena vs. Pendatun Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317 Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Executive Secretary. Facts: Petitioner challenged the Executive Order no. 284, which in effect, allow s members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretary to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary position, al beit subject to the limitations imposed, runs counter to Sec. 13 Art. VII of the Constitution. Respondent on the hand, argued that the same Constitutional provision provided a proviso stating that unless otherwise provided in this constitution . They furthe r contended that his proviso refers to if allowed by law or by the pressing func tions of his position. Issue: Does the of E.O 284 violates the Constitutional limitation prohibiting ap pointive officials from holding two offices? Ruling: Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose stricter prohibition on President, Vice-President, members of the cabine t, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or emp loyment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. The language of Sec. 13 Art. VII is prohibito ry so that it must be understood as intended to be positive and unequivocal nega tion of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. The 1987 constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, m embers of the cabinet, their deputies or assistant from holding during their ten ure multiple offices or employment in the government except in those cases speci fied in the constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to post held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law an d as required by the primary functions at their office. Sec. 13, Art VII in relation to Sec. 7 par.2 Art. IX-B of the 1987 Const itution, E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that the cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries ma y hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations. E.O. No. 284 allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Swc.13, Art. VII of the Constitution prohibiting them from doing so unless othe rwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. Noblejas v. Teehankee 23 SCRA 405 (1968) Borjal v. CA 301 SCRA 1 (1999) Hizon-Pamintuan v. People 234 SCRA 63 (1994) Garcia v. Mojica 314 SCRA 207 (1999) Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (1986)

Municipality of Malabang v. Benito 27 SCRA 533(1969) Minucher v. CA 397 SCRA 244(1992) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority 384 SCRA 152 (2002) Uy v. Commission on Audit 328 SCRA 607 (2000) UP Board of Regents v. Rasul 200 SCRA 685 (2001) Azarcon v. Bunaga 399 SCRA 365 (2003) People v. Garcia 313 SCRA 279 (1999) Churchhill v. Rafferty 32 Phil 580 (1915) Ass. Small v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 175 SCRA 343 (1989) People v. Fajardo 104 SCRA 443 (1958) Gonzales v. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 (1963) Rodriguez v. Tan 91 PHIL 724 (1952) Manalo v. Sistoza 312 SCRA 239 (1999) In re: Laureta 148 SCRA 382 (1987) EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL OF CEBU MARCH 01, 1995, 219 SCRA 256 Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibitio n Facts: All petitioners are Jehovah s witnesses were expelled from their classes by the school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthe m and recite the patriotic pledge as required by R.A.1265 and D.O.#8 of the DECS . Jehovah s witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing t he national anthem for they believe that those are Acts of worship or religious dev otion which they cannot conscientiously give to anyone except God? They consider t he flag as an image or idol representing the state. The action of the local auth orities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transience s constitution protect s against official control.

Issue: Whether or not the children of Jehovah s witnesses may be expelled from sch ool for disobedience of R.A.1265 and D.O.#8 series of 1955. Ruling Religious freedom is a fundamental right, which is entitled to the highe st priority, and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his creator. We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehova hs witnesse s with regard to the observarnce at the flag ceremony out of respect for their r eligious beliefs, however bizarre those beliefs may join to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them aright to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Wherefore, the position for certiorari and prohibition is granted.

Generoso R. Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals and Nerito L Santos June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 637 J. Grio Aquino Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals Facts Generoso R. Sevilla was acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City. In the advent of the 1986 revolution the OIC Mayor of Cabanatuan appointed Nerito L. Sa ntos as City Engineer of Cabanatuan City and a memorandum was given to Sevilla i nforming him of the same, said memorandum was received by another person on his behalf. A few months later Generoso R. Sevilla was designated as acting District Engineer of Pasay City, Then on Feb. 3, 1987 he was removed from the office by the New Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Generoso R. Sevilla returned to Cabanatuan and filed a quo warranto petition aga inst Nerito L. Santos. Generoso R. Sevilla contends that being a Presidential appointee he could not be removed from office by the OIC Mayor and supposing that the OIC Mayor indeed ha ve authority his separation was illegal because there was no ground for said sep aration and replacement. Issue Whether or not an acting appointment is merely temporary Ruling An acting appointment is merely temporary petitioner s appointment has lap sed upon appointment of Santos as permanent and not acting Civil Engineer of Cab anatuan. Petitioner was an incumbent City Engineer of Palayan when he was design ated acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan. There is a difference between designati on and appointment. Appointment is a selection by the proper authority of an ind ividual who is to exercise the functions of an office; Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely an imposition of additional duties upon a person already in public service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election. Appointment of City Engineer by Mayor confirmed by the Department of Pub lic Works and Highways is effective.Petitioner s right to discharge his function a s acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan was extinguished when a permanent appointme nt to the same office was made.

Antonio Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro C. Cruz May 7, 2001 GR No. 142840. 357 SCRA 545 J. Kapunan Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Facts Teodoro C. Cruz, being born on 1960 in Tarlac to Filipino parents is und oubtably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. On 1985 Teodoro C. Cruz was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps a nd without consent of the republic of the Philippines took an oath of allegiance to the United States as a consequence thereof he had lost his Filipino citizens hip. On 1990, in connection with his service in the United States Marine Corp s, he became a naturalized US citizen. On 1994 he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation un der RA 2630. He ran for election as Representative of the 2nd District of Pangas inan in 1998 and won. Subsequently Antonio Bengson III filed a case for quo warranto ad cautel am claiming that Cruz was not qualified for the position since he is not a natur al-born citizen as required under Art. Vi, Sec 6 of the Constitution. HRET dismissed the petition declaring Cruz the duly elected Representati ve of the 2nd District of Pangasinan. Issue Whether or not a natural born Filipino who became an American Citizen, c an still be considered a natural born citizen upon his reacquisition of Philippi ne Citizenship Ruling The Court ruled that the act of repatriation under RA 2630 allows him to recover or return to his original status before he lost his Philippine citizens hip. His original status as natural born Filipino was restored, needless to say he is qualified for the position of Representative of the Lower House. HRET was empowered by the Constitution to be the sole judge of all conte sts relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the H ouse. The House of Representatives on showing of grave abuse of as no showing of grave abuse iction thus the petition was Morohombsar vs. Alonto, Jr. February 25, 1991 GR No. 937711. 194 SCRA 390 Gutierrez, Jr., J. Electoral Tribunal s decision can only be annulled up discretion on HRET s part. In the case at bar there w of discretion amounting to lack or excessive jurisd dismissed.

Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the President of the Mindana o State University. Facts On March 22, 1988, the petitioner was designated as officer-in-charge of the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Academic affairs of MSU in a concurrent c apacity with her position then as VP for External Studies. On January 2, 1989, t he Office of the VP for the External Studies was merged with the OVCAA and as su ch the functions for the former were to be exercised by the latter. The petition er was appointed acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs on the same day. Th e Board of Regents of the MSU approved her appointment as acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs. On March 14, 1990 respondent Ahmad E. Alonto, MSU Preside nt wrote the petitioner informing her that he has decided to tap the petitioner s talent for the MSU system as VP for academic affairs which position is under adm inistrative staff. The petitioner did not accept the position. A certain Batara was later appointed but refused the same. Now, the petitioner assails her remova l as Vive-Chancellor by the respondent President. Issue Whether or not her removal is valid. Ruling A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary a nd revocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be removed anyt ime even without hearing or cause. A person who accepts an appointment in an act ing capacity extended and received without any protest or reservation and who ac ts thereunder for a considerable time cannot be heard to say that the appointmen t was, in reality permanent and theretofore there can be no removal except for c ause. Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora July 10, 2001 GR No. 142801-802 360 SCRA 718 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus Facts On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino, issued Executive No. 127 establishing the Economic Intelligence And Investigation Bureau as part of t he organization of the Ministry of Finance. On March 17, 1989, President Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 255 providing that the EIIB shall be the agency pri mary responsibility for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland w aters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Cust oms. On January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No 191 entitled deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and later issued executive Order No. 196 creating the President Anti Smuggling Task Force Aduana . And on March 29, 2000 President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 233 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shal l be separated from service pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. Issue

Whether or not there is a violation of their right to security of tenure . Ruling The general has always been that the power to abolish a public office i s lodge with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the powe r to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, statute or by authority by law. Thus, where the office was cr eated by the constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature th at brought to existence. The exception, however, is that as afar as bureaus, age ncies r offices in the executive department are concerned, the President s power t o control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular of a parti cular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reo rganization measures. AQUILINO T. LARIN, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY October 16, 1997 GRN 112745 TORRES, JR., J. Nature of the case: Challenged in this petition is the validity of petitioner's removal from service as Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Facts A decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting herein petitione r Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commissioner o f the Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused of the crimes of violation o f Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A 3019 in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208-14209. The fact of petitioner's conviction was reported to the President of the Philipp ines by the then acting Finance Secretary Leong through a memorandum. It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Larin has been found beyond reasonable d oubt to have committed acts constituting grave misconduct. Under the Civil Servi ce Laws and Rules which require only preponderance of evidence, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal. Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 which provides for the creation of a n Executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against herein pe titioner Aquilino T, Larin. The committee directed the petitioner to respond to the administrative charged a gainst him, and the petitioner complied on it. Consequently, the President, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. In the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retir ement benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the government se rvice. Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition to que stion basically his alleged unlawful removal from office. Issue

Whether or not the petitioner was unlawfully removed from office? Ruling The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was given every chance to present hi s side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in administrati ve proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. The records cl early show that on petitioner submitted his letter-response dated to the adminis trative charge filed against him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted vario us documents attached as annexes to his letter, all of which are evidences suppo rting his defense, prior to this, he received a letter from the Investigation Co mmittee requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It cannot there fore be argued that petitioner was denied of due process. WENCESLAO P. TRINIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS December 15, 1999 GRN 134657 BUENA, J. Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction seekin g to set aside the resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc. Facts Petitioner Wenceslao Trinidad and private respondent Jovito Claudio both ran for the position of mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 18, 1998 private respondent Claudio was proclaimed by the Pasay City Boar d of Canvassers as the elected mayor with 55,325 votes over petitioner Trinidad' s 55,097 votes. On May 23, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for correction of manifest errors a nd annulment of proclamation. Alleged as grounds, among others, were the double canvassing of five election returns and the inclusion of a bogus election return in the canvass. On June 8, 1998, petitioner filed a supplemental petition averring an error in t he Summary of Statement of Votes for District II of Pasay City (No. 094338). It was alleged that in the said summary of statement of votes Trinidad gathered 100 9 votes per Statement of Vote (SOV) No. 094284. But in SOV No. 094284 it was ref lected therein that he obtained 1099 votes. On June 9, 1998, an order was issued by the COMELEC requiring the parties to fil e their simultaneous memoranda within five days after which the case will be dee med submitted for resolution with or without memoranda. The Pasay City Board of Canvassers filed its Answer on given date. Thereafter, o r on June 15, 1998, private respondent Claudio filed his answer/memorandum (with counter-petition for correction). In the counter-petition it was stated that some statements of votes contained er rors which, if corrected, would entitle Claudio to an additional forty (40) vote s but would result in petitioner's being deducted thirteen (13) votes. Petitioner contested the filing of private respondent's answer/memorandum (with counter-petition for correction) in his Manifestation and Comments dated July 18

, 1998. In the said pleading, petitioner reiterated his plea for the addition of 90 votes to his total and manifested two (2) new errors, namely: (1) the electi on returns from five precincts were not canvassed and (2) there were some discre pancies in the election returns of nine precincts. These errors as well as the u ncanvassed returns, if corrected and accounted for in the total number of votes, would allegedly give petitioner an edge of eighteen (18) votes over private res pondent: 55,229 votes to Claudio's 55,211 votes The Commission dismisses the petition for annulment of proclamation of responden ts Jovito O. Claudio and Reynaldo Mateo and the Supplemental Petition for correc tion of the Summary of the Statement of Votes. We AFFIRM the proclamation of res pondents Claudio and Mateo with the margin of votes indicated above. Issue Whether or not respondent commission on election committed grave abuse o f discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the proclamation of respondent Jovito Claudio as elected mayor of Pasay City. Ruling We take pains to emphasize that the same was filed only on July 18, 1998, thirty -four (34) days after the case had been submitted for resolution on June 14, 199 8.When a case is already deemed submitted for decision or resolution, the court can only consider the evidence presented prior to this period. It can not and mu st not take into account evidence presented thereafter without obtaining prior l eave of court. For as held in the case of Arroyo vs. House of Representatives El ectoral Tribunal, "(t)he rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counter protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended plea ding filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of protest or c ounter protest." A pre-proclamation controversy praying for the correction of manifest errors mus t be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation while an election protest must be filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation o f the results of the election. At this juncture, we have to point out that the said Manifestation and Comments, whether it be considered a pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest, was filed beyond the reglementary period to do so. CAYO G. GAMOGAMO, vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP. May 7, 2002. G.R. No. 141707 DAVIDE, JR., C .J p: Nature of the case: The pivotal issue raised in the petition in this case is whe ther, for the purpose of computing an employee's retirement pay, prior service r endered in a government agency can be tacked in and added to the creditable serv ice later acquired in a government-owned and controlled corporation without orig inal charter. Facts Petitioner Cayo F. Gamogamo was first employed with the Department of Health (DO H) as Dental Aide. He was promoted to the position of Dentist 1. He remained emp loyed at the DOH for fourteen years until he resigned on 2 November 1977.

Petitioner was hired as company dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEV ECO), a private domestic corporation. Subsequently, respondent PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (hereafter Respondent) acquired and took over the shippin g business of LUSTEVECO, petitioner was among those who opted to be absorbed by the Respondent. Thus, he continued to work as company dentist. Respondent assum ed without interruption petitioner's service credits with LUSTEVECO, but it did not make reference to nor assumed petitioner's service credits with the DOH. The n President Fidel V. Ramos issued a memorandum approving the privatization of PN OC subsidiaries, including Respondent Petitioner retired after serving the Respondent and LUSTEVECO for 17 years and 4 months upon reaching his 60th birthday. He received a retirement pay which is equivalent to one month pay for every year of service and other benefits. Petitioner filed a complaint at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) f or the full payment of his retirement benefits. Petitioner argued that his servi ce with the DOH should have been included in the computation of his years of ser vice. Hence, with an accumulated service of 32 years he should have been paid a two-month pay for every year of service per the retirement plan. Issue Whether or not petitioner maintains that his government service with the DOH should be recognized and tacked in to his length of service with Respondent because LUSTEVECO, which was later bought by Respondent, and Respondent itself, were government-owned and controlled corporations and were, therefore, under th e Civil Service Law. Ruling We cannot uphold petitioner's contention that his fourteen years of serv ice with the DOH should be considered because his last two employers were govern ment-owned and controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law. Article IX(B), Section 2 paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumen talities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controll ed corporations with original charters. It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are govern ment-owned and controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence th ey are not under the Civil Service Law. In any case, petitioner's fourteen years of service with the DOH may not remain uncompensated because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to the afore quo ted Section 12, as may be determined by the GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitl ed to some benefits from the GSIS.

Adiong v. COMELEC 315 SCRA 712 (1992) Macasiano v. Diokno 212 SCRA 464 (1992) Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Notre 163 SCRA 182 (1988) Bito-Onon v. Fernandez 350 SCRA 732 (2001) Abbas v. COMELEC Secretary of Justice v. Lantion Philip Morris case Nicaragua v. U.S. case Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading 3 SCRA 351 (1961) Bayan v. Zamora 342 SCRA 449 (2000) Antonio Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro C. Cruz May 7, 2001 GR No. 142840. 357 SCRA 545 J. Kapunan Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Facts Teodoro C. Cruz, being born on 1960 in Tarlac to Filipino parents is und oubtably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. On 1985 Teodoro C. Cruz was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps a nd without consent of the republic of the Philippines took an oath of allegiance to the United States as a consequence thereof he had lost his Filipino citizens hip. On 1990, in connection with his service in the United States Marine Corp s, he became a naturalized US citizen. On 1994 he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation un der RA 2630. He ran for election as Representative of the 2nd District of Pangas inan in 1998 and won. Subsequently Antonio Bengson III filed a case for quo warranto ad cautel am claiming that Cruz was not qualified for the position since he is not a natur al-born citizen as required under Art. Vi, Sec 6 of the Constitution. HRET dismissed the petition declaring Cruz the duly elected Representati ve of the 2nd District of Pangasinan. Issue Whether or not a natural born Filipino who became an American Citizen, c an still be considered a natural born citizen upon his reacquisition of Philippi ne Citizenship

Ruling The Court ruled that the act of repatriation under RA 2630 allows him to recover or return to his original status before he lost his Philippine citizens hip. His original status as natural born Filipino was restored, needless to say he is qualified for the position of Representative of the Lower House. HRET was empowered by the Constitution to be the sole judge of all conte sts relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the H ouse. The House of Representatives on showing of grave abuse of as no showing of grave abuse iction thus the petition was Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan April 18, 2001 G.R. No. 128055, Vitug, J. Nature of case: Petition for review on certiorari. Facts The herein petitioner was alleged in violating the Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act upon willfully, law fully and criminally approve the application for the legalization of the stay of disqualified aliens. Thus, the Sandiganbayan ordered for her preventive suspens ion. Issue Whether or not the herein respondent acted grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said order. Ruling Electoral Tribunal s decision can only be annulled up discretion on HRET s part. In the case at bar there w of discretion amounting to lack or excessive jurisd dismissed.

Section 13 of R.A 3019 does not state the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is allegedly to committed the acts with which he has been charged -the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particu lar office under which he stands accused. Hence, R.A.3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore the Sandiganbayan did n ot err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Guingona Jr. vs. Gonzales October 20,1992 G.R, No.106971, Campos, Jr., J Nature of the case: petition of prohibition Facts

The herein petitioner, in behalf of his party (LAKAS NUCD) filed a petitio n for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the said respondents fro m sitting and assuming the position of members of the Commission on Appointments and to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales, as ex officio Chairman, of said Commi ssion from recognizing and allowing the respondents to sit as members of the sai d Commission. Petitioner had allegedly that it was violative of the rule of prop ortional representation, and the right of the minority political parties in the Senate consistent with the Constitution in combining their fractional representa tion in the Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein and to decid e who among the Senators in their ranks shall be additionally nominated and elec ted. Issue Whether or not the said respondents are entitled as members of the said Commission. Ruling The provision of Section 18 is a proportional representation is mandator y in character and does not leave and discretion to the majority party in the Se nate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Court declares the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as m embers of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being violation of the rule on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1 987 Constitution. Hence, petition is granted. Cunanan vs. Tan May 10, 1962 G.R. No. L-19721 Padilla, J. Nature of the case: Petition for quo warranto. Facts The herein petitioner having been qualified and assumed the duties and f unction as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Depa rtment of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Fortunately, on November 6, 1961, t he President extended to the said petitioner an ad interim appointment of his po sition as Deputy Administrator. However, the Commission on appointment composed of six Senators and seven members of the House of Representatives rejected the s aid ad interim appointment. The herein respondent was designated by the Presiden t as acting Deputy Administrator of said office without the consent of the petit ioner. Issue Whether or not the petitioners ad interim appointment was valid by the l egitimate Commission of Appointment. Ruling The court holds that the rejection of the ad interim appointment of peti tioner by 13 alleged members of the Commission of Appointments and designation o f herein respondents in the same position as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources wh

en said office was not vacant are null and void. Hence, the petitioner was entit led to hold the said office and the respondent should vacate the same and turn i t over to petitioner. Bondoc vs. Pineda September 26, 1991 201 SCRA 792 Grino- Aquino, J. Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus. Facts In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pined a of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the fourth district of the province of Pampanga. On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due ti me, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET no. 25) in the House of Representatives Elector al Tribunal (HRET). By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by margin of twenty-three (23) votes. The reexamination and rea ppreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc s lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressm an Cerilles to proclaim the winner of the case. Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991 to his Chief Congressman Jo se S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bon doc case but also but also that he voted for Bondoc consistent with justice and s elf-respect , and to honor gentlemen s agreement among the members of the HRET that th ey would abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot. Congressman Cojuangco notified the chairman of the tribunal to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and seeks to cancel the promulgation of the tribunal s decision in Bondoc v. Pineda case. Issue Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its representative in H ouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal at the request of the dominant politi cal party. Ruling No. If the House Electoral Tribunal would serve the interest of the party in pow er, the independence of the Electoral Tribunal as embodied in the Constitution, will no longer be protected. The resolution of the House of Representatives remo ving Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to th e LDP, because he cast his votes in favor of the Nacionalista Party s candidate, B ondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Elec toral Tribunal to the Sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bond oc. To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which tree justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member woul d be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the treshold of the tribunal.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence-even i ndependence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to p arty and breach of the party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from HRET for hav inf cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion an injustice, and a violation of the constitution. It s resolution of expulsion agai nst Congressman Camasura is therefore, null and void. Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary February 22, 1991 194 SCRA 317 Fernan, C.J. Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Executive Secretary. Facts Petitioner challenged the Executive Order no. 284, which in effect, allows membe rs of the cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretary to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary position, albeit su bject to the limitations imposed, runs counter to Sec. 13 Art. VII of the Consti tution. Respondent on the hand, argued that the same Constitutional provision pr ovided a proviso stating that unless otherwise provided in this constitution . The y further contended that his proviso refers to if allowed by law or by the press ing functions of his position. Issue Does the of E.O 284 violates the Constitutional limitation prohibiting appointiv e officials from holding two offices? Ruling Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose stricter prohibition on President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. The language of Sec. 13 Art. VII is prohibitory so th at it must be understood as intended to be positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. The 1987 constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, m embers of the cabinet, their deputies or assistant from holding during their ten ure multiple offices or employment in the government except in those cases speci fied in the constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to post held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law an d as required by the primary functions at their office. Sec. 13, Art VII in relation to Sec. 7 par.2 Art. IX-B of itution, E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting positions that the cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant y hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two the 1987 Const the number of secretaries ma (2) positions

in the government and government corporations. E.O. No. 284 allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Swc.13, Art. VII of the Constitution prohibiting them from doing so unless othe rwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. Flores vs. Drilon June 22, 1993 223 SCRA 568 Bellosillo, J. Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action. Prohibition Facts The constitutionality of Sec. 13 par (d) of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the b ases conversion and development Act of 1992 under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer o f the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is challenged in this original pet ition with a prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restra ining order to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds of p ublic funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached in the of fice. Petitioners who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.U. Facility at the Subic Zambales and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) Sec. 13, herein, infringes on the following constitutional and statutor y provisions: (A) Sec. 7, first par. Art IX-B of the Constitution which states A rt IX-B of the Constitution, which states that No elective Official shall be elig ible for the appointment in any capacity to any public officer and position duri ng his tenure, because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective Official a nd the Subject post are public offices of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint, since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the Presi dent who appointed the Mayor to the subject post (c) Sec. 26 par. (g) of the Omn ibus Election Code. Issue Whether or not the appointive was valid in the view of the provision of the Local Government Code. Ruling Sec. 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutional of Sec. 13 par (d) of RA 7227 for no legislative act can prevail over fundamental law of t he land. The view that an elective official maybe appointed to another post if al lowed by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut dif ference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec.7, Art. IX-B of the Cons titution holding of multiple offices by an appointive officials when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post except as particu larly recognized in the constitution itself. As an incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for a

ppointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive of t he SBMA; hence his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contra venes that the Constitution cannot be sustained. He, however remains Mayor of Ol aongapo City and his Acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer. Manalo vs. Sistoza People vs. Marti Jan. 18, 1991 Gr no. 81561 Bidin, J. Nature of the Case: Facts This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the special criminal court of Manila RTC convicting the accused appellant of violation of the provisions of RA 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act. On August 14, 1987 the app ellant and his common law wife Shirley Reyeswent to the booth of the Manila Packi ng and Export Forwarders carrying with them the 4 gift wrapped packages to be se nt to a friend in Zrich, Switzerland. He claimed that only books, cigars and glov es are contained in the boxes. The Proprietress Anita Reyes, no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. Before the delivery of the appellant's box to the bur eau of customs, Anita and her husband Job Reyes, following the sop, opened the b oxes for final inspection. When he opened Marti's box, a peculiar odor emanated w ithin, his curiosity aroused, he squeezed the box allegedly containing the glove s and felt dried leaves inside. He took several grams of the content inside. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter to NBI requesting the lab to examine the sampl es. NBI made an inventory and took charge of the boxes. They tried to locate Mar ti but the address that he used in his passport was that of Manila Central Post Office, On August 27, 1987, they invited Marti to NBI as he was cling his mail a t the post office. Information was filed and appellant was then accused of viola tion of RA 6425. Issue Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally sear ched and seized objects contained in four parcels and erred in convicting appell ant despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while und er custodial proceedings. Ruling The court sees no error committed by the trial court. The evidence was o btainedand surrendered by a private person in his privatecapacity and that absence in government interference would mean that the constitutional guarantee cannot be invoked against the state. In his second contention, the court examined the r ecords of the case and found nothing to indicate as an undisputed fact that the appellant was not informed of constitutional rights. People of the Philippines vs. de Castro July 31, 1997 G.R. No. 119068. Padilla; J

Nature of the Case: Facts An information, dated 14 November 1991, 1 was filed by Provincial Prosec utor Alejandro A. Pulido of Cagayan charging Dante, Oscar, Rito, Joel, George, a ll surnamed Castro, Caridad Menor y Castro alias Caring and Genesia Garcia y Cas tro with the crime of murder. On 10 February 1992, the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned an d pleaded not guilty to the charge. Defense counsel waived pre-trial for the acc used and moved for continuous trial which commenced on 2 March 1992 and terminat ing on 15 February 1994 when both prosecution and defense submitted the case for resolution. On 10 May 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02 of Tuguegarao, Cagay an rendered a decision where the parties are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private respondents enga ged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already obs erved, the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process o f law, not on the right of government workers to strike. Issue Whether or not the right of due process by the parties has been violated . Ruling In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to includ e the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the instituti on of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real oppor tunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witn esses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal ve sted with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charge d administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; an d (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence subm itted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made k nown to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 kno wn as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers admi nistrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law ex pressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrativ e cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chair man, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teache rs' organization and a supervisor of the division. Mere membership of said teach ers in their respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto make them au thorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of R A 4670. Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to in dicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigat ing committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of edu cation or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant cas e, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as member s of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers ' organization as its representative in said committee. It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed no rever sible error in affirming the trial court's decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private re

spondents and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other ben efits that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their suspensi on or dismissal. 21 Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. M oreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private responde nts should, as a consequence, be reinstated 22 and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal. 23 This Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system. Wherefore, p remises considered, the petition is hereby denied for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus AFFIRMED. Yap vs Lutero April 30, 1959 Gr no. L- 12669 Concepcion, J. Nature of the case: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloil o City. Facts On September 12, 1956, petitioner Yap was accused, in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, of reckless driving, in violation o f a city ordinance. December 10, 1956, he was again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same court, with serious physical injuries through reckless imprud ence. Petitioner moved to quash the latter information on the ground of double j eopardy. This motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meanwhile, th e petitioner was acquitted in Case No. 16054. Petitioner instituted the present case for certiorari in the Court of First Instance, charging the respondent with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash. The Petition was dism issed; however, on motion for reconsideration, the decision was set aside by an order directing the respondent to desist from further proceeding s in Criminal Case No. 16443. Respondent has brought the case for review, conten ding that the case of People vs. Francisco Diaz. Issue Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that the accused is guilt y of reckless driving in violation a city ordinance. Ruling This pretense is untenable. Firstly, the crime of damage to property thr ough reckless driving-with which Diaz stood charged in the court of first instan ce-is a violation of Revised Penal Code, not the Automobile Law. Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless driving an d certain crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable under differe nt provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence, from the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as distinguished from Political or Constitutional Law-they constitute, strictly different offenses, although, under certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and, accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plead of doub le jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz case. The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information in Case No. 16443, petitioner could-if he failed to plead double jeopardy-be con victed of the same act charged in Case No. 16054, in which he has already been a cquitted. The information in Case No. 16054 charged the petitioner with reckless

driving; while in Case No. 16443 he was accused of serious physical injuries th rough reckless imprudence. Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second informa tion were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in the first case of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No. 16064, unless he pleaded double jeopardy. Decision affirmed. People vs. Relova De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals 2002 305 SCRA 303 Bellosillo, J Nature of the Case: Facts Petitioners was public schools teachers from various schools in Metro Ma nila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dis missed by then sec. of DECS. It was immediately implemented. Petitioners appeal ed to Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the Civil Service Commiss ion (CSC). The CSC found petitioners guilt of conduct prejudicial to the best int erest of the service for having been participated in the mass actions and imposed the reduced penalty of 6 months. However CSC ordered petitioners automatic rei nstatement in the service without back wages, in view of the length of time they r e out in the service by reason of the immediate dismissal. Petitioners filed pet itions for certiorari with this court which were referred to CA. CA dismissed th e petitions for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that they should not be penal ized because they were merely exercising their constitutional right to free asse mbly. Issue Whether or not petitioners are exercising right to assembly and entitled to award of back wages for the period they were not allowed to work while await ing resolution of their appeals. Ruling No. Petitioners did not exercise their constitutional rights within re asonable limits. They committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the ser vice by staging mass protest on regular school days, abandoning their classes an d refusing to go back even after they have been ordered to do so. Petitioners ar e not entitled to back wages on the ground that the petitioners were neither exo nerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the gr ant of back wage in administrative disciplinary cases. Fabella vs. CA November 28,1997 G.R. No. 110379 Panganiban, J. Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Facts On Sept.17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work ord er to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes o n various dates during the period Sept. 26, 1990 to Oct. 18, 1990. The mass act ion had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allo wances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. On Oct. 18, 1990 Secretary Carino filed Administrative cases against her ein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they shoul d not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations. Secretary Carino ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventi ve suspension. Administrative hearing started on Dec. 20. 1990. Petitioner-appe llees counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded tha t he be furnished of the copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation. As he received no response from committee, counsel walked out. Later, however, counsel was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines. The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the RTC in Quezon City, charg ing the committee with fraud and deceit however the court denied the order. The y amended the complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner -appellee Adriano S. Valencia filed a motion to intervene and the trial court gr anted his motion. The DECS investigating committee rendered a decision finding the appellees guilty. The teachers filed a petition in the Supreme Court which issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court s order of dismissal a nd reinstating petitioner-appellee s action. The trial court set the case for he aring which denied the motion for reconsideration and the manifestation and moti on. On July 3, 1992 the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Carino had c eased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. But the trial court failed to act on his motion. The trial court rendered a decision in which it st arted the dismissal of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and vio lative of the teacher s right to due process. The petition was granted. From thi s decision former DECS Secretary Carino filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal s which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition for review. Issue Whether or not private respondents were denied due process of law. Ruling The petition is bereft of merit. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following 1) the right to actual constructive no tice of the institution of proceedings which may affect the resondent s legal righ ts, 2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of couns el, to present witness and evidence in one s favor, and to defend one s right, 3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a pe rson charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impar tiality and 4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evid ence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, R .A. 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specially c overs administrative proceedings involving public school teacher s organization an d a superior of the division.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear admin istrative charge against private respondents did not include a representative of the local or in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher s organi zation as required by Section 9. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to ha ve no competent jurisdiction. Thus all proceedings undertaken by them were nece ssarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of of a representative of a teacher s orga nization in these committees was indispensable to insure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given a substance and meaning to the ri ght to be heard. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teac hers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever de signated or authorized by the teacher s organization as its representative in said committee. Indeed in the case at bar neither the DECS Secretary nor the DECS-N CR regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it to a committee composed of a division supervisor, secondary and elementary school t eachers and consultants. But there was no representative of the teacher s organiz ation. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the committee because the p rovision for the representation of a teacher s organization is intended by law for the protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges. When c ounsel walked out of the hearing, the teachers did not waive their rights based on such action of counsel. The walk out was staged in protest against the proce dures of the committee. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered t he dismissal of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full acces s of the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend themselves. The pe tition is hereby denied. Halili vs. Court of Appeals March 12, 1998 287 SCRA 465 Panganiban, J. Nature of the case: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Facts Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, leaving real properties in the Ph ilippines. His forced heir was his widow Helen Meyer Guzman and his son David Re y Guzman both defendant appellee are also American citizens. Helen executed a de ed of quitclaim, assigning, tampering, and conveying to David Rey all her rights , title and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inhe rited from Simeon. Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation. Dav id Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to Emiliano Cataniag. Petitioners who are owners of the adjoining lot filed a complaint before the RTC questioning the validity and constitutionality of the two conveyances a nd claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption. The trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzman s waiv er of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiv er was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in ac cordance with the Constitution and the law of the Philippines and not to subvert them. The Court of Appeals denied their appeal. Hence this petition. Issue Whether or not the conveyance from Helen Meyer Guzman to her son David R

ey Guzman is illegal and should be declared null and void. Ruling The petition has no merit. Neither do we find any reversible error in th e appellate courts holding that the sale of the subject land to Cataniag renders moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to her son David Rey. True Helen s deed of quitclaim collided with the Constitution Art. 12 Sec. 7. In fine non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands of the p ublic domain except only by way of legal succession. But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citize n? Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfer to a citizen, the flaw is the or iginal transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is render ed valid. Accordingly, since the disposed land is now owned by Cataniag, a Filipin o citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed the objective of the constitutional provision - to keep one land in Filipino hands - has been se rved. US vs. Barrias September 24, 1908 GR No. 4349 Nature of the Case: The power of the Commissioner to prescribe rules and regulat ion based on the legislative act promulgated by Congress. Facts Defendant was charged for violating paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs which prohibits heavily loaded casco, l ighter or other similar craft to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power. Defendant questions the validity of para graph 70 of Circular No. 397 Issue Whether or not there was an illegal delegation of legislative power. Ruling The judgment of the Court of First Instance is revoked and defendant is convicted of misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars. Act No. 1136 is v alid and there was no illegal delegation of legislative power. The criminal offe nse is fully and completely defined by the Act and the task given to the commiss ioner was a mere matter of detail. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto August 22, 2001 317 SCRA 272 Pardo, J. Nature of the Case: Special civil action for certiorari to annul and set aside t he resolution of the Ombudsman.

