2004 Second Preliminary Report (Eng.)

The Second Preliminary Report
by
The Ad Hoc Commission

on the Depayin Massacre
(Burma)
“Let’s join hands together in promoting global justice by facilitating the efforts of
the people in Burma to seek justice for the Depayin Massacre.”
Published by
The Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre
May 2004
This publication has been funded by the Euro-Burma office.
Contact us at:
e-mail address: ahcdm@cscoms.com
mailing address: PO Box 29, Hua Mark Post Office
10243 Bangkok Thailand
Contents
Words of gratitude 6
Introduction 8
Chapter (1) 15
Examples of serious violent actions and repressive measures committed
by the State authorities against Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members
before the Depayin ambush
Chapter (2) 26
Disturbances and harassments during the trip to Kachin State
– the last trip before the Depayin Massacre
Chapter (3)
36
The Depayin Massacre
Chapter (4) 45
The preliminary analysis of the Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre
Chapter (5) 59
Testimonies of eyewitnesses:
1. Khin Oo 60
2. Wunna Maung 70
3. Nyunt Nyunt 77
4. Min Thein 85
5. Phoe Zaw (a.k.a. Maung Zaw) 92
6. Aung Aung (a.k.a. Aung San Win) 98
7. Naing Naing (a.k.a. Thein Naing) 107
8. Khin Aye Myint 118
Chapter (6) 122

Domestic and international responses to the Depayin Massacre
Chapter (7) 137

Pleas from the Ad hoc Commission
Chapter (8) 147

Authorities involvement in the massacre
Appendixes
162 (1) List of the wounded, missing, and dead and list of vehicles
involved in the massacre
178 (2) Statement from the NLD
180 (3) Excerpt of Aung San Suu Kyi’s press conference on Apr 23,
2003
193 (4) Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech delivered in Monywa on the night
of 29 May 2003
197 (5) Press conferences of the Burmese military junta
204 (6) Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung
209 (7) Testimony of Soe Than, an NLD member from Kamayut

Township, Rangoon
218 (8) Burma resolution from the 57th UNGA on 18 November 2003
4 Ad hoc Comission on the Depayin Massacre

Aung San Sui Kyi with NLD members speaks to the public.
2nd Preliminary Report: May 2004 5

Words of Gratitude
T
he Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre would like to express
our heart-felt gratitude to the following organizations and individuals
that have assisted us in receiving eyewitnesses from inside Burma,
collecting evidence, opening the commission office, taking care of the
victims/eyewitness, dissemination of collected information regarding the
massacre to the media at home and abroad, translation of the entire report
into English, the layout and design and all other assistance for the report.
Without their unwavering and crucial support for timely publication of the
report, it would not have been possible for the Commission to accomplish
the task.
1. Victims and eyewitness who courageously testified or provided

affidavits regarding the Depayin Massacre.
2. Organizations, leaders and all other responsible personnel from the

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the
National Council of the Union of Burma.
3. Legal experts and lawyers from the Burma Lawyer’s Council,

international legal experts and human rights organization who have
advised the Commission in regard to matters relating to legal and
human rights issues and assisted or cooperated with the Commission
in its endeavor to expose the truth about the Depayin Massacre.
4. The Political Defiance Committee of the National Council of the

Union of Burma.
5. Members of Parliament from inside Burma, the United Nationalities

League for Democracy and the National League for Democracy (NLD)
who wrote letters to the UN and have assisted the Commission by
collecting information and evidence regarding the massacre and
leaders and all other political forces, including the Youth Wing of
the NLD, that have constantly demanded for an investigation into
the massacre so that justice may be served.
6. The Network for Democracy and Development in Burma that

provided the Commission with information and photographs, the
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) that compiled
the list of victims of the massacre, and all other organizations and

individuals from inside Burma whose name cannot be divulged,
due to concerns that they may be persecuted, for their invaluable
support which has made this report possible.
7. U Aung Naing Oo from the Burma Fund who translated the report
into English, Tracy who assisted us in the editing and layout of the
report, the volunteers from Burma Volunteer Program (BVP) who
also helped with some editing, office staff members Zarny, Tun
Hla, and Bo Nyein who assited with logistics and Maung Tauk for
the report’s cover design.
-The Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre
May 2004

Introduction
A
massacre took place on 30 May 2003, near a village called
‘Kyi’ in Depayin Township, which is located in Shwebo District,
Sagaing Division, of Upper Burma. The massacre was
orchestrated by the Burmese military junta, known as the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC). The victims were members of the National
League for Democracy (NLD) and innocent villagers.
The SPDC is entirely responsible for the ambush that is now known
as the ‘Depayin Massacre’. Officially 4 people were killed and 48 were
injured. Following the ambush, the SPDC shut down all NLD offices and
detained all of the top party leadership, including its General Secretary
and 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi. An unknown number
of NLD and other political activists have also been jailed. However, the
SPDC has avoided taking any responsibility in the matter and has refused
to investigate the massacre. Furthermore, it has ignored all calls for an
independent inquiry.
Therefore, the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), the

largest pro-democracy and ethnic alliance, whose members include
organizations such as; the Members of Parliamentary Union (Burma), the
National Democratic Front, the Democratic Alliance of Burma and the
National League for Democracy (Liberated Area), in conjunction with the
Burma Lawyers Council (BLC), formed a commission known as the Ad hoc
Commission on Depayin Massacre on 25 June 2003, in order to investigate
the events surrounding the Depayin Massacre.
Members of the Commission
NCUB
1. U Khin Kyaw Han, member of the NCUB Presidium and elected

NLD representative from Yeinanchaung Constituency 2
2. U Kyaw Kyaw, team leader of the Political Defiance Committee
and the Chairman of the Network for Democracy and
Development in Burma

BLC
1. U Aung Htoo, M.A. (Human Rights), R.L. and General Secretary

of the BLC
2. U Min Lwin Oo, L.L.B, Legal Aid section of the BLC
The Commission has the total political support and guarantee of

the NCUB and the legal expertise and assistance of the BLC. Based on
these credentials, the Commission has the freedom to decide and carry
out the necessary tasks and procedures.
The Role of the Commission
The Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre is not an organization

that has the discretion to travel inside Burma to the spot where the massacre
took place. Nor is it an organization that has the power to question both
the State authorities and witnesses, as well as collect all of the information
and evidence concerning the massacre. It is simply a temporary commission
to reveal the facts regarding the events surrounding the massacre and the
massacre itself, whereby a situation may emerge in which justice can be
brought upon those responsible for the massacre.
Collecting Testimonies from the Witnesses
In the process of collecting and accepting testimonies from witnesses,

the Commission first contacted various reliable sources inside Burma for
the verification of the authenticity of witnesses, their identities, backgrounds
and involvement in the massacre and other political activities. Then by
studying their testimonies, the Commission determined if they were in
fact bone fide witnesses.
The Commission experienced many difficulties in carrying out this

task. Before interviewing the witnesses on a one-on-one basis for their
testimonies, the Commission was obliged to request each witness to take
an oath swearing that they were in fact present at the massacre. Only after
initial screening and investigation was complete, were their testimonies
taken.
The Commission tried its best to be as objective and accurate as

possible in its task. However, the Commission is mindful of the fact that
there may be flaws or incomplete data in the report. The Commission still
has a number of testimonies that have not yet been utilized, due to the
fact that they may be controversial and they still require confirmation
despite repeated analysis and verification. These testimonies have not
been included in this report.

The Second Preliminary Report
The Commission published an urgent preliminary report in English

on 4 July 2003. This was done following the collection of testimonies
from four people who were deemed reliable witnesses. The reason for
publishing the report in this manner, without waiting until ample evidence
was collected, was because the Commission wanted to disclose the findings
of the massacre to the people of Burma and the international community.
The Commission had the aim to publish a full report at a later date once
more information and testimonies had been gathered. At present, it has
collected testimonies from eight witnesses that have been thoroughly
checked and analyzed. Based on these testimonies, this report is the fruit
of the work that the Commission has accomplished thus far. Further, the
Commission continues to collect information and evidence with the hopes
of disclosing additional findings, if there are any, in the future.
Crimes Committed by the Military and Impunities
Burma has been suffering from lawlessness for more than 40 years.
During this time, the military authorities have committed a multitude of
crimes. They began with the 7 July event in 1962, three months after the
military coup in March, in which numerous students from Rangoon
University were killed. However, the military junta reported that only 15
people were killed and 27 were injured. In the same manner, the current
regime announced that only 4 political activists were killed and 48 were
wounded in the Depayin Massacre. Hundreds of unarmed civilians were
gunned down in another shooting incident on 9 August 1988 that took
place in front of the Sagaing Police Station. Similarly, the military regime
understated that death toll with 31 deaths and 31 wounded. No one has
ever been brought to justice for these brutal crimes.
Furthermore, a sham commission was formed on 13 March 1988,

in order to investigate the death of Phone Maw, a student from the Rangoon
Institute of Technology. However, the junta did not bring charges against
anyone. Likewise, the junta failed to bring justice in the case of 41 people
who were suffocated to death on 18 March of the same year during their
transport to prison in a police van. Neither the victims nor their families
ever saw legal justice done. There was no public report from the police.
Nor did the police give any explanation to the general population regarding
this case. In addition, the Burmese junta continues to blatantly deny
responsibility for the rapes and other crimes committed against the Shan
and other ethnic women during military offensives in ethnic areas. Despite
repeated documentation and damning evidence, no one has ever been
brought to justice. In short, the Burmese military junta and the Burmese

Army have enjoyed impunity from the crimes they have committed since
the 1962 military takeover.
The Significance of the Depayin Massacre
The Depayin Massacre is different from many other abuses that the
Burmese junta has committed in the past. It is significant in that it was
executed - unlike previous crimes - in cold blood and without any
provocation. Previous shootings were always a response to demonstrations
or uprisings, such as the State sponsored shootings during the 1988
uprising. It was also significant in that the crime was not committed in a
remote area where the Burmese Army wages war against the country’s
ethnic groups; the massacre took place in the presence of hundreds of
witnesses and while Burma was at the focus of the international community.
Furthermore, the crime was not directed against ordinary citizens.

It was committed against a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and leaders of a
legal political party that might have been the legitimate government, had
it not been for the repudiation of the results of the election that it won in
1990.
If military impunity continues, as it has thus far in other crimes,

justice will be lost not only for the victims of the massacre, but also for the
whole of Burmese society. It will be like bestowing a legitimate “license to
kill” on the military junta. Fear will be instilled in the minds of the Burmese
people, even more so than at present, and the populace’s passivity will
become even greater. Under these circumstances, any opportunity for
genuine reconciliation will be lost forever. It may also not be possible for
the nation to achieve peace that is complete both in essence and deed.
The Commission, therefore, will strive its best to at least uncover

the truth concerning the massacre, following its thorough investigation. It
will cooperate and work together, within its power, with individuals and
organizations that have worked to promote the personal safety of Burmese
citizens, the disappearance of lawless violence and the rule of law in Burma.
The Forte and Weakness of the Commission
The Commission admits that there are difficulties, limits and flaws
in its ability to care out its task. The Commission cannot travel to the area
where the massacre took place and meet all witnesses. Nor are we able to
collect all of the evidence. However, it is fair to say that the Commission
has received cooperation from the Burmese people to a certain extent. It
has also received encouragement and cooperation from various political
organizations and leaders inside and outside of Burma. In addition, it
would be fair to say that the location of the Commission, which has open
access to the outside world, is a strength.

Testimonies
The Commission has published six testimonies that have been verified
in the preliminary report. Analysis and verification of the remaining
testimonies is continuing. In addition, the Commission has obtained the
testimonies of two other witnesses through reliable sources from inside
Burma. The testimonies of these eight witnesses form the core of this
report. Corroborating and supporting evidence has also been recorded,
including proof that NLD leaders had meetings with these witnesses, from
relatives who visited the victims in hospitals or prisons and their interviews
with foreign radio stations regarding the conditions of the victims. This
report is based on all of these pieces of evidence, along with the above-
mentioned testimonies.
The Recommended Policy Concerning the Massacre
The Depayin Massacre is not an incident that concerns just one

individual, group or political party. It concerns with the whole of Burmese
society and the nation. It can be construed as a declaration to the people
of Burma and beyond that the Burmese junta will utilize state terrorism to
suppress any dissidence that is deemed a danger to its power structure.
As long as those who are responsible for the planning, organizing,

directing and execution of the massacre within the junta remain unpunished
and unaccounted for, justice for those who were killed, injured, imprisoned
or still missing will remain lost. The lives of their loved ones will also have
to be lived in uncertainty, having lost hope for any justice. Likewise, the
efforts towards the restoration of democracy in Burma and self-
determination for Burma’s ethnic nationalities will be certainly weakened.
The efforts of the people who fight against oppression will also be
undermined. Similarly, the prospects for the rule of law prevailing will
forever be lost and state terrorism will remain the only dominant force in
the country. In addition, the hope that national reconciliation can be built,
following political negotiation with the military junta, will disappear like
water poured into sand. Eventually the resulting consequences from the
non-realization of justice regarding the massacre will deprive both present
and future generations of Burmese citizens of their personal safety, freedom
and peace. For these reasons, uncovering the truth about the Depayin
Massacre and bringing about justice has become the ultimate responsibility
of each and everyone of Burma’s peoples.
Prosecution of Crimes and the Cycle of Violence
The task of bringing about justice with regards to the Depayin

Massacre is paramount. It will be a failure unless everyone – the people of
Burma, political parties and activists, lawyers and other judicial experts
from within Burma and abroad who wish to see the return of the rule of

law in Burma and truth-loving people the world over – effectively cooperates
and participates in these efforts. There is a genuine possibility that the
significance and urgency of the massacre meeting justice will slowly fade
away, just as the previous crimes committed by the military have. Therefore,
no matter what sort of dialogue is held with the opposition groups, the
Burmese regime will surely not hesitate to commit such heinous crimes in
the future, perhaps even worse than the Depayin Massacre, especially if
and when it feels threatened by a group or groups in the opposition
movement. This will then be a formula for the recurrence of violence in
Burma.
Efforts of the Commission
The Commission, despite limitations in its power, human resources,

expertise and other physical resources, has accomplished a number of
important things within the 11 months since its inception on 25 June
2003.
1. The Commission has and will continue to gather information,

evidence and testimonies with the help of various political entities
and human rights activists inside Burma. It has continued to
support financially, within its power, and provided protection to
the witnesses.
2. The Commission has and will continue to approach international

human rights organizations and legal experts to solicit their help
and cooperation and seek their advice. It has called upon exiled
political communities, leaders and citizens of Burma who love
democracy and human rights to participate in the formation of
the “Depayin Campaign Committee” to specially focus on the
Depayin Massacre.
3. With the assistance of the NCUB and the National Coalition

Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the Commission
has sent witnesses to testify in front of the Senate in Thailand
and the Congress of the United States of America, in order to
raise international awareness about the Depayin Massacre.
4. The Commission published its first preliminary report in English

on 4 July and its second preliminary report in Burmese on 30
November 2003 – six months after the massacre took place.
5. The Commission has submitted a full report, complete with

eyewitness reports and evidence, to the office of Mr. Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro, the UN Special Human Rights Investigator for Burma.
During his Burma Human Rights Report to the 58th UN General
Assembly on 12 November 2003, Mr. Pinheiro mentioned the

Depayin Massacre as one of the major transgressions against
human rights in Burma. Mr. Pinheiro stated, “I can say that
there is prima facie evidence that the Depayin incident could not
have happened without the connivance of State agents.”
Pleas from the Commission
To uncover the truth and bring about justice with regards to the
massacre, the Commission sincerely asks for the effective cooperation
from the people of Burma, political organizations, political activists, internal
and external legal experts who wish to see the rule of law in Burma and
individuals and organizations that have worked for the promotion of human
rights in Burma. Otherwise, it will not be possible for such an enormous
task to be successful.
In fact, at present, not much to speak of has been achieved in

terms of cooperation on either the domestic or international fronts, if
compared with the enormity of the case. The Commission has worked
continuously for this to become a success. It considers the fruits of its
efforts born on 18 November 2003 during the 58th UN General Assembly,
in which the UN called on the Burmese junta “to cooperate with the
international community in launching a full independent inquiry into the
30 May incident.”
Bringing about justice with regards to the massacre, in accordance

with this call, will depend upon the concerted efforts of all political
organizations. Therefore, the Commission calls upon the victims of the
massacre, their families, various political organizations, elected
representatives of the 1990 election, leaders of the NLD and ethnic groups
and all those from within and outside of the country who wish to see the
justice done, to effectively cooperate with each other in order to make this
effort a reality.
The Commission has published this report partly because it wants

to see increased cooperation, and partly because it wishes to expose the
facts and evidence, though they may be incomplete, concerning the
massacre.
-The Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre

Chapter (1)
Examples of serious violent actions and
repressive measures committed by the
State authorities against Aung San Suu Kyi
and NLD members before the Depayin ambush
A
ung San Suu Kyi began her various trips across the nation
following her release from 19 months under house arrest on
6 May 2002. Her release at this time was unconditional; the
Burmese junta had agreed to her freedom of movement.
Aung San Suu Kyi in Arakan State, December 2002.

Listed below are the dates and places of her trips. She visited:
1. Shwepyitha Township NLD office, Northern Rangoon District,

17 May 2002.
2. Dawpon Township NLD office, Eastern Rangoon District, 22 May
2002.
3. Kamayut Township NLD office, Western Rangoon District, 24
May 2002.
4. Kyimyindine Township NLD office, Western Rangoon District,
31 May 2002.

5. Thaketa Township NLD office, Eastern Rangoon District, 12 June
2002.
6. Mingaladone and Hlegu Townships NLD offices, Northern
Rangoon District, 16 July 2002.
7. NLD offices of Dala, Kawhmu and Kwangyangone Townships,
Southern Rangoon District, 30 August 2002.
8. Tamwe Township NLD office, Eastern Rangoon District, 19
“The junta came September 2002.
to power after 9. Thingangyun Township NLD office, Eastern Rangoon District, 4
gunning down October 2002.
thousands of
unarmed She received enormous support and a warm welcome from her supporters
during these trips.
civillians.”
She also traveled to the following states and divisions:
1. Mon State and Thamanya Taung, 14-15 June 2002. (She paid
homage to the reverend monk Thamanya Taung Sayataw).
2. Mandalay and Magwe Divisions (tour of 16 townships in Magwe
Division), 22-29 June 2002.
3. Tour of fourteen townships in Pegu Division, 14-17 July 2002.
4. Tour of twelve townships in Mon and Karen States, 20-23 July
2002.
5. Tour of seventeen townships in Shan State, 13-27 November
2002.
6. Tour of fifteen townships in Arakan State, Magwe and Irrawaddy
Divisions, 16-24 December 2002.
7. Tour of twenty-one townships in Magwe Division and Chin State,
3-13 April 2003.
8. Tour of twenty-eight townships in Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions
and Kachin and Shan States, 6-30 May 2003.
She traveled to a total of 125 townships in 12 states and divisions,

out of the total of 14 states and divisions in Burma. She garnered incremental
support during these trips. At the same time, harassment of a multifarious
nature by the authorities increased as she traveled across the country.
In fact, the history of harassment and repression perpetrated by

the military authorities against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD goes
all the way back to 1988. The Burmese military junta which came into
power after gunning down thousands of unarmed civilians in 1988 has
continuously suppressed all political activities, despite the fact that it has
allowed for the formation of political parties. The regime has done all that
it can to prevent political parties from meeting the public during their
campaigns. Political parties have been coerced, restricted and targeted by
the junta in order to prevent them from conducting their political activities.

1988
The State authorities harassed and restricted Aung San Suu Kyi and the
NLD during their trip to various destinations in states and divisions, after
the foundation of the NLD on 27 September 1988. The NLD, however,
was greeted by thousands of people during its campaign trips in Mon
State from 14-18 December 1988. The military authorities did not prevent
the NLD’s campaign trips during this time, but as soon as Aung San Suu
Kyi wrapped up her Mon trips, the military began arresting NLD members
in Mon State accusing them of violating Order 2/88.1
1989
The worst restrictions were imposed during the NLD’s campaign

trips to the Irrawaddy (Delta) Division. Aung San Suu Kyi made two trips
to the region between 14-25 January and 4-6 April 1989. Before she
arrived in the Delta, the authorities had issued warnings to the public in
the various areas she intended to visit. The restrictions were as follows:
1. They must not greet her.

2. They must stay in their homes when she arrived.
3. They must not wave.
4. They must not shout, “Long Live Aung San Suu Kyi”
or “May Aung San Suu Kyi be in good health”.
Aung San Suu Kyi in Bassein City, 1989. Three soldiers were chasing
after her, and a military vehicle with loudspeakers followed behind .
The public did not dare to approach her.

In some places the authorities warned people that they were not
permitted to even smile in her direction when she turned up.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Chairman of the Irrawaddy

Division Law and Order Restoration Council, Major General Myint Aung,
mobilized soldiers from the Burmese Army to eliminate Aung San Suu Kyi
and intimidate her party members during their Irrawaddy Delta campaign
“We’ll shoot trips. He cited security concerns as the justification for suppressing the
to crush the pro-democracy supporters and their aspirations for democracy and human
procession.” rights in Burma.
The situation reached a boiling point on 5 April, when the army
planned to shoot Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage in Danuphyu
Township.
The event occurred as Aung San Sui Kyi was on her way back from
a tour of villages in Danuphyu and Nyaung Don Townships on that day. At
about 9:30 in the morning, after Aung San Suu Kyi had met her party
members and organizers at the Danuphyu Township NLD office, she made
her way toward the boat landing named ‘Yan Myo Aung,’ located near the
township NLD office. She was in the process of continuing her trip onwards
to Ahphyauk Township.
She was walking towards the boat landing and had a large crowd
following her. When the NLD entourage arrived at a junction near ‘Khit
Light’ Guest House, local Law and Order officials and soldiers, who had
been following the crowd in their car, began issuing warnings using loud
speakers to the NLD and its party supporters. They warned people not to
demonstrate or walk in a procession aimed at “instigating riots”. “Otherwise,”
they shouted, “we will shoot to crush the procession.”
People heard an army officer commanding his troops to “load”

their guns. The officer then shouted, “This is the first warning.” Soon
afterwards came the second and third warnings. Then the officer proceeded
to order his troops to kneel down on the road and aim their guns at Aung
San Suu Kyi and her supporters. However, no shooting occurred and her
life was miraculously spared.
The second encounter with the army occurred on that same day, 5
April, upon her return to Danuphyu. She had finished visiting the villages
of Sagagyi and Latpan Pin in Ahpyyauk Township. She arrived back in
Danuphyu at about 6:00 pm. Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage walked
back towards the NLD office and arrived at a market called ‘Bandola,’
which was closed at the time. All was quiet and peaceful.
Then Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members arrived at the
junction of Bandola and Post Office Road and continued walking. When

they were about 300 feet from the junction, a military jeep suddenly
pulled up and blocked the road. There were six soldiers and a captain
inside. They dismounted from the jeep. Immediately, four of the soldiers
knelt down on the road, ready to shoot, while two others stood with their
guns aimed at Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage.
The captain shouted, “Don’t walk as if you are demonstrating and

don’t block the road.” Then he continued shouting, “I am giving you the “Soldiers
first warning.” stood with
their guns
Aung San Suu Kyi told her supporters and party officials to part and aimed at
walk on either side of the road. They did as they were told, and began
walking on both sides of the road. But the captain said, “Even if you walk Suu Kyi.”
on the sidewalks, we’ll have to shoot.” Then Aung San Suu Kyi walked
back into the middle of the road and passed between the four soldiers
who had knelt down on the road.
Just then two army majors turned up behind the NLD Youth members
and shouted as they ran towards the spot of confrontation, “Don’t do it,
Captain Myint Oo.” The majors immediately ordered the solders to unload
their guns. For the second time in one day, her life was again spared.
Captain Myint Oo was visibly angry. He ripped the stars off his
shoulders, which showed his army rank. Then he retorted to his superior
officers while displaying the stars, “Then what are these for?” One of the
majors said, “You will be reprimanded for this.” But Captain Myint Oo
replied, “I don’t care. Do whatever you want.”
1996
The 47th anniversary of Burma’s Independence Day was celebrated

within the premises of Aung San Suu Kyi’s home on 4 January 1996.
Following the celebrations, comedians Pa Pa Lay, Lu Zaw, Htway and
Aung Soe, who had performed at the celebrations, were arrested upon
their return to Mandalay. In order to testify in this case, Aung San Suu Kyi
and a group of NLD officers planned to go to Mandalay. However, when
the train departed from the Central Train Station in Rangoon, the authorities
left behind the carriage that Aung San Suu Kyi and her party was riding in,
citing engine trouble.
Win Sein, the Minister of Rail Transportation at the time, was also
the secretary of the political wing of the Burmese Army, the Union Solidarity
and Development Association (USDA). Win Sein called for the death of
Aung San Suu Kyi in speeches made during his organizing trips for the
USDA on 1-3 November.

Following this incident, the NLD sent a letter to Senior General
Than Shwe, who was also the patron of the USDA, on 20 December 1996.
Below are excerpts from the NLD’s letter to General Than Shwe:
At 2:00 pm on 1 November 1996, U Win Sein delivered

a speech at a ceremony to present applications from the was
held at Lel Pyin Primary School, about one mile from the
“We’ll have town of Indaw and 5,000 villagers were in attendance. U
to kill her. Win Sein verbally attacked Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in his
Have you speech, using strong, rude and inappropriate language. The
participants were so surprised that they could not believe
got the what they were hearing. Here are some excerpts from his
guts?” speech, as reported by participants and witnesses.
“We must get rid of Aung San Suu Kyi

who is creating political unrest. Do you
understand what it means to ‘get rid of’? It
means we’ll have to kill her. Have you got the
guts to kill her?”
He asked the audience the same question five or six

times in an angry manner. No one responded to him. “We
must kill her,” he continued. Because his speech was broadcast
over the loudspeakers, it was heard not only by the villagers
in the audience but by monks from a nearby monastery.2
Win Sein
Furthermore, Win Sein called for her death in another town during that
same trip. Below is another excerpt from the letter the NLD sent to General
Than Shwe regarding this incident.
U Win Sein arrived in the town of Katha on the evening

of 2 November 1996 and held a didactic meeting that night
with the USDA and local government officials at the USDA
building. The following morning another ceremony to present
applications for USDA membership was held in the village of
Thain Enn, in Katha Township. Officials from the village LORC
[Law and Order Restoration Council] were instructed to force
the inhabitants of the six villages within the township to
participate in the presentation of applications to U Win Sein.
The villagers, including farmers, villager elders and
community leaders were required to attend the ceremony.
In his speech, U Win Sein told lies about and slandered Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi’s personal life. Furthermore, he shouted
to the audience, “Do you dare kill Aung San Suu Kyi?” He
asked this questions three times.3

Win Sein repeated his call for opposition against Aung San Suu Kyi
in another ceremony at Enn Ywa, in front of 3,000 villagers, by encouraging
the people to turn against her.4
Likewise, according to the same NLD letter to General Than Shwe,

Win Sein told the audience at a ceremony in 1995 to ‘light Katha Township
24 hours a day’ that, “the SLORC [State Law and Order Restoration Council]
would fight man to man, baton to baton and sword to sword” with the
“SLORC
NLD if necessary.5 would
Although Win Sein was a minister, he attacked and defamed Aung fight man
San Suu Kyi blatantly – in addition to the daily barrage of personal attacks to man,
against her through the state-owned media. Win Sein’s speeches were
sword
very forceful, and as mentioned earlier, even called for her death.
to sword.”
In another case, on 9 November 1996, a group of about 200 hired
thugs attacked in a well-organized manner an NLD motorcade carrying
Aung San Suu Kyi and two NLD Vice-Chairmen, Tin Oo and Kyi Maung.
The assault took place in Rangoon during broad daylight before the very
eyes of police and military personnel. The thugs used batons and knives
and threw stones at the cars. The violent attack damaged the cars, but the
leaders of the NLD escaped unscathed.6
1998
On 25 June 1998, security officials did not

allow entry to NLD Youth members onto Aung San
Suu Kyi’s premises, who had come to attend a
reading circle session that was held fortnightly at
her home. The youth members had given their
names in advance to the security officers, as they
were required, but were still detained at the gate.
Therefore, Tin Oo and Aung San Suu Kyi came out of the house to receive Car damaged
in attack on
the youth. When all of them arrived in front of a primary school near Aung
9 Nov. 1996.
San Suu Kyi’s house, and as they were walking back from the gate, security
officials shouted, “What kind of a leader is she anyway? Strike! We don’t
care!” They began to beat everyone in sight with sticks and tree braches.
At a result, four youth members sustained serious injuries on their heads
and other parts of their bodies. Aung San Suu Kyi herself sustained minor
injuries. Clearly, the attack was intended to harm Aung San Suu Kyi.
NLD Chairman, Aung Shwe, and Aung San Suu Kyi went to see Hla
Hla Moe, the NLD representative from Min Hla Township Constituency-2,
on 7 July 1998. But at about 9:30 am, their vehicle was stopped at the
Htauk Kyant Check Point on the Rangoon-Mandalay Highway. Security
officers let them go after about 10 minutes. They were stopped for a
second time in Hmawbe. Again they were allowed to proceed. However,

when they reached Shwe Myaya Village at about 10:20 am, they were
completely blocked by security officials as a police regiment had been
stationed there.
Aung San Suu Kyi and her party were unable continue their journey.
They were forced to stay inside their cars the entire night. The next morning,
at about 7:30 am, the authorities brought Hla Hla Moe to see Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi. The authorities agreed to send Hla Hla Moe to the NLD
Headquarters no later than 3:00 pm on 10 July. Only then, did the NLD
leaders return to Rangoon in the evening.
In a similar manner, the authorities blocked Aung San Suu Kyi’s

motorcade at 11:55 am on 20 July 1998, near the villages of Ah Nyar Su
and Pan Dine, about 15 miles from Nyaung Don, as Aung San Suu Kyi and
NLD Irrawaddy Division Chairman, Hla Pe were on their way to Pantanaw.
Later in the day, the authorities brought, Dr. Tin Min Htut, NLD representative
from Pantanaw Constituency-1, to see Aung San Suu Kyi. As agreed upon
with the authorities, the NLD leaders returned to Rangoon along with Dr.
Tin Min Htut.
On 24 July 1998, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with NLD Irrawaddy
Division Chairman, Hla Pe, went to
Bassein City in order to see NLD
representatives in the Delta and lend
encouragement to them and their
families, as the regime had used
criminal procedures to restrict the
movements of NLD representatives.
Again, the authorities, on the bridge
of Ah Nyar Su Village, at a location
about 15 miles from the town of
Nyaung Don, blocked Aung San
Suu Kyi and her motorcade. They
blocked the road by laying down
spikes and barricades. The standoff
lasted six days.
Suu Kyi On 29 July, Major Thura, from Military Intelligence Unit 12 (army
blocked by serial no. 18242), who was also in-charge of security around Aung San
authorities.
Suu Kyi’s house and the surrounding areas, arrived with a group of 50
soldiers. By then Aung San Suu Kyi was frail and tired, due to lack of
proper food and water. The security officials forced Aung San Suu Kyi out
of her car and involuntarily sent her home.
Again, on 12 August 1998, Aung San Suu Kyi and Hla Pe tried to
return to the Delta because their mission there had yet to be accomplished.
They were blocked near the place where they had been forced to stop and

stay during their second visit to the area. The situation was much worse
on this occasion. Aung San Suu Kyi and the group did not have sufficient
water and food, and her health deteriorated. This time, the standoff lasted
13 days. Therefore, on 21 August, the authorities allowed her family
physician to visit her. He declared that her physical condition was
deteriorating. The doctor again visited Aung San Suu Kyi on 24 August.
By this point, her situation had not improved. Therefore, the public
urged Aung San Suu Kyi to return home. She could not afford to lose
her life. Finally, she returned home on 24 August.
2000
Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage (including NLD Vice-
Chairman, Tin Oo, Rangoon Division Organizing Committee members,
Soe Myint and Dr. Myo Aung, two drivers and 16 Youth Wing
members) attempted to travel to Kyunchangon and Kawhmu Townships
through the Dala Township across Rangoon on 24 August 2000. As
usual, the authorities prevented Aung San Suu Kyi and her party from Sui Kyi wounded
boarding the ferry. The standoff lasted about an hour and a half. and suffering from
extreme fatigue
Once on the other side of the river, the NLD vehicles continued their
journey. However, they were stopped by police officer Myo Lwin and other
officials at a location called Kyan Sittha, about 3 miles outside of Dala. The
NLD was instructed to return to Rangoon. Aung San San Suu Kyi and her
party did not budge. Consequently, security officials pushed the NLD
vehicles into the rice paddy fields beside the road.
The NLD party entourage set up tents there and waited for an
opportunity to continue their journey to their destinations. Nine days after
the standoff began, on 1 September 2000, police and military reinforcements
arrived, headed by Police Chiefs, Aung Nwe and Myo Lwin, Military
Intelligence Major Thura, a.k.a. Nay Soe (army serial no. 18242) and
Major Tayza. The reinforcement was comprised of about 200-400 security
personnel who arrived in the middle of the night at 11:00 pm. The security
forces raided the NLD tents and sent everyone back to Rangoon.
During the raid, several youth members were beaten. Six female
security officers forced Aung San Suu Kyi out of her tent and into a car.
She was sent straight home. Tin Oo was dragged out of a car upon arrival
at his home.
Furthermore, on the same night, security officers raided the NLD

headquarters. The following day, all NLD senior leaders were place under
house arrest.

On 2 September, a group of security officials headed by
Colonel Than Tun from Military Intelligence (army serial no.
12013) entered the NLD headquarters. They broke the padlocks
and doors down and confiscated all papers and documents found
on the premises.
On the morning of 14 September, Secretary-1 of the

State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) invited NLD
Chairman, Aung Shwe, to speak with him and informed the
chairman that they had been freed and were permitted to reopen
the NLD offices.
On 21 September, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo planned

to go to Mandalay by train to investigate if any restrictions had
been placed upon the activities of their party members, whether
broken lock
the party offices were actually able to reopen and if party signs
on safe at torn down by the authorities had been resurrected.
NLD HQ
Once they had arrived at Rangoon Central Station, Aung San Suu
Kyi and her group were told that the train tickets had all been sold out.
Although this claim was untrue, they were powerless to do anything about
it. So they waited until the train left, to
no avail. The following morning, NLD
officials went to the train station again
and waited for the train. But this time
they were all forcibly detained. The youth
members were arrested and senior NLD
leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi,
were sent home by the authorities. On
22 September, all NLD leadership was
ordered not to leave their homes.
Given these actions, the speeches

and behavior of the state authorities, it
is evident that the military authorities
documents seized harassed, restricted and blocked political
by authorities at parties and their leadership, particularly that of the NLD and Aung San
NLD HQ
Suu Kyi. It is also evident that in carrying out these repressive policies, the
Burma junta even intended to harm Aung San Suu Kyi’s life.

documents
were seized
by authorities
from NLD HQ
Endnotes
1
According to Order 2/88, people are not permitted to gather in groups of five people or
more in public. It was issued on 18 September 1988, the day the current military regime
forcibly seized state power.
2
Correspondence from NLD Chairperson to the SPDC Chairperson, Ref 179/See (Nyein)/
96, 20 Dec 1996.
3
Ibid. P. 130-131.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid. P. 132.
6
Ibid. P. 112-115.

