he Defense & Foreign Affairs Group of Publications, which started in 1972, circulate exclusively to senior

government, defense, intelligence and industry officials in more than 170 countries worldwide !he
Defense & Foreign Affairs periodicals include"
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy #monthly print $ournal%
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy monthly $ournal & the official $ournal of the 'nternational
(trategic (tudies )ssociation & in )pril 200* celebrated its +,th anniversary as the only international,
unclassified report dealing with global strategic issues from the perspective of Grand (trategy Strategic
Policy #originally called $ust Defense & Foreign Affairs% each edition has comprehensive analysis on topics
of global strategic influence -rom the beginning, the ob$ective of the $ournal was to loo. at, and
understand, the /big picture/, but to do so in detail
!he $ournal was founded by Gregory 0opley and 1r (tefan Possony in (an -rancisco, 0alifornia, in )pril
1972
!his material & now read by some 170 governments at the highest levels because of its professional,
non2partisan approach & offers uni3ue insights and trend analysis 't was the only service to forecast
45G67)4 -5)!645(" 5ach monthly edition carries comprehensive tables of recent international arms
transfers, several pages of listings of .ey changes of governments worldwide, biographies of .ey leaders,
defense industrial news, a column on psychological strategy, a column of news on defense & and
strategy & related web sites and databases, and more
!his is truly essential material for all involved in international security studies
8uly +1, 1992
The Unspoken Concern Over Germanys Path
European community (EC) politicians from many of the Community's 1 states ! inclu"in#
Germany ! are reluctant to "iscuss their very real concerns over the strate#ic "irection $hich
Germany is takin# %oth itself an" the EC as a $hole& The reluctance to 'uestion some of
Germany's recent actions is %ase" on the em%arrassment of most EC politicians to say anythin#
$hich $oul" revive memories of na(i Germany's a##ressions $hich le" to an" inclu"e" )orl"
)ar **& There is an almost universal consensus that "iscussin# any issues $hich $oul"
automatically invoke parallels %et$een to"ay's Germany an" +itler's Germany of the 1,-.s an"
'/.s $oul" split the EC an" once a#ain make Germany an outsi"er& One German official tol"
Defense & Foreign Affairs: 0)e must su%limate our 'Germanness' an" %ecome totally %len"e" as
a nation $ith Europe&0 The pro%lem $ith this is that %y %ecomin# 01uper Europeans20 the
Germans #ive the appearance of tryin# to %ecome all of Europe2 $ith the ri#hts an" interests of
the smaller economies of the EC %ein# totally su%servient (an" immaterial) to the German
position& 3ut the specific strate#ic policy 'uestions $hich concern other Europeans an" policy
analysts in the Unite" 1tates an" else$here inclu"e4
1. Unilateral and clandestine support for Croatia: 5u#oslavia %e#an its "isinte#ration $ith the
appointment of a Croatian hea" of the collective presi"ency a couple of years a#o& The
can"i"ate2 $ho $as committe" to the %reak6up of 5u#oslavia2 $as heavily promote" %y the EC&
7any 5u#oslavs a#ree" that each mem%er repu%lic shoul" "etermine its o$n future2 an" 66
"espite the uncertainties inherent in any ma8or transition 66 the 5u#oslav mem%er states $ere on
the $ay to "eterminin# a $orkin# arran#ement $hich $oul" have left some kin" of customs
union2 or confe"eration& This %rief opportunity to achieve chan#e more6or6less peacefully $as
lost $hen 3onn precipitately reco#ni(e" the in"epen"ence an" soverei#nty of Croatia2
encoura#in# it to remove irrevoca%ly any chance of a $orkin# confe"eration of 5u#oslav states&
German reco#nition of Croatia $as its most "ecisive an" unilateral forei#n policy initiative since
1,/9&
Germany has #one an" continues to #o further& *t has either allo$e" or has provi"e"2 at a
Government level2 lar#e num%ers of German nationals to #o to Croatia as mercenaries or
a"visers for the Croatian forces $hich are not only in Croatia2 %ut $hich are controllin# lar#e
areas of 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& Germany continues to provi"e si#nificant 'uantities of former East
German $eapons systems2 spares an" or"nance to Croatia clan"estinely2 an" in contravention of
Germany la$2 via +un#ary an" other routes&
German support for Croatia is a natural e:tension of the country's historical links $ith Croatia
an" its support for the $artime Ustae fascist or#ani(ation of the country's historical links $ith
Croatia an" its support for the $artime Ustae fascist or#ani(ation $hich has once a#ain revive"
in Croatia an" has use" its sym%ols an" remem%rances of its o$n $artime e:ploits to threaten
ethnic 1er%s livin# in Croatia an" hun"re"s of thousan"s of civilians in )orl" )ar ** 66 $as
pre"icta%ly "efensive&
There is no$ concern that Germany has "ra##e" Europe2 an" possi%ly the U12 into an intracta%le
conflict in the 3alkans2 $ithout consi"erin# the real o%8ectives or reasons for such an action&
2. Germany's natie efforts to undermine t!e U" dollar: German Government officials have
either provi"e"2 or have allo$e" to %e provi"e"2 the ti#htly6controlle" %anknote printin# paper to
*ran to ena%le its mint to pro"uce vast 'uantities of counterfeit2 hi#h6'uality U1 %anknotes& The
*ranian "istri%ution of vast 'uantities of for#e" U1 currency 66 outline" an" confirme" in the U1
Con#ress in recent months 66 is aime" at helpin# *ran pay off some of its international "e%t $hile
at the same time "eli%erately un"erminin# confi"ence in the U1 "ollar& The fact that Germany
has supporte" this economic $arfare a#ainst a ;<TO partner has shattere" some U1 officials'
faith in Germany after more than /. years of alliance&
#. German inolement in nuclear and C$% proliferation: The German Government has "one
virtually nothin# to stop German firms supplyin# the technolo#y to states such as *ra'2 =i%ya2
*ran an" others for $eapons6relate" nuclear2 chemical an" possi%ly %iolo#ical capa%ility& 7ost
senior intelli#ence analysts contacte" %y Defense & Foreign Affairs %elieve that the German
Government has kno$le"#e of the situation an" coul" have controlle" the transactions if it
"esire"&
(eptember +0, 1992
>ashion <n" 1trate#ic Priorities 1till ?ictate
Terms >or 1tate @eco#nition
Germany le" the European Community in #rantin# "iplomatic reco#nition to an in"epen"ent
state of Croatia "urin# the %reak6up of 5u#oslavia recently& 3ut none of the normal criteria2
$hich have tra"itionally %een applie" to reco#nition of ne$ly6in"epen"ent states $ere2 in fact2
applie" to the reco#nition of Croatia& *t $as "ifficult2 then2 for the rest of Europe 66 an" then the
Unite" 1tates2 an" so on 66 to $ithhol" reco#nition of Croatia2 an" then 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& <s
a result2 it can no$ %e ar#ue" that many other states2 $hich have an e'ual or #reater claim to true
political in"epen"ence2 can pursue international reco#nition& <re they likely to receive itA
3asically2 it $ill "epen" on 8ust $ho is "oin# the askin#&
The %reak6up of the U11@ into in"epen"ent repu%lics precipitate" consi"era%le "e%ate $ithin
;<TO states %efore they offere" "iplomatic reco#nition initially to the three 3altic states $hich
%roke a$ay from the U11@& Thin#s move" rapi"ly once the )est's reco#nition of the 3altic
states ha" %een accepte" %y the U11@2 an" that empire itself ha" %e#un to "ismem%er further
into a loose association of repu%lics $hich mutually accepte" each other's in"epen"ence& The
)est coul" then freely %e#in to reco#ni(e the former 1oviet repu%lics $ithout fear of alienatin#
the former 1oviet (an" later @ussian) lea"ers $ho ha" once e:ercise" control over the 0ne$0
in"epen"ent entities&
The 'uestion $as never raise"2 ho$ever2 as to $hether these states complie" $ith the ne%ulous
criteria $hich the )est (or the Unite" ;ations) apparently esta%lishe" as to $hat makes a state
accepta%le an" reco#ni(a%le as an in"epen"ent le#al entity& *n"ee"2 %y acceptin# the U11@ as a
state2 the )est ha" specifically2 for some seven "eca"es2 in"icate" that the mem%er 0repu%lics0
of the Union $ere not2 in fact2 reco#ni(a%le as states&
7arshal Tito2 $hen he le" 5u#oslavia for several "eca"es after )orl" )ar **2 create"
a"ministrative %oun"aries $ithin his country $hich $ere never inten"e" to represent le#al
%or"ers for su%6states $ithin the state of 5u#oslavia& *n"ee"2 these a"ministrative lines on maps
$hich Tito "re$ "i" not even represent the #eo#raphic %oun"aries of the ethnic #roups they
$hich they nominally 66 for a"ministration purposes 66 represente"& The su%6state of 5u#oslav
7ace"onia2 for e:ample2 "i" not represent the ethnic 7ace"onia of history& The %or"ers of
Croatia2 or 1er%ia2 or 3osnia6+er(e#ovina2 for e:ample2 $ere not meant %y Tito to represent the
%oun"aries of a state&
<n" yet Germany2 follo$e" %y the European Community an" the )est #enerally2 reco#ni(e"
these lines on the map as "iplomatically accepta%le %or"ers& Greece2 to its cre"it2 hesitate" an"
oppose" the EC's reco#nition of the Tito lines as representin# le#itimate2 in"epen"ent states& The
U12 too2 $as cautious2 as it $as a%out the reco#nition of much of the former U11@ as ne$ly6
accepta%le2 an" truly in"epen"ent states&
3ut finally2 the U1 an" others have2 $ithout imposin# any true le#al2 moral or historical criteria2
accepte" an" "iplomatically reco#ni(e" the in"epen"ence of all the former 1oviet repu%lics2 an"
the former 5u#oslav a"ministrative areas& This $ave of acceptances2 or "iplomatic reco#nitions2
poses a si#nificant num%er of pro%lems for the $orl" community& The first an" most o%vious is
the fact that a si#nificant num%er of other ne$ states (or captive ol" states) can le#itimately
"eman" international reco#nition as to their true in"epen"ence& The Tatars of @ussia are one of
several true nations $ithin the former U11@ $ho are "eman"in# such reco#nition&
The 1kills of *n"ia's Pun8a% are "eman"in# international reco#nition of their in"epen"ence2 as
are *n"ian6controlle" Bashmiris& <n" virtually any of a hun"re" *n"ian states coul" e'ually
"eman" such reco#nition& <s coul" the 1cots2 the )elsh an" the ;ava8os& <n" $hy notA They
have historical proof of their former in"epen"ence an" via%ility as in"epen"ent states&
)hat2 in"ee"2 are the criteria for acceptance as an in"epen"ent stateA Control of one's o$n
#eo#raphyA Perhaps this is the stron#est claim2 %ut it may inclu"e allo$ance for con'uest of that
territory at some sta#e %y conflict2 $hich the tenets of the U; prohi%it& Even so2 the U; has
i#nore" this tenet in the past2 an" $ill certainly "o so a#ain& ;ot self6"etermination2 %ecause
most states "o not meet this 0re'uirement0&
)hat is no$ more true than ever is that no state e:ists alone2 in isolation or true in"epen"ence&
<ll are inter"epen"ent& <ll states2 moreover2 are the result of historical accretion of peoples2
either %y mi#ration2 evolution or con'uest& The a%ori#ines of <ustralia themselves "isplace" an
earlier people&
1o if to"ay the in"epen"ence of Croatia is accepte"2 or <(er%ai8an2 then so too must the
in"epen"ence of Transkei2 Ciskei an" 3ophuthats$ana2 %ecause they are no$ %ein# threatene"
%y rene$e" con'uest %y the <frican ;ational Con#ress (<;C) $hich seeks to take over 1outh
<frica&
9ctober +1, 1992
*lle#al German )eapons to Croatia an" 3osnia
>uel the 3alkan Conflict
)ar in the former 5u#oslav repu%lics is %ein# fuelle" %y a massive an" comple: pattern of
$eapons shipments to Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina2 fun"e" an" or#ani(e" %y Germany&
Defense & Foreign Affairs "trategic &olicy has uncovere" a $i"esprea" pattern of arms
shipments $hich have %een allo$e" to cross into Croatia an" 3osnia $ith the tacit approval (an"
sometimes2 apparently2 "irect support) of the #overnments of Germany an" <ustria2 an" possi%ly
other states& <s $ell2 Germany has pointe"ly i#nore" the movement of German nationals into
Croatia an" 3osnia to fi#ht a#ainst the 1er%ian resi"ents of those t$o former 5u#oslav states& <ll
of the activity is in "irect violation of German an" <ustrian la$ as $ell as %ein# in violation of
international em%ar#oes a#ainst the supply of $eapons to the conflict (one&
<ll of the actions support Germany's tra"itional ally2 Croatia2 a#ainst the 1er%ian populations
still resi"ent in $hat is no$ Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina2 an" a#ainst the rump of the
5u#oslav >e"eration& The $i"e collection of information came to Defense & Foreign Affairs
from "iverse sources2 inclu"in# Defense & Foreign Affairs correspon"ents& 1ome2 from other
sources2 came in $ritten form in a variety of lan#ua#es2 $ithout ela%oration2 often $ith only
partial i"entification of some of the transactions2 companies an" $eapons involve"&

GE@7<; )E<PO;1
'cto(er )* 1++1: < convoy of three truckloa"s of anti6tank $eapons an" /.2... military
uniforms arrive" in the Croatian capital2 Ca#re%2 from 3ielefel"2 Germany& Elements of the
Croatian paramilitary forces have su%se'uently %een foun" in German6ma"e uniforms2 an"
supplie" $ith very nutritious foo" from German military stocks&
,ate 'cto(er 1++1: >our mo%ile $orkshops2 si: 199mm ho$it(ers2 an" a num%er of 1.mm
mortars2 alon# $ithD. U16ma"e General ?ynamics "tinger a"vance"2 manporta%le surface6to6air
missiles (1<7s)2 reache" the port of Ca"ar2 from German sources&
-oem(er +* 1++1: T$o truckloa"s of G? "tinger 1<7s an" a 'uantity of %lank 8ackets arrive"
in Barlovac2 Croatia&
-oem(er 1.* 1++1: < truck $ith a variety of arms arrive" in Ca"ar from Germany via *taly&
Decem(er 1+* 1++1: Pier 1D at the port of @i8eka $as the site of unloa"in# to E. tanks (type
unspecifie"2 %ut %elieve" to have %een East German 0T06series tanks) from Germany&
/anuary 01+* 1++2: Three 7iG fi#hter aircraft2 mo"el unspecifie"2 $ere receive" %y the Croatian
<rme" >orces from Germany& The aircraft2 from former East German stocks2 inclu"e" one ne$
aircraft an" t$o $hich ha" 0previously %een flo$n0&
2id1/anuary 1++2: 1pare parts for Panavia 3ornado aircraft $ere reporte"ly transporte" to
Croatia from Germany in trucks& They $ere alle#e" to have %een su%se'uently assem%le" an"
the aircraft (num%er unspecifie"2 %ut %elieve" to %e more than one) are %ase" no$ at Pleso
airfiel"2 Croatia&
2id1/anuary 1++2: )eapons an" military e'uipment $orth a%out ?7 92...2... $ere shippe"
to the port of @i8eka& They $ere in a container $ei#htin# 1D&9 tons& The contents inclu"e" ni#ht6
vision sniper si#hts2 ni#ht6vision fiel" #lasses2 *C fiel" #lasses2 optical si#hts for "ay shootin#2
ra"ios for vehicle mountin#2 mo%ile ra"io sets2 an" a lar#e amount of ammunition of various
cali%res& Three tons of these $eapons $ere imme"iately sent to the 11-th 3ri#a"e of the Croatian
<rmy statione" at 1i%enik&
/anuary 1)* 1++2: T$o truckloa"s of $eapons (anti6tank rockets2 mortars2 "tinger 1<7s) $ere
"elivere" to Croatia& The $eapons $ere reporte"ly purchase"2 source say2 in Germany an"
1$it(erlan" %y the firm 3+7 from 3asel&
/anuary 14* 1++2: >ive truckloa"s of arms an" ammunition $ere unloa"e" at the port of @i8eka&
They $ere transporte" to2 an" store in2 the villa#e of Bukul8anovo2 1 km from @i8eka&
2arc! 12* 1++2: < truck transportin# small arms arrive" at @i8eka an" continue" on via 1i%enik
to 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina&
5arly 2arc! 1++2: Croatian 7inistry of ?efence %ou#ht ,. military trucks from the surplus
stock of the >rench <rmy contin#ent in Germany throu#h a German firm i"entifie" as )e%a or
Fe%e#& The "elivery $as carrie" out in three shipments %y the en" of 7arch via <ustria an"
1lovenia& The source sai" that the transaction took place $ith the kno$le"#e of >rench an"
German authorities&
April 1.11#* 1++2: < further E. tanks from Germany (a#ain2 %elieve" to %e former East German
0T06series 73Ts) $ere unloa"e" in the port of Boper an" store" in the $arehouses of
Bukul8anovo near @i8eka&
April 21122* 1++2: The Croatian Government si#ne" a contract $ith a German supplier for the
"elivery of various $eapons an" or"inance totallin# U1G -6million in value& This "eal $as
si#ne" throu#h the Ca#re%6%ase" firm2 Hu#oart2 accor"in# to sources2 $hich has offices in
Fienna& Hu#oart reporte"ly arran#es for "eliveries of military e'uipment to the +i#h Comman"
of the Croatian <rmy from various suppliers in Germany&
2ay 1++2: ?urin# the course of the month2 Croatia $as supplie" $ith 12.1. "tinger 1<7s2
2... Arm(rust anti6tank rockets2 /D21.. <B6/D 6alas!ni7o automatic assault rifles $ith 9..