Facts On Oct. 8, 1992, Fidel V. Ramos, issued Administrative Order No.13, crea ting the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. President R amos issued a Memorandum Order No.61 directing the Committee to include in its i nvestigation, inventory and study all non-performing loans which shall embrace b oth behest and non-behest loans. The Committee reported that the Philippines See ds, Inc. was one of the 21 corporations which obtained behest loans. In his inst ructions, handwritten on the cover of the aforementioned report, Pre. Ramos dire cted Committee Chairman Magtanggol C. Guingundo to proceed with administrative a nd judicial actions against the 21 firms in this batch with positive findings as soon as possible. The Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint agai nst the Directors of PSI and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philip pines who approved the loans for the violation of par. E & G of Sec.3 of R.A. 30 19. In its Resolution, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground o f prescription. Relying on the case of People vs. Dinsay, a case decided by the C.A. Issue Whether or not the public respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discre tion in holding that the prescriptive period in this case should be counted from the date of the grant of the behest loans involved and not from the date of dis covery of the same by the Committee. Ruling We agree with the Ombudsman that Sec.15 of Art. 11 of the Constitution a pply to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal acti ons such as the complaint against the respected firms. This is clear from the pr oceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. The upshot of the discussion is the prosecution of offense arising from, relating or incident to or involvin g ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Sec.15 Art.11 of the Constitution may be bar red by prescription. The applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Sec.2 of Act. No.326 in the special law violated. It stated that if th e commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to ru n on the day it was committed. In the case at bar, the Ombudsman forthwith dismissed the complaint with out even requiring the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and solely on the basis of dates the alleged behest loans were granted or the dates of the commission of the alleged offense was committed. Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the c riminal actions should commence from the discovery of the offense, the Ombudsman clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing outright the case. P etition granted. Farias vs. Barba April 19, 1996 GR No. 116763 Mendoza, J. Nature of the Case: Appointment of the Governor in case of permanent vacancy cau sed by a Sangguniang Bayan Member who does not belong to any political party.

Facts A member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, who does not belong to any political party, resigned after going without leave to the Un ited State. To fill the vacancy, respondent Mayor recommended to petitioner Gove rnor, the appointment of Edward Palafox. Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas made t he same recommendation but to respondent Mayor. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan dis approved the recommendation and Petitioner Governor appointed Nacino as member o f the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. Issue In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the ce ssation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure. Ruling There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Baranga y. Any vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be m ade by the mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason is that members of the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to have party affiliations. Indeed there is no reason for supposing that those who drafted Section 4 5 intended to make the manner of filling vacancies in the Sanggunians, created b y members who do not belong to any political party, different from the manner of filling such vacancies when created by members who belong to political party or parties. The provision for the first must approximate the provision for the sec ond situation. Any difference in procedure must be limited to the fact that in t he case of vacancies caused by those who have political affiliations there is a party which can nominate a replacement while there is none in the case of those who have no political affiliation. Accordingly, where there is no political part y to make a nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must be consid ered the appropriate authority for making the recommendation, by analogy to vaca ncies created in the Sangguniang Barangay whose members are by law prohibited fr om having any party affiliation. Neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox is entitled t o the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. For while petitioner Al Naci no was appointed by the provincial Governor, he was not recommended by the Sangg uniang Bayan of San Nicolas, on the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was re commended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the Mayor and not the provincial G overnor who appointed him. Gamboa vs. Aguirre July 20, 1999 GR No. 134213 Ynares-Santiago, J. Nature of the Case: Facts Sometime in August, 1995, the Governor of Negros Occidental designated V ice-Governor Romeo Gamboa, Jr. as Acting Governor for the duration of his offici al trip abroad until his return. Later, when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) h eld its regularsession, respondent members thereof questioned the authority of G amboa to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor. When the court declared Gamboa temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the ses

sions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor, Gamboa filed t his petition for review. Issue Whether or not an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . Ruling A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a qua si-Governor. This means that, for purposes of exercising his legislative preroga tives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. Und er RA 7160, the governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP as he is not a member thereof. Hence, being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor can not continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office since th e nature and duties of the Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governo r creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor w henever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This ev ent constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (ViceGovernor) to preside during SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of t he remedy set in Art. 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor s (Vice-G overnor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Sec. 49 (b), in the event of the inability of the regular p residing officer to preside during SP session, the members present sand constitu ting a quorum shall elect from among themselves presiding officer. Victoria Amigable, Plaintiff-Appellant, Vs. Nicolas Cuenca, As Commissioner Of P ublic Highways And Republic Of The Philippines, Defendants-Appellees. G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972 Makalintal, J. Nature of the case: State immunity from suit and the capacity of a citizen to su e the government. Facts Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of T itle No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No ann otation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appe ars at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sa le, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square mete rs, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Aveunes. On February 6, 1959 A migable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 1 7, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines a nd Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the re covery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory da mages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral dam ages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the c osts of the suit. Issue

Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the f acts of the case. Ruling YES. If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for pro perty taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of th is character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental imm unity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing l aw at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment o f the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners wo uld not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government w ould stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fi delity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be m aintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit co uld still be appropriately invoked. Alexander A. Krivenko, Petitioner-Appellant, Vs. The Register Of Deeds, City Of Manila, Respondent And Appellee. G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947 Moran, C.J. Nature of the case: Constitutional right of an alien, if any, to own residentia l land in the Philippines. Facts Alexander A. Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalen a Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted b y the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denie d by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cann ot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the four th branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and t hat court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, fro m which Krivenko appealed to this Court. Issue Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential l and. Ruling NO. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Articl e XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should , therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation

and for their posterity." Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricu ltural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in co nnection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to ke ep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that o ur God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital or gans of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for w hat kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" Professor Aruego says that since the ope ning days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objec tives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the c ountry. This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, a nd Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certa inly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land. Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission On Human Rights, Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia And Pedro Ordonez G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 Grio-Aquino, J. Nature of the case: To ascertain the power of the CHR to issue a writ of injunct ion or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights. Facts On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Proc essing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phas es I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, form erly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Before EPZA could take possession o f the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultura l products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To c onvince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financ ial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedr o Ordoez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complai nt (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the co mplaint. Issue Whether or not the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction o r restraining order against supposed violators of human rights. Ruling

NO. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preve ntive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdicti on on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdi ction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by im plication. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a p reliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of th e Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instanc e [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within h is district." A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is ava ilable only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994 Quiason, J. Nature of the case: Petitions for review of orders or resolution. En Banc Facts This is a consolidation of four cases upon to rule on the conflicting cl aims of authority between the Legislative and the Executive. Providing the focus for the contest between the President and the Congress over the control of the national budget. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned t axpayers on the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceede d their respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the Pr esident has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power. Issue Whether or not the Presidential veto of the special provision in the app ropriation for debt services and the automatic appropriation of funds is valid. Ruling The Court went one step further and ruled that provisions are beyond the e xecutive power to veto, but such sections were not provisions in the budgetary sen se of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items r the purpose of the President s veto power. The petitions were dismissed, except with respect to G.R. Nos. 113766 an d 113105 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service and G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the a nnulment of the veto. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit G.R. 91890 June 9, 1995 Romero, J.

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Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition. En Banc . Facts Philippine Airlines, Inc seeks to review and annul and reverse the decision of the Commission on Audit and to prohibit, enjoin and prevent COA from enforcing or in any way implementing Department Order No. 19, Circular No. 498 and 88-565 that PAL is required to purchase its fuel requirements solely from Petron Corporation. Pal sought for reconsideration for preferring to bid out and secure its fuel supply from more than one supplier and such order should not be applied to PAL. COA denied PAL's request for reconsideration, that such order be applied to GOCC,including subsidiaries. Issue Whether the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in holding that Department Order No. 19 of the defunct Department of General Services applies to Pal? Ruling Pursuant to the government's privatization program, PAL's shares of stock were bidded out, resulting in the acquisition by PR Holdings, a private corporation, of 67% of PAL's outstanding stocks. PAL, having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COa. Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become moot and academic. The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. Joel B. Caes, , vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court November 6, 1989. Gr. No. 126379 Cruz, J. Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate App ellate Court. Facts On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate informati on with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana befor e the court of First Instance of Rizal. On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was schedul ed for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. In view of the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several schedul ed hearings and also for the hearing which is an indication of lack of interest, upon motion of the trial fiscal for the provisional dismissal of the cases and with the conformity of the accused, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered provisionally dismissed. On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was denied on October 9 filed b

y Major Dacanay who alleged that they could not attend the hearing for lack of n otice. Issue The present petition is based in two agreements to wit: a. that the motion to re vive the cases was invalid because it was not filed by the proper party nor was a copy served on the petitioner; and b. the revival of he cases would place the petitioner in double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights. Ruling It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecution and must always be under his control. This is true e ven if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the ex amination of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. The witnesses , even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor of t he case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personal ity to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto no r as they represent the parties to the action. Their only function is to testify . In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government pros ecutor, or one acting under his authority, and by no one else. On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double jeopar dy has not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was with the conformity of the accused. The petitioner denies that he consented to the dismissal and submits that the dismissal was final notwithstanding its descr iption. Fittingly described as res judicata in prison grey , the right against double jeopa rdy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previ ously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first pro secution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be s ubjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same o ffense. It has been held in a long line of cases that to constitute double jeopardy, the re must be a. a valid complaint or information b. filed before a competent court c. to which the defendant had pleaded and d. of which he had been previously ac quitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at bar. What we must resolve is the effect of the dismissal, which the petitioner c ontends finally and irrevocably terminated the two cases against him. Its submis sion is that the dismissal was not provisional simply because it was so designat ed, more so since he had not expressly consented thereto. Petition Granted. People of the Philippines, vs. Court of Appeals June 26, 1998. Gr. No. 7498990 Narvasa, C.J. Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts

On December 14, 1995, Senior Inspector PNP James Brillantes applied for search w arrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Sa n Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The following day, December 15, 1995, search warrant against Mr. Hussain was iss ued not at Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani n ationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects suc h as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t.shirts, belts, sunglasses and traveling bags including cash amounting to $ 3,550.00 and P 1,500.00 aside f rom US $ 5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of foregoing verdict, describing to Cou rt of Appeals the following errors 1. sanctioning the lower courts precipitate a ct of disregarding the proceedings before the issuing court and overturning the latters determination of probable cause and particularly of the place to be sear ched. Issue Whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in w hich private respondents were the actually residing. Ruling The government insists that the police officers who applied to Quezon City Regio nal Trial Court for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the pla ce to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of the said of ficers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously later the place to be searched or to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind t he Abigail Variety Store and they were also the same police officers who eventua lly effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the pla ce to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exa ctly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence suf ficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the plac e they had in mind-the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No.1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Store - was not what the judge who issued the warrant himse lf had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant. Wherefore the judgment if the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is her eby affirmed. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals August 7, 1996 G.R. No.91885 Panganiban, J. Nature of the Case: Petition for review under Rule 45 to set aside the decision 1 of the court of appeals, 2 Promulgated on November 27, 1989 and the resolution 3 denying reconsideration, promulgated on January 17, 1990 in CA-GR. CV. No. 17 828 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Laureano Bros., Co, Inc. Facts It appears that under the contract (date not indicated in the pleadings) , private respondent Laureano Brothers, Inc, undertook to supply petitioner repu blic of the Philippines with plumbing materials for the use of the National Wate r and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) which procurement was financed by the United S tates Government through the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). How

ever, all the materials delivered by private respondent to nawasa were rejected because they did not conform to the agreed specifications. Refusing to refund th e money paid for says materials, private respondent was sued by the Republic in the then Court of first Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 44566. A decision was rendered by the trial court based on a compromise agreem ent whereby private respondent agreed to pay the petitioner the amount of US$358 ,882.02 or its equivalent in Philippine peso. A disagreement on the rate of exch ange for conversion of the dollars into pesos was settled by this court in G.R. No. L-250554 by fixing such rate at P3.91 per US$1.00. This judgment became fina l and executory on July 27, 1968. On April 16, 1973, the trial court issued an o rder authorizing private respondent to sell the attached property. On May 31, 19 73, Firma Techno Machineries, Inc, purchased the said lot and building through a deed of sale registered on June 1, 1973. Thereafter, private respondent remitte d to NEDA the net proceeds of P881,003.01 deducting P68,995.99 representing taxe s. On December 10, 1973, NEDA disapproved said sale on the ground that the price was too low and that the conditions imposed by the trial court were not allowed . NEDA thus returned the two checks it received (P10,000.00 earnest money and O8 81,004.01 net proceeds of the sale) and filed an action to annul the sale. Issue Whether or not the five-year period within which to enforce the decision in Civil case No. 44566 was interrupted by the period when the question of the legality if the sale of respondent s properties was pending in the Court of Appeal s and before this Honorable Court. Ruling The court held that there is no question that the decision in favor of the Republic has not been satisfied and the private respondent has not paid its obligation under such judgment. The only question is how such decision shall be enforced against the obligor. Under the Rules, 7 a Judgment may be executed withi n five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final an d executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statut e of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. Wherefore the petition is granted and the assailed decision is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby directed to issued t he writ of execution in Civil Case No. 44566 for the enforcement of the decision therein. Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals August 4, 1994. G.R. No. 110662. Padilla, J. Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Tria l Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages agains t petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license an d/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as C ivil case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided ov er by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent s oral offer of e vidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent s offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was d enied on 23 June 1992. A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals a ssailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. Issue Whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. Ruling The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordi nary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds f or assailing the interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the re medy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may a llow certiorari as a mode of redress. In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telepho ne conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the mili tary to wire tap his home telephone. Clearly, respondent trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afor e-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in qu estion. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is m andatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28545 is hereb y set aside. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence Hon. Renato C. Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines an d Manila Pilots Association December 12, 1997 G.R. No. 111953. Romero, J. Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Cour t of Manila, Branch 6. Facts The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA s ch arter. On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilot Association and the Manila P ilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recalling or an nulling PPA s administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Director

s as its governing body. Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injun ction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. which was docketed as Ci vil Case No. 93-65673. Issue Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondent s right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law. Ruling The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA , recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore a property right under Call anta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. Thus, abbreviating the term within which tha t privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights o f the harbor pilots. Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property r ight must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not cond uct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents alleg edly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From this de cision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari. Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby dismissed and the assailed decision of the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is affirmed . Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994 Nature of the case: Petitions for review of orders or resolution. Facts: This is a consolidation of four cases upon to rule on the conflicting cla ims of authority between the Legislative and the Executive. Providing the focus for the contest between the President and the Congress over the control of the n ational budget. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned ta xpayers on the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the Pre sident has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power. Issue: Whether the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriati on for debt services and the automatic appropriation of funds is valid? Ruling: The Court went one step further and ruled that "provisions" are beyond t he executive power to veto, but such sections were not "provisions" in the budge tary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treat ed as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto power. The petitions were dismissed, except with respect to G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113105 onl y insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service and G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals 1999

306 SCRA 287 Mendoza, J. Nature of the case: Facts Private respondents are public schools teachers. During the teacher s str ike, they did not report to work. For this reason they were administratively cha rge and place under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded befor e the lapse 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty. Respond ent Margallo was dismissed from service while other respondents were suspended f or 6 months. Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and Preventive Bo ard (MSPB) which found him guilty. Other respondent also appealed but it was dis missed. On appeal, Civil service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision of the M SPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas, Someban g) guilty of reasonable office rules and regulations and ordered them reinstated to their former positions. Rspondent filed petition for certiorari in this Cour t. The case was referred to Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered decision (1) af firming the decision of CSC with respect to Amparo, Bandigas, Somebang but (2) reversing the CSC ordered suspension of Margallo. The appellate court found him guilty of reasonable office rules and regulations only and imposed him the pena lty of reprimand. Private respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending th at they should be exonerated of all charges against them and that they be paid s alaries during their suspension. CA ruled that they are entitled to the payment of salaries during their suspension beyond 90 days . Petitioner Gloria moved for a reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence this petition. Petitioner con tends that the administrative investigation was concluded within the 90 day peri od of preventive suspension and that the continued suspension of private respond ents is due to their appeal, hence the government should not be held answerable for payment. Issue Whether or not respondents are entitled to payment of salaries during t he period of their suspension and appeal. Ruling Yes, they are entitled. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employee who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or s uspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (51) and (2) preventiv e suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority is suspension or dismissal and after review, the respondent is exonerated. As a lready stated, CA ordered DECS to pay private respondents their salaries, allowa nces and other benefits beyond the 90 day preventive suspension . In other words, n o compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending inves tigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated. Wherefore decision of CA, dated Sept. 3, 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED with t he modification that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be compu ted from the time of their dismissal/suspension by DECS until their actual reins tatement, for a period not exceeding five years. CAES vs. IAC November 6, 1989, G.R. Nos. 74989-90

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari. FACTS: On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate in formations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijua na before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on December 10, 1981. Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some reaso n postponed. On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was schedu led for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. On April 19, 1983, the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset becau se the prosecution witnesses were again absent. On June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had been per sonally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on J une 6, 1983. On November 14, 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio issued the following order: The failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several scheduled hearing and also for the hearing today which is an indication of lack of interest, upon motion of the trial fiscal for the provisional dismissal of these cases and with the conformity of the accused, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered Prov isionally Dismissed. On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he h ad been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado who alleged that they could n ot attend the hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for lack of notice. On May 18, 1984, the respondent judge issued the following order: On the "Motion for the Revival of the Case" no opposition has been filed and con sidering that the dismissal of these cases was only provisional, for reasons sta ted in the motion, the same is granted. The petitioner questioned the judge's order which was dismissed for lack of meri t on May 20, 1986, and reconsideration was denied on June 17, 1986. Hence, this petition. ISSUES a) Whether or not the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was riot filed by the proper party nor was a copy served on the petitioner; and b) Whether or not the revival of the cases would place the petitioner in double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights. RULING: It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsib ility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control. The wit nesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecuto r in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not e ven parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action. In a crimin al prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or on e acting under his authority, and by no one else. The mere fact that the government prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion and he did not interpose any objection was not enough to justify the action of t hese witnesses. The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he th ought it proper. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, e specially since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. The fact that he wa s not so informed made the irregularity even more serious. On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double jeopar dy has not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was with the conformity of the accused. To constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or informati

on; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dism issed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at bar. A case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused h imself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. The consent cannot be pre sumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure t o object, otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final. There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to d ispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismiss al has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accuse d, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a fai lure to prosecute. As the record shows, the petitioner was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was ne ver actually tried until the cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, followin g eleven postponements of the scheduled hearings, mostly because the prosecution was not prepared. Meantime, the charges against him continued to hang over his head even as he was not given an opportunity to deny them because his trial coul d not be held. Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of th e cases on the ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was desc ribed by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that dism issal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the conse quent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent, as we have re peatedly held, is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the presum ption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a consti tutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accuse d. We conclude that the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases agai nst the petitioner and that the respondent court also erred in affirming that or der. Caes having been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and not having expressly consented to the "provisional" dismissal of the cases against him, he was entitled to their final dismissal under the constitutional prohibiti on against double jeopardy. It is possible that as a result of its in attention, the petitioner has been nee dlessly molested if not permanently stigmatized by the unproved charges. The oth er possibility, and it is certainly worse, is that a guilty person has been allo wed to escape the penalties of the law simply because he may now validly claim t he protection of double jeopardy. In either event, the responsibility clearly li es with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City for its negligence an d ineptitude. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DECLARO February 9, 1989, G.R. No. L-64362 Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan. FACTS: As a the morning lbabao was a complaint result of a traffic accident that occurred at about 9:00 o'clock in of July 7, 1980 at Barangay Laguinbanua West, Numancia, Aklan, Edgar charged for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence in that was filed on September 5, 1980 in the Municipal Circuit Court o

f Malinao, Aklan. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1028-N wherein a ce rtain Crispin Conanan was the offended party. On October 1, 1980, an information for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against the same accused in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan. The case was docketed as Cri minal Case No. 1421 with one Eduardo Salido as the offended party. This second c ase arose from the same incident. Upon the arraignment of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1028-N, he entered a pl ea of not guilty. The case was first set for hearing on January 19, 1983. Both t he offended party and the prosecuting fiscal failed to appear at the scheduled h earing despite due notice. Counsel for the accused thus verbally moved for the d ismissal of the case for lack of interest on the part of the prosecution. This m otion was granted. A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by t he fiscal on January 27, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an order dated May 27, 1983. The case was, therefore, set for trial. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the accused, the inferior court issued ano ther order dated August 30, 1983, dismissing the case anew. Considering that the said case had been dismissed on January 19, 1983, counsel f or the accused filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground th at the dismissal of the prior case is a bar to the prosecution of the latter. Th e trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground of double jeopardy. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the prosecution but was denied. Thus, this petition filed by the private prosecutor with the conformity of the p rovincial fiscal. Petitioner argues that double jeopardy has not set-in in this case because: (1) The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N was at the instance and with the e xpress consent of accused and his counsel. 2) The second offense charged is not the same as the first, nor is it an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, nor does it include or is necessar ily included in the first. (3) Criminal Case No. 1028-N is not yet terminated. ISSUES Whether or not there is double jeopardy. Whether or not there is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy tria l. RULING: To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be presen t: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first je opardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be fo r the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) whe n the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwi se terminated without the express consent of the accused. Although there are criminal cases which were dismissed upon motion of the accuse d because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and/o r his witnesses did not appear at the trial and where this Court held that the d ismissal is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense the facts and the circumstances of the present c ase do not warrant a similar ruling. In the present case, the accused was duly notified that the case was set for hea ring on January 19, 1983. On said date of hearing neither the complainant nor th e fiscal appeared despite due notice. This was the first date of hearing after a rraignment. The court a quo should not have dismissed the case and should have i nstead reset the case to another date to give the prosecution another day in cou rt. Thus, while a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial can serve as a basis for the dismissal of a case, this must be balanced with the right of the prosecution to due process. In the instant case, the complaining witness and the prosecutor failed to appear

only in the first hearing. Even if the court did not dismiss the case but merel y postponed the hearing to another date, there would not have been a denial of t he right of the accused to a speedy trial. The right of the accused to have a sp eedy trial is violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period o f time is allowed to elapse without his case being tried. None of said situation s exists in the present case. Surely, it cannot be said that there was a violati on of the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. The more pruden t step that the court a quo should have taken was to postpone the hearing to giv e the prosecution another opportunity to present its case. The dismissal of the case by the trial court on the ground that the accused is entitled to a speedy t rial is unwarranted under the circumstances obtaining in this case. Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consen t of the accused, or upon his own motion, only if it is predicated on either of two grounds, i.e., insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right to a spe edy trial. In both cases, the dismissal will have the effect of an acquittal. Si nce the dismissal in this case does not fall under either of these two instances and it was made with the express consent of the accused, it would not thereby b e a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS October 27, 1989, G.R. No. 88211 Nature of the case: Motion for reconsideration on the Court s decision dated Septe mber 15,1989 dismissing the petition, after finding that the President did not a ct arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. FACTS: On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said: In the interest of the safety and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raisi ng the following major arguments: 1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippin es is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their co untry of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution; 2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has , she had exercised it arbitrarily; and 3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Ma rcos. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner s arguments are impressed with merit. RULING: The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening even t, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was ren dered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has be en viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power an d which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Const itution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Con

stitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reactio n to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander -in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she h ad acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at thi s decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision. The Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. PHIL. ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS December 15,1989, G.R. No. 84992 Nature of the Case: Appeal on decision dated March 21, 1987 by the Court of Appe als setting aside the decision and order of execution pending appeal which the R egional Trial Court of Manila issued in favor of the Philippine Rock Industries in Civil Case No. 82-11394, authorizing the immediate execution of its decision against the funds deposited in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of the respond ent Board of Liquidators as liquidator of the defunct Reparations Commission. FACTS: On July 30, 1982, PHILROCK filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, B ranch 38, a complaint against the Board of Liquidators for Specific Performance or Revaluation with Damages, praying that the defective rock pulverizing machine ry which it purchased from REPACOM be replaced with a new one in good and operab le condition according to the specifications of their contract, or, in the alter native, to refund the value of the defective rock pulverizing machinery at 31 % of its contract price. PHILROCK also prayed for actual damages of P 5,000 per mo nth for losses it allegedly incurred due to the increased expenses of maintainin g the plant, P 4,000 per day as unrealized profits, exemplary damages, attorney fees of P 50,000, plus expenses and costs of the suit. On April 23, 1987, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of PHILROCK and ordered REPACOM and the Board of Liquidators1. To reimburse Plaintiff Philrock for the expenses it had invested and incurred in connection with its purchase of the said rock pulverizing plant from REPACOM in the total amount of P l02,837.66; 2. To pay Plaintiff Philrock compensatory damages for unrealized profits from Ma y, 1966 and up to December 31, 1983 in the amount of P 33,896,844.47; 3. To pay Plaintiff Philrock the amount of P 671,925.32 as reimbursement for the expenses incurred in storage and maintenance of the rock pulverizing plant at P hilrock's plant site from June 1, 1966 up to December 31, 1982; 4. To pay Plaintiff Philrock exemplary damages of P 200,000.00; 5. To pay Plaintiff Philrock's (sic) Attorney's fee of P 50,000.00; 6. To pay the costs of this suit. On May 5, 1987, PHILROCK filed an urgent motion for execution pending appeal. On May 14, 1987, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the State, filed a notice o f appeal and an opposition to the "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal" on the g round that the funds sought to be garnished by PHILROCK are public funds, hence, exempt from attachment and execution. On May 19, 1987, an order of Garnishment was served to PNB against the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators to satisfy the judgment in fa vor of PHILROCK. On March 21, 1988, the Court of Appeals held that: ... the funds deposited by the Board of Liquidators in the Philippine National B ank may not be garnished to satisfy a money judgment against the petitioner as t hese funds are public funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquid ators in the Philippine National Bank may be garnished to satisfy a money judgme nt against the BOARD. RULING: The Board of Liquidators is a government agency under the direct supervi sion of the President of the Republic created by EO 372, dated November 24, 1950 . It is tasked with the specific duty of administering the assets and paying the liabilities of the defunct REPACOM. Hence, when a suit is directed against said unincorporated government agency which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's principal , i.e., the State. The sale of the rock pulverizing plant to PHILROCK by the Board of liquidators, although proprietary in nature was merely incidental to the performance of the B oard's primary and governmental function of settling and closing the affairs of the REPACOM. Hence, its funds in the Philippine National Bank are public funds, which are exempt from garnishment. It should be mentioned that when the State consents to be sued, it does not nece ssarily concede its liability. Even when the government has been adjudged liable in a suit to which it has consented, it does not necessarily follow that the ju dgment can be enforced by execution against its hands for, every disbursement of public funds must be covered by a corresponding appropriation passed by the Leg islature. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power o f the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the s tate has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for i tself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgme nt against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legisla ture will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfacti on thereof. Funds should be appropriated by the legislature for the specific purpose of sati sfying the judgment in favor of PHILROCK before said judgment may be paid. SUMMERS vs. OZAETA October 25, 1948, G.R. No. L-1534 Nature of the Case: FACTS: Prior to February 16, 1946, the petitioner was a cadastral judge. On said date he qualified for and assumed the position of judge-at-large of first insta nce by Secretary of Justice, the petitioner having received an ad interim appoin tment on February 11, 1946. On July 9, 1946, petitioner's ad interim appointment was disapproved by the Commission on appointment, as a result of which the resp ondent Secretary of Justice duty informed the petitioner that latter was thereup on separated from the service. Thereafter and until the present action was insti tuted on July 11, 1947, his efforts were limited to the task of being reappointe d. It was argued that then petitioner did not cease to be a cadastral judge. At any rate, the petitioner does not pretend that he has ever rendered service as c adastral judge or received any of its emoluments subsequent to the rejection of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. It is now argued by the petitioner that under section 9, Article VIII, of the Co nstitution, he is entitled to continue as cadastral judge during good behavior u ntil he reaches the age of seventy years or becomes incapacitated to discharge t he duties of said office; that the positions of cadastral judge and judge-at-lar ge are not incompatible and that therefore by the acceptance of the latter offic e he did not cease to be a cadastral judge, especially where his ad interim appo intment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner s argument is with merit.

RULING: There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of member of the Su preme Court and judge of inferior court to hold offices during good behavior unt il they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. Said right is waivable. Petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position of judge-at-large consequent u pon his taking of the oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a waiver of his right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and g uaranteed by the Constitution. An ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the " President shall hav e the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such app ointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appoint ments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." It is an appointment perma nent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the C ommission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and qualified for the position of ju dge-at-large by taking the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely of a n "acting" judge-at-large. As stated in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, the pet itioner "knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was s ubject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembl y and that if said commission were to disapprove the same, it would become ineff ective and he would cease discharging the office. In a situation faced by the petitioner, the safer course to follow would have be en for him to await the confirmation of the ad interim appointment before qualif ying for and assuming the position of judge-at-large. The petitioner cannot seek refuge in the general principle that the acceptance o f a second office may be held as amounting to a vacation of the first, the two o ffices must be incompatible. The situation before us is undoubtedly not one wherein he may appropriately hold two compatible offices at one time such, for instance, as the positions of town recorder and county and probate judge but one wherein he cannot legally hold tw o offices of similar category at the same time, like two positions of judge of f irst instance. Two offices are incompatible when viewed in the light of the publ ic policy expressed in the statutes creating them and defining their powers and duties. To hold otherwise would be to say that, in certain instances, there shou ld be but two magistrates in the township, and it would become wholly without fo rce and effect. It becomes unnecessary to determine whether petitioner's acts after he was notif ied by the Secretary of Justice about his separation from the service, constitut e an implied acquiescence therein or an abandonment of the position of cadastral judge. SIMON, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS January 5, 1994, G.R. No. 100150 Nature of the case: A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining or der and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respon dent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled " Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al." Facts: A demolition order was signed Carlos Quimpo, in his capacity as an Execut ive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the O ffice of the City Mayor, which was sent and received by herein private responden ts. It was an order to leave after 3 days, the area in North Edsa to give way to the "People's Park". Led by their President Roque Fermo, the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorpor ated filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR ag ainst the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for

a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to st op the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and cari nderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 2 3 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vend ors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, or dered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in f avor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food und er the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist fr om further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, ar guing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolve d. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the cou rts. On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitione rs, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confin ed only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and th at "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political ri ghts, (but) their privilege to engage in business." On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resoluti on, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private r espondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia d espite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was de nied. Issue: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose sta lls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by th e Mayor of Quezon City. Ruling: The petition has merit. The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Ex ecutive Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative p ower at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Comm ittee on Human Rights. In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR th eorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. This view, however, has not heretofore been shar ed by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "on ly the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance t o adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained: . . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental la w to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate muc h less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. B ut fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial funct ion of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The func tion of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the facul ty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions t o the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, fin ally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be prov ided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Macasiano vs. Diokno 1992, G.R. No. 97764 Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of M akati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied for b y respondents Municipality of Paraaque and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service ag ainst petitioner. Facts: Respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the clos ure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea marke t thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or m unicipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions. The Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. subject to the followin g conditions: 1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/ven ding areas thereon; 2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians; 3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly de signated; 4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. The municipal council of Paraaque issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor W alfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the es tablishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vendin g areas.In pursuant to the resolution, respondent municipality and respondent Pal anyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Par aaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. Hence, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary in junction. The trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of th e Municipality' of Paraaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from en forcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.

Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid. Ruling: The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into pro perty for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states: Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public w aters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said province s, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension an d Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore consid ered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local gover nment which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the ab solute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoeve r to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authority given by Con gress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Sectio n 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code, which states: Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local government unit may likewise, through its hea d acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with exis ting law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any par t of thereof shall be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpos e for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be l awfully used or conveyed. However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local governme nt units to close roads and other similar public places should be read and inter preted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. These bas ic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city o r municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civi l Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commer ce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to pr ivate persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complie d with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when c ircumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for publ ic use or public service. Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authori ty to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented becaus e it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to n on-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied wit h the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The alleg ations of respondent municipality that the closed streets were not used for vehi cular traffic and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establish ment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will show that this first condition has been met. Likewise, the designation by respon dents of a time schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent. Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congest ed with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets i

n Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion. We take note of the other observations of the Solicitor General. The powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limi tations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreo ver, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount consideratio ns of health and well-being of the members of the community. People vs. Macam 1994, G.R. Nos. L-91011-12 Nature of the case: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Co urt, Branch 104, Quezon City, finding Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque guilty beyo nd reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Facts: In Criminal Case No. Q-53781, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Ca wilan, Jr., were accused of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. On or about the 18th day of August, 1987, in Quezon City, the accused rob one BE NITO MACAM entered the residence of Benito Macam and rob properties valued in th e total amount of P454,000.00. And by reason of the crime of Robbery, said accus ed attacked Leticia Macam, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal injuri es which were direct and immediate cause of her death, and on the occasion of sa id offense, Benito Macam, Salvacion Enrera, and Nilo Alcantara, all sustained ph ysical injuries which have required medical attendance. Together with Criminal Case No. Q-53781, Criminal Case No. Q-53783 was filed aga inst Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwi se known as the Anti-Fencing Law. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., assisted by their respective counsels, changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty. The trial court rendered its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonabl e doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. Q-53781 and a cquitting Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in Criminal Case No. Q-53783. Issue: Whether or not their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled ident ification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital are violative of their constitutional rights. Ruling: In Gamboa v. Cruz, it was held that the right to counsel attaches upon t he start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused. The counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the tr ial, inasmuch as the accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the la w and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of the change s in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adv ersaries and the judicial system well before his trial begins. It is therefore a ppropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution eve n before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical c onfrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proce edings. After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncouns eled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims befo re the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identificat ion. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.

