FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

SCOPE
ABRAMS V US, 250 US 616, NOVEMBER 10, 1919 (CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE)

Statement of the Facts: During World War I, a group of Russian immigrants in the United States circulated flyers calling for a strike in
ammunition plants to undermine the war effort. The defendants were indicted for throwing two leaflets out of a New York City window
—one denouncing American troops on Russian soil and the other opposing the war and calling for a halt to weapon production. They
were convicted under the Espionage Act and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Procedural History: The case was brought before the U.S. Supreme Court on writ of error from the District Court for the Southern
District of New York.

Issue and Holding: Does the First Amendment protect speech that aims to undermine the Nation's war effort? No, it does not.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in the case of Abrams v. United
States. The court held that speech seeking to incite sedition, riots, revolution, or undermine wartime efforts is not protected by the First
Amendment. The defendants were prosecuted under the Espionage Act for distributing leaflets with the intent to hinder the U.S.'s
military plans. Justice Holmes dissented, arguing that the leaflets did not pose an immediate danger and that free speech should only
be restricted in cases of imminent harm. This case set a precedent for the clear and present danger test in First Amendment cases.

FREEDOM FROM CENSORSHIP OR PRIOR RESTRAINT

MOVIE CENSORSHIP
GONZALES VS. KATIGBAK, 137 SCRA 717

Facts:

Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of Malaya Films, filed a petition against Maria Kalaw-Katigbak and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C.
Estrada, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television. The issue stemmed from the
classification of the film "KapitsaPatalim" as "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions, by a sub-committee of the Board.
The film contained scenes of erotic dancing, lesbianism, and excessive violence. The Board offered Malaya Films the option to
reclassify the film as "For-General-Patronage" if the objectionable scenes were removed. A motion for reconsideration was filed,
challenging the "For Adults Only" classification. The Board released a decision affirming the sub-committee's ruling and withholding
the issuance of the permit until certain deficiencies were addressed. Gonzales and others filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court on January 10, 1985.

Issue:

Whether the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television has the authority to classify the film "KapitsaPatalim" as "For Adults
Only" and impose conditions to edit the material for a "General patronage" rating.

Held:

The Supreme Court addressed the classification of motion pictures and the power of the Board to impose restrictions. It acknowledged
the significance of films in public perception and expression but recognized that reasonable limitations can be imposed to prevent
substantive harm. The Board's authority is limited to classifying films based on their content. Prior restraint, such as banning an entire
film, is permissible only when there is a clear and present danger to public safety, morals, health, or legitimate public interests. The
Court found an abuse of discretion in classifying a specific film as "For Adults Only" without any deletions, but the abuse did not
warrant significant consideration. Therefore, the Court did not intervene.
FREEDOM FROM SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
CONTENT-BASED AND CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATIONS
CHAVEZ VS. SECRETARY GONZALES, G.R. NO. 168338, FEBRUARY 15, 2008
Facts:

Following the 2004 elections, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye publicly disclosed an audiotape allegedly containing a conversation
between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano of the COMELEC. The conversation was said to have been
recorded through wiretapping. Respondent Secretary Raul Gonzales of the DOJ warned reporters and broadcasting companies in
possession of the tape about potential liability under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. The NTC issued a press release further prohibiting the
dissemination of the tape, stating that broadcasting the information could result in the suspension, revocation, or cancellation of
licenses or authorizations. Petitioner Francisco Chavez filed a petition challenging these acts, alleging violations of freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, and the right to information.

Issue:

Whether the acts of the respondents infringe upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

Held:

The Supreme Court evaluated the restrictions on freedom of speech and expression in this case. The respondents sought to prevent
the airing of a tape recording, citing violations of the anti-wiretapping law. However, the evidence presented was insufficient to meet
the clear and present danger test. The identity of the voices in the recording was unclear, doubts existed about its integrity and
authenticity, and important details regarding the wiretapping act remained unknown. The Court emphasized that not every violation of
the law justifies restricting fundamental rights and that the respondents failed to demonstrate a clear danger to national security.
Therefore, the Court upheld the exercise of free speech and the free press.

TEST OF VALID GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE

A. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE
RUIZ VS. GORDON, 126 SCRA 233

Facts:

Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, filed a petition for mandamus against Richard
Gordon, seeking permission to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle at 1:00 P.M. The respondents, in their
reply, stated that they had received the request for a prayer rally and that the Mayor had announced on multiple occasions his
willingness to grant permits for freedom of speech and assembly. They also mentioned that the permit had been granted to the
petitioner, as reported in a newspaper interview with the Mayor. Based on these facts, the respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, which was granted.

Issue: Can the petition be granted?

Held: No. The petition is dismissed.