roun"s per $eapons2 299. @PG6D manporta%le antitank rocket launchers2 an" E. 7iG com%at
aircraft en#ines& These $eapons an" supplies $ere "elivere" to Croatia throu#h *taly an" via the
%or"er posts at Bo(ina an" 1e(ana&
/uly 2.* 1++2: < shipment of 1.. automatic rifles2 t$o sniper rifles2 1. ra"ios an" E.2...
roun"s of D&E mm rifle ammunition $as "elivere" from 1tutt#art2 Germany2 to Pro(or2 3osnia6
+er(e#ovina2 for the use of the Croatian ?efence Council (+FO)&
/uly1August 1++2: 1ources claim that >a"il =ipovaca2 a former mana#er of the 7osco$ office of
the firm Union invest2 1ara8evo2 an" no$ o$ner of the private firm Carinthia (hea"'uartere" in
=8u%l8ana)2 pai" some U1G 19.2... for the purchase of arms for 7uslim paramilitary forces& Part
of this sum $as alle#e"ly provi"e" %y the Government of Turkmenistan throu#h *n"ustry an"
Ener#y 7inister Berimov& <s $ell2 a man name" as E"o 3olic2 mana#er of the 7osco$ office of
the 1ara8evo firm Franica2 reporte"ly pai" U1G1D.2... to %uy $eapons for the 7uslim forces in
3osnia an" +er(e#ovian& Payments $ere ma"e to the account of the =+36*nternationale
+on"els%ank <G2 +T+6Unioninvest *mport6E:port Gm%+2 >rankfurt67ain2 ;o& D/I&-.12 3=C
9.. -.I ..&
1ources in"icate" that most of the purchases an" "eliveries of $eapons an" military e'uipment
for Croatian irre#ulars $ere effecte" $ith the assistance of the German firms2 ><3<2 >OG< an"
>ranconia6Ha#"& The ?eutsche 3ank an" ?res"ner 3ank <G in ?armstra"t $ere2 in most cases2
use" for the "eposit an" transactions involvin# lar#e sums of money inten"e" for arms
purchases&

<U1T@*<; )E<PO;1
'cto(er 8* 1++1: <n <"ria <ir$ays ?C6, transport aircraft lan"e" at 1ara8evo from Bla#enfurt&
*t carrie" 0lar#e amounts0 of +eckler J Boch (German6ma"e) automatic rifles an" han"#uns for
the 3osnian 7inistry of the *nterior&
5arly 'cto(er 1++1: Croatia's 7inistry of ?efense pai" U1G E16million into an account at the
<ustrian %ank ?ie Erst Osterreichische 1par Basse63ank for the purchase of T6D main %attle
tanks2 an" in late Octo%er2 the Croatian ministry re'ueste" the <ustrian firm i"entifie" as
<)?7 to provi"e Croatia $ith spare parts for these tanks&
,ate 'cto(er 1++1: The Croatian 7inistry of ?efense %ou#ht2 throu#h a firm i"entifie" as
Kan"ill *nternational =t"& Consultin#2 hea"'uartere" in Fienna2 -29.. automatic rifles an"
-.2... han"#rena"es $orth U1G 12D9.2...&
/uly 28120* 1++2: Ten 7iG61 fi#hter aircraft an" t$o 1aa% aircraft $ere relocate" from <ustria
to Croatia&
The ammunition factory at 3a"en2 <ustria2 has since the %e#innin# of 1eptem%er 1,,
reporte"ly "elivere"2 on a "aily %asis2 ammunition to the Croatian <rme" >orces an" to the
Territorial ?efence >orces of 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina an" 1lovenia&

+U;G<@*<; )E<PO;1
)eapons an" military e'uipment from +un#ary $ere e:porte" to Croatia on several occasions in
1,,1 in a variety of aircraft 66 inclu"in# a#ricultural aircraft 66 %elon#in# to Croatia an" +un#ary&
3et$een 1eptem%er 9 an" D2 1,,12 an" Octo%er E to I2 1,,12 an airlift $as esta%lishe"
%et$een 3eremen"2 3il8e an" Osi8ek for the transport of small arms an" ammunition a%oar" <;6
aircraft an" to$e" #li"ers& +un#arian authorities also provi"e" security for these overfli#hts %y
electronic 8ammin# of 5u#oslav air "efence surveillance ra"ars&
"eptem(er1'cto(er 1++1: < +un#arian2 name" %y sources as Barol Gala2 o$ner of the firm
Universum 1?2 %ase" in 3u"apest2 alle#e"ly %rou#ht into Croatia from Polan" (via +un#ary)
t$o truckloa"s of arms an" or"inance2 inclu"in# .. @PG6D anti6tank rocket launchers2 29..
@PG6D rockets2 2... <B6/D 6alas!ni7o assault rifles2 2... han"#rena"es2 an" E..2...
roun"s of D&Emm ammunition for the <B6/Ds& The trucks $ere reporte"ly rente" %y a Pra#ue
resi"ent2 i"entifie" as 7ikulas ;a"asi&
5nd "eptem(er 1++2: +un#ary alle#e"ly "elivere" to Croatia a surface6to6surface missile
system2 kno$n as @6-..2 for $hich the Croatian 7inistry of ?efence pai" U1G 1&96million
throu#h the Croatian companies *;H<2 <stra an" Pliva&

1)*11 )E<PO;1
Croatia purchase"2 "urin# 1,,12 some 1. T6D main %attle tanks $orth U1G ,.6million throu#h
the 1$iss firms Eram 3au 7onta#e <G an" >61 *nternational =T1 (=t"&A) of +on# Bon#& The
transaction $as carrie" out2 accor"in# to sources2 throu#h the <ustrian %ank2 @ossler 3ank <G2
in Fienna& The tanks2 formerly in service $ith the 1oviet <rmy2 $ere supplie" to Croatia "urin#
Octo%er 1,,1&
/anuary 1)* 1++2: T$o truckloa"s of arms 66 alle#e"ly inclu"in# rocket launchers2 mortars an"
U16ma"e G? "tinger 1<7s 66 arrive" in Croatia from 3asel& The $eapons $ere alle#e"ly
%ou#ht in Germany %y the 3asel firm2 3+72 an" their "elivery itinerary $as 3asel6Curich6
Gotthar"6Fenice6Trieste6Pula& On the follo$in# "ay2 Hanuary 192 four more vans of small arms
ammunition came from Curich via +un#ary&

CCEC+O1=OF<B )E<PO;1
Pra#ue $as one of the ma8or centres of ille#al supplies of $eapons an" "efence e'uipment to
Croatia "urin# the secon" half of 1,,1 an" the first half of 1,,& 1ources claime" that the
follo$in# firms $ere involve"4
Omnipol2 Unime:2 the 03ank of 3ohemia02 the Pra#ue offices of the 1$e"ish firms 1can"inavia
*nvest an" <%arent2 the Pra#ue office of the 1$iss firm Computer Graphic 1ystems2 t$o other
companies from 1$it(erlan"2 some <ra% em%assies (inclu"in# the 1yrian Em%assy in Pra#ue)&
Contracts $ere conclu"e" for lar#e 'uantities of "efence e'uipment2 inclu"in#4 9.2... <B6/D
6alas!ni7o assault rifles2 .2... 761E assault rifles2 D.6million roun"s of ammunition2 12...
@PG6D launches an" 92... rockets2 1.. 0#ui"e" rocket0 launchers& ;e#otiations are kno$ to %e
un"er$ay in Pra#ue for the supply of heavy $eapons an" aircraft&
Fe(ruary 1++2: ?urin# >e%ruary2 an" earlier2 in late 1,,12 the C(echoslovak firm Omnipol
alle#e"ly supplie" @6-.. surface6to6surface missiles to Croatia2 installin# the $eapons in the
area of Binkovo villa#e near 1lavonski 3ro"2 Croatia&

OT+E@ 1OU@CE1
The Fatican 3ank2 in 1,,12 reporte"ly pai" throu#h the trust of the institute for the
?issemination of @eli#ion2 U1G 12,II2-..2 via the *nternational +an"el 3ank in the ;etherlan"s2
for the purchase of $eapons in 3eirut on %ehalf of Croatia& LCroatia is CatholicM 1er%ia is
Ortho"o:& 66 5d.N
-oem(er 19* 1++1: Croatia shippe" throu#h the port of G"ansk2 Polan"2 1E29.. <B6/D assault
rifles an" 96million roun"s of ammunition2 1D9 @PG6D antirank rocket launchers an" relate"
roun"sM 19. 76I mortars an" -29.. roun"sM 761. mortars an" ammunition& Total value U1G
1&96million& Payment $as alle#e"ly throu#h =a8%ic 3ank an" 3anca ;ationale "e 7ilano2 of
*taly&
-oem(er 1++1: The ships 6umroec an" 6o:ara* o$ne" %y the firm ?anu%e =loy"s2 of 1isak2
alle#e"ly shippe" arms an" ammunition from 3ul#aria an" @omania to Croatia&
Decem(er 2* 1++1: < lar#e shipment of $eapons $as sent from Paris to the firm P@O in Ca#re%2
Croatia& The shipment $as %y four trucks %earin# Greek re#istration&
5arly /anuary 1++2: The Ca#re% firm2 <stra2 contracte" for the ac'uisition of $eapons in
Turkey to %e supplie" to Croatia an" the civil "efence units of 3osnia an" +er(e#ovian& The
purchases $ere $orth ?712E..2... an" the "elivery $as ma"e %y sea&
5arly /anuary 1++2: < "eal $as ma"e to ship 9. anti6aircraft missiles an" 9 launchers
(unspecifie" type) to Croatia from Polan"2 $ith the a#reement of the Polish authorities2
accor"in# to sources& The Customs certificate for this shipment $as issue" in late Hanuary 1,,2
in"icatin# a "ealer from the Philippines as the %uyer& The airline 0General an" <viation
1ervices02 re#istere" in ;i#eria2 $as in"icate" as the shipper&
/anuary 11* 1++2: < vessel carryin# $eapons left the port of Hunieh in 3eirut& These arms $ere
%ou#ht from the =e%anese Christian militia hea"e" %y 1hamir Cha(hra& The $ei#ht of these
$eapons an" e'uipment $as estimate" at %et$een 2... to /2.. tons2 an" inclu"e" a ran#e of
supplies from small arms to ho$it(ers& =e%anon2 as one of the lar#est ille#al suppliers of
$eapons to the Croatian forces2 has so far e:porte" U1G .6million $orth of "efence items to
Croatia&
5arly /anuary 1++2: Croatia or"ere" from Chile 1.. UB6manufacture" 1horts $lo;pipe
manporta%le 1<7s& These 1<7s ha" reporte"ly %een up#ra"e" in Chile& The same or"er
inclu"e" 9.. 2am(a anti6tank rockets value" at U1G 2.9E2,I& The or"er $as reporte"ly
place" throu#h the e:port company 0>a%ricas y maestran(as "el e8ercito avi"a Pe"ro 7ontt
1E.E0& The in"icate" %uyer on the en" user certificate $as a 1ri =ankan firm2 an" Croatia ma"e
the payment throu#h 3anco Central "e Chile&
/anuary 2#* 1++2: < ship %oun" for @i8eka $as loa"e" in the port of O"essa $ith assault rifles2
#uns2 sniper rifles2 mortars2 anti6tank rockets2 1<7s an" or"nance&
2id1August 1++2: < vessel from Turkey entere" the port of 1plit carryin# arms for the Croatian
an" 7uslim forces of 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina&
August 14* 1++2: < Turkish <ir >orce aircraft flyin# humanitarian relief to 1ara8evo also %rou#ht
an uni"entifie" amount of $eapons an" other military e'uipment for the 3osnian territorial
"efence units&
August 2#12)* 1++2: Three 3oein# D/Ds of the *ranian <ir >orce lan"e" at Ca#re% an" 1ara8evo
airports carryin# $eapons in unkno$n 'uantities an" types& Unite" ;ations (U;P@O>O@)
officials $ere alle#e"ly una%le to inspect the car#oes&
2id1'cto(er 1++2:* T$o ships carryin# $eapons for 3osnian an" +er(e#ovinan 7uslims
starte" their voya#es from *stan%ul on Octo%er 1.2 1,,2 an" it has %een esta%lishe" that one of
these ships reache" the port of Ploce2 Croatia2 on Octo%er 1-2 1,,&
The 3ul#arian firm2 Binte:2 reporte"ly me"iates the sale of @ussian6ma"e $eapons to 3o(nia
an" +er(e#ovina an" Croatia& Throu#h its %rokera#e efforts2 9 tons of $eapons an" ammunition
are reporte"ly ferrie" each $eek from 3ul#aria2 via @omania an" +un#ary& < lar#er shipment of
$eapons an" relate" e'uipment from 3ul#aria reache" 1plit on Octo%er 1E2 1,,2 ho$ever&
These $eapons $ere for the use of the Cenica6%ase" units of the 7uslim <rmy in 3osnia6
+er(e#ovina&
The hi#hest officials in the Government of the @epu%lic of 1lovenia are "irectly involve" in the
"elivery of $eapons to 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina2 accor"in# to sources& These inclu"e Prime
7inister H& ?rnovsek2 ?efence 7inister H& Hansa2 an" *nterior 7inister *& 3avcar&
*n the first part of 1,,2 these officials alle#e"ly si#ne"2 throu#h their a#ents2 a#reements $ith
Herko ?oko2 3osnia's ?efence 7inister2 an" @a#i% 7er"(anic2 a"viser to Presi"ent <li8a
*(et%e#ovic2 for the "elivery of -.2... <B6/Ds at ?79.. each2 .2... *talian 3eretta ,
han"#uns at ?7D9. each2 E6million roun"s of ammunition (for the rifles an" han"#uns)2 an" an
uni"entifie" amount of 7otorola ra"io e'uipment2 $inter camoufla#e uniforms2 four6$heel "rive
vehicles2 an" other military e'uipment&
@epresentatives of the 3osnian Government pai" for the $eapons $ith fun"s "onate" %y *slamic
countries& <t least 1-2... of the <B6/Ds have %een "elivere" of the amounts or"ere"&
<t the %e#innin# of Octo%er 1,,2 Croatia conclu"e" a %usiness "eal $ith Fene(uela an" 3ra(il2
offerin# three oil tankers for t$o s'ua"rons of Em%raer 3ucano tur%oprop trainin# aircraft& <
#roup from the Croatian 7inistry of ?efense $as reporte" in 3ra(il in Octo%er an" ;ovem%er
$ith several pilots to test the aircraft&
Defense & Foreign Affairs has a""itional material on forei#n mercenaries2 "efense transactions
an" other relate" intelli#ence on the violation of the international em%ar#oes on "efense materiel
shipments to the com%atants in the current 3alkan conflict& 7uch of this material $ill appear in
the ne:t e"ition 66 ?ecem%er 1,, 66 of Defense & Foreign Affairs "trategic &olicy.