However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identifi cation at the police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admi ssion in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can not be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identif ication made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made t he identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again ide ntified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court iden tification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objec tion, the prosecution need not show that said identifications were of independen t origin. The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. Ho wever, appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Th is issue is being raised for the first time by appellants before this Court. The y have not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on t his ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by ente ring a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. People vs. Lamsing 1995, G.R. No. 105316 Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant guilty of the sp ecial complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him accordingly. Facts: The case arose from the killing in the early hours of November 1, 1989 of Winnie Cabunilas, a security guard, while on duty at the construction site of a Synergy building on Aurora Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon City. Four days after the killing, accused-appellant was arrested by policemen, while in a drinking spree with friends at a basketball court near the scene of the cri me. He was detained and in a police lineup, was identified by witnesses as one o f those responsible for the death of Winnie Cabunilas. On November 9, 1989, an information was filed against him and a John Doe for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. As the other accused was at large, trial proceeded against accused-appellant alone. The prosecution evidence is the testimony of the witness Elizabeth de los Santos .The witness said that at dawn of November 1, 1989, she was roused from her sleep by the cries of a distressed person calling for his "mama". She got up, partly opened the door and saw, at a distance of about one meter, two male persons, one of them holding Winnie Cabunilas and the other one stabbing him. She identified the person who stabbed Cabunilas as the accused-appellant. Appellant denied involvement in the crime. However, the trial court found the te stimony of Elizabeth de los Santos credible. Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied due process. Ruling: That Elizabeth De los Santos' testimony was uncorroborated does not make it less worthy of credit. Uncorroborated testimony can stand alone if, as in th is case, it is intrinsically credible and there is no showing that it was improp erly or maliciously motivated. So long as it is credible and trustworthy and is sufficient to support a finding of guilt, its probative value is not diminished and corroborative testimony of another eyewitness becomes dispensable. On the other hand, accused-appellant's defense consists merely of alibi which wa s correctly rejected by the trial court. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses be cause it is easy to fabricate it while it is difficult to disprove it. It cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witness, especially where it is not physically impossible for the accused to be present at the place of the cri me or its vicinity at the time of its commission. Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testi

fy falsely must prevail over simple denials and unacceptable alibis of the accus ed. The accused complains that he was made to join a police lineup where he was iden tified by three persons, including Elizabeth De los Santos, without the assistan ce of counsel. It was settled in Gamboa v. Cruz, however, that the right to coun sel guaranteed in Art. III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution does not extend to police lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. The reaso n for this is that at that point, the process has not yet shifted from the inves tigatory to the accusatory. The accused's right to counsel attaches only from th e time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him. People vs. Acol 1994, G.R. Nos. 106288-89 Nature of the case: Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly st aged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to co urt, not for the felonious asportation, but for possession of the two unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them which were instrumental in the commiss ion of the robo. Facts: At around 3:45 in the morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan wa s driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed P asay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a ho ld-up. Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes interchange wh ere the other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including t he jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the She ll Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan an d his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was f orthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with th e responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police auth orities to accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets . After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identi fied by Percival Tan and the passengers who ganged up on the accused. Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them. Issue: Whether or not the accused were denied due process. Ruling: It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein accused- ap pellant can not feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to pres ent his defense, through his own narration on the witness stand. The search in the case at bar falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 1 13 which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:When an offense has in fact been committed, and the has personal knowledge of facts indi cating that the person to be arrested has committed it The police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible fo r the crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Arane ta that they had just been robbed.And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful , it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid. Moreover, the un licensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for th e robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Ma goncia vs. Palacio that:. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the comm ission of a criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen to dis cover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded f rom performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilt

y person and the taking of the corpus delicti. EBRALINAG vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU 1995, 251 SCRA 569 Nature of the case: Facts: The petitioners 43 high school and elementary school students in the town s of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province. All minors , they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah' Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Phil ippines. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the p ublic school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the not ional anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 126 5 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of Depar tment of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsor y in all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides: "Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremo ny, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem. "Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue o r cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ce remony herein provided. "Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act an d in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution conc erned and its head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation. "In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall ca use the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational ins titution responsible for such failure." Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that thos e are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion which they "cannot conscientiousl y give x x x to anyone or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's c ommand to "guard ourselves from idols-1 John 5:21". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local author ities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitat ions on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit tha t the Constitution protects against official control. Issue: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jeho vah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refus ing, on count of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony whic h includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, salut ing the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge. Ruling: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippine s, an emblem of national sovereignty of national unity and cohesion and of fre edom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Unde r a system of complete separation of church and state in the government, the fla g is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not i nvolve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for adm ission to the bar." "In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru th e Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a rel

igious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory scho ol regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or J ehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying, at the duty imposed upon it by t he Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all edu cational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among othe r things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship." "The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in th e flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of th e school population which by far constitutes the great majority." "The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and can not mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminator y laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority." "The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect, via., freed om to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the pub lic welfare" Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offe nd their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, the re is no warrant for their expulsion. "Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country , x x x--assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion-i s not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious lib erty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs. Nebras ka, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.) Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 19 87 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to " protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV). We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witness with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religiou s beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, th eir right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR 1988, 167 SCRA 393 Nature of the case: FACTS: In this consolidated case, three principal issues were raised. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner were denied due process when information for libel wer e filed against them although the case was still under review by the Secretary o f Justice and subsequently, by the President. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when responden t RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the com plainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may ini tiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a compl aint affidavit.

RULING: Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that the reason which ne cessitates presidential immunities from suit impose correlative disability to fi le suit. He contends that is criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presiden t s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness f or the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court s jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way, defeat, her privilege of immunity from suit, or by testifyin g on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of co urt or perjury. This privilege of immunity from suit-perhaps to the President by virtue of the o ffice and may be invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any other pers on in the President s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case cannot raised pr esidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against it s accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from wai ving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection aff orded by the privilege and submit to the court s jurisdiction. The choice of wheth er to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. TORRES VS. GONZALES 1987, 152 SCRA 272 Nature of the case: Original petition for Habeas Corpus FACTS: A conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on co ndition that petitioner would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phi lippines. Should condition be violated, he will be proceed against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the condition pardon and was consequentl y released from confinement. Subsequently, the Board of Pardons and parole resol ved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon bas ed upon the evidence showing that the petitioner had been charged 20 counts of e stafa in a criminal case which were then pending trial before the RTC and on his conviction by the RTC of the crime of sedition which is now pending appeal befo re the IAC. Respondent Minister of Justice based on the board s resolution, recomm ended cancellation of the conditional pardon. President cancelled the conditiona l pardon after which the respondent issued by authority of the President, an Ord er of Arrest and recommitment against petitioner. Petitioner was accordingly arr ested. It was the petitioner s contention that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts estafa nor of the crime of sedition. Petitioner also contends that he was not given th e opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and thus deprived of his rights under due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE 1) Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment is necessary in t his case. 2) Whether or not petitioner was denied due process. RULING: These issues were discussed in three cases before and can be summed up a s follows: 1) The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts that are not subject to scrutiny . 2) The determination of the occurrence of a breach of condition of a pardon and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive ac t, not subject to a judicial scrutiny under Sec 649i) of the Rev. Administration Code; or it may be judicial act consisting of a trial for and conviction of vio lation of a conditional pardon under Art. 159 Revised Penal Code. Where the Pres

ident opts to proceed under Sec 64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code no judicial pronounc ement of guilt of a subsequent crime if necessary, in order that a convict may b e recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process and because the con ditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in hi s trials and conviction for the offense which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec 64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. In this case, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under S ec 64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code that choice is an exercise of the President s execu tive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. LLAMAS VS. ORBOS 202 SCRA 844, 1991 Nature of the case: Petition to review the resolution of the Executive Secretary FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the incumbent Vice Governor of the Province of Tarlac, he assumed the position by virtue of a decision of the office of the President, the governorship. Private respondent Mariano Ocampo II is the incumbe nt governor of the province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days, due to a verified complaint filed by petitioner against respondent Governor before the Department of Local Government charging him with alleged vio lation of the local government code and the anti-graft and corrupt practices law . Public respondent Orbos was Executive Secretary at that time and is being impl eaded herein in that official capacity for being issued, by authority of the Pre sident, the assailed resolution granting executive clemency to respondent Govern or. Petitioner s main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on Art. VII Sec 19 of the Constitution. According to t he petitioner, the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies s olely to criminal cases and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative case. ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant ex ecutive clemency in administrative cases. RULING: The President has the power to grant executive clemency in administrativ e case because the law does not distinguish. The constitution does not distingui sh between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, wit h sole exclusion of impeachment cases. There is no valid and convincing reasons why t he President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It i s the view of the SC that is the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reas on can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly l ess serious than criminal offenses. The President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all e xecutive-departments may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, mo st especially where the basis therefore would be to serve the greater public int erest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant executiv e clemency but also to reverse or modify the ruling issued by a subordinate again st an erring public official. RIVERA vs. COMELEC July 12, 1991, G.R. No. 95336 Nature of the case: Petition to review the decision of the Commission on Electio ns.

Facts: Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia were candidat es for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay in the January 1998 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor b y the majority of ten votes. Garcia filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court(RTC) . The trial court found Garcia to have obtained 6, 376 votes against Rivera's 6, 222. Rivera appealed to the Comelec through its First Division, the COMELEC sustained with modification the appealed judgment of the RTC declaring Garcia as the duly elected Mayor of Gunibatan, Albay. Rivera's motion for reconsideration was acted upon by the COMELEC en banc. COMEL EC denied the motion. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan by virtue of a writ of execution implementing the COMELEC de cision until when he has served notice of this Court's temporary restraining ord er issued upon Rivera's motion. Rivera filed the present petition seeking the annulment of the COMELEC en banc d ecision. Garcia contends that the Constitution declares the decisions of the COM ELEC on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials to be final, executory, and not appealable. Issue: Whether or not the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involvin g elective municipal and baranagy officials, being final and executory and not a ppealable, preclude the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. Ruling: NO. The provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution tha t decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests invo lving elective municipal and baranagay offices shall be final, executory and not appealable applies only to questions of fact and not of law. The said provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve questio ns of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitutio n. The challenged COMELEC decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically b y respondent. It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred s uch factual determinations. The Court find none in the case. The Court resolved to dismiss the petition. LAZATIN v. COMELEC January 25, 1998. G.R. No. 8007. Nature of the case: Special civil action for certiorari. Facts: Petitioner filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the C OMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties as Congressman of the First District of Pampan ga. The petitioner claims that the House Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests(Sec. 17 Art.VI of the 1987 Constituti on). Issue: Whether or not the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all elec tion contests involving house of representatives. Ruling: YES. Petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional election s in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and a ssumed his duties as congressman. For the Supreme Court to take cognizance of th e electoral protest against him would be usurp the functions of the House Electo ral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation despite alleged irregul arities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

The revocation by the COMELEC of petitioner's proclamation is set aside. SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MORAN July 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 249 Nature of the Case: Petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of F irst Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed agai nst the petitioner. FACTS: The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance o f Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to t he jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of t he United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. Petitioner contends that the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisd iction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Ar ticle III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Cour t of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassad ors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the cou rts of the Philippines and even under the Constitution of the Philippines origin al jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and co nsuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. RULING: Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner . This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or min ister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of t he laws of the country where he resides. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPIL May 15, 1995, G.R. No. 95028 Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari. Facts: On 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitures located along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwell ing of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made thei r way into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the sec ond floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers fort hwith herded the two (2) maids of the owners into the bathroom. They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the piece s of furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen stab wounds. In the investigation that followed, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told op eratives of the Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that evening, he saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bart olome to the police investigators who also learned that the trio who were all fr om Samar failed to report for work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his sister's child. Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents went to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon , to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions. From the records of the parish

they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar Mabini stood as godfather in th e baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez. Immediately they pro ceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and his comp anions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still pl anning to leave. After being positively identified as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accu sed Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed und er arrest. After regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil rea dily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators o f the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compi l was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigat ed. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shor tly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ Furn itures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his parti cipation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture shop since he would be recognized. Only those who were not known to th eir employers went inside. Compil said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to de ath. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all met in Bangkal, Makati, i n the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit, w here they shared the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go home to th eir respective provinces. From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to the house of Pablo Pakit who confirmed that his younger brother Rogelio, with some six (6) others including Compil, went to his house past midnight on 23 Oct ober 1987 and divided among themselves the money and jewelry which, as he picked up from their conversation, was taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. They drank beer u ntil past four o'clock the next morning. The day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer M elencio Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville Compil and brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cp l. Patricio Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a loo kout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators of the and asserted that he was me rely forced to join the group by Jose Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who were the ma sterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work for MJ Fu rnitures where he was the foreman. Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations in Manila, Paraaque and Bulacan but failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil. Later on, an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compi l. Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraig ned. After the prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de par te instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence. However, the RTC o f Manila, Br. 49, denied the demurrer, found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. On appeal, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his constitution al rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the polic e officers started interrogating him from the time of his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at the Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he) was made to confess and declare statements that can be used agains t him in any proceeding." And, the belated arrival of counsel from the CLAO pri or to the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession did not cure the constitutional infirmity since the police investigators had already extracte d incriminatory statements from him the day before, which extracted statements f ormed part of his alleged confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admi ssion of (his) oral . . . and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (h e) cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homi cide based on the testimonies of other witnesses" which are replete with "serio us and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions." Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant was denied of his constitutional rig

ht. Ruling: In People v. Rous, the Court held that an extrajudicial confession may b e admitted in evidence even if obtained without the assistance of counsel provid ed that it was read and fully explained to confessant by counsel before it was s igned. However the Court adopts the view in Gamboa v. Cruz where the Court En Ba nc ruled that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigatio n, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit inform ation and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the p ernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offen se." In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subje cted to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Q uezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further qu estioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commissio n of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, h e was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the ac tual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the inve stigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-app ellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigatio n is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus o n a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry ou t a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statem ents, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confessio n. Thus in People v. de Jesus the Court said that admissions obtained during cu stodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constit ution. What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fu lly explained to the accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the records, the latter's constitutional rights and th e consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession. While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, t he Court finds other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROUS March 27, 1995, G.R. No. 103803-04 Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari. Facts: Socrates Rous alias Bobby, Rolando Laygo y Collado alias Lando, Primitivo Garcia alias Bong/Peming, Virgilio Pradis, and Celestino Rabina were charged wi th the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide. Further accused, except Laygo, we re charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1 972. After joint trial against Laygo and Rous only, as the other accused were never a rrested and have remained at large, the court a quo rendered a decision acquitti ng Rous of the charge of carnapping, but finding both Rous and Laygo guilty unde r the charge of Highway Robbery and sentencing each to an imprisonment term of r eclusion perpetua, aside from the payment in solidum of civil indemnity. From said decision, Rolando Laygo and Socrates Rous appealed, with both of them

ascribing as error the admission of their extrajudicial confessions. Accused-appellant Laygo contends that his extra-judicial confession is inadmissi ble in evidence because the taking thereof was started and finished without the assistance of counsel. Issue: Whether or not the confession is admissible. Ruling: We reject this argument. The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed accused-appellant Laygo of his right to counsel and categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted t he assistance of counsel, to which inquiry, Laygo expressed his desire to be so assisted by counsel. Thereupon, the investigating officer, Sgt. Robert Gaddi, br ought him to the office of Atty. Abraham Datlag. Accused-appellant and Atty. Dat lag conferred for a while; thereafter, Sgt. Gaddi and accused-appellant returned to the CIS Office of Sgt. Gaddi and Sgt. Gaddi started the investigation. Atty. Datlag arrived soon after the investigation started and left before the last th ree questions were asked, instructing them to follow him to his office. After th e extra-judicial statement of Laygo was finished, Gaddi and accused-appellant La ygo went to the office of Atty. Datlag who read and examined Exhibit C, after wh ich, Atty. Datlag conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign Exhibit C. Laygo did so and Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise signed Exhibit C. From the above facts, we find that there was more than substantial compliance wi th the constitutional requirement that a person under investigation for the comm ission of a crime should be provided with counsel, (Section 12 (1), Article III, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The very purpose of said constitutional requirement is to prevent the use of coercion in extracting a con fession from a suspect. Any form of coercion, whether physical, mental, or emoti onal in extracting confessions stamps the confession with the taint of inadmissi bility (People vs. Cuison, 106 SCRA 98 [1981]). Nowhere in the evidence is it sh own that coercion was ever employed by the investigating officer in obtaining th e confession of accused-appellant Laygo. The investigation was even witnessed by the relatives of Laygo. The fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after the investigation of Laygo had begun and left before the confession was concluded does not negate the validity and admissibility of said confession for the reason that after the confession wa s put down in writing, accused-appellant and the investigating officer proceeded to the office of Atty. Datlag and the latter then read the confession, conferre d with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign the confession. It will be readily s een that the confession was voluntary and the signing thereof by Laygo was done upon advice of counsel. The constitutional requirements were thus fully complied with. Moreover, the presence of Rolando's uncle, Tiburcio Laygo and the latter s wife, Fely, clearly precluded the use of coercion in extracting the confession. A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the str ong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly c onfess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. A confession is a dmissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency (People vs. Da sig, 221 SCRA 549 [1993]). There is not a speck of evidence to show that the con fession of Laygo was extracted by such means or promise. Atty. Datlag would not have affixed his signature to the extrajudicial confession of Laygo as counsel f or Laygo had he known or had he been informed by Laygo of any infirmity in its e xecution. Said confession is, therefore, admissible in evidence. The same ruling applies to the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit G) of accused-a ppellant Rous. Although Atty. Ferrer, the counsel of Rous, was not present when the confession was taken, after the confession was prepared, Sgt. Gaddi brought Rous to the office of Atty. Ferrer who read the confession and fully explained i t to Rous. Only after Atty. Ferrer had interviewed Rous and fully explained the confession and apprised Rous of his rights and the consequences of his answers d id Rous sign said confession. It is clear, therefore, that Rous signed his confe ssion upon advice and in the presence of his counsel, without any violence, inti

midation or threats being employed against him. Said confession suffers from no infirmity and, is therefore, admissible in evidence. Furthermore, the prosecutio n presented a medical certificate (Exhibit H) issued by Dr. Cesar S. Bernabe of the Ilocos Regional Hospital attesting that he physically examined accused-appel lant Rous and found no injury on his body, evidently showing that no violence wa s used against accused-appellant Rous. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, without special pronou ncement as to costs. PEOPLE vs. FLORES December 8, 1994, G.R. Nos. 111009-12 Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari. Facts: Jose Flores y Salinas, Manuel Corpuz y Lacuata, Romeo Artienda y Galvez, Jr., Amado Merca y Lopez, Edwin "Eden" Tubiera y Detabli, Leonito Macapagal and one other unknown person who remains at-large, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, with the crimes of Murder with Unintentiona l Abortion, two (2) counts of Murder and Frustrated Murder in four (4) separate informations Upon arraignment, all the accused present pleaded not guilty to all the offenses charged. The cases were tried jointly and on 2 July 1993, the trial court rende red a decision finding Jose Flores y Salinas, Manuel Corpuz y Lacuata, Romeo Art ienda y Galvez, Jr., Amado Merca y Lopez, and Edwin Tubiera y Detabli GUILTY of the crimes filed against them. For insufficiency of evidence, the Court finds th e accused Leonito Macapagal NOT GUILTY of the crimes charged and hence his acqui ttal him. All five (5) convicted accused appealed the judgment to this Court claiming, amo ng others, that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ' DEFENSE OF ALIBI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS FULLY CORROBORATED BY WITN ESSES WHOSE REPUTATION FOR PROBITY COULD NOT BE IMPUGNED. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants right to be presumed innocent was vi olated because their alibis were not given credence. Ruling: In People v. Salveron, the Court held that: The alibi itself, although co rroborated . . was not convincing enough in the face of the positive identificat ion. Furthermore, in People v. Cortes the Court ruled that: Justifiably, courts have al ways looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have received the same with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also bec ause of its easy fabrication. It cannot prevail over the clear, direct and posit ive testimony of prosecution witness Dignos identifying appellants as the perpet rators of the crime. In the cases at bench, the alibis presented do not clearly show that it was impo ssible for the accused-appellants to be at the locus criminis at the time the cr imes were committed. It is of note that a certain police officer, Robert Cabrera , who could have corroborated the alibis of Manuel Corpuz and Jose Flores, if th e defense version were to be given credence, was never presented. The presumptio n therefore is that his testimony would be adverse to the defense. The other defense witnesses who tried to establish the alibis of the other accus ed-appellants can hardly be considered to be disinterested witnesses. Against My rna Diones' positive identification that the five (5) accused-appellants were th e perpetrators, the alibis would have to fail. Accused-appellants in their Reply brief also argue that since Myrna Diones admit ted having fallen unconscious after she was struck in the head, she could not ha ve testified to the actual commission of the crimes. Hence, accused-appellants c onclude that the findings of the trial court that they committed the crimes are really without basis.

The argument is specious. What occurred subsequent to Myrna Diones' becoming unc onscious is adequately established by the other circumstances testified to by My rna. Myrna Diones was able to convincingly testify to the participation of the five ( 5) accused-appellants in taking her and her three (3) female companions to Nagui lian Road in the early hours of 19 June 1992. Myrna testified that her two (20 c ompanions in the Fiera-typed vehicle were handcuffed, tied around the neck with rope and mauled by the accused-appellants. Myrna testified that she, herself, wa s stabbed and hit three (3) times with a wooden club by accused-appellant Edwin Tubiera before she fell unconscious. The acts of accused-appellants clearly show that there was a conspiracy to inflict potentially fatal injuries on the four ( 4) women. Myrna and the three (3) deceased victims sustained injuries consistent with Myrna's account of how they were mauled, stabbed and strangled with ropes. That accused-appellants were the authors of the crimes committed is adequately e stablished by circumstantial evidence which proves with moral certainty that acc used-appellants not only conspired in inflicting injuries on Myrna Diones and th e three (3) deceased victims but that they also conspired in committing the crim es of Murder with Unintentional Abortion, Double Murder and Frustrated Murder. Finally, the offer of accused-appellants to compromise, which was never denied, constitutes additional evidence against their innocence. Clearly, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of accused-appella nts has been overcome by proof which to a moral certainty establishes their guil t for the crimes of Double Murder, Murder with Unintentional Abortion and Frustr ated Murder. The five (5) accused-appellants are still fortunate that the court could not the n impose the penalty of death upon them, for undoubtedly they would have been se ntenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death for having violated, so heinously at that, the laws which they had sworn to uphold as members of the police force . WHEREFORE, the joint decision rendered by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 92-CR-1358, 92-CR-1365, 92-CR-1366 and 92-CR-1407 convicting the five (5) accuse d-appellants is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. APOLONIO CABANSAG vs. FERNANDEZ October 18, 1957, G.R. No. L-8974 Nature of the case: This is a contempt proceeding which arose in Civil Case No. 9564 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyers Roberto V. Merrera were found guilty and sentenced the first to pay a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that a repetition of th e of offense will next time be heavily dealt with. Facts: Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instanc e of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. However, the case was only partially heard during the p eriod of seven years. On December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Or der No. I creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), whi ch was later superseded by Executive Order 19 promulgated on March 17, 1954. And on August 12, 1954 Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he fur nished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of First In stance of Pangasinan. Counsel for defendants, filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he ma de in his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been depr ived of his land "thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which cou nsel for Cabansag replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn declared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him

in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter- charges, on September 14, 1954, Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending the above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of t he President and the people. Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did not h ave the idea to besmirch the dignity or belittle the respect due the court nor w as he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to the PCAC; that there is no single contemptuous word in said letter nor was it intended to give the Ch ief Executive a wrong impression or opinion of the court; and that if there was any inefficiency in the disposal of his case, the same was committed by the judg es who previously intervened in the case. Issue: Whether or not the writing of said letter tend to draw the intervention o f the PCAC in the instant case which will have the effect of undermining the cou rt's judicial independence? Ruling: We agree that the trial court that courts have the power to preserve the ir integrity and maintain their dignity without which their administration of ju stice is bound to falter or fail. This is the preservative power to punish for c ontempt. This power is inherent in all courts and essential to their right of se lf-preservation. In order that it may conduct its business unhampered by publica tions which tends to impair the impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstr uct the administration of justice, the court will not hesitate to exercise it re gardless of who is affected. For, "as important as is the maintenance of unmuzzl ed press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance o f the independence of the judiciary".The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such said institut ion would be resting on a very shaky foundation. The question that now arises is: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiabl y exercised this power in the instant case? We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at the bottom of our democratic institutions-the independence of the judiciary the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. How to balance and re concile the exercise of these rights is the problem posed in the case before us. Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting ri ghts of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the " clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as i nterpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely hi gh" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is th e "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "dis orderly and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe pub lished. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridg ed unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the a dministration of justice. Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supr eme Court of the United States said "Clear and present danger of substantive evi ls as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings jus tifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely hi gh. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitution al protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judici al proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case i t must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justi ce. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of t he published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press." No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt

in relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech an d press should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for contempt o f court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious a nd imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in contemp t one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to be little him. . . . The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications c oncerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent not merely a l ikely, threat to the administration of justice. And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of publ ic comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tende ncy to influence pending cases." The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words us ed are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congres s has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases wher e extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression e nds and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that t he freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redr ess of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They a re subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.) This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in gene ral terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated t o incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.). The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag created a suff icient danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCA C create a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules mentioned ab ove? Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to t he PCAC which has given rise to the present contempt proceedings, we would at on ce see that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw n o other way of obtaining the early termination of his case. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating f actor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of th e precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken ma y not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be c ontemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the adm inistration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency " to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the write r merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redre ss of a legitimate grievance. Under such a state of affairs, appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be blamed for entertaining the belief that the only way by which he could obtain redress of h is grievance is to address his letter to the PCAC which after all is the office created by the late President to receive and hear all complaints against officia

ls and employees of the government to facilitate which the assistance and cooper ation of all the executive departments were enjoined (Executive Order No. 1, as amended by Executive Order No. 19). And one of the departments that come under t he control of the President is the Department of Justice which under the law has administrative supervision over courts of first instance.(Section 83, Revised A dministrative Code) The PCAC is part of the Office of the President. It can, the refore, be said that the letter of Cabansag though sent to the PCAC is intended for the Department of Justice where it properly belongs. Consequently, the sendi ng of that letter may be considered as one sent to the Department of Justice and as such cannot constitute undue publication that would place him beyond the man tle of protection of our constitution.

DONALD BAER vs. HON. TITO V. TIZON May 3, 1974, G.R. No. L-24294 Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the o rders of the respondent judge. FACTS: On November 17, 1964, respondent Edgardo Gener filed a complaint for inju nction with the Court of First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Bae r, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging in an area situated in Barrio Mabayo, Municipality of Morong, Bataan and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging operations. A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge on November 23, 1964. Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Phil ippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sover eign without its consent. Then, on December 12, 1964, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, wherein such g round was reiterated. It was therein pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being official acts done by him for and in behalf of the Un ited States of America. It was added that in directing the cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner was entirely wi thin the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the securi ty of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern an d most important duty of the Commander of the Base. There was, on December 14, 1964, an opposition and reply to petitioner's motion to dismiss by respondent Gener, relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover poss ession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Governme nt, who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government." Tha t was his basis for sustaining the jurisdiction of respondent Judge. Petitioner, thereafter, on January 12, 1965, made a written offer of documentary evidence, including certified copies of telegrams of the Forestry Director to Forestry per sonnel in Balanga, Bataan dated January 8, and January 11, 1965, directing immed iate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan and calling attention to the fact that the records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or temporary extension permits. The above notwithstanding, respondent Judge, on January 12, 1965, issued an orde r granting respondent Gener's application for the issuance of a writ of prelimin ary injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUES Whether or not the invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate. Whether or not the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, posses s diplomatic immunity. RULING The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate. Based from the opinion of Justice Montemayor: "It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manil a have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not onl

y a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latte r's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of juris diction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cit e authorities in support thereof." Then came Marvel Building Corporation v. Phil ippine War Damage Commission, where respondent, a United States agency establish ed to compensate damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was hel d as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it "would eventually be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government becau se ..., the Commission has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money j udgments." To the same effect is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from the opinion of Justice Tuason clearly shows: "It is a widely accepted princ iple of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to s uit before the courts of another state or its own courts without its consent." There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by thi s Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongap o, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against i n his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to th e government which he represents. Thus, after the Military Bases Agreement, in M iquiabas v. Commanding General and Dizon v. The Commanding General of the Philip pine-Ryukus Command, both of them being habeas corpus petitions, there was no qu estion as to the submission to jurisdiction of the respondents. As a matter of f act, in Miquiabas v. Commanding General, the immediate release of the petitioner was ordered, it being apparent that the general court martial appointed by resp ondent Commanding General was without jurisdiction to try petitioner. Thereafter , in the cited cases of Syquia, Marquez Lim, and Johnson, the parties proceeded against were American army commanding officers stationed in the Philippines. The insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent Judge is that a foreign sovereign without its consent is haled into court in connection with acts perfor med by it pursuant to treaty provisions and thus impressed with a governmental c haracter. The infirmity of the actuation of respondent Judge becomes even more glaring whe n it is considered that private respondent had ceased to have any right of enter ing within the base area. This is made clear in the petition in these words: "In 1962, respondent Gener was issued by the Bureau of Forestry an ordinary timber license to cut logs in Barrio Mabayo, Morong, Bataan. The license was renewed on July 10, 1963. In 1963, he commenced logging operation inside the United States Naval Base, Subic Bay, but in November 1963 he was apprehended and stopped by t he Base authorities from logging inside the Base. The renewal of his license exp ired on July 30, 1964, and to date his license has not been renewed by the Burea u of Forestry. .. In July 1964, the Mutual Defense Board, a joint Philippines-Un ited States agency established pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes betwe en the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the United States Ambassador to provide "direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and United State s authorities on military matters of mutual concern,' advised the Secretary of F oreign Affairs in writing that: "The enclosed map shows that the area in which M r. Gener was logging definitely falls within the boundaries of the base. This ma p also depicts certain contiguous and overlapping areas whose functional usage w ould be interfered with by the logging operations.'" 36 Nowhere in the answer of respondents, nor in their memorandum, was this point met. It remained unrefuted . WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, nullifying and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge in Civil Cas e No. 2984 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan. The injunction issued by th is Court on March 18, 1965 enjoining the enforcement of the aforesaid writ of pr eliminary injunction of respondent Judge is hereby made permanent.

PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION vs. DOMINGO D. PANIS December 21, 1993, G.R. No. L-106528 Nature of the case: An appeal by certiorari to review the decision and resolutio n of the respondent judge. FACTS: In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein priva te respondents before the metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was rende red against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonab le compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court , the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262. As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a motion for execution of judgment, which was granted on April 9, 1990. A writ of demolition was later prayed and likewise issued by the same court on May 30, 1990. On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injuncti on and restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and peti tioner herein (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their ejectment from and the d emolition of their houses on the premises in question. On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No . 90-53531 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila , for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of the ejectmen t proceedings in Civil Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no pow er to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for public use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million in the City of Manila representing the provisional value of the l and, was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law declared unconstitutio nal by the Supreme Court. The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was former ly a part of the Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal Boar d of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to expropriate the Fa bie Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18, 017.10 square meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and distributed the portions to the actual occupants thereof. The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by its owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has been occupied by private respondents. On 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila, with the approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the exprop riation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot. ISSUE: Whether or not expropriation will prosper. RULING: Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. N o. 409, expressly authorizes the City of Manila to "condemn private property for public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100). The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila ge neral powers over its territorial jurisdiction, including the power of eminent d omain, thus: General powers. The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and pe rsonal property for the general interest of the city, condemn private property f or public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute a nd defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers hereinaft er conferred (R.A. 409, Sec. 3). Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake u rban land reform, thus: Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city

and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residen ts, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands, a nd second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of th is section, the city may raise the necessary funds by appropriations of general funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approv al of the President . . . The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots f or sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salar ied employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expro priation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simpl y not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, su pra; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader noti on of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing. The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise bee n complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for hearing as the court is required to do (National Housing Authority v. Valenz uela, 159 SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of hearing before the t rial and appellate courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the i ssue of due process. Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for reconsi deration of the trial court's order, denying its motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals, in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was commi tted by respondent courts, passed upon the very same issues raised by petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner therefore cannot argue that it was denied its day in court. The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an am ount not only fixed by the court, but accepted by both parties. The fact remains that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore estopped from assailing the same. It must be remembered that the valuation is me rely provisional. The parties still have the second stage in the proceedings in the proper court below to determine specifically the amount of just compensation to be paid the landowner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS May 17, 1993, G.R. No. 103125 Nature of the case: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appea ls. FACTS: This Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural l ands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretar y of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementor of the agrarian reform program. On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Govern or to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site , in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultur al crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the tr ial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to

answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the ex propriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990. ISSUE: Whether the Expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform as the implementor of the agrarian reform program. RULING: The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolutio n is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Cama rines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community in valuable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage indu stry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would b e enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can n o longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, br idges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these proje cts would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then b e the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is f or a public purpose or public use. The petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is s et aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Provin ce of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) ord ers the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires t he Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agraria n Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultura l to non-agricultural use. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS., INC. vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN RE FORM. July 14, 1989, G.R. No. 78742 Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari. FACTS: The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and th e constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public u se without just compensation. They contend that President Aquino usurped legisla tive power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also f or violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to pro vide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation. ISSUE: Whether or not constitutionality of P.D. No.27, E.O. Nos.228 and 229, and R.A. No.6657. RULING: The said laws are constitutional. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limi ts has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. However, no eviden ce has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same pa rticulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpos es of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) i

t must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that al l these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary an d discriminatory. WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: 1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUST AINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only u pon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are r etained and recognized. 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. N o. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the condit ions therein prescribed.Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs. WRIGHT vs. COURT OF APPEALS August 15, 1994, G.R. No. 113213 Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari, to set aside the order of deporta tion. FACTS: Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities f or indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before t he Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deport ation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty givin g retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law w hich violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country . Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner before this Cour t strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the govern ment against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the judge extraditing the petitioner valid. RULING: The order of the trial court is affirmed.Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the supp ression of crime, the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provision s of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after bo th States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for th e entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents requi red for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The wa rrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged agai nst the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person i s wanted for prosecution under the said article. Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that p etitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evad e arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treat y is required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requ ested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has in f act already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As the Court o f Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to perso

n charged with an information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffec tive over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecut ion. In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either co untry. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a Resolution dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of the 1987 Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requireme nts for entry into force were complied with by both governments. THE HOLY SEE VS ROSARIO December 1, 1994, G.R. No. 101949 Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari. Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican Cit y in Rome and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporatio n engaged in the real estate business. The petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land registered in the na me of the petitioner. Said lot is contiguous to two other lots registered in th e name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the selle rs. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute arose as to who of the pa rties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Co mplicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of one of the lots to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for annulment of the sale and specific performance and damages. Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the complaint based sovereign immu nity from suit. The trial court denied petitioner s motion to dismiss after finding that petitione r shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in que stion . Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. Thereafter, a motion for intervention was filed by the Department of Foreign Aff airs. Issue: Whether or not petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Ruling: Yes. Petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and f irmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign c annot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the court of another soverei gn. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered commercial and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come ou t with our own guidelines. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. The logical question is whet her the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of busine ss. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the p articular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary co

urse of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized a s an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition an d subsequent of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said p roperty for the site of its mission. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation. The donation was not made for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the of ficial residence of the papal nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental charac ter. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to d ispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossib le for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. US VS. RUIZ May 22, 1985, G.R. No. L-35645 Nature of the Case: This is a petition for review. Facts: The United States of America (US) had a naval base in Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippin es and the United States. The US invited the submission of bids for several projects. Eligio de Guzman & C o., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, th e company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with it s requests. Thereafter, the company received a letter from petitioner stating that the compa ny did not qualify to receive an award for the projects and said projects had be en awarded to third parties. The company sued the US. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of question ing the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of the defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts an d omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant US, a foreign so vereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit. Subsequ ently, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion. Issue: Whether or not defendants may be sued. Ruling: No. Defendants may not be sued. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the co urts of another State without its waiver or consent. However, State immunity no w extends only to governmental acts or acts jure imperii. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be sued only when it enters into business contracts. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devot ed to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. US VS GUINTO February 26, 1990, G.R. No. 76607 Nature of the case: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of State immunity. Facts: In GR No. 76607, private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contract for bar

ber services. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the pri vate respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, includ ing the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid. Petitioners explained that said concession was not awarded to Dizon but was al ready operating such, and the expiration of the contract had been extended. Pri vate respondents filed a complaint. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on th e ground that the action was in effect a suit against the US, which had not waiv ed its suability. The trial court denied the motion. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint against petitioners for his dis missal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center. It had been ascertained a fter investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cook ing the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to the board of arbitrators. The board unanim ously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was employed as a barracks boy in an extension of Clark Air Base. He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by in dividual petitioners herein. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint for damages. In GR No. 80258, according to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handc uffed and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may not be sued. Ruling: The doctrine of State immunity is based on the justification given by Ju stice Holmes that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes t he law on which the right depends . The doctrine is sometimes derisively called th e royal prerogative of dishonesty because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. T he rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly i mports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the State may be mani fested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or special law. Consent is implied when the State enters into a contract or it commences litigation. In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Treaty. There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, wi ll be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be impli ed. State immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts or acts jure imperii. In GR No. 80018, petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their offici al functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharg ing their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so d enominated, as in the case at bar. In GR No. 80258, the record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were rea lly discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority w hen the incident in question occurred. Only after it shall have determined in w hat capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunit y is applicable. In GR No. 79470, the Court can assume that the restaurant services partake of th e nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprie tary capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for fr

ee as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the US. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, includin g the tourists. Such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commerc ial and not a governmental activity. The consequence of this finding is that th e petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismis sal of the damage suit against them by Genove. For that matter, not even the US government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. There was not hing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in t erminating the private respondent s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act . It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense. In GR No. 76607, the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the US go vernment are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complain t filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts in questio n being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the US vs Ruiz case cann ot be applied. IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE September 12, 1974, A.M. No. 533 Nature of the Case: An administrative case against respondent herein based on hi s citizenship. Facts: On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo, this Court ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962, for the purpos e of determining whether his name should be stricken from the roll of persons au thorized to practice law in the Philippines. After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal Officer Investigator, a d ecision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by prepondera nce of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respon dent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare w as declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revo ked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him. Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Co urt in its resolution of January 10, 1969. On February 4, 1969, respondent petit ioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, i nter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of which could alter t he decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consis ted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Chur ch at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent's f ather) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of cer tain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetim e. Considering that the respondent, as a duly admitted member of the bar, should be given ample opportunity to establish the true facts about his citizenship and t hat no effort should be spared to ascertain the truth before strippling him of t he privilege granted to him by the Court since 1962, and denying him the practic e of his chosen profession which he has honorably discharged as far as the recor ds show. Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29, 1968, as well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon three basic arg uments, to wit: (a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son

of Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen; (b) Esteben Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen Philippine citizenship; and (c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen. Issue: Whether or not the citizenship of respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, f or if Esteban were a Filipino as respondent claims, the latter axiomatically wou ld also be a Filipino and the objection against his inclusion in the Roll of Att orneys in the Philippines would lose legal basis. Ruling: After a painstaking study of the original and additional evidences herei n presented, the Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting as ide of Our decision of April 29, 1968, and a definitive declaration that respond ent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines. In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a Filipino was denied for lack of evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of his father, Es teban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana Mallare (Esteban's mother) can not be consi dered a Filipino, there being no proof that she was "an inhabitant of the Philip pines continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing certificate issue d by the Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent's mother, Te Na, as "wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex parte determination of the evidence presented by therein applicant and consequently carries little evid entiary weight as to the citizenship of her said husband; and that the affidavit of Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20, 1939, to the effect that he had ch osen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino mother was not only self-serving, but also it can not be considered a re-affirmation of the alleged election of c itizenship since no previous election of such citizenship has been proved to exi st. With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority g ranted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's citiz enship has been duly filled. The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the perso n, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in thei r declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declar ations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban M allare. Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike tha t of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from person s who are not members of the family the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations. The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural community where relationships not in conformity with established contentions become the s ubject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus, the public reputation in Macalel on that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witness, would cons titute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the su rname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposed ly sought by Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can no t concede that alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legal ly-oriented. The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Malla re is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as bein g mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only b ased on the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-ancestry, whi ch is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. For it m ust be realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person h

ails from the same region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified having known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a Tagalog should receive a high degree of credibil ity. Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs . Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 195 3; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act taken o n the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship p rivileges to which he is rightfully entitled. And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Es teban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a pos itive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Es teban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to sh ow his preference for Philippine citizenship. 15 Indeed, it would be unfair to e xpect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS May 25, 1990, G.R. No. 83820 Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Co mmission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petitio n for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province. Facts: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his cer tificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor o f Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumb ent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualificat ion of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citi zen, being a citizen of the United States of America. Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to co ntinue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation. At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citiz en: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration s igned by private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of Regist ration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Per mit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to p roclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, pri

vate respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition fo r disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient p roof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the present petition. Issues: a) Whether or not the dismissal of the petition by the COMELEC was valid an d proper. b) Whether or not the private respondent is a Filipino citizen. Ruling: The petition is not meritorious. A) There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidac y was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wi t: (1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that: 'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy . A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of c andidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. T he petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the ti me of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. and (2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz: 'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any M ember of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the gro und of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall f ile a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on N ovember 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disquali fication was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of t he Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time. The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treat ed as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is un questionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provi ncial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988. B) We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citiz enship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaim ed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the c ase, as the COMELEC did below. Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, t herefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provi ncial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct p roof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the mod es provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalizatio n in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by s ubscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a for eign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did no t lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or b y any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the U nited States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private r espondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance a nd permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Depor tation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an A

merican and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn t o the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws. Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and wh o are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of t he United States does not concern Us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that privat e respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prov e that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated , however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact. CRUZ vs. TANTUICO October 28, 1988, G.R. No. L-49535 Nature of the case: A petition for review on certiorari in seeking relief from t he Court, in addition to the setting aside of certain orders of respondent COA A cting Chairman, in the issuance of an order for the release of petitioner's reti rement benefits. Facts: An investigation of an anomaly, involving treasury warrants, revealed tha t it was the handiwork of a "syndicate" composed of employees of the Budget Comm ission and the Department of Education and Culture (DEC). Using falsified comput ations and service records, some sixty-eight (68) treasury warrants were issued and made payable to fictitious or "ghost" teachers in Region IX (Zamboanga del S ur), all of which appeared to be genuine and duly signed by the authorized signa tories of the DEC. Twenty-eight (28) of these warrants are the subject of this c ase. The Auditor assigned to the Treasury Vault and Banking Audit Division of the Bur eau of Treasury requested the National Cashier to "cause the dishonor of the sub ject warrants and the encashment thereof charged back to the account of the bank s concerned or to Miss Cruz, as the case may be. The first charge back against M iss Cruz as made on August 17, 1976 in the amount of the P15,308.91 and subseque ntly increased by P6,236.17 on August 23, 1976 thus making her total cash accoun tabilities amount to P21,545.08. The Auditor also formally demanded that petitio ner produce the missing funds while the Acting National Cashier required her to increase her cash accountability. In her written explanations to these demands, petitioner stressed that she paid the warrants in good faith as there was nothing on their faces or in the endorse ments to raise any doubt as to their genuineness. Petitioner requested that in l ieu of charging her for the shortage, "the same be dropped from the cash book an d simultaneously recorded as a receivable (from the guilty party/parties) on the books of the Bureau of Treasury. Acting on the matter which was formally referred to him, the respondent Commissi on on Audit (COA) Acting Chairman issued an order stating among others that: appearing from these papers that it was Miss Romana Cruz, Cashier IV, Cash Divisi on, that Bureau, who paid the treasury warrants in question totalling P21,545.08 to wrong or fictitious payees and, therefore, is the last indorser liable for t he value thereof, it is hereby directed that she be required to restore and rest itute to that Bureau the said amount, without prejudice to her right of recourse against the guarantors of said warrants, if any. In case of failure of Miss Cruz to effect the restitution of said amount as here in directed, her salary should be withheld pursuant to Section 624 of the Revise d Administrative Code and applied in settlement of her liability. Manifesting his disagreement with the above ruling, the Treasurer under the 5th indorsement opined ". . . that the loss of government funds arising from the enc ashment of the subject treasury warrants as a result of the negligent act of the DEC in issuing these treasury warrants to fictitious persons, should be borne b y the DEC and not by Miss Romana Cruz who paid them in good faith and pursuant t o her duty as Cashier IV of this Treasury to pay treasury warrants and governmen t checks presented to her for payment.

Hence this petition by the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the treasury warrants . Ruling: It is not disputed that on the face of the treasury warrants, there appe ared no irregularity The warrants were signed by the authorized signatories of t he DEC. Furthermore, Editha Gonzales, the party who presented the treasury warra nts for encashment, was a bona fide employee of the DEC who regularly cashed war rants with the petitioner and was therefore known to her personally. Considering these circumstances, the encashment by the petitioner of the subject treasury w arrants did not amount to an act of negligence for which she should be made liab le. Having established that petitioner was not negligent in encashing the treasury w arrants, justice dictates that she should not be made personally liable for the consequent losses. As mentioned above, no neligence attended the petitioner's encashment of the tre asury warrants. Even assuming that. she could be held liable for non- compliance with or violation of some rule or regulation, this Court agrees with the petiti oner that Section 624 of the Revised Administrative Code cannot be construed to authorize a deduction of the value of the treasury warrants from her retirement benefits. Said section provides: Sec. 624. Retention of salary for satisfaction of indebtedness. When any person is indebted to the Government of the Philippine Islands (or Government of the Unit ed States), the Insular Auditor may direct the proper officer to withhold the pa yment of any money due him or his estate, the same to be applied in satisfaction of such indebtedness. The question to be determined is whether or not the gratuity of the petitioner i n this case can be withheld and applied to the payment of his remaining indebted ness to the San Lazaro Investment Fund notwithstanding the provision of section 3 of Act No. 4051 that the gratuity provided for in this Act shall not be attach ed or levied upon execution. *** The respondents contend that the withholding of the corresponding amount of the petitioner's gratuity was made with a view to i ts application to the payment of his indebtedness to the Government, and that su ch action is authorized by section 624 of the Administrative Code which provides that "When any person is indebted to the government of the Philippine Islands o r Government of the United States, the Insular Auditor may direct the proper off icer to withhold the payment of any money due him or his estate, the same to be applied in satisfaction of such indebtedness. While Section 3 of Act No. 4051 refers merely to attachment or levy upon executi on, we are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally construed in fa vor of the pensioner. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the gracious ness of the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, t o provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his fam ily. Unless otherwise clearly provided, the pension should insure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved was had under section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view of the prohibition of section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropria tion thereof by administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohib ited result and enable the respondents to do indirectly what they can not do dir ectly under section 3 of Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having be en approved on February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies section 624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that year. Considering section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general authority granted in section 624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between the two provisions is avoided. TANTUICO, JR. vs. DOMINGO

February 28, 1994, G.R. No. 96422 Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, under Ru le 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Facts: Petitioner was a former chairman of the Commission on Audit. Petitioner a pplied for clearance from all money, property and other accountabilities in prep aration for his retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which covered the period from 1976 to December 31, 1985. The clearance had all the required s ignatures and bore a certification that petitioner was "cleared from money, prop erty and/or other accountabilities by this Commission. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner submitted his courtesy resignation to Pres ident Corazon C. Aquino. He relinquished his office to the newly appointed Chair man, now Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. on March 10, 1986. That same day, he applied for retirement effective immediately. Petitioner sought a second clearance to cover the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. All the signatures necessary to complete the second clearance, e xcept that of Chairman Guingona, were obtained. The second clearance embodies a certificate that petitioner was "cleared from money, property and/or accountabil ity by this Commission. Chairman Guingona, however, failed to take any action th ereon. Chairman Guingona was replaced by respondent Chairman. A year later, respondent Chairman issued COA Office Order No. 87-10182, which created a committee to inve ntory all equipment acquired during the tenure of his two predecessors. Not satisfied with the audit reports he received, respondent Chairman created a special audit team for the purpose of conducting a financial and compliance audi t of the COA transactions and accounts during the tenure of petitioner from 1976 to 1984. The special audit team submitted its report stating: (i) that the audi t consisted of selective review of post-audit transactions in the head offices a nd the State Accounting and Auditing Center; (ii) that the audit disclosed a num ber of deficiencies which adversely affected the financial condition and operati on of the COA, such as violations of executive orders, presidential decrees and related rules and regulations; and (iii) that there were some constraints in the audit, such as the unavailability of records and documents, and personnel movem ents and turnover. While the report did not make any recommendation, it instead mentioned several officials and employees, including petitioner, who may be resp onsible or accountable for the questioned transactions. In a letter dated December 21, 1989, a copy of which was received by petitioner on December 27, 1989, respondent Chairman informed petitioner of the approval of his application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568, effective as of March 9, 19 86. However, respondent Chairman added: . . . In view, however, of the audit findings and inventory report adverted to a bove, payment of only one-half () of the money value of the benefits due you by r eason of such retirement will be allowed, subject to the availability of funds a nd the usual accounting and auditing rules. Payment of the balance of said retir ement benefits shall be subject to the final results of the audit concerning you r fiscal responsibility and/or accountability as former Chairman of this Commiss ion. In a letter dated January 22, 1990, petitioner requested full payment of his ret irement benefits. Petitioner submitted a letter-complaint, wherein he cited certain defects in the manner the audit was conducted. He further claimed that the re-audit was not au thorized by law since it covered closed and settled accounts. Issue: Whether or not the non-payment of petitioner s full retirement benefits is legal and proper. Ruling: Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the government that may be discovered from the audit concerning his fiscal responsibility as former COA

Chairman, respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under the retirement laws. In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the respondents, we found that the employee had been cleared by the National Treasurer from all money and prope rty responsibility, and held that the retirement pay accruing to a public office r may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government. In Tantuico, we cited Justice Laurel's essay on the rationale for the benign rul ing in favor of the retired employees, thus: . . . Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Gove rnment intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the pe nsioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless othe rwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the pe nsioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved was had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial pro cess, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view of the prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by a dministrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and e nable the respondent to do indirectly what they can not do directly under Sectio n 3 of the Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved on February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies Secti on 624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that year. Con sidering Section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general authority gran ted in Section 624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between the two provis ions is avoided. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the bene fits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or executi on. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended (The Revised Governm ent Service Insurance Act of 1977), the benefits granted thereunder "shall not b e subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes." Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood. DAZA vs. SINGSON December 21, 1989, G.R. No. 86344 Nature of the case: Petitioner challenges his removal from the Commission on App ointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Facts: After the congressional elections of May 1987, the House of Representativ es proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance w ith Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution. In September 1988, the LDP was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the HOR. Twenty-four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from tha t party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and corresponding ly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this developm ent, the HOR raised its representation in the CA by withdrawing the seat occupie d by the petitioner and giving this to the newly formed LDP. Respondent Singson was added as a member from the LDP. The petitioner went to th e Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the commission and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. The respondent questions the court s jurisdiction o n the ground that it is political in nature. Issue: Whether or not the SC has the competence to act, in the case at bar, sinc e it involved the legality of the act of the HOR in removing the petitioner from the CA.

Ruling: The Court declared that it has the competence to act on the matter at ba r. The case is not a discretionary act of the HOR that may not be reviewed by th e court because it is political in nature. What is involved is the legality not the wisdom of the act of the HOR in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. This is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Conc epcion explained in Taada vs. Cuenco: The term political question connotes in legal parlance, a question of policy. In other words, it refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive bran ch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. Not legality, of a particular measure. Garcia vs. De la Pea February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 766 Nature of the Case: Administrative Matter in the Supreme Court. Partiality, abus e of authority and grave abuse of discretion. Facts: Petitioner Garcia filed an administrative case before the Supreme Court a gainst respondent Judge Meljohn dela Pea for partiality, abuse of authority and g rave abuse of discretion for presiding over a criminal case in which the respond ent's brother was a complainant and petitioner Garcia's wife was an accused in s aid criminal case. A complaint was earlier filed by the complainant against res pondent judge before the Office of the Ombudsman, which however, dismissed the c omplaint. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of an administrative case by the Ombudsman, filed against an erring judge precludes the Supreme Court from taking cognizance of the resolution of such administrative case filed before it by the petitioner . Ruling: Respondent judge dismissed from the service. The dismissal of the crimi nal aspect of the same complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman in its resolutio n of March 23, 1993 will not affect the resolution of this case which basically relates to the power of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1 987 Constitution to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and cour t personnel, from the presiding justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal t rial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that ca n oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws and pertinen t rules and take proper administrative action against them, in the event that th ey commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Buenaseda vs. Flavier September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645 Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to nullify the order of the Ombudsma n Facts: Private respondent Juan Flavier, among others, filed an administrative co mplaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Dra. Brigida S. Bu enaseda, among others, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act. Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition and an Urgent Supplemental Manifesta tion stressing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary r estraining order. Petitioners likewise seek the nullification of the order of s uspension by the Ombudsman. The Solicitor General submitted its comment finding

that the authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend. Respondents argue that the power of the Ombudsman t o preventively suspend government officials and employees is vested under Sectio n 24 of R.A No. 6770 as being contemplated by Sec. 13 (8) of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend Government official s and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pendi ng the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officia ls and employees. Ruling: Petition dismissed. When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the p ower "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees, it referre d to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the wor d "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Section 24 of R.A No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisite therei n set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to th e appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommen d such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in orde r for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent. Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals April 18, 1990, 184 SCRA 426 Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Dev't. (BED) for the ex ploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. However, it turned out that the Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corp. (MMIC) shall be the logical coal operator. Thus, IEI & MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby IEI assigned a nd transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. Eventually, IEI filed with t he Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati Br. 150 an action for rescission of the MOA with damages on the ground of certain violations of the provisions of the MO A. The RTC ordered the rescission of the MOA. The CA reversed the RTC ruling that the latter has no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under PD No. 12 06, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exp loration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the su it for rescission of the MOA concerning a coal operating contract over coal bloc ks. Ruling: Petition denied. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line wit h the integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over all coal-supply-demand balance. IEI's cause o

f action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. The doctrine of primary jurisdictio n is applicable in this case. Such principle applies where a claim is originall y cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the clai m requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administra tive body for its view. Rosario vs. CA 1992, 211 SCRA 384 Nature of the case: Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS: There was a land dispute that arose between petitioner Juanito A. Rosari o and private respondent Alejandro Cruz over a lot. The controversy stemmed from the "land for the landless program". The City of Manila through its City Tenant 's Security Commission (Commission) undertook to subdivide and award parcels of land to the occupants thereof. Lot 3, Block 3 was subdivided into three lots, d esignated as lots 3-A, 3-B and 3-C with areas of 56.5 sq. m. each. Private respo ndent, as original lessee of the area, sublet his house on lot 3-A to petitioner . Both parties filed with the City Tenant's Security Commission their applicati ons to purchase lots 3-A and 3-C. The Commission awarded lot 3-A to Rosario whil e lot 3-C was awarded to Cruz. Not satisfied, Cruz opposed the award of lot 3-A to Rosario. Eventually the Commission revoked its resolution awarding lot 3-A to Rosario. Rosario filed an action to quiet title before the Court of First In stance (CFI) which dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner did not exercise his right to exhaust administrative remedies by filing an appeal to th e Office of the President before seeking a judicial review thereof. The CA like wise dismissed petitioner's appeal filed before it. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a hard and fast rule, the failure to resort thereto warrants the dismissal of t he case before the judicial tribunal. RULING: Decision of the CA reversed. Failure to exhaust administrative remedie s is not, however, necessarily fatal to an action. Citing Soto vs. Jareno, 114 SCRA 116, the Court ruled that failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. It does not appear in this case that a motion to dismiss, based on non-exhausti on of administrative remedies had been filed. The Supreme Court, in the broader interests of justice has in a number of cases given due course to a petition for certiorari although the proper remedy is appeal. Benito vs. COMELEC 1994, 235 SCRA 436 Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner Ottomama Benito and the deceased Hadji Murad Kismen Sampiano O gca were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in the May 11, 1992 elections. There was a disqualification case filed against Og ca and investigations were conducted. However, Ogca was killed in an ambush. P etitioner, probably not aware of the death of his opponent, filed a motion to su spend the proclamation of Ogca as elected mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in w hich the COMELEC denied the same. The Municipal Board of Canvassers ruled that

the votes of deceased Ogca be excluded from tallying, counting and canvassing. Herein private respondent appealed the above ruling to the COMELEC praying that the Municipal Board of Canvassers be enjoined from implementing its ruling. The COMELEC directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim as winner the ca ndidate who obtained the highest vote. The Municipal Board of Canvassers procla imed petitioner as the duly elected mayor. The COMELEC declared such proclamatio n null and void. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a candidate who obtained the highest number o f votes in a regular election shall allow the candidate obtaining the second hig hest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winner. RULING: Petition dismissed. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highe st number of votes dies, or is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candida te who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. For to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choi ce. MARQUEZ vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR March 16, 1989. G.R. No. 80685. 171 SCRA 337 Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari with the issuance of temporary restr aining order. FACTS: Private respondent Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL- KATIPUNAN) in behalf of seventy nine (79) of its members who are employed at the Little Fol ks Snack Mobile owned by petitioner, filed on July 16, 1986 with the Office of t he Director of the National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment ( DOLE) a complaint for underpayment of minimum wage, non-payment of ECOLA, non-pa yment of incentive leave benefits and non-payment of overtime pay. The complaint was later amended to include non-payment of holiday pay, non-payment of premium pay on rest day, non-payment of maternity leave benefits and illegal exaction. Minerva Peran, the representative of the employees during the proceedings before the hearing officer filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Samahan ng mga Mang gagawa sa Little Folks Snack Mobile (SAMAHAN) a local chapter of respondent KAMP IL-KATIPUNAN, to which the seventy nine (79) employees allegedly belong, and pet itioner employer were able to settle amicably their dispute through a compromise agreement. The employees opposed the motion on the ground that Minerva Peran wa s not authorized to enter into the alleged compromise agreement and much less to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The Regional Director if DOLE rendered a decision denying the motion to dismiss and directing petitioner to pay the em ployees their various claims. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the dec ision of the Regional Director. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari with the issuance of temporary restraining order, after their two motions for recons ideration was denied. Petitioner relies heavily on the amicable settlement which was allegedly entered into with the employees through their representative Minerva Peran. According t o petitioner, with the execution of the amicable settlement, the employees' comp laint was rendered moot and academic and petitioner's submission of a position p aper became unnecessary. Petitioner also alleged denial of due process when the Regional Director of DOLE rendered judgment in favor of the employees. ISSUE 1) Whether or not an amicable settlement entered by a Union Representative is va lid.

2) Whether or not there was denial of due process. 3) Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction. RULING: 1) The rule in this jurisdiction is that money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected by the union, union officers or counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. This is so because the aggrieved parties are the individual complainants themselves. Their representative can only assist but not decide for them. In the light of t he categorical denial by the employees that Peran was authorized to enter into a n amicable settlement as regards their claims, the Court holds that public respo ndent Secretary of Labor ruled correctly in upholding the Regional Director's re jection of the agreement. 2) There is denial of due process when a party is not accorded an opportunity to be heard in a case filed against him. However, what the law prohibits is the ab solute lack of an opportunity to be heard. Hence, it has been ruled that there w as no denial of due process where the employer was duly represented by counsel a nd given sufficient opportunity to be heard and present his evidence nor where t he employer's failure to be heard was due to the various postponements granted t o it or to his repeated failure to appear during the hearings. Petitioner, in this case, was given at least three chances by the hearing office r to submit his position paper but failed each time. Even prior to the hearing o fficer's order for the submission of the position paper, petitioner was given th e opportunity to traverse the employees' complaint when he was ordered to commen t on the employees' computation of their claims. The comment was never submitted since petitioner failed to appear during the two hearings set for the purpose d espite due notice. Clearly, petitioner was granted ample opportunity to present his case before the Regional Director. 3) Petitioner impugns the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and the Regiona l Director to award the money claims of the employees contending that all money claims of workers arising from an employer- employee relationship are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided by Art. 217 of the Labo r Code, as amended. This contention, which is being raised for the first time in this petition, can no longer be considered by the Court at this stage. The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupl ed with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisd iction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar sai d party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction. CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS December 2, 1940, G.R. No. 47800 Nature of the case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition. Facts: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer o f Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition agai nst the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commiss ion; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secr etary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the Cit y of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. As alleged, the National Traffic Commission s resolution to recommend to the Direc tor of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from 1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m. , for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge t o traffic and as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles ar

e not now allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Dir ector of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Co mmunications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulati on and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is uncons titutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Issue: Whether or not the writ of prohibition may be issued. Ruling: The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upo n and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of t he public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted b y considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with persona l liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and propert y may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure th e general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state to this fundamental aim o f our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a ble ssing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should autho rity be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authorit y in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be e stablished the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logicall y so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precis ely the very means of insuring its preservation. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force b y the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception m ay at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare o f all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insur e economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maint enance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures leg ally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers unde rlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus p opuli est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recogni tion of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a soc iety and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all gro ups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fun damental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort. and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greate st number." SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MORAN July 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 249 Nature of the Case: Petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of F irst Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed agai nst the petitioner. FACTS: The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,

Philippine Islands. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance o f Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to t he jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of t he United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. Petitioner contends that the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisd iction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Ar ticle III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Cour t of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassad ors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the cou rts of the Philippines and even under the Constitution of the Philippines origin al jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and co nsuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. RULING: Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner . This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or min ister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of t he laws of the country where he resides. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. July 20, 1994. G.R. No. 111097 Nature of the case: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order Facts: In light of establishment of casinos in Cagayan de Oro City by PAGCOR, th e Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 entitled as AN ORDINANCE PROH IBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTI ON THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. and Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled AN ORDI NANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION TH EREFOR. Pryce assailed the ordinances and succeeded. Petitioners assailed the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the ordinances a nd that under the Local Government Code s general welfare clause, the petitioner w as justified in enacting said ordinances. Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are valid. Ruling: The petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Cou rt of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, t here is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gamb ling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to d eal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits l otteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has co nsulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less r everse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of co nflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It i

s settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of st atutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legisl ative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, the y are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ulti mately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions ha s held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local go vernment units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling an d other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitione rs are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such gam es of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should b e interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associ ated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as ref erring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance , must be prevented or suppressed. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 186 9 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exe rcising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Th e petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is t he ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot pre vail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Loc al Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking auth ority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can chang e or repeal another law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that i t is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Sectio n 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepte d meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambli ng. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulat e or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pur suant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PA GCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elepha nt and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of govern ment revenue through the operation of casinos. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly me ntions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) b y the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission: Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known

as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Or der No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed. (b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed. (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regardin g hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidenti al Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidentia l Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Dec ree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and ren dered of no force and effect. (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs lo cally-funded projects. (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Pre sidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive or ders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof whi ch are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the cont rary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Boar d of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for meas ures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these t wo statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by th e Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the ent ity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government. It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effo rt to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as t he handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a co nflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one an d annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Th is is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at ha nd is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may ( and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territo ries except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserve d in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws e qually effective and mutually complementary. This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of g ambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, followin g this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philipp ine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1 169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983. In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the concl usion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the ch

aracter and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the de cree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a sta tute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national governmen t. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them b y Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to th e principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy t o suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from wh ich they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinan ce the mandate of the statute. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local governmen t units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengt hening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy , we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units al though in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions . The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant st ill includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable in novations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local governmen t units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By a nd large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. BARRIOQUINTO v. FERNANDEZ January 21, 1949, G.R. No. L-1278 Nature of the case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus. Facts: Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with th e crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded ag ainst the former, Jimenez was to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfec ting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamati on No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with a n act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and commit ted during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from ene my control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Gu errilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other pet itioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same . The Amnesty Commission returned the application of the petitioners to the CFI of Zamboanga, without deciding over the amnesty on the ground that inasmuch as nei ther Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, becaus e Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the vi ctim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to application for amnesty. Ruling: Respondents are entitled to amnesty. The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicate d on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must b e distinguished from pardon. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which m ust be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no not ice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concu rrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judic ial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, ge

nerally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometime s after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the cons equences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such right s be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sent ence" while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offe nse itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though h e had committed no offense. It is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, ad mit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and al lege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the te rms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocati on of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoid ance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. F or, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with whic h he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the intere sted party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants a nd the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the re sistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy , and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regard ed as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," o r not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnes ty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions c reated thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply th e benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction , whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to said benefits. The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty P roclamation which has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evi dence, has committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being g uilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person considered b y law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable services to the nation inn committing such an act. Vera v. People January 31,1963, 31 SCRA 711 Nature of the Case: Special proceeding for certiorari to set aside a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS: Petitioners Gaudencio Vera, Restituto, Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Flo rido, Paulino Bayran, and 92 others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon petition ers' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, ser ies of 1946, the case was referred to the Eighth Guerilla Amnesty Commission, wh ich actually tried it. During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having committed the crime charged and as there was no admission to their crime the Commission, in its decision of January 12, 1956, held that it could not take cognizance of t

he case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be i nvoked only by defendants in a criminal case who.. admitting the commission of t he crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupat ion. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial. Where the court denied the application for amnesty. ISSUE: Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the crime of which they were accused. HELD: Petitioners are not entitled to amnesty in not admitting the crime. It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness fo r an act which, according to him., he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation impos es certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prov e the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature o f a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the al legations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the a mnesty proclamation. At any rate, the facts established before the Commission no not bring this case within the terms of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8. Note that said proclamation exte nds its provisions to "all persons who committed any act penalized under the Rev ised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy." As found by the Commission, the killing of the deceased (Lozaes) was not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but was due to the rivalry between the Hunter's Guerrilla, to which he belonged, and the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners. Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) August 24, 1993, G.R. No. 96541 Nature of the case: Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Praye r for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order Facts: Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C . Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreemen t between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila al leged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his rela tives and cronies which was authorized. The Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignme nt Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former P CGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful leg ality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG h ad a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the as sets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, he nce, their disposal was prohibited by law. Issue: Whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case. Ruling: Petition is denied. Petitioners have failed to show that respondents Exe cutive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of discreti on or in excess of their jurisdiction. The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity

of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case o r controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportu nity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be nec essary to the determination of the case itself. On the first requisite, the Court have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provide s that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real part y-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court w ill exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal quest ion. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the g overnmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material intere st, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover , the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a de sire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to th e rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procur e the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recogni zed by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governm ental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds. Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were giv en to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign count ries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these pa intings and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of M anila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these prop erties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean tha t the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government wi thout complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process an d just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government , any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subseque nt disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are pro tected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly own ed, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question thei r alleged unauthorized disposition. Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action file d by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by t he government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expend iture of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administerin g an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challen ging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they all ege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that th e paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not wi th public money. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of o pposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be mo ot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cogni zable by a court of justice. 16 A case becomes moot and academic when its purpos e has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petiti