Ratio: In considering applications for permits to hold peaceful assemblies, applicants must provide necessary information and submit
applications well in advance. The decision to grant or deny the permit should be based on the clear and present danger test, with an
opportunity for the applicants to be heard if there is an imminent and grave danger. After the decision, applicants have the right to
seek recourse from the appropriate judicial authority. In this case, the petitioner could have avoided the need for mandamus by
verifying the status of their permit request and being present at the licensing authority's office. Failure to do so warrants the
transmission of the decision to the petitioner's address.
DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE
CABANSAG VS. FERNANDEZ, G.R. NO. L-8974, OCTOBER 18, 1957
Facts:

Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyer, Roberto V. Merrera, were found guilty of contempt in Civil Case No. 9564 and fined for their
actions. Cabansag had written a letter requesting a swift resolution of his case to the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission
(PCAC). Geminiana Fernandez, the opposing party, sought to hold Cabansag in contempt for a specific line in the letter. The case
involved the ejectment of Fernandez from a piece of land, and Cabansag's letter expressed frustration over the prolonged delays
caused by tactical maneuvers and the non-transcription of stenographic notes. Atty. Manuel Fernandez, counsel for Geminiana
Fernandez, filed a motion requesting that Cabansag be held in contempt for the alleged scurrilous remark.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner can be held liable for indirect contempt.

Held:

No. The decision is reversed, without costs.

The First Amendment guarantees citizens the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, which is closely tied
to an independent judiciary. Two theoretical formulas, the "clear and present danger" and "dangerous tendency" rules, are used to
determine the boundaries between freedom of expression and judicial independence. The clear and present danger test requires a
high level of seriousness and imminence for speech to be punishable, aiming to prevent disorderly administration of justice. The
dangerous tendency rule recognizes that freedom of speech is not absolute and allows limitations to protect courts against contempt.
In this case, the Court determined that Cabansag's letter did not constitute contempt as it aimed to express legitimate grievances and
seek redress. He was exercising his constitutional right, and therefore, cannot be held in contempt.

BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST

PEOPLE VS. PEREZ, 45 PHIL 599 (1923)

Facts:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, engaged in a discussion about the administration of Governor-General Wood
with Fortunato Lodovice. During the discussion, Perez repeatedly shouted that Filipinos should use a bolo to cut off Wood's head for
killing their independence. He expressed his dissatisfaction with Wood's actions, stating, "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for
cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Perez was
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon for contempt of ministers of the crown or other persons in authority under Article
256 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Issue:

Whether the accused violated Article 256 of the RPC or Section 8 of Act 292.

Ruling:

The court affirms the trial judge's decision that the accused's insulting words violated the law. It clarifies that Article 256 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) remains enforceable, except in specific cases, until decided otherwise by higher authority. However, in this case,
the accused's words fall under the Treason and Sedition Law instead of Article 256. The court emphasizes that the accused's words
did not cause community disturbance and should not restrict freedom of speech, assembly, and petition unless they become seditious.
The court considers an attack on the Governor-General as an attack on Filipino and American sovereignty. It finds the accused's
words seditious and convicts him of violating Section 8 of Act No. 292, sentencing him to imprisonment and payment of costs.
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
B.P. BLG. 880 (PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT OF 1985)
SPEECH AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC FIGURES, AND SUBJECTS OF LEGITIMATE PUBLIC INTEREST
US VS. BUSTOS, G.R. NO. L-12592, MARCH 8, 1918

FACTS:

In 1915, thirty-four residents of Pampanga signed a petition accusing Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, of malfeasance in office and requested his removal. The petition contained specific charges of misconduct
against Punsalan. The case was referred to the Court of First Instance by the Executive Secretary. After a trial, the judge found
Punsalan not guilty and acquitted him. However, criminal charges were filed against the thirty-four residents for libel. The judge found
most of the residents guilty and imposed fines and subsidiary imprisonment on each. The residents appealed the decision, raising
several assignments of error.

ISSUE:

Whether Bustos et al are guilty of libel.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that Bustos et al were not guilty of libel. They were protected by qualified privilege, which is rooted in the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, expression, and the right to petition the government. The court emphasized the
importance of encouraging citizens' honest attempts to improve public service rather than punishing them. Qualified privilege applies
when a communication is made in good faith on a matter of interest or duty, even if it contains defamatory statements. It can still apply
even if the statements are false but made in good faith with probable cause. The court concluded that Bustos et al should be
commended for their efforts and acquitted them of the charges.

FREE SPEECH AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY

AYER PRODUCTION VS. CAPULONG, SUPRA

Facts:

Hal McElroy and Ayer Productions proposed a motion picture called "The Four Day Revolution" depicting the events of the EDSA
revolution. Juan Ponce Enrile refused permission to use his name or reference him in the film for advertising or commercial
purposes. McElroy complied and removed Enrile's name from the script. However, Enrile obtained a temporary restraining order
(TRO), claiming a violation of his right to privacy. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Enrile, prompting an appeal.

Issue:

Whether the production of "The Four Day Revolution" constituted a valid exercise of the petitioners' rights to freedom of speech and
expression, despite the respondent's right to privacy.

Held: The Court ruled that the production and filming of "The Four Day Revolution" did not violate Enrile's right to privacy. The
temporary restraining order (TRO) issued was unjustified since there was no immediate threat to Enrile's privacy. The EDSA
revolution, the film's subject matter, is of significant public interest and falls within the realm of free speech and media coverage. The
film focuses on the historical events rather than solely on Enrile as an individual. As a public figure involved in the revolution and a
senator, Enrile has a narrower right to privacy. The film must present a truthful and historical account, and as long as Enrile's portrayal
relates to public facts, it is not necessary to obtain his permission.