9ctober +1, 1992
Croatia <cts as the ;e:us of a ;e$ <rms Tra"e
U1 Con#ressional sources have i"entifie" a $i"esprea" tra"e in arms an" nuclear technolo#y
centere" aroun" the 1tate of Croatia& 7uch of it has to "o $ith the ille#al ac'uisition of $eapons2
lar#ely throu#h Germany an" <ustria2 for Croatia's o$n use in the $ar in the 3alkans& 3ut it also
involves the traffickin# of nuclear technolo#y an" ra"ioactive materials throu#h Croatia& U1
Con#ressional sources tol" Defense & Foreign Affairs "trategic &olicy that a German $oman2
@ita ?ra:ler2 then operatin# out of Fienna2 $as one of the primary $eapons suppliers to Croatia
an" 1lovenia2 smu##lin# the $eapons in from Germany an" Eastern Europe& <mon# the ma8or
"eals she %rokere"2 accor"in# to the sources2 $as a U1GE.6million "eal2 si#ne" on 1eptem%er D2
1,,12 for U16%uil" General ?ynamics "tinger man6porta%le surface6to6air missiles (1<7s)2 an"
Euromissile (>ranco6German) man6porta%le 2ilan anti6tank #ui"e" $eapons& The $eapons $ere
alle#e"ly shippe" from Germany to Croatia2 an" payment $as arran#e" throu#h a =iechtenstein6
%ase" %ank& The sources also sai" that @ita ?ra:ler $as also involve" in smu##lin# ra"ioactive
materials&
*n a separate "eal2 apparently involvin# ?ra:ler2 the ma8or German "efense firm2 7332 sol"
Arm(rust anti6tank rockets to %oth Croatia an" 1er%ia2 usin# a 1in#apore en"6user certificate&
0>or lar#er items from Eastern Europe2 such as tanks2 aircraft2 etc&2 ?ra:ler uses certificates
i"entifyin# the items as historical pieces on their $ay to military museums20 a Con#ressional
report sai"& <s $ell2 in the early <utumn of 1,,12 @ita ?ra:ler reporte"ly cooperate" $ith a
Croatian $ho i"entifie" himself as 7ari8an 1okolovic in a series of $eapons "eals $ith Polan"2
involvin# the shipment of 9. tons of $eapons for Croatia& On that "eal2 the Ca#re% Government
coul" not come up $ith payment2 %ut ?ra:ler sai" that it $oul" not %e a pro%lem if 1okolovic
coul" arran#e for Ca#re% to instea" provi"e assistance in the smu##lin# of uranium an"
plutonium as an alternative form of payment& <s a result2 Croatia has %e#un to emer#e as a ma8or
component in the international nuclear smu##lin# net$ork from Europe to the ra"ical states of
the Thir" )orl"& Croatia's primary role2 accor"in# to Con#ressional "ocuments2 is to provi"e
safe stora#e an" false "ocumentation to facilitate the shipment of materials&
<ccor"in# to the terms of the first "eal2 1okolovic $as to provi"e lo#istical support for the
transfer of nuclear material from 1i%eria to *ra'& On the @ussian si"e2 the net$ork $as alle#e"ly
or#ani(e" %y senior officers of the BG32 le" %y Fitali TarchukO>e"orchuk2 an" the G@U le" %y
Ole# Petrovsky& These men ha" access to nuclear materials inclu"in#2 alle#e"ly2 tactical nuclear
$arhea"s& <ll the $eapons $ere alle#e"ly stolen from C*1 <rmy "epots in 1i%eria2 primarily
from the *rkutsk area& <lthou#h *ra' $as the net$ork's ma8or initial customer2 =i%ya $as
apparently soon to %ecome a customer& 7ari8an 1okolovic $as reporte"ly in char#e of the
un"er#roun" tra"e in nuclear materials for these net$orks2 an" arran#e" seclu"e" an" safe
stora#e an" inspection facilities in 1e%enico2 Croatia& >rom there2 the material for *ra'2 inclu"in#
key components for the nuclear $eapons pro#ram of *ra'2 $as "riven %y truck to 3a#h"a" via
3ul#aria& The shipments are reporte"ly continuin#& 3ul#arian truck "rivers $orkin# for the
1omat company in the 1ummer of 1,, $ere reporte"ly sufferin# from several rare "iseases
attri%ute" to prolon#e" e:posure to 0"an#erous to:ic car#oes02 primarily 0chemical $arfare
a#ents0 an" 0hi#hly to:ic ra"ioactive su%stances0 $hich they ha" %een transportin# to *ra' from
Germany2 *taly an" Croatia since the 1prin# of 1,,1&
The volume of nuclear traffic %ecame so lar#e %y ;ovem%er 1,,1 that the net$ork $as havin#
pro%lems meetin# "elivery sche"ules2 a pro%lem complicate" %y repeate" security failures&
*talian intelli#ence2 in mi"6Octo%er 1,,12 intercepte" ne#otiations for the sale of nuclear
materials an" %om%6makin# tools in Como L< measurement tool $ith traces of %om%6#ra"e
plutonium $as also capture" in a police rai"N& The *talians also learne" that one of the net$ork's
%ankers2 Barl >rie"erich >e"erer2 kept a stockpile of -.k# of uranium an" 1.k# of plutonium in a
Curich %ank vault& The uranium $as sei(e" on ;ovem%er 112 1,,12 in suitcases in the %oot of the
car of >rie"rich @efner2 the honorary consul of +on"uras2 also reporte"ly a BG3 a#ent in
1$i(terlan"& 3ut "espite this set%ack 1okolovic $as a%le to ship another lar#e plutonium loa" to
1e%enico& +is name $as "iscovere" "urin# the Como rai"s an" he $as arreste" in ;ovem%er
1,,1 in Fienna on his $ay to Croatia& )hen cau#ht2 he $as carryin# &Ik# of plutonium& +e
$as release" in >e%ruary 1,,& 7ean$hile @ita ?ra:ler continue" to attempt to sell the
plutonium2 $hich2 she sai"2 0coul" %e use" for $eapons02 an" re" mercury2 on 1okolovic's
%ehalf& *talian intelli#ence sources "iscovere" continue" activity relate" to nuclear materials
#oin# throu#h 1e%enico& @outine an" #ro$in# involvement %y Croatian authorities to provi"e
safe haven for the shipments an" stora#e has meant that there are no$ fe$er interceptions& @ita
?ra:ler reporte"ly 0escape" to Germany0 %efore she coul" %e arreste"& <s $ell2 the
Con#ressional reports cite the involvement of a Croatian6%orn Cana"ian2 <nton Bikas2 $ho2 in
1,,12 arran#e" Croatia's ela%orate system for the clan"estine purchase an" "elivery of 1outh
<frican6ma"e <rmscor $eapons2 usin# aircraft lease" %y U#an"a <irlines Corporation&
9ctober +1, 1992
< 1ane 3alkan Policy
By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. Firtually ever strate#ic policymaker in the $orl" must
%ear some %lame for the "evelopin# $ar $hich is envelopin# the 3alkans as a result of the
"isinte#ration of the 5u#oslav fe"eration from its ori#inal %oun"aries& <ll of usA )e have ma"e
this an issue for the Unite" ;ations2 a #lo%al %o"y2 an" all the peacekeepin# an" peace6enforcin#
$hich the 3alkan conflict $ill entail& <n" yet $e are once a#ain allo$in# the merits of the
situation to %e "eci"e" %y the international me"ia2 an"2 de facto* %y the forces %est a%le to
manipulate ima#es for the me"ia& Thus far $e have seen a runa$ay #rasp on the me"ia e:ercise"
%y Croatia an" its allies2 particularly Germany& 3ut $e must not allo$ this to color ho$ the rest
of the $orl" reacts to the 3alkans crisis&
Defense & Foreign Affairs "trategic &olicy has this month prepare" some information on the
ille#al supply of $eapons $hich is currently fee"in# the 3alkan conflict& Principally2 it sho$s
ho$ Germany an" other states are provi"in# massive $eapons support to Croatia an" 3osnia6
+er(e#ovina2 in contravention of "omestic an" international la$& ;e:t month $e $ill "etail the
e:tent of forei#n mercenary involvement in Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina2 a#ain an activity
un"ertaken $ith the %lessin# of the German an" other #overnments& Germany2 it is true2 has a
tra"itional #eopolitical role in the 3alkans2 as "oes <ustria& 3ut this shoul" not %lin" the rest of
the $orl" $hich coul" %e avoi"e" or ameliorate" %y the 8u"icious e:ercise of #oo" intelli#ence
collection2 un%iase" all6source analysis2 an" policymakin# $hich "ares to fly in the face of
populist me"ia reports&
)hat $ill happen if Greece sees no alternative to military intervention2 for e:ample2 in the
former 5u#oslav state of 7ace"oniaA +o$ $ill this affect ;<TOA T$o ;<TO states2 Greece
an" Turkey2 have "ifferent interests in the 3alkans2 %oth $ith historical an" mo"ern ori#ins& Can
Turkey stan" %y an" $atch *ran (an" other 7uslim states) attempt to sei(e the *slamic %attle
stan"ar" in the fi#htin# in 3osnia2 $here many 7uslims are involve"A
)ho amon# the European community or ;<TO policymakers is a$are of the full 3alkan
mosaic2 its historical an" current attitu"es& )hy is the U1 prepare" to allo$ Europe to take the
lea" on the 3alkans crisis $hen )ashin#ton has tra"itionally %een calle" upon in this century to
restore the peace in Europe $hen it shatters into $arA <n" $hy is Germany persistently prepare"
to support Croatian 66 an" *ranian 66 attempts to inflame the overall conflictA
Defense & Foreign Affairs has never %een afrai"2 in its . years of e:istence2 to take an
unpopular vie$ in or"er to force a %alance" ar#ument of a vital strate#ic situation& *n this current
crisis2 1er%ia has consistently faile" to make its case to the )est of the Unite" ;ations& *ts
lea"ers2 $ith the e:ception of the Prime 7inister2 $ere cau#ht off6#uar" %y the crisis& 3ut "oes
this mean that their situation shoul" not %e hear" an" un"erstoo"A
1ecember +1, 1992
Croatias ;e$ <rme" >orces4 >rom Creation2
1trai#ht into Operation
Complete "etails of the %attle or"er of the ne$ <rme" >orces of Croatia are not yet kno$n&
*n"ee"2 the complete connection %et$een the official <rme" >orces an" the various paramilitary
units in Croatia an" the Croatian areas of 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina is also not clear& +o$ever2 the
<rme" >orces of Croatia $ere fully functionin# an" e'uippe" $hen the state came into %ein# as
an in"epen"ent state in 1,,.&
There are no$ /.2... Croatian <rmy troops (as oppose" to militia or 3osnian Croatian forces)
statione" outside the 1tate of Croatia& These troops2 all "eploye" in 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina in
"efiance of Unite" ;ations e"icts on the presence of forei#n (none6U;) forces in that country2
comprise 1. to 1 %ri#a"es2 at least E. main %attle tanks2 an" I. heavy artillery pieces& The
infantry units are heavily e'uippe" $ith man6porta%le systems2 inclu"in# U1 General ?ynamics
"tinger surface6to6air missiles2 Arm(rust anti6tank rockets an" Euromissile 2ilan anti6tank
#ui"e" $eapons& The )estern systems $ere o%taine" a#ainst the %an on arms transfers to the
re#ionM mostly from Germany2 or $ith German help&
The Croatian <rme" >orces e:cee" 1D.2... men2 mostly in the appr& DD <rmy %ri#a"es& Croatia
has an availa%le man6po$er pool of 1&III6million men %et$een 19 an" /, years of a#e2 $ith
/-2... more reachin# military a#e each year& < small num%er of patrol vessels remaine" in
CroatiaM they $ere un"er repair $hen the >e"eral ;avy $ith"re$ to 7ontene#rin ports in
5u#oslavia& Croatia inherite" ship6%uil"in# an" repair facilities on the ?almatian coast& The H;<
<ir >orce $ith"re$ entirely into the ne$ %or"ers of 5u#oslavia after Croatian in"epen"ence2
leavin# only airfiel" infrastructure& Croatia has2 su%se'uently ac'uire" at least t$o s'ua"rons of
7iG61 com%at aircraft an" other military aircraft& T$o main military airfiel"s2 one on Brk
islan"2 the other at the port city of Pula2 have %een close" to U; o%servers2 %ut Defense &
Foreign Affairs learne" that these airfiel"s accept "aily fli#hts %rin#in# forei#n mercenary troops
to 8oin Croats an" 7uslims in 3osnia& The military airfiel" at Ca#re% also %rin#s in such fli#hts&
Even "urin# the peace process2 on the ni#ht of ?ecem%er ,6-.2 1,,2 1. fli#ht loa"s of troops
came into Brk an" Pula&
Part of the Croatian rationale for attackin# #arrisons of the H;< $hich ha" %een statione" in
Croatia at the time of in"epen"ence $as to sei(e $eapons stockpiles %efore the H;< coul"
$ith"ra$&
Pres& >ran8o Tu"8man2 a former #eneral in the ol" H;<2 actively participate" in plannin#
Croatia's ne$ military policies an" strate#ies as "i" 7artin 1per#el82 the first *nterior 7inister2
also a former H;< #eneral&
1ecember +1, 1992
>or 1er%ians2 >ears of a German <:is @ise >or
The Thir" Time This Century
"er(s can cite strong feelings and many reasons for t!eir concern oer Germany's support for
Croatia's ne; ;ar against t!em. Associate &u(lis!er 3. %. Carr loo7s at t!e !istorical patterns
;!ic! led to t!e current $al7an conflict.
By T. W. Carr, Associate Publisher. 1er%s have ha" to fi#ht for survival as a people in every
ma8or European conflict this Century2 from the %reak6up of the <ustro6+un#arian Empire in
)orl" )ar *2 throu#h )orl" )ar **2 an" a#ain to"ay& 1i#nificantly2 the 1er%s never %e#an any of
the conflicts2 an" in all of them2 1er%ian sentiment notes2 their enemies al$ays inclu"e" a
German2 Croat an" Fatican a:is&
On each occasion conflict erupte" "urin# a perio" of German e:pansion2 irrespective of $hether
policy $as implemente" %y military2 political or economic means&
<nte Pavelic2 the e:treme ri#ht $in# nationalist $ho later %ecame Croatia's first >uhrer2 state" in
1,D 0+o$ can Croatia 66 full of $estern culture2 =atin an" German culture2 *talian humanistic
culture an" German romanticism 66 co6e:ist $ith the Ortho"o:2 rou#h2 sava#e an" ruthless
1er%sA0
=ess than t$o years later he left 5u#oslavia for *taly $here he soon esta%lishe" his 0Ustas!a: the
Croatian @evolutionary Or#anisation0& *t set up trainin# camps an" ran a campai#n of terror an"
assassinations2 inclu"in# the mur"er of 5u#oslavia's Bin# <leksan"ar "urin# a visit to >rance&
<nte Pavelic $as trie" an" convicte" in a%sence for <leksan"ar's mur"er2 yet *taly continue"
provi"in# a safe haven for him an" his Ustas!i. )hen <"olph +itler an" his ;a(i Party came to
po$er in Germany in 1,--2 Pavelic a"opte" the na(i racial policies $hich accor"e" $ith his
vie$s aire" in 1,D&
>or . months after the out%reak of )orl" )ar **2 5u#oslavia $alke" a ti#htrope an" staye"
neutral until the Cvetkovic67acek Government 8oine" the Tripartite Pact on 7arch 92 1,/1&
T$o "ays later2 the 1er%ian General2 ?usan 1imovic2 ai"e" %y 3ritish intelli#ence2 hea"e" a
popular revolt a#ainst the Government's action&
+itler reacte" %y "ivertin# massive forces from the Eastern >ront to attack 3el#ra"e on <pril E2
usin# /9. %om%ers in a "a$n rai"& There $ere 91 "ivisions of <:is forces2 supporte" %y 21D.