on for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auc tion sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long p ast, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic. At this point, however, the Court need to emphasize that this Court has the disc retion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a n actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. Howe ver, there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxa tion of the rule. The Court agrees with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the law, it is the Director of the Museum who is authorized to undertake the invent ory, registration, designation or classification, with the aid of competent expe rts, of important cultural properties and national cultural treasures. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because the ir jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their ackn owledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. Marcos v. Manglapus October 27, 1989, 177 SCRA 668 Nature of the Case: Petition for mandamus and prohibition to order the responden ts to issue travel documents to the petitioner. FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate membe rs of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President s decision to b ar their return to the Phils. Petitioners advance the view that the President s po wers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, i.e. the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices; the power to execute the laws, the appointing powers, the powers under the commander-in-ch ief clause; the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans; the power to enter into treaties of international agreements; the power to submit budget to Congre ss and all the power to address Congress and that what is not enumerated is impl iedly to her. ISSUE: Whether or not the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. RULING: Yes the President may under her residual powers. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific p owers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Const itution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated in the Constitution. The President has the obligation under the C onstitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national in terest. To the President, the problem is one of the balancing the general welfar e and common good against the exercise of right of certain individuals. The powe r involved us the President s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. The request of demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return cannot be considered in the light solely of the Constitution provisions guaranteeing the right of liberty to abode and travel. It must be treated as a matter that is app ropriately addressed to the residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to saf eguard and protect the general welfare. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neit her legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whim sically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to

the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines wi ll cause the escalation of violence against the State that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting t hrough the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against t hreats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to b ecome serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State-the fruition of the people's sovereig nty-is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility. Cua v. COMELEC December 17,1987, G.R. No. 80519-21 Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Commission on Elections. Facts: Petitioner Cua was proclaimed as winner in the lone congressional distric t of Quirino through a 2-1 decision rendered by COMELEC First Division but never theless was suspended of his proclamation due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2, 198 4. The position of the petitioner is that the 2-1 decision of the First Division wa s a valid decision of the COMELEC itself despite the above rule because of Artic le IX-A. Section 7 of the new Constitution, providing that "each Commission shal l decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it." He argues that this applies to the votings of the COMELEC both in division and en banc and that the private respondent himself recognized this when he fil ed the motion for reconsideration/appeal with the COMELEC en banc. Respondents argue that in any case no valid decision was reached by the COMELEC en banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute a majority of the body. Issue: Whether or not a valid decision was rendered by the COMELEC First Divisio n. Ruling: Petition is granted and the public respondent is enjoined from further p roceeding with the private respondent s motion. The restraining order enjoining pe titioner from assuming office is lifted. A 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division is a valid decision as the total n umber of votes which were three constituted a majority. After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court h olds that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision u nder Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five membe rs who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid un der the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on t he basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now t o assume his seat in the House of Representatives. It is expected that the above categorical rulings will put an end to the seeming ly interminable debates on this matter that have been festering for quite some t ime now not only in this case but also in other cases still pending in the COMEL EC. The indecisiveness of the public respondent in the appreciation and applicat ion of its own rules has seriously prejudiced a considerable number of our peopl e who remain unrepresented to date in the House of Representatives despite the f act that the congressional elections were held more than seven months ago.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals March 16, 1994, G.R. No. 110120. Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with pra yer for restraining order Facts: The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan t o dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Cam arin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication. The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Author ity seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Ta la Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the hea lth of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of th e surrounding area. The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation and found that the water collected f rom the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality , in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Calooca n, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to comp letely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed. After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14 , 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order an d issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Calooc an from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area. Issue: Whether or not the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease an d desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basi s of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. Ruling: The petition is granted. The temporary restraining order issued by the C ourt on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Gover nment of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camari n, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent. To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-part e cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistak e to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situati ons like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ult imate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of c ourse may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and impleme

nting regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive , sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly des ignated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinar y requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital pu blic interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Decla ration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Se ction 16. As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlati ve duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippine s is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right. The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practic al matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the c ease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Governme nt of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would hav e been necessary. Flores vs. Drilon June 22, 1993, G.R. No. 104732. Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari with prayer for prohibition, prelimi nary injunction and temporary restraining order Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise kno wn as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Execu tive Officer of the Subic Bay etropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in thi s original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temp orary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of publ ic funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the offic e . . . ." Paragraph (d) reads that a the President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority. Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Su bic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Assoc iation in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following constit utional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Cons titution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appoin tment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during hi s tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and t he subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers o f the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and t hose whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the sub ject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, stated th at this act of appointment would result to an election offense. Issue: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Pro vided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity o f this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutiona

l proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. Ruling: The proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Pro vided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity o f this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitution al; consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City , respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy against the concent ration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or em ployee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time jo b. In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an e lective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (a s Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is prec isely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretch ing of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first pa r., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elec tive official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clearcut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple off ices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions o f his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providin g any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective of ficial to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Cons titution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency ; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Coun cil. The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in th e second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph. Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or auto matically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of a ppointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to m ake the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olo ngapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instea d, "ex officio" would have been used. The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Authority made by respondents cannot be applied to uphold the constitutionality of the challenged proviso since it is not put in issue in the present case. In the same vein, the argument that if no elective official may be appointed or designated to another post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double compensation would be useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for ex ample, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec. 3, Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if spec ifically authorized by law. As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the pe rson or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some offic e or trust," or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or p ersons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and disch arge the duties of the same. Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment in

volves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of t he appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power. In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivi ty of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to onl y one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can q ualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very na ture itself of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the of ficer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescrib e qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while t he conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legi slative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all thro ughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an inc umbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another publi c office. Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility impos ed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This pr ovision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other offic e or employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his s eat . . . ." "Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding o ne office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office, eit her generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitat e the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to ho ld the second is void . As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitu tion cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his act s as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, u pon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were e xercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because th e officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise , such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public un constitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such. BASCO v. PAGCOR May 14, 1991, G.R. No. 91649 Nature of the case: Petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gamin g Corporation Charter (PD 1869).

Facts: The petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR Charter PD1869 because it is all egedly contrary to morals, public policy and order and because it waived the Man ila City government right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. Petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the new restored democracy and the people s will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a gambling objective and therefore is co ntrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Art. II Sec. 1 of Art. VII and c. 3(2) of Ar t. XIV of the present Constitution. Petitioners contend that PD 1869 constitute a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of the principles of local autonomy . They must be referring to Sec. 13 par 2 of PD 1869 which exempts PAGCOR as the branches holder from paying any tax, any kind of term income or otherwise as we ll as fees, charges as levies of whatever nature whether national or local. Issues Whether or not the local autonomy clause was violated by PD 1869. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated. Ruling 1.) The petitioner s contentions are without merit. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confe r that power or the municipality cannot assume it". Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upo n by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax". The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should b e stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" which ha s the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general l egislative powers". Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local gov ernments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been rev oked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of ga mbling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a cons equence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Governm ent. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original cha rter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrument ality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR shou ld be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress t o carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire abs ence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at leas t, the instrumentalities of the United States and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way a s to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to serio usly burden it in the accomplishment of them. Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermi nation of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or en terprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation".

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "l imitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operati ve" law until "amended, repealed or revoked", its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes a nd fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the prin ciple of local autonomy. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply mean s "decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the st ate or an "imperium in imperio." What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing wi th gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the Stat e to retain it or delegate it to local governments. 2.) No valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The cla use does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded differen t treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or a rbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishin g classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. Th e Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinio n to be treated in law as though they were the same. If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overt hrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupation s called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which h arm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insu re if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy i ssues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the p eople themselves as the repository of all state power. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals August 29, 1996, GRN 119761. 261 SCRA 236 Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of Court of Appeals. FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufac ture of different brands of cigarettes. On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separat e certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cig arettes. In a letter, dated 06 January 1987, of then Commissioner of Internal Re venue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., to Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, "the initial position of the Commission was to cl assify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed i n the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortun e Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More to 'Premium More ,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. Proof was a lso submitted to the Bureau (of Internal Revenue ['BIR']) that 'Champion' was an original Fortune Tobacco Corporation register and therefore a local brand." A bill, which later became Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654,6 was enacted, on 10 Jun e 1993, by the legislature and signed into law, on 14 June 1993, by the Presiden t of the Philippines. The new law became effective on 03 July 1993. About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was issued by the BIR which expressed: "In view of the issues raised on whether 'HOPE.' 'MORE' and 'CHAMPION' cigarette

s which are locally manufactured are appropriately considered as locally manufac tured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, this Office is compelled to review the previous rulings on the matter. "Under the foregoing, the test for imposition of the 55% ad valorem tax on cigar ettes is that the locally manufactured cigarettes bear a foreign brand regardles s of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or t ransferred by its owner to the local manufacturer. The brand must be originally owned by a foreign manufacturer or producer. If ownership of the cigarette brand is, however, not definitely determinable, 'x x x the listing of brands manufact ured in foreign countries appearing in the current World On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.On 1 0 August 1994, the CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco. In its resolution, dated 11 October 1994, the CTA dismissed for lack of merit th e motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: Whether RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative rule the issuance of which needs n o prior notice and hearing, or an adjudicatory Ruling which calls for the twin r equirements of prior notice and hearing, and, Whether RMC 37-93 is discriminatory in nature. RULING: The Court must sustain both the appellate court and the tax court. Petitioner stresses on the wide and ample authority of the BIR in the issuance o f rulings for the effective implementation of the provisions of the National Int ernal Revenue Code. Let it be made clear that such authority of the Commissioner is not here doubted. Like any other government agency, however, the CIR may not disregard legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise of its qu asi-legislative powers. Let us first distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances - a legis lative rule and an interpretative rule. In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary, the Court expressed: "a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to imp lement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way t hat laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides: "Public Participation. - If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as f ar as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford int erested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of a ny rule. "(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the pr oposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. "(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. "In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rule s are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing." It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpret ative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already presc ribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely pro viding for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implemen tation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those gov erned, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a ch ance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance i s given the force and effect of law. A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which i t has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a c orrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of past Commiss

ioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but h as, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Pr emium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cig arettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Spec ifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally ma nufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classifie d as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, " Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valo rem tax. Hence, without RMC 3 7-93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate consequence on private respondent's products. Evidently, in order t o place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scop e of the amendatory law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now dispu ted RMC 37-93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observ ance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not ha ve been then ignored. Indeed, the BIR itself, in its RMC 10-86, has observed and provided: Nothing on record could tell us that it was either impossible or impracticable f or the BIR to observe and comply with the above requirements before giving effec t to its questioned circular. Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of ta xation. Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on equal footing b oth in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of proper ty of the same class must be taxed at the same rate and the tax must operate with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found. Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," Premium More" and "Cham pion" cigarettes and, unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the submi ssion of private respondent that the circular should, as in fact my esteemed col league Mr. Justice Bellosillo so expresses in his separate opinion, be considere d adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process following the Ang Tib ay doctrine, the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. In its de cision, the CTA has keenly noted that other cigarettes bearing foreign brands ha ve not been similarly included within the scope of the circular, All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fal len short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. A brief discourse on the powers and functions of administrative bodies may be in structive. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule making powers and quas i-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule maki ng power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated l egislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. Interpretative rule, one of the three (3) types of quasi-legislative or rule mak ing powers of an administrative agency (the other two being supplementary or det ailed legislation, and contingent legislation), is promulgated by the administra tive agency to interpret, clarify or explain statutory regulations under which t he administrative body operates. The purpose or objective of an interpretative r ule is merely to construe the statute being administered. It purports to do no m ore than interpret the statue. Simply, the rule tries to say what the statue mea ns. Generally, it refers to no single person or party in particular but concerns all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said interpre tative rule. It need not be published and neither is a hearing required since it is issued by the administrative body as an incident of its power to enforce the law and is intended merely to clarify statutory provisions for proper observanc e by the people. In Taada v. Tuvera,6 this Court expressly said that "interpre

tative regulations x x x need not be published." Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the pow er of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. I t is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by t he law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.7 The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the po wer to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the perfo rmance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.8 In carrying ou t their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are requi red to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, wei gh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action a nd exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial pow er due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. The importance of due process cannot be underestimated. Too basic is the rule th at no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Thus when an administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial in character, n otice and fair open hearing are essential to the validity of the proceeding. The right to reasonable prior notice and hearing embraces not only the right to pre sent evidence but also the opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit arguments implies that opportunity otherwi se the right may as well be considered impotent. And those who are brought into contest with government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of t heir activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the government propose s and to be heard upon its proposal before it issues its final command. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected in administrative proc eedings. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations9 e numerated these rights (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of t he party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in s upport thereof, (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the d ecision must have something to support itself, (4) the evidence must be substant ial; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or any of its Judges must act on its or his own independent conside ration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and, (7) the tribunal should in all controversial questions render its decision in such manner that the parties to t he proceeding may know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decis ion rendered. In determining whether RMC No. 37-93 is merely an interpretative rule which requ ires no prior notice and hearing, or an adjudicatory rule which demands the obse rvance of due process, a close examination of RMC 37-93 is in order. Noticeably, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue at first interprets Sec. 142, par. (c), subpar. (1), of the NIRC, as amended, by citing the law and clarifying or e xplaining what it means Section 142 (c) (1), National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6956, provides: On locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, fifty-five (55%) Provided, That this rate shall apply regardless of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was sold or tr ansferred by its owner to the local manufacturer. Whenever it has to be determin ed whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign brand, the listing of brands manuf actured in foreign countries appearing in the current World Tobacco Directory sh all govern. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the Court of Tax Appeals, is AFFIRMED. No costs. VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE, JR. February 13, 1989. G.R.No. 74930

Nature of the Case: Special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunctio n. Facts: Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary i njunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed : (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa member s belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immed iately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencin g their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners seem to the public records for the subject information. The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte which provides: xxxAs a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requ esting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of ( the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each o n guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Man ila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certi fied true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us. We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Fre edom Constitution of the present regime. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shal l be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertain ing to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen s ubject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6). On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Go vernment Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a r eply, "We are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necesary with in the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest. " On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the i nstant suit. In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance o f a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust adm inistrative remedies. Issue : proceedings. Ruling Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a part y can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all m eans of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons o f law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available adm inistrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administra tive forum, However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is s ubject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is invo lved. The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of th e scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed u pon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustee s, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this cas Whether or not there was a lack of exhaustion of administrative

e from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remed ies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue. We now address ourse lves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perfor m the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to info rmation. We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are enti tled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS. This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controver sy directly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuve ra, and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, the Court uph eld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public intere st and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the pet itioners. An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of i deas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government env isioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of gov ernment is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, gover nmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority con ferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of gove rnment, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the peopl e from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if acces s to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations pres cribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law f rom the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public int erest" and "public concern". As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or n ot a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which ca n be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a terra that eludes exa ct definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply be cause such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whethe r the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. In the Taada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the vari ous laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions r equiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligible s." A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be en forced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. When the information requested from the government intrudes into the pri vacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in

Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private cap acity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. Neither can the GSI S through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of it s borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked on ly by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned bor rowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privac y, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were a lleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest th ey generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those hold ing responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy a s compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny. Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transacti ons of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitu tional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)cc ess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official act s, transactions, or decisions" only. It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation perf orming proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records. It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is mere ly incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not cove red by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to info rmation which is applicable only to "official" transactions. In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that dam age to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the d uties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of oth er persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured. The petition, as to t he second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is merito rious. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant th ereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not a ccord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, ab stracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matter s of public concern. It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thi ng demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act r equired. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act mu st be clear and specific. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted.

Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego December 21, 1989 GRN 89572. 180 SCRA 533 CRUZ, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, M.M., Br. 172. Dizon-Capulong, J. FACTS The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took t he NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.1 When he applied to take it ag ain, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional right s to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the pr ivate respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subje ct to the outcome of his petition.2 In an amended petition filed with leave of c ourt, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declari ng the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita DizonCapulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a med ical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. ISSUE

Whether or not the three-flunk rule is constitutional? RULING We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed. In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT a s a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court: Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some re asonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps mo st usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medici ne in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protec ting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legisla tion and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicin e first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognize d as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of mini mum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the stat e. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, art iculates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the profes sional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading t he quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That up grading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consis ting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the requ ired degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical. practic e. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the c urrent state of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like t he NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of me dical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admissio n tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the M edical College Admission Test [MCAT]) and quite probably, in other countries wit h far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is use ful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effec ts of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodie s and minds for disease or trauma. However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admis sion test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule." We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the appli cant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed wi

th more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to r epeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public gen erally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interfere nce of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the att ainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon i ndividuals.5 In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the po lice power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpos e of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a cons titutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link the longer the bridge to on e's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources an d to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common go od while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patien ts. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a stu dent who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may he for others. The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute . The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a p rofession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admissio n and academic requirements." It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swa mped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lackin g in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated J anuary 13,1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

Ricardo Valmonte vs. Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. 170 SCRA 256 GRN 74930 February 13, 1989 CORTES, J.: Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for Mandamus with Preliminary Injuncti on to review the decision of the GSIS General Manager. FACTS The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte which p rovides:: As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am request ing that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the ) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on g uaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection here with shall be borne by us. We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Con stitution of the present regime. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be rec ognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to o fficial acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject t o such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6). On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "W e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necesary within the p remises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant s uit. In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrat ive remedies ISSUE

Whether or not there was a lack of exhaustion of administrative proceedings. RULING Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, c omity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrat ive remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been giv en opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative for um, However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject t o settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pa scual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G. R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA, 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-22 70, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSI S or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustio n of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural is sue. We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to co mpel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuan ce of their right to information. We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done , both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS. This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy direc tly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civi l Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, the Court uphe ld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interes t and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the peti tioners. The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which st ates: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be rec ognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research dat a used an basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject t o such limitations as may be provided by law. An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral an d artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred b y the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the pow er had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institu tionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from a buse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to suc h information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed b y implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought i s of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" a nd "public concern". As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern ther e is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a terra that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affec t their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of a n ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, a s it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid, at p. 641.] In the Taada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right t o information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Legaspi, it was t he "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles." A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced t hrough mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolve d in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe i s that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, a nd not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right ca nnot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vass ar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is a n injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager , the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is pur ely personal in nature (Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W . 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R .A. 286 (1895)], and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is cl aimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers t hemselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, consi dering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged t o have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they gener ate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding resp onsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compar ed to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutin y Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of t he GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional r ight to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to o fficial records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, trans actions, or decisions" only. It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing p roprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access t o official records. It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incid ental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by t he constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions. In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans gr

anted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulg ate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to o r loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other perso ns entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Comm ission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petit ion, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioner s, is meritorious. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, a re entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord th em a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of pub lic concern. It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that th e applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing deman ded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be cl ear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners acce ss to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Ba tasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations a s to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

Rodolfo Aguinaldo vs. Luis Santos August 2l,1992. GRN 94115. 212 SCRA 768 NOCON, J. Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Inj unction to review the decision of the GSIS General Manager FACTS Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, t o serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oath sometime around Mar ch 1988.

Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpab le violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao a nd Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed durin g the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to the complaint. On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter from pe titioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary's December 4, 1989 letter requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or removed f rom office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the p lanning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitt ed that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the c omplaint of Mayor Veronica Agatep and others.2 On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, p ending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him. Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petiti oner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as Govern or of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then the Vice Governor of Cagayan. Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the petition, namely: (1 ) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government o fficials under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petition er should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not he a mere preponde rance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revise d Penal Code. While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 electi ons. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed against h im, all based on the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of th e March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. The Commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9, 1992. On the same day , acting upon a "Motion to Clarify" filed by petitioner, the Commission ruled th at inasmuch as the resolutions of the Commission become final and executory only after five (5)days from promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a c andidate for governor pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases wi th this Court. Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with t his Court, d seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission ordering his di squalification. The Court, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992, issued a temporar y restraining order against the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing it s May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the disqualification case, there by allowing the canvassing of the votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. Howev er, the Commission was ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has dec ided the case.

On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case granting the petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission on the grou nd that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and i s still ending review with this Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin i n the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as G overnor of Cagayan

ISSUE Whether or not Secretary of Department of Local government has the power to sus pend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President, and as embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which i s now vested in the courts. RULING Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find the petition meritori ous. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term for whi ch the officer was elected or appointed. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that t he reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his presen t term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must b e assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of an y. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practicall y overrule the will of the people.' (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. 17 SCRA 58, 59 -60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [19741)3 Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administ rative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, find s no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may h ave committed during the failed coup. The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration. Petitioner c ontends that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local govern ment officials as alter ego of the President, and as embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 h as been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which is now vested in the courts. We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government of ficials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legi slative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control ov

er all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general super vision over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the departme nt head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him.4 The statutory grant found in RR Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2 of which specifically provided as follows SEC. 2. T he National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafte r be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more respo nsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of rec all, allocating among the different local government units their powers, respons ibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and rem oval, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties of local government officials , and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not ta ke effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.5 A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, w hich reads: 'SEC. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide fo r a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted throug h a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers , responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment, and removal, term and salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operati on of the local units.6 Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local governme nt code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution, then it can not be said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., 7 this Court had the occa sion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of th e present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government to remov e local elective government officials is found in Sees. 60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 3 37.8 As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of respondent Secretary to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan, We need but point to S ection 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337 to show the fallacy of the same, to wit In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functionc of his office, the vice-go vernor ... shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the former. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No, P-10437-89, dismissing petitioner as Governor Cagayan. is hereby REVERSED.

Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres vs. Court of Appeals 1998 284 SCRA 276

Alejandro Manosca vs. Court of Appeals January 29, 1996 GRN 1064. 252 SCRA 412 VITUG, J Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Tagu ig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square met ers. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Fe lix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Ser ies of 1986, pursuant to Section 41 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring th e land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1 986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opini on of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirma tive; he explained: "According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that mak es a turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the fo under of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had m ade contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a natio nal landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical inte rest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized x x x. "The National Museum and the National Historical Commission are hereby vested wi th the right to declare other such historical and cultural sites as National Shr ines, Monuments, and/or Landmarks, in accordance with the guidelines set forth i n R.A. 4846 and the spirit of this Decree." Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-G eneral, instituted a complaint for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial Cour t of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia, that: "Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical I nstitute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the 'Iglesia ni Cristo,' as a National Historical Landmark. The plaintiff perfor ce needs the land as such national historical landmark which is a public purpose ." Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for 'the use , benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.5 Petitioners s ought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1 989 order of the trial court.

On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners' motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued i ts denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 19 90,17another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic th e motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 wi th the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order. ISSUE Whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492square-meter parcel of la nd so declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national histor ical landmark. RULING We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates. Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency , as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sove reignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so descri bed as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.9 It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is sa id to he an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thu s inseparable from sovereignty.10 The only direct constitutional qualification i s that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensa tion."11 This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible a buse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power i s sought to be enforced. Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,12 to wit: ( a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.13 Petitioners suggest that we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public uses,14 i.e. , the "x x x taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridge s, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including schoolhouses, par ks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and sewerag e systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads." This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive. The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President 's power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the Court ha d made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusiv e in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be u nderstood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. The term "Public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, mu st be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exi

gency.16 Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the te rm; thus: "Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking p roperty by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, 'public use' is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual us e by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed faciliti es for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whe ther exercised by one or many members of public, a 'public advantage' or 'public benefit' accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. B okma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773. "Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and ever y member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S. Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulnes s, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be li mited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in commo n, and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the pu blic, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience . A 'public use' for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it c hanges with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, chang ing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circum stances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communicatio n and transportation. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional pur poses is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use " is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discar ded. "We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not de sirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. Th e values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as m onetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the communi ty should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balan ced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its au thorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the Distric t of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sa nitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. "Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it th rough the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain i s merely the means to the end. It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co.,19 that: " A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use' to be on e of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual incre ase and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. x x x for 'whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a pu blic use."' Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: "The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was fel t that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever proj ect is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any

doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be su bdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the tra nsfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterp rise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever ma y be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."20 Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenur e Administration,21 has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one tha t "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a not ed constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimat ely emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare ." Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropri ation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appro priate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspectiv e to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is t he principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, t he exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of th e Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived b y members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but su ch a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in n ature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law a nd jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

J.M Tuazon Company Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration DECEMBER 26, 1961 G.R. L-18672. 31 SCRA 413 FERNANDO, J. Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition FACTS The record shows that the judgements rendered in 1955 by the Court of First Inst ance (CFI) of Rizal in the two ejectment cases filed by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. against respondents, Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon, were upon regular appe al, affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.The CFI, after the appellate court s decision became final and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ of execution of the judgement against the said respondents as prayed for by the landowner, Tuason & Company. Subssequently, On November 19, 1960, the CFI issue d orders of demolition of the houses of the evictees or judgement debtors. On November 16, 1960 , the landowner also applied for prohibition in the CFI aga inst the Land Tenure Administration (LTA), the Auditor-General and the Solicitor -General to restrain from instituting expropriation proceedings of the petitione r Company s land in Quezon City, generally known as Tatalon Estate by virtue of Repu blic Act (R.A.) No. 2616, that became law without executive approval on August 3

, 1959 on the basis that said law is unconstitutional, null and void as legislat ion aimed at depriving it of its property for the benefit of squatters and occup ants, even if said property had been actually subdivided and its lots were being sold to public. ISSUE Whether or not expropriation proceedings can be had by the LTA pursuance to R.A. 2616 which the landowner claimed to be unconstitutional? RULING The court saw nothing in the terms of R.A. No. 2616 to justify the belie f that the Legislature intended departure from the normal course prescribed for eminent domain cases, where the rights of the owner of the land may not be distu rbed without previous deposit of the provisional value of the property brought t o be condemned. The effectivity of Section 4 of R.A. 2616, discontinuing ejectm ent proceedings against a present occupants and restraining any act of dispositi on of the property, is justifiable only if the Government takes possession of th e land in question by depositing its value. It needs no argument to show that by restraining the land owner from enforcing even final judgements in his favor to recover possession of his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons of his choice, he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and his title is le ft as an empty shell. The landowner would then be deprived of those attributes of ownership that give it value, and his property is virtually taken from him wi thout compensation and in violation of the Constitution. Particularly, Bill of Rights requires that private property shall not be taken for public use without p ayment of just compensation and Article XIII, Section 4 in prescribing that Congre ss may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots an conveyed at cost to individuals, prohibit any disturbance of property rights without coetaneous payment of just indemnity. H ence the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee s dominical rights, whethe r of possession, enjoyment, or disposition, And this is especially the case wher e final and executory judgements of ejectment have been obtained against the occ upants of the property as in the case at bar. The LTA confesses that it has onl y Two Million Pesos available funds, an amount way short of the P6,034,865.95 re asonable assessed value of the property subject of the case. Based on the for egoing, the court remanded the case to CFI to hear and resolve the prohibition c ase filed by the landowner with all practicable dispatch.

Tanada vs. Angara May 2, 1997 G.R. 118295. 272 SCRA 18 PANGANIBAN, J. Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. FACTS The emergence of World Trade Organization (WTO) after half a century and severa l dizzying rounds of negotiations where the Philippines joined as a founding mem ber with the goal, brought about the ratification of the WTO Agreement by then P resident Fidel V. Ramos on the basis, as articulated in his two letters to Senat e, of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major tradi ng partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agric ultural and industrial products. Subsequently, this Agreement was concurred by t he Senate. However, this drew unfavorable reactions from various sectors of the Philippine society, that resulted in the filing of the subject petition-case on the grounds that: WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products; WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress a nd the Supreme Court. Hence, assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitut ion to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively contro lled by Filipinos (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote th e preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced go ods, among others. ISSUES: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy (involve a political questio n)? Does the provisions of WTO Agreement and its three annexes contravene section 19 of Article II, and Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitu tion? Do the provisions of said Agreement and its annexes limit, restrict or impair th e exercise of legislative power by Congress? Do said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of judicial powe r by this court in promulgating rules of evidence? Was the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement and its annexes sufficien t and/or valid, considering that it did not include the final act, ministerial d eclarations and decisions and the understanding commitments in financial service s? RULING The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has b een grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. As this Court has rep eatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, commi tted by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. Th e Court stress though that in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, Certiorari

it will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of the trade libera lization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions and other import/trade barriers. R ather it will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether or not t here had bee a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdic tion on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annex es. The Constitution indeed mandates as bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, l abor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exch ange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and lim its protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trad e practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolation policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods, se rvices in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution do es not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services, and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exch ange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Frowning only on foreign competit ion that is unfair. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however, subject to restrictions and limitations volu ntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermittype isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted pr inciples of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nat ions. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepte d principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligations but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties A state which has contracted valid i nternational obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. O ne of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is PACTA SUNT S ERVANDA --- international agreements must be performed in good faith. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies the intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain unreasonable burde n consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute se ttlement inherent in our judicial system. By signing the Final Act, Secretary Rizalino Navarro, as representative of the P hilippines, undertook to submit, as appropriate the WTO Agreement for considerat ion of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of it in accordance with their procedures; and to adopt the Ministerial Declaratio ns and Decisions (MDD). The assailed Senate Res. No. 97 expressed concurrence i n exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories namely, concurrence o f the Senate in the WTO Agreement. The MDD were deemed adopted without the need for ratification. They were approv ed by them ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT (General Agreement on T ariffs and Trade) which provides that representatives of the members can meet to give effect to those provisions of this Agreemet which invoke joint action and g enerally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering of this Agreem ent. The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakes h does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which h ave indicated their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, eliminati on of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers,

temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information and na tional treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinan cing available in the normal course of business. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veri table forum for the development of international trade law. Let the people, thr ough their duly authorized elected officers make their free choice. PETITION WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

PEOPLE vs. GALIT MARCH 20, 1985 G.R. L-51770. 135 SCRA 465 CONCEPCION, JR., J. Nature of the Case: Appeal from the Judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pa sig, Rizal.

FACTS The defendant-appellant, Francisco Galit, was convicted for the crime of Robbery with Homicide with death sentence as its penalty. Such being the case it is su bjected to the automatic review of the High Court. That on or about the 23rd of August, 1977 in the municipality of Montalb an, Province of Rizal, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow was found dead in the be droom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal as a result of s even (7) stab wounds inflicted upon the different parts of her body by a blant i nstrument. More than two (2) weeks later, police authorities of Montalban pick ed up the herein defendant, an ordinary contruction worker (pion) living in Mari kina, Rizal on suspicion of the murder based on the testimony of his son-in-law, Florentino Valentino. Valentino testified that he heard accused Galit and his wife s arguments in connection with the robbery and killing of the victim which th e former, together with two of his accomplices, Juling Dulat and a certain Pabl ing perpetrated. ISSUE Whether or not the alleged extra-judicial confession extracted and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment obtained from the accused-defendant are admissible as evidence? RULING After a review of the records, the Court found that the evidence presented by th e prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by compe tent evidence. In the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, the court laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in cond ucting a custodial investigation which, At the time the person is arrested, it s hall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for his ar rest ad he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any stateme nt he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, pr anyone he chooses by the mo st expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accompl ished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be conducted in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his beh alf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or b y anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtaine d in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpa tory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state wit nesses and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. Such confession wa s obtained after such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer which do es not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his r ights under the Constitution and our laws. The court said that there should inst ead be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple wor ds in dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is f rom Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend, In fact his sisters were and other relatives did not kn ow that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about t wo weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to v isit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel an

d yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-en actment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. The court dec lared that these constitute gross violations of his rights, hence, the alleged c onfession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evid ence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDES PAYNOR SEPTEMBER 9, 1996 G.R. 116222. 261 SCRA 615 REGALADO, J. Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Roxas, Isabela Br. 23 FACTS On September 18, 1991, on or about 4:00 in the afternoon, a ten-year old pupil n amed Fesnaida Magaway, while sweeping the ground near her classroom having been assigned as cleaner that day, witnessed the stabbing incident perpetrated by the accused-appellant, Lindes Paynor against the victim-teacher of Roxas Central El ementary School known as Carmelita Aguinaldo. The victim was rushed to the hosp ital by her fellow teachers but was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA). Through t he lone testimony of witnessed Magaway and after due investigation, a criminal case was filed against the accused in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela. RTC rendered its decision on April 21, 1994 declaring the accused guilt y beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder provided for and penalized unde r Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes upon him a penalty of reclus ion perpetua together with all the necessary penalties provided by law, to indem nify the heirs of victim in the amount of P50,000 pesos, without however, subsid iary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay cost. Appellant sought the reversal of that verdict claiming that the lower court erre d, among others, that there was violation of the MIRANDA DOCTRINE. ISSUE Whether or not the accused rightfully raised the issue of violation of the MI RANDA DOCTRINE when allegedly the police unceremoniously stripped him of his clo thing and personal items, the latter having been introduced as evidence during t he trial? RULING The court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused under custodial investigation which is invoked by the accused-appellant, Lindes Paynor, refers t o TESTIMONIAL COMPULSION. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (Bil l of Rights) provides that such accused shall have the right to be informed of h is right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the right to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission ob tained in violation of such rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him . As held in People vs. Gamboa, this constitutional right applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be ex amined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or meas ured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription agai

nst testimonial compulsion.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS JULY 28, 1989 G.R. 85279. 175 SCRA 686 CORTES, J. Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS On June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS. The reason for the strike was due to SSS s failure to act on the union s demands wh ich included, among other things, implementation of the provisions of the old SS S-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues, paymen t of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay, conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent status and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowan ces and benefits granted to other regular employees of the SSS, etc. The strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council (PSLMC) which ordere d the strikers to return to work. For failure of the strikers to heed the PSLMC s order, SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complai

nt for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work. ISSUE Whether or not the employees of the Social Security System have the right to str ike? RULING The court held that while the 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justic e and Human Rights provides that the State shall guarantee the rights of all work ers to self-organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and peaceful conce rted activities in accordance with law (Article XIII, Section 31), it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law as gleaned from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners in tended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only withou t including the right to strike. Further, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors to the provision that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees, explained in his answer to the apprehension expr essed by Commissioner Ambrosio Padilla , When we proposed this amendment providin g for self-organization of government employees, it does mean that because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a diffe rent matter. We are only talking of organizing, uniting as a union. Now then, i f the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes from employees exercising governmental functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited , then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that prov ision is carried in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 875. In R.A. No. 875, workers inclu ding those from government-owned and controlled are allowed to organize but they are prohibited from striking. Apropos to the constitutional guarantee of the ri ght of the government employees to organize, then President Corazon C. Aquino is sued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 180 which provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shal l be observed subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress , apparen tly referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1987 of the Civil Service Commission dated April 21, 1987 which prior to the enactment by Congress of appl icable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of admini strative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass actions which wil l result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service . The court is of the considered view that SSS employees are covered by the prohibition against s trikes considering that under the 1987 Constitution the Civil Service embraces al l branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government inclu ding government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters (Article IX.B, Section 2(1) and Section 1 of E.O. No. 180) with SSS is one such governmen t controlled corporation with original charter having created under R.A. No. 116 1. Thus, the court declared that the strike staged by the SSS employees was ill egal.