Chapter (2)
Disturbances & harassment during
the trip to Kachin State – the last trip
before the Depayin Massacre
A
ung San Suu Kyi and the NLD experienced the following
harassment during their trip to Kachin State, which began on
6 May 2003.
The authorities prohibited the erecting of the NLD sign at the Shwebo
Township NLD office on 8 May, citing the location as strictly a rice paddy
field zone. In addition, restrictions were imposed upon the people of the
township and surrounding areas against offering support to or welcoming
Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage. However, the NLD received a
resounding welcome from the public.
When the state authorities realized the extent of the support Aung
San Suu Kyi was enjoying, they began to organize counter demonstrations
on 9 May. The counter protests began in the town of Kawlin.
At about 6:00 pm on 9 May, members of the USDA organized a

noisy counter protest in front of the
Kawlin High School. They put up signs
declaring, “ Oppose all axe handles
[meaning traitors] who rely on foreign
stooges.”7
On the following morning of 10

May, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD
arrived at Nam Tel village, near the
entrance to Indaw Town, where some
70 USDA members were awaiting their
arrival. Led by Monywa District USDA
Secretary, Htay Aung, the USDA had
NLD harassed by organized a protest against the NLD and
USDA on 11 May at Katha Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, displaying a huge
sign with green letters written on white cloth which read, “Oppose
all axe handles who rely on foreign stooges and cynics.”8 The protest
nearly reached a riotous level when USDA members instigated scuffles

while Aung San Suu Kyi was delivering a speech to her supporters and the
local public. Although there were security police present, they ignored the
tensions building up and did nothing to prevent a possible open
confrontation.9
At about 12:00 pm on 11
May, the NLD was greeted with
harassment from a USDA protest
numbering around 150 people at
the entrance of Katha Town.10 The
protesters had blocked the entrance
to town. But the Chairman of Katha
District Peace and Development
Council, Lt. Colonel Myint Naing,
arrived at the scene of the protest
and told Aung San Suu Kyi that he
would call off the protest only if she
promised not to repeat the
slanderous attacks she had made
against the USDA at Wuntho in the USDA protesters
future.11 Aung San Suu Kyi replied to the colonel that what she had said in on 12 May
Wuntho was the recounting of true events involving the USDA, that she
had informed or consulted with state authorities regarding her trips and
that the colonel and his group should make way for the NLD entourage.
She also recommended that the colonel tell his followers to use utmost
constraint, and that she would do the same with her NLD members.12 The
authorities should have intervened in a constructive way in the harassment
and blocking of the roads by the USDA members. Instead, they demanded
that Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD
entourage return home.13
In another incident on 12 May,

some 100 USDA members staged a
protest at the entrance to Man Ywet
Village, in Mogaung Township at about
8:30 am. On the following day of 13
May, the USDA held yet another protest
at the entrance of Nantmasit Village,
in Pharkant Township. This time
however, it was a silence protest, but
the protesters still held small placards
that read, “Oppose all axe handles
[meaning traitors] who rely on foreign more
USDA
stooges and cynics.”14
protesters
on 15 May
On 15 May, at the arrival of Kaung Village on the Nammatee Highway,
the NLD was greeted with another protest at 4:30 in the morning. The

protesters shouted slogans and held up signs such as: “We don’t want the
axe handle who relies on foreign stooges,” “We don’t want cynics,” “We
don’t want destructionists of the (country’s development),” and “We don’t
want those who destroy peace and stability.”15
Despite continuous protests and disturbances instigated by USDA

members and state officials, the NLD continued
their journey to Myitkyina City at about 6:00
am on 16 May. The NLD entourage arrived at
the Nangwae Bridge near Myitkyina at
approximately 8:00 am. Protesters who had
taken over both sides of the road greeted them.
The roughly 300 protesting USDA members
wore headbands and held placards declaring,
“Oppose axe handles who rely on the foreigners,
those who disturb the tranquility of our state.”
In addition, the protesters had blocked the
road.16 The NLD members noticed that there
were also security police present, not far from
USDA protesters the bridge, armed with shields and batons.17
on 18 May The protesters were armed with slingshots,
knives, bicycle ball bearings used as slingshots and pellets, but the security
police did nothing to intervene.18
The NLD continued its journey onwards to Waingmaw Township on

18 May. When the NLD entourage arrived at Naung Tarlay spirit house,
near Waingmaw, it was greeted again by a USDA protest comprised of
roughly 200 members. On 19 May, the
NLD entourage traveled on to Bamaw
Township. Afterwards they arrived at
Leljaryam Village, in Momauk Township,
located just on the China-Burma border.
However, the NLD’s planned journey
onward to Laiza, the headquarters of the
Kachin Independence Organization
(KIO), did not materialize as Major Tin
Aung Kyi from Military Intelligence Unit
8 and Major Min Lwin Oo from MIS
(Military Intelligence Service)-21
prevented the NLD from continuing. The
NLD was then forced to return to
Banmaw.
Suu Kyi’s car
warmly greeted The NLD entourage arrived at Thonemine Village, near Bamaw, at
by locals in about 3:00 am on 20 May, where an early morning protest was awaiting
Mogok
the NLD. Approximately 300 USDA members were seen carrying swords
and batons and came to the protest location in cars and on motorbikes

with no license plates. Some USDA
members even tried to snatch the video
camera that Tun Zaw Zaw of the NLD
was carrying. At the same time, the
authorities had restricted the movement
of people in the area around the
municipal market so that no large crowd
could gather to see Aung San Suu Kyi.19
Again, the authorities did nothing to
intervene in the harassment of the NLD
by USDA members armed with
weapons.20
The NLD left Shwegu for Momaik Thousands

at about 8:00 am and arrived in Momaik Township at roughly 8:00 pm on welcoming
21 May. They had planned to go to Mabein Township, which is located on Suu Kyi
in front of
the Shweli riverbank, across from Momaik. However, Momaik Police Chief,
Ba Ho Cinema,
Win Htay, and Chief of Immigration, Sai Myint Thein, had ordered, through in Mogok
the local Chairman of the Peace and Development Council, the boat owners
at the boat landing located at the confluence of the river to take the engines
off their boats.21 Consequently, the NLD was unable travel to Mabein
Township.22
The NLD party arrived in Mogok at about 4:30 in the afternoon on

22 May. It continued its journey, and arrived in Kyatpyin Myoma on 25
May. When the entourage reached Kathae Oaksu-Bogone, a group of about
400 USDA members staged a protest. The NLD learnt that the local USDA
leader had threatened the people in the area by ordering one person per
household to attend the protest, and failing to do so would result in being
conscripted as force laborers for the Letpanhla Highway.23 Many of the
forced draftees for the protest included ethnic minorities who could not
read Burmese. The USDA had told these ethnic peoples that the signs they
were holding up when the NLD appeared were signs to welcome and
support the NLD. Some of signs they were holding and which denounced
the NLD were in fact held upside down.24 They realized what they were
doing only when Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members explained to them
what the signs said. They then demonstrated their support for Aung San
Suu Kyi by discarding their signs denouncing NLD.25
The NLD again was greeted at 3:00 pm by a noisy protest of

approximately 1,000 USDA members, comprised of both men and women,
at a location known as Seven Mile Village near Thabeikkyin Township.26
The NLD motorcade experienced all kinds of harassment, not only from
USDA members, but also from traffic police who were assisting the USDA.
Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech for about 15 minutes in front of her
supporters as well as the protesters. She was interrupted repeatedly during
her speech. Many protesters, who had been part of the protest due to

forcible conscription, discarded their signs after listening to Aung San Suu
Kyi’s speech and welcomed her.27 They later told the NLD that the Local
Peace and Development Council had forced them to contribute somewhere
between 4 and 20 persons per village to the protest. Furthermore, the
villagers had even been threatened with a seven-year prison sentence if
they were found welcoming Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. The NLD
received information that some 200 protesters had been given liquor and
“Make way persuaded with the promise of monetary reward.28
or you’ll have
The NLD experienced another round of harassment, at about 7:00
to pick up
pm on 25 May, near the villages of Kyi Tauk Pauk and Nweyon, in Singu
your dead Township. Approximately 500 USDA members, in 11 sedans, 4 Dynas
bodies!” (mini-trucks) and 15 Toyota Hiluxs shouted similar slogans and harassed
the NLD, as had been standard throughout the campaign. The NLD learned
that the protesters were brought in from towns such as Amarapura, Madaya,
Kyaukse and Mandalay. In addition, the USDA had persuaded the laborers
from the goldmine near Nweyon to participate in the protest with bribes of
food, a limitless supply of liquor and 500-1,000
kyat29 per day.30 Local Peace and Development
Council officials also threatened the villagers
with the penalty of two days of forced labor on
the construction of the Latpanhla Highway if one
villager per household did not join the protest
against the NLD. The USDA members were seen
carrying bamboo sticks and shouting slogans
such as, “We don’t want the wife of a Kala!”31
and “We don’t want axe handles who rely of
foreign stooges!” USDA members habitually
tested the NLD’s patience by attacking NLD
members and supporters with the weapons they
vechile (license #2B/
4363) full of armed
carried. With the help of traffic police, the USDA
protesters motorcades rode into or cut off the NLD’s motorcade. Upon arrival at Kyi
Tauk Pauk Village, USDA members in vehicles (license plates 2B/4363,
5A/1899, 2A/3726, 7A/6643, W/7358) drove into the crowd that was
waiting to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi. Simultaneously they shouted, “Make
way for us. Or you’ll have to pick up your dead bodies!” Although people
were waiting for the NLD by the side of the road, they had to run in order
to avoid the marauding vehicles. Moreover, the USDA members carried
batons, sticks, slingshots, swords and knives. They also beat iron sheets
of metal, creating loud noises, in order to scare the crowd away while
driving into the people.32
Furthermore, whenever a USDA vehicle caught up with an NLD

vehicle, the USDA members shouted abusive language at the NLD and
behaved as if they were going to strike the NLD members with the weapons
they held in their hands.33 They also harassed Aung San Suu Kyi by shouting
“Do you want to rely on a Kala?”34

The verbal and often physical intervention by USDA members this
time lasted more than three hours. The USDA members threw stones at
Aung San Suu Kyi’s car. A stone hit the head of Maung Tun Tun Win, from
the Mandalay NLD Youth Wing, and blood gushed forth from his head.35
Aung San Suu Kyi recounted the USDA onslaught at Kyi Tauk Pauk
Village to the people in Monywa City. She said, “Authorities
failed to
take action
Lt. Col. Than Han
closely supervising
against
protesters on the USDA.”
25 May. He also
supervised the
30 May massacre
and reportedly
arrested
Suu Kyi on the
morning of 31 May.
“The authorities have failed to take action against the

USDA, despite the fact that they have carried out lawless
acts. The authorities behave as if we are in their hands and
know that we are not going to retaliate. That only makes the
USDA bolder. At Kyi Tauk
Pauk Village, on the way
from Singu and Madaya,
the USDA attacked our
supporters with sticks,
swords and slingshots.”
The NLD entourage

arrived in Madaya Township on
26 May. At about 5:00 pm, the
NLD experienced another protest
from about 500 USDA members
at Pathein Lay, in Pathein Gyi
Township. The NLD then
returned to the Mandalay NLD
office at about 6:15 pm without
any problems. However, between 7:30-8:00 pm that night a Dyna Crowd gathered at
vehicle (license plate 5A/8175) tried to drive into the crowd, with the Mandalay Division
NLD branch office, in
help of traffic police, order to hear
Suu Kyi’s speech

while people
were gathered to
listen to Aung San Suu
Kyi near the junction
of 78th-79th Streets.
People threw stones at
the car and as a result
its windshield was
Dyna truck shattered.36
(license
# 5A/8175)
with shattered
windsheild
The Commission’s findings of USDA harassment

during the Kachin trip
The Commission found the following forms and instances of

harassment against the NLD by the USDA during the NLD’s campaign trips
to Kachin State.
The involvement of the USDA in the harassments
The USDA harassment of the NLD during the Kachin State trip
began in Kawlin Township. The NLD, at that point, had previously
mentioned malevolent interference by the USDA in its statements. Lwin,
the spokesperson for the NLD, had also continually cited the involvement
of the USDA in the harassment of and attacks on the NLD and its supporters
during his interviews on foreign radio broadcasts.
So far, the USDA has not made any public statements regarding
their fundamental involvement in the campaign to disrupt the NLD during
its trips. Nor have the SPDC authorities denied or responded to Aung San
Suu Kyi’s accusation of governmental collusion with and the aiding of
USDA members. Thus, they are able to continue to conduct their campaign
of disturbances and harassment freely.
The nature of USDA protests
While protesting against the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, the
protesters wore headbands and put up signs that denounced the NLD and
Aung San Suu Kyi at the entrance of towns and villages, in front of schools,
etc. These acts could not have been carried out without the unequivocal
help of the State and various authorities. Since the protests had the

complete backing of the authorities, the protesters appeared to have no
fear of any consequences for their actions. This is clearly evident in the
fact that they often used violence against the NLD and its supporters. The
Commission has found that the authorities not only contributed the
harassment and violence, but also helped to organize and supervised the
USDA in their actions. The following are some examples: “Authorities
organized and
1. Members of the police and traffic police aided and controlled the supervised
motorcades of the protestors, both in their transportation and the USDA
in their intervention against the NLD and its supporters. They
assisted the USDA protesters in their attempts to disturb the protesters.”
formation of the NLD motorcade.37
2. The police and other security personnel never once tried to

intervene in the scuffles between the NLD and USDA members
during the protests, although they were present at all times.
3. The protest sites were carefully chosen. The protests were

organized mostly outside of towns and villages – away from a
large number of public eyes. The authorities transported the
protesters to the protest locations.
4. Major Tin Aung Kyi, from MIS-8, and Major Min Lwin Oo, from
MIS-21, prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from visiting the
headquarters of the KIO, which had entered into a truce with
the Burmese military junta.
5. The USDA leaders and officials from various Peace and

Development Councils threatened the public with various
penalties if they turned up to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi.
6. The authorities, along with USDA officials, had forced people in

various areas to contribute one person per household to the
protests against the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi.
7. In some townships in Kachin State, the protesters awaited the

arrival of the NLD well into the night. For instance,
a) On 10 May at about 9:00 pm, the USDA staged a protest

in Nanthae Village, at the entrance of Indaw Township.
b) On 12 May at about 8:30 pm, the NLD experienced
harassment by approximately 100 USDA members on
the road to Manywet Village, in Mokaung Township.
c) On 15 May at about 4:30 am, the USDA staged a protest
against the NLD at the village of Kaung on the Namatee
Highway.

d) On 16 May at about 8:00 am, approximately 300 USDA
members greeted the NLD with a protest near Nangwe
Bridge.
e) On 20 May at 3:00 am, a group of about 300 USDA
members, carrying weapons and driving vehicles and
motorbikes without license plates, harassed the NLD near
Three Mile Village.
f) On 25 May at about 7:00 pm, the NLD, while driving in
30 vehicles, experienced a raucous protest and harassment
by a group of 500 USDA members at the villages called
Kyi Tauk Pauk and Nwe Yone, in Singu Township.
It is evident that the USDA protesters had ulterior motives because

they waited for the NLD well into the wee hours of the night in
numerous places during this time.
Furthermore, the Commission, based on
the evidence cited above, found that
various strata of the State and local
authorities organized and aided the USDA
Armed with in their protests, disturbances and
bamboo initiation of violent acts against the NLD.
sticks,USDA
Only in one single town – Shwebo – did
memebers
harrassing the NLD experience no acts of violence
NLD in throughout their entire trip.
KyiTauk
Pauk. 8. The traffic policemen cooperated with
the protestors in disturbances against
Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. The
policemen stayed close to the vehicles of the people who
demonstrated against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The above mentioned evidence clearly illustrates that traffic policemen,

policemen, riot policemen, and military leaders supervised USDA protests
in Kachin State against Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members.
Endnotes
7
The New Light of Myanmar. 1 June 2003. P-9.
8
Ibid. (See also the testimony of Khin Oo.)
9
NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03), 27 May 2003.
10
Article by Maung Yin Hmine, “Daw Suu Kyi, the NLD Party and Our Ray of Hope – 6”
The New Light of Myanmar. 10 July 2003.
11
Ibid.

Buddhist monks
accompanying
NLD convoy
from Mogok
to Mandalay.
12
See testimony of Khin Oo.
13
NLD Statement No. 6(5/03)
14
Article by Maung Yin Hmine and testimony of Khin Oo
15
Article by Maung Yin Hmine.
16
Ibid.
17
Testimony of Khin Oo.
18
NLD Statement No.6 (5/03).
19
20
NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03).
21
Ibid.
22
Testimony of Ko Khin Oo.
23
24
Testimony of Nyunt Nyunt.
25
Ibid and foreign radio interview with an NLD member.
26
27
Testimony of Nyunt Nyunt.
28
NLD Statement No.6 (5/03).
29
Name of the Burmese currency. (500 kyat = 45.5 US cents)
30
Foreign radio interview with an NLD member.
31
It refers to Aung San Suu Kyi’s marriage to Oxford Don, the late Dr. Michael Aris. While
Kala directly translated means a person coming from India, since the British used Indian
soldiers to invade Burma, Burmese people have referred to the British as Kala or Kala
Phyu (white Indian). Kala is used as a derogatory insult.
32
Foreign radio interview with an NLD member.
33
This tactic was often used to solicit a physical response from NLD members. The idea
is that if the NLD members responded with violence, the State authorities could readily
accuse the NLD of using confrontational and violent methods. The NLD’s policy is non-
violence.
34
Unwanted and meddling foreigners.
35
Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and the NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03).
36
Ibid and The New Light of Myanmar. 1 June 2003.
37
Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.

Chapter (3)
The Depayin Massacre
A
ung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest on 6 May
2000. Following her freedom, she traveled across the nation.
During her trips to 12 states and divisions, from 11 June
2002 to 13 April 2003, she visited 235 townships.
From 6 May 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi

carried out various functions, such as the
reopening of NLD offices and restoring party signs
that had been removed by the authorities during
her trips to Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions, and
Kachin and Shan States. She began her Monywa
and Mandalay trip on 29 May. Before her trips,
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD had obtained
permission and agreement from the SPDC and
the Election Commission for their planned
itineraries.
On the morning of 29 May, NLD officials

and their entourage left for Sagaing from
Mandalay. NLD members were transported in
seven vehicles. There were also about 20
motorbikes and an unknown number of vehicles
carrying some 100 NLD supporters and locals,
Depayin Township area
whom had come to see the NLD party off. The
NLD began the Sagaing trip from the western
part of 38 Street and southern part of 84th Street.
th
The first vehicle in the NLD entourage, which acted as security and
vanguard, traveled ahead of the car in which Aung San Suu Kyi was riding.
In the first car were Naing Naing, Aung Aung and NLD Mandalay Division
member, Myo Min.
The NLD entourage arrived at Sagaing Bridge at about 10:00 am.

Once the NLD vehicles crossed the bridge spanning the Irrawaddy River,
some 200 USDA members, who had occupied both sides of the highway,
confronted them in protest. They held up signs saying, “We don’t want

those who do not support the USDA!” The protesters were all shouting the
same slogan. Luckily, nothing untoward happened at this protest site.
However, the people from Sagaing City warmly welcomed the NLD upon
their arrival in the town. Approximately 2,000 NLD supporters were seen
shouting slogans such as, “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi may you be in good
health!” and “Ba Ba38 U Tin Oo may you be in good health!”39
The NLD continued its journey on to Myinmu from Sagaing. They

arrived in Myinmu Town at about 12:00 pm. NLD members noticed traffic
police trailing behind their motorcade and MIS personnel taking video
recordings and pictures of the NLD.40
At Myinmu the NLD party sign was erected. The NLD Youth Wing
for the township party branch was assembled, with NLD elected
representative from Lewe Constituency-1, Tin Htut Oo, leading the
ceremony. At the time, there were five
vehicles outside the township NLD office
carrying police, reserve firefighters, members
of the Pyithu Swan-ar Shin Organization,41
local Peace and Development Council
officials and USDA members. On one of
the vehicles was a sign on which, “Pyithu
Swan-ar Shin” was written in green on a
white cloth. The five vehicles followed the
NLD until Yeposar Village, between Myinmu
and Chaung U, after it left Myinmu.42
It was about 3:00 pm when the NLD

left Myinmu. At this time Aung Aung and
Naing Naing in the NLD vanguard vehicle protesters
against the NLD
noticed the first signs of preparation for an attack on the NLD in Yeposar
Village – but that was to come later. A protest was awaiting the NLD in
which USDA protesters held up signs and shouted the following slogans:43
· “Oppose all axe handles and cynics who rely

on foreign stooges.”
· “Consider both domestic and international
destructionists as common enemies.”
· “We don’t’ want those who have blocked
international assistance to Myanmar (Burma).”
· “We want peace and stability.”
· “We don’t want those who initiated the tourism boycott.”
· “We don’t want those who have blocked
foreign investment in Myanmar.”
· “We don’t want ‘discretional’ democracy.”

The NLD later learnt that the protesters were not residents of the
villages located along the highway between Myinmu and Monywa City,
simply because there is no village near the highway, except the village of
Yeposar. At the site of the protest there were a number of vehicles that
had transported the protesters along with their signs. State authorities
such as police, traffic police, riot police
and military officers believed to be
colonels were seen present at the protest
location. Military vehicles and vehicles
belonging to military police were also
seen partially hidden behind tropical
bushes and margosa (neem) trees. The
NLD noticed that the buses that normally
plied between the cities of Monywa and
Mandalay, known as “Monywa-Man” and
“Chindwin Thar,” were used to transport
the protesters. The NLD observed
approximately 30 vehicles at the protest
site. NLD officials also saw Htay Aung,44
who had harassed Aung San Suu Kyi and
More
protesters the NLD throughout their Kachin trip. He was seen directing the protest
against the NLD yet again at Yeposar. When the NLD encountered the protest, as part of
normal NLD procedures, Thein Soe from the NLD Department of News
and Information took pictures, and Ko Tun Zaw Zaw videotaped the event,
while Myint Kyaw recorded the slogans shouted out by the USDA.45 In
addition, NLD members noticed stones piled up on both sides of the road.
They appeared not to be in use for road construction.
The authorities had issued an order to stop the operation of buses

between Monywa and Mandalay. They also issued orders that the people
from Monywa were not permitted to leave the town. These schemes were
part of a well-organized plan by the authorities to upset the NLD campaign.
However, the USDA and other state officials were unable to initiate any
violence at this time, mainly because of the large crowds from Monywa
and Chaungoo who had gathered to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi and the
NLD.
The NLD motorcade arrived in Monywa at about six in the evening.
The townspeople and villagers from nearby villages warmly welcomed the
NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. The authorities had cut electricity to the town
when the NLD arrived in Monywa, but the townspeople overcame this
obstacle and greeted the NLD by lighting candles. They also shouted,
“Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, may you be in good health!” and “Ba Ba U Tin
Oo, may you be in good health!”
Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the welcoming crowd for roughly 40
minutes. At about 9:30 pm, the NLD reopened the Monywa branch office
and erected the party sign. Aung San Suu Kyi then held a meeting, from

midnight until two in the morning, concerning the formation of the NLD
Youth Wing in town. The meeting was organized at the residence of former
Army Major, Kyi Soe (Sein Hmya Store), who is now an NLD elected
representative from Monywa Constituency-1. Aung San Suu Kyi stayed at
his home that night.
On the morning of 30 May, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo paid
homage to the abbot of Zawtika Monastery. Their plan to attend meditation
Okkan Taw Ya Monastery was deferred, and the NLD left Monywa for
Budalin using the ring road at about 10:00 am. When the NLD reached
the headquarters of the Army’s North-Western Region Command, which is
located near a village called Zetaw, soldiers stopped the NLD motorcade.
Then they ordered the vehicles and motorbikes from Monywa that had
accompanied the NLD motorcade to return to Monywa after reaching
Budalin. When Aung San Suu Kyi and company reached Budalin, they
conducted the usual functions, such as the reopening of their party office,
erecting their party sign and the formation of the township Youth Wing.
NLD supporters from Monywa returned home, as ordered by the authorities,
once they reached Budalin. But police were waiting for their return from
Budalin, and when they had reached the Army’s North-Western Command
they were physically assaulted. As soon as Aung San Suu Kyi learned of
the beatings, she asked Budalin NLD Chairman, Aung San, and Tun Myaing,
the elected NLD representative for
Wetlet Constituency-1 and
member of the NLD Sagaing
Division Organizing Committee,
to go and resolve the matter. She
asked them to go in Bar Bar’s car,
the NLD Chairman for Sagaing
Division.
The NLD began to notice

a large number of monks,
members of the USDA and
members of Pyithu Swan-ar Shin
upon their departure from
Budalin. The NLD observed them
sitting in vehicles near gas
stations toward the town’s
More protesters
entrance. 46 The NLD leaders
therefore warned Aung Aung, Naing Naing and Myo Min to take extra care
while driving in the front of the NLD motorcade. They were also told to
consult and cooperate with Saw Hlaing, the NLD’s elected representative
for Indaw Constituency. Tin Htut Oo 47 also asked Kyaw Aung to use a
motorbike for communication in case of an emergency, or in case motor
vehicles could not be used.

The NLD left Budalin at about 4:30 in the afternoon for Depayin.
On the way, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi dropped by Saipyin Village to visit the
home of Win Myint Aung, an elected NLD representative in military
detention, in order to encourage his family members, as well as NLD
members and supporters.
On 30 May, the Depayin police had detained the son of Win Myint
Aung, who had left for Depayin that morning to investigate the safety
conditions of the road to Depayin.48 At Sai Pyin Gyi, before Depayin, the
NLD again sent several people on motorbikes to investigate the security of
the road, as the car that had been sent in advance to carry out the
reconnaissance had not yet returned. However, the motorbikes did not
return either. The NLD later learnt that all of these NLD members and
supporters had been detained on the premises of the Department of
Irrigation, located near a village called ‘Kyi,’ by the USDA who later that
night were to commit violence against the NLD.
The NLD, nonetheless, continued on its journey and arrived at Kyi

at about 8:00 pm. The village of Kyi is about two miles from Depayin. The
villagers from ‘Kyi’ came out to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
At the time of the massacre, the NLD vehicle (Townace 7A/5661)

carrying Vice-Chairman Tin Oo was at the front of the NLD motorcade.
Following directly behind was a car (Toyota Hilux) driven by U Ko Ko Lay
from Mandalay, followed by the car in which Aung San Suu Kyi was riding.
Its license plate number was A/5415. Tun Win and Khin Maung Thaung,
from Zegyo Market in Mandalay, drove their car immediately behind Aung
San Suu Kyi’s vehicle. A green Toyota Hilux car followed carrying NLD
Youth Wing members from Mandalay, who were on emergency security
duty for the NLD. Behind them was Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, the NLD’s elected
representative from Singaing Constituency-2, in his white Sunny sedan.
Following the motorcade of NLD leaders were NLD members and their
supporters in various vehicles.
Two Buddhist monks blocked the road in front of the vehicle carrying
Aung San Suu Kyi and directed the driver to stop the car. The NLD had just
passed the village of Kyi and was already about 100 yards outside of the
village. Tun Zaw Zaw, who was in-charge of NLD security and from the
NLD Central Youth Wing, got out of the car and asked the monks their
justification for blocking the road. One of the monks replied, “We have
been waiting for a long time. Ask Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to give us a
speech.” Tun Zaw Zaw told them that she would not be able to comply
because the NLD did not have sufficient time.49
Due to the blockade by the monks, the NLD motorcade came to a

halt. While Tun Zaw Zaw was busy talking with the monks, the people
who were following the NLD and its supporters got out of their Dyna

vehicles and buses. They shouted, “We don’t want axe handles and cynics
who rely on foreign stooges” repeatedly while existing their vehicles. The
villagers from Kyi, who had come to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi and the
NLD, returned words by shouting, “We the people don’t want you either.”50
Immediately the USDA members, imposter monks and other hired

thugs shouted, “What did you say?” Then they got out of their vehicles
carrying iron spikes and rods, bamboo batons and wooden sticks. With “The women
systematic brute force, they began beating every one in sight - the villagers, were stripped
Aung San Suu Kyi along with NLD members and leaders, as well as innocent of their
bystanders.51 Consequently, the villagers from Kyi and those who had clothes and
come to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi ran in all directions to avoid being
the attackers
beaten with savage force. As it was a sudden and unprovoked attack from
behind, those who had followed the NLD towards the end of the motorcade bashed their
were struck the most violently. heads against
the road.”
Sham Buddhist monks with armbands and civilians with white
armbands beat the unarmed NLD members and civilians relentlessly. While
striking, they also screamed abusive and derogatory language such as,
“Those of you women who have destroyed our race! Those who want to
make Kala their husbands! Come and make us your husbands before you
choose the Kala as your husbands!” The NLD women, who wore matching
uniforms of pinny and yawhtami,52 had their shirts and sarong stripped off
by the attackers. The attackers grasped the women’s hair and bashed their
heads against the road. It was an evil act, brutal beyond belief, and the
attackers acted with intent to kill.53 In addition, the attackers forcibly
snatched gold chains, earrings, and money from the wounded.54
The attackers concentrated on attacking Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle

from the left side. Therefore, those who had protected Aung San Suu Kyi,
using their own bodies as human shields by interlocking their hands, were
beaten and as a result sustained serious injuries. They included NLD Youth
Wing members from the NLD Rangoon Headquarters, those from Mandalay
who had come along with the NLD motorcade, youth members from NLD
Monywa and students from the Institute of Economics who were responsible
for the security of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership.55 Due to the
severity of the assault, Thein Toe Aye, the NLD organizer for Mandalay
North-Western Township, photographer Tin Maung Oo and driver San
Myint (a.k.a. Raju) died on the spot.56
Fortuitously, Aung San Suu Kyi’s driver was able to drive the car
through carnage, and bring her to relative safety. Immediately after her
car drove off, some 4,000 people, who were laying in wait for the NLD on
both sides of the road near the Department of Irrigation, came running
out and began charging the villagers and the NLD who had escaped from
the mayhem.57 At that very moment, an order was shouted with, “Get out
and strike!” Instantly, two Dyna trucks drove out from the Irrigation

Department premises, where they had been ready waiting, and tried to
ram the car carrying Aung San Suu Kyi head-on. Her car was able to avoid
the head-on collision with the two Dyna trucks, and as a result was forced
to drive over three barbed wire barricades. In no time, just as her car
crashed past the barricades, another order was heard, “Fire!” It was an
order to shoot and approximately 10-15 rounds of bullets were rapidly
fired.58 However, vehicles carrying Aung San Suu Kyi and Dr. Hla Soe
“The police
Nyunt were able to drive through the charging mob and the two Dyna
carted off trucks, amid gun-fire, and narrowly escaped. Following this, Aung San
the dead Suu Kyi’s vehicle reached Ye Oo and Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt’s car arrived at
bodies, as Depayin Hospital.
if they were
Win Mya Mya, the Mandalay Division NLD organizer, was not so
throwing
lucky. Her car drove off the road and hit a tree along the side of the road
rubbish onto while trying to avoid the head-on coalition with the two Dyna trucks. As a
a garbage result, both of her arms were broken.
pile.”
As Aung San Suu Kyi’s car had already escaped, the attackers
concentrated their attack on Tin Oo’s vehicle. At the same spot, police
arrested Tin Oo and Tin Aung Aung, along with five other NLD members,
and took them to the Depayin Police Station that night. Tin Htut Oo, Teza
Naing and Hla Oo were detained the following morning of 31 May, near
the village of Kyi, by security forces led by the Shwebo District Peace and
Development Council Chairman.59 They were subsequently sent to the
Depayin police station, and transferred to Shwebo Prison on 1 June.
There were roughly 5,000 people from various areas involved in

the attack.60 The USDA paid them to participate in the attack against the
NLD and other innocent villagers.61 The attack lasted more than three
hours and was well planned, well organized and intended to cause grave
and serious harm to Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD officials.
Shortly after 11:00 pm that night, about 80 riot police, armed with
shields and batons, and members of the Pyithu Swan-ar Shin62 organization
arrived at the scene of the attack. Subsequently, two cars that appeared to
be Mitsubishi Pajeros arrived. Two officious looking people got out of the
cars and inspected the scene. The police and the Pyithu Swan-ar Shin
members carted off the dead bodies in their Dyna trucks, as if they were
throwing rubbish onto a garbage pile, and left the scene.
The two Toyota Hilux vehicles that had been damaged and left at
the scene were pushed off the side of the road – into the rice paddy fields.
They were rearranged in such a way that they appeared as if they had over
turned after being involved in traffic incident. Two other Hiluxes were
rearranged to appear as if they had been involved in a head-on collision.
The rearranged scenes were then photographed and videotaped.63

Eyewitnesses also saw some of the destroyed cars being taken away toward
Ye Oo.64
It is clear that the attack was planned, organized and systematically

executed by Shwebo District USDA Secretary Htay Aung65 and Shwebo
District Peace and Development Council Chairman, Lt. Col Than Han,66
with the help of local authorities. Due to vital assistance from various
authorities, the attackers launched a violent assault on unarmed civilians
and NLD members, including Aung San Suu Kyi, with impunity. This also
emboldened the attackers, even to the point of robbing the wounded of
their valuables and tearing and stripping off clothes of the injured and
unconscious women. Villagers from Kyi, NLD Youth Wing members and
students from the Institute of Economics were severely beaten. Several of
them died during the course of their beatings. Some had their faces
disfigured and body parts broken.
The attack was brutal and without mercy. It was an attempt by

authorities to break up the support for Aung San Suu Kyi that was gaining
momentum. The attack can be construed as a display of brutality that is
being used as a deterrent to intimidate others not to participate in the pro-
democracy movement. In other words, it is a signal that the regime will
not hesitate to use brute force against anyone who attempts to replace its
rule with democracy.
Endnotes
38
Burmese honorific title for great uncle or grandpa.
39
Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Nyunt Nyunt, Min Thein, and Phoe Zaw.
40
Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Naing Naing.
41
Pyithu Swan-ar Shin means “force of the people” or “People Power” and is a people’s
militia. Although it’s not an official organization, it does deal with local authorities. Its
members and USDA members reportedly cooperate in confronting NLD members. Its
members do not have any uniform; rather, they wear a piece of cloth on their arm with
the organization’s name on it.
42
Testimonies Nyunt Nyunt, Naing Naing, Aung Aung, Khin Oo, Phoe Zaw.
43
Ibid and testimony of Phoe Zaw.
44
Monywa District USDA Secretary. See also Chapter 2.
45
Testimonies of Khin Oo, Naing Naing and Aung Aung.
46
Testimonies of Naing Naing and Aung Aung.
47
Elected NLD representative from Lewe Constituency-1.
48
49
Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Khin Oo, Min Thein and Nyunt Nyunt.
50
Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Min Thein and Nyunt Nyunt.
51
Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Min Thein, Khin Oo and Nyunt Nyunt.
52
Pink NLD uniform of traditional Burmese dress and sarong.
53
Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.
54
Testimonies of Wunna Maung and Khin Oo.

55
Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Khin Oo and Min Thein.
56
57
58
59
As the Commission continued its investigation, it found that the Shwebo District Peace
and Development Council Chairman is Lt. Col. Than Han.
60
Testimony of Wunna Maung and NLD members interview with foreign radio stations.
61
The New Light of Myanmar on 1 June and the SPDC press conference on 31 May.
62
Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung.
63
Ibid.
64
Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung, NLD members’ interviews with foreign radio stations
and information sent from inside Burma directly to the Commission.
65
66
Foreign radio interviews and information sent directly to the Commission from inside
Burma.

Chapter (4)
The preliminary analysis of
the Ad hoc Commission on
the Depayin Massacre
T
he Commission found that the 30 May Depayin Massacre was
a premeditated crime committed by state and local authorities
in Burma against Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD members, their
supporters and unarmed villagers. The Commission has the following
evidence.
1. Training of attackers prior to the massacre
USDA secretaries from 8 townships in Shwebo District, and other

townships in Monywa District, were responsible for the recruitment of
people necessary for the protests against the NLD. The majority of the
recruitments or conscriptions were carried out in these areas.67 The USDA
and authorities used bribery, as well as threats of forced labor and other
means, to secure the number of protesters needed.68
The recruits were taken to respective areas in Sagaing Division.

Some were housed at Sagaing High School No. 2, and Monywa High
Schools No. 2 and 3. Others were sent to the compound of the North-
Western Region Command Headquarters and the Depayin High School in
Depayin. They all were given systematic training on how to attack and
disintegrate crowds.69
The state authorities have given similar training to USDA members

before. Soe Than, who is the NLD Youth leader for the Kamayut Township
in Rangoon, recounted his experience:
“Beginning 1 November 1996, the authorities have conducted special

mob control trainings for USDA members in a new building behind the
State Cooperative Showroom, which is located across the road from the
Ministry of Home Affairs. The USDA members were trained on how to
attack a larger number of people and vehicles. The USDA members selected
for the training were given meals and 200 kyat per day.”

2. The weapons used in the assault
The Commission found that the weapons used to attack the NLD at
Kyi Village near Depayin - bamboo sticks, sharpened bamboo sticks, two-
and-half-inch-thick wooden sticks, etc - were the same as those the USDA
protesters had used throughout their protests in the past. The methods of
striking with the weapons were also found to be the same. For instance,
the attackers chose heads and waists as their targets. The Commission
found that respective USDA secretaries in the Sagaing Division ordered
the public to make such weapons.
3. Timing of the attack and choice of the killing field
The Depayin Massacre began at about 8:00 pm on 30 May, and

finished around midnight.70 The night of the attack, the 30th of May, fell
on the waning moon in the month of Kason, meaning that it was a moonless
night. Visibility therefore was limited and very poor.
At a bend in the road before the village of Kyi, the authorities

devised their plan in such a way that the NLD motorcade had no other
choice but to stop. The authorities had also laid down three layers of
barbed wire barricades on the road near the Department of Irrigation in
Depayin. The police and soldiers had taken position on the department
premises and the would-be attackers were placed strategically on both
sides of the highway. Floodlights were used and aimed at the NLD
motorcade so that the attackers could see their targets clearly. The vehicles
following the NLD vehicles systematically lined up and aimed their front
lights at the NLD members, so that the attackers could clearly see.71
Moreover, the involvement of the authorities is evident in that they

were able to assemble the attackers in one place in a very systematic
manner and disassemble them quickly, in fact as soon as the attack was
over. This could not have been done without the collusion of the authorities
in the attack. There were more than 5,000 attackers and protesters, but
the populations of the villages near the location of the attack, namely the
villages of Kyi and Ywa Thit and those living in the Irrigation premises, do
not exceed more than 1,000.
Aung Aung and Naing Naing - both from the Democratic Party for
a New Society (DPNS) - who acted as vanguards for the NLD motorcade in
order to investigate the safety conditions of the road, had been detained
along with their vehicle (license plate R/801) on the Irrigation premises.
As the time of their arrests was about 5:30 in the evening, or just before
dusk, they were able to clearly see the situation surrounding the massacre
site and nearby areas.72

4. The methods used in the attack
As mentioned earlier, the attackers chose the head as their primary

target. Those dying, moaning in pain, having fallen down on the road, yet
who had remained conscious, were beaten repeatedly. A group of four to
five attackers at a time systematically struck an injured individual.73 The
attackers wore white armbands so that they could differentiate between
the NLD and their fellow attackers.74 The attackers threatened the occupants
of NLD vehicles to get out of their cars. The USDA shouted that they
would set the cars on fire if the NLD members did not get out. As soon as
the NLD members had gotten out of their cars, the waiting attackers beat
them incessantly.75 Those who failed or refused to get out of their cars,
seeing others being beaten, were dragged out of their vehicles and then
beaten.76 The attackers forcibly took the uniforms off NLD members and
robbed them of their valuables.77
5. Direct involvement of the authorities
Concerning the involvement of state officials in the Depayin Massacre,

the Commission found the following:
a) The authorities prevented the regular bus services between

Monywa and Mandalay on the day of the massacre.78
b) The police and soldiers detained some 70-80 motorbikes, along

with NLD riders and supporters from Monywa, who were then
forced to return home by the authorities. They were detained at
Zetaw Village, on the Monywa-Budalin Highway, where the
Headquarters of the North-Western Region Command is located.79
Those who came from Monywa to resolve the detention of NLD
members and supporters were also detained at the same place.
As a result, unrest broke out in Monywa at about 4:30 in the
afternoon that day. When Aung San Suu Kyi, who was already
in Budalin at the time, learnt of the incident, she sent Budalin
NLD Chairman Aung San and Sagaing Division NLD Secretary
Tun Myaing to resolve the matter. These two were also detained,
in the same manner as the others before them. The Commission
believes that the authorities detained all of these NLD activists
and leaders to ensure that there were fewer NLD members
present at the time of the attack, and that the attack could be
concentrated on NLD leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo.
c) On 30 May, Myo Naing (in-charge of Mandalay Division

Organization Committee), Thet Tun (Tin Oo’s car driver) and
Naing Naing (DPNS) went to the Budalin telecommunication
office in order to phone NLD Headquarters in Rangoon regarding
the safety conditions of the road. However, an employee told

them that all phone lines had been cut and that he could not
make any phone calls. It is clear that state officials cut the
phone lines on the day of the massacre so that no one, including
the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, could communicate outside
Budalin by phone in the case of an emergency. It is also very
clear to the Commission that this was part of the overall plan
leading up to the massacre.
d) Local officials had ordered the monasteries in and around the

village of Kyi in advance not to welcome or aid the NLD in any
way. They were instructed not to assist the NLD, even in the
case of some emergency. The monks were also told to stay put,
if something did in fact happen. Officials provided some of the
monasteries with donations and materials so that they would
comply with the demand. Consequently, the monks could not
assist the NLD when something happened, even if the monks
had wanted to, because the roads were closed and travel or
communication to outside the area was not possible.80 The
Commission believes that it was part of the systematic plan to
deny any possible outside help to the NLD during the mayhem
and that the authorities did not want any witnesses around when
the massacre occurred.
e) All NLD members who went ahead of the motorcade as

vanguards were detained by police and soldiers on the Irrigation
Department premises. “I saw nine sets of barbed wires on the
road, which were used to construct three barricades to block the
road. All passing vehicles and motorbikes had to slow down
due to the roadblocks. There were about 30 riot police, complete
with their combat gear, behind the barricades. A man in white
shirt approached our car and asked us where we were going.
We replied that we were part of the motorcade carrying Aung
San Suu Kyi and the NLD. Then the man reported to another
man about 50 years of age, who was wearing military trousers
and a white tank top (undergarment), ‘Major, it is a car that has
come along with Aung San Suu Kyi.’ ‘Yeah, get them inside the
premises,’ replied the major. The older man who was addressed
as an army major was fat, but his rank could not be verified
because he wasn’t wearing a uniform shirt.”81 There were
floodlights installed in advance and cars systematically parked
behind the attackers so that they could shine their headlights on
the chosen spot for the attack.82 The two officials who were
closely supervising the attackers were an army major83 and
Depayin Township Police Chief Sein Win.84
f) The Commission also learnt that the police officer in-charge

holed up in the Irrigation Department was Sein Win himself.