com%at aircraft2 in the attack on 5u#oslavia&
On <pril 1.2 the 1/th Pan(er "ivision rolle" into Ca#re% enthusiastically $elcome" %y Croatians&
)ithin hours2 $orkin# to a $ell6prepare" plan2 ?r E"mun" Fesenma#er (>orei#n 7inister von
@i%%entrop's envoy from 3erlin) proclame" on Ca#re% ra"io the formation of the *n"epen"ent
1tate of Croatia (*1C) un"er &oglani7 (lea"er) <nte Pavelic&
1even "ays later the <:is forces controlle" all 5u#oslavia2 an"2 in the punitive carve6up2 +itler
an" *talian lea"er 3enito 7ussolini create" the *1C proper2 allocatin# to it Croatia2 1lavonia2
3osnia an" +er(e#ovina2 1rem an" part of ?almatia (the territory claime" to"ay %y Croatia)&
*n the meantime2 only -E hours after the pan:ers ha" arrive"2 the @oman Catholic 3ishop of
<(#re%2 <lo8(i8e 1tepinac2 en"orse" the proclamation on %ehalf of the Church& )ithin a fe$
"ays he issue" an instruction to the Catholic cler#y2 0& & & to $ork $ith "e"ication for the
fosterin# an" promotion of the ne$ *n"epen"ent 1tate of Croatia0& Pope Pious K** then
appointe" <rch%ishop 1tepinac as 1enior 7ilitary Chaplain& < Catholic priest $as su%se'uently
assi#ne" to serve $ith every Ustas!i military unit&
On takin# office2 the &oglani7 state"4 0*t is the "uty of the Ustas!i movement to ensure that the
*1C is rule" al$ays an" every$here only %y Croatians2 so that they are the sole master of all the
real an" spiritual #oo" in their o$n lan"& )ithin Croatia there can %e no compromise %et$een
the Croatian people an" others $ho are not pure CroatsM Ustas!i must e:tin#uish all trace of such
people&0
The campai#n of ethnic cleansin# ha" %e#un earlier2 less than three $eeks after +ilter's creation
of Croatia& *t commence" $ith the slau#hter of prominent 1er%s an" lea"ers of the Ortho"o:
Church& On 7ay 92 1,/12 the 3ishop of 3an8a =uka2 to#ether $ith archpriests from 3osanska
Gra"iska an" ?usan 1u%otic2 $ere torture" in an attempte" conversion& )hen this faile"2 all
$ere mur"ere" in col" %loo"& < similar fate $as "ealt to the 7etropolitan of ?a%ar63osnia2 Petar
Cimonic2 an" to 1ava Trlaic2 the 3ishop of Gom8i Barlovac&
7ore than .. Ortho"o: priests $ere slau#htere" in rapi" succession follo$in# the mur"er of
the 7etropolitan of Ca#re%2 ?osite8 Fasic& On <u#ust /2 1,/12 Ca#re% issue" a"ministrative
or"ers concernin# the arrest of the remainin# Ortho"o: priests an" monks& Perhaps the most
si#nificant e:ample of state an" church colla%oration in thnic cleansin# $as >riar 7iroslav
>ilipovic& This Catholic priest "ou%le" as the comman"er for four months of Hasenovac2 Europe's
lar#est concentration camp locate" on 1.s'&km& alon# the %anks of the river 1ava& L"ee story*
pa#e seven&N

1,/94 Escapin# Europe
The #enoci"e continue" una%ate" throu#hout the $ar& 1er%s2 He$s an" Gypsies $ere mur"ere"
$ith me"iaeval ferocity& 7ore than a million 1er%s of all a#es $ere %utchere" in their homes2 in
forests an" in concentration camps& <nother 9.2... $ere forcefully converte" to Catholicism2
an" a further -..2... or so $ere "riven out of Croatia into the remote mountain areas of 1er%ia&
3ut as the $ar "re$ to a close in Europe2 communist partisan lea"er Hosip 3ro( 0Tito0 took
control of 5u#oslavia& Un"er cover of "arkness2 <nte Pavelic fle" across the <ustrian %or"er
into the 3ritish Cone2 at that time un"er the control of >iel" 7arshal <le:an"er& Europe $as
a$ash $ith refu#ees2 more than 1I6million2 most of $hom $ere "isplace" persons2 %ut hi"in#
amon#st them $ere thousan"s of $ar criminals&
Tito $ante" Pavelic2 an" in Huly 1,/9 he informe" the 3ritish that Pavelic $as hi"in# in their
(one& The 3ritish replie" statin# 0every effort is %ein# ma"e to fin" him0& Tito respon"e" month
after month $ith specific alle#ations as to Pavelic's shiftin# hi"in# places4 villas2 monasteries&
*rritate"2 the 3ritish >orei#n Office re%utte" Tito's alle#ations4 0The alle#ations are un#racious
an" unfoun"e"& <t no time has Pavelic %een in 3ritish custo"y2 or his $herea%outs kno$n to the
3ritish authorities&0
<n internal >orei#n Office memo $as circulate" in"icatin# that 0it is %ecomin# increasin#ly
clear that 'uislin#s are fin"in# refu#e un"er the $in# of the church0&
This $as pro%a%ly the outcome of an intelli#ence report on the activities of >ather Tra#anavic2 a
Croatian @oman Catholic priest $ho hel" hi#h office in the Ustas!i Government& +e $as2
althou#h classifie" as a $ar criminal2 permitte" %y the <llies to tour European refu#ee camps
throu#hout the secon" half of 1,/9 an" "urin# 1,/E& Ostensi%ly his task $as to ren"er reli#ious
ministry to refu#ees2 %ut in fact he $as makin# covert contact $ith thousan"s of Ustas!i hi"in#
$ithin the ranks of true refu#ees& +e arran#e" for ne$ @e" Cross i"entity car"s to %e issue"2 an"
at the same time or#anise" a political intelli#ence net$ork to help Ustas!i an" other $ar
criminals& U1 intelli#ence co"ename" the net$ork an" its escape routes 0ratlines0&
*n ?ecem%er 1,/E2 an intelli#ence report from <ustria a"mitte" that Pavelic ha" %een hi"in# in
the 3ritish Cone2 %ut ha" escape" $ith collea#ues "resse" as priests to 7ilan "urin# 7ay 1,/E&
>rom 7ilan2 usin# false i"entity car"s2 they ha" travelle" south to the Fatican& Pavelic use" a
1panish passport in the name 0?on Pe"ro Gona0& Gainin# @e" Cross i"entity car"s $as easy for
Tra#anavic& T$o vali"atin# authorities per country $ere appointe" %y the *nternational @e"
Cross& *n the case of *taly2 one $as the Fatican @efu#ee Committee&
The Fatican @efu#ee Committee $as in fact the 3rotherhoo" of 1an Geronimo2 the Croatian
Colle#iate $ithin the Fatican& >ather Tra#anavic $as the 1ecretary of the 3rotherhoo"2 an" he
$as also the Croatian ;ational @epresentative of the @e" Cross& This $as a stran#e "ou%le
appointment for a man %ran"e" a $ar criminal %y Tito's Government& < former Croatian Ustas!i
"iplomat2 Evor Omrechanan2 %ase" in @ome2 is on recor" sayin# he ha" no pro%lem in o%tainin#
an i"entity car" for Pavelic from the Fatican to ena%le him to make the 8ourney from 7ilan to
@ome&
3y Hanuary 1,/D2 the U1 Counter6*ntelli#ence Corps (C*C) kne$ that Pavelic $as %ein#
sheltere" at the Fatican& < special a#ent calle" Go$er infiltrate" the 1an Geronomo 3rotherhoo"
an" "iscovere" that this Fatican Colle#iate $as "oin# much more than 8ust har%ourin# Pavelic&
)ithin its $alls $as a complete Ustas!i unit $here na:i salutes $ere #iven&
On <pril 112 1,/D2 the U1 C*C planne" to capture Pavelic from a Fatican li%rary or $hile en
route in a Fatican car& +o$ever2 Pavelic staye" one step ahea" of C*C2 thanks to a "ou%le a#ent
plante" in the C*C %y >ather Tra#anavic&
*n Huly2 the C*1 a#ain or"ere" that Pavelic $as to %e taken& One $eek later the operational or"er
$as counterman"e"2 across it $as a han"$ritten instruction 0han"s off0&
)ithin "ays Pavelic ha" a +un#arian passport un"er the name of Pa%lo Eranias an" a visa for
<r#entina& *n Genoa2 another priest2 >ather >ichanico2 arran#e" a %erth for Pavelic to sail to
security a"viser to <r#entine Presi"ent Huan Peron $ho su%se'uently #ave visas to -92...
Ustashi escapin# from Europe thanks to the 0ratlines0 intelli#ence net$ork or#anise" %y >ather
Tra#anavic an" the 3rotherhoo" of 1an Geronimo&

>*>T5 5E<@1 O;
The first convention of the Croatian ?emocratic Union (+?C) on >e%ruary E2 1,,.2 in Ca#re%
marke" the re%irth of the Ustas!a an" the reha%ilitation of the *n"epen"ent 1tate of Croatia& <ll
the killin# an" ethnic cleansin# policy implementation flo$e" from that "ay in a re6run of the
events of 9. years %efore&
On 7ay -.2 1,,.2 the +?C $as electe" to po$er in the "o(or (parliament) an" ?r >ran8o
Tu"8man %ecame Presi"ent of the @epu%lic& <t an open air rally in Helacic 1'uare2 the
<rch%ishop Car"inal >ran8o Buharic2 %lesse" a %a%y's cra"le to sym%olise the re6%irth of the *1C&
On ?ecem%er 2 1,,.2 the "a(or proclaime" the in"epen"ence of Croatia an" summarily
a"opte" a ne$ constitution un"er $hich 1er%s lost their nation status2 re#ulate" to a national
minority&
The +?C took a series of steps "urin# 1,,. to purify Coratia %y era"icatin# the 1er%ian i"entity&
The cyrillic script $as %anne"2 Croatian %ecame the only official lan#ua#e2 1er%ian associations
$ere a%olishe"2 literature $as cleanse" of 1er%ian authors an" 1er%s $ere not permitte" to
operate their o$n TF an" ra"io pro#rammes& On another front2 1er%s lost their 8o%s in the police
an" security or#ans as $ell as in Government posts&
<s the same time2 )orl" )ar ** history $as re6$ritten an" street names chan#e" to #lorify
Ustas!i %y eliminatin# any trace of the #enoci"e& T6shirts sho$in# Ustas!i sym%ols such as the
infamous 3lack =e#ion $ent on sale to youn# Croatians&
<rms an" "efence e'uipment flo$e" into Croatia "irectly an" in"irectly from Germany& 7ass
armin# of +?C mem%ers took place2 the police force $as e:pan"e" an" the ;ational Guar" $as
re6e'uippe" as an Ustas!i army& 7ay I2 1,,12 sa$ a na(i style rally of the 0Croatian <rme"
>orces0 at Ca#re% foot%all sta"ium&
Then the killin# of in"ivi"ual 1er%s starte"& 7emories of 1,/1 stirre" an" the e:o"us %e#an& The
"ay after the rally2 1er%s from 3orovo 1elo fle" from Croatia& The killin#s2 $hich starte" early in
<pril 1,,1 at Plitvice2 escalate" "urin# Huly2 <u#ust an" 1eptem%er& <t Fukovar2 1er%s $ere
su%8ecte" to torture2 rape2 an" mur"er for many months %efore the conflict $as presente" to the
$orl" as %rutal a##ression %y the 5u#oslav <rmy a#ainst peace6lovin# Croations& The mur"ers
are "ocumente" an" proven&
<roun" 92... 1er%s $ere roun"e" up an" hel" in the 3orovo foot$are factory comple: at
Fukovar& >rom this Croatian concentration camp hun"re"s of 1er% men2 $omen an" chil"ren
$ere taken out an" slau#htere"& 7utilate" %o"ies thro$n into the river $ere carrie" "o$nstream
into 1er%ian territory& These $ere recovere"2 photo#raphe" an" their i"entities painstakin#ly
"iscovere"&
Octo%er 1,,1 sa$ the arrest of . Ortho"o: priests2 inclu"in# his +oliness =uki8an2 3ishop of
1lavonia2 yet another replay of 1,/1 actions&
+avin# arreste" their 3ishop2 Croatian authorities "urin# ;ovem%er e:pelle" some 92... 1er%s
from )estern 1lavoni8a& <t the same time (Octo%er ,) the inha%itants of / 1er%ian villa#es
$ere or"ere" to vacate their homes $ithin /I hours %y the Croatian authorities in 1lavonska
Po(e#a& 1eventeen of the 1er%ian villa#es $ere ra(e" in Croatian ethnic cleansin# operations
$hich "rove another 1.2... 1er%s into 3osnia&
;o less than 1I, villa#es in nine communes south of the @iver ?rava $ere completely cleanse"
of 1er%s "urin# 1,,1 an" early 1,,&
Church "estruction $ent han" in #love $ith the arrest of Ortho"o: priests an" the e:pulsion of
1er%s from Croatia& 3y the en" of Octo%er 1,,1 alone2 more than D. churches $ere completely
"estroye" or severely "ama#e"& L7ore than -.. have no$ %een "estroye" in the current
fi#htin#&N On 1eptem%er I2 Croatian paramilitary forces "emolishe" the 3aro'ue comple: of the
Pakrac 3ishops %uilt in 1D-& They set fire to the seminary2 an" in the cathe"ral thy %urnt icons
an" the %ishops' li%rary containin# almost E2... %ooks2 many of historical importance& >ifty of
the %ooks "ate" %ack to the 1Ith Century an" inclu"e" a uni'ue copy of a "a(orni7* printe" in
Fenice circa 19-E&
<s in 1,/12 it $as Germany an" the Fatican $hich %rou#ht Croatia to life2 the secon" time %y
prematurely reco#nisin# Croatia as an in"epen"ent state $ith the ri#ht to ce"e from 5u#oslavia&
3oth authorities pushe" mem%ers of the EC an" the international community into reco#nisin#
Croatia& <t the same time2 %oth manipulate" the mass me"ia2 presentin# the 1er%s as leftover
communists tryin# to su%vert the pro6)estern "emocracies of Croatia an" 1lovenia&
1er%ian officials trie" to tell the EC an" other mem%ers of the international community $hat
Germany $as "oin# in 5u#oslavia an" Eastern Europe&
Plans to %uil" a superhi#h$ay in the north from +am%ur# to 1t Peters%ur#h are aime" at #ivin#
Germany "omination of the 3altic& < similar hi#h$ay planne" to link 3u"apest $ith Trieste an"
@i8eka via Ca#re% is perceive" to provi"e the infrastructure that #ives the pro8ecte" German
economic 0empire0 access to the 7e"iterranean&
German la$ preventin# forei#n military action helpe" Germany stay out of the costly military
operations of the Gulf )ar& The same $ill %e true of any conflict in 5u#oslavia an" the 3alkans&
1o the 3alkans conflict costs Germany virtually nothin#2 $hile it "rains the U1 an" UB
economies&
1er%s report that Germany is actively lo%%yin# some /. countries in <frica an" the 7i""le East
to support a forthcomin# German %i" to #ain a permanent seat on the Unite" ;ations 1ecurity
Council&
<s far as the 1er%s an" 5u#oslavs are concerne"2 the German Government starte" the present
conflicts in 5u#oslavia an" has use" its influence an" me"ia channels to help "istort the truth
an" prevent a $orka%le form of peace comin# a%out& There is much evi"ence to support the
5u#oslav point of vie$&

1ecember +1, 1992
1T@<TEG*C PO=*C5 *;TE@F*E)4 CO=&6GE;& C*FOT< P<;*C
5u#oslavia 3races >or < ;e$ Conflict )hich
*s 3ein# *mpose" >rom <%roa"
3!e C!ief of t!e General "taff of t!e Armed Forces of t!e ne; <ugoslaia* Col.1Gen. =iota
&anic* spo7e at lengt! ;it! Defense & Foreign Affairs "trategic &olicy a(out t!e t!reats of a
;ar ;!ic! is (eing ;is!ed on !is country* regardless of any actions !is o;n "tate could ta7e.