FREE SPEECH AND THE CYBERCRIME LAW

 DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. NO. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioners, as taxpayers, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullify certain provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175). The respondents include various government officials. The challenged provisions are Sections
4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12, and 19, which the petitioners argue violate their constitutionally protected rights.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:

Whether Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12, and 19 of the Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners' fundamental rights to freedom of expression,
due process, equal protection, privacy of communications, and other constitutional safeguards.

Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the petition.

RULING::

The petitioners challenged various provisions of the Cybercrime Act, citing violations of free speech, double jeopardy, equal
protection, privacy, unreasonable searches and seizure, and undue delegation of legislative authority. The Supreme Court declared
Section 19, allowing the DOJ Secretary to block or restrict access to computer data based on prima facie findings, as unconstitutional.
Sections 12 and 4(c)(3) were also ruled unconstitutional. Other provisions, such as Section 5 on aiding or abetting cybercrimes and
Section 7 on liability under other laws, were deemed unconstitutional in specific cases. The court recognized the importance of
protecting free speech, due process, privacy, and equal protection rights while addressing concerns related to cybercrimes.

PUBLIC AID TO RELIGION

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 PHIL. 201 (1937)

FACTS:

The petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition against the respondent Director of Posts, challenging the issuance and sale of postage
stamps commemorating the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. The petitioner argues that such action violates the constitutional
provision prohibiting the appropriation or use of public funds in favor of any church or religious system. This provision is based on the
principle of separation of church and state, aimed at preventing the state or church from using each other as tools to further their
respective interests. The respondent argues that the issuance of the stamps is authorized by Act No. 4052, which appropriates funds
for the production and issuance of postage stamps advantageous to the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance and sale of commemorative postage stamps for the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress violates the
freedom of religion.

RULING:

The Court recognizes and appreciates the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. The issuance of commemorative stamps for
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress does not violate the freedom of religion. The stamps were not intended to favor a
particular church but rather to promote the Philippines and attract tourists. The stamps feature a map of the Philippines and the
location of Manila, highlighting the city as the venue for the congress. The government officials aimed to take advantage of an
internationally significant event, and any incidental benefit or propaganda was not the government's purpose. The Court emphasizes
that religion, when it instills moral principles, is deeply respected and acknowledged.

INTRAMURAL RELIGIOUS DISPUTES

 FONACIER VS. CA, 96 PHIL. 417 (1955)

FACTS:

The Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) filed a case against Bishop Santiago A. Fonacier, seeking an accounting of church properties in
his possession and their recovery. The IFI claimed that Fonacier had ceased to be the Supreme Bishop. Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes,
Jr., elected as the new Supreme Bishop, joined as a co-plaintiff. Fonacier defended himself, stating he had not been properly
removed and that his legal successor was someone else. The court ruled in favor of Bishop De los Reyes, Jr., declaring him the
legitimate Supreme Bishop and ordering Fonacier to account for the church's properties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision,
and Fonacier appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the ouster of Bishops Manuel Aguilar, Alejandro Remollino, Isabelo de los
Reyes Jr., Gerardo Bayaca, Juan Quijano, and Pablo Tablante decreed by the Supreme Council and the petitioner as Obispo Maximo
was illegal.

RULING: The civil courts have jurisdiction to review the action regarding the ouster.

(A) "Where a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to administer or is in conflict with the laws of the
land, it will not be followed by the civil courts."

(B) "Expulsion of a member without notice or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a property right is
involved."

Since it is claimed that the ouster was carried out by an unauthorized person or in a manner contrary to the church's constitution, and
that the ousted bishops were not given notice of the charges against them or afforded an opportunity to be heard, the civil courts have
jurisdiction to review the action regarding the ouster.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR, A.M. NO. P-02-1651. JUNE 22, 2006
(BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY)

FACTS: Alejandro Estrada reported to a judge in Las Piñas City that Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter, was living with a man who
was not her husband. During the investigation, Escritor admitted to living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without being married, but they
argued that their arrangement was in accordance with their religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses. They had executed a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" after ten years of living together. Escritor invoked the moral standards of her religion to
defend against charges of "gross and immoral conduct." The court had to consider whether their conjugal arrangement constituted
disgraceful and immoral conduct under the law.

ISSUE: WON Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter, can be held administratively liable for "gross and immoral conduct" under the
Revised Administrative Code

HELD: The Free Exercise Clause grants freedom to believe and, to some extent, freedom to act. Different tests have been employed
by the courts to balance religious freedom with state interests. The court follows the concept of "a wall of separation between
church and state" and uses the Lemon test to assess policies under the Establishment Clause. The court adopts a benevolent
neutrality approach, accommodating religious beliefs within constitutional limits. The Philippine jurisdiction also adopts this
approach. In the present case, the court applies the compelling state interest test and balances the state's interest against religious
liberty. The court distinguishes public and secular morality from religious morality and remands the case to determine if a compelling
state interest exists that justifies any infringement on religious freedom.