BANGALISAN vs. CA 276 SCRA 619 July 31, 1997 REGALADO, J.: Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. FACTS Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school te achers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public authoritie s to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended f or their material benefit. On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Departmen t of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitio ners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with "grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, other wise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were simultaneo usly placed under preventive suspension. Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint so, the DECS Secretary rendered a decisi on finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service ef fective immediately. Petitioners Bangalisan et al, filed a motion for reconsideration with the DECS Secretary who subsequently modified the penalty of dismissal to suspension for n ine months without pay. Not satisfied with the aforestated adjudication of their respective cases, petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) wh o decided to rule on the merits of their appeal in the interest of justice. All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were all denied, except that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because of his failur e to inform the school of his intended absence and to file an application for le ave therefor. This petitioner was accordingly given only a reprimand. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court but thei r petition was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Revised Administrati ve Circular No. 1-95.4 ISSUE Whether or not employees in the public service have the right to engage in strikes. HELD: It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, d emonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of gove rnment employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or assoc iations, without including the right to strike.

Rosales vs. CA September 15, 1998 165 SCRA 344 BIDIN, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS On April 11, 1972, the Don Bosco Technical Institute posted the list of honor st udents for the graduation of its elementary department which was to take place o n April 22, 1972. Rommel Rosales, a student of Grade VI, candidate for graduatio n and likewise candidate for Valedictorian, reported to his parents that he was not listed as Valedictorian of the class but that it was another boy by the name of Conrado Valerio. The parents of Rommel demanded for a re-computation of the grades of their son who, they averred, should be class valedictorian and filed a formal complaint with the Director of Bureau of Private Schools against the sch ool claiming anomalous ranking of honor pupils for the grade school with a reque st for a review of the computations made by the school. The Chief of the Legal D ivision of the Bureau of Private Schools sent a copy of the complaint by first i ndorsement to the Rector of herein respondent school stating, among others, that the complaint had lost its validity because the same was filed on the eve of th e commencement exercises of the school, in violation of the provision of paragra ph 176, Section XI of the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools requiring com plaints of the kind to be filed not later than ton (10) days before commencement exercises. However, defendant Rector indicated that he would welcome an investi gation in order to erase any doubt as to the selection of the honor students of the grade school concerned. On May 5, 1972, the Director of Private Schools rend ered a decision holding that Rommel Rosales was the rightful valedictorian. On N ovember 29, 1972, Rosales filed a complaint for damages in view of the failure o

f the school to graduate Rommel Rosales as valedictorian of his class. In its an swer, respondent school prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground tha t the Director of Private Schools acting on its motion dated May 11, 1972 recons idered and set aside his decision of May 5, 1972 and instead "approved and/or co nfirmed the selection and award of honors to the students concerned for the scho ol year 1971-1972 as effected by the school." Petitioners, in their reply, averred that said motion for reconsideration was my steriously filed, there being no original copies of the same in the Office of th e Director of Private Schools which would show the date of filing thereof and th eir corresponding receipt of a copy thereof by the petitioners. Respondent schoo l however, insisted that their motion for reconsideration was regularly filed an d the assailed decision was in fact reconsidered as above stated on December 18, 1972. The records show that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on J anuary 11, 1973 of said decision of December 18, 1972 but was denied on January 19, 1973. Thus, on February 7, 1973, petitioners appealed both decisions of Dece mber 18, 1972 and January 19, 1973 to the Secretary of Education which appeal wa s still pending at the time of the filing of their complaint in court. On September 14, 1973, the trial court issued an order finding that plaintiffs h ave not exhausted all administrative remedies against the defendants and that it does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the requirement. Since the complaint does not allege exhaustion of said remedies principally on appeal to the Secretary of Education which was available to him, the Court finds that the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute cause of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the court a quo incurred no error when it found that the decision of the Director of Private Schools dated May 5, 1972 was far from being final and that the administrative remedies availed of by plai ntiffs had not yet been exhausted and affirmed the decision appealed from in tot o. ISSUE Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case. HELD: Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse th rough court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies hav e been exhausted at the administrative level. When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a Litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to i nterfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenien ce but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administ rative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court.

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. HON. ALFONSO ABAD February 24, 1992 206 SCRA 482 CRUZ, J: Nature of the Case: Petition for review from the decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. FACTS

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years. Privat e respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural Re sources for the cancellation of the TLA, on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same cha rges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a compla int for injunction with damages against the petitioner in the RTC of Pagadian Ci ty. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the c ourt had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhau sted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibi ted by Section I of PD 605. Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and also the motion for recon sideration. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of A ppeals, which sustained the trial court s decision and in its resolution denying t he motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of ex haustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention. The decision also declared invalid Se ction 1 of PD 605, which provides: Section 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any rest raining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocat ion or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative offi cial or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines. This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,7 where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases. ISSUE Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied. HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort f irst to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a contro versy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the co urts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action,8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dis miss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been ob served. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of p owers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference wit h matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a b etter position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by th

eir superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is t hat administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is n o other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a co nsiderable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of i nstances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly res orted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question ra ised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when th e act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judici al intervention: 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controver sy is private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. In this case, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy was not correc tly applied. Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly requ ire prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if s uch reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pert inent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the developme nt, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and " to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all la nds of the public domain, and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bure au of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws and regulations" here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive co nferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to ru le in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers befo re the courts of justice may intervene.

SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC vs. CA

March 25, 1999 305 SCRA 147 PURISIMA, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for review for Certiorari of a decision of the Cour t of Appeals. FACTS Macario Aro was the former owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Dasmarinas, Cavite and the members of petitioner Samahang Magbubukid Ng Kapd ula, Inc. were the tenants thereon. Sometime in 1979, Mr. Aro sold the said parc els of land to Arrow Head Golf Club, Inc., which was founded by Ricardo Silverio who envisioned to establish a car assembly plant within the area. In the proces s, the members of petitioner were evicted. But the establishment of a car assemb ly plant in the place never materialized. The parcels of land in question were l ater leased to the spouses Rodriguez for a term of seven (7) years and were the n developed into a sugarcane plantation, with the herein private respondents as the regular farmworkers. The same property was acquired by the Philippine National Bank at a Sheriff's au ction sale. The members of petitioner sought the assistance of the former Minist ry of Agrarian Reform now Department of Agrarian Reform, through then Minister Heherson Alvarez, for their reinstatement as farmworkers thereon, but nothing ca me out of such efforts. The ownership of subject parcels of land was later trans ferred to the Asset Privatization Trust which conveyed the same to the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DAR. In furtherance of its objective of instituting agrarian reform in the country, the DAR issued Certificate of Land O wnership ("CLOA") for the said parcels of land in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE 1. Whether or not there was a need for the private respondents to exhaust admini strative remedies before filing their petition for Certiorari with the CA. 2.Whether or not there was observance of due process by the DAR prior to the iss uance of Certificate of Land Ownership in favor of petitioner

HELD: 1. From the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, it can be gleaned that dec isions of the DAR Secretary cannot be questioned before DARAB. Pertinent rules, provide: "SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Ad judication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, t o determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matt ers or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Refo rm Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the foll owing: (c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or their am endments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;" (Rule II,

DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure) From the foregoing, it is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals from decisions or orders of DAR officials other than the Secretary. It is also irrefutable that the issuance of subject CLOAs constituted a decision of the Sec retary, who issued and signed the same. Consequently, the propriety of the recou rse by private respondents to the respondent court on a petition for certiorari, to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in question, is beyond cavil. Un der Section 54 of RA 6657, decisions and awards of the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari. Time and again, this court has ruled that in ca ses of denial of due process, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is unnecessary. The aggrieved party may seek judicial relief outright. 2. Respondent court found that herein private respondents were denied the opport unity to ventilate their stance before the DAR. But according to the petitioner, during the investigation and conferences conducted on the question of inclusion of subject properties in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the gover nment, Mr. Ruben Rodriguez was notified of the same Records show, however, that the letter which was supposed to be the notice to the private respondents regar ding the inclusion of subject properties in the CARP, was ineffective. First of all, the letter of Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Serapio T. Magpayo to Mr. Ruben Rodriguez indicates no receipt of the same by Mr. Rodriguez nor was it sig ned by Mr. Magpayo. Secondly, if it was ever sent, it was sent too late, the sam e being dated June 5, 1991, when the said parcels of land had already been award ed to the members of petitioner. (The CLOAs under controversy were issued on Mar ch 26, 1991.) Thirdly, the letter was addressed to Mr. Ruben Rodriguez, who no l onger possessed the said properties as his lease thereover ended on July 8, 1990 . There is thus a need for further hearings to determine the beneficiaries of subj ect parcels of land. In such hearings, the private respondents, who were deprive d of an opportunity to be heard before the DAR, should participate. This is in p ursuance of the provisions of Section 40(4),17 in relation to Section 2218 of RA 6657, providing for the order or priority of the qualified beneficiaries of CAR P.

Natividad Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals February 23, 2000 GR NO.131641. 326 SCRA 338. BELLOSILLO, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS On 15 March 1985 Natividad Nazareno filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages against spouses Romeo and Eliza Nazareno. Natividad avers in her complai nt that she is the sole and absolute owner of a parcel of land located in Naic, Cavite, covered by TCT No. 51798 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. Sometime in April 1981 Natividad's brother, Romeo, and his wife Eliza convinced Natividad t o lend them TCT No. 51798 to be used as collateral to a loan the proceeds of whi ch would be used in the completion of the construction of the Naic Cinema on the subject property. Natividad agreed on the condition that title to her property would be returned within one (1) year from the completion of the construction of the cinema. Accordingly, Natividad executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the lot covered by TCT No. 51798. The sale, howeve r, was simulated because Natividad did not receive any consideration therefor. The cinema was completed in November 1981 but despite several demands by Nativid ad, spouses Romeo and Eliza failed and refused to return Natividad's title to th e property; instead, they had the property transferred in their name. Consequent ly, TCT No. T-118276 was issued in their name in lieu of TCT No. 51798. Spouses Romeo and Eliza denied that the property belonged to Natividad. On the c ontrary, they averred that it originally formed part of the estate of the late M aximino Nazareno, Jr., father of Romeo and Natividad. According to Romeo, the pr operty was his share in their inheritance. As regards the deed of sale, he expla ined that it was only resorted to for the purpose of carrying out and implementi ng the transfer of the property forming part of the estate of Maximino Nazareno Jr., the distribution of which was entrusted to Natividad. The trial court found for the spouses Romeo and Eliza and ruled that although th e Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated, the same could be treated as an adjudicat ion and a conveyance to Romeo of his share in the estate of his father. But the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. It found that during pre-trial, the pa rties stipulated that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Natividad and spouses Ro meo and Eliza was simulated as there was in fact no money consideration. Consequ ently, the burden of proof was shifted to Romeo to prove that the transfer was i n reality a conveyance of his share in the estate of his father. But during tria l, Romeo failed to prove this so-called conveyance of his share. On the other ha nd, Natividad satisfactorily showed that the property was previously sold to her by their late father. Romeo failed to disprove this fact. Neither did he succes sfully cause the deed of sale executed by Maximino Nazareno Jr. in favor of Nati vidad to be declared null and void. Resultingly, its authenticity and validity r emained unrebutted. In short, the Court of Appeals did not sustain the trial court and set aside its Decision. The case was brought to us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari but we denied the petition after having ascertained that the appellate court committed no reve rsible error. Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on 13 June 1996. ISSUE Whether or not there was a deprivation of property without due process o f law.

RULING A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed; it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms o f the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life, and in fact exceeds it, it has pro tanto no v alidity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision a gainst depriving a person of his property without due process of law. Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, i t would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for the parties to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who h ave no right to remain therein, they must submit to court litigations anew.2 An exception however exists where the actual possessor has shown a valid right over the property enforceable even against the owner thereof. Execution not in harmony with the judgment has no validity. It must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the deci sion, as the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution. Therefore, to issue a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. Moreover, it is a settled rule that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from poss ession unless sought in connection with (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has inter vened; and (4) in execution sales. It is an undisputed fact that this case is for the annulment of a private sale m ade by petitioner to private respondent. This action is not a land registration case nor a foreclosure of mortgage whether judicially or extrajudicially nor was the subject property sold in execution. Petitioner sought for the issuance of a writ of possession in connection with a decision in a civil action for annulmen t of a private sale and damages. Evidently, the decision of the Court of Appeals required no writ of possession a s the writ of execution would suffice to place Natividad in possession of Lot 50 4-A-3. A case in point is Perez v. Evite7 wherein the lower court declared Evite as owner of the disputed land. When the judgment became final and executory, Ev ite moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the trial court granted. Perez moved to quash the writ arguing that the writ was at variance with the de cision as the decision sought to be executed merely declared Evite owner of the property and did not order its delivery to him. Perez argued citing the cases of Jabon v. Alo8 and Talens v. Garcia9 which held that adjudication of ownership o f the land did not include possession thereof. In resolving in favor of Evite th is Court held Considering that herein plaintiff-appellants have no other claim to possession o f the property apart from their claim of ownership which was rejected by the low er court and, consequently, has no right to remain thereon after such ownership was adjudged to defendant-appellees, the delivery of possession of the land shou ld be considered included in the decision. Indeed, it would be defeating the end s of justice should we require that for herein appellees to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs, from those who have no right to remain therein, they must submit to court litigations anew. In the instant case, spouses Romeo and Eliza could not use Jabon v. Alo and Tale ns v. Garcia to support their contention that the adjudication of ownership over the land does not necessarily include possession. As already decreed in Perez v . Evite It may be observed that in both decisions (Jabon v. Alo and Talens v. Garcia), t his Court underscored the possibility that the actual possessor has some rights which must be respected and defined. It is thus evident that the pronouncement w as made having in mind cases wherein the actual possessor has a valid right over the property enforceable even against the owner thereof. As example, we gave th e cases of tenants and lessees. However, it is our view that that above doctrine may not be invoked in instances where no such right may be appreciated in favor of the possessor. In the instant case there appears in the appealed order of Ju ne 30, 1959, the specific finding of the trial court that "the plaintiffs have n

ot given any reason why they are retaining the possession of the property" x x x x This factual finding cannot be reviewed in this instance as the appeal has be en taken to us directly on a question of law x x x x The same ruling would apply in the instant case. The Court of Appeals categorica lly declared that the claim of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the disputed lot has utterly no factual basis. Therefore, they have no reason to remain in possessio n of the property. But the same could not be said of the Naic Cinema. The matter of ownership and p ossession of the Naic Cinema was never put in issue. Consequently, petitioner ca nnot ask for a writ of possession to place her in physical occupancy of the Naic Cinema. Being declared owner of subject lot does not also mean that she is auto matically entitled to possession of all the improvements therein. Otherwise, the actual possessor would be deprived of his property without due process of law. Finally, petitioner cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since i n her complaint and subsequent pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner t hereof. On the contrary, she claims that the Naic Cinema belongs to the estate o f her father. On the other hand, respondent spouses have asserted dominion over the Naic Cinema. Plainly, petitioner cannot wrest possession of the moviehouse f rom respondent spouses through a mere writ of possession as she herself even dis claims being the owner thereof. Ownership over the Naic Cinema must be threshed out in a proper proceeding. A mere prayer for the issuance of a writ of possessi on will not suffice. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the issuance of a writ of possession is AFFIRMED.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS vs. RASUL August 16, 1991 G.R. No. 91551. 200 SCRA 685 GANCAYCO, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision and order of RTC Pasig, Mani la. FACTS Estrella was appointed as PGH Director. After several weeks, the new UP Preside nt recommended the reorganization of the PGH and renaming it as UP-PGH Medical C enter. The Board affirmed the recommendation and declared all seats in the form er PGH, including that of Estrella, as vacant. Estrella filed an Injunction of for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) alleging that he enjoys se curity of tenure. UP Board argues that it has the power to abolish the position of PGH Director held by Estrella and that there was a valid reorganization cond ucted by it. ISSUE Whether or not respondent Dr. Felipe A. Estrella who holds the position of Direc tor of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) can invoke security of tenure durin g his term of office notwithstanding the abolition of the said position by the U niversity of the Philippine Board of Regents.

RULING

1.) As the PGH Director and UP-PGH Medical Director s functions are one and the same, the abolishing of the former position is not and abolishment, bona fide, agains t Estrella but only a renaming of office. 2.) Estrella is protected by the security of tenure by virtue of his appointment. Hence, the purported reorganization is not valid. The Dario V. Mison doctrine i s affirmed. 3.) Assuming there was an abolition, the charter at UP does not grant its power to abolish but only to merge colleges and departments.

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN January 20, 1999. G.R. No. 123997. 301 SCRA 237. BELLOSILLO, J.: Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohi bition and Mandamus. FACTS The Republic against Balbanero filed a forfeiture of alleged unexplained wealth over the amount of ten (10) Million. By reconciliation of records, it was decre ased into Php165,043.00 to which Balbanero likewise presented appointing documen ts. He made several motions with the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the cas e and the cancellation or suspension of scheduled hearings for the presentation of Republic s evidence. The same were all denied by the sandiganbayan. Come hear ing date, the Republic through the ASGs however were not prepared due to flimsy excuses of substitution and re-alignment of prosecutors. Republic moves for the re-schedule of hearing but the Sandiganbayan ordered them to file formal offer of evidence. Republic contends that it will be deprive of due process by the or der of the court. ISSUE Whether or not there was deprivation of due process. RULING Order for filing of formal offer of evidence affirmed. The counsel of the Repub lic should have prepared with due diligence the cause of its client and not unre asonably request for postponement of hearings cause at which is due to its own n egligence. Under the circumstances, it cannot rightly be said that the OSG was not guilty o f inexcusable carelessness, presumptiousness, indifference to and neglect of dut y in assuming that public respondent would grant its oral motion for postponemen t, coming to court unprepared and without a witness. Hence public respondent was well within its authority to deny the Republic's oral motion for postponement o f the hearings set on 19 and 20 October 1995 and require it, instead, to just fo rmally offer its evidence within fifteen (15) days from notice. Petitioner is no t guilty of abuse of discretion, much less grave, nor can it be charged by petit ioner with denial of due process. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DENI ED. GABRITO vs. Court of Appeals November 24, 1988 G.R. No. 77976.167 SCRA 623. BIDIN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction to review the order of the Court of Appeals. Campos, J. FACTS Tans predecessor applied for a sales application over a parcel of land and had it leased by Gabrito. Tan later on acquired the land and when he decided to use t he land for their personal use, demanded its return from Gabrito, although the o riginal sales application is pending approval. Gabrito failed to heed the deman d and later on filed a sales application for the same with the Bureau of Lands a nd praying for annulment of sales application of Tan s predecessor. Tan filed a co mplaint for unlawful detainer against Gabrito and was sustained by the MTC, the RTC and the CA. Later, Gabrito s application was granted and the prior sales appl ication of Tana s predecessor was cancelled but Tan filed an appeal of the same wi th the DENR. ISSUE Gabrito interpose the issue of ownership as to the unlawful detainer case. RULING The issue in unlawful detainer is the possession and the issue with the Bureau o f Lands is for ownership; although the law grants the Administrative Agency the power to decide issue on ownership, it does not deprive courts the power to deci de issue of possession. The application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a c ondition precedent to the filing of a juridical action is confined to controvers ies arising out of the dispositive of public lands (Geukoko vs. Araneta, 102 Ph il. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), alienation of public l ands (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to the determination of the respective rig hts of rival claimants to public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra) and not to possessory actions involving public lands which are limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in questio n (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra)." In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the juris diction of the courts to decide the case on the question of physical possession, although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179). Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogen t reason to disturb the findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities; of the Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City and finally of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is Affirmed and the tempo rary restraining order is lifted. Costs against petitioners.

Sabello vs. DECS December 26, 1989 G.R. No. 87687. 180 SCRA 623 GANCAYCO, J: Nature of the Case: Petition for review the decision of the Secretary of Departm ent of Education, Culture and Sports. FACTS Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistan t Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the s tudents could hardly pay for their monthly tuition fees. Since at that time also , the President of the Philippines who was earnestly campaining was giving aid i n the amount of P 2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council through proper re solutions alloted the amount of P 840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the hig h school teachers, with the honest thought in mind that the barrio high school w as a barrio project and as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in question. The only part that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized by the said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was subsequen tly deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio H igh School. That was a grave error on the part of the herein petitioner as it in volves the very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its t echnicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, we re charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suf fer a sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The herein petitioner appealed his case to the Court of appeals, Manila. The Court of appeals modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary impriso nment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being invol ved. The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a l awyer to proceed to the highest court of the land. Finally, the herein petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President o f the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil and political ri ghts.' With this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstate ment to the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Prin cipal I. ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner merits reappointment to the position he held prior to his conviction that of Elementary Principal I. RULING There is here a justiciable controversy. Petitioner claims he must be restored t o the same position he was in before he was convicted on a mere technical erro r and for which he was given an absolute pardon. This is not a hypothetical or abstract dispute. It is not academic or moot for, to our mind, there is a definite and concrete controversy touching the legal rel ations of parties having adverse legal relations. This is a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a court decree that is conclus ive in character. The case does not call for a mere opinion or advise, but for a ffirmative relief . As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be reappoint ed to his former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly d eprived of' what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requireme nts of giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and j ustice. As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot b e sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged grave erro rs in their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a s uit against the officials of this government agency. Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a non-lawyer, who claim s that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, We also set aside the requir ement of exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of the petition. In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 3 this Court held that the absolute disqualificat ion from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all t he penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Al though such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entit le him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said off ice. In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the service as a classroom teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and Sport s. As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, jus tice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher. However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4 this Court said he is not entitled to a utomatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the government se rvice upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had b een duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered r einstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them. In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made c ontinuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not. At any rate whe n he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate reti rement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom teacher. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of Ed

ucation, Culture and Sports and/or his duly authorized representative is hereby directed to appoint petitioner to the position of Elementary School Principal I or it equivalent, without pronouncement as to cost. This decision is immediately executory.

RULLAN vs. VALDEZ November 28, 1964 G.R. No. L-20031. 12 SCRA 501 DE VEYRA, J.: Nature of the Case: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bagui o City. FACTS Rullan and Valdez are members of Baguio Loakan Placer Mining Association (BLPMA ) at which Valdez owes 40% interest. BLPMA has located and grabbed mining clai ms at Morning Glory and Silica. Unknown to his co-members, Valdez decreased the protion at Silica and included the excluded portion to his lease application fo r Selecta Placer claim. Rullan filed and adverse claim against the same lease a pplication, pending due course at the adverse claim, Rullan filed an action with the CFI for the recognition of BLPMA/Rullan s rights over the excluded portion. Defendant Valdez moved for its dismissal for lack of sufficient allegation of ri ghts but was denied, on Motion for Reconsideration, Valdez argued that CFI has n o jurisdiction yet on the action as to the adverse claim in the lease applicatio n has yet to be given course by Director of Mines. CFI dismissed the complaint. ISSUE Is the action on the adverse claim a condition sine qua non for the filing of cl aim in court? RULING No. Section 73 of CA 137 prescribes that the adverse claimants must file their c laim in the Bureau of Mines and thereafter file an action with the proper court within twenty (20) days from such filing at adverse claim. The filing in court

stays the application. The law applicable to the issue before us is Section 73 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended by Republic Act No. 745, which we quote: "Sec. 73. At any time during the period of application, any adverse claim may be filed under oath with the Director of Mines. and shall state in full detail the nature, boundaries, and extent of the adverse claim, and shall be accompanied b y all plans, documents, and agreements upon which such adverse claim is based: * * * Upon the filing of any adverse claim all proceedings except the making and filing of the affidavit in connection therewith, as herein prescribed, shall be stayed until the controversy shall have been settled or decided by a court of co mpetent jurisdiction, or the adverse claim waived. It shall be the duty of the a dverse claimant, within thirty days after filing his claim, to commence proceedi ngs in a court of competent jurisdiction to deter. mine the controversy and to p rosecute the same with reasonable diligence to final judgment, and a failure to do so shall be considered as a waiver of his adverse claim. The above statutory provision prescribes the method by which a person h aving an adverse claim to a certain mineral land can have his day in court. If h e fails to file an adverse claim within the time therein provided for or fails t o commence the proceeding within the statutory period, his claim is deemed waive d. Any person who has an adverse interest in the whole or to a portion of the su rface of a mining claim for which a lease is applied for by another may file an adverse claim which must state in full the nature, boundaries and extent thereof , to be accompanied by the necessary plans, documents and greomonts upon which t he issue is based. The filing of said adverse claim produces the effect of stayi ng all the proceedings on the application filed with the Bureau of Mines, except only in relation to the publication and proof of notice, until the controversy shall have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Since then the fun ctions of the Bureau of Mines are suspended to, await the action of the court. This is the situation herein obtained. After plaintiffs had filed their adverse claim with the Bureau of Mines with regard to the lease application of certai n mining claims filed by defendant, they at the same time commenced the present action wherein they squarely brought to the fore the issue of ownership over the mining claim controverted. The question, therefore, comes well within the juris diction of the court a quo regardless of whether the action of the Director of M ines on the adverse claim filed in his office is still pending. This is the reve rse situation of a case involving the ownership of a portion of public land wher ein exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, for here the law is speci fic that the question of ownership affecting an adverse claim must first be dete rmined by the competent court before administrative action could proceed to its termination. It is, therefore, error for the court a quo to dismiss the complain t on the ground that plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies before coming to court. The situation obtained herein is just the contrary. Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. This case should be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. Costs against appellee. DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS October 9, 1997 GRN 113447. 280 SCRA 400 PANGANIBAN, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts "At about 2: 10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen f

rom the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini Street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan C ity Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez AasdrivingaTarnaraw vehicle which was the officia l car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made be cause of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of' the Ka lookan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from th eir vehicle. They then chanced Upon a male person in front of the cemetery who a ppeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the police men, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could s ee what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allo wed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and e xamined it. He found Suspected Crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wal let and its marijuana contents. The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalo okan City Police Headquarters Lind was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong fo r investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscate d wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accu sed ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON. Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat, Es piritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote 'Evidence 'A' 4/11/88 Alain Manalili.' The white sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit 'E-3'. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of fold ed paper. (Exhibit 'E-4'). Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forens ic Chemistry Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana res idue (Exhibit 'D'). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit 'A'). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referra l slip (Exhibit 'D') to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including th e subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit 'D'. The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referra l slip and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit 'D'. It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical exami nations of the specimen which she identified. (Exhibit 'E')13 Mrs. Pascual refer red to the subject specimen as 'crushed marijuana leaves' in her Certification d ated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit 'F').14 These crushed marijuana leaves gave positiv e results for marijuana, according to the Certificate. Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specime n. In this examination, she also found that the 'crushed marijuana leaves' gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her examinat ions (Exhibit 'G'), After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the sp ecimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit 'E'). She then wrote i dentification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit 'E-1'). Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit 'F' from the NB I Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamon dong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Ex

hibit 'C') On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tri cycle but was walking in front of the cemetery when he was apprehended. ISSUE Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in Ruling that the guilt of the accused had been proved (be yond) reasonable doubt. RULING The petition has no merit. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark ca se of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designati on of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed duri ng their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a po pular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the AntiNarcot ics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristi c of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession. Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that peti tioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A val id waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unre asonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish t he right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption agains t waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the fai lure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation befo re the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinar y appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised be low cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFIC ATION.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUBEN MONTILLA January 30, 1998. GRN 123872 . 285 SCRA 703

REGALADO, J. Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the RTC Dasmarias, Cavite, Br.90 FACTS That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality o f Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and del iver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered pro hibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damag e and prejudice to the public interest. The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of no t guilty from appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte. Trial was held on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extrem e penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amo unt of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings. It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended a t around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Sali tran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, bot h members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmarias. Ap pellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bri cks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos. These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer i n the arrest of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, ha d informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a d rug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of mari juana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the app ellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place. Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He c laimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any lugg age. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier o ffered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he w ould return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted b y SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran. He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated app ellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reported ly worked as a supervisor, although, as the trial court observed, she never pres ented any document to prove her alleged employment. ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant is valid? RULING Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a sea rch and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial war rant, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the mea

ning of said constitutional provision. Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being t he proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This ex clusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) c ustoms searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in pl ain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) "stop and frisk" measures 18 have been invariably recognized as the tra ditional exceptions. A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the a rresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offe nder (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commi ssion of an offense. On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as o ne in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the fact s of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and circumstance s which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclu de as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand b y pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and car ton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized tha t he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking p air of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, int roduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the con tents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cu rsory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, witho ut bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage t o their headquarters for questioning. Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-gr ounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality tha t appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohi bited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was ca ught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings wit hout the requisite warrant were both justified. Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evi dence. To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselv es as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resig ned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conduct ed upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in th e second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV,

if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense i n said section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maxi mum penalty shall be imposed. 32 While the minority or the death of the victim w ill increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute ge neric aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition o f the single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either o f such factual features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the graduatio n of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic r ules in Article 63 of the Code govern. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cav ite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-ap pellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE March 28, 1996 GRN 104386. 255 SCRA 238 PANGANIBAN, J.: Nature of the Case: Special action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. FACTS This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by t he Solicitor General to set aside the order of the respondent Judge dismissing C riminal Case No. Q-91-17782, on the ground that the prosecution was not prepared for the first scheduled hearing of the case due to the non-availability of its witness who was out of town on official business. "That on or about the 10th day of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines and wi

thin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with mal icious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of one DEMOCRITO T. MENDOZA, a well-known labor leader in Cebu and with the malicious intent of i njuring and exposing said Democrito T. Mendoza to public hatred, contempt and ri dicule, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused (sic) to be published in Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philip pines based in Cebu City an article. On May 3, 1991, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of Crimin al Case No. Q91-17782 was scheduled for July 29, 1991.2 Three days before said scheduled hearing or on July 26, 199 1, private prosecuto r Amado A. Caballero filed an urgent motion for postponement,3 citing as ground therefor, the fact that the complainant, Atty. Democrito T. Mendoza, "would stil l be out of town during said date for the reason that he would be in Cebu City t o attend to the strike of some workers in some firms in Cebu City and his person al presence thereat is very necessary." Since said witness "would be out of the country during the month of August 1991 to attend to some official transaction relative to the International Labor Movement" and would be back during the first week of September 1991, private prosecutor prayed that the scheduled hearing be reset to a later day, preferably on September 9 or 13, 1991 at 8:30 a.m. Only t he City Prosecutor of Quezon City was furnished a copy of this motion. Also on July 26, 1991, private respondent, through Atty. Lorenda Estrella-Amion of the Public Attorney's Office, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the groun d that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense.4 Invok ing Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons5 holding it not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed but that a t hird person must be able to identify the complainant as the object of the libelo us publication, private respondent claimed that the Information did not identify the person allegedly alluded to in the article and neither did it state that a third person could identify said Democrito T. Mendoza as the object thereof. Pri vate respondent stressed that he did not write the article nor cause its publica tion, and never had the intention to publish the same. The Office of the City Pr osecutor was duly served a copy of this motion. On July 29, 1991, the day of the scheduled hearing, private prosecutor manifeste d in open court that he had filed an urgent motion for postponement, and moved f or the cancellation of hearing for that day due to the unavailability of the pro secution witness. The public prosecutor did not object to the postponement. On the other hand, the defense manifested that it had filed a motion to dismiss. The respondent Judge then issued in open court the following Order6 now being assailed: The private prosecutor filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of said Or der, stating that the prosecution had no opportunity to file an objection to the motion to dismiss as it was served a copy thereof only on the day of hearing it self. He insisted that the court should have considered as valid the reason for the absence of the prosecution's principal witness, as his presence in Cebu City was duly certified to by the Officer-in-Charge of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. On August 7, 1991, the trial court gave the defense five (5) days from notice wi thin which "to file a comment to the motion for reconsideration furnishing copy to the opposing counsel who shall have five (5) days to file a reply, after whi ch the matter shall be deemed submitted . ISSUES: Whether or not the grant of the prosecution's motion for postponement have viola

ted the accused's right to a speedy trial Whether or not would the reversal of the trial court's assailed Orders place th e accused in double jeopardy? RULING To be perfectly clear, we restate the general rule: motions for postponement are granted only upon meritorious grounds and no party has the right to assume that his motion will be granted. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to "the sound discretion of the court, (which) should always be predi cated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served th ereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our proc edural system of dispensing justice."15 Thus, when no substantial rights are aff ected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the corresponding motion to tr ansfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretio n to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilat ed. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be inter fered with either by mandamus or appeal. While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of R ule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judic ial cognizance,17 this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application o f the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technica lities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as m uch as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. As this Co urt held in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals "an order of the court granting the mot ion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service t hereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings x x x (which) cannot depriv e a competent court of jurisdiction over the case." In the case at bench, the postponement of the July 29, 1991 hearing was the very first one ever requested by the private prosecutor. And it was for a valid reas on: the principal prosecution witness, a labor lawyer, had to be in Cebu City to attend a conciliation meeting concerning a strike/picket. Such reason is likewi se easily verifiable, and as already mentioned, was in fact certified to in writ ing by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board's officerin-charge in Cebu City. There being no showing that any substantial right of the accused would hav e been unduly prejudiced by the postponement, respondent Judge should have grant ed the motion to afford the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case . As it is, his precipitate dismissal of the case is tantamount to denying the S tate due process. In People vs. Navarro20 this Court held that: The right of an accused to speedy trial is not violated by the mere postponement of scheduled hearings of the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accuse d to speedy trial. The right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution its day in court.21 As held in Gonzales vs. Sand iganbayan: x x x (T)he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy tr ial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capri cious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are ask ed for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally appl icable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been deni ed his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matte r, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, a

nd such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's as sertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered." Anent private respondent's claim that a reopening of the case would place him in double jeopardy, this Court previously ruled in Tampal that: "x x x The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy mus t have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been valid ly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first. Legal jeopardy attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) befor e a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been enter ed, and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismi ssed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. (italic s supplied) In the instant case, the termination of the case was precisely sought by accused (private respondent) through his motion to dismiss. In any event, private respondent's right to speedy trial not having been violate d, he cannot invoke the right against double jeopardy: "It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal o f cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be s tressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of th e accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at ben ch considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy."23 (italics supplied) In sum, it must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entit led to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system -as a whole and caused unc alled for delays in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, t he precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing the burden of t he accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically enough, unnecessarily delayed the case - in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought t o avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, The Order of J uly 29, 1991 as well as the Order of November 5, 1991 dismissing Criminal Case N o. Q-91-17782 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered to proceed with the trial and resolution of the case with judicious and deliber ate dispatch, with a stern warning to avoid similar unjustified and unwarranted dismissals in the future.