Among those detained on the department premises was Bo
Moung, the NLD’s elected representative from Depayin
Constituency.85 During the assault, Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle
was able to drive through the barricades. After seeing her get
away, Sein Win told all of the detainees sarcastically, including
Bo Moung, “Listen all of you, including U Bo Moung. As you
have just seen, remember that you all are quite lucky. I wish
you good luck in the future.”86
“The captain
ordered the
g) The evidence that all of the buses used to transport the USDA people in
protesters and attackers were seen parked inside the premises the truck to
of the North-Western Region Command, and that it was an army get out and
captain who was in-charge of clearing the dead bodies, all point
join in the
to the fact that the authorities were behind the attack. Confirming
this information, Kyaw Lwin, a truck conductor,87 told the scuffle.”
following during a Burmese language foreign radio broadcast,
“I am the assistant of a Nissan-UD (license plate

no. 2B/1962). The gate (truck station) is in Rangoon
and its phone number is 681 229. We transport goods
between Rangoon and Monywa. We have been forcibly
taken for state duty since 28 May.88 It was the North-
Western Command who had detained us for the use
of our vehicle. There were 10 trucks in total. We had
to stay on the command premises. On 30 May, we
left the premises. A captain sat in the front seat, but
he wore civilian clothes. I saw walkie-talkies in the
truck. About 50 people got into the truck. Some of
them had monk’s robes on. We were asked to cover
the back of the truck (where the people were) with
green tarpaulin before we left. We left the command
at about 7:00 pm. The captain ordered us to drive
toward Depayin and Ye Oo. Before we arrived in
Depayin, by about 2 or 3 miles, we saw a great scuffle
on the road. The captain in the front seat asked the
driver to shine the truck’s headlights onto the carnage.
He also ordered the people in the back of the truck to
get out and join in the scuffle. There were only three
of us – myself, Ko Nyo (believed to be the driver) and
the captain - left in the truck. What I saw was
unbelievable. I saw that tremendous force and violence
was being used, as some one with a large grudge
would use. It was extremely frightening. I have never
seen or experienced such mayhem. It was as if the
scuffle was one-sided. People were being brutally
beaten. There were many people lying on the road,
people running away from the carnage, people

shouting out in pain as if they were in a frenzy. Those
lying unconscious or dead were carried and piled up
near our truck. I don’t know the people who were
carrying the unconscious, but I think they were from
our truck. The captain in the front seat was talking on
his phone the entire time, saying ‘Yes, General, yes,
General.’ In a short while, the captain ordered me to
“We were ordered put the dead onto the truck. At the same time, I saw
to unload the the captain shoot into the crowd three or four times
bodies and we with his revolver. I don’t know if the bodies were
piled them on the dead or unconscious, but they were soaked in blood.
I carried all of them into the back of the truck. There
side of the road.” were exactly seventeen bodies. As soon as it was
completed, we were ordered to reverse the vehicle
and drive off. Our passengers, among whom were
monks, did not come back with us. I saw other trucks
that had been commandeered like us driving toward
the carnage. I don’t know what they had to do though.
When we reached Ahlone Village, we were ordered to
stop and unload the bodies. We piled them up on the
side of the road. It was the captain who ordered us.
Then we were told to drive back to the command
premises. I saw a feast that was ready to be eaten
there. We were invited to dine. Then we were given
30,000 kyat each. While we were having dinner we
saw someone taking our truck away, but the captain
assured us that it was only going to a place nearby.
He said, ‘Don’t worry.’ The truck arrived back the next
day, on 31 May, in the evening. We were only able to
wash the truck and make some offerings (for the dead)
on 1 June. I don’t know what happened to the
seventeen bodies that we left piled up by the side of
the road. I heard that they were cremated. We are
back in Rangoon now at the truck station and back in
business again.”89
6. The methods of command and control
During the mayhem, radio communication sets (walkie-talkies)

were used to give direct orders. According to eyewitnesses,
below are some examples:
· “Deva, Tin Hla, We’ve got it!”

· “Block the entrances to Taze and Ye Oo!”
· “Setkhalay (medium light automatic machine
gun), make it ready! Fire if necessary!”

· “Aung Khin, Aung Naing, what is the situation?
Commission, what is the status! Have you sent
it yet?”90
To ensure that the attackers would attack systematically, orders

such as “Water Group! Strike!” and “Fire Group! Strike!” were given. When
the attack was over, orders such as “Water Group! Let’s go home!” and
“Fire Group! Let’s return!” were called out. Only the military and the police “Policeand
use these types of orders. The words used for the orders were encoded. soldiers
destroyed
7. The arrangement of 5,000 attackers and protesters for the the
massacre
evidence.”
The Burmese military junta told the world, in the press conference
held on 31 May, that the scuffle was the result of a protest against the NLD
by some 5,000 people who do not support the party.91 The Commission
learnt from eyewitnesses that there were about 1,000 people - 500 USDA
and Pyithu Swan-ar Shin in the buses, which followed the NLD motorcade
when it left Budalin, and another 500 attackers in 10 ten-wheel trucks (50
passengers in each truck), which were from the Command premises.92
The Commission also learnt from eyewitnesses that there were about
4,000 people laying in wait for the NLD in front of the Irrigation Department
near the village of Kyi.93
Throughout the NLD’s trip to Kachin State, there were both male
and female protesters. However, it was notable that those involved in the
massacre were all men. The state authorities excluded women because
they were not just protesting against the NLD, but had premeditated plans
to launch an attack against the NLD.
8. Destruction and creation of evidence
Immediately following the massacre, police and soldiers took away

the vehicles, motorbikes, the injured and dead from the spot where the
ambush was staged. The evidence of the massacre was thus destroyed.
Further, in order to create the appearance of a scuffle, the authorities
themselves destroyed some of the vehicles that were used to transport the
attackers.94
When the massacre was over, at about 11:30 pm, a team of police
and military officers arrived at the crime scene.95 They changed the positions
of four vehicles that were left at the scene and then videotaped the newly
created crime scene.96
Until today, the authorities have either hidden or not returned any
of the vehicles belonging to the NLD and its supporters, which were
confiscated when the massacre occurred on 30 May.

9. Detention of eyewitnesses and the injured
The junta detained eyewitnesses and the wounded from the

massacre. It continued to detain those who escaped from the massacre.
Those who sustained serious injuries were sent to Army Medical Unit (7),
and those who had minor injuries were sent to Shwebo Prison. A total of
44 people, who were arrested in front of the Irrigation Department, were
sent to Shwebo Prison on the morning of 31 May. Political activists, who
had been detained at the massacre, were interrogated by a team, led by
Captain Lin Zaw Kan from MIS-20.97 After being illegally detained for 12
days, those who were not NLD members were released. When they were
released an official, said to be the Commander of the MIS-20, instructed
them to meet at the entrance of Shwebo Prison. He warned them not to
recount any of the details about the massacre to anyone. He told the
newly released that the foreign media would use the information, if they
said anything to anyone. He threatened that his MIS would take actions
against anyone found to be spreading information.98
The authorities continued to detain the injured and witnesses, but

only the MIS, without the police, carried out the interrogations. Later
when some eyewitnesses were released, excluding the most important
ones, they were forced to sign pledges not to recount the events of 30 May
to anyone. They were released only after they signed these documents.
These were the steps taken by the authorities in order to cover up the
Depayin Massacre. So far, the Burmese military junta has not disclosed
any information regarding the legality of the detention of those detained
in Shwebo, Kale and Hkamti Prisons following the massacre. Neither has it
made public if detainees have been charged under any criminal procedures.
Most importantly, the Burmese junta has not taken any action against
any of 5,000 protesters and attackers who were responsible for the attack,
in the year following the massacre. Nor has it arrested or brought legal
actions against any officials who were directly responsible for the planning,
organizing and executing of the massacre. The Commission therefore
believes that the state authorities are anxious about the uncovering of the
truth about the massacre, and that they have done all in their power to
keep the true facts about the massacre hidden.
Final Conclusion
The Depayin Massacre took place on 30 May. The carnage began at

about 8:00 pm and finished sometime between 11:30 pm and midnight.
Sixteen hours later, at 4:00 pm on 31 May, the SPDC organized a press
conference. It told the world that the massacre was a scuffle between the
NLD and anti-NLD protesters. The Commission believes that it was not
possible for anyone to investigate the massacre within this limited period
– even if the investigation included the best and experienced investigators.

Furthermore, it was also a time of confusion among the injured, dead and
detained, etc. A conclusion could not have been drawn without the prior
organization of so-called ‘facts’ in its hands. One major discrepancy is that
the MIS could not begin the photographing of 146 detainees until 1 June.
The interrogation could then logically only have begun at 9:00 am on 2
June.99 By this time, the junta had already held the press conference a day
and half earlier.
What is more blatant is that the authorities have made no attempts

at investigation in the whole year following the massacre. In addition,
they have not published any new conclusions about the massacre. This is
because, as the Burmese saying goes- ‘The thief who stole the royal scepter!’-
it was the Burmese military junta itself who perpetrated the heinous crime
and thus there was no need for the junta to look into the massacre. Based
on the evidence mentioned earlier in this chapter, and the preliminary
analysis and investigation of the Commission, it is more than clear that the
Burmese junta itself committed the crime against the NLD, Aung San Suu
Kyi and other unarmed NLD supporters.
Why did the Burmese junta commit such a heinous crime? What
motive did it have in committing these crimes? Why were the attacks
brutal beyond belief? What motivated the regime to commit a crime against
a well-known Noble Laureate in the presence of many eyewitnesses? These
questions need to be examined.
The Commission has avoided making any unfounded accusations

towards the Burmese junta. It has tried not to tamper the findings with
malicious intent or sworn grudge. The Commission has searched for an
objective answer based on the available evidence.
The Commission has reached the following two conclusions:
First, that the junta might have just wanted to scare the NLD, so
that it stopped or scaled back the party’s political campaigns amongst the
people. In doing so, however, the actions of the regime might have gotten
out of control, and unexpectedly resulted in the deaths of many people.
Second, it is probable that the junta wanted to end the lives of Aung San
Suu Kyi and Tin Oo, and eliminate the NLD once and for all.
The Commission will analyze the first assumption. If the regime

had just wanted to coerce the NLD, in order to put an end to NLD’s political
campaigns:
1. The junta did not need that much manpower. The

objective would have been easily accomplished if it had
used some 1,000 people – perhaps twice the size of NLD
entourage and supporters.

2. The attackers did not need to use lethal weapons. The
mission would have been easily accomplished if the
attackers had used the stones and sticks found by the
roadside to threaten the NLD.
3. The junta did not require the use of armbands, coded

messages and radio communication sets. Neither did it
require the training of attackers and ordering them when
to attack and when to retreat. All it had to do was let the
crowd loose, and assail themselves by provoking the NLD
physically.
4. There was no need for the conspicuous involvement of

the state authorities, such as the police and soldiers, in
the attack. The USDA could have single-handedly carried
out the deed and initiated the incident.
5. The massacre need not be covered up, if the state

authorities had not planned the attack and been involved.
The junta could have allowed for an independent inquiry
or international investigation into the massacre. Further,
had the junta’s campaign merely been one of coercion
and harassment, it could have taken actions against those
who inflicted fatalities (on the NLD and its supporters)
for breach of duty.
Indeed, the Commission has found that the above-mentioned

hypothesizes on the actions of the state authorities are contradictory to the
following evidence:
1. Systematic training was given prior to the massacre,

specifically on how to attack.
2. Weapons, of whose size and length were potentially lethal,

were prepared in advance and used in the attack.
3. The strategy and tactics of the attack, the time and killing
field were all carefully chosen. Radio communication sets
were used. Excessive force was used, with the help of
floodlights and headlights from vehicles to support the
attack.
4. The attack was executed as if it was a battle, commanded

by army officers as high-ranking as colonel, by other
junior officer ranking captains, as well as police chiefs.

5. There was the recruitment of around 5,000 hired thugs
from Sagaing Division and their assembly and dispersal
was executed systematically, as if in a battle.
6. The regime was able to keep the plan for the attack hidden,
prior to the attack. The evidence, including the dead bodies
of the victims, was destroyed after the crime was
committed. Witnesses were intimidated, threatened or
jailed so that they would not speak out. These are all
attempts by the state authorities to keep even a shred of
evidence of the crime from being exposed to the public.
7. The regime came out with a readily prepared statement

after the attack, declaring the incident a scuffle between
the supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi and her opponents.
Further, the regime explained away the deaths as the
results of a scuffle gone wrong.
Given these findings, the Commission therefore cannot accept, even

at this stage of a preliminary report upon the massacre, that the regime
merely intended to frighten the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi in order to
coerce them into ending their political activities. The Commission has
come to the conclusion that the Depayin Massacre was a premeditated
crime, and that the regime actually intended to kill Aung San Suu Kyi and
Tin Oo.
Furthermore, the Commission has come to the conclusion that Aung San
Suu Kyi was the primary target of the attack. It has the following evidence:
1. Many of the youth who linked their hands in a chain and

surrounded Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle during the attack
were beaten severely and fell onto the road. The attackers
were able to smash the rear windshield of the backseat,
where she was sitting. Her car was only able to speed off
from the first killing field because her driver took his own
initiative and broke through the line of attack.
2. Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle was able to escape the second
killing field because it was able to drive through the
barricades and two Dyna vehicles that tried to ram her
car head-on.
3. An army major was giving orders from the Irrigation

Compound to stop and detain all vehicles that had been
able to break through the attack. The order was given to
fire at vehicles if necessary. There are witnesses who
heard the orders, as well as gunshots, at the same time

as the vehicle carrying Aung San Suu Kyi drove through
the barricades. Therefore, it can be assumed that she
was luckily able to escape amid gunfire.
This leads the Commission to examine the motives as to why the

regime considered and executed a plan to eliminate Aung San Suu Kyi. It
seems plausible to the Commission that the regime came to the conclusion
“The generals that the situation was no longer viable, as she could no longer be controlled.
became She posed a great danger to its plans to hold onto to power, if she was
worried alive and continued her political activities.
about their
The regime became overly anxious. The basis of that great anxiety
continued was that the regime faced all kinds of problems in managing the country.
hold on It could not resolve the social and economic problems that the country
power.” faced. Daily hardships choked the people more and more each day.
Furthermore, the regime has been unable to turn the economy around,
despite the fact that it has received considerable assistance from neighboring
Thailand, India and China. Although the economy did not completely
collapsed after the failure of the banking system in 1992 due to large scale
money laundering, the lack of prevalence of due process of law, itself a
result of the banking crisis, has forced many a foreign companies to
withdraw from Burma. This contributed to a growing economic crisis.
Moreover, the ethnic problem loomed large on the horizon and

political settlement with ethnic groups was nowhere in sight, despite the
regime’s claim that it had secured peace with various armed ethnic groups.
There still remained a number of armed ethnic groups whom had yet to
enter into a truce with the regime. The political activities of political forces,
activists and people working inside the country had gathered momentum
over the preceding year. It is evident in that these groups have been able
to articulate their calls for political reforms. Through the efforts of various
exiled groups, the misrule of the Burmese regime had been increasingly
exposed to the international community. Pressure from foreign countries,
such as the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada,
Japan, etc. had grown steadily.
All of these factors made it extremely difficult for the Burmese

regime in its quest for a way out. The Burmese generals became genuinely
worried about their continued hold on power. The majority of the problems
they perceived were the result of the political deadlock between the junta
and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. She had called for international sanctions
against the regime and had asked the UN and other international players
to rebuke the junta. From their point of view, she had to be gotten rid of.
To intensify the mounting concerns of the junta, Aung San Suu

Kyi’s trips across the nation were a phenomenal success. She garnered
increasing support as she traveled throughout Burma. Despite various

attempts to contain the movement of and intimidate the public against
demonstrating support for her, thousands of people turned up to welcome
her and hear her speak.
Among her trips, Aung San Suu Kyi’s campaign trail in Upper Burma
was the most successful. During this time, seas of people turned up,
cheering and applauding for her while filling the streets. A clear message
of defiance was spreading throughout the entire country and it shook the
“Seas of
foundation of the regime’s rule. The tide was about to turn. people
turned up
Under these circumstances, the regime resorted to using the tactics to see
it knows best. In other words, the regime decided to use state terrorism to Suu Kyi
eliminate Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD once and for all, and in doing so
instill greater fear in the people’s minds in the hope that they would become speak.”
even more passive. The regime believed that if it could create such enormous
fear, it could continue to control the country’s national agenda.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that this was the key motive
as to why the Burmese junta committed the Depayin Massacre.
The Commission, at the same time, must admit that there are still
numerous facts and information regarding the massacre that it has been
unable obtain. The Commission, for instance, still cannot establish who
exactly in the junta’s leadership directly ordered the massacre, how the
strategy to commit the crime was conceptualized and realized and how the
division of labor was organized among various state organs in order to
commit the crime. Further, the Commission still cannot establish how and
where exactly the dead bodies were destroyed and later vanished to.
It is, however, crystal clear that the Burmese regime is primarily

responsible for the massacre, given the testimonies of eyewitnesses,
evidence around the killing fields and other information. But for the
Commission to be able to present its finding in a more convincing manner,
it needs to be able to travel to the area where the massacre took place,
speak to witnesses and victims, as well as to local and state authorities. To
make the Commission’s work more meaningful, an independent international
commission needs to be formed. Only when such a commission takes the
time to carry out its task, without any hampering or harassment from
state authorities, will such findings be complete and can a formal conclusion
be drawn.

Endnotes
67
Information sent directly to the Commission from inside Burma.
68
Ibid., NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03) and foreign radio broadcasts.
69
Testimonies of Wunna Maung and Phoe Zaw and foreign radio interviews.
70
SPDC press conference on 31 May and testimonies of eyewitnesses.
71
Testimonies of Aung Aung and Naing Naing.
72
Ibid.
73
Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein and foreign radio interviews.
74
Tetimonies of Zaw Zaw Aung, Wunna Maung, Min Thein, Nyunt Nyunt and Khin Oo.
75
76
Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and foreign radio interviews.
77
Testimonies of Wunn Maung, Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.
78
Testimonies of Naing Naing, Aung Aung and Phoe Zaw.
79
Testimony of Naing Naing.
80
Testimonies of Maung Po Zaw and Ko Min Thein .
81
Testimonies of Ko Naing Naing and Ko Aung Aung.
82
Ibid. and foreign radio interviews.
83
According to information sent to the Commission from inside Burma, one of the
officers in charge of the attackers was Shwebo Peace and Development Council
Chairman, Col. Than Han. The Commission has continued its investigation to verify the
facts it has so far gathered.
84
85
86
Ibid.
87
An assistant to the truck driver.
88
Known as ‘Chaw Swae’, all kinds of private and company vehicles are often enlisted or
commandeered for governmental duty, mostly in emergency and military matters
without warning and without pay, regardless of time and place of the vehicle.
89
Kyaw Lwin’s interview with Burmese language foreign radio interviews.
90
91
SPDC press conference at 4pm on 31 May and The New Light of Myanmar on 1 June.
92
Kyaw Lwin’s interview with Burmese language foreign radiobroadcast.
93
Testimonies of Naing Naing, Aung Aung, Phoe Zaw and Wunna Maung.
94
95
Testimonies of Min Thein and Zaw Zaw Aung’s interview with foreign radio stations.
96
Zaw Zaw Aung’s interview with foreign radio stations.
97
Testimonies of Naing Naing and Aung Aung and Zaw Zaw Aung’s interview.
98
99

Chapter (5)
Affidavits/Testimonies of the
Depayin Massacre Witnesses
1. Khin Oo
2. Wunna Maung
3. Nyunt Nyunt
4. Min Thein
5. Phoe Zaw (a.k.a. Maung Zaw)
6. Aung Aung (a.k.a. Aung San Win)
7. Naing Naing (a.k.a. Thein Naing)
8. Khin Aye Myint

Affidavit of Khin Oo
Member of the Mayangone Township
NLD Organizing Committee
Personal Data
Name: Khin Oo
Gender: Male
Age: 37 years
Date of Birth: 3 September 1966
Father’s Name: U Hla Htun
Mother’s Name: Daw Khin Suu
ID Number: MYG 163 815
Nationality: Burman
Religion: Buddhist
Education: 8th Standard
Address: No. 71, Thura Street, Ward 9, Mayangone
Township, Rangoon Division
Place of Birth: Letyetma Village, Myaing Township in Magwe Division

I, Khin Oo, hereby declare the following regarding the Depayin
Massacre under oath.
1. My name is Khin Oo. I was born in Letyetma Village of Myaing Township

in Magwe Division on 3 September 1966. My parents are U Hla Htun and
Daw Khin Suu.
I was arrested on 18 March 1988, after participating in a demonstration in

front of Section C of the Theingyi Market in Rangoon. As a result, I was
forced to serve three months in Insein Prison. I was released on 1 June
1988.
I joined the NLD on the day of its establishment, on 27 September 1988.

My NLD membership number is 2401247. I worked as treasurer in the
Youth Wing of the NLD. During the 1990 election, I took on other party
duties, such as participating in the Information and Security Committee of
the Mayangon NLD election campaign.
2. Following the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest on 10 July
1995, I was given the duty of In-Charge (3) of the party Youth Wing
Working Group in my township NLD chapter. Under party instruction, I
carried out duties concerning the Youth Wing such as political campaigns,
organizing, security, etc. On 9 September 1998, I was detained at Light
Infantry Division 215 under the command of Division 11, based at Yemon
Garrison, as I had participated in activities for the formation of the
Committee Representing Peoples’ Parliament.
I was released again on 21 December 1998 and was promoted to the

position of Joint-Secretary for the Township NLD Organizing Committee. I
continued in that position until 2002. Afterwards, I continued my work
with the party as a member of the township Organizing Committee.
On 24 August 2000, I accompanied Aung

San Suu Kyi, as part of her security
arrangement, during her trip to Twante
Township in Rangoon Division in order to
form a township Youth Wing Working
Group there. State authorities halted the
trip. Police Chief Aung Nwe and Deputy-
Police Chief Myo Lwin detained all of us in
the rice paddy field near Kyansittha Ward,
in Dala Township, until 1 September 2000.
At about 11:45 in the morning on that day,
the authorities plunged us into water,
handcuffed us and forcibly returned us to
Aung San Suu Kyi’s house on University NLD detained in rice field.
Avenue. We were all put under house arrest. Aung San

Suu Kyi was released from house arrest on 14 September 2000. The
restrictions placed upon us were also lifted.
3. On 21 September 2000, Aung San Suu Kyi planned to travel. I took

security duty for Aung San Suu Kyi, as part of the party’s plans to travel
and form the Youth Wing in Mandalay Division. I traveled with Ko Aye
Htun, from the NLD Central Youth Supporting Group, in a vehicle (license
7A/5661) on 19 September 2000. At about midnight that night, both of
us were detained at the Htauk Kyant Checkpoint, outside of Rangoon.
We were temporarily detained at the Central Military Intelligence

Headquarters, located at Yekyi Ai. We were freed when the NLD Central
Executive Committee members were freed. I then continued the duties of
the party. Following the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest on
6 May 2002, I carried out my security duty for Aung San Suu Kyi as
follows:
1. Thamanya trip 14-15 June 2002

2. Trips to Madalay and Magwe Divisions 20-29 June 2002
3. Mon State trip 20-23 July 2002
4. Western Pegu (Bago) Region trip 13-17 July 2002
5. Shan State trip 13-27 Nov. 2002
6. Arakan State and Irrawaddy Division trips 16-24 Dec. 2002
7. Chin State trip 3-13 April 2003
8. Donation trip to Pegu
(Panditayama Monastic School) 18 Jan. 2003
9. Trips to Kachin State, Sagaing
and Mandalay Divisions 6-30 May 2003
Furthermore, I continued to carry out my security duties, such as providing

security for Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence and during her outings in
Rangoon.
4. We left Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence at about five in the morning,
on 6 May 2003, in order to begin our Kachin State trip. In the front seat of
Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle sat Ko Myo Nyunt (driver) and Tun Zaw Zaw.
In the back seat sat Aung San Suu Kyi. I sat at the back of the car with Min
Lwin, Moe Zaw, Than Tun, Myo Nyunt, Thet Tun and Toe Lwin. We arrived
in Mandalay at about midnight on that same day.
Accompanying Tin Oo in a Townace car sat Aung Soe (the driver from
Mandalay), and Thein Soe and Myint Kyaw, members of the NLD Information
Department of the Central Youth Working Group.
In a Dyna car driven by Sein Win, a member of the Pegu Division’s Inntakaw
Township Organizing Committee, sat Hla Min, Tun Myint, Aung Htoo and
Kyaw Zin Win.

5. The NLD were harassed throughout their Kachin State trip. The following
is my testimony:
At about 9:00 pm on 10 May 2003, we arrived at Intaw in Sagaing Division.

At the entrance to Intaw, USDA members numbering between 70-100
and led by Monywa District Secretary for the USDA, Htay Aung, shouted
slogans against the NLD. Beside them was a pile of homemade weapons,
such as sharpened wooden sticks, batons and stones. A member of the
NLD Information Department videotaped and photographed what we saw
at the demonstration, as part of the record.
We left Intaw for Katha on 11 May 2003. At a location about two miles
from Katha, we saw Htay Aung and his USDA protesters, along with those
who were hired to join in the protest. As in Intaw, we observed weapons
such as wooden sticks and stones piled up beside the demonstrators.
There were about 500 protesters.
We also witnessed the Monywa District USDA Secretary, Htay Aung,

disrespect Colonel Myint Naing, who is the Chairman of the District Peace
and Development Council, and that he ignored the colonel’s orders. The
colonel told Htay Aung, “Htay Aung! Do what you have to do, but let Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi who is a visitor continue on her journey.” We witnessed
the colonel apologizing to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi himself. I myself heard
Htay Aung exchanging words with the colonel. He told the colonel, “We’ll
leave only when they (NLD entourage) go first.”
In Katha, we met with township NLD members and officials. When we left,
at about 8:00 pm, we saw Htay Aung and his people waiting for us in
front of the Katha High School. There was a bonfire in the school compound
and we saw approximately 1,000 people inside
the school. As our convoy passed the school,
we heard USDA members shout, “We have
won! We have won!” All of us in the convoy
witnessed the USDA proclamations. Again, the
USDA members were armed with the
homemade weapons that we had seen in the
previous demonstrations. They were shouting
the victory proclamation while raising their
weapons in the air with every chant.
On 13 May, we were greeted with a silent

protest at Namasit Village, near Phakant
Eye witness
Township. USDA members held small placards Khin Oo seen at left
that read, “Oppose all axe handles (meaning traitors) of photo taken
who are cynics and rely on foreign stooges.” on 25 May.

We continued our journey to Myitkyina Township at about six in the morning
on 16 May. At about 8:00 am, we saw a protest by USDA members
numbering around 300 near the Nangwae Bridge. They wore headbands
and held up placards saying, “Oppose axe handles who rely on foreigners,
those who disturb the tranquility of our State” and “Oppose and destroy
those who steal our race and religion.” The protesters blocked the road.
Not very far from where the protest was taking place was the presence of
riot police, complete with shields and batons.
We arrived at Thonemine Village, near Bamaw Township, on 20 May 2003.

It was about 3:00 am. There were some 300 USDA members waiting for
us. They had homemade weapons in their hands. They were in vehicles
and on motorbikes that had no license plates. The USDA protesters even
tried to snatch the video camera that Tun Zaw Zaw was carrying.
6. We had no weapons in our convoy. We only had a 16-gallon gasoline

can with us, so that we would have no problems when traveling long
distances. It was so heavy that none of us on security detail could lift it.
So, we improvised a loop on a one-inch wooden stick to lift the gasoline
can. All of us in the security unit knew about the stick.
During our trips to Kachin State, Mandalay and

Sagaing Divisions, we experienced attacks similar
to the Depayin Massacre. At Kyi Tauk Pauk and
Nweyon Villages in Singu Township, Mandalay
Division, we were violently harassed by the USDA
and state authorities. That night between 8:30
and 9:00, seven vehicles (3 Dyna trucks and 4
Hilux pickup trucks) harassed our entourage, and
in particular squeezed the car carrying Aung San
Suu Kyi and myself from both sides of the road.
The occupants of the USDA vehicles also
pretended that they were about to attack us with
their homemade weapons, in order to frighten
us. As we entered Singu Town, the USDA fired a
Protesters on slingshot into our convoy. As a result, a pellet hit a Youth Wing member
25 May near NLD
convoy. Eye witness
from Mandalay and injured him. Tin Oo, therefore, reported the case to
Khin Oo at left the Singu Police Station.
of photo.
7. On 29 May 2003, we began our Monywa trip. We arrived in Sagaing
City at about 10:30 am. We saw approximately 150 USDA members, led
by Htay Aung, protesting near the entrance of the Sagaing Bridge. They
held up signs and shouted slogans. We did not respond to their
demonstration. At that time, I was in the back seat of Aung San Suu Kyi’s
car. We arrived in Myinmu Township at about 12:30 in the afternoon.
Tin Htut Oo, who is the NLD elected representative from Lewe Constituency-
1 and in-charge of reorganizing the party Youth Wing for the Upper Burma

chapter, led the youth organizing activities. Tayza Naing acted as master of
ceremonies at that function. During the ceremony, we saw five vehicles
leave the Myinmu Township NLD office. We saw members of the police,
reserve fire brigade, Pyithu Swan-ar Shin 100 and local Peace and
Development Council. I observed a banner that said, “Pyithu Swan-ar
Shin” in green writing upon a white piece of cloth.
When we left Myinmu Township, we noticed those same vehicles following

us. We arrived at Yeposar Village at about three in the afternoon. At
Yeposar, we saw vehicles belonging to the
authorities partially hidden behind tropical
bushes and margosa (neem) trees on the
sides of the road. They were riot police
vehicles, military vehicles, and vehicles
belonging to the military police and traffic
police. We saw USDA demonstrators on
both sides of the highway. The USDA had
used buses that normally plied between
the cities of Monywa and Mandalay, known
as ‘Monywa-Man’ and ‘Chindwin-Thar,’ to
transport the protesters. We counted
roughly 30 vehicles at the protest site.
There were about 500 USDA members and Authorities’ car

partially
others at that location. Stones and batons were piled up near the protesters, hidden in bushes
as if they were going to start a fight. The person who was supervising the & stones piled up
protesters closely was none other than Htay Aung, who had harassed us at side of road.
earlier all throughout our Kachin State trip. When we encountered the
protesters and vehicles belonging to state officials, Ko Thein Soe, who was
in-charge of the News and Information Unit, took photographs, while Tun
Zaw Zaw videotaped and Ko Myint Kyaw took audio recordings of the
scene of the protest.
As we passed Yeposar, there were three NLD vehicles in front of us, including
the one carrying NLD Vice-Chairperson Tin Oo. (When I look back), from
the way the protest at that village had been arranged and the presence of
a number of state authorities, I could say that had we arrived in Yeposar at
night, the authorities would have staged an attack, just as they later did at
Depayin. I think the would-be attackers were deterred by the presence of
a huge crowd near Yeposar Village, who were there to welcome us. Besides,
it was broad daylight when we arrived in Yeposar. (I think) all of this
deprived the attackers of an opportunity to attack us here.
We left Chaungoo and arrived in Monywa at about 9:30 pm. At the ceremony
to re-hoist the NLD sign at the township party office, NLD Chairman Tin
Oo recited the sutra called ‘Victory’ and Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the

crowd. We then continued with the meeting, in order to form a township
Youth Wing, until two in the morning on 30 May.
8. At 10:00 am on 30 May, we went to pay respect to the abbot of Zawtika

Monastery. Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the public briefly and bid them
farewell. We then left for Budalin Township. We witnessed cars and
motorbikes from Monywa accompanying us to Budalin. We arrived in Budalin
“USDA at about noon. We put the NLD sign back up and met with township NLD
members officials. We gave greetings to the local people and took a short rest. We
left Butalin for Sai Pyin Gyi Village at about three in the afternoon. We
behind us
arrived at Sai Pyin Gyi around 5:00 pm. At Sai Pyin Gyi, we went to see
began to the family of Win Myint Aung, who is being held under detention. Tin Oo
attack the and Aung San Suu Kyi gave encouragement to his family. Afterwards,
villagers.” Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the local people. We continued to Depayin
from Sai Pyin Gyi at about 7:00 pm that evening.
9. We arrived at the village of Kyi at about 7:30pm. We began to see

people who were out to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi. She accepted flowers
and garlands from the well-wishers. We continued on our journey slowly.
We noticed two monks with red armbands on their right arms in the
crowd. They followed us. Then the monk who was fatter than the other
blocked the road and told the driver, “You are ignoring us even though we
are asking you to stop!” The monk asked Aung San Suu Kyi to give a brief
speech to the people. Tun Zaw Zaw apologized and replied that the NLD
could not comply with the request because we still had a long way to go.
Then Aung San Suu Kyi said, “U Zin (the Reverend Monk), please assemble
the people, and I will give a greeting for about 10 minutes.” Just then a
youth security detail from Mandalay arrived and informed us that the
USDA members who were right behind us had begun to attack the villagers.
We went to inform Aung San Suu Kyi of this. At the same time, Tun Zaw
Zaw said to the two monks, “We are being attacked. Can you please stop
the attackers?” The monks disappeared immediately. We did not see them
again, while we were under attack.
10. After the villagers were beaten severely, we witnessed the attackers
begin to charge the NLD vehicles from Mandalay and Monywa. I observed
the mayhem clearly, as the USDA cars’ headlights were shown directly on
carnage. There were so many attackers that I could not say exactly how
many of them were involved in the attack. First they threw stones to our
vehicles, after which they charged us with batons, hard bamboo sticks,
bamboo sticks with hard joints, wooden sticks and sharpened bamboo
poles. Some NLD members were able to get out of their vehicles and
escape. Those who could not escape were violently attacked. The last
vehicles were attacked first without warning. That’s why the number of
fatalities in those vehicles was far higher than in others. I saw before my
very eyes women being beaten. Those who were severely and savagely
beaten were from the Mandalay NLD Youth Wing, as well as others who

were part of the security detail and were student members of the Monywa
NLD. The attackers screamed, “You who want to be the wife of a Kala!”
The attackers used abusive language as they charged forward. When the
attackers started to surge forward to attack Aung San Suu Kyi’s car, it was
not possible for any of the vehicles behind to overtake her car. They were
sandwiched and trapped between the attackers. Therefore, the people in
those vehicles sustained a lot of injuries and incurred the most deaths.
11. Tin Oo, whose car was in front of Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle, got out
from his car and came to ask her to leave the carnage. Previously, when
speaking to Aung San Suu Kyi, Tin Oo used the honorific title, “Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi.” But this time, Tin Oo pleaded with her to leave saying, “My
daughter! The situation does not seem very good. Please leave.” He spoke
to her with such kindness, I can still hear his words in my ears to this day.
Aung San Suu Kyi replied, “Baba! The villagers, public and our NLD members
are being beaten, I cannot possibly leave.” When he could no longer plead
with her, Tin Oo returned to his car.
12. No sooner had Tin Oo left, when our car (carrying Aung San Suu Kyi)
was attacked from the rear. Our security team members – Moe Thaw, Min
Lwin, Than Tun, Toe Lwin, Myo Nyunt, Thet Tun and myself – blocked
and surrounded the each side of
the front seat. I positioned myself
near the engine, towards her right
and in front of her. The attackers
began to attack the left flank of
our vehicle. They first beat the
youth security members
surrounding the vehicle who
stood on the left side. I saw the
windshield to Aung San Suu Kyi’s
left smashed. I also saw Aung San
Suu Kyi sustain an injury on her
left arm. I could see it clearly
because the light in the front seat
was switched on. At the same
time, the attackers began to
charge Kyaw Soe Lin, who was our NLD Youth
driver. I was on the right side of the car and the closest to Kyaw Soe Lin. Wing members
Blood spurt out from his right arm. When an attacker hit me, I tried to surrounded
Suu Kyi’s car
block the blow with my left hand. The stick hit my watch on my left hand
before the attack.
and it was smashed. Just then, Kyaw Soe Lin shouted, “Aunty (Aung San
Suu Kyi) is hit! Aunty is hit!” The broken windshield had hit Aung San Suu
Kyi’s left shoulder and she was wounded. Thiha, from the Mandalay NLD
Youth Wing, was struck on the head and as a result blood gushed forth
from it. Toe Lwin and Moe Thaw from Rangoon, who were both part of

the security team, were beaten on their backs and heads. Than Tun
sustained a serious wound. This was because when the attackers attacked
the back seat of the car, they used pointed bamboo sticks. Than Tun was
with us all throughout the trips and had never left the car. This was because
his duty was to watch over all of our belongings in the car. I also saw
blood running down the face of Toe Lwin, as he had been severely beaten
on the head.
“They are
killing us! To tell you the honest truth, I became terrified as the violent attack
Don’t go progressed. If Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Burma’s architect of the
any independence struggle and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, was being
beaten like this, I knew the attackers would not spare someone like me – a
further!” nonentity. They would beat me to death. So I moved away from Aung San
Suu Kyi’s vehicle and shouted, “Aunty! Run! Drive the car out of here! Ko
Kyaw Soe Lin! Drive away! Get out of here!” I shouted the warning at the
top of my lungs.
The rest of the youth security members shouted along with me to get the
car out of the carnage. A little while later, Kyaw Soe Lin drove the car out
of the mayhem. He did not do it because Aung San San Suu Kyi had
ordered him to. If someone asked me why Aung San Suu Kyi was able to
escape from the violent attack at Depayin, I would have to answer that it
was Kyaw Soe Lin who saved her life.
When Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle broke through the attackers and sped
off, I jumped into the Hilux truck in front of us, which was driven by Ko Ko
Lay from the Mandalay NLD. His car was able to break through the attackers.
But before long, a group of motorbikes, which had escaped before us,
came charging back towards us. They shouted, “The attackers have blocked
the road! They are beating us! They are killing us! Don’t go any further!”
Ko Ko Lay stopped the truck right at that spot. If I continued to run
forward, I would be beaten to death and if I ran back, I was sure to be
beaten to death. Therefore, I ran into the rice paddy fields on my right.
13. The Depayin Massacre on 30 May was extremely terrifying and

frightening. I saw before my very eyes people lying in pools of blood.
Whenever they tried to get up, they were beaten back down onto the road.
It was shocking, horrifying and traumatic beyond belief. Some of the NLD
women were stripped of their clothes. The attackers called people names
and used abusive languages. They shouted, “Those of you who want to
make a Kala your husbands! It’s good that you are dead!” I am not
exaggerating. I am recounting what I saw with my own eyes. The attack
was so violent that there were numerous deaths. I believe there were
about one hundred - who were dead, injured, unconscious and lying on
the road. No less than 100 victims. After I ran off from the Hilux truck and
into the rice paddy field, I saw seven NLD Youth members from Monywa,
including Ko Ko Lwin, who is No. 2 in the township NLD Youth Wing. I

also came across a Youth Wing member from the Mandalay NLD Southwest
Township chapter. All nine of us ran across the rice paddy fields for about
an hour. We witnessed floodlights from the direction of Depayin while we
were resting from our escape. Then we saw military vehicles driving away
from what we believed to be the ambush spot. We also heard an
announcement over loudspeakers that Article 144 (dusk to dawn curfew)
had been imposed in the area. At the same time, we heard about 8 to 10
gunshots fired. “It’s good
that you
14. We hid ourselves in the rice paddy fields near Budalin during the night are
of the attack. At about four in the morning on 31 May, we asked for help
dead!”
from some people living in a small hut. One of them accompanied us to
Nabae Hla Village. From Nabae Hla we continued on to Pyankya Village.
We then arrived at the village monastery. About twelve people who were
wounded in the attack were already there. Only four of them were able to
speak, and the condition of the rest did not look good. Two people from
Myaing Township, Sagaing Division had sustained serious injuries. They
were in very bad shape. They could no longer speak. They were vomiting
and had many wounds on their heads, as well as on their backs.
We heard that the authorities would come and check for the wounded
there. So we left Pyankya for Sai Pyin Gyi, after resting at the monastery
for a short while. At about noon, we (Ko Ko Lwin and myself) arrived at
the place where Aung San Suu Kyi had last stopped the night before.
The son of Win Myint Aung (who is in prison) told us that he had been
detained along with his motorbike on the morning of 30 May at the Depayin
Police Station, while he was on his way to check the security conditions of
the road before Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage traveled. He then
took me to Butalin. Ko Ko Lwin got off earlier at Saipyin Gyi, stating that
he would go and check for wounded at the monastery in Pyankya. I slept
in the rice paddy field near Budalin. From 1-4 June, I stayed at a monastery
near Budalin, as I was forced to continue hiding. The roads were closed
up until 4 June, so I could not travel. When the roads were re-opened on
4 June, I went to Mandalay. I hid myself the whole time, without returning
to my home. I left for the Thai-Burma border on 28 October 2003.
I certify that in giving all of my testimony from No 1 to 14, I was not

unjustly influenced, threatened or misled by anyone. Nor have I lied about
the Depayin Massacre. The testimony is of my own free will. I certify that
the testimony recounts the true events that I saw, experienced and knew
of during the ambush on 30 May near the village of Kyi in Depayin Town-
ship.
-Khin Oo
24 November 2003
Bangkok, Thailand