"trategic &olicy E"itor6in6Chief Gre#ory Copley an" <ssociate Pu%lisher 3ill Carr met this
month $ith the Chief of the General 1taff of the <rme" >orces of 5u#oslavia2 Colonel6General
Civota Panic2 to pose 'uestions not ans$ere" 66 or not aske" 66 in the )estern professional an"
#eneral me"ia a%out the strate#ic situation in the 3alkans& )hat the Defense & Foreign Affairs
"trategic &olicy "iscussions $ith Col&6Gen& Panic an" many other senior an" 8unior 5u#oslav
officers reveale" $as not2 as has %een $i"ely state" in the )est2 that 5u#oslav an" 1er% lea"ers
"ou%te" the )est's resolve to act in the 3alkan crisis& @ather2 there $as a #eneral %elief that the
)est $oul" an" coul" act2 "espite all cre"i%le intelli#ence $hich shoul" ensure that there $as no
8ust cause for such action& There $as also a reco#nition that if $ar $as impose" on 5u#oslavia
"espite all protestations an" efforts to avert conflict2 then the 5u#oslav <rme" >orces $oul"
prosecute the national "efence on the $i"est possi%le canvas&
General &anic* t!e secession of some of t!e mem(er repu(lics of t!e former <ugosla
Federation !as meant t!at t!ere is no clear picture no; 11 as far as muc! of t!e international
community is concerned 11 as to ;!at comprises t!e <ugosla Armed Forces >/-A?. Can you
gie some idea of !o; t!e Federal Armed Forces !ae c!anged in structure* si:e* e@uipment and
mission from* say* t;o years agoA
<s you kno$2 the international community has reco#nise"2 as in"epen"ent states2 three of the
repu%lics of the former 1>@54 1lovenia2 Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& The last contin#ent of
sol"iers of the former 5u#oslav Peoples' <rmy $ho $ere citi(ens of the >e"eral @epu%lic of
5u#oslavia2 left 3osnia6+er(e#ovina on 7ay 1,2 1,,& There are no$ no mem%ers of the <rme"
>orces of 5u#oslavia $hatsoever "eploye" outsi"e the territory of the >e"eral @epu%lic of
5u#oslavia2 $hich to"ay consists of the repu%lics of 1er%ia an" 7ontene#ro&
*n Huly 1,,12 formational stren#th of the former military force Lie4 of the ol" 5u#oslaviaN $as
1E929, sol"iers an" #roun" /.2... officers& The peacetime stren#th of the <rme" >orces of
5u#oslavia is no$ %et$een 1..2... an" 1.2...2 of $hich half are professionals&
;umerous chan#es have %een ma"e from the ol" military structure& )e have a ne$ "efence
concept& < 'ualitative personnel chan#e has %een implemente" an" instea" of the four 7ilitary
?istricts2 $hich $e formerly ha"2 there are no$ three <rmies L<rmy Groups $ith #eo#raphic
areas of responsi%ilityN an" t$o other2 separate services2 the <ir >orce (@F) an" <ir ?efence
>orce (PFO) Las a sin#le serviceN2 an" the ;avy& The territorial component of the <rme" >orces
has %een a%an"one"2 an" the partisan echelon "is%an"e"&
The <rme" >orces of 5u#oslavia is no$ compose" of 1er%ian67ontene#ran recruits an" officers
$ith hi#h com%at spirit an" po$er2 %ase" on the %est of the $artime tra"itions of these t$o
peoples& 1o a num%er of essential conceptual as $ell as other chan#es 66 personnel2 or#anisation2
le#al an" materiel an" technical 66 have alrea"y %een intro"uce"&
The %asic task of the <rme" >orces of 5u#oslavia2 then2 is the "efence of the in"epen"ence2
soverei#nty an" territorial inte#rity of the >e"eral @epu%lic of 5u#oslavia&
3o ;!at eBtent are t!e Federal Armed Forces still operating outside t!e ne; (orders no;
generally accepted* at least for t!e time (eing of t!e <ugosla Federation >ie: "er(ia and
2ontenegro?A
;ot only "o they not perform com%at operations2 %ut there isn't a sin#le unit or mem%er of the
<rme" >orces of 5u#oslavia outsi"e the %or"ers of the >e"eral @epu%lic of 5u#oslavia& )e
have %een emphasisin# this fact for some time no$2 %ut the me"ia in the )est keeps accusin# us
of participatin# in the arme" conflict outsi"e our country& *t is clear from their reportin# that the
e"itors in the )est "o not $ish to accept this fact&
3!ere seems to (e confusion as to t!e operations of t!e <ugosla Federal Armed Forces* t!e
forces of t!e "er(ian repu(lic* and t!e forces of "er(s liing in $osnia. Can you say ;!at
connections eBist (et;een t!ese t!ree sets of forces* including any Coint operational or command
structure or operations* and e@uipment s!aring etc.A
The 1er%s in 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina have %een livin# in that @epu%lic for centuries2 an" make
up more than -. percent of the population of 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& They are sprea" over2 an"
le#ally o$n2 more than half of the territory of that @epu%lic& L*n fact2 more than E9 percent 66
5d.N
The 1er%ian people in 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina have forme" their o$n state 66 the 1er% @epu%lic
66 an" their o$n arme" forces in or"er to resist %ein# force" to leave their lan"& The military arm
of the 1er% @epu%lic Lnot to %e confuse" $ith the @epu%lic of 1er%ia in 5u#oslavia 66 5d.N is
fi#htin# the 7uslim an" Croatian <rme" >orces in 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina&
The <rme" >orces of the >e"eral @epu%lic of 5u#oslavia "oes not have any military formations
in 3osnia or +er(e#ovina& 1o it is incorrect an" senseless to speak a%out 5u#oslavia's "irect
involvement in the territory of 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& Claims that (5u#oslav) 1er%ia is responsi%le
for the $ar in 3osnia6+er(e#ovina are a%solutely #roun"less& The help provi"e" to the 3osnian
1er%s %y 5u#oslavia is humanitarian2 not military&
;either 1er%ia2 nor the >e"eral @epu%lic 5u#oslavia2 are involve" in that $ar& The $ar is not an
act of 1er%ian a##ression2 %ut a comple: issue involvin# competin# reli#ions an" inter6ethnic
an" civil arme" conflict in 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina& <n" the initiator of the conflict $as the
Croatian an" 7uslim coalition&
3!e ne; Armed Forces of Croatia* $osnia1Der:egoina and "loenia !ae (een ac@uiring
massie amounts of defence e@uipment since t!e $al7an conflict flared up. 3!ese ac@uisitions
iolate some international agreements and clearly !ae (een underta7en clandestinely. $ut !o;
!ae t!e <ugosla Federal Armed Forces (een a(le to get t!eir e@uipment* ordnance* etc. during
t!is periodA
>irst2 let me say that $e have irrefuta%le proof $ith re#ar" to the preconflict armin# of military
formations in the former repu%lics of the (then) 1ocialist >e"eral @epu%lic of 5u#oslavia2 an"
the many violations of the arms em%ar#o& The evi"ence has %een ma"e availa%le to the relevant
international %o"ies2 inclu"in# the most senior representatives of the European Community (EC)
an" the Unite" ;ations (U;)&
1ince the <rme" >orces of 5u#oslavia are not at $ar2 out supply an" procurement is "one in the
usual $ay from in"i#enous sources& Priority is #iven to those parts of the <rme" >orces an" to
the $eapons an" e'uipment $hich are crucial for the "efence of soverei#nty an" inte#rity of the
>e"eral @epu%lic of 5u#oslavia&
Es t!e defence industrial (ase ;!ic! ;as ;ell17no;n in t!e former <ugoslaia still functioningA
And ;ould you say t!at you are fairly ;ell self1sufficient in defence materielA
5es2 conceptually speakin#2 the e:istin# military in"ustry of 5u#oslavia can satisfy the nee"s of
the 5u#oslav <rme" >orces very 'uickly& Of course part of the military in"ustrial capacity of the
former 5u#oslavia remaine" in the secessionist repu%lics $hen the 1>@5 %roke up& 1ome of that
capacity has %een "estroye"M some of it has %een ren"ere" uselessM %ut most of the capacity $as
move" to L$ithin the ne$%or"ers of theN >e"eral @epu%lic of 5u#oslavia&
There are no particular "ifficulties in terms of skille" la%our availa%ility an" no technical or
technolo#ical pro%lems $ith re#ar" to continuation of pro"uction of current military e'uipment&
<n" "espite the current materiel an" financial "ifficulties2 as $ell as the sanctions2 ne$ pro8ects
for the pro"uction of or"nance are in the preparatory phase& One such pro8ect is the pro"uction of
the ne$ "omestic tank2 others inclu"e ne$ missile systems2 an" so on&
Our people kno$ that free"om is the most e:pensive commo"ity& Over the centuries our
forefathers have sacrifice" their lives for it2 an" to"ay the people are prepare" to "efen"
5u#oslavia an" their free"om $ith all availa%le means&
<ugoslaia ;as* in t!e past* 7no;n to !ae conducted considera(le researc! into nuclear*
c!emical and (iological defences and* one ;ould assume* into ;eapons in t!e -$C arenas. Can
you gie some idea of t!e current situation in <ugoslaia in t!e areas of defences and of
;eapons >if any? in t!e nuclear* (iological and c!emical arenasA
The former 1>@5 "i" not carry out research in the fiel" of the $artime use of nuclear2 chemical
an" %iolo#ical com%at means& <ll of our efforts $ere "irecte" to$ar" collective an" personal
protection in a hostile ;3C environment& 5u#oslavia's "omestic in"ustry2 in fact2 pro"uces
sufficient 'uantities of "etection an" protection systems2 inclu"in# e'uipment an" or#anisations
$hich are use" for "ealin# $ith the conse'uences of hostile nuclear2 chemical an" %iolo#ical
$eapons&
Das t!e current conflict in $osnia1Der:egoina led you to reconsider t!e <ugosla Armed
Force's operating rationale* strategies andFor doctrinesA %ere your forces prepared for suc!
com(at conditionsA
* shoul" say2 firstly2 that the "efence concept of the >e"eral @epu%lic of 5u#oslavia stems from
factors $hich are not affecte" %y the conflict in 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& Our "efence system is an"
5u#oslavia's entire military "evelopment is %ase" on the analysis of all si#nificant forei#n an"
internal factors&
*t is imperative2 of course2 that $e evaluate the military6political position of the country $ithin
the conte:t of the ne$ ratio of forces in the $orl"2 on the re#ional level2 an" in the imme"iate
nei#h%ourhoo"& ;aturally2 the 3osnian e:perience of the former 5u#oslav <rmy is carefully
stu"ie" %y the military of to"ay's 5u#oslavia&
3o ;!at eBtent !ae t!e <ugosla Armed Forces (een inoled* if at all* in supporting United
-ations !umanitarian operations in t!e former <ugosla repu(licsA
The <rme" >orces of 5u#oslavia provi"e all necessary support to the humanitarian convoys
$hich are sent to 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina& +o$ever2 $e can only support LinternationalN ai"
convoys $hile they are on >e"eral territory (ie4 1er%ia an" 7ontene#ro)& )e shall continue to
provi"e this support into the future&
Dae t!e <ugosla Armed Forces (een put in a position to respond to t!e (uild1up of t!e
Al(anian Armed Forces on your (order in Decem(er 1++2A
* can assure you that the <rme" >orces of 5u#oslavia are prepare" to respon" to arme"
provocations an" any attack2 no matter $ho the potential a##ressor may %e2 inclu"in# the
<l%anian <rme" >orces& )e are fully prepare" in all respects for an en#a#ement of this type&
3!ere !as (een discussion of U-1sponsored military action against <ugosla territory* "er(ia in
particular* for alleged "er(ian or <ugosla actions in $osnia1Der:egoina. Could t!e <ugosla
Armed Forces respond to suc! t!reatsA %!at ;ould you foresee as t!e conse@uences of suc! a
conflictA
)e %elieve that the "an#er of forei#n military intervention is still there& )e are %ein# su%8ecte"
to continuous2 un8ustifie" pressures $hich are impose" on all sorts of e:cuses& 3ut if there is
military intervention2 then $e shall "efen" our free"om2 in"epen"ence an" territorial inte#rity
$ith all availa%le means&
Our #reatest resource is our people an" their ine:hausti%le "efence potential& )e $oul" certainly
inflict unaccepta%le losses upon any a##ressor& Clearly2 $e "o not $ant a $ar2 %ut $e are
prepare" to $a#e it shoul" it %e impose" upon us2 "efen"in# our homelan" re#ar"less of the
amount of casualties& < potential a##ressor $oul" %e face" $ith a million6man army2 an" the
entire potential of the nation2 inclu"in# the millions of 1er%s an" 7ontene#rans livin# a%roa"&
Those $ho "eman" arme" attacks on 1er%ia lack %oth the kno$le"#e of the truer situation2 an"
#oo" military 8u"#ment %ase" on an un"erstan"in# of the history of $arfare in the 3alkans& 1uch
people fail to comprehen" that the %attle#roun" $oul" not2 * repeat not2 %e confine" to 1er%ia
an" the imme"iate area aroun" it& )e too $oul" have the a%ility to choose the %attle#roun"2 an"
carry the fi#ht %y a variety of means $herever necessary&
Can you descri(e t!e morale position in t!e Federal Armed Forces at presentA Do; (adly !as it
(een affected (y t!e fact t!at 11 as a multi1et!nic force 11 it !as (een faced ;it! t!e fact t!at t!e
territory it ;as supposed to protect as a unified state is no; engaged in internecine conflictA
The morale of mem%ers of the H;< is very hi#h& The H;< is no$ very "ifferent to the multi6
ethnic <rme" >orces of the former 1>@52 an" no$ the %i##est part of the <rme" >orces is ma"e
up of 1er%s an" 7ontene#rans& <n" the fi#htin# morale of the H;< is no lon#er %ase" on the ol"
communist values& ;o$ it is %ase" on patriotism2 the very %est $ar tra"itions of 1er%s an"
7ontene#rans2 on professionalism an" on loyalty to the ne$ state&
Only the positive e:periences of the ol" 5u#oslav <rmy are %ein# taken up %y the ne$ H;<&
Do; !as <ugoslaia's current inflation leel affected your operational capa(ilitiesA
O%viously2 the #rave economic situation in our state2 accompanie" %y the hi#h rate of inflation2
affects our "efence capa%ilities insomuch as the "efence %u"#et is ero"e" in real purchasin#
po$er& 3ut $e are strivin# for ma:imum efficiency an" a rational structure $ith the e:istin#
means availa%le to us& The <rme" >orces have %een reor#anise" to ensure that inflation "oes no
si#nificantly affect operational "eployment&
)e are o%viously fortunate in that $e can "ra$ on ma:imum civilian support "urin# this crucial
time&
3o ;!at eBtent !ae you detected t!e presence of foreign mercenary forces as operational cadre*
or trainersFadisers* operating in Croatia* $osnia1Der:egoina* "loenia andFor 2acedoniaA
"imilarly* !ae t!ere (een any really distur(ing clandestine inputs of foreign military aid or
e@uipment into t!ose statesA
The presence of mercenaries in the armies of the %reaka$ay repu%lics $as "ocumente" %y the
former 5u#oslav People's <rmy $ith many films an" vi"eo recor"in#s2 statements #iven %y
capture" mercenaries2 alon# $ith $itness testimonies& Evi"ence $as sent to our 1tate %o"ies2
particularly to the 1tate Commission for the investi#ation of $ar crimes an" #enoci"e& The
Commission passe" this information to various international or#anisations2 inclu"in# the U;&
Unfortunately2 the ne$ <rmy of 5u#oslavia is not in a position to collect evi"ence a%out this2
since the $ar is %ein# $a#e" outsi"e the territory of the >e"eral @epu%lic of 5u#oslavia&
Et seems t!at t!e inolement of Germany in t!e $al7an crisis is constantly mentioned in articles
in t!e %est. From t!e !istorical ie;point* t!e Austro1Dungarian 5mpire and more recently na:i
Germany "loenia and Croatia 11 ;!ic! are primarly of Cat!olic fait!. Do; do you see t!ings
no;* in t!e lig!t of t!ose !istoric precedents* and t!e German inolement in t!e current
conflictA
Certain European countries are tyrin# to achieve "omination over the territory of the former
1>@5& The strate#y of in"irect approach has so far employe" all the availa%le political2
economic an" propa#an"a means short of "irect military conflict& )e have %een e:pose" for
some time no$ to lo$ intensity conflict "octrine as a component part of this in"irect strate#y&
<t this point * $ill not comment on the German strate#y in Europe& +o$ever2 Germany's
involvement in the "estruction of the former 1>@5 is o%vious& * $oul" like to remin" you that
Germany applie" stron# pressure on EC mem%er countries to reco#nise 1lovenia as the first
in"epen"ent state in the territory of the former 1>@5&
As a follo;1up to ;!at you Cust said* are you ;orried (y t!e fact t!at t!e "ecretary1General of
-A3' is a German Gformer Defence 2inister 2anfred %ornerH ;!o pu(licly stated t!at -A3'
;as ready to interene against "er(ia despite t!e fact t!at* on t!e preious day* suc! a policy
;as met ;it! disapproal from t!e -A3' ministers ;!o are supposed to set policyA
Certainly such a statement is cause for concern& The 3alkans have ha" very unpleasant
e:periences as a result of earlier German e:pansionism& The Germans2 too2 have ha" unpleasant
e:periences in the 3alkans& Of course to"ay German la$ preclu"es the "eployment of German
forces in such areas as the 3alkans&
* $oul" say that some people pay insufficient attention to history2 or have "ifficulty
remem%erin# it correctly2 so at this point * $oul" say that it is at least un%ecomin# for a German
L7anfre" )ornerN to make such provocative statements&
Personally2 * cannot %elieve that there coul" %e such a level of military "ilettantism as to hea" to
a #lo%al2 or ;<TO2 involvement in a $ar in the 3alkans2 particularly in 1er%ia& The la$s of $ar
are kno$n2 an" such an intervention in 1er%ia $oul" inevita%ly lea" to an uncontrolle" sprea" of
chaos to the rest of Europe& The 'uestion is2 "oes ;<TO $ant peace or an e:pansion of the $arA
1er%ia an" 5u#oslavia "o not $ant $ar2 %ut they have forces to "efen" themselves& The fact that
the initiative of the ;<TO General 1ecretary $as not met $ith #eneral approval of the )estern
<llies speaks enou#h for itself a%out the illo#ical statement re#ar"in# an intervention a#ainst
1er%ia&
<ugosla &rime 2inister 2ilan &anic isited $onn on -oem(er 29 in order to eBplain t!e
<ugosla position regarding t!e $al7an conflict* and on Decem(er 1 t!e $erlin daily -eues
Deutsc!land criticised C!ancellor Delmut 6o!l and Foreign 2inister 6laus 6in7el for Imissing
t!e opportunity to correct t!e unilateral policy in relation to t!e <ugosla crisisI. 3!e
ne;spaper also said t!at It!e open antagonism to;ard &rime 2inister &anic ;ea7ens !is peace
effortsI. Do you agree ;it! t!e criticism and t!e assessment (y t!e German paperA
* really "o not kno$ $hat $oul" happen in the case of chan#es in lea"ership of 5u#oslavia
un"er the imperative of the #eneral international pressure& *n principle2 the <rme" >orces are not
en#a#e" in such calculationsM they con"uct their o$n affairs& * $oul" comment on the position of
the German paper in 'uestion only as to the assessment of the pressure option an" its effects& The
policy to$ar" 5u#oslavia is tra#ically one6si"e"2 re#ar"less of the people $ho hol" the key
positions in 5u#oslavia&
3!ere !as (een muc! tal7 in t!e %estern media of It!e "er(ian concentration campsI* and t!is
produced a profoundly negatie effect on ;orld pu(lic opinion. Did t!e <ugosla Armed Forces
!ae any role ;it! relation to It!e concentration campsIA Are t!ere no;* or ;ere t!ere (efore*
any camps in "er(iaA
<lle#ations are not the same as facts& *f there ha" %een any camps2 then such camps e:iste" in
the territories $hich are no$ controlle" %y the other t$o $arrin# parties Lie4 Croatia an" 3osnia6
+er(e#ovinaN& )e have evi"ence $hich proves that $retche" "er(s $ere photo#raphe" %ehin"
the $ire fence an" that then their photo#raphs $ere sho$n to the $orl" $ith the e:planation that
they $ere 2uslims in 1er%ian camps&
* can assure you cate#orically that there are no camps in 1er%ia& The <rme" >orces of
5u#oslavia have nothin# to "o $ith 0the camp affair0& Those are ill6inten"e" alle#ations the aim
of $hich $as to "iscre"it the 5u#oslav military&
"o ;!at is t!e trut! a(out Iconcentration campsI in t!e territories of $osnia and Der:egoinaA
En ot!er ;ords* camps controlled (y $osnian "er(s. 3eleision programmes in $ritain and t!e
United "tates* for eBample* seemed so real* and t!e reporters concerned seemed genuinely to
(eliee ;!at t!ey sa;.