Malaluan vs. COMELEC March 6, 1996 G.R. 120193. 254 SCRA 397 HERMOSISIMA, Jr.: Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. FACTS Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both may oralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synch ronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Private respondent Jo seph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor. On May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Co urt contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The t rial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the cou rt found private respondent liable not only for Malaluan s protest expenses but al so for moral and exemplary damages and attorney s fees. On February 3, 1994, priva te respondent appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC. on February 4, 1 994, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was gran ted by the trial court. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of Kid apawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office. S uch exercise was not for long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse t o Malaluan s continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato , the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan t o vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private responde nt to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en b anc affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 19 95 as a consequence. ISSUE Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforeci ted damages in favor of private respondent. RULING YES. The COMELEC found the election protest filed by the petitioner to be clearl y unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested ballots yielded result s contrary to those of the trial court. Assuming, ex gratia argumentis, that thi s is a reasonable observation not without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to conclude a malicious intention on the part of petitioner to molest private resp ondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling of the trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court, after the

filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does not, in the absence of clear proof, make the suit clearly unfounded for which the complainant ought to be penalized. Insofar as the award of protest expenses and attorney s fees are concerned, therefore we find them to have been awarded by res pondent COMELEC without basis, the election protest not having been a clearly un founded one under the aforementioned circumstances. It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has b ecome moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner s right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality because expiration of the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic.

Sarmiento vs. Mison 156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 PADILLA, J: Nature of the Case: Delineation of Constitutional Boundaries. Petition for Prohi bition. FACTS The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of th e Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the responden t Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salarie s and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmatio n of the Commission on Appointments. ISSUE Whether or not Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is

unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

RULING NO. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointm ents, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in thi s Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be au thorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of ot her officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the head s of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effec tive only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. However laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) which were approved during the effecti ity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with t he consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and P D No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that , while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, s uch appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals February 6, 1997 G.R. No. 111682. 194 SCRA 402 MEDIALDEA, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Inj unction and Restraining order to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a deed of sale of four (4) parcels of l and "by feigning and signing the name of Pablo Floro, who could not affix his si gnature anymore due to age infirmity, on the said document as seller and causing it to appear that said Pablo Floro [had] participated in the execution of the s aid document when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, said deed of sale was not executed and signed by the said Pablo Floro, nor did he ever appear before any notary public for the purpose of acknowledging the deed above mentio ned. Upon being arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then followe .

ISSUE Whether the trial court properly held petitioner to have waived the righ t to present evidence because of her failure to proceed despite several postpone ments granted to her.

RULING NO. It was Atty. Tenorio's absences, then, rather than petitioner's, which appea r to be the cause for the defense's failure to present its evidence. Atty. Tenor io's negligence did not consist in error of procedure or even a lapse in strateg y but something as basic as failing to appear in court despite clear warning tha t such failure would amount to waiver of her client's right to present evidence in her defense. Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the negligence of coun sel was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice petitioner 's constitutional right to be heard. The judicial conscience certainly cannot re st easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just bec ause the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. R igid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice whe re justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prov e his innocence of a crime with which he or she might be charged. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 29, 1995 is G ANTED.

Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee November 28, 1975 G.R. No. L-40779. 68 SCRA 277 FERNANDO, J.: Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus. FACTS In summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the s ame course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from readmission in their school; That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither p resent any violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct.

ISSUE Whether petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia possesses such right as to allow her to continue studying at said school and that such right ought to be respected. RULING NO. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeab le in the field, to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness of the need to resp ect freedom of thought on the part of students and scholars. Moreover, it could amount to minimizing the full respect that must be accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by the Constitution "to institutions of higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and universities should be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher, category.

MOY YA LIM YAO vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION October 4, 1971 G.R. No. L-21289. 41 SCRA 292 BARREDO, J.: Nature of the Case: Appeal from a decision of CFI of Manila. FACTS Lau Yuen Yeung was a Hong Kong national who came to visit the Philippines and wa s allowed to stay for 1 month. Upon approved extensions however, she was able to stay for more than one year and later married Moy Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino citize n. The Commissioner of Immigration however, ordered her to leave the Philippines as she was already staying beyond the allowed time. Petitioner Moy Ya Lim Yao t hen filed a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of injunction against the C ommissioner of Immigration as Lau Yuen Yeung is now a Filipino citizen by virtue of marriage, which was denied. They then appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung is a Filipino citizen by virtue of marriage. RULING Under Sec. 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law, a foreign woman who marries a F ilipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen provided she possesses none of the di squalifications for naturalization. The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely repl ies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "h ad (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. T hat she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact t hat at her marriage, she became a citizen. Lau Yuen Yeung, is hereby declared t o have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage.

Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice 5 SCRA 108

Monsanto vs. Factoran Jr. 1990 170 SCRA 190 FERNAN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the resolution of the Deputy Executive Se cretary. FACTS The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (assista nt treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner Monsanto appealed h er conviction which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by the Presi dent Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to the past assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. ISSUE Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position with out need of a new appointment. RULING The Supreme Court held that the pardon does not ipso facto restore convi cted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of such conviction. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part o f the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsificat ion of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public past, the facts constituting her o ffenses must and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimat ely whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. The pardon grante d to petitioner has resulted in remaining her disqualification from holding publ ic employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former past as assista nt city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission 1991 196 SCRA 69 GUTIERREZ, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari to review the resolution of the CSC. FACTS The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Ri zal was left vacant. In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed D irector Reynaldo Abella of the Department if Budget and Management (DBM) Regio n IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 p ursuant to a memorandum issued by the petitioner. In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, th en Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private res pondent Cecilia Almajase as PBO of Rizal as the basis of comparative study of al l Municipal Budget officers of the said province which included three names of t he petitioner. On August 1, 1988 DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabinguit Jr. sig ned the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the af orestated recommendation of Abella.

In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Corague, the petitioner rei erated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested petiti on unaware of the earliest appointment made by Secretary Cabuguit. ISSUE Whether or not the Department Head free to appoint anyone he foresees i n the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person. RULING The Supreme Court ruled that the Department of Budget and Managemen t may appoint provincial budget officers only from the list of qualified recomm endies nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements a nd ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualificati on as enunciated in EO# 112 Sec 1. The PBO is expected to synchronize his work w ith DBM. Provincial and Municipal Budgets are prepared at the local level and af ter completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. It is for thi s reason that there should be genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, a ha rmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for t

he reason that the nomination and appointment involves a sharing of power betwee n the two levels of government. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which t hese provisions are based. The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajase is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officerof Rizal among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor.

USA vs. Ruiz May 22, 1985. G.R. No. L- 35645. 136 SCRA 487 ABAD SANTOS, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition to review the orders of the CFI of Rizal Br. XV, Ru iz, J. FACTS The United States invited bids for the repair of the military base in Subic. Res pondent who submitted a bid was asked to confirm the price proposals and to subm it the name of its bonding company. Respondent complied with the request. Later on the projects were awarded to another. Respondent sued the US for specific per formance on the ground that the request was an acceptance pursuant to the biding practices of US. ISSUE

Whether or not the US may be sued in the case at bar. HELD The US is immune from suit without its consent. While the immunity exten ds only to governmental acts and does not extend to proprietary acts, no tacit c onsent to be sued can be deemed to have been given in this case. The contracts r elate to the exercise of the sovereign functions of the US. The projects were in tegral parts of the naval bases devoted to the defense of the US and RP.

USA vs. Guinto February 26, 1990 182 SCRA 644 CRUZ, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Inj unction to review the decision of RTC, Angeles City Br.62. FACTS The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contract s for barbering services in the said base. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for pre liminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against t he USA which had not waived its non-suitability. The individual defendants as of ficials or employees of the US Air Force were also immune from suit. ISSUE Whether or not petitioners are immune from suit. HELD: There is no question that the USA, like any other state will be deemed to have i mpliedly waived its non-suitability if it has entered into a contract in its pro prietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract undue its sovereign o r governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. The barbershops subj ect of the concessions granted by the US government are commercial enterprises o perated by private persons. The petitioner cannot plead any immunity from the co mplaint filed by the private respondents.

Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. September 30, 1954 103 PHIL. 473 PARAS, J.: Nature of the Case: Appeal from an Order of the CFI of Manila. FACTS Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had been repossessed by the Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquire d by the government, following the original purchaser, Fernando Froilan s, default in his payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for the said vessel . Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the vessel and paid the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its opti on to purchase, pursuant to a bareboat charter contract entered between said com pany and the Shipping Corporation. The Cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to his rights under the original contract of ale on condition that he shall pay a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining installments due, and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel. Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilan s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping A dministration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Froila n having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Froilan paid the required cash of P10, 000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender posses sion of the vessel, he filed an action for in the CFI of Manila to recover posse ssion thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property.

The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying f r the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon m ay be foreclosed. ISSUE Whether or not the government s motion to dismiss Pan Oriental counterclai ms may prosper. HELD: Under the circumstances already ad voted to, Pan Oriental cannot be cons idered a possessor in bad faith until after the institution of the instant case. However, since it is not disputed that said appellant is entitled to the refund of such expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been reimburs ed therefore. As it is by the corrected acts of defendant and intervenor Republi c of the Philippines that the appellant ha a lien far his expenses, appellees Fr oilan, Compania Maratma, and the Republic of the Philippines are declared liable for the reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed by la w, with legal interest from the time of disbursement.

AMIGABLE vs. CUENCA FEBRUARY 29, 1972 G.R. No. L-26400. 43 SCRA 360, MAKALINTAL, J.: Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cebu. FACTS Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in the Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the gov ernment used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mongo and Gorordo Avenues. Amigable s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting pa yment of the portion of her lot which has been appropriated by the government. T he claim was disallowed. Amigable then filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu fo r the recovery of ownership and possession of the land traversed by the Mongo an d Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the su m of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the sui t. Said court rendered a decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the p laintiff s cause of action on the ground that the government cannot be sued withou t its consent. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reco

nsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to the Supreme Court, there being no question of fact involve d. ISSUE Whether or not a registered owner of a parcel of land, where the governm ent used to construct avenues without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, ma y properly sue the government. HELD: If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken f or public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from su it cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the tim e, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compens ation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payme nt of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." I f there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because ther e was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to leg al norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public u se, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed a ny deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an act ion to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only rel ief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal i nterest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for at torney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hear ing.

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION vs. CIR July 25, 1975 65 SCRA 416 FERNANDO, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari from an order of the CIR. FACTS On December 20, 1966, private respondents filed with respondent Court a petitio n wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in e xcess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Petition er Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denied the allegations and raised the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation o f Commonwealth Act No. 444. After the parties submitted the case for decision, t he then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and direct ing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. There was a moti on for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. Hence, thi s petition for certiorari. ISSUE Whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges g overnmental and not proprietary functions. HELD: A reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporation suffices to demons trate the merit of petitioner's plea that it performs governmental and not propr ietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, its purpos es and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective merchandisi ng of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establis h and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its m anufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, estab lish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so tha t the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their in vestments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classif ying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and econ omic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry." The amendatory s tatute, Republic Act No. 4155, renders even more evident its nature as a governm ental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: "It is decla red to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco indust ry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities neede d and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establis h this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate con ducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the qualit

y of locally manufactured cigarettes." The objectives are set forth thus: "To at tain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financ ing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administ ration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the be st obtainable prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia tobac co industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virgini a leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of on e kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration."

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. CEBU CITY NOVEMBER 5, 1992 215 SCRA 382 Bellosillo, J. Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the then CFI of Manila, Br. 22. FACTS Proclamation No. 430 was issued reserving Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of Cebu City, for warehousing purposes under the administration of National Ware housing Corporation (NWC). Subsequently, a warehouse was constructed thereon. On October 4, 1947, E.O. 93 dissolved NWC with NDC, a government-owned or controll ed corporation (GOCC), taking over its assets and functions. Commencing 1948, Ce bu City (CEBU) assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the land and the warehouse thereon. NDC wrote the City Assessor demanding full refund of the real estate taxes paid to CEBU claiming that the land and the warehouse standin g thereon belonged to the Republic and therefore exempt from taxation. CEBU did not acquiesce in the demand; hence, the present suit filed 25 October 1972 in th e Court of First Instance of Manila, which ruled in favor of NDC. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which however certified the case to the Suprem e Court as one involving pure questions of law. ISSUE Is a public land reserved by the President for warehousing purposes in favor of a government-owned or controlled corporation, as well as the warehouse subsequen tly erected thereon, exempt from real property tax?

HELD: To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law, it is important to establish that the property is owned by the g overnment or its unincorporated agency, and once government ownership is determi ned, the nature of the use of the property, whether for proprietary or sovereign purposes, becomes immaterial. What appears to have been ceded to NWC (later tra nsferred to NDC) is merely the administration of the property while the governme nt retains ownership of what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes under Proclamation No. 430. However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a public reservation, a different rule should apply because "the exemption of publ ic property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public lands ma de by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or occupants, at their o wn expense, and these are taxable by the state." Consequently, the warehouse co nstructed on the reserved land by NWC (now under administration by NDC), indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as such improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic. Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous tax payments coll ected by CEBU should be refunded to NDC. This is in consonance with Sec. 40, par . (a) of the former Real Property Tax Code which exempted from taxation real pro perty owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisi ons, as well as any GOCC so exempt by its charter.

MELO vs. PEOPLE March 22, 1950 85 PHIL 766 Moran, C.J. Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

FACTS Petitioner was charged in the CFI with frustrated murder, for having allegedly i nflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill. Sev eral serious wounds on different parts of the body. On December 29, 1949, at 8 i n the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10: 15 in the evening of the same day Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the next day, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. Melo filed a motion to quash alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied b y respondent court, hence, the instant petition. ISSUE Whether or not the amended information was rightly allowed to stand. HELD: The rule is that where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for whi ch the defendant is responsible, which changes their character of the offense an d together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct o ffense. The accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Hence, the amended information was rightly allowed to stand.

CUISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS April 15,1998 289 SCRA 159 Panganiban, J. Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS Respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554 finding accu sed Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable dou bt and therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each offense, with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Ac cused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30 ,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsi diary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was i ncreased to P50,000.00. The Supreme Court denied accused s petition for review. T he case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for prom ulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated on April 4, 199

5 the decision of the Court of Appeals only with respect to the modified civil l iability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence servi ce of his sentence. The Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. Re spondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, how ever, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the ground to pursue with the scheduled promulgation will violate the accused s constitutional right against jeo pardy. In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the af orestated motion. ISSUE Whether petitioner s right against double jeopardy was violated. HELD: To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy m ust have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same o ffense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a f rustration thereof. And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictm ent; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a val id plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise termin ated without the express consent of the accused. As a rule, a criminal prosecuti on includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in s uch case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an ac cused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal. As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substa ntially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases have n ot yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.

ELEUTERIO C. PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS November 29, 1988 G.R. No. L-80838. 168 SCRA 236 CORTES,J.: Nature of the Case: FACTS On October 21, 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against E leuterio Perez for Consented Abduction. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. On June 28, 1980 a judgment of conviction was rendered ag ainst Perez. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of th e crime of Consented Abduction. Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal complainan t Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 198 3, this time for Qualified Seduction. Petitioner Perez filed a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy. ISSUE Whether or not double jeopardy exists for two distinct offenses punishab le separately by law. RULING No. The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy o f punishment for the same offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973 Constitution , Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The term "same offense" means i dentical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense ch arged in the former complaint or information. However, the plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they ma y appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection agai nst double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offens e. A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated p rovisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or e lement which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of th e information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewi se, where two different laws or articles of the same code define two crimes, pri or jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, alth ough both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some import ant act which is not an essential element of the other. An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy. There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements differen tiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common element s, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her con sent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an informat ion for Qualified Seduction also requires that: (1) the crime be committed by ab use of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual i ntercourse with the woman.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. vs . THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA July 31, 1967 G.R. No. L-24693 CORTES, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by the petitio ners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, H otel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general mana ger of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty t o enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was then alleged t hat the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approv ed by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. In the answer filed, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regard ing the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or con stitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a c ause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of t he police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty again st self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary i njunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolut ion and the dismissal of the petition.

The lower court declared the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void and made permanent the prelimina ry injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him fr om enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal. ISSUE Whether or not challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitu tional and violates due process of law. RULING No. It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinan ce is void on its face which is not the case here. On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primaril y rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasize d, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, g ood order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties and the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, libert y or property of any person are subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or un reasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable const itutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. Due process is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dicta tes of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoide d. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardoz o, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due proc ess is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Cor rectly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodimen t of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for ju stice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of rea son drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions o f legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on s uch a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principl es of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or p edantically in slavery to form or phrases. Considering the foregoing principles and rules of law, it would thus be an affro nt to reason to stigmatize the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Mani la precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdicat ion of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the C ity of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enac tment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, a nd, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due p rocess requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibilit y to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to sin gle out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailme nt of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness. Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees pr ovided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels but these fees clea

rly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld ins pite rarely been declared unreasonable. Moreover, the fixing amount of the lic ense fees by the municipal corporations is allowed in a much wider discretion in this class of cases and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, court s have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract on the ground that there appears a co rrespondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and th e legislative attempt at correction.

STATE PROSECUTORS vs.JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO September 19, 1994 A.M. No. RTJ-92-876. 236 SCRA 505 PER CURIAM Nature of the Case: Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Ignorance of the Law, Grave Misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01, 3.02 of the Code of J udicial Conduct. FACTS In a letter-complaint dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosec utors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code o f Judicial Conduct, committed as follows: 1. That the respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases o n the basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining t he full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending crimi nal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regu lations previously issued on the matter; 2. That respondent Judge did not even have the prudence of requiring first the comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/ Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the same, there

by denying the Government of its right to due process; and 3. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss th e cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order of the c ourt (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; The respondent judge s order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorar i filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision set ting aside the order of Judge Muro, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-10195 9 to 92-101969 on the ground that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdicti on and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal. ISSUE I. Whether or not judicial notice exists. II. Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. RULING I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts . To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is no t judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judici al knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowl edge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a me re newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twi ce removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange con trols, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation wh ich was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence d ictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effe ctive. The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still i n existent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable de monstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial n otice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not pro per for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued. II. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the e leven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the acc used, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be he ard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indi cative of bad faith and partiality. The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does s uch professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution' s right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of law.

To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusab le negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty that diligen ce, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manife st injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, i n the notorious violation of the legal precept. In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial argument has been advanced in plausible justificatio n of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or even equitable ju stification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation give n is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do n ot speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probity as a j udge. On the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge M anuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS September 26, 1996 G.R. No. 118882. 262 SCRA 452 MELO,J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS Petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction a nd/or restraining order is filed before the Supreme Court, seeking to: (a) annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31733 enti tled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it denied the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the Re gional Trial Court of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 9 3-01-39, respectively, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, e t al." and "People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and b) enjoin respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases. All t he respondents have not yet filed their comments after several notices were sent to them, for verily, delay in the submission of the same would appear to benefi t respondents, and sanction against them may not really amount to much, consider

ing that most of them are under detention. Thus, so as not to unduly delay the d isposition of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, we now resolve to dispen se with respondent's comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petitio n. ISSUE Whether or not the cold neutrality of an impartial judge is an indispensable imp erative of due process

RULING Yes. One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial procee ding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Javier vs. Commission on E lections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), this Court has repeatedly and consistently deman ded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor appro aches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already m ade and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone t he charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings ar e not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions a nd reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to fo reordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evi dence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established fac ts and the pertinent law. In the case at bar, Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serve s as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more pru dent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the cri minal cases. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presidi ng Judge of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stat ioned in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified from taking cognizance of Crim inal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further ordered that these criminal cases be re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Ci ty.

MANGUBAT vs. DE CASTRO July 27, 1988 G.R. No. L-33892. J. Paras, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Police Commission. FACTS On January 11, 1963, a case against Detective Florencio Mangubat, Cebu C ity Police Department for misconduct, dishonesty and/or violation of law was ins tituted by Mayor Carlos J. Quizon of Cebu City with the former Municipal Board o f the city pursuant to RA 557. He was thereafter, temporarily suspended by the M ayor pending the outcome of the investigation and was reinstated 60 days thereaf ter. However, before the case could be decided, the name Municipal Board was cha nged to City Council of the City of Cebu, pursuant to the approval of Charter of Cebu City (R.A. 3857) on June 10, 1964, providing under Section 30 thereof that the Fiscal of the City shall investigate and report to the mayor whenever it is brought to his knowledge that any city officer or employee is guilty of neglect or misconduct in office. The case was forwarded to the Cebu City Fiscal for reinvestigation. On the b asis of the records and testimonies before the Municipal Board (now City Council ) and finding no prima facie evidence, the Assistant City Fiscal, in a resolutio n, recommended the dismissal of the administrative case, affirmed by the City Fi scal and transmitted to the City Mayor on December 14, 1965. Records show that n o appropriate resolution was submitted by the City Fiscal and no such administra tive order was issued by the Mayor. On February 5, 1968, invoking Section 26 of R.A. 4864, the Mayor forwarded the ecords of the case to Jesus E. Zabate, Acting City Treasurer and chairman, Cebu City Board of Investigators requesting that he take cognizance of this case. The case was thereafter forwarded to the Police Commission. Apparently the Chairman of the Board of Investigators, found a formal investigation no longer necessary since the City Fiscal's Office had recommended dismissal of the aforementioned administrative case. On the other hand, the Commission found Mangubat of the Ceb u City Police Department guilty of Grave Misconduct and Violation of Law and was dismissed from the service with prejudice. ISSUE Whether or not the respondent commission violated Petitioner s constitutio nal right to due process. HELD: NO. Petitioner insists that the action of the Police Commission was highly irreg ular when it took over the case and thereafter made its own findings, contrary t o the findings of the City Fiscal acquitting petitioner of the charges, apart fr om the fact that its decision was based on the records which were forwarded by t he Board of Investigators without the latter making its own investigation, and i ts own findings and recommendation. This argument misconceives the meaning of due process. The proceeding provided f or is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order

to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses." Otherwise st ated, where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sus tained. The records show that the case at bar was exhaustively heard both in the Municip al Board and in the Fiscal's Office, with both parties afforded ample opportunit y to adduce their evidence and argue their causes. But as earlier stated, the fi ndings of the Fiscal that there was no prima facie case were not finalized with the requested brief statement of materials and relevant facts on which a conclus ion could be based. Without the requested resolution, the City Mayor was unable to issue the corresponding administrative order. Verily, the respondent Commissi on can not be bound by the findings of the City Fiscal, much less was it prohibi ted from making findings of its own on the basis of the records which both the C ommission and the Board of Investigators considered sufficient for purposes of r endering a decision. Neither was the Board's discretion not to conduct a new inv estigation foreclosed by such findings. Furthermore, apart from the fact that the uniform requirements of due process wer e all complied with under Republic Act No. 557, Republic Act No, 3857 (the Revis ed Charter of Cebu City) and Republic Act No. 4864 by the investigating official s, there is nothing in the records indicative of any act on the part of subject administrative bodies amounting to a deprivation of petitioner's right to admini strative process. At this juncture, the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect but also finality where the decision an d the order of execution issued by public respondents are not tainted with unfai rness or arbitrariness that would amount to abuse of discretion or lack of juris diction deserves reiteration. The findings of fact must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponde rant. Indeed, if the Police Commission were to accede to the suggestion of petitioner that the Board of Investigators be directed to conduct its own investigation and give the parties a chance to present their evidence and not merely rely on the result of the investigation conducted by the Municipal Board and by the City Fis cal's Office, this would be favoring technicalities over substantial justice. Clearly, petitioner was given his "day in court" and there is no occasion to imp ute deprivation of due process. On the contrary, the rendition of the questioned decision by the Police Commission actually promoted and served the interests of justice. In addition, there is no denial of due process if the decision was ren dered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the rec ord and disclosed to the parties affected.

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. NLRC June 13, 1997 G.R. No. 102467. J. Vitug, J.: Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for Certiorari. FACTS Private respondent Ricardo Sadac was appointed, effective 01 August 1981, Vice-Pr esident for the Legal Department of Equitable Banking Corporation. However, onJun e 26, 1989, nine lawyers of the bank's Legal Department, who were all under priv ate respondent, addressed a "letter-petition" to the Chairman of the Board of Di rectors, accusing private respondent of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanage ment, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. The individual written complaints of e ach of the nine lawyers were attached to the "letter-petition." Private responde nt was furnished with a copy of the letter. Private respondent promptly responded and manifested an intention to file crimin al, civil and administrative charges against the nine lawyers. Various alternati ves and avenues to solve the crisis, nothing positive, however, came out of thei r meeting, Convinced that reconciliation was out of the question, A report submi tted a report to the Board of Directors with the findings that abusive conduct, mismanagement and inefficiency, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness are proven an d/or established by the same nature of the evidence. On August 10, 1989, a memorandum was issued to private respondent Sadac informin g him that no formal hearing would there be instituted just to terminate his ser vices, consonant with the due process requirements of the Constitution, the Labo r Code, the Implementing Regulations thereof and other pertinent laws, it has ch osen the more compassionate option ofvoluntary resignation. Private respondent re quested for a full hearing by the Board of Directors. It was stressed by petitio ners that private respondent's services were not terminated by the Board which, instead, was merely exercising its managerial prerogative. Likewise, in order to adhere to the Bank s compassionate policy, a hearing would not anymore be resorte d to. Private then instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal against Petition ers. The Board of Directors after learning of the filing of the complaint adopte d Resolution No. 5803 terminating the services of private respondent "in view of his belligerence" and the Board's "honest belief that the relationship" between private respondent and petitioner bank was one of "client and lawyer." Labor Ar biter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, convinced that the relationship between petitioner bank and private respondent was one of lawyer-client. On app eal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NLRC ruled that privat e respondent was denied the right to due process with the bank's failure to obse rve the twin requirements of notice and hearing. ISSUE Whether or not the dismissal of private respondent is illegal for failure of pe titioner to comply with the procedural requirements of due process.

HELD: YES. Failure to comply with the procedural requirements for terminating one's emp loyment taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, any j udgment reached by management without that compliance can be considered void and inexistent. While it is true that the essence of due process is simply an oppor tunity to be heard or, as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of consultation and conferences su ch as the case here, however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper observ ance of notice and hearing. For having violated private respondent's right to du e process private respondent shall, considering the attendant circumstances part icularly his repeated, but unheeded, request for a hearing, be entitled to an am ount of P5,000.

PALMERA vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION August 4, 1994 G.R. No. 110168. J. Cruz Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a resolution of the Civil Service Com mission. FACTS Rodolfo Palmera started working in the government in 1953 and has held various po sitions in the Ministry of Public Works. On October 1, 1982, upon the merger of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministy of Public Highways, he was appointe d Assistant Regional Director of the National Capital Region (NCR). Palmera then turned over his office to Pacifico Mendoza as directed by DPWH Minister Rogacia no Mercado. On June 26, 1987, Palmera was charged along with several others, with grave misc onduct and dishonesty in two administrative cases and were placed under 90-day p reventive suspension, which was lifted on November 16, 1987. On December 1, 1987 , he was again charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Palmera was again p laced under preventive suspension. All such administrative cases were based on t he recommendation of the DPWH Fact-Finding Committee in an investigation of anom alies in the flood control and related projects in Metro Manila. Its findings we re embodied in a number of separate complaints and information filed with the Of fice of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and the Sandiganbayan, for malversation, esta

fa, falsification and violations of R.A. No. 3019 and P.D. 1759. On May 19, 1988 , Palmera's second preventive suspension was lifted but he was no longer ordered reinstated. The petitioner alleged that it was while he was still under preventive suspensio n that he learned of Pacifico Mendoza's appointment to his position. Palmera sai d he was repeatedly assured he would be appointed to another position but no suc h appointment was ever extended him. Instead, Palmera was hired on a contractual basis for the period from January 1 to December 31, 1987, to provide a legal ba sis for the payment of his salaries. After December 31, 1987, the contract was n ever renewed. On November 21, 1991, Palmera filed with respondent Civil Service Commission a letter-appeal for his reinstatement with full back wages and withou t loss of seniority rights. He also prayed for the nullification of the appointm ent of Mendoza as Assistant Regional Director. The Commission found the contract of employment issued to Palmera to be violativ e of the Civil Service Law and Rules. Nevertheless, it dismissed the appeal main ly on the ground of laches mainly because of failure to contest the issuance of the contract and his non-reinstatement within a reasonable period, thus renderin g the appeal moot and academic. ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner s constitutional right to security of tenure was vio lated when he was held guilty of laches. HELD: YES. It is not disputed that the petitioner has the constitutional right to secu rity of tenure P.D. 807 specifically includes the position of Assistant Regional Director in the Career Executive Service. The career service is characterized b y (1)entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications;(2) oppo rtunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure. Security of tenure means that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall b e suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due proce ss. In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding the herein petitioner's ac ceptance of the temporary appointment evidences that Palmera had no intention to abandon his permanent position and his security of tenure therein. The petition er had been working in the government for about 34 years. It cannot be reasonabl y supposed that by signing the contract, he was knowingly relinquishing his perm anent post and all big concomitant rights, including his accrued leave benefits. Furthermore, the petitioner was already getting on in years and could not affor d to face an uncertain future without a regular and steady income. It can be inf erred that Palmera did not seek to be appointed as Technical Assistant to the Se cretary. He was not informed of the real objective of contract. He was made to u nderstand that the contract was merely for the sake of formality, to give some l egal basis for his compensation for 1987. Furthermore, a public office may become vacant by abandonment, In order to const itute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as cl early to indicate an absolute relinquishment. Temporary absence is not sufficien t. There must be an intention, actual or imputed to abandon the office. The Comm ission itself has held that the contract of service entered into by the petition er and DPWH officials was null and void for being contrary to law and public pol icy, A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into, and which cannot be valid ated either by time or by ratification. Hence, the subject contract cannot be us ed as basis for the claim that the petitioner abandoned his post as Assistant Re gional Director.

In addition, the doctrine of laches is an equitable principle applied to promote but never to defeat justice. Thus, where laches is invoked against a plaintiff by reason of the latter's failure to come to court within the statutory period p rovided in the law, the doctrine of laches will not be taken against him where t he defendant is shown to have promised from time to time to grant the relief sou ght for. Section 24 (d) of P.D. 807 provides: Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career servic e and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom ma y be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified. It fo llows that the petitioner should be immediately reinstated to his former positio n or appointed to another position of equivalent rank and compensation.