Affidavit of Wunna Maung
Personal Data
Name: Wunna Maung

Gender: Male
Age: 26 years
Date of Birth: 16 March 1977
Father’s Name: U Kyaw Maung
Mother’s Name: Daw Tin Win
ID Number: No-9/MCS- (N) 003840
Nationality: Burman
Religion: Buddhist
Education: Middle school
Address: Htundone Myo Thit, Chan Mya Thar Zi Township,
Mandalay Division
Place of Birth: Mandalay

I, Wunna Maung, hearby swear under oath that:
1. I am a citizen of Burma, holding national identification card no-9/ MCS-

(N) 003840. I was born on 16 March 1977. My parents are U Kyaw Maung
and Daw Tin Win. I live in Htundone Myo Thit, Chan Mya Thar Zi Township,
Mandalay Division. I make this affidavit in support of my statement on the
Depayin Massacre in Burma, which took place on 30 May 2003.
2. I had applied for membership to the Mandalay National League for

Democracy (NLD) Youth Wing. The NLD Vice-Chairman, Tin Oo himself,
said that we had been accepted as members. He continued to say that
membership cards had not yet been issued to anyone due to the prevailing
situation and told us to continue to implement the party’s programs anyway.
As I had been elected by youth from the Htundone Ward, I served as the
Htundone Township youth organizer.
3. For the organizing trip by Aung San Suu Kyi to Upper Burma, I had to
serve as a youth security officer, according to the duty entrusted to me by
the Mandalay Division NLD. By security duty, it is meant that those holding
that duty had to take responsibility for keeping a close watch on the traveling
party during the entire journey, in order to guard against any danger that
might befall us. Daw Suu101 entrusted security duty for the organizing trips
within Mandalay Division to Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, an elected MP from Sagaing
Township Constituency No. 2 in Mandalay Division.
Accordingly, Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, in turn, entrusted to the youth from
Mandalay Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and Southwest Townships, the
duty to serve as reserve security units. Providing security for Daw Suu
were 17 members from the Central Headquarters Youth Wing, who had
accompanied Daw Suu from Rangoon. Whenever there was a break in the
journey for rest, the Central Youth members took up position in the inner
tier of security, while Mandalay Township Youth members took up position
in the outer tier.
4. Even before we started on the journey, we had learned that bamboo

club wielding troop units had been formed at township USDA offices and
training was being given, with Ya-Ya-Ka102 chairmen serving as battalion
commanders. We also learned that villagers were ordered, under a different
pretext, to furnish meal packets for these trainees. For that reason, before
departing on our journey, Daw Suu advised us to absolutely avoid any
words or behavior that might lead to confrontation with the authorities.
5. On 29 May, at about 9:00 am, the long line of cars and motorcycles
started out in a convoy from the back of 38th Street and drove along to
84th Street. In the car I was riding in, were Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, Aye Win,
Wunna, Mandalay Northwest Township Secretary Hla Than, Aung Ko, Khin
Aye Myint, Nyunt Nyunt, and Thein Zaw. In order to serve as a scout, a car

drove at a distance ahead of the main party. The party arrived in Sagaing
City at about 10:30 am.
6. At a bend in the road, before entering Sagaing City and after passing
over Sagaing Bridge, we saw on both sides of the road a group of about
600 people holding placards with slogans saying, “We don’t want people
who don’t support the USDA”. They were also chanting this slogan. At a
“The scout moderate distance behind the group was a large crowd of people who
car failed were welcoming Daw Suu. When we saw people en masse welcoming and
supporting us enthusiastically, we also joyously responded to their greetings.
to return.” To the shouts of, “Long live Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Ba Ba U Tin Oo,”
we shouted in return, “Long live the people,” and so on. The party did not
take the time to enter Sagaing and went straight on to Myinmu Town. The
party reached Myinmu at about noon and Daw Suu presided over the
ceremony for installing the signboard and the opening of the Myinmu
Township NLD office. After that, the Upper Burma youth organizer, Tin
Htut Oo, presided over the formation of the Myinmu Township NLD Youth
Wing.
7. At about 3:00 pm, the party started to leave for Monywa City. On the
way we encountered more and more people in cars and on motorcycles
coming to meet us. The party drove on in an orderly fashion and began to
reach the entrance to Monywa at about 6:00 pm. As the crowd of people
coming to meet Daw Suu in the town was so big, we were unable to reach
the clock tower in the center of town until 9:30 pm. In Monywa, Daw Suu
addressed the town elders and public for about 45 minutes, and then the
party retired for the night in Monywa Town. Daw Suu slept in the house of
one of the MP elects and the rest of the party found other places to retire.
8. On 30 May, the party began to leave Monywa for Budalin Township at

10:30 am. At the exit of Monywa, our group, including vice Chairman Tin
Oo and Daw Suu, went into the Zawti-ka Monastery of Monywa in order to
pay respect to the abbot. However, the abbot was away and we continued
our journey on to Budalin. At the beginning of the journey, 10 +cars and
about 150 motorcycles from Monywa escorted the party. Upon reaching
Budalin, the ceremony for installing the signboard and the opening of the
Budalin NLD Township office was held and the Budalin NLD Youth Wing
was formed. At about 4:30 pm, the party started to leave Butalin for
Depayin Township. On the way, at Saing-pyin Village, Daw Suu stopped to
meet with local NLD members and the family members of U Win Myint
Aung, an MP-elect who is being held in prison, to give words of
encouragement and comfort. Before reaching Depayin, as the scout car
going ahead of the party had failed to return, motorcycle riders were sent
to find out about the situation. However, the motorcycle riders also failed
to return.

9. As we were continuing our journey, it was about 8:00 pm when we
reached the place near Kyi Village between Saingpyin and Depayin, where
the incident took place.
At that time, there were only two cars between the car we were in and
Daw Suu’s car. The car of NLD Vice Chairman Tin Oo was at the head of
the convoy. Daw Suu’s car was at the forefront and in the middle was the
car in which Tun Win (from Zaygyo) and Khin Maung Thaung were riding. “They
Our car was fourth-in-line (Hilux model, green in color). Behind our car attacked
was that carrying MP-elect Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt (Sunny model, white in the villagers
color). Behind that was the car carrying the Central Youth (Hilux model, with iron
white color), and then the cars of NLD members, all in a line. After passing
bars,
Kyi Village by about 100 feet, two Buddhist monks blocked the way and
stopped the vehicle in which Daw Suu was riding. bamboo
and
At that moment, Tun Zaw Zaw got out of the car, and when he inquired wooden
about the reason for the blockade the two monks replied, “We have been clubs.”
waiting for a long time. Ask Daw Suu to give us a speech.” In response,
Tun Zaw Zaw explained that the request could not be complied with, as
there was no time. While he was still explaining, two Dyna and two Torlagi
(tractor with a trailer) trucks, making altogether four trucks full of people,
came towards us from the Monywa side. The people in the trucks, shouting
over and over again the slogan, “Oppose those relying on external forces,
act as stooges, holders of negative views,” alighted from their vehicles. At
that moment, villagers from Kyi shouted, “We, the people, in return don’t
want you!” To that, the USDA members and their cohorts from the trucks
shouted, “What are you saying?” And with that, they started to attack the
villagers with irons spikes, iron bars, bamboo clubs and wooden clubs,
which they had brought with them. We were forced to witness the incident
helplessly, with pain in our hearts. At that time, a Dyna truck was also
trying to run over anyone in sight, and the Kyi villagers who had come to
receive us were forced to run away in disorder. When the two monks who
had blocked Daw Suu’s car demanding a speech were asked to halt what
was happening, they said, “We won’t be able to do anything,” and “You
may also drive on.” Just at that moment, our cars started to come under
attack.
10. I took responsibility for security on the right side of Daw Suu’s car. The
position of security was such that I was close to the right side of the body
of Daw Suu’s car. There was no one behind me. We were standing in a
line, side by side. As the cars were parked close to the right side of the
road, there were only one or two of us on that side. Two monks, with red
cloth wrapped around their arms down to the elbow, were standing close
to us. They were not the initial two monks who had blocked the way. At
that moment, we saw that all of the cars behind us were being battered by
packs of attackers. The members of the security unit were standing in two
to three tiers on the left side to protect Daw Suu’s car. All of the USDA

members and their hired hands attacking our cars were drunk. We learned
later that from the time of departure from Monywa, a half-drum full of
liquor was put in their car and anyone in that car was allowed to drink as
much liquor as he wished. For that reason, when they attacked our cars
they did it inhumanly and they also shouted, “Are you the death-defying
force for Kalama?103 If that is so, die!” Shouting in this manner, they brutally
“The struck down the youth. As there were few people on the right side of the
car, the attackers concentrated their attack on the left side, and thus I
attackers escaped from being beating. When people on the other side of Daw Suu’s
looked like car fell, the attackers smashed the glass windows of her car. When the
they were windows were broken, they jabbed into the car with the rods they were
high on carrying. At that time those of us who remained shouted, “Daw Suu, do
drugs.” run, run!” Inside the car were the driver, Kyaw Soe Lin, Tun Zaw Zaw and
Daw Suu, only three. At the rear, also in a pack, they attacked Tin Oo’s car
and I saw them seizing and taking away Tin Oo. At that time, Tin Oo was
wounded on the head. Daw Suu narrowly escaped from being beaten
because she did not get out of the car. If she had, the attackers would have
beaten her to death because the attackers were completely drunk. They
did not look like they were drunk on liquor, but they looked as if they were
high on drugs. While the situation was in mass confusion, the attackers
arrived near our car and in a pack they rushed to attack Daw Suu’s car.
They knew that we would not resist and I think, for that reason, they beat
with greater force and killed extensively.
They also beat up women riding in the third car (Hilux, green in color),
after pulling off their blouses and sarongs. When the victims covered in
blood fell to the ground, I saw the attackers jump on them, grab the
women’s hair in their hands and pound their heads against the stone
surface of the road, all with immense force. I saw them behaving most
inhumanly. I saw with my own eyes, earrings being forcibly taken from a
woman who had fallen to the ground (Thanda Soe, second year student).
The attackers uttered such base and sordid words like, “You woman, wanting
to be Kalas’ wives, go ahead die! Before a Kala, we will make you our
wives. We have to build roads, repair roads, repair bridges and you want
to be wives of a Kala - die, die!” They went on brutally beating and attacking
until the victims were dead. As the cars in the back kept their full headlights
on, we witnessed all that happened. I still cannot get out of my mind the
sight of people, covered in blood, being beaten mercilessly and inhumanly.
11. After Daw Suu’s car left, we also ran away. There were people fleeing
on motorcycles. The three of us, including a young monk, were on foot.
After running for a considerable distance, we could no longer continue to
run. At that time, we saw a car coming up from behind and flagged it
down. It happened to be a car from our group. All three of us climbed
onto the bonnet of the car. Before we drove for long, we encountered a
group of USDA members and their henchmen waiting for us on the way.

We also saw about 40-50 motorcycle drivers being beaten. Hence, we
were forced to turn around and run back. It was only about a 10-minute
drive from the place we were first beaten to the place where they were
lying in wait. We also saw traffic policemen from a distance. As there was
no escape for us going either forward or backward, we wheeled down to
the side of the road at a place that seemed to be a fork in the road.
However, it turned out to be a ditch. The car then got stuck in the mud.
All the people got out and pushed. At first, the car moved slightly. After
moving forward for a while, the car got entirely stuck in the ditch. No
amount of pushing moved the car. As we had not had our meal and we
previously had to run from the killing, we became completely exhausted
and could no longer push the car. There were about 18 of us, who had all
been in our car. We were members of the Youth Wing from Mandalay who
had taken responsibility for security, including Tin Htut Oo, in-charge of
reorganizing the party Youth Wing for the Upper Burma chapter, Deputy
In-charge Myo Naing, Joint In-charge Hla Oo, Central Youth Wing member
Thein Soe and Youth Wing members from Mandalay. We could no longer
worry about the car and all of us tried to flee, away from the danger.
Fortunately, the place we came to turned out to be a big bush. In our
flight, Tin Htut Oo and Myo Naing had failed to come with us. We met at
that place the people who had fled before us. We counted ourselves to be
a total of 97 persons and 49 motorcycles. The people we met were female
and male students from Monywa and Sagaing, who had accompanied our
convoy. The counting was conducted, of course, only the next morning.
Two among the group turned out to be members of the gang that had
attacked us, supposedly on the bidding of the USDA. They told us about
themselves freely, not because we had asked them to. They revealed their
identities of their own volition. They explained, “We have never before
done such a thing in our lives and since we could not bear to do such a
thing, we fled with you.”
12. After counting all of the people and motorcycles, on the morning of
31 May, we all ventured towards the main road at 5:00 am. At first, the
motorcycles were forbidden from getting onto the main road, but
unsuccessfully. They stubbornly went onto the main road anyway. Chit
Yin and I remained behind. Among those who went onto the road was Hla
Oo. His head was fractured and his hand was broken. From their car, the
police fired guns to stop the motorcycles that had made it onto the road.
We could see from a distance the motorcycles that were on the road. At
that time, we heard 7 gunshots. The person who saw everything was
Thanda Soe, as she had been in a tree near the road since the previous
night, in flight from the danger. From her place in the tree, she was able to
see all that happened that morning.

Three novice monks and Thanda Soe were about to get onto the road, but
as I called out to them, they turned around and returned to us. Thanda
Soe was from Mandalay and we had been riding in the same car. She was
a second-year student from Mandalay University. There were about 20
women who came all the way from Mandalay. At the time of reassembly,
we found that the car in which Poant Poant and Khin Ma Ma Tun were
riding, was missing. We did not know the whereabouts of the rest of the
“ We were women.
told we’d
get 800 kyat 13. As we did not get on the road and instead walked across the rice
to beat up a paddy fields, we reached a village called Yin-Dwai. The villagers fed us
group of there, so we ate and took rest for a while. Then, a child who had returned
from outside told us that the village headman was asking about us, so we
peple.” started to leave the village. After leaving the village and walking in the
fields for about 30 minutes, we met six other villagers. Those people took
us to their field huts and looked after us for the night.
14. On 1 June, at 5:00 am, we started out from the villagers’ field. I put
on the clothes of farmers I had met along the way, with whom I exchanged
my Kachin sarong and white shirt. A villager showed us the way until we
reached Hsin Inn Village in Shwebo Township.
That villager had guided us for about 15 miles, and until we got to Hsin
Inn, we had to walk through other villages. We rode in a car from Hsin Inn
to Shwebo. At Shwebo, I was temporarily put up at a friend’s house. While
in Shwebo, I met eight other people who had come back from the Depayin
attack. They said, “While we were looking for jobs, a person took us to the
USDA office. We were told that we would get 800 kyat as daily wages,
meals and liquor, and the job was to gang up on and beat up a group of
people.” “As we were afraid of the officers in that office, we said ‘Yes,’ and
gave our promise,” explained the participants in the attack. With regards
to the furnishing of liquor, we looked into it at the time we got to Saingpyin.
I left Shwebo at about 1:00 pm by bus to Mandalay, and reached Mandalay
at about 3:30 pm.
I certify that in giving all of my testimony from No 1 to 14, I was not

unjustly influenced, threatened or misled by anyone. Nor have I lied about
the Depayin Massacre. The testimony is of my own free will. I certify that
the testimony recounts the true events that I saw, experienced and knew
of during the ambush on 30 May near the village of Kyi in Depayin Township.
-Wunna Maung
4 July 2003
Bangkok, Thailand

Affidavit of Nyunt Nyunt
Personal Data
Name: Nyunt Nyunt

Gender: Female
Age: 51 years
Date of Birth: 19 September 1951
Father’s Name: U Win
Mother’s Name: Daw Seinn Shwe
ID Number: Ma-Na-Ma (Naing) 077 051
Nationality: Burmese
Religion: Buddhist
Education: 8th standard
Address: 75/1, Ah Nate Taw ward, Sa Kyin Wa, Mandalay City
Place of Birth: Maymyo, Mandalay Division
Spouse: U Aung Naing Oo

I, Nyunt Nyunt, hereby swear under oath that:
1. I joined the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 1989 and worked
as an organizer in North East Township, Mandalay Division. I was in the
group that went to Mogok Township to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi after
her Upper Burma trip. I was not on duty at the time. During the 1990
election campaign I walked 180 miles for 50 days to Ya Mae Thin and Pya
Si. This was the reason why I was allowed to
accompany the North East Township group on
this trip.
2. On the journey to Mogok, there were Aung

Thu, Chit Tin, Htay, Mar Mar Cho and some
new youth members in our car. Near Kyi Tauk
Pauk Village the demonstrations against Aung
San Suu Kyi were worse than before. There were
demonstrators in 13 or 14 Dyna trucks. They
were holding bamboo rods. They beat us and
cried out, “We don’t want a Kalar’s (an Indian
or foreigner’s) wife! We don’t want those relying
Protester screaming on external forces, axe handles and those with
rude insults.
negative views!” With the help of police and traffic police, their cars rushed
into the crowd and our motorcade. When they were next to our car, they
tried to beat us and intimidate us by using rude words. Concerning Aung
San Suu Kyi, they said, “Do you want to rely on a Kalar’s wife?” We
experienced this for three hours. The local people also approached Aung
San Suu Kyi’s car. The demonstrators forcibly stayed between Aung San
Suu Kyi and the crowd. Two youth members were attacked and wounded,
I don’ t know why. According to my
knowledge, Aung San Suu Kyi reported this
case to the police station.
“Remove yourselves from the road, cars are

coming. Otherwise, you all will die!” said the
demonstrators. Our Youth Wing members in
uniform tried to control the crowd by holding
hands in order to form a barrier, so that the
crowd couldn’t approach the cars that were
welcoming us peacefully.
At that time, using a loudspeaker, they (the

Traffic policeman demonstrators) cried loudly to respect the
aiding protesters. traffic rules and to move back from the road. In her speech, Aung San Suu
Kyi said, “There were no cars coming. It was merely an insult, as they
knew that I was going to give a speech. It’s better to respect each other.

Yesterday, one of our young men was wounded. I complained about it (at
the police department) and I had to pay 50 kyat for the complaint. Please
wait and see how the authorities judge that case”.
3. We continued our trip and we reached Madaya Township. Aung San

Suu Kyi joined a founding ceremony for a
new Youth Wing. A Dyna truck came and
pestered us with a loudspeaker. At that time,
a young betel nut vendor informed us that
demonstrators wielding bamboo rods and
swords were waiting for our motorcade. I
passed this information on to two Members
of Parliament: Mg Mg Than (Ya Mae Thin
Constituency) and Tin Htut Oo (Lewe
Constituency-1).
Tin Htut Oo reported this to the NLD

Mandalay Division branch and asked them
to send some more members, as the
security condition was not good. Some
Protesters
monks also worried about our security and with loudspeaker.
came along with us until we reached Mandalay. From Mogok to Mandalay,
our security condition was not good. Aung San Suu Kyi had already told
the members, “Do not attack, there is no need to be hostile, just take it
when we are attacked.” So, we were not allowed to react against them. We
were even warned not to look at them in hostile way.
More members came to us for security protection. It was about 6:30 or

7:00 pm when we reached the NLD Mandalay Division branch office, after
Aung San Suu Kyi had visited around Mandalay city. She gave a speech to
the local people waiting at the branch office. I saw that police and traffic
police ordered two cars to enter into the crowd.
On 28 May, I went to the branch office and I met Bo Zan (Chairperson of

the Mandalay Division branch), Kan Tun, Ko Gyi, Tin Aung and Mg Mg
Than. They agreed to my plan to participate in the motorcade. I went back
home to arrange the final details of my traveling arrangements, such as
the renting of a private car and the purchasing of beverages for along the
way. To be able to rent a car, we had to share it. I needed to manage other
details. We had to rely on ourselves for beverages and sometimes we
wouldn’t have anything to eat. My spouse also agreed with my trip.
4. On 29 May, I joined Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Monywa. There were
about eleven cars in our motorcade when we left Mandalay City. When we
reached Sagaing Bridge, at the entrance of Sagaing City, there were
demonstrators holding up placards, but they were quiet. Afterwards, we
went on to Myinmu Township. We held some activities there, such as the

founding of the Youth Wing and the installation of an NLD sign at the
branch office. The trucks carrying demonstrators continued to follow,
however we did not receive any disturbances when we left Myinmu.
At Yeposar Village, before Monywa, there

were many Dyna trucks filled with traffic
police. There were 200 or 300
demonstrators, including women, with
placards in roughly 13 trucks that bothered
us extensively. We reached Monywa at 6:00
pm. It was about 9:00 pm when reached
the downtown area.
There were plenty of motorbikes when we

looked ahead and behind. The local people
welcomed us warmly. Some older people
Protester armed said, “Where is the general’s daughter
with bamboo rod (Aung San Suu Kyi)? Show us and stop the car!” They also welcomed her
at leftof photo. by giving her some flowers. We reached Monywa branch office at about
10:00 pm. We learned later that the crowd had been waiting for us since
early morning. Then we carried out the founding ceremony of a new
Youth Wing. We didn’t rest until midnight.
5. On 30 May, we prepared to start our trip around 6:00 am. At about

9:00 am, Aung San Suu Kyi greeted the local people and left. On the way,
we went to pay respects to the monks at the Zawtica Monastery.
There were 15 others in my car when we left Monywa. They included

Aung Ko, Tin Maung Lay, Thwe, Chit Tin, Thein Aung Lay and Wunna
Maung from Htundone, Mandalay. Khin Aye Myint, Ah Thay Lay (alias
Thanda Soe) and I were the only females. In the other car were 13 monks
and young novices. After leaving Budalin, there were no other vehicles
along the way. Then we reached Sai Pyin Village and rested for a while at
the residence of an MP-elect. Aung San Suu Kyi encouraged us and talked
to the villagers and NLD members there.
6. We left Sai Pyin at about 7:00 pm and there were no disturbances. It

took about 20 minutes to reach Kyi Village. There were many people from
Kyi and neighboring villages waiting to welcome us.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s car was at the head of the motorcade. There were only
two cars behind my car. A motorcyclist told us that the villagers were
being beaten. Our car stopped and we asked Wunna Maung and some
others to go to Aung San Suu Kyi’s car, as they were also responsible for
her security. So then only five Youth Wing members remained in my car.
When I looked back, I could see the villagers being beaten under the
headlights from Dyna trucks. The Dyna trucks were facing north, towards

the village. At this time, Tin Oo went with two Youth Wing members to
Aung San Suu Kyi’s car. This is the last time I saw him.
7. When the demonstrators who were coming from behind the motorcade
reached us, we all laid face down on the car floor. They beat us. Chit Tin
lay down over the three women to cover us from the beatings. He was
beaten whenever the women were beaten. Chit Tin was then pulled off of
us. My blouse was pulled and torn off. My back was pounded with a brick.
“My blouse
Men usually wear jackets, so they were left still wearing a shirt when the was pulled
demonstrators pulled off their clothes, while women however usually wear off and my
only a blouse. Some men weren’t wearing jackets and their shirts were back was
also pulled off and torn. While I was being pounded with a brick, a pounded
demonstrator beat me twice using a bamboo rod. Then, they entered the
with a
car and stole our traveling bags and necklaces.
brick.”
8. We were pulled out of the car and some of us had our blouses removed.
All of the women’s blouses were torn at the back, at least. We had to wrap
and cover our chests with our own sarongs. At first, my blouse was torn
only at the back. Two monks and a young thin man attacked me. The
young man was in a white shirt and wore his hat backwards. He was
wearing his sarong over his shoulder and was in shorts. All of us were
pulled out of the car. Those who were pulled out by their legs were then
dropped on their faces. Attackers were waiting for us next to the car in
order to beat us. I was pulled by my hair and I fell down to ground. As
they pulled me along the road, all of the skin from the left side of my back
was scrapped off.
The attackers grabbed my hair and pounded my head against the tar road.
While beating me, one of the attackers asked me, “Do you want to be a
Kala’s wife? Do you rely on the Kala’s wife? We have built many bridges
and roads - haven’t you stepped on them? Don’t you drive on them?
Don’t you know this?” Then, I was attacked with a bamboo rod with a
sharpened point.
However, my face and eyes were not hurt. Then, they said that I just loved
the ‘pinny’ dress (NLD uniform). So, my blouse was totally removed and I
had to pull my sarong up quickly. While I was doing this, they tried to pull
down my sarong, but they couldn’t remove it as it was glued with the
others’ blood. I also used my arms to keep it up. I was beaten again with
a bamboo rod. Before I passed out, I saw a car with dead people inside of
it. I also heard that the attackers beat Thanda Soe, the girl in my car. Her
blouse was removed because the attackers were unsure whether she was
male or female, as her hair is very short. I saw them attack and beat up
other people. They looted money and necklaces. While they were doing
that, a person came back and started issuing the order, “Water groups, fire
groups!” “Water groups, fire groups!” Following this, they left in their cars.
I stayed quiet for about 30 minutes after they had gone. Then a monk and

about five men from the village came to us. I requested that they take me
with them. When they started to carry me I passed out, so they didn’t take
me any farther, as they thought I had died.
9. I woke up when I heard the voices of Min Thein and Kyi Kyi Myint. I
took a blouse from the car and put it on. I shouted that I wanted to go
with them. A villager carried me from the car. I saw our driver San Myint.
“Let’s go, He was dead and his left eye was poked out. He was not one of our
otherwise members; we had just hired him to drive the car. When I looked around,
we will all many people were in the rice paddy field. Some were murmuring and
die when some were quiet.
the attckers
Kyi Kyi Myint, who ran away with me said, “Let’s go, otherwise we will die
come back when the attackers come back again.” We then walked to the village. I
again.” don’t remember how I reached the monastery, as I was half unconscious.
The monk said that he had just sat there, as he didn’t have anyone to help,
although he called a driver and a traditional doctor. Kyi Kyi Myint, Maung
Min Thein, a student from Monywa, and I were treated warmly there. The
monastery was about one mile from the place where the incident occurred.
At 3:30 am, the monk asked us to leave, as he was frightened for us to

stay. He gave us 1700 kyat each. We didn’t have any money, as it had been
looted in the attack.
10. We left for the nearest railway station at 3:30 am and we reached it at
5:30 am. According to the young monk who accompanied us to the station,
we had walked for three-and-a-half miles. At 8:00 am, we took a train.
The two NLD members, the young student from Monywa and I went back
together. The train reached Monywa City at 12:30 pm. I wasn’t able to
move, as my knees and legs were beaten, so we took a trishaw and went
to the monastery. The young student left for his village when we reached
Monywa. Maung Min Thein, Kyi Kyi Myint and I stayed at the monastery.
We requested that the monks give us some clothes, as we didn’t have

anything to change into. Three days later, Hla Than and Khin Aye Myint
also came to the monastery. I recovered there, as a medical doctor had
given me some treatment. Later, I reached the Thai-Burma border on 19
August.
I hereby declare that the above experiences are those that I have seen and
experienced, and that I was not threatened, tricked or cheated into telling
my story- I expressed it according to my own desire.
-Nyunt Nyunt
20 August 2003
Bangkok, Thailand

Endnote:
Statement No 6 (5/03) of the National League

for Democracy (NLD) on 27 May 2003
Before (Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members) left Mogok, Mandalay Division
the NLD branch reported the following information: Some 300 USDA
members had reached Sint Guu. They were in 11 sedans, 4 Dyna trucks
and 15 Hilux pickups. They were reportedly from Amarapura, Madaya,
Kyauk Se and Mandalay. The report also stated, “(Local people) were coerced
into gathering, otherwise they would be forced to work on the Let Pan Hla
Road building project for two days.” The leaders asked them to shout and
demonstrate for one hour because they thought that Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi was about to come from Mogok. However, they did not see anyone.
They left because they thought that they were being exploited.
In Kyee Dauk Pauk Village, Sint Guu Township, Swe Win and Myint Ngwe
supervised the (USDA) demonstration. They had 30 pairs of imitation
NLD uniforms. They reportedly planed to give Daw Aung San Suu Kyi a
flower before having the demonstration. In Kyee Dauk Pauk, Myint Lwin
and Aung Myint, both part of the Village Peace and Development Council,
reportedly collected some 20 thugs to attack Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade.
On the way, (she and the NLD members) faced the following obstacles:
In Chan Tha Village, Thabeikkyin Township, there were some 100 USDA
members holding placards with slogans like, “Oppose those relying on
external forces, axe handles and those with negative views.” When NLD
members from Chan Tha Village and some 300 young motorists sang the
former national anthem together, the USDA members dropped their
placards and left. At about 7:00 pm, in Kyee Dauk Pauk, there were three
Dyna trucks, (license plate numbers: 2 Kha 4363, 5 Ka 1899, 2 Ka 3726)
and two Hilux pickups (license plate numbers: 7 Ka 6643, Ba 7358) with
loudspeakers. The cars drove quickly into the crowd of local people that
welcomed Aung San Suu Kyi. They cried out, “Go away, otherwise you
will have to collect your own corpses!” The local people lining the roadside
ran away in order to avoid being hit by the cars. The people in the cars
were thugs with swords, clubs and catapults. They also banged iron plates
together and threw stones at Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car. Tun Tun Win,
an NLD Youth member from Mandalay, was injured on his head when he
was hit by one of the stones. The USDA members drove beside the
motorcade for about two miles. Sometimes, they drove in front of the cars
in the motorcade. They moved away when they were asked to do so. A
stone (from a catapult) hit a woman’s hand. She was from Mogok. The
USDA members caused problems until (they reached) the NLD branch

office in Singu Township. Some stones hit the houses along the roadside.
A camera was also slightly broken when USDA members attempted to
steal it.
Reports anticipated that there would be attacks in Let Pan Hla and Kyee
Dauk Pauk Villages. Later, the attacks occurred. Quarters Peace and
Development Council members (local authorities) threatened the local people
with seven years imprisonment if they welcomed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Some 200 (hooligans) were reportedly collected. They received money or
some drink.
Because of the above-mentioned events, the NLD Vice-Chairperson made

the following requests at the police department in Singu Township:
1. To take action against the USDA members responsible for the

attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade,
2. To take action (against those responsible) for throwing stones

at Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car,
3. To take action (against those responsible) for the throwing stones

at the head of an NLD Youth member.

Affidavit of Min Thein
Personal Data
Name: Min Thein

Gender: Male
Age: 33 years
Date of Birth: 2 April 1970
Father’s Name: U Tin Aung
Mother’s Name: Daw Ah Mar Kyi
ID Number: 9/Ma-Ta-La (Naing) 018 041
Religion: Buddhist
Address: Mandalay Southwest Township, Mandalay
Division
Place of Birth: Maha Aung Myay Township, Mandalay Division

I, Min Thein, hereby swear under oath, with regards to the Depayin
Massacre on 30 May 2003, that:
1. My name is Min Thein and my ID card no is 9/Ma-Ta-La (Naing) 018

041. My parents are U Tin Aung and Daw Ah Mar Kyi. I was born on 2
April 1970. I worked as a sculptor and a gem trader while I was living
with my parents in Mandalay Southwest Township.
“People
welcomed us In the National League for Democracy, I have worked as third in-charge of
with candles, the Youth Wing in Mandalay Southwest Township branch since April 2000.
as the I was detained in Mandalay Prison between 19 May 2000 and 31 March
2001 because of my activities in founding our Youth Wing.
electricity had
been cut.” 2. I was responsible for the security (of the motorcade) on the trip that
started from Mandalay. On the trip, I was in charge of the security team
from the Mandalay Southwest Township branch.
After we passed the Sagaing Bridge, we saw a group of USDA members

waiting there. They held placards that read, “(We) don’t want those relying
on external forces, axe handles, (we) don’t want undisciplined democracy.”
When we reached Myin Mu, a founding ceremony was held for the new
Youth Wing of the Myin Mu Township NLD branch. A Dyna truck carrying
USDA members was outside the NLD branch office. The truck had two
loudspeakers and was full of USDA members; they were even sitting on
the roof.
3. Military Intelligence personnel in cars also followed our motorcade.