)ell2 *'ve alrea"y ans$ere" that 'uestion2 $ithout any intention to fin" e:cuses for any%o"y& )e
must %e $orrie" over the selective 66 * $oul" say totalitarian 66 mo"el of information $hich
%rain$ashes the #eneral pu%lic %y satanisin# only one si"e2 in this case the 1er%ian si"e& ?oes it
seem lo#ical to you that only 1er%s are the #uilty ones in such a lar#e conflictA
3!e /e;is! !umanist and -o(el &ri:e ;inner* 5li %iesel* recently isited <ugoslaia in order to
see for !imself on t!e ground t!e trut! a(out t!e camps. %as t!at an attempt (y "er(s to
improe t!eir imageA %!at places did 2r %iesel isit in "er(ia and $osnia1Der:egoinaA
7r )iesel visite" those places $hich he thou#ht $ere of key importance for his o$n research& *
think he mana#e" to #et a more realistic picture a%out $hat is #oin# on in the former 1>@5& The
1er%s "i" not try to retouch the picture a%out themselvesM they only trie" to correct the "istressin#
impression Lof themN an" to eliminate the institutional hatre" $hich seems to %e felt for the
$hole 1er%ian people in some 'uarters&
*n this era of mass crimes2 $here the victims are also 1er%s (as $ell as others)2 only the 1er%s are
portraye" as criminals& * hope that 7r )iesel ha" sufficient information to see that this is not the
case& <ctually2 he sai" himself that he ha" e:pecte" the Croats an" the 7uslims to allo$ him
access to the many camps in $hich 1er%s are kept an" massacre"& L+e $as "enie" access& 66 5d.N
*t $oul" %e #oo" 66 "esira%le 66 an" most of all necessary an" 8ust that the $orl" hear a%out that2
too2 an" that the $orl" takes a stan" on the Croatian an" 7uslim crimes2 $hich are enormous&
A recent report prepared for t!e U" Congress said t!at t!e $osnian 2uslim leader* 2r
E:et(egoic* in !is Eslamic Declaration* claimed t!at It!ere can (e no peace nor coeBistence
(et;een t!e Eslamic fait! and t!e non1Eslamic fait! and non1Eslamic institutions. 3!e Eslamic
moement must and can ta7e oer po;er as soon as it gro;s stronger morally and in si:e* and
not only in order to destroy t!e non1Eslamic aut!orities* (ut also to (uild t!e ne; Esmalic
aut!oritiesI. Under t!ese circumstances* !o; do you t!in7 t!at peace can (e ac!ieed in
$osnia1Der:egoinaA
The key points in 7r *(et%e#ovic's Declaration prove that his national concept is %eyon"
reconciliation $ith the presence of the non6*slamic people $ho2 inci"entally2 comprise more than
half the total population of 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& This is the key to the conflict in 3osnia an"
+er(e#ovina2 an" not 01er%ian a##ression0 or the 0#enetic e:pansionism0 of the 1er%s& * must
repeat that the stru##le in 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina is one of survival of the 1er%s $ho have %een
livin# there for centuries&
Co6e:istence is possi%le2 provi"e" that 7r *(et%e#ovic2 $ith the help of the international
community2 realises that the e:treme essence of his Declaration $ill not %e tolerate"&
3!e same U" Congressional report contains eidence of 2r E:et(egoic's ties ;it!
fundamentalist Eran and it says t!at I2r E:et(egoic made a deal ;it! 3e!ran ;!ic!* (efore any
escalation of conflict in $osnia and Der:egoina starts* it is imperatie t!at t!e sympat!y of t!e
%est is ;on. For t!at reason* t!e 2uslim special forces !ad carried out terror actions against
t!eir o;n peopleI. Es t!e /-A familiar ;it! suc! actsA
1uch actions L%y the 7uslimsN are not only kno$n to the H;<2 %ut to you also& The 3ritish
ne$spaper2 3!e Endependent* pu%lishe" the classifie" report %y U;P@O>O@ $hich state" that
the massacre at the %rea" 'ueue 66 $i"ely televise" in the )est 66 $as or"ere" %y the 7uslim top
lea"ership 0in or"er to $in sympathy0& LThe attack $as carrie" out %y 7uslims2 accor"in# to the
U;2 a#ainst 7uslims2 an" presente" as televise" evi"ence of a 01er%ian attack0 on 7uslims in
1ara8evo& 66 5d.N
The U; "iscovere" the true perpetrators of this crime2 %ut2 $ith the e:ception of the %rief
mention in such papers as 3!e Endependent* the $orl" has overlooke" the truth& The #raphic
television ima#e of the 01er%ian attack on the 7uslim %rea" 'ueue0 remains $ith most people&
The killin# of the three >rench sol"iers $as also hushe" up2 "espite later evi"ence that it $as
committe" %y the 7uslims2 not the 3osnian 1er%s&
?oes all of this mean that the )est $ill persist in "e%asin# its reputation %y continuin# to
sympathise $ith $hat is in reality a cruel fanaticism on the part of the 7uslims in 3osnia an"
+er(e#ovinaA <n" $ithin that conte:t the )est threatens to use force a#ainst those people2 the
1er%ian population in 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina2 $ho have %een force" to "efen" themselves&
Unfortunately that appears to %e the case&
General &anic* t!e <ugosla Goernment !as so far failed to ;in t!e sympat!ies of t!e %est* as
you !ae noted. 5ents c!arged ;it! emotion* suc! as t!e claim t!at I"er(s mortared t!e (read
@ueueI* and t!at "er(s attac7ed a (urial party ;it! sniper fire* and t!e murder of U" A$C ne;s
producer Daid Caplan* !ae (een largely ignored (y t!e %estern media. 3!at silence !as
clearly contri(uted to t!e pressure on t!ose ;!o are to decide on military interention against
"er(ia. Do; do you counter* or resist* suc! negatie pu(licityA
)e have not #iven up the %attle of tryin# to $in the un"erstan"in# of the )est& *t has not %een a
me"ia $ar2 %ut rather the imposition of political concepts& )hat $as the #oo" of irrefuta%le
evi"ence in our favourA Either such evi"ence $as not hee"e"2 or it $as hel" %ack %efore
important 66 an"2 for 1er%ian people2 tra#ic 66 "ecisions $ere taken2 an" then 8ust for#otten&
)hat more coul" the <rme" >orces of 5u#oslavia have "one $ith re#ar" to the sta#e"
0mortarin#0 of the %rea" 'ueue %ut offer the analysis of its e:perts $ho sai" that such effects
coul" not have %een cause" %y a mortar roun"2 %ut %y an e:plosive char#e $hich ha" %een
plante" earlier on in the 7uslim 'uarterA Please2 you tell me $hat influence coul" the <rme"
>orces of 5u#oslavia have ha" on the situation $here the official "ocument %y U;P@O>O@ $as
i#nore" an" kept secret %y the international institutions in a most immoral $ayA
)hy "i" not the truth #et covera#e in the )estern me"iaA *t is a 'uestion $hich shoul" %e rather
put to you than ice ersa.
The fact is that 8ournalists an" e"itors hate to #o %ack over a story2 an" particularly hate to a"mit
that they $ere use" or "upe"& That is un"erstan"a%le& 3ut the monstrousness of the killin# of
one's o$n people 66 as the 7uslims "i" to 7uslims in 1ara8evo 66 merely to provi"e false ima#es
to the me"ia shoul" arouse the an#er an" horror of every 8ournalist an" e"itor&
)e have not2 as * sai"2 a%an"one" hope of seein# %alance" covera#e of the situation& This $ill %e
an important factor in seein# %alance" policymakin# on the 3alkans %y $orl"' lea"ers& *t is for
that reason that those stru##lin# to push the 1er%s from their lan"s in 3osnia an" +er(e#ovina
fi#ht so har" to ensure that truth an" %alance" reportin# are the first casualties of this $ar&
The pen is in"ee" mi#htier than the s$or"2 an" the television camera mi#htier than the missile&
Gen. &anic*t!an7 you for your replies to our @uestions.

Regional Ethnic Coposition o! Bosnia and "er#ego$ina
Region Total Croats %uslis Serbs &ugosla$s 'thers
Tu(la ,192DDD I/21,D 9.E2I,1 992-1 /D21I 21,9
3an8a =uka D,,21, I21,9 .E2-,D ///2E9I //29/1 1,2/.1
1ara8evo D.I2-I, D12.1 -E92/,. 1,D2.-9 E2// 2-,
Cenica 992E, 1/-21-D ED211/ D-2DE/ -12-,D 1.2-E.
?o%o8 //-2.91 11E2,D- 1-I2I9 1992,E9 -21DD I2111
7ostar /D2/D1 1,-29- 11E2,,1 ,29E 1I2/II E21,1
3ihac IE2-E, E2DE1 ./2-D. E92ED/ D2.DE 2/I
Gora("e 1/2-EI 9/ E,2/.D 9.2ID 12D99 2.E/
=ivno ,12-/ 9D2,-/ 12.I1 1,2-D. 1299 -D,
/2-12I D9E21D9 12IID29EE 12-9921DE -D29, ,-2-EI
"ource: 1,,1 Census

1ecember +1, 1992
+i"in# Genoci"e
Croatia has resume" its 0li'ui"ation0 of 1er%s2 $hile ar#uin#
that 0ethnic cleansin#0 is a 1er%ian creation
"The Big Lie" technique is alive and well. Croatia has used the media and skilful image
manipulation to hide its renewed genocide against the Serbs while at the same time ensuring
that Serbs are themselves wrongly accused of the same type of crime and more.
Editor(in(Chie! Gregory Copley reports !ro the Bal)ans. T$ice %efore in this Century there
have %een $ell6"ocumente" attempts %y the Croats to "estroy the 1er%ian people2 an" to
o%literate their culture2 reli#ion an" memory& *t first %e#an2 "urin# the upheaval of the <ustro6
+un#arian Empire ! of $hich Croatia2 %ut not 1er%ia2 $as part ! $ith )orl" )ar *& Then2
after a perio" of apparent 3alkan harmony un"er the first 5u#oslavia ! the Bin#"om of 1er%s2
Croats an" 1lovenes ! it resurface" $ith the invasion an" occupation of 5u#oslavia %y *taly
an" Germany& ;a(i Germany of <pril 1.2 1,/12 proclaime" Croatia an in"epen"ent state for the
first time in its history2 an" installe" a neo6na(i puppet Government of the *n"epen"ent 1tate of
Croatia (kno$n in 1er%o6Croatian as -e:aisna Dr:aa Drats7a: ;?+)&
3et$een 1,/1 an" 1,/92 the Ustae ;?+ Government of &oglani7 (lea"er) <nte Pavelic
systematically kille" as many as one6million 1er% men2 $omen an" chil"ren& 1er%ian historians
claim that as many as t$o6million 1er%s have %een kille" %y Croatia in this century& Population
fi#ures over this century #ive cre"ence to the latter claim& ?ocumente" evi"ence confirms the
appro:imate accuracy of the )orl" )ar ** "eaths& >rom the %e#innin#2 the Pavelic Government
repeate"4 0There can %e no 1er%s or Ortho"o:y in Croatia&0 ;?+ official ?r 7ilovan Canic sai"
at a meetin# in ;ova Gra"iska on Hune 2 1,/14 0This $ill %e a country of Croats an" none other2
an" $e as Ustae $ill use every possi%le metho" to make this country truly Croat an" pur#e it of
the 1er%s& )e are not hi"in# this2 it is the policy of the state an" $hen it is carrie" out2 $e $ill %e
carryin# out $hat is $ritten "o$n in the Ustae principles&0
To"ay2 the ne$ly6in"epen"ent 1tate of Croatia has a"opte" the same sym%ols as the Ustae
puppet na(i state& *n many instances its military an" para6military units have a"opte" the same
uniforms of the 1,/16/9 Ustae 3lack =e#ions& <n" the killin# has %e#un a#ain& The
"ispossession has %e#un a#ain& The ;?+ puppet Government2 $ith the full support of the na(i
German occupyin# <rmy2 "estroye" some /9. 1er%ian Ortho"o: churches in )orl" )ar **& The
ne$ly6in"epen"ent 1tate of Croatia has either "irectly or in"irectly supporte" the "estruction of
more than -.. 1er%ian Ortho"o: churches ! many of $hich ha" %een re%uilt on the ru%%le of
the )orl" )ar ** sites ! in Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& 3et$een E..2... an" I..2...