LUMANTA vs. NLRC February 8, 1989 G.R.No. 82819 J. FELICIANO Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC FACTS On March 20, 1987, Luz Lumanta, joined by 54 other retrenched employees, filed a n original complaint for unpaid retrenchment or separation pay against private r espondent Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) with the Department of Labor and Employment. Private respondent FTI argued that being a government-owned and controlled corp oration, its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law not by the Labor Co de, and that claims arising from employment fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Department of Labor and Employment. The pet itioners, on the other hand, contended that although FTI is a corporation owned and controlled by the government, it has still the marks of a private corporatio

n - it directly hires its employees without seeking approval from the Civil Serv ice Commission and its personnel are covered by the Social Security System and n ot the Government Service Insurance System. Petitioners also argued that being a government owned and controlled corporation without original charter, private r espondent FTI clearly falls outside the scope of the civil service as marked out in Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. d. ISSUE Whether or not a labor law claim against a government-owned and controlled corpo ration, such as private respondent FTI, falls within the jurisdiction of the Dep artment of Labor and Employment. HELD: NO. The pleadings show that FTI was previously a privately owned enterprise, cre ated and organized under the general incorporation law, with the corporate name "Greater Manila Food Terminal Market, Inc." The record does not indicate the pre cise amount of the capital stock of FTI that is owned by the government; the pet itioners' claim, and this has not been disputed, that FTI is not hundred percent (100%) government-owned and that it has some private shareholders. As provided under Article IX-B, Section 2 [1]) of the 1987 Constitution which to ok effect on February 2, 1987 - The civil service embraces all branches, subdivi sions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-o wned or controlled corporations with original charter. It is concluded that beca use respondent FTI is government-owned and controlled corporation without origin al charter, it is the Department of Labor and Employment, and not the Civil Serv ice Commission, which has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from employment of the petitioners with private respondent FTI, and that consequently, the terms and conditions of such employment are governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Public respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in dismiss ing petitioners' complaint. Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the De cision of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further appropriate proceedings. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. NLRC affirme

BENGZON vs. DRILON April 15, 1992. G.R.No. 103524. Guttierez Jr., J.: Nature of the Case: Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1999. FACTS On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No. 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pen sions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals, who have ren dered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) ye ars or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the sa lary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. President Marcos issued PD 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing Section 3-A of Repu blic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of t he retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. PD 1909 was also issued provid ing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Force s who have retired prior to September 10, 1979. While the adjustment of the reti rement passions for the Armed Forces whonumber in the tens of thousands was resto red, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not. Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of RA 1797 and RA 3595. Congress was under the impression that PD 644 became law after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explana tory note of HB 16297 and SB 740, the legislature saw the need to reenact RA 179 7 and 3595 to restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Jus tices and members of the Constitutional Commissions in order to assure those ser ving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions adequ ate old age pensions even during the time when the purchasing power of the peso has been diminished substantially by worldwide recession or inflation. President Aquino, however vetoed HB 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that it would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensatio n as articulated in RA 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Ac t of 1989. Further, the Government should not grant distinct privileges to selec t group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service ser vants. ISSUE Whether or not the veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separat ion of powers.

HELD: Yes. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the Presiden t, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of g overnment. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the ex ecutive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviol ate what it decrees. As the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the dut y of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of government do not go beyon d their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government its elf or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people. T he act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, i t also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs th e money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill e ven if it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compe lled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remai ning portion of the same item. In the case at bar, it turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repe aled and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it wa s enforced from 1957 to 1975, so should it be enforced today. House Bill No. 162 97 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away v alidly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1990 did not also produce any effect . Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises. It can be seen that wh en the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Ac t, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond he r power to accomplish. Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Re public Act No. 1797 never achieved that purpose because it was not properly publ ished. It never became a law. The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not counte nance as they undermine the principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not wit hin its powers to pass laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpre ting or defining what the law is and whether or not it violates a provision of t he Constitution. As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to ret ired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was amende d by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds necessary to pay the retirement pensions u nder these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every Thus, Congress i ncluded in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the SC Re solution. As long as retirement law remains in the statute book, there is an exi sting obligation on the part of the government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA. Neither may the veto power of the Presid ent be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the Pr

esidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no power to amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal exi sting laws. The President's power is merely to execute the laws as passed by Con gress. There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to dep rive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the cons titutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary. Accordingly, Section 3 Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the Judi ciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be r educed by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year an d, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. The importance of and the need for an independent judiciary cannot be overstressed. It is an a dded guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Electi ons and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collec t fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse s uch sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the di scharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us , the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude . The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the i ndependence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duti es. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their op erations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express ma ndate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the in dependence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitu tional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme C ourt, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their ob jections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that: "Requirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree becaus e their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devo ting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciat ion of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retireme nt gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generos ity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gon e. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did h is task well, and was rewarded for it." For as long as these retired Justices ar e entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can not dep rive them of their vested right to the payment of their pension. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subs isting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursu ant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensi ons as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM February 3, 1997 G.R. No. 122156. 267 SCRA 408. BELLOSILLO, J.: Nature of the Case: Special Civil action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and M andamus. FACTS The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i. e., in the gra nt of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and pa trimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 5 1% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporat ion (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain t hat the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Const itution The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) , pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Procl amation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC The winning bidde r. or the eventual "strategic partner." is to provide management expertise and/o r an international marketing, reservation system, and financial support to stren

gthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel, In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation. a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51 % of t he MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of s hares at P44.00 per share. or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partne r and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respon dent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tend ered by Renong Berhad 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos ( P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x 5which respondent GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded th e tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad. petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a tempora ry restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. ISSUES: (1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self -executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect; (2) Assuming Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is selfexecuting, whether th e controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation; (3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement S ection 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution; (4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to 'petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a f oreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Co rporation; (5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Re nong Berhad, a foreign corporation. RULING Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundati on and general framework of the law and government.5 As a rule, its provisions a re deemed selfexecuting and can be enforced without further legislative action.6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate la ws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing. To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is selfexecuting i s a hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamenta l law oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made t o find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itse lf as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enf orcement. The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of th e provision in question. Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as selfexecuting, r ather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement.10 The reason i s not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the m

andate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ign ored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyieldi ng rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but co ngressional inaction should not suffocate them. Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial investiga tion, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-incrimination. It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate co nstitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional pr ovisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use without ju st compensation. Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into ef fect.19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our Const itution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as mere statements of principles of the State.20 We have also rule d that some provisions of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports''can not be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addresse d to the discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for legislatio n23 to effectuate their policy content. Guided by this map of settled Jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is selfexecuting or not. It reads: "Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning a gency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippin es or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encou rage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and prioriti es." The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipinoowned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and priv ileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also dir ects the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals a nd well-set priorities. The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, th ere is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting.foreign owne rship in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the format ion and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right b y means of legislation. Parenthetically. this paragraph was plucked from Section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.27 The provision in the 1973 Constituti on affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez,28 where we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of

investments.29 By reenacting the 1973 provision. the first paragraph of Sectio n 10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos. The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed t o the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branch es of our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the nationa l economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdic tion" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privi leges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not sugge st that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Decl aration of Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that ''[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.'' It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy i n our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-pause in time. The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila H otel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertaine d the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony " refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritag e of our race.By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the cover age of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified F ilipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The unique val ue of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Be th Day Romulo,31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel b uilt by the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing thro ugh, Manila while travelling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino cr aftsmanship were utilized in its construction. For sometime, it was exclusively used by American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Jap anese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the hi ghest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that t he Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war , the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and king s, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports c elebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conv entions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetin gs, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and conti nues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and trave l award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity . These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind. The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursu ant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patr imony. Republic Act No. 486, 'The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protectio n Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may b e classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property." 32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 3 74 in 1974, the law is limite d in its reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultur

al treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation." The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-own ed and controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the government.33 The funds are held i n trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently.34 They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefit s of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS.3 5 Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventur es for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus contended that the GSIS' inves tment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an ac t beyond the contemplation of Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Cons titution. The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It i s essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original c harter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civi l Service Commission37and the Commission on Audit.38 As a state-owned and contr olled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the pe ople. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevat ed as a constitutional command. The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase "qualified Fi lipinos" and their "preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down fle xible policies and principles which can be bent to meet today's manifest needs a nd tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity c an grow as a living constitution.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR. February 11, 1999 GRN 130906. 96 PHIL 770 DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Nature of the Case: Original action in the Supreme Court. Quo Warranto. FACTS On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate o f Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of the then Court of First Instance of Albay, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1113 of the C adastral Survey of Legazpi, G.L. Cad. Rec. No. 88, containing an area of fifty e ight thousand and twenty six square meters (58,026), more or less, situated in L egazpi City.

The plaintiff seeks to judicially declare the transfer certificate of titles des cribed in the preceding paragraphs null and void; to order the said defendants t o surrender the owner's duplicate of their aforesaid titles to the Register of D eeds of Legazpi City and directing [sic] the latter to cancel them as well as th e originals thereof and to declare the reversion of the lots covered by the afor esaid titles to the mass of the public domain. In support of its stand, the plaintiff contends among others that on letter requ est addressed to the Honorable Solicitor General dated March 20, 1994, residents of Purok No. 1 and Bgy. 24 Legazpi City, represented by Antonio F. Aguilar, req uested that Original Certificate of Title No. 408 (500) in the name of Elias Imp erial be cancelled and the land covered thereby reverted back to the State on th e ground that the land subject thereof is a foreshore land. Subsequent investiga tion conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Re gion V, Legazpi City, upon the request of the Office of the Solicitor General (O SG) disclosed that OCT No. 408 (500), from whence the transfer certificate of ti tles of the defendants were derived it null and void, and was, thus, acquired to the prejudice of the State, considering that: a. the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) has the features of a foresh ore land; b. natural ground plants such as mangroves and nipas thrive on certain portions of the land in question; c. some portions of the same land are permanently submerged in seawater even at low tide; d. some portions of the same land are not anymore inundated by seawater due to the considerable amount of improvements built thereon and the placing of boulder s and other land-filling materials by the actual residents therein. The plaintiff alleged that consequently on the basis of said findings, the Direc tor, Lands Management Bureau recommended to the Director, Lands services, DENR, the cancellation of OCT No. 406 [sic] (500) as well as its derivative titles thr ough appropriate proceedings. The plaintiff contended that since the land in question is foreshore land, the s ame cannot be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, now F.D. No. 1529) in the name of private persons since it is non-alienable and belongs t o the public domain, administered and managed by the State for the benefit of th e general public. The plaintiff further contended that under Public Land Act No. 141, as amended, such land shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwis e as soon as the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, now DENR, shall declare that the same are not necessary f or public services and are open to disposition. Within the time for pleading, defendants EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest of the defe ndants, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Jr., Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial an d Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. The aforesaid motion to dismiss was anchored on the following grounds: (a) the l ands covered by the defendants' transfer certificate of titles which were derive d from OCT No. 408 (500) was already the subject of the cadastral proceedings in 1917 and which has been implemented by the issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) under the Torrens system. The adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world inclu ding the plaintiff since cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government its elf through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and is a direct and

active participant. OCT No. 408 (500) issued under the Torrens system has long become incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the entry of decree of registration; (b) OCT No. 408 (500) was judicially reconstituted in 1953 in acco rdance with Republic Act [No.] 26 in the then Court of First Instance of Albay, by Jose R. Imperial Samson in Court Case No. RT-305, entitled. The Director of L ands vs. Jose R. Imperial Samson. The proceedings in the judicial reconstitution in said case No. RT-305 is one in rem and has long become final and gave rise t o res judicata and therefore can no longer legally be assailed; (c) the findings of the Director of Lands dated February 22, 1983 [sic] from which no appeal was taken in said administrative investigation that Lot No. 1113, Cd. 27 and a port ion of it covered by Lot No. 1113-M-5 in the name of Jose Baritua cannot be cons idered as part of the shore or foreshore of Albay Gulf. This finding of the Dire ctor of Lands has become final and thus constitute res judicata, and finally mov ing defendants contended that several interrelated cases have been decided relat ed to OCT No. 408 (500), specifically Civil Cases Nos. 6556, 6885, 6999 and 7104 , all of the Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City which have been brought by sever al squatters [sic] family against Jose Baritua attacking the latter's title over Lot No. 1113-M-5 which was derived from OCT No. 408 (500) which cases were all decided in favor of Jose Baritua, hence, the decisions rendered therein have bec ome final and executory and constitute res judicata. The plaintiff through the Office of the Solicitor General filed an objection to the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: (1) the purported decision issued by the Court of First Instance of Albay in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 suppose dly resulting in the issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 does not constitute res judicata to the present case; (2) the incontestable and indisputable character of a Torrens certificate of title does not apply when the land thus covered, like foreshore land, is not capable of registration; (3) a c ertificate of title judicially reconstituted from a void certificate of title is , likewise, void; (4) administrative investigation conducted by the Director of Lands is not a bar to the filing of reversion suits; and (5) the filing of the m otion to dismiss carries with it the admission of the truth of all material fac ts of the complaint. After hearing the motion to dismiss, or on 9 August 1996, the trial court dismis sed the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral cour t in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and our resolution in the petition to quiet title, G .R. No. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. The 1917 cadastral proceeding was binding upon the governmen t, which had initiated the same and had been an active and direct participant th ereon. Likewise, the 1982 petition to cancel OCT No. 408 (500) filed by the clai mants of Lot No. 1113, Cad-47, and resolved by the Director of Lands in his 22 F ebruary 1984 letter5 to the effect that "Original Certificate of Title No. 408 ( 500) 2113 in the name of Elias Imperial and its derivative title[s] were legall y issued" was res judicata to the instant case. Petitioner's contention that the judicially reconstituted certificate of title was void since the land covered b y OCT No. 408 (500) was foreshore land was a mere assumption contrary to existin g physical facts. The court further considered as forum shopping petitioner's at tempt to seek a favorable opinion after it was declared in related cases questio ning the title of a certain Jose Baritua, which was also derived from OCT No. 40 8(500), that the land in question was foreshore. On 28 October 1996, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. On 18 April 1997, the Court of Appeals required petitioner to file its appellant 's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice. Petitioner rece ived said notice ten (10) days later, or on 28 April 1997. Due to the alleged heavy workload of the solicitor assigned to the case, petiti oner moved for an extension of thirty (30) days from 12 June 1997, or until 12 J

uly 1997, within which to file the appellant's brief. The Court of Appeals grant ed petitioner's motion for extension in a resolution dated 26 June 1997. On the same ground of continuing heavy pressure of work, petitioner filed, on 12 July 1997, its second motion for extension of thirty (30) days or until 11 Au gust 1997 within which to file the appellant's brief. On 11 August 1997, petitioner asked for a third extension of thirty (30) days, o r until 10 September 1997, within which to file appellant's brief citing the sam e ground of heavy pressure of work. Meanwhile, on 30 July 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution, the full t ext of which reads: The Office of the Solicitor General is GRANTED a LAST EXTENSION of thirty (30) d ays from July 12, 1997, or until August 11, 1997, within which to file the oppos itor-appellant's brief. Failure to file said brief within the said period will m ean dismissal of the appeal.6 On 12 August 1997, petitioner received a copy of the aforesaid resolution. On 26 August 1997, petitioner moved to reconsider the 30 July 1997 resolution an d, despite the appellate court's warning, reiterated its third motion for extens ion of another thirty (30) days to file the appellant's brief. On 10 September 1997, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion requesting ano ther extension of five (5) days, or until 15 September 1997, within which to fil e appellant's brief, reasoning that the brief, although finalized, was yet to be signed by the Solicitor General. On 15 September 1997, petitioner filed the required appellant's brief. On 29 September 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for recons ideration for lack of merit and sustained its Resolution of 30 July 1997 dismiss ing the case for failure to file the appellant's brief within the extended perio d. ISSUE Whether or not the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands which constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rule s and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's br ief. RULING The rules of court governing practice and procedure were formulated in order to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding without sacrificing substantial justice and equity considerations. The filing of appellant's brief in appeals is not a jurisdictional requirement. Nevertheless, an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its own moti on or on that of the appellee upon failure of the appellant to serve and file th e required number of copies of the brief within the time provided. If the appeal brief cannot be filed on time, extension of time may be allowed pr ovided (1) there is good and sufficient cause, and (2) the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.9 The court's l iberality on extensions notwithstanding, lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension would be granted as a matter of course or for the length of time sought; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exerc ised in accordance with the attendant circumstances. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rul es is discretionary upon the court. The court has the power to relax or suspend

the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so wa rrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. Among the reasons which the co urt allowed in suspending application of the rules on filing an appeal brief wer e the following: (1) the cause for the delay was not entirely attributable to th e fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (2) t here was no objection from the State, and the brief was filed within the period requested; (3) no material injury was suffered by the appellee by reason of the delay in filing the brief; (4) the fake lawyer failed to file the brief; (5) ap pellant was represented by counsel de oficio; (6) petitioner's original counsel died; and (7) the preparation of the consolidated brief involved a comparative s tudy of many exhibits. At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are fo reshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public doma in and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "th at part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the fl ux and reflux of the tides."19 It is also known as "a strip of land that lies be tween the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide." The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of gove rnment, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Manage ment Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by the Secreta ry of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as to question s of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling is tha t the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however, when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR Secre tary. There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director o f Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No. 18655, which stemmed from O CT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."23 Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Lega zpi City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the t itles were derived "has the features of a foreshore land."24 The contradictory v iews of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by th e RTC, cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involv ed. The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficie nt cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an. excep tional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due c ourse. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; the Resolutions of 30 July 1 997 and 29 September 1997 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE; petitioner's ap peal is reinstated; and the instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. U.S. vs. Ruiz Supra at 95.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA August 31, 1977 GRN L-36084. 78 SCRA 470 FERNANDO, Acting C.J.: Nature of the Case: Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibi tion. FACTS The jurisdictional issued raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on beh alf of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition procee ding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of reiterated doctrine o f the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit wi thout its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Admini

stration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collect ion of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff b eing private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.1 Such a motion to dismis s was filed on September 7, 1972. At that time, the leading ease of Mobil Philip pines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Servicewere Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against an y office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government un less consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. There is thus mor e than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdictional infirmity against th e order of respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. 4 What is more, the position of the Republic has been fortified with the explici t affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State ma y not be sued without its consent." ISSUE Whether or not the State may be sued without its consent. RULING The doctrine of nonsuability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the e ffectivity of the [19351 Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist c oncept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal r ight as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all. Even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to enga ge in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to t he analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability . Why it must continue to be so, even if the matter be viewed sociologically, wa s set forth in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic thus: 'Nonetheles s, a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance-of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and th e availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, t he loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could ver y well be imagined.'"It only remains to be added that under the present Constitu tion which, as noted, expressly reaffirmed such a doctrine, the following decisi ons had been rendered: Del Mar v. The Philippine Veterans Administration;8 Repub lic v. Villasor;9 Sayson v. Singson; and Director of the Bureau of Printing v. F rancisco. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administ ration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract wit hin the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise.13 The consent. to be ef fective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute a s pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration Weed to had no binding force on the government. Tha t was clearly beyond the scope of his authority At any rate, Justice Sanchez, in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations,14 was quite categories] as to its "not [being] possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. On the contrar y, by the law of its creation, it is an office directly 'under the Office of the President of the Philippines/'" WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October 4. 1972 denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn Administration nullified and set aside and the petition for prohibition is likewise granted res training respondent Judge from acting on Civil Case No. 79082 pending in his sal

a except for the purpose of ordering its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued on February 8, 1973 by this Court is made pe rmanent except for the above-mentioned purpose of definitely terminating this ca se. Costs against Yellow Bill Freight Lines, Inc. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL vs. UNG SIU SI TEMPLE May 21, 1955 GRN L-6776. 97 PHIL 58 REYES J. B. L., J.: Nature of the Case: Appeal from resolution of the CFI of Manila, Ibanez, J. FACTS The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a d eed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipin o citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unre gistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three tru stees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representati on and in behalf of the latter and its trustees. The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consulta to the IVth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the actio n of the Rizal Register of Deeds. ISSUE Whether or not the transcribed consulta of a deed of donation of a parcel of la nd executed in favor of a religious organization whose founder, trustees and adm inistrator are Chinese citizens should be registered RULING It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religio us organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are all Chi nese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the prov isions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philip pines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for registration.". Not nee ion by satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the do Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisit of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:

"SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name o f other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Isla nds upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable insti tutions. "SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land i n the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; * * *". (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.) and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religi

on clause of our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)]. We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of th e absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions o f Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing tha t,"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qua lified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines",the Con stitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is ther e any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acq uisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporatio ns or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines). The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirem ent is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipin os; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital st ock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricult ural lands would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land ho ldings in this country. We can not ignore the historical fact that complaints ag ainst land holdings of that kind were among the factors that sparked the revolut ion of 1896. As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are b y no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that o ne may not worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unl ess upon land held in fee simple.The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. Resolution appealed from, affirmed.

CARMELO F. LAZATIN vs. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL December 8, 1988 G.R. No. 84297 CORTES, J.: Nature of the Action: Special Civil action for certiorari, and prohibition to r eview the resolutions of House Electoral Tribunal. FACTS Petitioner and private respondent are candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga. Despite Private respondent s objections and suspension of p roclamation of winner, petitioner was proclaimed winner. Private respondent the n filed for petition to declare petitioner s proclamation as void ab initio and to prohibit him from assuming office which was granted by COMELEC. Petitioner the n challenged the said Resolution in the Supreme Court which was granted in his f avor. Private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribuna l (hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46. Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881 ). However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether or not the election protest had been seasonably filed. RULING The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Mem bers of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relati ve to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows f rom the general power granted it by the Constitution. Petition is hereby DISMISS ED.

EVANGELISTA vs. JARENCIO November 27, 1975 G.R. No. L-29274 MARTIN, J.: Nature of the Case: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition wi th preliminary injunction FACTS The President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) and vested in the Agency all the powers of an inve stigating committee including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpo ena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the in vestigation. Petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, is sued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witne ss at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending th erein. Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, cert iorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order an d assailed its legality. Manalastas petition was granted by the judge. Petitioner s then elevated this matter directly to the Supreme Court. ISSUE Whether or not the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to is sue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. RULING An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings who se sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislati ve or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses i n proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fe rnando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue. Th e order of respondent Judge, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and ef fect.

TEODORO CHAVEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS January 31,1987 G.R.Nos.L-49167-70 SANCHEZ, J.: Nature of the Case: Original and Supplementary Petition in Supreme Court. Mandam us and Habeas Corpus. FACTS Carlos Teodoro was hired by Teodoro Chavez as security guard in his fish pond and later was asked to find workers to construct salt beds. Teodoro and his br others then constructed salt beds in the said fishpond and were the ones who mai ntained it for several years. They were however forcibly ejected one day from t heir work and not allowed to return. They then filed a case against Teodoro Chav ez to restore them to possession, maintenance and cultivation of the said salt b eds as they are tenants of Chavez which was granted by the court. Defendants app ealed to the court of Appeals but were denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether or not the Private Respondents are tenants. HELD: Participation of the private respondents in an the phases of farm work in the sa lt bed cultivation of the questioned landholdings leaves no doubt that the tenan cy relationship existing between petitioners and respondents is fully substantia ted by the records. The findings of facts of the trial court which heard, saw an d observed the witnesses testify in Court should not be disturbed on appeal in t he absence of any showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or otherwise mis interpreted some facts or circumstances which when properly weighed and interpre

ted, would justify a reversal of the appealed decision- In the same manner, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are generally binding upon the Supreme Court. Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

MUNICIPALITY OF PAOAY, ET AL. vs. TEODORO MANAOIS, ET AL. June 30, 1950 G.R. No. L-3485. 86 PHIL 629 MONTEMAYOR, J.: Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with Prelim inary Injunction. FACTS The municipal waters of the town of Paoay were divided by the municipality and l eased out to private persons for fishing. One of the lots was leased to Francis co Duque but was later confiscated for his failure to comply with the lease agre ements. The said lot was later leased to Teodoro Manaois. When Manaois tried to enter said lot he was refused entrance by Duque as the latter still assumes own ership over the said lot. Manaois then brought an action against the municipali ty for the recovery of the sum paid by him plus dmages which was decided in his favor. A levy of attachment was then executed. The municipality then filed a p etition for dissolution alleging that the said lots are not subject to levy as t hey are properties for public use, which was denied. Their motion for reconside ration was also denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE Whether or not the properties for public use can be levied. RULING The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, are clearly not subject to execution. In the first place, they do not belong to the municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State. section 2321 of th e Revised Administrative Code reads: 1. SEC. 2321. Grant of fishery. A municipal council shall have authority, for pu rposes of profit, to grant the exclusive privileges of fishery or right to condu ct a fish-breeding ground within any definite portion, or area, of the municipal waters. "Municipal waters", as herein used, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal w aters, include within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownersh ip, but also marine waters include between two lines drawn perpendicular to the general coast line from points where the boundary lines of the municipality touc h the sea at high tide, and third line parallel with the general coast line and distant from it three marine leagues. Where two municipalities are so situated on opposite shores that there is less t han six marine leagues of marine waters between them the third line shall be a l ine equally distant from the opposite shores of the respective municipalities.

The order of the respondent Judge is reversed insofar as it failed to dissolve t he attachment of the fishery lots. In all other respect, said order is hereby af firmed.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. COURT OF APPEALS October 1, 1990 G.R. NOS. 89898. 190 SCRA 206 CORTES, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS Petitioner Municipality of Makati initiated to expropriate the land own ed by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium Inc., et. al, atta ched to the action it filed is the petitioner s certification that it opened an ac count at PNB Buendia Branch, however, after the writ of execution filed by the p rivate respondent was granted by the RTC, petitioner refused to pay on the groun d that the manner of payment should be installment which was opposed by private respondent. Pending resolution of the above motions petitioner filed a Manifestation informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true and lawful o wner of the subject property because a new title for the property has been regis tered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank

Petitioner later admitted that it has two accounts with the PNB Buendia , one was exclusively opened for the payment of said land and the other for sta tutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government which it conte nded as exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner municipality can refuse to effect payment considering that the orders assailed of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount, the fu nds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal government s other statutory obligations, are exempted from exec ution without the proper appropriation required under the law? RULING Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and e xecution, unless otherwise provided by a statute. However, this does not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no other recourse. They may avail of the remedy of mandamus to compel the enacment and and approval of the necessa ry appropriation ordinance anddisbursement of municipal funds therefore. Within the context of the State s inherent power of eminent domain, just compensa tion means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the ow ner but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. W ithout prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property o wner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amo unt necessary to cope with his loss. The State s power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In this case, considering that valuable property has b een taken, the compensation to be paid is fixed and the Municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three years, the Court finds the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compe nsation. Petitioner should immediately pay Phillippine Savings Bank and private responden t the corresponding amount and to submit to the Court a report of its compliance with this Court s order.

LORENZO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH September 1, 1927 G.R. NO. 27484. 50 PHIL. 595 MALCOLM, J.: Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila. FACTS Petitioner who is a counsel for the leper confined at the San Lazaro Hos pital contends that the law authorizing the segregation of lepers found in Artic le XV of Chapter 37 of the Administrative Code Section 1058 is unconstitutional. ISSUE Whether the law authorizing the segregation of the lepers is unconstitut ional. RULING All questions relating to the determination of matters of fact are for t he legislature. If there is probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached , its findings are not subject to judicial review. Debatable questions are for t he legislature to decide. Petitioner should reopen the question to the local legislature who has r egarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized measures to control t he dread scourge.

IN RE: GONZALES April 15, 1988 GRN 8845433, 160 SCRA 771 PER CURIAM Nature of the Case: Review of an Administrative Matter. Resolution. FACTS

 The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Go nzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fer nan a "letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had broug ht this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the imp ortant implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement. The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymo us letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M . Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco agai nst Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco add ressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparen tly filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by M r. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file resp onsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employee s Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention. The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to furnish Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez a copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Admini strative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" i n which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complainan t Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolut ion, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he shoul d not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations ag ainst Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cuenco, the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988 within which to file his Motion for Reconsid eration of the Resolution of this Court of 17 February 1988. On 28 March 1988, M r. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 313 5 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr. Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE Whether or not removal of a member of the Supreme Court is valid, RULING It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involv ed. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from o ffice only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumben cy of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with an y offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penal ty service of which would amount to removal from office. The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988: "There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be d ismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the C onstitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office onl y by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbar ment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the

same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [ 8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commiss ion on Elections (Article XI [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id. and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be m embers of the Philippine Bar." It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immun ity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Ca nons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed befo re such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment un der Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure o f the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be he ld to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) f or any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate procee dings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independe nce and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independenc e is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Cour t would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against th em by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any n umber of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.

Republic vs. Go Bon Lee

1961 1 SCRA 1166

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM LI YAO 1992 G.R. No. L-35947. 214 SCRA 748 ROMERO, J.: Nature of the Case: Appeal from the order of the CFI of Manila, Br.5 FACTS William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, which petition was docketed as Case No. 8225. After several hearings on the petition were held wherein the Office of the Solicitor General, in the representation of the Republ ic of the Philippines appeared, the lower court rendered a decision in his favor .

About fifteen years later, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of natu ralization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained. That h e was not a person of good moral character, having had illicit amorous relations hips with several women other than his lawfully wedded wife, by whom he fathered illegitimate children. In contracting marriage, he used the name Fransisco Li Y ao without prior judicial authority to use the aforesaid first name Francisco, t he same not appearing to be his baptismal name. He was also known and had used t he name and/or alias LI CHAY TOO, JR. before the last World War, and under which name, a trust fund was created for him. He evaded the payment of lawful taxes d ue to the government by under declaration of income as reflected in his income t ax returns for the years 1946-1951. He committed violations of the Constitution and Anti-Dummy laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring real properties by employi ng dummies in the formation of a private domestic corporation, which acquired th e real properties. He made it appear, falsely, in the baptismal certificate of a n illegitimate son he fathered, named William Jose Antonio, that the latter's mo ther is Juanita Tan Ho Ti, his law-mother is another woman. William Li Yao opposed the forgoing motion on July 22, 1971. The lower c ourt, however, without touching on all the grounds upon which the said motion wa s based, relied solely on ground that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawfu l taxes due the government by under declaration of income as reflected in his in come tax returns for the years 1946-1951. William Li Yao filed a motion for reco nsideration on December 29, 1971, which the lower court denied. William LI Yao f iled a notice of appeal to this Court, manifesting that he was appealing from th e order of the lower court dated July 22, 1971, and from the order dated Decembe r 29, 1971. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, petitioner-appe llant Li Yao died. The case has not, however, become moot and academic since its disposition, either way, will have grave implications for the late petitioner-a ppellant's wife and children. ISSUE The issue in this case is whether or not the cancellation of the certifi cate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made by the government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid. RULING The appeal is without merit. It is indisputable that a certificate of na turalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applican t therefore obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certifica te. Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding , the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would support a judgment canceling a certificate of naturalization on the g round of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof. The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the fi nding of evasion of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Se c. 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant c onduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period o f his residence in the Philippines in his relation with constituted government a s well as with the community in which he is living," to strip him of his citizen ship without going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Soli citor General. Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws sh ould be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, t his Court has repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to

meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship.

Philippine Constitution Commission vs. Enriquez 1994 G.R. No. 113105. 235 SCRA 506 QUIASON, J.: Nature of the Case: Petition for review of orders or resolutions of the Executiv e Secretary, Secretary of Budget and Management, National Treasurer, and the Com mission on Audit. FACTS House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized member s of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. The President signed th e bill into law. The Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operat ional Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion all ocated for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Coun trywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for infrastructure, pu rchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities an d credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries." Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Developmen t Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said powe r in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the propos al and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the r epeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Cons titution. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realig n his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category, claimin g that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitut ion. Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Repr esentatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated. While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII o f the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department o

f Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 because under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest funding. The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the P86,323,43 8,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article. Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt se rvice without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose. The Solicitor General counterposed that the Special Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject of an item veto. Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special Provisio n on the ceiling for debt payment is valid, the President cannot automatically a ppropriate funds for debt payment without complying with the conditions for auto matic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967. ISSUE The validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appr opriation bill. RULING Under the Constitution, the spending power belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or a ctivity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as b road as Congress wants it to be. The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastr ucture, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and act ivities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementatio n of the priority projects specified in the law. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify p rojects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 , the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the mem bers of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fu nd was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line wit h other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement the m. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress a re merely recommendatory. The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative. The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, th ere was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the membe rs of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or who ho ld cards for "horse-trading," getting more than their less favored colleagues. T he members of Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who c

ould exercise his veto power to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator. The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President a nd their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project. Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippin es, the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of t he savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are savings a vailable in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of thei r operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education h as tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appr opriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all de partment budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according h ighest priority to education. Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that c an reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inheri ted from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to pr otect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutio nal. The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President m ay not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provis ion in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particu lar appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its op eration to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriat ion to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill. It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appr opriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds ot her than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act o f 1991. Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the d ebt payment policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws s hould be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part o f the legislative process. That is why it is found in Article VI on the Legislat ive Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Con stitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of val idity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof. The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropr iations bill. In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separat e fiscal unit. Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully exe cute the laws. The writ of prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions will be done in contravention of the laws. We reiterate, in order to obv iate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the Special Provis ion of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein requiri ng that "any payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subje ct to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of t he Congress of the Philippines . WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, except with respect to G.R. No. 113105 onl y insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for p ayment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohi biting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators"), which is GRANTED. IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529 Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS: The subject programs were barred from public viewing by the board for at tacking certain doctrines and practices of the Catholic and Protestant religions , but were sustained by the regional trial court, which also prohibited the Boar d from requiring the petitioner to submit its programs to it for previous cleara nce. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, prompting the INC to go to t he Supreme Court for relief. ISSUES: Two basic issues were raised, to wit, whether the Movies and Television Review and Classification Board had the power to review the petitioner s programs and clear them for showing on television and, assuming it had, whether it gravel y abused its discretion in prohibiting their exhibition as x-rated material. RULING: The majority of the Court held for the Board on the first issue but found that it should not have banned the telecast of the programs because th ey did not attack but merely criticized the other religions in the exercise by t he INC of its freedom of _expression and religion. The criticisms did not create a clear and present danger requiring the prior restraint of the state, accordin g to Justice Puno, who was joined by Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Francisc o and Torres, with Chief Justice Narvasa concurring in the result. Justices Padi lla, Melo and Kapunan, while agreeing that the Board had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion, filed strong dissents impugning its censorship powers as vi olative of the Bill of Rights. LORENZO M. TAADA, vs. JUAN C. TUVERA December 29, 1986, G.R. No. L-63915. 146 SCRA 446 Nature of the Case: Resolution FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure o f a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. In the decision of this case, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive port ion as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazett e all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and u

nless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The petitioners move for reconsideration/ clarification of that decision by aski ng where the publication is to be made.. ISSUE: Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to decide the issue beyond the contemplation of the law. RULING: We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Publica tion in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the p rescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Offici al Gazette and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifte en days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legisl ature.