There were also vans and Publica pick-up trucks. Three people were in a
car in front of the NLD office. One of them put a video camera on the
other’s shoulder. Some people were also busy with still cameras and video
cameras in other cars.
When we reached Monywa, it was getting dark. At about 6:00 pm, we

reached the billboard saying, “Welcome to Monywa City.” We reached the
Monywa NLD branch office after 9:00 pm. People holding candles warmly
welcomed us, as the electricity had been cut off in Monywa. The people
shouted, “Long live Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, long live the National League
for Democracy.” The road was filled with roughly 100,000 well-wishers
and a lot of motorbikes.
After the ceremony for installing an NLD sign at the branch office, there
was a founding ceremony for the local NLD Youth Wing in the Sein Myar
mini-market that night.
4. On 30 May, we left Monywa for Budalin Township. In Budalin, we held a

ceremony for the founding of the Budalin NLD Youth Wing. I saw other

vehicles close to our motorcade the entire time. These vehicles belonged
to Military Intelligence (MI) personnel and members of the USDA. We left
Budalin for Sai Pyin Village in the early evening. Aung San Suu Kyi gave a
speech to the local well-wishers waiting for her at the Sai Pyin NLD office
branch. Then our motorcade continued on our trip.
5. We reached Kyi Village about 8:00 pm. The villagers welcomed our
motorcade. Our car stayed at the head of the motorcade during the trip.
There were three cars between Aung San Suu Kyi and us. Some 300 yards
after we reached Kyi Village, the group of villagers was broken up. Her car
passed ours.
At that time, her car came to a halt because two monks and two or three
men had stopped it. A monk requested, “Give a speech (here), you can
leave after it.” Then, Tun Zaw Zaw in Aung San Suu Kyi’s car got out of the
car. He said, “Let us move on as we don’t have time. We need to continue
our trip.”
The monk replied, “You are not allowed to go. We cannot permit you. You
can go after the speech.” Two men said in a hostile manner, “Hey guy! Go
after the speech.” A monk interrupted them with, “Hey you guys stay
quiet. I will ask them by myself.” He again asked, “Our men are coming
here. Wait for them and give a speech. You can go after the speech. Give
us a speech here.”
NLD Youth Wing members reached her car. We got back into our car, as
we heard that our cars were leaving. As soon as we were in the cars, the
demonstrators’ cars, with their headlights on, reached the back of our
motorcade.
6. Many demonstrators got out of their cars and started to attack whomever
they saw. The villagers were still there. As the cars had turned on their
Artist’s rendering
of the massacre
based on
eyewitness’
testimonies.

headlights, we witnessed the villagers being beaten. We also heard cries of
pain. Even old people and children were attacked. I saw the villagers run
back into their village.
7. Then, the motorbikes and cars in the motorcade were attacked. Since
we had left Budalin Township, the attackers had followed behind our
motorcade in their trucks. A USDA car with two loudspeakers on it led the
“Beat her trucks. Their motorcade was quite long. I didn’t know exactly how many
up. Kill her. cars were in their motorcade. The monks led the attackers; all of them had
She must white cloths wrapped around their right arms. They said, “You want to be
an Indian’s wife!” They used rude words when they started to attack.
die.”
When they got near our car, I just sat down in the car. My friends standing
next to me were beaten and their heads were targeted. During the attack
wooden bats, bamboo sticks, and iron rods with sharp points were used.
Because of the attack, my friends fell over me. Blood from their wounds
flowed over me and it even flowed into my mouth. It was difficult to spit it
out because of my friends’ weight.
At that time, one of the attackers commanded, “Go to the car of the Indian
woman (Aung San Suu Kyi). Beat her up! Kill her. She must die.” My
friends in the car cried out in pain. They cried, “Oh, I’m afraid, I’m going
to die!” When the attackers heard this, there were even more attacks. They
said, “Hey, this one is not dead yet, beat him up, beat him up!” Later, no
one dared to cry out or move. Some seemed to pass out unconscious.
Others appeared to die.
8. There were about fifteen people in our car. The driver was Tun Win, a
member of the NLD Social Supporting Committee, of the Zay Gyo market
area in Mandalay city. Next to him were Khin Maung Thaung (a member of
the NLD Executive Committee, Mandalay Southwest (MSW) Township) and
Toe (an NLD member). The others were:
· Ye Min Zaw (joint-in-charge (1) of the NLD

Youth Wing, MSW Township),
· Zaw Zaw Aung (joint-in-charge (2) of the NLD
Youth Wing, MSW Township),
· Kyaw Myo Thu,
· Myo Tint,
· Wanna Aung,
· Tin Maung Oo (photographer who died during
the attack),
· Tin Myint,
· Thein Toe Aye, (member of the NLD Executive
Committee, MSW Township, who died
during the attack),

· Tin Myint (member of the NLD Women’s Wing and
Executive Committee, MSW Township),
· Kyi Kyi Myint (member of the NLD Women’s Wing
and Executive Committee, MSW Township),
· Khin Mya Win (member of the NLD Women’s Wing
and Executive Committee, MSW Township).
· There were two members from the NLD Youth
Wing, MSWT, but I have forgotten their names.
“They
destroyed
9. While they attacked us, car headlights shone from behind them the their own
entire time. They used rude words during the attack. They tore off the vehicle.”
dresses of the women. They also looted necklaces, travel bags, purses,
etc. Moreover, they said, “We build roads and bridges. Aren’t you optimistic
about that? What did your Aung San Suu Kyi do? What did the Indian
woman [Aung San Suu Kyi] do? You only know how to be an Indian’s wife
like her. Apart from that, what do you know?” Then repeated beatings
followed. Some women said that they would undress by themselves. But it
was all in vain. The attackers forcefully undressed them. I witnessed and
heard what was happening to them from our car.
10. There were many wounded people in cars and on the road. Some
were pulled from their cars. The attackers beat them. The attackers also
pounded their heads against the road. During the attack, monks pushed a
white car into the ditch. The car belonged to NLD members from MSW
Township. They prepared to push our car into a ditch. At the time, our
car’s gears didn’t work. They asked Tun Win, the driver, to fix it. He said, “I
am not the driver. The driver already left and took the keys with him. I
don’t even know how to drive a car.” He was also brutally beaten.
11. They later went and looked around the motorcade. We were all silent.
Then, one of them ordered, “Water Group! Let’s go home!” “Fire Group!
Let’s return!” Finally, all of them left.
Before they left, they burned a Dyna truck. It was the car that had carried
the USDA members and followed our motorcade the entire way. It was
affixed with two loudspeakers. They destroyed their own vehicle. We didn’t
respond at all during the attack. The villagers also ran away for the sake of
their lives.
12. In our car, at least ten people were seriously injured, and some even
died. I am sure that Thein Toe Aye and Tin Maung Oo died. Some didn’t
respond or move anymore when we talked to them and touched them.
At about 10:00 pm, the attackers left. We tried our best to rescue the
wounded people. We didn’t have any medical supplies. We placed them
beside the road to recover. Tun Win was crying because of his broken

hand. He felt great pain whenever we touched his hand. We used our
clothes as a sling for him.
Some were crying loudly on the roadside. We couldn’t see them, as it was
dark. Some pleaded, “Help me, come and help me!”
13. After the attackers left the scene, some villagers appeared. I begged,
“The “Please help our friends. Send them to a clinic. Help them.” I also noticed
physician a monk among the villagers. I asked, “Your Holiness, please help us.
will not Please send our friends to the hospital.” Then he said, “Hey, your friends
dare to are already dead”. He pointed at someone. I saw Raju, also known as San
Myint, who drove the car belonging to NLD members of Mandalay Northwest
come Township. One of his eyes was missing. He was lying on his back and his
here.” neck seemed to be broken. I said, “You are right your Holiness, this is a
dead person. However there are many people still alive; please help them.”
14. Villagers dared not to approach and help us. Some people in the rice
paddy field cried out, “Help me, I am still alive, help me!” I asked the
villagers to help them. Two villagers carried a person to the side of the
road. Then the monk said, “There’s a tractor with a trailer in the village. I
will go there to hire it.” Some villagers followed him, as they did not dare
help us.
I encouraged the injured to move from that place. I said, “Cross the ditch
and go to the rice paddy field.” All of them, except those who had died or
passed out unconscious, went to the rice paddy field.
15. Kyi Kyi Myint, Nyunt Nyunt, a young man from Monywa City, and I left
the injured and went into the village to find a physician. The villagers we
met along the way said, “The physician will not dare to come here.” We
asked them to take us to the monastery. In the monastery was the monk
we had recently met. I told him that we were seeking treatment for our
friends.
There was no medicine in the monastery. The monk said, “The situation
doesn’t favor you. I tried to hire a tractor with a trailer in the village. But,
I didn’t get one and so I stayed at the monastery.” Then I said, “I am
leaving to help my friends.” He replied, “Don’t go there alone. It will not
work.” I said, “If I don’t go, I will betray them.” He then instructed me to
go through the rice paddy field.
16. In the area where we had been attacked, a car was in a ditch and a
Dyna truck was on fire. Destroyed motorbikes were everywhere. Some
NLD members were lying on the ground. I went back to the monastery.
17. At 11:00 pm, I heard about ten or eleven gunshots. They were not far
from that area. At 12:45 pm, soldiers, policemen, firemen, members of

USDA, and Pyithu Swan Arr Shin (People Power) arrived. The USDA
members were in civilian uniform. They went to four vehicles on the road.
They moved two vehicles to the side of the road. The white car belonged
to NLD members from the Mandalay Southeast Township and the other
belonged to the Mandalay Northwest Township. They made it appear as if
the two cars had been damaged in a traffic accident. They recorded the
scene of the incident using still and video cameras. They left at 1:45 am.
At 2:05 am, they moved a yellow car onto the road on the way to Depayin
Township. It belonged to Hla Myint, Chairperson of the Amarapura
Township NLD branch. Later I heard the sound of car parts being removed
from the car.
At the scene of the attack, only three vehicles were left. We quietly stayed
in the rice paddy field close to the monastery. A second-year student from
Monywa University was with me. I looked at my watch using a torch and
wrote down the time.
18. On 31 May, at about 5:00 am, we left the village before the villagers
woke up. The abbot gave us 1700 kyat each. We took the 8:05 am train,
in order to reach Monywa. We stayed there for three or four days. On the
second day, Hla Than and Khin Aye Myint of Mandalay Northeast Township
arrived.
I hereby declare that the above experiences in paragraphs (1) to (18) are
those, which I have seen and know, and that I was not threatened, tricked,
or cheated into writing my story. I expressed it according to my own
desire.
-Min Thein
12 August 2003
Bangkok, Thailand

Affidavit of Phoe Zaw
(a.k.a. Maung Zaw)
Personal Data
Name: Phoe Zaw

Gender: Male
Age: 23 years
Date of Birth: July 24, 1980
Father’s Name: U Than Maung
Mother’s Name: Daw Mya Kyin
ID Number: Ma Ma Na (Naing) 139877
Religion: Buddhist
Address: Ba Ba Lay Ward, Mya-yi-nanda Myothit Town,
Mandalay Division
Place of Birth: Myaing Township, Magwe Division

I, Phoe Zaw, hearby swear under oath that:
1. I, son of U Than Maung and Daw Mya Kyin, am a citizen of Burma,

holding national identification card no. Ma Ma Na (Naing) 139877. I am 23
years old residing at Ba Ba Lay Ward, Mya-yi-nanda Myothit Town, Mandalay
Division, Burma.
2. I have never been involved in politics. I applied for membership to the

NLD only two weeks before Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Mandalay. While
Daw Suu104 was staying in Mandalay, I was given nighttime security duty
for two nights. Daw Suu came to Mandalay on 26 May. On the next day of
27 May, she went to Tada-U. During the Tada-U trip, the persons who took
security duty with me included Win Kyi, Phone Myint Zaw, Wunna Maung,
Aye Win, Yeh Min San, Myint and Soe. I went together with Zaw Zaw
Aung, Tin Aung Myint and Thay from the Southwest Township on 29 May
for the Mandalay-Monywa trip. On that trip, I did not take security duty for
Daw Suu. Due to a shortage of vehicles,
only two from each township were allowed
to come for security duty. However,
responsible persons explained that some
others could come along at their own
expense. Accordingly, some went along
with the traveling party on their own
arrangements. On the Mandalay-Monywa
trip, members from the NLD Central Youth
took the main responsibility for Daw Suu’s
security.
3. The Mandalay NLD members and other

people who went with Daw Suu on her
At Yeposar, before
trip were transported in a total of roughly
Monywa, 200-300
20-30 cars and motorcycles. The car I rode in was a Sunny model pickup demonstrators,
truck. On the journey from Mandalay to Sagaing City, initially nothing including women,
eventful occurred in particular. However, after passing the Sagaing Bridge, with placards
we began to see a crowd of about 100 people and heard them shouting, in roughly 13
trucks harassed
“We don’t want Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” We continued to travel on from
NLD members.
Sagaing to Myinmu Township. We reached Myinmu after noon. In Myinmu,
the activities of installing the signboard and opening of the Myinmu
Township NLD office, and formation of the Youth Wing were made. We
continued our journey from Myinmu at about 3:00 p.m. Before reaching
Chaung U, we saw a crowd of about 170 to 180 people holding placards,
near Yeposar Village. That crowd started to hurl abuses and provoke us by
poking placards into our cars. On the placards were slogans saying, “Relying
on external elements, acting as stooges, we don’t want the NLD”, etc.
Consequently, the people from Myinmu, who had come along with the
party, and the sanghas105 from Monywa, who had come to welcome us,

asked them not to behave in that manner. However, the placard bearers
did not listen. They even started to increase their provocative behavior. At
that time, there were police cars present and authorities were in the bushes
on the left side of the road. They did not try to settle the squabble between
the sanghas and the placard bearers, and just kept on watching. When the
sanghas could not prevent the acts of
provocation, they started punching the
placard bearers, who then turned
around and departed. At the scene of
that incident, there were no villagers
or other people. As we continued on
our journey, the noisy protesters
followed behind us in their own cars.
At a village (name unknown) on the
way between Myinmu and Monywa, we
learned from the villagers that the
authorities had ordered the local
population not to go out and welcome
Daw Suu when she arrived. At that
village, we saw a number of people who
were systematically lined up for a
protest against Daw Suu. Behind the
More demonstrators line of people, there were two
at Yeposar.
policemen in uniform keeping watch. On the village entrance road, we
saw a number of traffic policemen. Although the villagers were ordered
not to come out to the road and welcome Daw Suu, they ignored this
order and the entire village came out to welcome her. At that time, when
the protesters saw the villagers and sanghas in force, they remained silent,
put down their placards and kept their heads bowed. I noticed that the
people in the cars tailing behind our convoy were taking, with video and
still cameras, pictures of the villagers clapping their hands and greeting
us.
4. From Chaung U to the entrance of Monywa, I saw people on 200-300

motorcycles from Monywa coming out to welcome Daw Suu. Those cars
and motorcycles drove systematically keeping to their own lanes. In
Monywa, as the authorities had cut off power to the whole town, the
people gave our party a candle-lit welcome. We reached Monywa at about
6:00 pm. At about 10:30 or 11:00 pm, the ceremony for installing the
signboard and the opening of the Monywa Township NLD office was
performed. At about 9:00 am on 30 May, the party went to the Zawtika
Monastery of Monywa to pay respect to the abbot, but as the abbot was
away and we failed to see him. Therefore, we left for Butalin Town. Before
our cars left Monywa, I saw to the left of our car a police inspector and
people with meal packs in a Mandalay-Monywa bus (converted Dyna truck),
who were going to hold a protest against Daw Suu. According to a
schoolteacher from Monywa, people who agreed to participate in the protest

against Daw Suu were given three free meals and 500 kyat per day. At the
time of departure from Monywa, there were about 12 cars carrying Daw
Suu and NLD members. Behind our car was the car in which the female
NLD members were riding, and in the front seat was Win Mya Mya, and
about 12 men and women were in the back. Monks and novices were
riding in the last car.
5. When we left Monywa, there was still nothing unusual. On arrival in “Authorities
Budalin, the ceremonies for installing the signboard, the opening of the forbid
Budalin Township NLD office and formation of NLD Youth Wing were monks from
performed. From there, we left for Sai Pyin at about 6:00 pm. In Sai Pyin, welcoming
Daw Suu gave a speech for approximately 30 minutes. Then we left for
or aiding
Depayin. At that time, there were nine cars in front of our car and two
behind. When we arrived near Pyankya Village, I saw about 20 buses, the NLD.”
each of which was capable of carrying 40 persons, trailing at a moderate
distance behind our convoy. When we arrived near Kyi Village, two monks
stopped the car in which Daw Suu was riding and advised Daw Suu to give
a speech. Then I saw the Central Youth security detail leader appealing for
a pardon, as no speech could be given due to lack of time. Then the cars
moved on a little. At that time, the protesters trailing at a distance behind
us got out of their cars and started to attack the local people with the
wooden bats, pointed iron rods, iron bars and bamboo sticks they had
brought with them. Daw Suu told our cars to stop. While the attack was in
progress, three or four villagers shouted, “Daw Suu please help us!” and
came to the place where our cars were stopped. When Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt
asked for help from the two monks, they replied that it was impossible.
On that day, the local authorities had come in advance and forbid, with
threats and promises of offerings, all monks from the monasteries near
Kyi Village from going out and welcoming Daw Suu and NLD members
when they arrived, and from giving them assistance or coming out even if
a problem arose. The monk explained that as they were forbidden, help
could not be obtained and that all communication lines had been sealed.
6. In order to document the beating of the villagers on video, an attempt

was made to line up the motorcycles and light up the area with their
headlights. In the light from the motorcycles’ headlights, we saw the
attackers shouting and holding up wooden bats, iron bars, pointed iron
rods and bamboo sticks. At that moment the sound of a whistle was
heard, and while being led by monks wearing red armbands, they shouted
and charged towards us. While we were still dumbstruck on seeing the
charge, they started attacking the last pickup truck in which the monks
and novices were traveling.
7. After that, I saw them almost simultaneously attack the car in which
Win Mya Mya and the women were riding. As such things were happening,
some got out of their cars and fled into the fields, while others took off
down the road. As people were running in all directions, our convoy of

cars, including the car carrying Daw Suu, remained behind. At the same
time, there was shouting that Daw Suu’s car was under attack, and the
crowd of people that were in front turned around and came back. When
the crowd reached near Daw Suu’s car, I saw a car dash out from the pack
and attack it. From my car I saw eight or nine members from the Central
Youth Wing standing on the steps on the sides of the car, face one another
with linked hands in order to provide protection. As others’ cars started to
“NLD Youth immediately follow Daw Suu’s car, those running jumped on to the nearest
did not car. As my car was full, I climbed on to the roof. After we drove on for
respond about 10 minutes, because of the sound of our cars, our cars systematically
violently to parked in the fields on the left and right sides of the roads and turned on
their headlights simultaneously. As I was on the roof of the car, I could see
the attack.” in the light from the headlights people with bats, iron bars, bamboo sticks
and pointed iron rods waiting, ready for us. When Daw Suu’s car reached
the waiting attackers, they flung themselves at her car with the sticks,
bricks, bats and iron bars they were holding in their hands and shot at it
with catapults. In the pack, the ones in range also hit the car.
8. At the time when Daw Suu’s car was passing through the attacking
crowd, our car started to enter it. Just as our car tried to rush through the
crowd, a Dyna truck parked on the side of the road for the purpose of
blocking charged into and hit our car. While trying to avoid the collision,
our car drove off the side of the road and arrived at the front of the crowd.
While our car was veering, I jumped off the roof and down to the ground.
While our car veered round to get back on the road, I managed to get in at
the back of the car, after catching the rails on the sides. While I was trying
to get back into the car, a stick thrown at me hit me on my back. The
canvas tarps covering the sides of the car were taken down while the car
was driving on. The attacking crowd beat us for about two minutes. As
the people in the back of our car were lying flat on the floor, the people on
top took most of the beating. After driving for a few minutes, we reached
the Depayin Hospital. The members of the NLD Youth Wing did not respond
violently to the terrorist attack made by the crowd lying in wait. Daw Suu
had told us that if we were wearing the NLD uniform of a white shirt and
Kachin sarong, we had to bear with a bowed head whatever was done to
us, and must not retaliate under any circumstances.
9. When we arrived at Depayin Hospital, our group included: Soe (who’s

arm, knee, foot was injured), Myint Oo (head fractured), a student from
Monywa, name unknown, (head fractured), Rev. Ashinpyinnya Depa, a
monk from Yankin Monastery (fractured head and elbow), two female
NLD members from Monywa, names unknown (wounds on their heads),
Myint Soe of Saingpyin Village, who had run away from the incident, and
a person from Mandalay Southwest Township. All had to be treated as in-
patients as their injuries were serious, except the one from Mandalay
Southwest Township, whose injuries were light. On the second day of
receiving treatment at the hospital, 31 May, two traffic policemen came

and took away our car’s driver. Then a police inspector and a policeman
arrived on a motorcycle. They came to get a list of the names of the in-
patients at the hospital from the township hospital doctor. The patients
were checked against the list and addresses of the patients were noted.
10. After the list of patients was taken, Soe said to me, “They’ve taken the
patient list, but your name is not on it. So you’d better leave and inform
responsible persons.” At about 5:00 pm, the police inspector and five
policemen came back to the hospital in a car. All of the people on the list
were arrested and taken for detention. After staying two nights and three
days, on 1 June at three in the morning, I left the hospital with a friend for
the Depayin railway station. Upon arrival at the station, my friend and I
bought train tickets and took the train to Monywa City. We arrived at
Monywa at 10:00 am. After arriving in Monywa, I went round and inquired
about the bus going to Mandalay. I found out that buses were prohibited
for 10 days from going to Mandalay, starting on 30 May, and that there
was a nighttime curfew imposed in Monywa. I arrived back in Mandalay
on 2 June at 6:00 pm.
I hereby declare that the above experiences are those that I have seen and
experienced, and that I was not threatened, tricked or cheated into telling
-Phoe Zaw
4 July 2003
Bangkok, Thailand

Affidavit of Aung Aung (a.k.a. Aung San Win)
A Member of the Democratic
Party for a New Society
Personal Data
Name: Aung Aung (a.k.a. Aung San Win)

Gender: Male
Age: 38 years
Date of Birth: 19 July 1965
Father’s Name: U Maung Ko
Mother’s Name: Daw Tin Oo
ID Number: Ma Na Ma (Naing) 049 658
Religion: Buddhist
Education: University
Address: 19th Street, Aung Myay Tha Zan Township,
Mandalay Division
Place of Birth: Mandalay Northwest Township

I, Aung Aung, hereby swear under oath that, in reference to the Depayin
Massacre of 30 May 2003:
1. I, Aung Aung, son of U Maung Ko and Daw Tin Oo, was born on 19
July 1965. I am now 38 years old. I graduated from Mandalay University,
where I majored in Burmese. My address is 19th Street, Aung Myay Tha
Zan or Northeast Township, Mandalay Division.
2. I joined Aung San Suu Kyi’s Upper Burma trip in Madaya and was
responsible for checking the security conditions in advance of her motorcade.
On the evening of 28 May, I went to the Mandalay Division branch office of
the National League for Democracy (NLD) and met with Tin Htut Oo, Myo
Naing, and Tin Aung Aung. There, Tin Htut Oo (elected Member of
Parliament, Lewe Constituency No. 1) requested that we participate in the
trip to Depayin. He wanted us to go in advance of the motorcade in a
separate vehicle. He didn’t want any NLD members in our car. He also
wanted us to wear civilian clothes. We agreed to follow these procedures
and joined the trip.
3. In the car, a friend of ours and I sat next to Naing Naing, the driver. At
about 8:00 am on 29 May we left Mandalay. We reached Sagaing City
without encountering any disturbances. After Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade
reached Myinmu Township, a ceremony for the founding of the Myinmu
NLD Youth Wing was held. When we left Myinmu, we saw a large group of
people in Yeposar Village. There were three or four Dyna trucks and buses
nearby.
They had been waiting for Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade, in order to
demonstrate against it. When they met our car, they prepared to
demonstrate because they thought the motorcade was coming. They moved
back upon realizing that there were no cars behind us. Almost immediately,
we saw three or four people in uniform next to the group. There was a
person in a colonel’s uniform, a person in a police uniform and a person in
a traffic police uniform.
They appeared to be blocking the way. We passed that place and stopped
not far from them. At that moment I said, “A terrorist attack could happen
here. The road is curvy and it would be easy for attackers to trap the
motorcade here. How can we report back to the motorcade before they
reach here?”
4. At that time, ten or fifteen motorbikes came the other direction from
Monywa City and met us. They had come to greet the motorcade. We
stopped them and said, “There is a big group waiting to demonstrate
against Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. They are holding placards in their
hands. The road is blocked and we wonder if we will be able to pass.” We
waited for more motorbikes. I asked them how many motorbikes would

follow. They replied that many cars and motorbikes had already left Monywa.
We stayed there for fifteen more minutes, as they had asked us to wait.
During that time, more motorbikes reached us. We encouraged them to
go on, as there was a big group here waiting to demonstrate. About 100
motorbikes left and the authorities didn’t stop them. They passed the
place where the demonstrators were waiting. As more motorbikes arrived,
I left the car and followed on a motorbike. When we reached Yeposar
“No one Village, the motorcade (NLD members) sang the national anthem. We
has ever didn’t hear anything about the demonstrators anymore.
been
greeted 5. I returned with the others on a motorbike and reached my car. We
continued on our trip. There were many vehicles from Monywa. Our car
like (Suu
had to slow down. The people from the villages along the way to Monywa
Kyi) warmly welcomed the motorcade.
was.”
We reached Monywa after 6:00 pm. It was amazing to see the people
welcome Aung San Suu Kyi. I think that Monywa’s reception of NLD leaders
was the greatest. In Burmese history no one has ever been greeted like
she was. The motorcade received a candle-lit welcome because the electricity
had been cut off. A motorbike dealer’s showroom lit up the road using
motorbikes’ headlights. Aung San Suu Kyi moved into a small pickup truck
and greeted people. We reached Monywa’s NLD branch office after 9:00
p.m. and held a ceremony for the installation of the NLD sign at the office.
Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech to the people in front of the office.
Monywa’s NLD Youth Wing was founded that night. We later went to a
monastery to rest.
6. On the morning of 30 May, we left Monywa. Aung San Suu Kyi visited
the abbot of Zawtika Monastery in order to pay respect. The motorcade
didn’t go on to Oat Kan Taw Yaa Monastery, although it had planned to.
The girls from the Monywa NLD Youth Wing had joined us in our car in
order to go to the monastery. However, we drove on directly to Budalin
Township, and the girls had to stay with us until we reached Budalin.
We reached Budalin at about 2:00 pm and set up a township NLD Youth

Wing. We finished at about 4:00 pm. Tin Htut Oo asked us to follow Kyaw
Aung, Secretary of the Mandalay Northwest Township, who had already
left on his motorbike. We left Budalin at about 4:00 pm.
In Sai Pyin Gyi Village, the local people were preparing a warm welcome
(for the motorcade). We had heard that there were no disturbances along
the way, so we continued our trip. There were no private buses coming
from the other direction. I told Naing Naing that it was unusual.
We continued our trip. We reached a large group of people waiting to

demonstrate. There were more people in this group than in the group we

had met at Yeposar Village. Some of them held up placards. After we
passed them, we reached the Irrigation Department compound.
7. There were nine barbed wire barricades (on the road). The barricades
were placed in three rows to block the way. Each row contained three
barricades. Our car was forced to slow down. Then, we encountered some
thirty policemen with batons and shields near the barricades. A man in a
white shirt asked, “Where you are going?” We replied that we were with “We were
Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. Then, he went to a man wearing military tied up
pants and a white t-shirt and reported, “Major, this car is with Aung San with
Suu Kyi’s motorcade.” The man replied, “Put them inside (the building).”
rope.”
The so-called major was a little bit fat. We didn’t see his rank because he
was only wearing his white t-shirt.
To our right, we saw some monks on plastic chairs. The major said to the
monks, “We are going to unblock the road when Aung San Suu Kyi and
her motorcade arrives. The people waiting here are going to have a
demonstration against her.”
Policemen with batons asked us to drive into the compound. Naing Naing,
the driver, steered away from the compound and the police raised their
batons in order to beat him. He backed the car into the compound, where
there were some buildings. When we stopped, the policemen with batons
ran to our car. They circled around our car and we did not dare get out of
our car. We got out of the car only when they ordered us to do so. They
asked us to raise our hands in the air, in order to search our bodies. Then
they searched our car. Finally, they took us near a building at the back of
the compound.
There were some local female travelers near the building. We met a police
officer on the grass in front of the building. He had stars on each of his
shoulders. Later that night, we found out that he is in charge of the Depayin
Township police department. We were asked for our names and addresses.
They also recorded the license plate number of our car. Then we were put
into a room where we met six or seven people, including elected members
of parliament such as, Bo Maung of the Depayin Constituency, Myint Kyi of
the Katha Constituency, and Saw Hlaing of the Indaw Constituency. They
were all in handcuffs. We learnt that local travelers were detained in the
next room.
8. Soon after we met Kyaw Aung, who was driving his bike into the
compound. He was tied up with rope immediately. At the same time, we
were tied up with him. After he had arrived there, we started to talk with
other detainees.

When night started to fall, we were moved into a Dyna truck. It was
around 7:00 pm. Policemen were standing guard next to the truck we
were detained in.
9. Around 8:00 pm, we saw the lights from Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade.
The cars in the compound turned on their headlights in order to light up
the road. The lights in the trees outside the compound also lit up the road.
I heard the sound of many people. At that time, the motorcade arrived
some 300 feet away from us. We could see very clearly, as there was
almost nothing between the motorcade and the truck we were put inside.
10. I think that Aung San Suu Kyi’s car was at the head of the motorcade
because the headlights of her four-wheel-drive vehicle were higher than
the lights belonging to others’ cars. “(Aung San Suu Kyi’s) car stopped
there. But, why is it stopping like that?” was whispered among the detainees
in the truck. Some of us assumed that (the NLD members in the motorcade)
were solving some problem.
At the same time, there were some commands in the group waiting at the
roadside. I heard someone say, “Don’t go to the road! Come back from the
road!” I could also hear that they were not calm. But, there was no shouting.
I guessed the motorcade had been there for about fifteen minutes.
Then we thought that the motorcade began to move because the lights
were moving. At that time we heard, “Strike, Strike, Strike! Fire! Kill, Kill!”
11. We saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car speedily drive ahead. Then, we heard
that the barricades on the road were hit. I think that there were about ten
gunshots fired.
Suu Kyi’s driver

managed to
drive at high
speed over
barricades laid
down on the road.

At that time, the officer in charge of the Depayin Township police department
came to the truck. He was familiar with Bo Maung (elected MP of the
Depayin Constituency). He said, “So, U Bo Maung, you all have seen and
heard (what has happened outside the compound). You all are lucky
enough, fortunate enough.” At the same time, there was some reporting
on the walkie-talkie next to our truck.
“Dava Tin Hla, we’ve got it. Dava San Shar escaped.” I didn’t understand it “Dava
at the time. Later, Naing Naing explained to me, “Dava Tin Hla means Tin San Shar
Oo; Dava San Shar means Aung San Suu Kyi.” escaped.”
12. After a while, we witnessed many detainees coming into the compound.
They were moaning. Soon I saw some girls and wounded men. One was
the daughter of Aung Soe, my friend. We tried our best to take care of the
wounded people. We managed to fan them, as the weather was very hot.
Aung Thu Win’s head incurred terrible damage. It was covered in blood.
Then a girl came into our truck. She was the daughter of Monywa Aung
Shin, a poet. “(They are) very cruel! (They) beat our heads!” she said. She
was terrified. The girls didn’t receive injuries on their heads very much,
but instead on their waists and backs. They were moaning because of the
pain.
13. Before dawn came, the injured people in our truck were moved into
the truck next to us. We heard that they were going to be sent to the
hospital. The truck left early in the morning. Our truck left the Irrigation
Department compound at about 6:00 am. Rev. Zawtica, Saw Hlaing, Bo
Maung, Kyaw Aung, Myint Kyi, Zaw Tun, Zaw Myint, Naing Naing, Myo
Min, Sein Hlaing, Than Tun Oo, Toe Toe Win (a girl from Monywa), the
daughter of Monywa Aung Shin, and Thet Tun Oo (a student) were in our
truck. I didn’t recognize all of their names.
When we got outside of the compound, we saw about 50 crowded Dyna

trucks. Kyaw Aung stared at them in an obvious manner. One of them in a
truck shouted, “You guys, don’t you recognize the excellent attack we
made? What are you looking at? Do you want to die?”
I thought that they were going to leave, as their activities were finished.
14. We were sent to Shwe Bo Prison and passed through Ye Oo Township

on the way. We were in the very first group that reached the prison. Two
girls, the daughter of poet Monywa Aung Shin (currently in prison) and
Toe Toe Win, were in our truck. At the gate, I saw Phyo Mya Mya Soe and
an unknown woman in the other truck. The majority of the detainees were
from Monywa City. All of us were taken downstairs inside the prison. In
the afternoon, we were moved upstairs. Both times we were put among
the criminals.

Photograph
taken by officials
from US Embassy
in Rangoon of
the location of
the attack.
On 1 June, I met with NLD Youth Wing members, including Nyi Nyi Aung.
However, I didn’t meet Tin Htut Oo.
15. Ten days later, Hla Myint, Chairperson of the Amarapura Township
NLD branch, and Thein Aung Lay, of the Mandalay Northwest Township,
arrived at the prison. Thein Aung Lay had three serious injures on his
head. One injury had six stitches and the other had four stitches. An injury
on his forehead didn’t contain any stitches and was still open. They came
from the hospital of the Northwestern Military Command. At first, they
had thought that they were being freed when they and some other patients
were moved into a vehicle. When the vehicle was outside the hospital
compound some other patients got out. Then, policemen joined the attack
victims and they all went to Shwe Bo Prison.
16. On 2 June, some young men who were in Aung San Suu Kyi’s car
(during the attack) arrived at Shwe Bo Prison. They included Tun Zaw
Zaw, Kyaw Soe Lin (the driver), Tun Myint, Thet Tun, Min Lwin, Tayza
Naing, and others. I asked Tin Htut Oo about what had happened to Aung
San Suu Kyi. He told me that the car’s windshield wasn’t broken. Instead,
the glass windows were broken. Two clubs were thrown into the car.
Some pieces of glass cut her neck and she was slightly injured.
17. On 1 June, we were interrogated by Military Intelligence (MI) personnel.

The officer in charge was Captain Lin Zaw Kan. We were asked about our
personal details and our activities in the attack. On 8 June, four or five
days before we were freed, a person came to us. He didn’t tell us that he
was an MI officer. He just said that (the authorities from) Rangoon had
sent him. He said, “I came here to free you guys - fifty persons.”

He prohibited us from telling others, even our family members, about
what had happened near Kyi Village. He also prohibited us from talking
about our experience inside Shwe Bo Prison. He said, “If others ask you,
just say simply that you traveled around.”
In prison, there were about 120 people, including Thet Tun Oo, a 14-
year-old student from Monywa City, five novices and three monks. The
monks and novices were disrobed and they received prisoner’s clothes.
“We
were
warned not
18. On 9 June twenty-five persons, including students from high schools to let others
and universities in Monywa, were released. On 12 June twenty-one persons know about
were released, including ourselves, because we were not NLD members. the event.”
We each received a sheet of paper. It briefly warned us not to let others
know about the event because it was a state secret. It also stated that
action would be taken against anyone who spoke of the event. The sheet
was in front of the commander of MI Unit 20 and had been typed up in
advance. We were forced to sign it.
19. At the prison gate we were told that we were freed because the superiors
had sympathized with us. Moreover, we were not found guilty, but if we
reported anything to the media, they warned us that we would be exploited
by the media.
Thaung Nyunt (driver of the car in which Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt traveled in),
Sein Yee (driver of the car in which Win Mya Mya traveled in), Myo Min,
Naing Naing, and I were put into a Dyna bus. The bus was forced into
service by the authorities.
20. Capt. Lin Zaw Kan and an MI officer sat next to the driver. There were
also six or seven policemen with weapons. We reached an MI office in
Sagaing City, where we stayed there for a while. They reported to MI Unit
1. We were then transferred into the custody of five MI officers from MI
Unit 1. One of them was a captain. I don’t know their names.
We went to MI Unit 1 and we were told to write down our personal details
there. Then we had to sign a sheet of paper. The paper said that we would
not talk to anyone about what we had experienced. Then, they took
photographs of me. They contacted the authorities in my township and
the Peace and Development Council ward authorities. Later, I was
transferred to local MI personnel in my township. They (local authorities
and MI personnel) took me to my home in the early evening. In my house
the authorities, my family members, and I were photographed together as
a group. My sister and I had to sit on chairs while they stood behind us
when the pictures were taken. My sister had to sign (a paper) stating that
she knew the authorities had returned me to my family in good condition.
46 persons in two groups were released from Shwe Bo Prison. Therefore,

there were some 60 or 70 people who remained there. At present, Kyaw
Aung, Win Khaing, and Thein Aung Lay have reportedly been freed.
I hereby declare that the above experiences in paragraphs (1) to (20) are
those that I have seen and known, and that I was not threatened, tricked
or cheated into writing my story. I expressed it according to my own
desire.
-Aung Aung
28 July 2003
Bangkok, Thailand

Affidavit of Naing Naing
(a.k.a. Thein Naing)
Personal Data
Name: Naing Naing (a.k.a. Thein Naing)

Gender: Male
Age: 34 years
Date of Birth: 16 May 1969
Father’s Name: U Khin Ko
Mother’s Name: Daw Than
Nationality: Burman
Religion: Buddhist
Education: University
Address: Aung Myay Tha Zan Township, Mandalay Division
Place of Birth: Aung Myay Tha Zan Township, Mandalay Division

I, Naing Naing, hereby swear under oath, referring to the Depayin
Massacre on 30 May 2003 that:
1. I, Naing Naing (ID card no- Ma-Na-Ma (Naing) 051 359), son of U Khin
Ko and Daw Than, was born on 16 May 1969. I graduated from Mandalay
University, majoring in Geography. I lived in Aung Myay Tha Zan Township,
Mandalay Division, and worked as a businessman. During the 1988 People’s
“Remind Uprising, I joined the student union along with other students. I became a
others not member of the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS) when it was
to press founded in 1989. I also worked in the Student and Youth Committee of
the horn. the DPNS. After the DPNS was abolished, other colleagues and I supported
You all the National League for Democracy (NLD).
have 2. A friend of mine, Aung Aung, and I joined Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip from
discipline.” Madaya to Mandalay on 26 May. We drove a motorbike, staying at the
front of the motorcade, so we could be the first to find out about the
conditions ahead. When we were next to her she said, “You need to remind
the other motorbikes not to press the horn. No need to turn on the
headlights. You all have discipline.” I replied to her that I would comply. I
also passed on her words to the others I met. We didn’t press the horn or
use the headlights. When we reached Kyar Ni Kan Village, eleven NLD
Youth Wing members responsible for her security started to sing the national
anthem. From Patheinlay to Mandalay, we sang the national anthem. When
we were near Oo Bo Prison, we all sang the national anthem together in
order to give mental support to the political prisoners. When we reached
Mandalay, the local people warmly welcomed us.
3. We stayed in Mandalay for one day and organized a public warm welcome
for Aung San Suu Kyi, who was visiting the NLD branch in Aung Myay Tha
Zan Township, as well as the Yadana Mizzu Pagoda. She was warmly
welcomed, as the people there admire her. At the branch office, she talked
to the public a little bit. We left for Tada-U Township after she had
worshipped at the pagoda. Aung Aung and I joined some other NLD
members in a car. When we were in Amarapura Township, Daw Yuu Yuu
May (the wife of political prisoner Dr. Zaw Myint Mg) welcomed us and
then joined the motorcade until we reached Tada-U. We left after Aung
San Suu Kyi and Tin Htut Oo supervised the founding of a Youth Wing
there. Ko Lay Inn Waa Gon Yay and U Kyi Aung, two well-known poets in
the area, greeted her as she exited Tada-U. We noticed that the local
people also warmly welcomed her, as they supported her almost hundred
percent.
4. On 28 May, the day after we had arrived in Mandalay, she asked me to

come to the NLD Mandalay Division branch office after taking some rest in
the evening. I went upstairs from the office to outside the room where she
was staying. Here, Tun Zaw Zaw, Tin Htut Oo, Aung San Suu Kyi and I
discussed the next trip. She said to me, “I want you to join the trip” so that

I could inform the rest of the group if I found any disturbances waiting for
us. Tin Htut Oo also asked for my co-operation. In addition, Aung San
Suu Kyi said, “Talk with Tin Htut Oo and Tun Zaw Zaw about the policies
we’ve made.” Tin Htut Oo explained to me that we might encounter
disturbances during the trip, and that according to the NLD policy; we
would have to accept any beatings or killings, irrespective of who was
responsible for the disturbance or attack.
“According to
NLD Youth Wing members from four townships in the city of Mandalay NLD policy,
had already learnt about the NLD policy of not fighting back. I was also we would
told to follow the rules whilst on the trip. She also said, “As you are not have to
NLD members, you don’t need to wear our uniform. Help us.” I replied to
accept any
her that we would join in the trip, as we hadn’t participated in her trip to
Kachin State. Tin Htut Oo said to me, “Ko Naing, come here tomorrow beatings
morning.” or killings.”
5. On the morning of 29 May, I parked my car on the corner of 38th Street

and 80th Road and went to the division branch office. Aung Aung stayed
in the car. When I met Tin Htut Oo, he told me to leave at 8:30 am, and
that they would follow at 9:00 am. The three of us, along with another
NLD member (also a friend of ours), left Mandalay in our car so that we
could warn of any disturbances in advance.
When we reached the reception camp in Sagaing City, we informed them

that we had arrived half an hour in advance and that Aung San Suu Kyi
would be there one hour later. On the way out of Sagaing, we saw NLD
members and local people in the reception camp with a signboard to the
right of the road. The board said, “(We) warmly welcome the National
League for Democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi.” We continued our trip onto
Myinmu Township.
6. We stopped at Own Taw Village, before Myinmu, to buy cigarettes and

betel nuts. We found some intelligence personnel busy with communication
material in a Hilux pickup truck (Na Gyi/6456). We then realized that those
people were following along with the NLD motorcade. However, we didn’t
receive any disturbances. We noticed that they followed us until we reached
the entrance of Myinmu. Some demonstrators against Aung San Suu Kyi
were making loud noises in front of the NLD branch office in Myinmu.
They were shouting into loudspeakers that were fixed to the Dyna truck.
When she went into the office, the local people shouted, “Long live Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo (Vice-Chairperson of NLD).” The noise
from the Dyna truck could not overpower the people’s shouting. The Dyna
truck drove around the office and continued to make loud noises. Then
the Myinmu NLD Youth Wing was formed. We waited outside the office for
one hour and 45 minutes, and then left.