ethnic 1er%s have fle" from Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina to 1er%ia to come un"er the
protection of the 5u#oslav ;ational <rmy (H;<)&
<ustrian historian >rei"rich +eer note" in 1,EI that $hat happene" in ;?+ Croatia $as the
result of 0archaic fanaticism an" pre6historic times0& Pavelic2 he sai"2 $as 0a sin#ular mur"erer
of the .th Century0& Pavelic is to"ay lau"e" as a hero of mo"ern CroatiaM his picture (an" that of
1,th Century Ustae i"eolo#ue <nte 1tarcevic) a"orns the T6shirts of a #eneration of Croatians
$ho $ere un%orn at the en" of )orl" )ar **&
Pavelic ha" note"4 0The 1lavoser%s are the ru%%ish of a nation2 the type of people $ho $ill sell
themselves to anyone an" at any price2 an" to every %uyer & & &0 3y Hune 12 1,/12 the movement
of all He$s an" 1er%s in Croatia ha" %een restricte"2 %ut %y then the mass killin#s ha" alrea"y
%e#un&
Croat $riter 7ile 3u"ak "eclare" in Gospic on Huly 2 1,/14 0& & & )e shall slay one thir" of the
1er%ian population2 "rive a$ay another Lthir"N2 an" the rest $e shall convert to the @oman
Catholic faith an" thus assimilate into Croats& Thus $e $ill "estroy every trace of theirs2 an" all
that $hich $ill %e left2 $ill %e an evil memory of them& & & & 0 The @oman Catholic Church2 far
more (ealous in Croatia than else$here in the $orl"2 "i" not fi#ht the na(is as they "i" in Polan"2
%ut em%race" them an" the Ustae. Croat catholic priests2 in clerical #ar%s an" out of it2 8oine" in
personally as killers in the concentration camps of Croatia&
To"ay2 it is $ith more than a hint of concern that 1er%s see the Catholic church offerin#
apparently unlimite" support to the ne$ Croatian Government an" its Ustae principles2 "espite
the 1,E- apolo#y of the @oman Catholic church in Croatia for the atrocities of )orl" )ar **& 0*t
is actually in this country that many of our Ortho"o: %rothers $ere kille" in the last $ar %ecause
they $ere Ortho"o:20 sai" <lfre" Pihler2 Catholic 3ishop of 3an8a =uka in his 1,E- Christmas
pastoral letter to @oman Catholics& 0<n" those Christians $ere kille" %ecause they $ere not
Croats an" Catholics& )e a"mit painfully such a terri%le fallacy of those people $ho ha" #one
astray2 an" %e# our %rothers of ortho"o: faith to for#ive us2 the same as Christ for#ave us all on
the cross&0
*t is si#nificant that2 in the 1,,161,, conflict2 there has %een no similar floo" of Croatian
refu#ees from 1er%ia (5u#oslavia) to Croatia2 as a counter%alance to those 1er%s (an" others)
$ho have %een fleein# from Croatia& *n"ee"2 so many Croatians have fle" to 1er%ia after
opposin# the ne$ Ustae 8u##ernaut of the >ran8o Tu"8man Government of Croatia that
or#ani(ations such as the <ssociation of Croatian Hournalists have %een set up in e:ile in
3el#ra"e& <n" yet the $orl" has not hear" anythin# of this&
Croatia2 in t$o $orl" $ars2 fou#ht on the si"e of Germany a#ainst the )estern <llies ($hile on
%oth occasions 1er%ia fou#ht $ith the <llies)& To"ay2 mo"ern Croatia is re#ar"e" as a creature of
the )est2 $hile $hat is left of 5u#oslavia (1er%ia an" 7ontene#ro) is re#ar"e" as a hostile
vesti#e of Tito's communist a"ministration& )hy2 or ho$2 can such a massive thin# as the
attempte" #enoci"e of a $hole people2 %e misrepresente" so that the victims2 rather than the
oppressors2 are calle" the criminalsA Can such a misrepresentation %e the result solely of
acci"ental misinterpretation of the factsA *t is not possi%le&
There is no "ou%t that the #enoci"e a#ainst 1er%s in Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina resume"
imme"iately after Germany force" the European Community2 in 1,,12 into the premature
reco#nition of $hat is no$ Croatia& Defense & Foreign Affairs correspon"ents have seen
irrefuta%le evi"ence of the facts& *t is precisely %ecause of the rene$e" #enoci"e a#ainst the
1er%s that those ethnic 1er%s $hose ancestors live" for centuries in 3osnia6+er(e#ovina2
re%elle" an" %e#an protectin# their villa#es an" their lives2 rather than once a#ain face slau#hter
or "eprivation of their lan"s&
Defense & Foreign Affairs has ha" the opportunity to match many of the photo#raphs an"
vi"eotape of the $ar "ea" $hich have #one out on the ne$s net$orks $orl"$i"e "urin# the past
1I months& *n virtually every instance2 the )estern me"ia has captione" the pictures of "ea" as
%ein# Croatian2 or 7uslims from 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& *n many instances2 families of the "ea"
have come for$ar" to i"entify the victims as ethnic 1er%s slau#htere" %y Croats2 or sometimes
%y 7uslims&
Firtually every piece of ne$s foota#e an" photo#raphy $hich emer#es from the conflict (one
comes out throu#h the Croatian capital2 Ca#re%2 or 7uslim6controlle" 3osnian outlets& )estern
me"ia chiefs have %een $arne" off acceptin# 0propa#an"a0 from $hat is purporte" to %e the
0vile2 neo6communist authorities0 of 3el#ra"e2 the capital of %oth 1er%ia an" 5u#oslavia&
)estern television2 inclu"in# the Eurovision e:chan#e2 has consistently refuse" to accept
anythin# emanatin# from 3el#ra"e& Defense & Foreign Affairs has seen the evi"ence of this2 too&
*t is si#nificant that the only television satellite uplink in 5u#oslavia $hen the state $as
prematurely %roken up $as in Ca#re%2 so it $as Croatia $hich $as a%le to corner the outflo$ of
television pictures& 3el#ra"e's links into the European satellite system $ere then rele#ate" to
secon" status2 an" so to"ay it must s$itch fre'uencies constantly in or"er to %roa"cast& <s a
result2 1er%ian6speakin# au"iences an" listeners in )estern Europe #enerally cannot fin" the
1er%ian or 5u#oslav %roa"casts2 an"2 on top of that2 there seems fairly #oo" evi"ence that
Germany is attemptin# to 8am2 or interfere $ith2 the %roa"castin# $hich "oes fin" an occasional
channel&
Croatian e:patriates have ha" a lon# time to esta%lish themselves in the )est2 an" #ain a #oo"
#rasp on some levers of po$er& The e:ile" 1er%s2 many of $hom fle" 5u#oslavia after )orl"
)ar ** %ecause of their opposition to Tito's communism2 $ere harrie" %y Tito's intelli#ence
services $herever they $ent2 even in <ustralia& Croatian e:iles2 ho$ever2 $ere left lar#ely
un"istur%e" %y the communist intelli#ence services2 lar#ely %ecause Tito himself $as a Croat&
To"ay2 as a result2 Croat nationalists fin" themselves in respecte" posts in respecte" )estern
or#ani(ations&
Christopher Cviic is a classic e:ample2 suppose"ly an impartial 3alkan e:pert in the @oyal
*nstitute of *nternational <ffairs& >rom this vanta#e point he is invite" onto 33C pro#rams to
#ive the *nstitute vie$ on the 3alkans2 only to reinforce a ra%i"ly anti61er%2 anti6(ne$) 5u#oslav
vie$point& The fact that the presti#ious institute $as use" in 1,,1 to pu%lish Cviic's tract2
Jema7ing t!e $al7ans* is testament to the su%version of respecte" %o"ies to achieve pro6Croatian
aims&
E"$ar" Gi%%on2 in his Decline and Fall of t!e Joman 5mpire* note"4 0?ili#ence an" accuracy
are the only merits $hich an historical $riter may ascri%e to himselfM if any merit can %e
assume" from the performance of an in"ispensa%le "uty&0 ?ili#ence2 accuracy an" %alance have
%een remove" from the current $ritin#s on the historic events no$ un"er$ay in the 3alkans& Part
of this is "ue to the fact that 8ournalists have a natural ten"ency to report mostly that to $hich
they can have easy accessM %elieve most rea"ily that $hich has %een lai" out for them in forms2
an" throu#h channels2 $ith $hich they feel comforta%le& Tra"itionally2 $hen one 8ournalist2 or
only a small num%er2 $orks har"er2 takes more risks2 strives more to un"erstan" the %roa"er
picture2 an" reports a vie$ contrary to that of his e"itorial cousins2 he is not haile" for his
achievement& +e is casti#ate" for %reakin# ranks $ith the accepte" line2 the accepte" truth& <
8ournalist $ho a"mits (in the li#ht of later6"iscovere" truths) that his $ork may not have %een all
that it shoul" fears most an" first the $rath of his e"itor& The e"itor himself re8ects correction
(for fear of losin# cre"i%ility2 a ne$s me"ium's only asset)2 unless the la$s of li%el force such
apolo#y or correction& <n" in $ar there is no li%el& 3etter to sustain a lie than to lose circulation2
vie$ers or listeners2 %y a revision of the vie$&
Perhaps this accounts for the apparently consistent effort to ensure that the 1er%ian an" 5u#oslav
messa#e is not allo$e" to compete $ith that of other veste" interestsA
*t is clear that Croatian strate#ic aims have %een consi"era%ly a"vance" %y the increasin#
persecution of 1er%s2 1er%ia an" 5u#oslavia in the current 3alkan conflict& *n"ee"2 Croatia's
#ran" strate#y is consi"era%ly a"vance" %y ensurin# that a confuse" ima#e appears in the min"s
of the international policymakin# au"ience (an" the me"ia $hich influences it) as to the
"ifferences %et$een 3osnian 1er%s2 1er%ia an" 5u#oslavia&
To %e#in $ith2 Croatian strate#ic o%8ectives have %een historically state"2 an" are to"ay re6state"2
to inclu"e the elimination of all 1er%s from $hat the Croatian lea"ership %elieves to %e its
territory& Croatia's territorial o%8ectives are state"2 $henever possi%le2 as the recreation of the
%oun"aries of the 1,/161,/9 so6calle" *n"epen"ent 1tate of Croatia2 $hich su%sumes virtually
all of 3osnia6+er(e#ovina an" much of 1er%ia& <""itionally2 mo"ern Croatia $ill not a%an"on
the #ift $hich 5u#oslavia's communist Croatian lea"er #ave it4 virtually all of the ?almatian
coastline an" key ports& The )orl" )ar ** "ivision of spoils #ave this to *talyM to"ay2 $ith no
historic prece"ent to 8ustify it2 the lan" has %een reco#ni(e" as Croatian&
The propa#an"a to remove 3osnian 1er%s from 3osnia6+er(e#ovina ena%les Croatian forces to
consoli"ate their hol" over as much of that ne$ly6in"epen"ent state as possi%le& The militias of
Croatian 3osnians to#ether $ith some /.2... Croatian <rme" >orces personnel have %een
consoli"atin# their control over much of 3osnia6+er(e#ovina at the e:pense not only of the
3osnian 1er%s2 %ut also of the 3osnian 7uslims $ho are themselves ethnically an" lin#uistically
1er%&
The campai#n of #enoci"e an" terror a#ainst the 3osnian an" Croatian 1er%s helps re"uce the
1er%ian populations of those t$o states2 helpin# to ensure Croatian "ominance& The campai#n to
claim that the #enoci"e is 1er%ian in ori#in an" that the victims are Croats or 7uslims puts the
1er%s on the "efensive an" %uil"s the case for Croatia to have the international community
#uarantee Croatia's status @uo an" its e:pansion in the 3alkans&
The late 1,,1 %attle for Fukovar $as portraye" in the )estern me"ia as a %attle %et$een heroic
Croatian "efen"ers a#ainst over$helmin# 5u#oslav (ie4 1er%ian) mo"ern military mi#ht&
1i#nificantly2 as in )orl" )ar ** Germany $hen the concentration camp ovens kept %urnin# as
the <llie" forces s$ept to$ar" them2 Croats in Fukovar from Hune 1 to ;ovem%er -2 1,,12
$ere %usy e:terminatin# those 1er% families $ho ha" not %een a%le to flee& *t $as for this reason
that the H;< ! the 5u#oslav <rmy ! fou#ht %ack into Fukovar&
<t least 12... 1er%s2 mostly $omen2 ol" people an" chil"ren2 $ere shot2 knife"2 a:e" or
%lu"#eone" to "eath systematically2 one6%y6one2 in t$o main centersM one the 3orovo >oot$ear
>actory2 the other the @o$in# Clu% of Fukovar& 7any of the %o"ies $ere "umpe" into the
?anu%e2 left to float "o$n to 3el#ra"e& <n" in many instances2 the Croats took pictures2 or
recor"e" the "eaths& One visitin# Croat female 8ournalist2 "urin# the Fukovar fi#htin#2
unfamiliar $ith firearms2 aske" one of the youn# #unmen to cock a pistol for her so that she
coul" feel $hat it $as like to kill a 1er%& 1he shot2 in"iscriminately2 an ol" 1er% $oman $ho $as
stan"in# un"er Croat #uar"&
One 1er%2 3ranko 1tankovic2 $as capture" after %ein# $oun"e" in the le# %y Croat forces& +e
$as taken to a hospital $here he $as force" to make a television %roa"cast for Croatian
television2 sayin# ho$ $ell he an" other prisoners $ere %ein# treate"& +e $as then taken out an"
kille"& Photo#raphs of his torture"2 mutilate" %o"y $ere su%se'uently foun"& 1o2 too2 $ere a
si#nificant variety of specially ma"e implements for torturin# an" killin#&
Fukovar has seen it %efore4 3et$een <u#ust I an" 1eptem%er 1E2 1,/2 some 1.2... 1er%s $ere
kille" an" scores of thousan"s more $ere torture" %y their Croat captors&
3ut the Fukovar tra#e"y of 1,,1 is %ut one of thousan"s of ne$ killin#s $hich have occurre"
"urin# the past year or so of in"epen"ence in Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& There $ere
similar atrocities in the Croatian to$n of Gospic in mi"6Octo%er 1,,1& <n" in Glina2 another
)orl" )ar ** massacre site revisite" %y Ustae in ?ecem%er 1,,1& <n" Bupres& There2 12.-E
1er%s $ere kille" in )orl" )ar ** un"er the or"ers of the Ustae ($ho kille" II, of the 1er%s)2
%y *talian troops an" %y German troops& < still unkno$n num%er of 1er%s $ere %utchere" %y
several Croatian military formations2 the +O12 C;G an" forei#n mercenaries2 in early <pril
1,,&
)hat is si#nificant is that the slo#ans of the Croats are those of the Ustae of )orl" )ar ** an"
pre6)orl" )ar **& The $eapons use" for ritual killin# are also2 sym%olically2 virtually the same&
The knife is a favorite2 an" many special knives $ere ma"e "urin# the Fukovar killin#s& These2
alon# $ith the 1er% victims2 $ere foun" later&
7any 1er%ian villa#es an" to$ns $ere ra(e" "urin# the past 1I months in Croatia an" Croatian6
hel" parts of 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& Even in Ca#re%2 $here no fi#htin# officially took place2 more
than 1.. 1er%s ha" %een kille" in 1,,1 alone2 an" the Ortho"o: churches there "ama#e" or
"estroye"&
Hournalists an" analysts lookin# at the overall situation in the 3alkans to"ay must ask $hy in
Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina hun"re"s of ortho"o: churches have %een "estroye"2 $hile in
Ortho"o: 1er%ia no Croatian institutions or Catholic churches have %een attacke"& The ans$er is
that in Croatia ! as has %een historically "ocumente" ! there is $i"esprea" Croatian Catholic
:enopho%ia aime" at the Ortho"o: church an" 1er%s2 $hereas there has %een no such
:enopho%ia a#ainst Croats or Catholics in 1er%ia or 7ontene#ro&
7ore than /. percent of the population of 1er%ia is non61er%ian2 an" there has %een a history of