7. When we reached Yeposar Village, located between Myinmu and Chaung
Oo Township, we saw some 1,000 people next to 15 or 20 piles of stone
(one pile fits inside a three tonne truck). In their hands were placards that
said, “(We) don’t want those relying on external elements acting as stooges.”
They (the demonstrators against Aung San Suu Kyi) usually hold placards.
When we passed that big group, we saw an army major and a traffic
policeman. They were stopping all the vehicles that had come from
“We saw
Mandalay to Monywa. We were not able to turn back. So we drove to the
4-5,000 front. We met some 100 people on some 40 or 50 motorbikes coming
people on from Chaung Oo to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi. Later, some monks followed
both sides the group. We informed them that the motorcade and Aung San Suu Kyi
would be there in the next hour and that they were in danger. We described
of the road.”
to them what we had seen on the way. Then four or five motorbikes tried
to go ahead. However, they had to turn back as the road was still blocked.
While we were waiting there, some 1,000 motorbikes followed us. So, we
all continued together and the major and traffic policeman allowed us to
pass.
8. First, we learnt that the people and their motorbikes from Monywa were
also blocked in and not allowed to leave Monywa City. University students
in Monywa with 200 or 300 motorbikes were gathering in front of their
university and college. It was difficult to block them in. Finally, they were
able to come to us. The number of people reached the thousands. As it
was so crowded with well-wishers (i.e. the local people), we were not able
to drive at first. I hadn’t experienced that kind of greeting for a political
leader in all my life. We were at the front of the group. We had to drive
very slowly along with their motorbikes. There were people of different
ages, including senior citizens who lived very far away from Monywa. At
the entrance, the local people shouted, “Long live Aung San Suu Kyi! Long
live U Tin Oo!”
Normally, it takes 20 or 25 minutes to reach the Monywa NLD branch. At

that time, it took almost four hours, from 5:00 pm to 9:00 pm. In Monywa,
the electricity had been cut off. The local people warmly welcomed us by
the light of their candles. Aung San Suu Kyi also felt pleased. As she
wanted to respond to the well-wishers, she moved into a pickup truck and
greeted the people. She also accepted flower garlands. Some people cried
tears of happiness. Some asked, “Where’s the daughter of our general? We
want to see!” I hadn’t experienced any event like that before. According to
my knowledge, no one has ever received a greeting like that before. If the
military junta wants to punish the people, they will have to simply put
prison walls around the town of Monywa. In the NLD office, Tin Oo and
Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech to the public. Afterwards we went to Sein
Myar mini-mart, which is also the residence of retired Col. Kyi Soe, a local
MP. Aung San Suu Kyi stayed and slept there after the formation of the
local NLD Youth Wing. Then we went to Phone So Monastery with Tun
Win.

9. The next morning, Tin Hutu Oo said that we were going to Zawtica
Monastery. He also told me that I needed to go in advance, as the crowd
of people could possibility block our car. After she paid her respects in the
monastery, we planned to go on to Oat Kan Taw Yaa, another monastery.
At that time, some NLD Youth members from Monywa joined our car.
However, we didn’t go to the monastery as we later learnt that the abbot
wasn’t present. We continued our trip onto Budalin Township.
“The
authorities
Zaw Lay’s car had engine trouble between Budalin and Monywa. There had blocked
were youth members responsible for Aung San Suu Kyi’s security in his the road.”
car. Two of them joined my car. When we reached the well-wishers at
Budalin, they left my car and went beside her car in order to protect her
and provide security. Wherever we went, Myo Naing and I went around
town to check the entrance and exit of the town. So, when we were in
Budalin, we checked the conditions of the entrance and exit that we would
have to use. At the petrol station at the entrance of Budalin, we saw some
people with white cloth wrapped around their arms. They were with some
16 vehicles. Moreover, there was a group of monks with white cloth wrapped
around their arms. We went to report back to her (Aung San Suu Kyi). A
girl informed us that their group, consisting of some 70 or 80 motorbikes,
was blocked in by barbed wire barricades at Zee Taw Village. They had
accompanied the motorcade from Monywa to Budalin. The girl wanted us
to report this to Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, we reported to her, Tun
Zaw Zaw and Tin Htut Oo whilst they were having lunch in the upstairs
room of the Budalin NLD branch office. She felt remorseful and asked
Aung San, Chairperson of the Budalin NLD branch, to go there and solve
the problem. He went there using the car belonging to Bar Bar, Chairperson
of the Sagaing Division NLD branch. We also reported to her what we had
seen at the entrance of Butalin. Tin Htut Oo warned me, “Ko Naing, all of
you keep an eye on the security conditions. Report to us when there is
anything unusual.” He also told me that he would arrange to have
communications between Saw Hlaing and us. They (Aung San Suu Kyi
and NLD members) had formed the NLD Youth Wing in Budalin. On the
way, we stayed at the tomb of Thein Phay Myint (a well-known politician
and writer) and we had our car repaired. NLD members from Monywa and
motorists came to the tomb with other NLD members. They stayed there
so they could be informed of and see the security conditions, because they
had heard that the authorities had blocked the road in Zee Taw Village.
Later, Tin Htut Oo came to us. He said, “Kyaw Aung, someone without an
NLD uniform will follow you on his motorbike. You go first and contact
him if you have any problems. Saw Hlaing will be in Depayin and you
need to meet him.”
10. We reached Saipyin Gyi, the residence of elected MP, Win Myint Aung,
who is currently in prison. His residence was also the reception camp for

Aung San Suu Kyi. The villagers between Sai Pyin Gyi Village and Budalin
Township were waiting there to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi. We stayed
there for one hour, knowing that Saw Hlaing had already left for Depayin.
As it was necessary for us to contact him, we left Sai Pyin Gyi.
When we reached the (killing) field, we saw some 4,000 or 5,000 people
on both sides of the road. We observed three rolls of barbed wire barricades
on the road. After we passed the crowd, we reached the barricades. We
also noticed that there were more people on the left side than on the right
side of the road. Like the people at the entrance to Budalin, they all had
white cloth wrapped around their left arm. Some held a placard in their
hands. It was strange that all of those in the crowd were male. We proceeded
forward. I thought that I could meet with U Saw Hlaing to discuss the next
step of the plan, if I was able to pass through the barricades. But I was
forced to stop there. Three men in mufti approached our car and one of
them asked me where we were going. I told him that we were going to
Depayin. At the same time, however, Aung Aung replied that we were
with Aung San Suu Kyi’s entourage. Then I got out of the car.
11. At that time, a man was talking to some monks sitting on chairs. He
was a little bit fat, with big eyebrows and a hard face. He was wearing a
white t-shirt, green military pants and shoes. He said, “Daw Suu Kyi and
her group will use this way. The crowd waiting here will demonstrate
against them. If there is any problem between the crowd and the monks
with Daw Suu Kyi, you need to let them know that you are here.” I heard
everything he said as they were standing next to my car. The man I met
first reported to him, “Major, this car is included in Aung San Suu Kyi’s
motorcade.” The major just ordered him, “Detain them and put them in
(the building).”
I was asked to drive into the Irrigation Department compound on the left
side of the road. The policemen, who held batons and shields, first searched
our bodies and then searched inside of our car. After they had asked us for
our personal details, they sent the three of us into a building. In the
building, we saw five NLD members who were under arrest. They were:
Saw Hlaing, Myint Kyi, U Bo Maung, Zaw Tun and Sein Tin. They all were
in full NLD uniform. I also saw two other NLD members, who were not
wearing uniforms, and Sein Lin, who is not an NLD member. I asked, “Is U
Saw Hlaing here?” They didn’t dare reply. Finally, Zaw Tun pointed out
Saw Hlaing. I asked him what we were going to do, as Tin Htut Oo had
asked me to contact him. He just replied, “I’m not able to do anything.”
Later, Kyaw Aung, Secretary of the Mandalay Northwest Township NLD
branch, entered the building. He had followed us on his motorbike, as he
wanted to talk to us about the security conditions.
12. After he was asked for his personal details, his hands were tied with
rope. Our hands were also tied. He told them that it wasn’t necessary, but

his request was in vain. When
darkness came, they took us out
of the building. We were then
moved into a Dyna truck that was
30 feet away from the building.
In a tree next to the compound,
there were two searchlights that
lit up the road. We saw some 15
Dyna trucks queuing at the back
of the crowd. The trucks gave
lighting to the crowd waiting to
attack Aung San Suu Kyi and her
group.
About one-and-a-half hours after

our arrest, we saw lights from cars
about 400 feet away from us, and At the location
of the attck,
it was Daw Suu’s motorcade. It stopped near the crowd and Kyi Village. At barricades were
that time, the monk U Zawtika and a student from Monywa, who were on placed in advance
a motorbike, drove out in front of the crowd. They came to find out about and attackers
the security conditions and were arrested. They were sent into our car were lying in wait.
after the student was beaten. The monk, however, was not beaten. Then
we noticed that Daw Suu’s car and two other cars had driven forward.
When they reached the compound in which we were being detained, the
crowd began the attack crying, “Kill the woman who betrays and destroys
the race, kill the woman who destroys the race!” The NLD Youth members
cried out and warned each other, “Protect mother, protect mother! Don’t
let her get hurt!” After the command, “Get out! Fight!” two Dyna trucks
drove out of the compound towards Daw Suu’s car. However, her car
drove away through three lines of barbed wire barricades. At that time,
somebody shouted the command, “Fire!” and some 10 or 15 gunshots
followed. However, her car didn’t stop.
At that time, a police officer came and said, “So, Bo Maung and all of you,
as you have seen, you have narrowly escaped. You must understand that
you were lucky.” According to Bo Maung (elected MP in Depayin Township),
the police officer was Sein Win, in charge of the police department in
Depayin Township. He seemed to have known about the attack in advance.
13. There was shouting outside the compound, “Strike!” “Beat!” and “Kill!”
A man next to the truck we were put in reported on his walkie-talkie. He
said, “Is train, is train?” The other side replied, “Train, train.” His report
followed: “Deva Tin Hla, Dava Tin Hla, We’ve got it. Dava San Shar escaped,
Dava San Sha escaped. Setkalay (medium light automatic machine gun),
make it ready! Fire if necessary!”

I heard that the people in the motorcade were being beaten outside of the
compound. I also heard, “Kill!” “Kill until they die!” “Kill those who want to
be an Indian’s wife!” At the same time, I heard the voice on the walkie-
talkie. The other side asked, “Is train, is train?” The man next to our car
replied, “Train, train.” “Aung Khaing, Aung Naing, what is the situation?”
the other side asked. The man answered, “Beating and killing is not finished
yet! Beating and killing is not finished yet!” The other side asked,
“Commission, what is the status! Commission, what is the status! Have
you sent it yet?” The man answered, “Still managing, still doing.”
Then the policemen brought some people into the compound while they
were beating them. They kicked females in the back. They beat males
using batons, including some monks. Young novices were kicked. They
were put inside two Dyna trucks next to us. There were more than twenty
people in each truck. So, the number of the people arrested would amount
to about 70.
At that time, I heard the voice on the walkie-talkie again. “Aung Khaing,
Aung Naing, what is the situation?” The man near our truck replied, “Aung
Khaing, Aung Naing, ice.” Then the other side said, “Commission, what is
the status! Have send it yet?” “Still managing, still doing,” the man replied.
14. At about midnight, there was shouting from the nearby villages, “Our
course!” There were also gunshots. I heard it until 3:00 am the next
morning. Injured persons were among the detainees in the three trucks.
They were separated from each other at 1:00 am. There were over 20
people per truck. The uninjured persons were in two trucks. At about
5:00 am, the two trucks we had been put inside started to move. The
attackers were in Dyna trucks and buses on the sides of the road. Some
buses didn’t have chairs so the passengers had to stand. There were
approximately 100 trucks and buses. We reached Shwe Bo Prison at about
9:00 am. In our first group, there were 44 people including four women:
16-year-old Pyo Mya Mya Soe, the daughter of Monywa Aung Shin (a poet
currently in prison), Toe Toe Win and an unknown woman. All of them
were from Monywa. Among the 40 men were some monks: Rev. Zawtica
of Alone Monastery, Rev. Nya Nain Da of Yan Kin Monastery, and four
other novices. The left hand of Rev. Nya Nain Da had been injured during
the attack.
15. On 1 June, Kyaw Soe Linn, Daw Suu’s driver, and some seven other
young people were moved downstairs. His right hand had been injured in
the attack. When I went to take a shower, I had the chance to talk to him.
I asked him what had happened to Daw Suu. According to him, her right
shoulder was injured as a result of the beatings. The glass from the back
door and door on the right hand side had been broken. The right side of
her neck had been cut by the pieces of glass. The left side of her neck also
hurt her slightly.

He explained to me what had happened to them on 30 May. At about
10:30 pm, after they had driven through the lines of barbed wire barricades,
they reached Ye Oo Township. There were some 20 youth members with
Daw Suu’s car. There were two rods and a stone thrown into the car as a
result of the attack. The entrance to Ye Oo was blocked. About ten
policemen aimed their guns at them. The next morning at about 3:00 am,
the soldiers arrived there and took them to the military area in Ye Oo.
“Two
rods
and a stone
16. On 2 June, nine members of the NLD Central Youth Wing arrived at were thrown
Shwe Bo Prison. Their names were: Tun Zaw Zaw, Tun Myint, Thet Tun, into Suu
Min Lwin, Than Tun, Myint Kyaw, Toe Lwin, Pauk Pauk and Myo Nyunt. Kyi’s car.”
Toe Lwin was suffering from a head injury. At 10:00 am, we all had our
photographs taken. At about 4:00 pm, some 10 people from Military
Intelligence (MI) Unit-20, led by Capt. Lin Zaw Kan, started to interrogate
all of the detainees.
After the interrogation, we were each sent to different places. I was sent
into a room where Tin Htut Oo and other NLD Youth members were being
detained. Tin Htut Oo said that at about 7:00 am on 31 May, they had re-
visited the place where they had been attacked. Soldiers and policemen
waiting near the Irrigation Department compound arrested them. Then
they were sent to the police station in Depayin.
At the police station, he met NLD Vice-Chairperson Tin Oo, who had been
arrested when the attack started. Tin Oo repeatedly told the policemen
“Kill me until I die. Otherwise, I will send you to court.” When the NLD
Youth members were about to be sent to Shwe Bo Prison, he said, “Where
are you going to take them? Let them stay with me, or I will follow them.”
He was left at the police station.
Tin Htut Oo also told me what Tun Zaw Zaw had said to him in another
room of Shwe Bo Prison. Daw Suu wasn’t concerned about her wound.
She was only concerned and worried all through the night about the other
injured members. When the Central Youth members were taken away
from her, Daw Suu didn’t agree with the authorities at all. At about 10:00
am, nine members were about to be removed from her presence. When
she disagreed, the colonel rudely said, “Take two for yourself, who do you
like?” She chose Tun Zaw Zaw and Tun Myint.
The next day at about 2:00 am, Tun Zaw Zaw and Tun Myint were also
removed. They were told that it would only take about 15 minutes. However,
they were all sent to us. We didn’t see Kyaw Soe Lin and the NLD Central
Youth members anymore, after their first two days in Shwebo Prison.
17. In prison, there were some 30 students from universities and high
schools in Monywa. Some of them had been injured. A novice had been

stabbed in his left hand, and we could see the bone. Another novice’s left
hand was in a plaster cast.
Some NLD members from No. 7 Military Hospital in Monywa were sent to
us. They had been injured. The members included: Hla Myint, Chairperson
from Amarapura Township, Tauk Tun Oo, member from Butalin Township,
Thein Zaw, member from Htundone Township, Mandalay Division, Thein
Aung Lay, member from Northwest Township, Mandalay Division and
Thwal, member from Northwest Township, Mandalay Division.
According to them, some members were still in the hospital, as they had
incurred serious injuries. They were: Win Mya Mya, member from Mandalay
Division branch, U Chit Tin and Zaw Lay (a.k.a. Ko Zaw Khin), son of U
Hla Myint of Amarapura.
18. On 9 June, a total of 25 high school and university students were

released in the first group. On 12 June, 21 of us were released. Thus, a
total of 46 people were released. I assumed that we were released because
we were not NLD members. All of us received a sheet of paper with typed
print. It said: “Don’t let others know about the important State secret,
otherwise action will be taken again…” and so on. We were forced to sign it
in front of the MI in charge of Unit 20. At the gate of the Shwe Bo Prison,
he said that we had been freed because the state leaders sympathized with
us. They didn’t want us to talk to anyone about the arrests, otherwise we
would be exploited by the press.
19. Five of us were taken to the MI Unit 20 office in Sagaing City: Thaung
Nyunt, who drove the car in which Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt traveled in during
the trip, Sein Yee, driver of the car in which Win Mya Mya traveled, Myo
Min, Aung Aung and I. We were taken by Capt. Lin Zaw Kan, an MI
personnel member, and six policemen who were heavily armed. The Dyna
truck we were taken in was owned a private bus company, however the
authorities used it forcibly. MI Unit 16 took Thaung Nyunt and Sein Yee.
We had to stay in the office while they contacted MI Unit (1) in Mandalay.
Captain Aung Zaw and four other MI personnel from Unit 1, all dressed in
mufti, came and took three of us in a four-wheel drive vehicle. They
photographed us and recorded our personal details. I had to sign a paper
stating that I would not talk to anyone about what had happened. The
chairperson of the Amarathani quarter USDA took Myo Min. Our township
and quarter Peace and Development Council were called and informed of
us. Then MI personnel, led by Lwin Oo, took us to our homes.
When I reached my house, they photographed my family. Then they took

two photos of my parents and myself sitting, with three of them standing
behind us. After that, my father had to sign a paper that said he
acknowledged that they had returned me to my family.

When the 46 of us were released, there were still some 80 people remaining
in Shwe Bo Prison.
I hereby declare that the above experiences are those, which I have seen
and known, and that I was not threatened, tricked or cheated into writing
-Naing Naing
7 August 2003
Bangkok, Thailand
Endnotes
100
People’s militia known as “People Power”.
101
Short for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
102
Village and Quarter Peace and Development Council.
103
Kalama means female Indian. It refers to Aung San Suu Kyi.
104
Short for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
105
Pali word for Buddhist monks.

Affidavit of Khin Aye Myint
Personal Data
Name: Khin Aye Myint

Gender: Female
Age: 43 years
Date of Birth: 19 January 1961
Father’s Name: U Tuu
Mother’s Name: Daw Khin Kyi
Religion: Buddhist
Education: Graduated (Bsc. Physic)
Address: 19 (d) street, between 86 & 87 Rd, Mandalay City
Place of Birth: Mandalay Division

I, Khin Aye Myint, hereby swear under oath that:
1. I lived in 19 (d) street, between 86 & 87 Rd, Mandalay City. I joined the
National League for Democracy (NLD) in 1989. Later, I was appointed to
perform many duties in NLD as follows:
1- In charge, Women’s Wing, Mandalay North-West Township
2- Member, Women’s Wing, Mandalay Division
3- In charge, Committee for Finance, Mandalay Division
While I was working for NLD, Myint Soe of Military Intelligence (MI) unit
(1) and some local policemen came to my house and arrested me on May
20, 1999. They didn’t charge me (under any act) but I was put in Owe Bo
(Mandalay) prison for about one year. The authorities detained several
NLD members around the country before the ninth anniversary of the
1990 general election.
2. I joined Aung San Suu Kyi’s Mandalay-Monywa trip because I was
responsible for the security team in Mandalay North-West Township. In
my car, the following persons were with me:
- Chit Tin
- Aung Ko
- Hla Than
- Twel
- Thein Aung Lay
- Tun Tun Aung
- Tin Maung Aye
- Thanda Soe
- Nyunt Nyunt
- Wunna Maung and
- a young member from Hton Done, Mandalay.
The driver was San Myint (also known as) Raju. Our car was a green Hilux
pick up.
3. On the morning of May 29th, 2003 at 10 am, we left the NLD Mandalay
Division branch office. MI’s gray-color car (1B/8090) followed at the end
of the NLD motorcade. When we reached Sagaing Bridge, we met
protestors. They held up signs which said “oppose axe handles who rely
on foreigners” and so on. We reached the NLD Myinmu Township branch
office at 11:15 am. Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD officials supervised
the founding of the Township Youth Wing and the installation of the NLD
Township sign ceremonies. We left Myinmu at 2:45 pm. MI’s white color
Sunny pick up (4A/5799) followed our motorcade. When we reached
Yeposar village, we met about 2000 motorbikes waiting to welcome us.
4. We reached the entrance of Monywa City at 3:15 pm. As our cars slowly
moved forward, we reached Monywa NLD branch late at night, at 9:30
pm. Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD officials supervised the founding of
the Township level Organizing Committee and the Youth Wing.
The next day, May 30th, at 10:20 am, our motorcade assembled in front of
Sein Mya mini mart and started to leave Monywa. MI’s cars such as a Hilux

pick up (1B/9458), a Parjaro van (Ma/4607), an Isuzu pick up (2B/2472)
and a jeep (7138) followed the motorcade. The motorcade reached Zawtica
monastery to pay respects to the monks. Then we continued our trip to
Oakkan Taw Ywa, another monastery. The NLD vice chairperson and general
secretary reportedly donated robes to the abbot of Oakkan Taw Ywa.
We reached Ah Lon Township at 11:15 am. MI personnel chased after the
motorcade in a Hilux pick up (Da/9458) and another pick up (Has/4103).
At 1:05 pm, we reached Budalin Township. There was a ceremony founding
the Township level NLD Youth Wing in Budalin. We left Budalin at 5:15
pm. We reached Sai Pyin village at 6:15 pm. The motorcade stayed there
about one hour while Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the public for about half
an hour. At 7:00 pm, we left Sai Pyin village.
5. At 7:30 pm, we reached Kyi village and villagers in waiting welcomed
the motorcade. At that time, another motorcade suddenly arrived at the
back of our motorcade. The motorcade carried demonstrators (against
NLD). Their cars’ headlights gave lighting to the villagers and our motorcade.
When their cars stopped, demonstrators immediately rushed towards us
and started to attack the villagers.
Some male NLD members warned the female NLD members to stay in the
car. Some NLD leaders from Mandalay Division tried to leave the car in
order to stop the attack. By that time, the demonstrators were next to our
motorcade and start to attack us. They used batons and iron spikes. They
also threw stones at us. They carried the stones in bags. There were no
stones nearby because there were only paddy fields at the road side.
People pretending to be monks were among the attackers. Those sham
monks covered their noses and mouths using yellow cloths. There were
white strings on their hands.
The attackers had brown skin and they were short. They rudely shouted at
us and they used rude words. At the same time, they continuously attacked
us. The women in the car lay (and faced) down on the floor. We didn’t
have any weapons. Our heads were targeted while they attacked us.
I was attacked five times. Three times my head was hit. As a result, I have
been having treatment until now. The other people in my car were beaten
at least about five times. During the attack, an old woman was beaten
several times because she looked at the area surrounding the attack.
The jewelry we wore was looted while we were under attack. Bags, money
and even slippers we wore were also looted. Each of us had about fifty
thousand kyat to use during the trip.
6. Then, the attackers ordered us to move from our cars. They shouted,
“Get out of the cars, otherwise, we will burn your cars!” They also removed
the NLD uniforms we wore. We all had to get out of our car. I wrapped my
chest with the sarong I wore and moved out of the car. We all were beaten
one time on our head while we moved from the car. That was why I fell
down to the ground. I wasn’t able to open my eyes for a moment. I felt
dizzy. Blood was covering my body.

We were lying down on the ground because we were wounded. Some of
us were moaning. The attackers moved our cars to the road side towards
the paddy fields. Then they collected their people. They shouted, “Was
there anybody left? Let’s go!”
They shouted to us, “Don’t try to look at us. Otherwise, you will be killed.”
They destroyed the white Dyna truck, which was used by the Buddhist
monks accompanying the motorcade. The attackers burned down the truck
but they shouted, “NLD burned down the truck!”
The car which belonged to NLD members of Yay Oo and Tantse townships
was also burned down. Then, the attackers went in the direction of Chaung
Oo and Monywa City driving their cars.
7. After they left, a man in our car gave us three or four shirts. We wore
them. He was looted during the attack and he lost his camera, photos and
money.
I gave some treatment to some other wounded persons. I put tooth paste
on some wounds. I passed some water to them. I used Chinese tooth
paste and two bottles of water. We planned to leave the place because we
were afraid the attackers would come back. I and some other NLD members
went into the paddy field to hide.
8. At 11:00 pm, the attackers came back to that area. Some of us in the
paddy field secretly looked at them. The attackers had batons, shields and
guns. They took the wounded people to their cars while they were shouting
rudely.
Then, they moved the NLD member’s vehicles into different positions to
create the impression that NLD members had been in car accidents, or
logs had fallen down on NLD member’s cars or NLD member’s cars had hit
trees. Then, they photographed their creations. The NLD members who
looked at the attackers told us what they saw. We also saw the flashes
when they took photographs. Later, they left in the direction of Depayin
Township.
At the same time, we heard gun shots. We thought that the gun shots
were coming from Depayin Township. We heard them until 4:00 am the
next morning. We came out of hiding at about 6:00 am. We met some
villagers looking at the area surrounding the attack. There were some cars
and motorbikes destroyed.
9. I tried to get treatment for the wounds I received in the attack while I
was hiding for ten months in Burma. On April 29th, 2004, I left Burma for
the Thai-Burma border.
I hereby declare that the above experiences from paragraphs 1 to 9 are
those which I have seen and known, and that I was not threatened,
tricked or cheated to write my story - I expressed it of my own desire.
-Khin Aye Myint

May 2, 2004
Bangkok, Thailand

Chapter (6)
Responses from internal political organizations
and leaders from around the world
I
n response to the 30 May Depayin Massacre, the re-arrest
of Aung San Suu Kyi and all NLD leadership and the
closing of party offices, numerous statements have been
issued. They come from various internal and international
organizations, leaders and NGOs. They include the United Nations,
the United States, as well as internal political parties such as ceasefire
groups and various political and ethnic organizations based all along
the borders, the NCUB and the NCGUB.
Below are some of the selected statements:
Thakin Thein Pe
In his interviews with various foreign Burmese language radio

broadcasts, political veteran, Thakin Thein Pe, claimed that the
Depayin Massacre was the second political assassination (referring
to the assassination of Aung San Suu Kyi’s father General Aung San
in 1947) and that State authorities were behind the massacre.106
Writer/ Journalist Ludu Daw Ahmar
Well-known writer and journalist, Ludu Daw Ahmar,

commented that the case of the Depayin Massacre should be discussed
in search of a resolution at the UN Security Council.107
Former Editor-in-Chief U Htein Lin
U Htein Lin, who is the former chief editor of the Botataung

Newspaper, stated that an independent commission should be formed
to investigate the Depayin Massacre and that all those who had
been detained following the massacre would have to be released.108

‘Thirty Comrades’ Member Major General Kyaw Zaw
In an interview with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on 10 June 2003,

with regards to the May massacre and his outlook on the
Tatmadaw, ‘Thirty Comrades’ Member, Major General Kyaw Zaw,
commented the following:
“Based on the information I have and the “I deplore

analysis I have made, I believe that the Depayin the scheme
Massacre was a pre-mediated assassination attempt to eliminate
on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s life. The army appears to (Suu Kyi)
have assumed that once she was gone there would be and (her)
no one left to defy them. The massacre was ugly and
evil. I deplore it in the strongest possible terms. This
organization
is because, firstly, the NLD is a political organization in the
that has worked for democracy peacefully. Secondly, strongest
she is the daughter of our Independence hero and the possible
leader of the armed forces, General Aung San. She terms.”
herself is a national leader, and has remained at the
forefront of the democratic movement and steadfastly
and bravely strived for the return of democracy in
Burma. Furthermore, U Tin Oo is a former leader of
the Tatmadaw, who won the “Thura” Award for his
bravery. He won the award when he fought alongside
me during our fight against the KMT,109 which was a
battle to defend our nation. Therefore, he is also a
national hero. He is also a national leader who has
struggled for democracy alongside Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi. That is why I deplore the scheme to eliminate
such personages and their organization in the strongest
possible terms. I am really worried about both Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo. This is my opinion.
When we established the Burmese Army in

1941, under the leadership of General Aung San, we
intended it to be used for the independence struggle
as well as for the greater good of the country. We
stuck to these objectives in the ensuing years. But the
lasting situation in Burma - the assassination attempts
on the leaders of the people and the people themselves
- has proven that the army has oppressed the people
all along and that it has resorted to myriad of wicked
methods. If the situation continues in this way, the
army will become like the ‘Lanmataw Phoe Toke Gang’,
which the British created in order to suppress the
people from outside of the law. And the country will
fall into the abyss. All patriotic officers in the army

should not let the situation further deteriorate
indifferently. They should work to get the situation
back to negotiations. That’s all I want to urge.
Our country is at a critical juncture. The first

path is the continued monopoly of power by the army
and continuation of repression. If the army continues
to go down this road, it will be discarded into the
historical dustbin for defying the will of the people. It
is the people who will suffer. Our national unity will
be affected and the situation may revert back to civil
war. The other path is for the army to make a retreat
and follow the road to negotiations in accordance with
the UN resolutions. This is the road that will benefit
the country and the people. But it is the army that will
have to make the decision about which path it wants
to choose. That’s why I would like to urge the
Tatmadaw to bring about national unity though
negotiations which are beneficial to the people. The
people should also spur the Burmese Army so that it
embarks on the road to negotiations. That’s all I want
to say.”
Furthermore, internal political parties, armed ethnic groups whom

have exchanged arms for peace, as well as those who have entered into
ceasefire agreements with the Burmese Army, issued various statements
in regards to the Depayin Massacre.
Seventy Members of Parliament
Members of the NLD, as well as seventy Members of Parliament elected

in the 1990 election, sent a letter to Senior General Than Shwe, the head
of the military regime at that time, demanding the following:
1. To release all NLD members who accompanied NLD

Vice-Chairman U Tin Oo and General Secretary Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi and have been detained following
the Depayin Massacre.
2. To release all NLD Central Executive Committee members,

including NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe, who have been
placed under house arrest.
3. To allow the reopening all NLD offices that have been

forced to close in the wake of the massacre.

4. To form an investigation commission so that it can make
a list of and disclose the actual number of deaths, the
wounded, detained and missing during and after the
massacre.
5. To carry out the resolutions of the UN and to convene

Parliament in accordance with the provisions of the 1990
“There have
Election Law.110 been gross
human
rights
Women Members of the NLD violations
under the
Women members of the NLD sent letters to the SPDC urging the
immediate release of all NLD leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Burmese
and the reopening of all NLD offices across the nation.111 military
regime.”
Members of the NLD from 6 Irrawaddy Delta Townships
Members and officials of the township organizing committees of the NLD

from 6 Irrawaddy Delta townships sent a signed letter demanding that the
UN Security Council take immediate action regarding the Depayin
Massacre. The demands are as follows:
1. To release all political prisoners, including the national

leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, unconditionally and
immediately and to cease unlawful arrests.
2. To immediately reopen all NLD offices that have been

closed following the massacre, to allow freedom of
movement and activities and to allow such freedoms to
other political parties.
3. To carry out the results of the 1990 election that, according

to numerous UN resolutions, is the demonstration of the
genuine will of the people.
4. To form an independent and impartial commission to

investigate the Depayin Massacre on 30 May and publish
the subsequent findings.
A total of 2,976 members of the NLD from six townships signed

the letter. The townships’ names and the number of signatures are as
follows:

· Kyon Pyaw 941
· Kyaung Gon 977
· Bogalay 508
· Pantanaw 66
· Malamyaing Kyun 198
· Nga Thaing Chaung 286
This letter was sent to the office of the UN Secretary General so that
truth can be brought to light and justice served.112
NLD Youth Wing
The Youth Wing of the NLD sent a letter to UN Secretary General

Kofi Anan on 8 July 2003 urging him to take appropriate actions regarding
the Depayin Massacre. In the letter, the Youth Wing members wrote:
“Recently NLD General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu

Kyi made a trip to Upper Burma with the agreement of the
Burmese military junta, in order to carry out party functions
as well as the reopening of NLD offices. She was welcomed
by thousands of people throughout her journey.
(However), more than 70 people were killed and over

100 people were wounded during an ambush near a village
called Kyi in Depayin Township, Shwebo District in Sagaing
Division on 30 May 2003. Although the party Vice-Chairman,
U Tin Oo, and General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
were able to escape narrowly, the Burmese military junta
has detained scores of NLD members in various prisons.
Therefore, the Depayin incident will remain in history as a
massacre orchestrated by the dictatorial government.
There is absolutely no doubt that there have been

gross human rights violations under the rule of the Burmese
military regime. Therefore we, the members of the NLD
Youth Wing, would like to urge you to carry out the following
measures immediately:”
1. To request that the Burmese junta report to

the UN immediately regarding the May massacre
or form an independent commission to
investigate the killings.
2. To request that the Burmese junta release

unconditionally and immediately all students,

monks and political prisoners who have been
punished (following the massacre).
3. To request that the Burmese junta reopen all

NLD offices and declare a clear and concise
program to the world in order to carry out the
results of the 1990 election within six months.
4. To take up Burma’s case at the UN Security

Council so that appropriate measures, including
further sanctions, can be taken and to remove
the representation of the Burmese junta from
the UN.113
Seven Ceasefire Groups
Regarding the May massacre, seven ethnic groups that have entered
into ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta issued a statement on 1
July 2003. The seven groups include the Kachin Independence Organization,
Kayan New Land Party, Karenni Nationalities’ People Liberation Front,
Palaung State Liberation Army, Shan State Peace Council, New Mon State
Party and Shan Nationalities’ People Liberation Organization.
Nine Ethnic Political Parties inside Burma
“We are greatly saddened by the deaths and wounding of

the people, which was the result of violence among fellow
countrymen on 30 May 2003. We also feel saddened because (the
ambush) has even led to interventions by the UN and the
international community.”
The nine ethnic political parties are:
1. Mara People’s Party

2. Zomi National Congress
3. Mon National Democratic Front
4. Chin National League for Democracy
5. Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
6. Karen National Congress for Democracy
7. Kayah State Nationalities League for Democracy
8. Kachin State Nationalities Democracy Conference
9. Kayan Nationalities Unity League
In their statement on 7 July 2003, with regards to the prevailing

political situation in Burma, the nine groups stated:

“We urge the cessation of all kinds of violence
immediately in the name of the nation and its people. We
also deplore those who created the violence in the strongest
possible terms. We urge (all parties concerned) to find political
solutions through political negotiations.”114
United Nationalities League for Democracy
The United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) issued a statement

on 29 September 2003, with regards to the current political situation in
Burma. The statement includes the UNLD’s five-point policy and political
roadmap. The first point of the policy concerns the Depayin Massacre.
1. “Just and equitable investigation into the Depayin

episode.”
“It is unmistakably clear that the 30th May 2003

occurrence near the town of Depayin, Sagaing Division was
a grave political killing ‘fest’ of enormous significance. The
authorities say that it was the result of the National League
for Democracy’s (NLD) unruly behavior, but the NLD claims
that it was a well-organized premeditated attack by the other
side.
No matter what they say, there is no dispute about

the fact that the clash was between followers of the NLD on
one side and Union Solidarity and Development Association
(USDA) members on the other side, with over 1,000 persons
armed with swords, clubs, bamboo spears and catapults.
The authorities announced that there were 4 deaths, but the
NLD claims that the number of missing and dead exceeded
100. This event is not a mere “internal affair”. It is a regional
and international issue, which has aroused global interest.
A government that claims “law and order” is its

primary concern should not trivially brush aside a people-
killing orgy of such grave proportions. It is necessary that
the matter be immediately investigated and with the utmost
concern for justice. It is most astonishing and inequitable
for NLD leaders, including U Tin Oo and Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi, to be arrested and imprisoned, for all NLD offices to be
shut down, and for other NLD leaders to be placed under
house arrest while no action whatsoever has been taken
against the military government’s sponsored USDA.

No one can deny that such a serious event – the killing
and destruction of human lives – requires investigation. Since
USDA members are involved, it is not proper that the
investigation be performed by anyone who is under the
military government’s authority. In order for the truth to be
revealed, the investigation should be conducted by the United
Nations. We think that after such an investigation a Truth
Commission (similar to that in South Africa) should be formed “Once truth
so that the process of forgiveness and reconciliation can is revealed,
commence. Once the truth is revealed, political hatred will political hatred
be reduced and both sides can begin building a climate of will be reduced
trust. We believe this is the first step. To pretend that and both sides
nothing happened would only build up suspicion in both
camps and this is not the road that should be taken.
can begin
building a
We request members of the military and members of climate of
the NLD who love their country and their fellowmen to give trust.”
this message serious consideration.”
National Council of the Union of Burma
The National Council of the Union of Burma demanded in a

statement, issued on 2 June 2003, that the junta cease all violence, including
the provocation of and attacks upon the NLD and the public, release all
political detainees including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members,
reopen NLD offices, investigate the deaths, wounded and other losses
incurred during the Depayin Massacre, and that the NLD and Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi be allowed to engage in political activities freely.115
ABFSU (FAC) / ABSDF / DPNS / NDD
The All Burma Federation of Students Unions (Foreign Affairs

Committee), the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, the Democratic
Party for a New Society and the Network for Democracy and Development
issued a joint statement regarding the Depayin Massacre in which they
wrote:
“We deplore the Burmese military clique in the

strongest possible terms for the detention of all NLD leaders,
including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the closing of all NLD
offices throughout the country. It is clear and undeniable
that the military-backed USDA disturbed and harassed the
NLD throughout Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s organizing trips.
There is also evidence that the USDA continuously disturbed
and harassed the NLD during her previous trips and these

acts of harassment worsened during her trip to Kachin State.
The Burmese junta, which obtained power illegally, must be
held responsible for the deaths and injuries inflicted upon
NLD members, students, monks and the public through
violent acts. These acts also demonstrate and reveal the
genuine nature of the Burmese junta by prioritizing the
continuation of their rule before the interests of the people.
Furthermore, (the Depayin Massacre) is an insult and
challenge to the whole nation, pro-democracy groups, ethnic
nationalities and all other organizations and countries wishing
to see the return of democracy in Burma.”116
Communist Party of Burma
Regarding the Depayin Massacre, a spokesman for the Central

Organizing Committee of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) said the
following in a statement (No. 7/2003) issued on 6 June 2003:
“We the CPB demand the immediate formation of a

commission comprised of respectable monks and individuals
regarding the violence that occurred near Monywa. We
demand the speedy publication of a report (by the
commission). We also demand that those who are responsible
for the violence be prosecuted.”117
NLD Statement on National Day
To mark the National Day, the NLD issued a statement on 18

November 2003. In the statement, the NLD called for the following to be
promptly implemented:
“As a first step, all NLD leaders, including Daw Aung

San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo, must be released immediately
and unconditionally. All political prisoners must be released
in the same manner. All NLD offices, which have been
temporarily closed since 31 May 2003, must be reopened as
soon as possible. All political parties must be allowed freedom
of assembly and allowed to carry out their activities.
Furthermore, in order to demonstrate to the people of Burma
and the international community that the prevalence of law
throughout the nation is respected and that everyone is equal
in the presence of the law, it is the sole responsibility of the
SPDC to form an independent commission comprised of
members who enjoy trust and acceptance by the people and
allow that commission to investigate the massacre freely.”118

US Secretary of State Colin Powell
The following is an article written by Collin Powell,

which was published in the Wall Street Journal on 12 June 2003:
It’s Time to Turn the Tables On Burma’s Thugs

By COLIN L. POWELL “The attackers
were brutal
WASHINGTON — United Nations Special Envoy Razali Ismail has just visited Burma and organized;
and was able to bring us news that Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and
the victims
the leader of a peaceful democratic party known as the National League for Democracy,
is well and unharmed. The thoughts and prayers of free people everywhere have been were
with her these past two weeks. Our fears for her current state of health are now somewhat peaceful and
lessened. defenceless.”
On May 30, her motorcade was attacked by thugs, and then the thugs who run the
Burmese government placed her under “protective custody.” We can take comfort in
the fact that she is well. Unfortunately, the larger process that Ambassador Razali and
Aung San Suu Kyi have been pursuing – to restore democracy in Burma — is failing
despite their good will and sincere efforts. It is time to reassess our policy toward a
military dictatorship that has repeatedly attacked democracy and jailed its heroes.
There is little doubt on the facts. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party won an election in 1990 and
since then has been denied its place in Burmese politics. Her party has continued to
pursue a peaceful path, despite personal hardships and lengthy periods of house arrest
or imprisonment for her and her followers. Hundreds of her supporters remain in prison,
despite some initial releases and promises by the junta to release more. The party’s
Offices have been closed and their supporters persecuted. Ambassador Razali has
pursued every possible opening and worked earnestly to help Burma make a peaceful
transition to democracy. Despite initial statements last year, the junta — which shamelessly
calls itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) — has now refused his
efforts and betrayed its own promises.
At the end of last month, this rejection manifested itself in violence. After the May 30
attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s convoy, we sent U.S. Embassy officers to the scene to
gather information. They reported back that the attack was planned in advance. A series
of trucks followed her convoy to a remote location, blocked it and then unloaded thugs
to swarm with fury over the cars of democracy supporters. The attackers were brutal
and organized; the victims were peaceful and defenseless. The explanation by the Burmese
military junta of what happened doesn’t hold water. The SPDC has not made a credible
report of how many people were killed and injured. It was clear to our embassy officers
that the members of the junta were responsible for directing and producing this staged
riot.
We have called for a full accounting of what happened that day. We have called for Aung
San Suu Kyi to be released from confinement of any kind. We have called for the

release of the other leaders of the National League for Democracy who were jailed by
the SPDC before and after the attack. We have called for the offices of the National
League for Democracy to be allowed to reopen. We are in touch with other governments
who are Concerned about the fate of democracy’s leader and the fate of democracy in
Burma to encourage them, too, to pressure the SPDC.
The Bush administration agrees with members of Congress, including Sen. Mitch
McConnell, who has been a leading advocate of democracy in Burma, that the time has
come to turn up the pressure on the SPDC.
Here’s what we’ve done so far. The State Department has already extended our visa
restrictions to include all officials of an organization related to the junta — the Union
Solidarity and Development Association – and the managers of state-run enterprises so
that they and their families can be banned as well.
The United States already uses our voice and our vote against loans to Burma from the
World Bank and other international financial institutions. The State Department reports
honestly and frankly on the crimes of the SPDC in our reports on Human Rights, Trafficking
in Persons, Drugs, andInternational Religious Freedom. In all these areas, the junta gets
a failing grade. We also speak out frequently and strongly in favor of the National League
for Democracy, and against the SPDC. I will press the case in Cambodia next week
when I meet with the leaders of Southeast Asia, despite their traditional reticence to
confront a member and neighbor of their association, known as Asean.
Mr. McConnell has introduced the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act in the Senate;
Reps. Henry Hyde and Tom Lantos have introduced a similar bill in the House. We
support the goals and intent of the bills and are working with the sponsors on an
appropriate set of new steps. Those who follow this issue will know that our support for
legislation is in fact a change in the position of this administration and previous ones as
well. Simply put, the attack on Ms. Suu Kyi’s convoy and the utter failure of the junta to
accept efforts at peaceful change cannot be the last word on the matter. The junta that
oppresses democracy inside Burma must find that its actions will not be allowed to
stand.
There are a number of measures that should now be taken, many of them in the proposed
legislation. It’s time to freeze the financial assets of the SPDC. It’s time to ban remittances
to Burma so that the SPDC cannot benefit from the foreign exchange. With legislation,
we can, and should, place restrictions on travel-related transactions that benefit the
SPDC and its supporters. We also should further limit commerce with Burma that enriches
the junta’s generals. Of course, we would need to ensure consistency with our World
Trade Organization and other international obligations. Any legislation will need to be
carefully crafted to take into account our WTO obligations and the president’s need for
waiver authority, but we should act now.
By attacking Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters, the Burmese junta has finally and
definitively rejected the efforts of the outside world to bring Burma back into the
international community. Indeed, their refusal of the work of Ambassador Razali and of

the rights of Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters could not be clearer. Our response
must be equally clear if the thugs who now rule Burma are to understand that their failure
to restore democracy will only bring more and more pressure against them and their
supporters.
Mr. Powell is Secretary of State of the United States.
US State Department
The State Department released a statement on the birthday of Burmese
democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi on June 19 calling for her immediate
release and urging the military junta to provide “a full accounting of the
dead, injured, and missing from the attack of May 30” on Suu Kyi and
many of her supporters.
“The continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, members of her political
party and others who have peacefully expressed their political views, is
without cause and unacceptable,” the statement reads. “They should be
released immediately and the offices of the National League for Democracy
should be reopened without delay. We call on Burma’s military rulers to
begin work immediately with the National League of Democracy to formulate
a concrete plan to restore democracy in Burma.”
The following is the text of the statement:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Office of the Spokesman, 19 June

2003STATEMENT BY PHILIP T. REEKER, DEPUTY SPOKESMAN
Burma - Birthday of Aung San Suu Kyi
Today is the birthday of the leader of the democratic opposition in Burma,

Aung San Suu Kyi. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has sent his personal
greetings, but our embassy has been unable to deliver them to her this
year because, sadly, this is the seventh birthday since 1989 that she has
spent under detention by her country’s military rulers. A Nobel Peace Prize
laureate who stands for nonviolent change to improve the lives of the
people of her nation, Aung San Suu Kyi is a symbol for those who support
democracy and freedom around the world. Her struggle on behalf of the
people of Burma is now in its 15th year.
Last year at this time Aung San Suu Kyi had recently been released from
house arrest and was working toward a political dialogue which would
lead to national reconciliation. The ruling military junta, the “State Peace
and Development Council,” has now dashed these hopes and dreams of
the Burmese people.
The continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, members of her political
party and others who have peacefully expressed their political views, is
without cause and unacceptable. They should be released immediately

and the offices of the National League for Democracy should be reopened
without delay. We call on Burma’s military rulers to begin work immediately
with the National League of Democracy to formulate a concrete plan to
restore democracy in Burma.
We also call on the junta for a full accounting of the dead, injured, and
missing from the attack of May 30, now known to Burmese as “Black
Friday.”
The situation in Burma is of grave concern not just for the United States.
Secretary Powell met with Burma’s neighbors this week to emphasize that
the international community must work together for reform. We welcome
the statement of the ASEAN member states on Burma and support ASEAN’s
plans to send a troika delegation to Rangoon.
We salute Aung San Suu Kyi and hope that future birthdays find her living
free in a free Burma.
U.S. Reports Signs of Deliberate Attack on Burmese Activist’s

Motorcade
(5 June State Department news release)
U.S. officials have found indications that a motorcade carrying Burmese
democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi on May 30 was hit in a “premeditated
ambush,” and that the individuals carrying out the assault on her group
were affiliated with Burma’s ruling authority, according to a June 5 statement
by Deputy State Department Spokesman, Philip Reeker.
“We call on the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in
Burma to provide a full accounting of the dead, injured, and missing,”
Reeker said.
He termed as “outrageous and unacceptable” the continued detention in

isolation of Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of her political party.
“We call on the SPDC to release them immediately, and to provide all
necessary medical attention to those who have been injured, including
assistance from international specialists,” Reeker said.
Following is the text of Reeker’s June 5 statement on the May 30 ambush

of Aung San Suu Kyi:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Office of the Spokesman, 5 June 2003
STATEMENT BY PHILIP T. REEKER, DEPUTY SPOKESMAN
Burma - Ambush on Aung San Suu Kyi
Officials from the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon have returned from a visit
to the site of the May 30 violent attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her

traveling party. Their findings indicate that there was a premeditated
ambush on Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. Circumstances and reports
from individuals in the region indicate that the attack was conducted by
government-affiliated thugs. The debris remaining at the scene suggests
a major clash, which could easily have resulted in serious injuries to
large numbers of people.
We call on the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in

Burma to provide a full accounting of the dead, injured, and missing.
The continued detention in isolation of Aung San Suu Kyi and other
members of her political party is outrageous and unacceptable. We call
on the SPDC to release them immediately, and to provide all necessary
medical attention to those who have been injured, including assistance
from international specialists. The offices of the National League for
Democracy closed by the SPDC should be reopened without delay and
their activities no longer proscribed.
United Nations Special Envoy Razali Ismail will be visiting Burma on

June 6. The U.S. fully supports his efforts. He must be allowed to see
Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders. If Amb. Razali is not
able to meet privately with Aung San Suu Kyi, the U.S. will need to
evaluate the utility of this U.N.-sponsored effort to support national
reconciliation in Burma.
U.S. Condemns Burmese Government’s Detention of Suu Kyi

(State Department 2 June statement)
Following is the text of a statement released by the Department of State
on June 2 on the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and the closing of the
National League for Democracy’s offices in Burma:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Office of the Spokesman, 2 June 2003
STATEMENT BY PHILIP T. REEKER, DEPUTY SPOKESMAN
Burma - Detention of Aung San Suu Kyi
The United States condemns placing National League for Democracy

leader Aung San Suu Kyi in any sort of custody. The recent detention of
Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior leaders of her party marks a
significant step back for the military regime in Rangoon and for the
people of Burma. The closing of the offices of the National League for
Democracy across the country hinders national reconciliation and a
peaceful transition to democracy and is inconsistent with the will and
rights of the Burmese people.
We call on the regime for the immediate release of these officials and the
reopening of their offices. A government that does not allow peaceful

political expression or an atmosphere in which citizens can peacefully
express their views cannot be counted as a responsible member of the
international community. The United States, in coordination with other
concerned members of the international community, including members
of the United Nations Security Council, is considering all measures
available in our efforts to foster this transition to democracy.
We also continue to support the efforts of United Nations Special Envoy

Tan Sri Razali Ismail to meet with all parties in Burma to encourage
national reconciliation. We urge the regime to provide the conditions that
will allow for a successful visit this week. Officials at the highest levels of
the military regime should meet with him and take advantage of this
visit to reverse this recent setback and make substantial progress on the
road to a better future for the people of Burma.
Endnotes
106
Unofficial translation of Thakin Thein Pe’s interview with RFA on 21 June 2003.
107
Unofficial translation of Ludu Daw Ahmar’s interview with RFA on 25 June 2003.
108
Unofficial translation of U Htein Lin’s interview with RFA on 9 June 2003.
109
KMT stands for Kuomintang, the Nationalist Chinese army that invaded Burma and
remained until a Burmese army offensive drove them out in 1961.
110
Unofficial translation.
111
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
113
Ibid.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.

Chapter (7)
Statements and Pleas from
the Ad hoc Commission on
the Depayin Massacre
The Commission’s Explanation and Plea to the People of

Burma and the International Community on the Three-Month
Anniversary of the Depayin Massacre:
1. Today marks the three-month anniversary of the Depayin Massacre.

During the time since the formation of the Ad hoc Commission on the
Depayin Massacre on 25 June 2003, we have been able to smuggle out
eight eyewitnesses, who themselves were victims present at the massacre,
to the liberated areas of Burma. Subsequently, the Commission has
systematically recorded their testimonies. The Commission has also received
two more affidavits that were sent directly from witnesses inside Burma.
The Commission has exposed the scheme and events of the massacre
to the world through the Senate of Thailand. Similar activities are being
organized so that witnesses can testify in the parliaments and congresses
of other countries.
Likewise, the Commission has been in contact with international

human rights organizations and tried to solicit cooperation from them in
its endeavors to expose the events of the May massacre. The Commission
has also been garnering support and sympathy from academics and groups
that have been instrumental in establishing an international court for trying
war crimes.
2. In its endeavors to convince the UN Security Council to take up

the Depayin case, on the grounds that the Depayin Massacre is a crime
against humanity and that the nature of the massacre transcends national
borders, the Commission has continually submitted letters and appeals to
the UN Secretary General. Letters were also sent to the leaders of the
various countries to achieve this end.

On 4 July 2003, the first preliminary report in English was submitted.
Using the information, evidence and testimonies that the Commission has
in its possession, and will continue to receive in the future, it plans to
publish the preliminary report, complete with an analysis, in Burmese in
September.
This is merely an explanation to the public so that they are kept

informed of the work of the Commission thus far. We would not have been
able to achieve this much without the assistance of the victims, political
leaders and organizations, as well as news organizations and radio stations,
which have cooperated with us in exposing the truth surrounding the
massacre. We express our gratitude to all those mentioned above.
3. The Burmese military junta maintains their explanation, presented

the day after the massacre, that the event was the result of a scuffle
between the supporters of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her opponents. To
this day, it has continued to stick to its statement. The Commission has
become aware that some journalists are also using this same statement to
describe the massacre.
However, the Commission wishes to explain, based on a thorough

analysis of the information, evidence and affidavits from the victims, that
the Depayin case was not a riot that took place between one group and
another, but instead a full-scale massacre. Nor was it an ordinary case of
murder. Instead, it was an organized crime that was committed in a pre-
mediated fashion. The Depayin incident not only terrorized the victims,
but also all of the people of Burma. The repercussions of this case have
been so intense it should be considered a ‘crime against humanity.’
4. At the beginning of the Commission’s investigation, after it had

received the depositions of four eyewitnesses, it learnt that there were
about 4,000-5,000 people involved in the crime and that they were
members of the USDA. The testimonies revealed that there were some
1,000 USDA members behind the motorcade of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
and the NLD, and another 3,000-4,000 who were lying in wait for the
NLD. However, the eyewitnesses could not establish who exactly was
responsible for mobilizing such a large number of attackers and planning
such an attack. By studying the use of radio communication sets and
encoded words, all that could be surmised was that the attack was carried
out by USDA members under the supervision of an armed organization.
However, according to new testimonies by newly arrived eyewitnesses in
August, there were a large number of soldiers and police under the
command of an army officer with the rank of major at the spot now
known as the second killing filed. The new testimonies revealed that these
armed security forces were directing the 4,000-5,000 people who were
lying in wait for the attack. Based on these affidavits, it has become very

clear that the SPDC was behind the planning and execution of the attack
against the NLD motorcade.
5. Based on the testimonies of the majority of eyewitnesses, the

Commission has had the opportunity to study the attempts and activities
conducted by the SPDC in order to cover up the crime, seemingly so
impossible to conceal. Following is some of the evidence of such activities:
· Cleaning up and removal of blood that had

stained the road, as a result of the massacre,
overnight.
· Removal and destruction of the victims’ corpses,

overnight.
· Rearrangement of the crime scene. Vehicles that

had been destroyed in the melee were re-
arranged and photographs were then taken in
such a way that they backed up the SPDC’s
assertions.
· Victims who were unable to escape, due to

injuries, were sent to prisons instead of hospitals
for treatment.
· Potential eyewitnesses from and around the

village of Kyi were forcibly relocated to other
villages following the incident
· Prisoners were released only after they had

signed a legal agreement stating that they would
not discuss the events surrounding the
massacre.
· Burma’s Foreign Minister, U Win Aung, was sent

to Asean countries with photographs of the re-
arranged crime scene in order to support the
SPDC’s claim that nothing of importance had
happened.
· SPDC summoned the ceasefire groups and gave

a similar explanation to them.
Meanwhile, the junta acted as though it would initiate some sort of

political reform and cooperate with the international community, due to
mounting international pressure. However, these were merely part of the
junta’s ruses to re-direct the attention of the country, as well as that of the

international community, so that over time the Depayin Massacre would
be forgotten, without a proper investigation into the incident and the
revealing of subsequent evidence.
6. The Depayin Massacre was a brutal crime perpetrated against

the leaders of the political party that won the elections in May 1990 and
their supporters. Reconciliation between the Burmese junta and the NLD
will remain a mere fantasy, as long as the truth surrounding the events of
the massacre and the prosecution of those responsible for the attack
remains unresolved.
In order for the SPDC to continue its project to eliminate Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and the NLD and to suppress information regarding the Depayin
Massacre, the junta has been trying to persuade ethnic groups into its
fold. By giving political incentives and claiming that it would open up
negotiations, through discussions with ethnic groups and their leaders,
the junta is using delay tactics so that demands for uncovering the truth
surrounding the massacre fade away. The Commission has previously
observed the Burmese junta’s general tendency to use such tactics.
7. The Depayin Massacre is no longer a case that concerns the NLD

and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi alone. It has become a brutal act that concerns
the entire nation. If innocent people, including an internationally-acclaimed
person such as the Nobel Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, were blatantly
attacked, and if no existing organization in the world is able to take action
against the junta and it continues to be exempt from persecution, the
Burmese junta will be even more emboldened in the future to commit any
crime against anyone at any given time and place. Therefore, uncovering
the truth about the events surrounding the massacre has become a pre-
condition to the process of negotiations between the SPDC and the NLD,
which may pave the way for eventual reconciliation and democratization
in Burma.
8. The Commission has tried its level best to solicit cooperation

from pro-democracy activists, human rights groups and news organizations.
However, the success of such actions has not yet been satisfactory. The
Commission needs further cooperation from the public, overseas Burmese,
pro-democracy groups and ethnic nationalities. The work of the Commission
will be more meaningful and complete in its attempts at uncovering the
truth concerning the Depayin Massacre only when it receives more
information, evidence and testimonies from eyewitnesses. Only then may
the Commission be able to find ways to convince the international
community to take action, including the possible adoption of a Depayin
agenda at the UN Security Council.
9. The Commission would like to call on the people of Burma and the
international community to carry out the following:

a) Victims and family members of those missing as a
result of the massacre are urged to bravely report
the disappearances of their loved ones to the police.
We also urge lawyers and legal organizations to
provide necessary assistance to the families of the
missing. In addition, we would like to call on all
those who may be involved in such legal actions
to inform media organizations, before or after the
missing cases are reported to the police.
b) Those who dare not report the case to the police

or courts are requested to send their detailed
affidavits to the Commission. Those eyewitnesses
who may have vital information regarding the
massacre may be asked by the Commission to
speak to various foreign missions and international
organizations, legal organizations or to testify in
front of parliaments or congresses around the
world.
c) Those who neither dare to report the case to the

police nor work with the Commission in uncovering
the truth concerning the massacre for various
reasons are requested to contact various foreign
embassies and international legal organizations
based inside Burma. They can send their
testimonies to the Commission, complete with
photographs and signed statements purporting to
be genuine in the presence of personnel from such
organizations.
d) The victims and witnesses whom are unable to

carry out the above-mentioned requests are
encouraged to speak to the broadcast media,
especially the radio, so that their testimonies may
be broadcast.
e) We urge the people of Burma to search for evidence

such as photographs, video, documents and
another other evidential materials concerning the
massacre and send them to the Commission. We
urge that all kinds of avenues and methods be
used to achieve this goal.
f) All academics, activists, legal and human rights

organizations, governments, leaders, NGOs, civil
society and political organizations that are based

both within and outside the country, who cherish
truth and hope that the truth about the Depayin
Massacre is uncovered, are urged to write the UN
Secretary General. This is aimed at urging the UN
to send an investigation commission from the UN
Security Council to Burma with the purpose of
looking into the killings that occurred at the Depayin
Massacre. Eventually, in this manner, the
Commission hopes that the Depayin case will be
tried in accordance with the international laws.

30 August 2003
4 Waxing Moon of Tawthalin, B.E 1365
For more information please contact U Aung Htoo, Coordinator of the

Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre
Plea to the People of Burma Concerning the Visit

of UN Special Human Rights Investigator for Burma
Mr. Pinheiro:
1. Now more than five months have elapsed since the Depayin
Massacre on 30 May. So far the Burmese junta has failed not only to
uncover the truth concerning the massacre and take against those
responsible, but also failed in forming a commission to investigate this
incident. The Burmese regime ended the attack around midnight on 30
May. However, the Burmese junta held a press conference, using information
that is believed to have been prepared in advance, the following afternoon;
a mere sixteen hours after the massacre occurred.
Since that time there has been no progress whatsoever regarding

the case. All that the Burmese regime has done is continue to give the
same explanation to the nation and the world, which it gave to the media
on 31 May. This is clear evidence that the regime has ignored the sufferings
of and requests for justice from the victims and their families. It can also
be construed as the blatant destruction of the basis of authority and
prevalence of law and order that guarantees and protects freedom, stability
and peace for human kind.
2. The Depayin Massacre is enormously horrifying precisely because

the State authorities committed state terrorism by using the existing state
apparatus. It is certain, from this point on, that the Burmese junta will

brutally suppress anyone who defies its rule or disrupts its plans to hold
onto power. This certainty will remain the case, so long as the authorities
refuse to take appropriate actions against those who are responsible for
the murders at Depayin. Therefore, it has become the duty of each and
everyone one of us to let the world know the truth concerning the massacre
and bring the culprits to justice, so that no similar massacre is repeated in
human society.
3. The Commission has recorded evidence with the thanks of the

UNLD, Members of Parliament, NLD members and leaders who have called
for the formation of an independent commission under the auspices of the
UN. However, at the same time, the Commission would like to point out
the more needs to be done. Although the massacre involved roughly
5,000 people and is considered to be of a particularly heinous nature
because of the loss of so many lives, the Commission has found that the
response from the public, as well as political parties and human rights
organizations, regarding the massacre has not been adequate.
Therefore, we would like to call on you, the people of Burma, to

carry out the following during the weeklong visit of Professor Pinheiro to
Burma to investigate the human rights situation in the country.
a) Send all information you may have to Professor

Pinheiro by using all available methods, so that he
can report his complete findings concerning the
massacre to the UN General Assembly on 12
November.
b) Write, via Professor Pinheiro, to the UN Secretary

General so that the UN Security Council can send
an independent investigation commission to Burma
by using the powers of the council.
c) Write or speak to the media, especially the radio,

so that you may tell the people of Burma about
yourself and your organization’s efforts to uncover
the truth concerning the massacre.

1 November 2003
For more information please contact U Aung Htoo, Coordinator.

Explanation and Plea of the Ad hoc Commission on
the Depayin Massacre to the People of Burma on the
Sixth-Month Anniversary of the Massacre:
1. Upon his return from his investigative mission to Burma, UN

Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma, Professor Pinheiro,
submitted his report to the Third Committee of the 58th UN General
Assembly on 12 November 2003. In the report, he called for a need to
conduct an independent inquiry regarding the Depayin Massacre. In his
concluding remarks, he said, “I can say that there is prima facie evidence
that the Depayin incident could not have happened without the convenience
of the State agents.”
2. The Commission’s investigation has revealed that, “The Depayin

Massacre is a pre-mediated crime against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD
members and other officials who accompanied with intent to kill and
eliminate the party once and for all.” This is evident due to the following
facts:
· Militia training sessions were given to prior to

the massacre.
· Careful selection of weapons (in order to

conceal the fact that it was pre-mediated).
· Systematic and careful selection of time and

place to commit the crime.
· The use of a command and control system that

is only used by armed forces.
· Systematic mobilization of some 5,000 people

to commit the crime.
· Detention of the wounded and witnesses after

the massacre.
· Re-arrangement of the crime scene and

destruction of evidential materials.
· Supervision of the attacks by an army major

and a policy chief at a location closest to the
killing field.
These are the analyses of the Commission after careful examination

of news, information and testimonies given by witnesses. In addition, the

Commission will publish a second preliminary report in order to provide
more information and analyses to the people of Burma and beyond.
3. Although the number of deaths and injuries sustained by the

people at the Depayin Massacre did not reach the magnitude of those in
Rwanda or Yugoslavia, the Commission finds that the Depayin Massacre is
a “crime against humanity” due to the following facts:
a) The pre-meditated violence was unnecessary and

gross violations of human rights during peacetime
are as criminal, if not more so, as those committed
during armed conflict.
b) The second distinguishing feature of a crime

against humanity is that it is committed in a
planned, systematic manner, insofar as it is directed
against a specific ‘civilian population’ and not
merely random individuals.
c) For it to be considered a crime against humanity,

it must be demonstrated that the perpetrator
targeted the victims specifically based on their
social, political, racial, religious or other affiliation.
d) The incident was executed in order to intimidate

the entire ‘civilian population.’
4. No matter how much is agreed upon politically between dictatorial

regimes and pro-democracy groups in countries that transform from
dictatorship to democracy through negotiated settlement, and regardless
if the culprits are pardoned domestically, those who commit the following
crimes, according to international law, can never be absolved of
responsibility; they must be held accountable for their crimes.
· Genocide
· Convention against torture
· Crimes against humanity
· War crimes
Recent instructions that the UN has given to Sierra Leone (regarding

crimes committed during the civil war) attest to the fact that criminals who
commit the above-mentioned crimes can in fact be tried internationally.

5. All efforts to bring justice to the victims of the Depayin Massacre
and prosecute those who are responsible for the crime are being exerted
in order to:
· Prevent further heinous crimes,
· Seek justice for the victims, and
· Seek institutional reform so that Burma

may adopt a governance mechanism
that guarantees peace, stability, freedom
and justice in the future.
6. Based on the above-mentioned points, the Ad hoc Commission

on the Depayin Massacre would like to call on the people of Burma and the
international community to carry out the following:
a) All political and ethnic leaders, and their

organizations along with various political forces,
are urged to work toward the formation of an
independent commission under the auspices of the
UN Security Council.
b) Collect more information and evidential materials

and search for eyewitnesses whose testimonies will
provide better verification, so that all of this
information can be submitted to the UN
systematically. In order to achieve this end the
victims, witnesses, people present at the time of
the crime, NLD leaders at all levels, Members of
Parliament, international law experts and
international organizations based within and
outside the country and those who are actively
participating in the efforts to bring about justice
concerning the massacre are urged to work
together with news organizations and disseminate
information pertaining to the Depayin Massacre.
c) Efforts should be made within national and

international networks to form a “Depayin
Campaign Committee” which will work until the
UN forms an independent commission to
investigate the massacre and prosecute those who
are responsible for the crime.
-The Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre

30 November 2003

Chapter (8)
Authorities’ involvement in the massacre
Please Note: This chapter contains new information and has been added to the English
version. the orginal Burmese version of this publication did not include Chapter (8)
The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) held a press conference
at 4:00 pm on 31 May 2003, regarding the attack on 30 May near Depayin
Township. The press conference took place merely 16 hours after the
attack.
At the press conference, Tin Winn, Minister for Labor and Chairperson of
the Public Relations and Information Committee, claimed the incident was
a clash between supporters and opponents of Aung San Suu Kyi and the
National League for Democracy (NLD). He explained that the two sides
started to clash after the cars in Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade rushed
from the crowd.
His explanation included details about Aung San Suu Kyi’s trips around
Burma. He said that Aung San Suu Kyi visited Thamanya Hill, Mon State,
from 11 June to 15 June in 2002. In truth, she visited there to pay respect
to Badanta Wenia, the monk at Thamanya Hill, on 14 June 2002 and left
the next day. Tin Win said that the trip took five days. His facts and
explanations are therefore unreliable.
On 3 June 2003, Khin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Foreign

Affairs, invited foreign diplomats in order to explain the events of 30 May
to them.
On 26 March 2004, U Mya Than, Burma’s Permanent

Representative to United Nations, presented a statement at the 60th session
of the Commission on Human Rights. He presented the following
information:
· The 30 May event was an accident.
· “Government security officials advised NLD members that

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members should not
venture on a trip to the area near Depayin, as there was

no police or military presence and that their safety could
not be assured. Against this advice, Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi and the NLD members went to that particular area.”
Therefore, claiming that it is was an ‘accident’ the
government had tried to prevent.
· There was no premeditation on the part of the

government.
· The event occurred when Aung San Suu Kyi made a

second trip to the Shwebo region, after her visit to the
same area a few days earlier.
The Commission (AHCDM) claims responsibility for the explanation

of what actually occurreded on 30 May, based on the affidavits of
eyewitnesses, data, and documents the Commission had received and is
in its possession.
According to the true facts and evidence:
On the morning of 30 May 2003, the chairperson of the 1990

Multi-party Democracy General Election Commission at Depayin Township,
gave permission to the NLD to install an NLD sign at the township NLD
office and found a township NLD Youth Wing.
At about 2:00 am, the chairperson of the Depayin Township Peace

and Development Council issued a curfew that stated that villagers from
the village of Ywa Thit could not leave their homes (Ywa Thit is close to
the massacre area).
After the massacre on 1 June, authorities sealed off the house of

Maung Maung in Depayin Township. As a result, he and his family members
had to rent a house to stay at. The NLD had had a plan to install an NLD
sign in his house, in order to run the township NLD branch office.
On 30 May at about 5:00 pm, a few hours before the massacre,

the phone lines of the following places and persons were cut off:
· NLD Headquarters in Rangoon
· NLD leaders including U Lwin, spokesperson of NLD
· Officers from the NLD Headquarters in Rangoon
The massacre took place in the area of Paya Htwet Village (located
in Kyi Village group) and Ywa Thit Village (located in Yin Tway Village

group) in Depayin Township, an area under the control of Military
Intelligence Unit 20.
The Irrigation Department compound, in front of Ywa Thit Village,

was created as a base camp and control camp for the attack. During the
massacre, the following persons were present at the compound:
· Lt. Col Than Han, chairperson of the Shwe Bo

District Peace and Development Council
· Tin Ohn, chairperson of the Depayin Township

Peace and Development Council
· Thaung Win, Township Police Commander, Depayin

Township Police Department
· Sein Win, police officer, Depayin Township Police

Department
Lt. Col Than Han
Four NLD members on two motorbikes left the NLD motorcade in

order to check security conditions. They were: Bo Maung (elected MP of
Depayin Constituency-1), Than Zaw Win (Ta Nel Village), Than Tun (Taung
Pyin Quarter) and San Myint (Pincy Village).
Tin Ohn, chairperson of the Depayin Township Peace and

Development Council, stopped them as they neared Ywa Thit Village.
Township Police Commander, Thaung Win, then detained them.
A white Sunny pick up (license # Da/801) that had left the NLD
motorcade in order to check the security conditions was forced to stop as
it reached the three rolls of barbed wire barricades in front of the Irrigation
Department. Lt. Col. Than Han, chairperson of the Shwe Bo District Peace
and Development Council, ordered security personnel to detain the three
people inside of the car. They were: Aung Aung, Naing Naing and Myo
Min. When they were sent into the Irrigation Department compound, they
met about 15 persons who had been detained earlier. Villagers from Ta
Nel Village and policemen, led by police officer Sein Win, guarded detainees.
Those villagers were holding sticks, and brandishing them as weapons. As
Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade headed towards Ywa Thit Village, the
detainees were put into a Dyna truck in the Irrigation Department
compound. They were then handcuffed and fastened two by two.
On 25 May 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade was disturbed

when it reached Kyi Tauk Pauk Village, Singu Township, in Pyin Oo Lwin
District. Swe Win and Myint Ngwe, of the local USDA, and Myint Lwin and
Aung Myint, of the Village and Quarters Peace and Development Council,

led the disturbances. The protestors forcefully drove into the people
welcoming Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage, using loud speakers
fixed to Dyna trucks (license # 2 Kha/4363, 5 Ka/1899, and 2 Ka/3726)
and Hilux pickup trucks (license # 7 Ka/6643 and Ba/7358). Lt. Col. Than
Han, chairperson of the Shwe Bo District Peace and Development Council,
closely supervised the protestors.
The head of Shwe Bo District, Sagaing Division traveled to Pyin Oo

Lwin District, Mandalay Division in order to participate in the disturbances
against Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members. It’s clear that he could not
have done this without orders from his superiors.
Compared to the above-mentioned facts, the words of U Mya Than,

Burma’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, ring hollow. On
26 March 2004, at the 60th session of the Commission on Human Rights,
he claimed that there were no police or military in the area of the 30 May
event.
Before Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade had reached Ywa Thit Village,
the authorities, led by Tin Ohn, chairperson of Depayin Township Peace
and Development Council, blocked the road in advance. They blocked the
road using barbed wire and Dyna trucks.
The authorities also used numerous people in order to block the

road.
Policemen, USDA members, and members of Pyithu Swan-ar Shin

gathered in Shwe Bo district. Policemen, firemen, USDA members,
members of Pyithu Swan-ar Shin, Cooperative Department staff,
Immigration Department staff and Public Relations and Information
Department staff were collected and placed on the side of the road in
order to block the road and attack Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade.
Criminals facing long term imprisonment, imposter monks, USDA

members and members of Pyithu Swan-ar Shin were also gathered in
Monywa District. They travelled in vehicles behind Aung San Suu Kyi’s
motorcade. When they reached Kyi Village, they brutally attacked a monk
among the villagers waiting for the motorcade. The monk was injured and
fell down. The clash then followed between local villagers and the thugs.
One of their vehicles was burnt and destroyed.
After the massacre, Rev. Weamala and Rev. Zawana, two monks
from Kyi Village, were arrested and sentenced to 9 years and 3 months
imprisonment each after was accused of burning the vehicles. Villagers
from Kyi, such as Kyi Nyo, Set Ngwe, Khin Maung Lwin and Htike Min were
accused of assisting the destruction of the vehicles. As a result, the authorities
gave them 7 years imprisonment each.

While the car was burning, Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade continued
to move toward Ywa Thit Village. There is a small bridge between Ywa
Thit Village and Kyi Village. The roadside attackers were lying in wait for
the motorcade between a small village and Ywa Thit Village. Policemen
supervised them. When the motorcade reached the bridge, the lights
installed in advance were turned on and the thugs started to attack at
approximately 7:00 pm. The following persons ordered the thugs to attack:
· Tin Ohn, chairperson of the Depayin Township

Peace and Development Council
· Mya Win, member No. 1 of the Myoma Quarter

Peace and Development Council, Depayin
Township
· Soe Tint, of the Taung Pyin Quarter, Depayin

Township
· Phoe Swe, member of the USDA, Depayin

Township branch
Thaung Win, Township Police Commander,

spiked liquor and soft drinks given to the attackers
with illicit drugs, namely methamphetamines. He
asked Mya Win, member No. 1 of the Myoma
Quarter Peace and Development Council, to provide
the illicit drugs.
While Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade was

under attack, over 100 people from Mae The Village
were demonstrating against the brutal attack on
the NLD motorcade. The demonstration took place
four furlongs (1/2 mile) away from Ywa Thit Village.
They demonstrated all night long, shouting, “Long
live Aung San Suu Kyi!” “Long live Tin Oo!” and
“We don’t want USDA!” The authorities shot in the direction of the Photograph taken
demonstration, however no one was injured. of attackers, 5 days
earlier on 25 May,
who appear
No. 2 police check point is currently being run out of the extremly
IrrigationDepartment compound, which was used as a base camp for the intoxicated.
massacre.
On the afternoon of 30 May, soldiers stopped monks, students

and local people who were trying to follow the NLD motorcade in Monywa
City. As a result, there was unrest between the soldiers and NLD
sympathizers at the Obo Taung Area. During the unrest, a novice and Min

Zaw Oo, a student from Monywa Technology College, were killed. Monks
carried the dead body of the student to the downtown area. When they
reached the General Aung San Memorial Statue at about 7:00 pm, the
soldiers looted the dead body, broke up the crowd, and warned the public
to stay away from that area. Chan Tha Kyaw, a 16-year old student who
witnessed the conflict, was also arrested. He was sent to Nget Aul San
Juvenile Camp, as he is a minor. He was released on 26 February 2004
because the international community demanded his freedom. However,
18 other people arrested during the struggle are facing long-term
imprisonment.
It’s clear that the authorities blocked NLD sympathizers in Monywa

City because they had already planned to assassinate Aung San Suu Kyi
and NLD members.
Aung San Suu Kyi was stopped at the entrance of Ye Oo Township.

Authorities then took her to the Ye Oo Police Department. She was detained
there until female police officers forcefully placed her in a car at 1:00 am
on 31 May. After the car left the police department, it stopped twice along
the way; once at the ‘No. 6’ guesthouse of the Tank Brigade compound,
and also at the guesthouse in the military compound of Min Bu Township.
On 21 June at 8:20 pm, Aung San Suu Kyi reached Insein Prison in
Rangoon. She was put into a small building in the Insein Prison compound
until June 24. She was then moved to ‘Ye Khaung’ guesthouse, Ye Mon
garrison. On 16 September, she was sent to Royal Asia private hospital, as
she required medical treatment. She left the hospital on 26 September
and has been held under house arrest ever since.
Until now, the authorities haven’t taken any action against the
perpetrators of the 30 May Massacre. Instead, those victims who were
brutally attacked have been blamed. Tin Oo, vice chairperson of the NLD,
Aung San Suu Kyi, general secretary of NLD, NLD members, monks,
students and local people were all attacked and arrested. It’s evident that
the authorities themselves participated in the massacre, although they
deny this assertion. Were their claim to be true, they would not have
refused the founding of an independence investigative commission on the
massacre.
(Remark: The list of Union Solidarity and Development Association Central Executive
Committee members is attached as follows. They are responsible for the local
authorities and USDA members’ participation in the massacre.)