multi6ethnic2 multi6reli#ious2 multi6cultural cooperation $hich has not prevaile" in Croatia&
*n"ee"2 $here Croatia's Government to"ay intimates that there $ere e:cesses in Croatia "urin#
)orl" )ar **2 it also says that there $ere similar e:cesses %y 1er%s in 1er%ia at the same time&
The truth is that Croatia2 $hen it #reete" its German 0li%erators0 $ith open arms on 1eptem%er
1.2 1,/12 %e#an its o$n campai#n of e:termination of 1er%s2 He$s an" Gypsies& On the other
han"2 the e:termination of He$s an" Gypsies in 1er%ia $as carrie" out virtually entirely %y
Germans or 5u#oslavs of German %ack#roun"&
To"ay2 the %o"ies of 1er%s still float "o$n the ?anu%e into 1er%ia& To"ay2 1er%ians an"
5u#oslavs are en"in# their 9. years of silence ! "eman"e" an" enforce" %y Tito ! a%out the
)orl" )ar ** anti61er% #enoci"e& < pro8ect to recor" 0Genoci"e <#ainst the 1er%s2 1,,1O,0
$as %e#an %y 7iss 3o8ana *sakovic& The pro8ect2 currently a massive "isplay of "ocuments2
photo#raphs an" artifacts2 has %ecome a tra#ic focal point for "isplace" Croatian an" 3osnian
1er%s2 $ho %rin# photo#raphs or reports of missin# family mem%ers to the 7useum of <pplie"
<rts in 3el#ra"e2 hopin# to fin" ne$s of their kin& 7any %urne" corpses have2 throu#h
painstakin# forensic research2 %een i"entifie" as a result of information %rou#ht to the center&
On more than one occasion2 1er%s livin# outsi"e the 3alkans2 some in Germany2 have seen
television of 0Croats (or 7uslims) %utchere" %y 1er%s an" have reco#ni(e" their o$n (1er%ian)
family mem%ers $ron#ly la%ele" as Croats or 7uslims& The pattern has %een too consistent to
have %een acci"ental& 1imilarly2 the many stories alle#in# rapes %y 3osnian 1er%s of 7uslim
$omen in 3osnia6+er(e#ovina have clearly involve" carefully sta#e" performances %y non6
7uslims "resse" up as 7uslims& @ape (on all si"es) is one of the %ypro"ucts of all conflicts2 %ut
the clear sta#in# of these events %y Croats has %een si#nificant&
The Unite" ;ations has alrea"y sai" that no$2 after proper research2 it kno$s that several ma8or
inci"ents $ere sta#e" %y 3osnian 7uslims or Croats so that they coul" %e %lame" on 1er%s&
These inclu"e the famous (televise") mortarin# of a 7uslim %rea" 'ueue in 1ara8evo2 un"ertaken
%y 7uslim forces a#ainst their o$n people $hen television cameramen ha" %een alerte"& The
attack $as %lame" on 1er%ian forces (no$ "isprove") an"2 "espite the U; fin"in#s2 has never
%een refute" %y )estern ne$s me"ia& <nother2 similar inci"ent occurre" (as verifie" %y the U;)2
$hen 7uslim snipers shot at mourners atten"in# a 7uslim funeral in 1ara8evo2 for the %enefit of
specially6place" TF Cameramen& The U; has also sai" that the shootin# "o$n of the *talian <ir
>orce G6 supply aircraft near 1ara8evo $as the $ork of Coats2 not 1er%s as ori#inally %lame"&
The )estern me"ia has not correcte" the story&
To"ay2 trucks %earin# Unite" ;ations relief supplies rum%le "o$n throu#h +un#ary an" across
5u#oslavia (in safety) an" then into 3osnia6+er(e#ovina& *t is only there that they come un"er
fire an" then mostly from 7uslim forces& *ronically2 the 7uslims counte" on Croatian military
support "urin# their conflict to #ain supremacy over the 3osnian 1er%s& Time an" a#ain2 Croatian
forces helpe" the 7uslims ri#ht up to the point that "irect conflict $as initiate" a#ainst the
3osnian 1er%s2 an" then Croatian forces $ith"re$ to leave the 7uslims e:pose"& <n" this
"espite the many occasions ()orl" )ar ** inclu"e") that 7uslims helpe" the Croatian #enoci"e
a#ainst the 1er%s&
The accounts of Croatian #enoci"e a#ainst 1er%s in )orl" )ar **2 assiste" %y %oth local 7uslim
lea"ers an" %y many Catholic priests2 have %een a%solutely verifie" %y international o%servers
an" ackno$le"#e" %y the Fatican& )hen ?r >ran8o Tu"8man proclaime" the ne$ Croatian state
in 1,,.2 it $as a ne$ Ustae state2 $ith all the ol" sym%ols (inclu"in# the re"6an"6$hite Ustae
che'uer%oar" shiel")2 an" in the presence of a papal representative an" 7uslim lea"ership&
Tu"8man2 at the first convention of the Croatian ?emocratic Union (Drats7a Demo7rats7a
=aCednica: +?C)2 on >e%ruary E2 1,,.2 sai"2 in the presence of more than 1.. Ustae $ar
criminals $ho ha" escape" the la$ courts an" fle" to international havens after )orl" )ar **4
0The *n"epen"ent 1tate of Croatia Lie4 the )orl" )ar ** stateN $as not only a mere Puislin#
creation2 %ut also an e:pression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people for an
in"epen"ent state of their o$n an" reco#nition of international factors ! the Government of
+itler's Germany in this case&0
The use of Ustae sym%ols an" slo#ans ha" the same effect on mo"ern 1er%s as if2 to"ay2
German Chancellor +elmut Bohl ha" use" s$astikas an" the re"2 $hite an" %lack of the na(is to
proclaim the ne$ unifie" Germany& <n" yet the )estern $orl"2 i#norant of the 3alkan history2
pai" no attention to this hi#hly6char#e" local sym%olism&
*n"ee"2 3avarian German Catholics2 $hile in"i#nant an" upset at the rise of neo6na(ism in
Germany2 have sent massive monetary ai" to the ne$ Croatian Ustae* $ho have openly
proclaime" their i"entity $ith the Ustae <"ministration of 1,/161,/9 an" its fervent support for
+itler&
Tu"8man "elivere" a speech to the Croatian "a(or (parliament) on the occasion of the
proclamation of the @epu%lic of Croatia on ?ecem%er 2 1,,.& *n the Constitution he propose"2
an" $hich $as a"opte"2 the 1er%s lost their nation status $ithin Croatia2 an" $ere rele#ate" to
the status of a national minority& The official $ar a#ainst the 1er%s ha" %een resume"&
Even %efore Croatia %ecame in"epen"ent2 the Croatian 7inister of *nternal <ffairs2 7artin
1pe#el82 a"vise" his collea#ues4 0)e are in the $ar $ith Lie4 a#ainstN the <rmy L5u#oslav <rmy4
H;<N& 1houl" anythin# happen2 kill them all in the streets2 in their homes2 throu#h han"
#rena"es2 fire pistols into their %ellies2 $omen2 chil"ren & & & )e $ill "eal $ith Lthe Croatian 1er%
to$n ofN Bnin %y %utcherin#&0
The premature reco#nition of Croatia's in"epen"ence %y Germany2 $ithout consultation $ith the
other EC state2 also sa$ the fact that a su%stantial Croatian <rmy ha" %een create" $ell in
a"vance2 fully e'uippe" $ith German6supplie" uniforms an" $eapons& The su""enness of the
situation "eprive" all the states of the ol" 5u#oslavia the opportunity to ne#otiate their
separation an" to "efine their %oun"aries alon# proper historical2 #eo#raphic an"2 if necessary2
ethnic lines& The Croatian militias (there are several) attacke" the H;<2 the 5u#oslav <rmy2
$hich $as still in its %arracks in Croatia2 ensurin# that there coul" %e no or"erly $ith"ra$al
from Croatia&
That $as not the case in the former 5u#oslav state of 7ace"onia2 $here consensus allo$e" an
or"erly an" peaceful $ith"ra$al of the H;< %ack into the ne$ 5u#oslav %or"ers&
3ut in Croatia2 the ne$ lea"ership $ante" (a) to initiate conflict a#ainst 3el#ra"e an" therefore
the 1er%s2 (%) to %e#in the process of rollin# 1er%ian an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina %or"ers %ack to the
)orl" )ar ** %or"ers2 an" (c) to sei(e H;< military assets& <t least t$o %ri#a"es of main %attle
tanks an" t$o %ri#a"es $orth of armore" personnel carriers $ere successfully sei(e" %y the
Croats throu#h this strata#em of unilaterally "eclarin# $ar on the rump 5u#oslavia an" the 1er%
peoples (%oth in an" out of 1er%ia)& To"ay2 the impact of 0The 3i# =ie0 $hich accuses the 1er%s
of Genoci"e in the current 3alkan $ar is the e'uivalent of lookin# %ack at 1,-, an" "eman"in#
sanctions a#ainst the $orl"$i"e He$ish population %ecause 0German He$s ha" %e#un a
campai#n of #enoci"e a#ainst the German people0& +istory $ill sho$ that the massive "eception
a#ainst the 1er%s $as not only un8ustM it also helpe" allo$ the $holly avoi"a%le #enoci"e $hich
has occurre" a#ainst the 1er%ian people for the thir" time this century& <n" it also $as the ma8or
cause for the conflict $hich ra#es to"ay&
Croats2 1er%s an" the 3osnian 7uslims are ethnically in"istin#uisha%leM they are all of the same
1lavic stock& This hi#hli#hts the irony of one people2 the Croats (sometimes ai"e" in Croatia an"
3osnia6+er(e#ovina %y the 7uslims)2 settin# out to annihilate its t$in2 the 1er%s& The most
outstan"in# "ifference to $hich most o%servers $oul" point to"ay $oul" %e the fact that
Croatians "efine themselves %y their @oman CatholicismM 1er%s %y their a"herence to the
1er%ian Ortho"o: Church& 3ut that is too simple& The t$o peoples $ere raise" in "ifferent2 al%eit
a"8acent2 territories2 1er%ia %ein# tra"itionally in"epen"ent2 an" Croatia for many centuries part
of the <ustro6+un#arian Empire& Croatians have also nurture" for much of this time a "ream of a
#reater Croatia2 e:ten"in# $ell into lan"s hel" %y 1er%s an" the 1er%s $ho ha" %een converte" to
*slam un"er the Turkish invasions& This has create" a Croatian mentality $hich is $i"esprea"
an" $hich resents the very e:istence of the 1er%s&
*t is si#nificant2 an" proven repeate"ly throu#h history2 that 1er%s have not %een raise" $ith
similar nationalistic or territorial am%itions& *t $as in this Century al$ays the 1er%s $ho $ere
prepare" to surren"er lan" an" presti#e (not to mention po$er) for the #oo" of the #reater
5u#oslavia& 3ut2 "urin# the Bin#"om an" then the post6)orl" )ar ** repu%lic2 Croats al$ays
referre" to themselves as Croatians first an" 5u#oslavs secon"& 1er%ian culture hel"2 "urin# the
5u#oslav era2 that it $oul" have %een in poor taste to %oast first of %ein# 1er%ian an" to rele#ate
5u#oslav status to secon" place& The 1er%s have not sou#ht #eo#raphic or cultural "ominance
$ithin 5u#oslavia& 7ost 1er%s $ithin the @epu%lic of 1er%ia an" $ithin the ne$ 5u#oslavia
(1er%ia an" 7ontene#ro) are not seekin# to em%race the ethnically 1er%ian areas of 3osnia6
+er(e#ovina into 1er%ia or 5u#oslavia2 even thou#h they are almost universally reluctant to turn
their %acks on their co6ethnic %rother across the %or"er&
<n" yet the H;< cannot #o into 3osnia6+er(e#ovina or Croatia to protect 1er%s from the attacks
$hich $ere starte" respectively %y the Croatians an" 3osnian 7uslims an" 3osnian Croatians&
To"ay2 Croatia a"mits havin# its troops L/.2... of theN in 3osnia6+er(e#ovina2 alon#si"e the
3osnia6+er(e#ovina Croat militias& <ll three so6calle" ethnic #roups (7uslims2 1er%s an"
Croats) in 3osnia6+er(e#ovina "rifte" into $hat is no$2 for the first time2 an in"epen"ent state2
artificially create" %y <ustro6+un#arian carto#raphers an" %y Hosip 3ro( Tito2 the late Croatian
hea" of 5u#oslavia& <n"2 save for the %ar%arities $hich came alive in )orl" )ars * an" ** an" in
1,,16,2 all live" an" share" the lan" $ith reasona%le e'uanimity&
Croatia's lea"ers2 an" Croatian $arlor"s $ho roam freely $ith their militias throu#hout Croatia
an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina2 are to"ay #iven complete po$er %y the )est an" particular %y )estern
me"ia&
The story is %i##er than this2 an" more comple:& The tra#e"y of the #enoci"e $hich continues
a#ainst the 1er%s is %i##er an" more vul#ar than there is scope here to in"icate& The reversal of
the %lame for the state of affairs is more than tra#e"y& *t is of strate#ic importance on a near
#lo%al scale&
< micro6state2 Croatia2 is "ra##in# much of the $orl" into $hat coul" %e a ma8or2 protracte"
conflict2 %y makin# the Unite" ;ations an i#norant party to its strate#ic o%8ectives& The
#eopolitical aspects are of si#nificance4 Germany's reluctance to reco#ni(e that Croatia's ne$
lea"ers an" %o"y politic are a thro$%ack to an era for $hich Germany has itself ha" to atone for
a half6century is %ecause Germany "oes not $ish to surren"er this 0open route to the
7e"iterranean0 $hich can pass throu#h Croatia& @ussia itself sees lon#6term #eopolitical #ain in
supportin# 1er%ia as a stalkin# horse to the 1outh (an" 5u#oslav lea"ers are most reluctant to
invoke @ussian support for fear of attractin# the un$ante" em6%race of 7osco$2 resiste" for so
lon# even $hen 5u#oslavia $as2 un"er the Croatian lea"ership of Tito2 a )estern from of
communist state)&
Perhaps the most ironic ima#e $hich >ran8o Tu"8man invokes is that he2 an" the ne$ @epu%lic
of Croatia2 are 0part of the )est2 part of Europe0& Tu"8man's 0"emocratic0 nation is %ecomin# a
one6party state2 in a reversal of tren"s in Eastern an" )estern Europe& *t has %ecome a neo6na(i
Ustae state2 harkenin# %ack to the last "ivision (rather than the ne$ unification) of Europe& <n"
it stiffly resists ten"encies to move to$ar" a market economyM less than 1. percent of the G;P is
#enerate" %y private in"ustry& *t is over$helmin#ly a nationalist6socialist state2 $hile %lin"ly
pointin# at $hat is the ne$ 5u#oslavia as the rump of a sort6of communist state& *n"ee"2 in
5u#oslavia to"ay there is consi"era%le momentum to$ar" a %roa"ly6%ase" mi:e" economy in a
pluralistic society2 the reverse of tren"s in Croatia an" 3osnia6+er(e#ovina&
3ut the #reatest "eception perpetrate" on the international me"ia is the fact that the Croatian
<"ministration has pur#e" all of the Croatian me"ia of any opposition (let alone 1er%ian)
elements2 at the same time that the )estern me"ia $ere le" to %elieve that the "er(ian me"ia
$ere universally controlle" %y 1er%ian Presi"ent 1lo%o"an 7iloQevic& <n" yet in 1er%ia most
television an" press $oul" consi"er itself to %e freely in opposition to2 or at least critical of2 the
current lea"ership&
)ill the prevailin# official an" me"ia vie$s of the 3alkan crisis eer come into %alanceA )ill
this information $ar create a ma8or conflictA
Attached Illustrations on 'riginal printed $ersion o! this story* Cover Photo2 < 1er%ian
victim of to"ay's campai#n of #enoci"e %y the Croatians& 7ira Balan82 a 1er% economist from
Gospic2 Croatia& Bille" an" %urne" %y Croatians in the rai" of Octo%er 1E61I2 1,,1& Pictures 1
an" 2 The remains of some of the 1I 1er% victims of Ustae 0pit mur"ers0 of Huly -.2 1,/1&
The victims2 from the to$n of @u8an2 $ere mostly $omen an" chil"ren2 an" $ere thro$n into the
@avni ?olac pit in the ?inara 7ountains& >ourteen victims survive" the 9.m fall an" $ere save"
after spen"in# /9 "ays $ithout foo" or $ater& 3ranimir 7ilosevic67ilic2 a 1er% %oy of 112 $as
kille" $ith t$o %ullets to the %rain2 $hen Croatians %e#an roun"in# up an" killin# 1er%s in
Fukovar in late 1,,1&