Members of USDA Central Executive Committee and
authorities responsible for security in the area of the massacre
on 30 May 2003, Depayin Township, Shwe Bo District, Sagaing
Division
(Remark: The positions of military leaders and authorities

were changed soon after the massacre)
UNION SOLIDARITY AND Development ASSOCIATION

(Central Executive Committee)
Patron
Senior General Than Shwe (BC No. 6710), Chairperson of the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services
Members of the Panel of the Patrons
Vice-Senior General Maung Aye (BC No. 7875)

Vice Chairperson of SPDC, Deputy Commander in Chief of Defence
Services, Commander-in-Chief (Army)
General Khin Nyunt (BC No. 8468)

Secretary-1 of SPDC
Lt-Gen Soe Win (BC No. 1171500)

Secretary-2 of SPDC
Lt-Gen Thein Sein (BC No. 11252)

Adjutant-General
Lt-Gen Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo (BC No. 11701)

Quartermaster-General
Lt-Gen Kyaw Win (BC No. 10194)

Chief of Armed Forces Training
Lt-Gen Thura Shwe Mann (BC No. 11534)

Member of SPDC
Lt-Gen Maung Bo (BC No. 10337)

Member of SPDC
Lt-Gen Khin Maung Than (BC No.10320)

Member of SPDC
Lt-Gen Ye Myint (BC No.10310)

Member of SPDC

Lt-Gen Aung Htwe(BC No.9752)
Member of SPDC
Lt-Gen Tin Aye (BC No.11236)

Member of SPDC
Vice-Admiral Kyi Min

Commander-in-Chief (Navy)
Maj-Gen Myat Hein

Commander-in-Chief (Air)
Maj-Gen Soe Naing

Chairperson, Sagaing Division Peace and Development Council,
Commander, North West Command
Maj-Gen Thura Myint Aung

Chairperson, Mon State Peace and Development Council,
Commander, South-East Command
Maj-Gen Htay Oo
Chairperson, Irrawaddy Division Peace and Development Council,
Commander, South-West Command
Maj-Gen Ye Myint (BC No. 12607)

Chairperson, Mandalay Division Peace and Development Council,
Commander, Central Command
Maj-Gen Maung Maung Swe (BC No. 12829)

Chairperson, Kachin State Peace and Development Council,
Commander, Northern Command
Maj-Gen Myint Swe

Chairperson, Rangoon Division Peace and Development Council,
Commander, Rangoon Command
Maj-Gen Maung Oo
Chairperson, Arakan State Peace and Development Council,
Commander, Western Command
Maj-Gen Tha Aye

Chairperson, Tennasserim Division Peace and Development Council,
Commander, Coastal Region Command
Maj-Gen Ko Ko
Chairperson, Pegu Division Peace and Development Council,
Commander, Southern Command
Maj-Gen Khin Maung Myint

Chairperson, Shan State Peace and Development Council,
Commander, Eastern Command

Maj-Gen Khin Zaw (BC No. 13242)
Chairperson, Shan State (East) Peace and Development Council,
Commander, Triangle Region Command
Maj-Gen Myint Hlaing

Chairperson, Shan State (North) Peace and Development Council,
Commander, North-East Command
General Secretary
Than Aung
Minister, Ministry of Education
Secretaries
Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan (BC No. 11536)
Minister, Ministry of Information
Brig-Gen Thein Zaw (BC No. 12308)

Minister, Ministry of Telecommunications, Post and Telegraphs
Aung Thaung (BC No. 10307)

Minister, Ministry of Industry-1
Central Executive Committee Members
Brig-Gen Ohn Myint (BC No.11031)

Minister, Ministry of Mines
Col. Thein Nyunt (BC No. 11700)

Minister, Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National Races and
Development Affairs
Col. Maung Pa
Vice Chairperson, Rangoon City Development Committee
(In Charge, Rangoon Division area, USDA)
Brig-Pyi Sone
Minister, Ministry of Commerce
Pann Aung (BC No. 7482)

Minister, Ministry of Office of Prime Minister
Col. Tin Hlaing (BC No. 11073)

Minister, Ministry of Home Affairs
Than Sein (BC No. 7617)

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Information

Col. Theik Tun
Deputy Minister, Ministry of Forestry
Col. Thura Aye Myint (BC No. 11248)

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Sports
(In Charge, Sagaing Division area, USDA)
Col. Khin Maung (BC No. 10499)

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
Col. Aung Thein (BC No. 11364)

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Energy
Soe Tha
Minister, Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development
Brig-Gen Myint Maung

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Home Affairs
Brig-Gen Kyaw Win

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Industry-1
Brig-Gen Aung Thein Lin

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Industry-2
Brig-Gen Thura Aung Ko

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Religious Affairs
Brig-Gen Maung Maung Thein

Deputy Minister, Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries
Aung Khin
Minister, Ministry of Religious Affairs
Khin Maung Thein

Minister, Ministry of Finance and Revenue
Thaung
Minister, Ministry of Science and Technology
Ko Lay
Chairperson, Rangoon City Development Committee
Mayor of Rangoon City
Maj-Gen Tin Htut

Minister, Ministry of Electric Power

SAGAING DIVISION USDA
In Charge, Sagaing Division area

Col. Thura Aye Myint (BC No. 11248)
Deputy Minister, Ministry of Sports
Patron
Maj-Gen Soe Naing
Secretary
Moe Moe Tun
SAGAING DIVISION PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
Chairperson
Maj-Gen Soe Naing
Secretary
Lt-Col. Ye Htut
NORTH WEST COMMAND
Commander
Maj-Gen Soe Naing
Deputy Commander
Brig-Gen Soe Myint
SAGAING DIVISION POLICE FORCE
Division Commander
Police Col. Aung Htut

SHWE BO DISTRICT PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
Chairperson
Lt-Col Than Han
Secretary
Col. Thein Htut
MONYWA DISTRICT PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
Chairperson
Lt-Col Win Naung
Secretary
Col. Kyaw Yin
DEPAYIN TOWNSHIP PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
Chairperson
Tin Ohn
Secretary
Thet Htar Maung
DEPAYIN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT
Township Police Commander

Thaung Win
Police Department Officer

Sein Win

EIGHT TOWNSHIPS IN SHWE BO DISTIRCT, SAGAING DIVISION
1- Shwe Bo
2- Wet Let
3- Depayin
4- Tant Se
5- Ye Oo
6- Khin Oo
7- Kant Ba Lu
8- Kyung Hla
EIGHT TOWNSHIPS IN MONYWA DISTIRCT, SAGAING DIVISION
1- Monywa
2- Chaung Oo
3- Ka Ne
4- Budalin
5- Sar Lin Gyi
6- Yin Mar Pin
7- Pa Lae
8- Ah Yar Daw

List of Appendixes
(1) List of the wounded, missing, and dead 162
(2) Statements from the NLD 178
(3) Excerpt of Aung San Suu Kyi’s press conference on 180

Apr 23, 2003
(4) Aung San Suu Kyi’s press conference and the 193
speech she delivered in Monywa on the
night of 29 May 2003
(5) Press conferences of the Burmese military junta 197
(6) Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung 204
(7) Testimony of Soe Than, an NLD member from 209

Kamayut Township, Rangoon
(8) Burma resolution from the 57th UNGA on 218

18 November 2003

Appendix (1)
Ko Aung Aung (Mandalay, South-West) Ko Aung Htoo
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi U Aye Win
U Chit Tin Ko Chit Yin

Ko Hla Moe Win U Hla Oo (Mandalay, Norht-West)
U Hla Soe Nyunt (MP) U Hla Than
U Khin Mg Thaung
Ma Khin Ma Ma Tun (Mandalay, South-West)

U Khin Oo Ma Khin Aye Myint
U Ko Lay Ko Kyaw Kyaw
Ko Kyaw Myo Thu

Ko Kyaw Zin Win (DPNS)
(Mandalay, South-East)

Daw Kyi Kyi Myint Ko Maung Soe
Ko Min Lwin Ko Min Thein (photo by AHCDM)
Ko Moe Thaw @ Pauk Pauk U Myint Kyaw

Ko Myint Maw (Mandalay, South-East) U Myint Oo
U Myo Naing (Mandalay) Ko Myo Tint
Daw Nyunt Nyunt (photo by AHCDM) Ko Pho Zaw

Ko Than Tun (Kamaryut) Ma Thander Soe
Ko Thein Aung U Thein Soe
Ko Thein Toe Aye (Died on the spot) Ko Thet Tun (South Okkalapa)

U Thiha (Mandalay) U Tin Aung Aung
U Tin Htut Oo (MP-Leway) U Tin Myint
Daw Tin Myint

UTin Oo (NLD, Vice Chairman)
(Mandalay, South-West)

U Toe Lwin U Tun Myint (Bahan Tsp)
U Tun Win (Mdy) Ko Tun Zaw Zaw
Ko Wunna Maung Ko Win Khaing (Mandaly, North-East)

Daw Win Mya Mya Ko Wunna Aung
Ko Zaw Win Tun

Ko Zaw Lay @ Ko Zaw Khin (Mandalay, West-South)
Ko Zaw Zaw Aung Ko Zayar Tun (Mandalay, West-South)

172
No Name Occupation Address Remark
1 Tin Mg Oo Photographer unknown Died on the spot
2 Thein Toe Aye

(a.k.a) San Myint unknown Died on the spot
3 Raju Driver unknown Died on the spot
Died in September, as a result of the

Monywa wounds
4 Tun Aung Kyaw Teacher City he received during the attack
Remarks:
The above-mentioned persons joined the motorcade at Mandalay.
Many people reportedly died in the massacre. They include the persons who joined the motorcade during the trip and the
local people who welcomed Aung San Suu Kyi and the motorcade. The Commission is still collecting data on those
victims. The data will be released when the Commission receives it.
Ad hoc Comission on the Depayin Massacre

No Remarks
Name Gender Occupation Address
She was detained at Insein
Prison after the attack and then
transferred to a Military
Intelligence unit. Later, she was
moved to Asia Taw Win Clinic
for necessary medical
General Secretary, treatment. She is currently
1 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Female NLD Rangoon under house arrest.
Township EC Mandalay Northwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
2 U Thwel Male member Township on 2 July 2003.
3 Township EC Mandalay Northwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
U Aung Ko Male member Township on 18 Jul y 2003.
Youth Wing Mandalay Northwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
4 Ko Thein Aung Male member Township on 2 July 2003.
Youth Wing Released from Shwe Bo Prison
5 Ko Aye Win Male member Htun Done Myo Thit Township on 2 July 2003.
6 Ko Soe Soe Male member Unavailable on 2 July 2003.
2nd Preliminary Report: May 2004

Township EC Mandalay Northwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
7 Ko Kyaw Aung Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
Youth Wing Mandalay Southwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
8 Ko Kyaw Myo Thu Male member Township on 2 July 2003.
9 Ko Myo Tint Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
10 Ko Wunna Aung Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
11 Ko Hla Moe Win Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
Ko Ye Min Zaw (a.k.a.) Youth Wing Mandalay Southwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
12 Phoe Zaw Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
173
174
13 Township EC Mandalay Southwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
Ma Khin Mya Win Female member Township on 18 July 2003.
Township EC Mandalay Southwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
14 Daw Tin Myint Female member Township on 18 July 2003.
Released from Shwe Bo Prison
on 12 June 2003 and later fled
15 Ko Aung Aung Male DPNS member Unavailable Burma
on 12 June 2003 and later fled
16 Ko Naing Naing Male DPNS member Unavailable Burma
17 Youth Wing Mandalay Northwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison

Ko Myo Min Male member Township on 12 June 2003.
18 Daw Win Mya Mya Female Division EC member Mandalay Division on 16 Jan. 2004.
19 U Sein Ye Male Driver Unavailable on 12 June 2003.
on 9 Nov. 2003. He was
Township EC, Mandalay Northeastern arrested again at the end of
20 U Hla Oo Male secretary Township Dec. 2003.
Youth Wing Mandalay Northeastern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
21 Ko Than Tun Oo Male member Township on 18 July 2003.

22 Ko Aung Naing Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
23 Ko Tun Tun Win Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
24 Ma Khin Ma Ma Tun Female member Township on 2 July 2003.
25 Ma Win Ei Phyu Female member Township on 18 July 2003.
26 Township EC, Released from Shwe Bo Prison
U Hla Myint Male chairman Amarapura on 16 Jan. 2004.
Youth Wing Mandalay Northwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
27 Ko Win Khaing Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
28 Ko Nyi Nyi Aung Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
29 Ko Zayar Tun Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
Township EC, Mandalay Northeastern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
30 U Ye Myint Aung Male chairman Township on 16 Jan. 2004.
Division EC, Released from Shwe Bo Prison
31 U Barh Barh Male chairman Sagaing Division on 16 Jan. 2004.
Division EC, Released from Shwe Bo Prison
32 U Tun Myaing Male secretary Sagaing Division on 26 Jan. 2004.
33 U Saw Hlaing Male Elected MP Indaw Township on 26 Jan. 2004.
34 U Myint Kyi Male Elected MP Katha Township on 26 Jan. 2004.

Township EC Released from Shwe Bo Prison
35 U Tun Shawn Male member Monywa City on 2 July 2003.
Township EC, Released from Shwe Bo Prison
36 U Aung San Male chairman Budalin Township on 16 Jan. 2004.
Mandalay Southeastern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
37 U Thaung Nyunt Male Driver Township on 12 June 2003.
Township EC Mandalay Southeastern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
38 U Myint Oo Male member Township on 2 July 2003.
Township EC Mandalay Southeastern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
39 U Than Htay Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
40 U Tin Htut Oo Male Elected MP Lawe Township on 16 Jan. 2004.
175
176
41 Youth Wing Mandalay Northwestern Released from Shwe Bo Prison
Ko Tin Lin Male member Township on 18 July 2003.
42 Ko Kyaw Zin Win Male member Rangoon on 16 Jan. 2004.
43 Ko Taza Naing Male member Mandalay Division on 9 Nov. 2003.
44 U Aung Soe Male Division EC member Mandalay Division on 12 June 2003.
Detained in Kalay Prison, then
NLD vice put under house arrest on 14
45 U Tin Oo Male chairperson Rangoon Feb. 2004.
46 Released from Kalay Prison on
U Paw Khin Male Elected MP Myinggyan, Mandalay Division 18 Jan. 2004.
Released from Kalay Prison on
47 U Tin Aung Aung Male Elected MP Mandalay 18 Jan. 2004.
Township EC, Released from Kalay Prison on
48 Dr. Win Aung Male chairman Khin Oo Township 18 Jan. 2004.
in charge, Youth Released from Kanthi Prison on
49 Ko Tun Zaw Zaw Male Wing Rangoon 13 Nov. 2003.
Township EC, Released from Kanthi Prison on
50 Ko Tun Myint Male secretary Rangoon 2 Dec. 2003.
Released from Kanthi Prison on
51 Ko Toe Lwin Male Central Youth Wing Rangoon 2 Dec. 2003.
Youth Wing Released from Kanthi Prison on
52 Ko Zaw Win Tun Male member Mandalay 2 Dec. 2003.

Youth Wing Kaw Lin Township, Sagaing Released from Kanthi Prison on
53 Ko Zaw Myo Aung Male member Division 2 Dec. 2003.
54 Ko Min Lwin Male member Rangoon 2 Dec. 2003.
55 Ko Myint Ngwe Male member Yay Nan Chaung Township 2 Dec. 2003.
56 Youth Wing Released from Kanthi Prison on
Ko Than Tun Male member Rangoon 2 Dec. 2003.
Ko Moe Zaw (a.k.a.) Youth Wing Released from Kanthi Prison on
57 Pauk Pauk Male member Rangoon 2 Dec. 2003.
Ko Myo Min (a.k.a.) Tin Youth Wing Released from Kanthi Prison on
58 Myo Min Male member Mandalay 2 Dec. 2003.
59 Ko Thiha Male member Mandalay 2 Dec. 2003.
60 Ko Myint Kyaw Male member Rangoon 2 Dec. 2003.
61 Youth Wing Released from Kanthi Prison on
Ko Kyaw Soe Lin Male member Mandalay 2 Dec. 2003.
62 Ko Aung Kyaw Myint Male member Mandalay 2 Dec. 2003.
63 Ko Myo Nyunt Male member Rangoon 2 Dec. 2003.
Ko Thet Tun (a.k.a.) Youth Wing Released from Kanthi Prison on
64 Kalar Male member Unavailable 2 Dec. 2003.
Acronyms:
EC: Executive Committee
DPNS: Democratic Party for a New Society
MP: Member of Parliament

177
Appendix 2
[Unofficial translation]
National League for Democracy

No. 97/b, West Shwe Gontaing Road,
Bhan Township, Rangoon
(1) The NLD is a legal, registered political party. Therefore, NLD activities related
to national politics are legal actions. Conducting a study session is also legal activity.
(2) A bi-weekly study session was arranged for youth education on June 29, 1998.
Intelligence personnel in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s compound were notified of the
names of those involved, including four elected representatives and forty young
men.
(3) The authority’s security forces at the gate, who usually monitor the entrance
way of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s compound, blocked those people who were heading
in an orderly manner into the compound. Security forces pushed these NLD members,
so the NLD members retreated to a traffic light at the junction of Kaba Aye Sati
Road and University Avenue.
(4) When they were informed of the incident, U Tin Oo (NLD Vice-Chairman) and
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (NLD General Secretary) went to the junction and brought
those NLD members coming to the study session back to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s
compound in an orderly manner.
(5) After blocking the NLD members at various points, a person directed the security
forces to strike the NLD members, using abusive language, such as “leader or no
leader — hit her!” and “I don’t care, leader or whatever, hit that leader!” Those
present described the person issuing the commands as tall, fair-skinned, and in a
yellow civilian shirt. They could identify him if they saw him again.

(6) During the incident, the security forces forcefully struck the NLD members
with police batons and tree branches from nearby. Eight NLD youth members
suffered injuries to the head and other parts of the body as a result of the attack.
The location of the incident was a restricted area, so no one else was present.
(7) Upon being informed of the incident, the NLD Chairman and three other NLD
Executive Committee members went to the scene immediately, but the authorities
blocked their entry.
(8) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was slightly injured. The security forces stayed positioned
in the same location at the gate, and U Tin Oo and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were
forced to stay outside the compound in the wind and rain from 14:00 p.m. (6/25/
98) to 01:00 a.m. (6/26/98).
(9) The political, economic, and social crisis in the country will indeed not be solved
by such hitting, arresting, and confining methods.
-Central Executive Committee

(National League for Democracy) Aung San Sui Kyi
Rangoon
26 June 1998

Appendix 3
[Unofficial translation]
“Excerpt of Aung San Suu Kyi’s press conference on Apr 23, 2003”
During this press conference, I will analyze the events of the past 12 months. I will
also discuss my own travels, including my trip to Chin State. I will discuss Chin
State first, because the authorities assertions are different from what we know as
fact.
I guess you’ve seen the photos on the wall. Some photos show disturbances to our
trip. Some photos relate to the authorities’ assertions (on my trips). The other
photos show that USDA members blocked the road we used with logs. Local people
informed us that they were USDA members, and there were flags in their cars. As
far as I know, the authorities asserted that there was no blocking the road and there
were only timber planks near a bridge under construction. We had passed several
bridges under construction. However, those bridges were different from (the bridges)
between Htee Linn and Kyauk Htu.
As you journalists can see from the photos, logs were placed intentionally in two
places. Fortunately, we had enough manpower to move the logs (to the roadside.)
The authorities argued about how the logs were moved onto the road. We had many
people with us on our trip. If we had only one or two people, we couldn’t have
moved the logs. I want you to be fully aware that those logs were intentionally
placed on the road in order to put a stop to our trip. In Saw Township, we again ran
into people who would block the road. You might know that authorities released
statements concerned with blocking the road.
By examining those photos, you can be aware of just what had happened (in our
trip). They (protestors) had been waiting to start trouble with us. They claimed that
they made problems because we didn’t give them back the videotapes we took from
them. Our policy was that they could take pictures of our activities freely. They
could take video if they stayed away from us. However, they had to inform us when
they wanted to take video of our meetings and meetings with local people. We told
them this all along. It’s a basic right of each of us to be asked if we want to be
photographed. We usually seized the film and videotape if they failed to inform us,
and we compensated them monetarily for the tapes we took.
The protestors in Kyauk Htu village were hostile. We tried to meet the authorities
to explain about the tapes and to give compensation, but they failed to come and
meet us. A person in their group threatened us, saying that they would do something
against us in Saw Township if we didn’t return their cassette tape. So disturbances

against us in Saw Township were planned in advance. We had never given in to any
threats. However, we are always ready to solve a problem by discussion in order to
reach a fair agreement accepted by both sides. It’s clear that they didn’t want to
solve the problem, only create one. If they were willing to solve the problem, they
would have met with Han Zaw and Myint Thein. We sent (those NLD officials) to
solve the problem.
We didn’t do anything dishonest. We do not hesitate to mention their names.
However, they were not ready to say who their leader was or what organization they
belonged to. They only mentioned that they were from an observation team. When
we reached Saw Township, we asked the chairperson of Township Peace and
Development Council to investigate the matter. We already knew who they were
and which organization they belonged to. We asked because we wanted an official
answer. It’s clear that the chairperson was biased. He said that the protestors were
Burmese people. Of course, we are also Burmese people.
They were not from Saw Township. They came from Gan Gaw Township to cause
problems. I think that they put the logs on the road we used.
The authority claimed that some NLD youth wing members responsible for my
security searched the house we stayed at for a while in Matupe Township and met
Aung Aung, a university student majoring in Physics. They then forcefully took him
to police department. We don’t know anything about what the authorities claimed.
None of us went around searching the houses. We didn’t have the time. Besides, we
would not enter anyone’s house without permission. Some people might do it but
not us. Why exactly did the authorities mention that Aung Aung was a student? Did
they want to see problems between the students and us? The students in Burma are
not naïve. There are different kinds of students. Students know that. They would
not think that a person is honest because he or she is a student. Not all students
support the democracy movement. However, we can’t say that a person doesn’t
have intelligence activities for some organizations because he or she is a student.
Q: You said that people were threatened. How they were threatened?
A: It’s simple. The people were told that they would face punishment in any way if
they welcomed us or showed their support for us. A place in Chin State, the people
were told that they would see the “bullet” if they welcome us. I was informed that
the chairperson of the District Peace and Development Council tried to prohibit
local peoples’ support for us in Gan Gaw Township. He even attacked some young
women, driving towards them in a threatening manner while he was driving his car.
His name is Htay Oo.
Disturbances in we encountered in Chin State were not the same with disturbances
in Arakan State. In Chin State, police officers didn’t openly participate in the
disturbances.
In Arakan State, however, traffic police and policemen in uniform openly participated
in the disturbances. Members of the Township Peace and Development Council
took part in every one. Firemen and members of Red Cross Association in uniform
were also involved.

In Chin State, we sometimes saw firemen and their vehicles. Generally, persons in
uniform were not used. However, their actions were similar to the actions we
experienced in Arakan State. They played songs very loudly, cited the Buddhist
sermon, and educated the people about how to prevent fire accidents.
In Gan Gaw Township, a car rigged with a loudspeaker came and tried to harass us
while we talked to the local people who welcomed us. However, the car left after a
while.
The local people received several threats. They were told that they would be punished
if they welcomed us or showed support. As you see in the photo, however, the
people confidently showed their support to the democracy movement despite the
threats.
In Chin State, Christians were indirectly harassed. It was a sad sight. I am a Buddhist
and proud of being a Buddhist. However, it’s totally shameful to disturb anyone
who belongs to other religions. In our country, we shouldn’t harass people with
different religious beliefs. The people in Chin State should have total freedom of
religion completely.
When I was in Chin State, I was told that the local people are seriously concerned
about transportation and education conditions. It is difficult to travel in Chin State
and people struggle to earn a living. Between 10 and 15 percent of students finish
high school. Education quality is very poor. I am also concerned about it.
Like the people in Arakan and Shan State, the people in Chin State obviously showed
that they have strong union spirit. The other ethnic people do not begrudge the
Burmans (Bamar). However, they suspect Burman’s behavior. The Burman, the
ethnic majority needs to acknowledge it. The Burman also have to understand that
the ethnic minorities suspect us because of our activities in the past.
Union spirit is still active among the ethnic people. The spirit should be matched by
a suitable political system and constitution that guarantees the rights of all of our
people.
I was not surprised by the disturbances (in Chin State). Since I started my trips May
6 of last year, I encountered them frequently. Some members of USDA and local
authorities tried to threaten the people. They also harassed people who support us.
When we reached Arakan State, their behaviors were becoming increasingly
egregious.
It was obvious that the authorities supervised disturbances against our trip to Arakan
State. We have no doubt that authority created them some place in Chin State, like
Gan Gaw Township. In several locations, USDA members and local authorities
bothered and threatened the people.
A government minister went around and installed USDA signs. We ned to ask why
he put up the signs such as Pyi Khaing Phyo (synonym of USDA) Village, Pyi Khaing
Phyo Township. What is USDA? Does it belong to the State? Which organization
can say that this town belongs to us, this is our own town, this town is under our
control? What sort of authority does the USDA have to put such signs in place?

While the USDA engages in such activities, why are the authorities worried about
reopening of NLD offices and installing NLD signs? NLD offices have been running
since 1988 and 1989. Back then, USDA had not even been created yet.
Recently, USDA members reportedly joined government staff trainings in Rangoon.
What is the connection between USDA members and government staff? How is the
USDA related to the government? How is USDA related to SPDC? These questions
need clear answers. We don’t believe that USDA is only a social welfare association.
It doesn’t seem to be a social welfare association. We don’t see it working for the
State’s social activities.
Based on my experience on my trips during last twelve months, I think that authorities
use the USDA to harass the NLD and NLD sympathizers. If that’s not the case, the
authorities need to prove that they no longer support the USDA’s activities. The
authorities have to prove beyond all doubt that they were not behind local USDA
members’ actions against us.
Q: Where did they threaten the local people with “bullet”?
A: In Matupe and Min Tup Townships, Southern Chin State.
Q: Who did it?
A: My understanding is the chairperson of District Peace and Development Council.
Q: Did the local people care about the threats?
A: No, they didn’t.
The next two weeks will be the first anniversary of my release from house arrest.
When I was released, the process of confidence building (between the authorities
and NLD) was over. The authorities and I had already agreed that we needed to
take the next step. However, I don’t think that the process has improved. In reality,
we can’t say that the process is improving. We have to question the SPDC’s good
will. I wonder whether they (authorities) really want to reach an agreement with us
or not.
Whether NLD as well as SPDC are interested in national reconciliation or not is not
important. This is what I want to mention. The important thing is what the country
needs now. Our country needs national reconciliation. SPDC should understand
this. It is time they understand.
As you journalists are here, (I want to advise you) that it’s important to ask: Why
does the SPDC maintain that they don’t have contact with NLD? Why do they
target only diplomats and international media? Why do they hesitate to communicate
to the people if they have sincere good will for the national reconciliation and truly
want to reach an agreement for the democracy that they’ve promised to restore
since they seized the State power.
We do not hesitate to officially express our wish to achieve national reconciliation.
We respect the agreement we had with the authorities. We are ready to express
anything officially and openly.

As you know, the authorities stated for the first time at the end of 2000 that we had
contact each other. They told diplomats and journalists but said nothing to the
people.
We also didn’t mention it, because both sides had agreed to hide the first step in
order to build friendship and confidence.
However, Win Aung, Foreign Minister revealed that there was contact between
NLD and SPDC. He revealed it without dealing with us. However, it still didn’t
hurt the confidence building process.
We want to raise a question. Why did (the SPDC) want to make this widely known
to diplomats, media and the international community, while the people in this country
were kept in the dark? Aren’t the people in this country more important? Aren’t the
people in this country more important for those leading the country?
I have more questions to raise. Burma’s national reconciliation process is related to
Mr. Razali Ismail, the United Nations Secretary General’s envoy. He has an optimistic
point of view in this process and tries to narrow the gap between NLD and SPDC.
I have no doubt that he wants Burma to achieve peace and development in the
economic, social and political sectors. NLD thanks Mr. Razali. NLD also trusts
him.
We are surprised at SPDC’s behavior to Mr. Razali. As the special envoy of the UN
Secretary General’s working for national reconciliation in Burma, he should be
allowed to visit any time he wants, go anywhere he pleases and talk with anybody.
As you know, he was prohibited to meet me in Taungyi City (Shan State) last year.
He has the right to check the conditions of my trips around the country. He is even
responsible for checking it in order to know the status of the confidence building
and reconciliation processes. If we respect the United Nations and trust the UN
Secretary General’s wish for national reconciliation in Burma, we should treat with
Mr. Razali with trust, honor and respect. He deserves to receive it.
He should have the right to decide when he should come here. If SPDC really
wants national reconciliation, they shouldn’t prohibit him. It is for Mr. Razali to
decide when he should come and not have to wait for an invitation letter.
When I was released on May 6 last year, we tried a lot for better political conditions
in our country. As we were in the confidence building process, we tried to reach the
other stages such as cooperation, dialogue and reconciliation.
For humanitarian aid issues, we tried to cooperate with the authorities through
some people and organizations. As a result, we came to know clearly that SPDC is
not keen to cooperate with us in humanitarian aid matters.
Now, we want to mention sanctions, aid and tourism. After I was released on May 6
(2002), I had a press conference and I claimed that NLD’s policies would not change
without dialogue beginning. It means NLD’s policies on tourists, economic sanctions
and aid will not be changed.
Some claims that NLD doesn’t want reconciliation because NLD asks for sanctions
against Burma. We want to respond to that person that we have never called for

economic sanctions. However, our policy with regards to sanctions remains
unchanged until such time as negotiations take place.
However, there are some sectors especially in humanitarian aid in which we are
ready to cooperate as much as we can. But, the authorities are hesitant to cooperate
with us in those sectors. We have to raise the question of why they are hesitating. If
SPDC suspects our will, they can solve it by cooperating with us.
If a child doesn’t want to take a shower, the child will have many excuses such as:
the water is too hot or too cold, I am not dirty yet, I have other things to do, and so
on. If a person is willing to take a shower, this person will be ready to take a shower
whether the water is hot or cold. If SPDC is really interested to try for the sake of
the country, SPDC should clearly mention that they are willing to cooperate with
NLD especially on humanitarian aid. They have to talk to the people about it. Why
do they want to keep it as a secret? Why don’t they want the people to know it?
We had already seriously decided on national reconciliation. Today, I will also talk
about the authorities. It doesn’t mean that we don’t want reconciliation. The
authorities may accuse us of having a confrontation. We are ready to face the
problems. If we want to solve it, we have to face it. We claim that we have a
problem because it will deteriorate without solving the problem.
You will know about the economic conditions in this country. No one knows what
is (the problem) behind the bank crisis. During my trips, I discuss this issue with
local people. I asked them whether the bank crisis affects them. Their answers were
“yes”. The peasants got less money when they sold their rice to authorities because
there was less money (in the bank). However, goods in Rangoon seemed to still be
expensive. Therefore, there is something wrong somewhere. It is time to solve the
problem if the authorities want to do so, for the sake of the country.
When I was released (in 2002), I said (to the authorities) that I would express my
opinion frankly on the country, I would not pretend that there is no problem, however,
I would try to have a good relationship with the authorities.
Now, we really don’t want to have problems with SPDC. Personally, we completely
don’t have any grudges with them. Whatever has happened in the past, we are ready
to propose that it is time for friendliness and reconciliation. Though we are ready to
cooperate anytime, we will not tolerate disturbances and threats. To do so would
not support the democracy movement or improve the people’s condition.
Local authorities would not dare to do what they did without the agreement of
State authorities. They would not dare to do it if they did not think that there was at
least State authorities‘ permission.
It will be a big mistake for us if we accept whatever the local authorities and USDA
members’ to do to us because it is the only way to support the confidence building
process. (If we accept it), disturbances and threats will be increased and the situation
will deteriorate. Moreover, real national reconciliation will be further and further
away from us. If SPDC really wants national reconciliation, SPDC has to face and
solve those problems. SPDC has to explain about some local authorities’ activities
during my trips and why USDA has authority to do everything it wishes.

NLD is accountable for NLD members.
Q: You said that Bank crisis is getting worse. What will be the effect on Social and Economic
issues?
A: If the crisis continues, there will be economic problems. Economic and social
problems are related. It is an example of why the problems need to be faced. To
solve the problems, we have to face them. Until now, none of us knows why this
crisis appeared. There are different sorts of rumours on the crisis because there is
no accountability and transparency in this country. People have no chance to find
out why we have this crisis.
Q: Do you think the situation (of the bank crisis) is deteriorating? Can Burma have a situation
like that in Argentina? Do you think it will bring violence onto the street?
A: Everyone uses different kinds of responses to get relief or justice if they can’t
bear the hardships anymore.
In Argentina, people resorted to violence because they thought that they didn’t
receive fair treatment from (the authorities). The people stay away from violence as
long as they believe that they receive justice (from the authorities).
Q: EU and United States show that they will take a tough stance on the sanctions (against
Burma) issue. But, Australia is continuously using the constructive engagement. What is the role
of Australia in international community?
A: You have to ask this question to your government. Your country is a democratic
country. You have the opportunity to raise many questions to your government. We
are also interested to know what the answer will be. We want to know why Australia
has this policy. Australia believes that there will be reconciliation (in Burma) regardless
of what happened in the past. Do they have any secret agreement to get
reconciliation?
Q: What do you want to say to the government of Australia?
A: We have repeatedly let them know that we do not agree with their activity (on
Burma).
Q: You said that SPDC is not interested in national reconciliation. Do you know what is
behind SPDC’s unwillingness on the national reconciliation?
A: I said that SPDC does not really seem to be paying attention to national
reconciliation according to the evidence we have. They are not just paying attention
to reconciliation. They may suspect us personally. But, they still have to work for
reconciliation.
In the problems of the past 14 years, NLD and democracy were at the down side.
Therefore, we didn’t give up holding firmly to the reconciliation solution. We have
many reasons to suspect the authorities. We may carefully look at the authorities.
We may heartedly look at the authorities sometimes. However, our desire for national
reconciliation is not taken away. If SPDC is not interested in reconciliation, it is
clear that SPDC doesn’t want reconciliation. If we can get reconciliation, there will
be benefits for all of us. How long will the confidence building take? If it takes

time, we will get a result opposite to what we want.
Q: Do you think it is time to change NLD’s technique?
A: We always use various techniques at the same time. We have more than one
technique. We are ready to use various techniques to start the national reconciliation
process. There will be reconciliation. However, for the sake of the people and the
country, we need to come to reconciliation quickly.
Economic conditions are deteriorating, and are sure to get worse. Moreover, we
have other issues (to solve) such as education and health. Now, we have to mention
HIV/AIDS if we talk about health issues in our country. It’s widely spreading in our
country. I understand that World Health Organization is also rather concerned about
it. Without strong action, it cannot be controlled in the near future.
We were ready to cooperate with the authorities on matters of humanitarian aid
including the HIV/AIDS issue. However, the authorities didn’t want to cooperate
with us even in the issue of HIV/AIDS. So, we need to raise questions about their
good will.
Q: How was the condition of collecting new members in the last twelve months? The young
people I talked to stay away from NLD and are sick of (the political situation). Young people
will be satisfied with the political conditions as long as the government can put the money into
their pocket.
A: My view is the opposite (of your views). We have been receiving plenty of
support from young people. Therefore, I would like you to explain to us about the
fact you just mentioned. On what do you base on your remark, that young people
are interested in making money rather than NLD?
Q: When I asked some young people I met, they are satisfied with their life if they have money
and music. They did not seem to be aware of NLD’s activities.
A: Those young people, especially some of those who can speak English fluently,
are not interested in politics. They want to be having fun all the time and they just
need money and disco.
It’s not a surprising situation. Young people anywhere want to be having fun. On
the last twelve months, we were surprised with their support to us. Compared to the
youth in Rangoon, the youths outside Rangoon were more aware of the (political)
conditions. They are aware of the current problems (of the country) while there are
less attractive things to their mind in their surroundings. I am a bit surprised at your
question. The selfish youths will care only for themselves whatever political conditions
they have.
Q: Mr. Pinheiro, United Nations human rights envoy to Burma discovered a concealed microphone
while interviewing political prisoners in Insein prison. Did it affect the international community?
Do you think it (discovering a microphone) changed (the international communities’ policy to
Burma) a lot?

A: If their policy to Burma changed because of it, we will be disappointed in them.
Actually, it was not a surprise. It’s just another question to raise about the authorities’
goodwill.
Q: Do you know why the authorities do not want national reconciliation?
A: I think, they do not want change. National reconciliation is change, but change is
inevitable. Therefore, we need to find the solution together about what changes are
suitable for the country.
Q: You said that NLD is ready to cooperate with SPDC on the issue of humanitarian aid. Is
it because of NLD’s policies such as accountability, transparency and independent monitoring
on those issues?
A: As I said before, our basic principle on economic sanctions, assistance and
tourism issues doesn’t change. Cooperation on humanitarian aid issues doesn’t
change our basic principles. Because, we have always said that there should be
accountability, transparency and responsibility concerned with humanitarian aid.
Without destroying the basic principle, we can fully and freely cooperate. Moreover,
we can find a solution for reconciliation by having cooperation.
By cooperating, we can know how to deal with each other for emerging real national
reconciliation. Cooperation doesn’t mean observing to know whether it will work
or not. It means finding a solution to know whether it will work or not. For the sake
of the country, we have to try to be tolerable.
Edited by Melanie Werner and Dan

9 July 2003
Mr. Kofi Annan

Secretary General
The United Nations
New York, N.Y
U.S.A.
Subject: The Disgraceful Situation in Burma after the Crisis at Da-Ba-Yin

Township
Dear Mr. Secretary-General,
On the evening of May 30, 2003, some members of the National League
for Democracy (NLD), including Vice Chairman U Tin Oo and General Secretary
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, while traveling on an organizational tour were savagely
attacked by a group of thugs between Kyi village and Da Ba Yin town in Sagaing
Division, resulting in several deaths and injuring hundreds of NLD members. The
government has not clarified nor provided details of the above event.
Moreover, it has been learnt that U Tin Oo, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and
the youth who accompanied them on their journey were seriously harmed and are
also being held under detention, without legal grounds.
Hence the undersigned, the representatives who were duly elected at the
Multiparty Elections held in 1990, on behalf of the people of Burma, have sent a
letter of protest to Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of State Peace and
Development Council, calling for the:
(1) Immediate release of U Tin Oo, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all others
who were arrested at the site of the crisis.
(2) Unconditional release of Chairman U Aung Shwe and other Central
Executive Members of the NLD who have been kept under house arrest
since May 31, 2003.
(3) Reopening of all NLD offices sealed by the government and resuming
of legal political party functions.
(4) Official independent investigation and statement of facts regarding the
event, including the number of deaths, wounded, missing and detained
persons.
(5) Compliance and implementation of the Resolutions and
Recommendations of the General Assembly, the Security Council and
other agencies of the United Nations.
The above demands are made for the people of Burma, as well as
for the whole community of the world. We firmly believe that the current

impasse in this country is not only a disgrace to the Nation, but is also
becoming a threat to the peace and security of the whole region.
Attached herewith a copy of the above-mentioned letter translated from
Burmese, with a humble request that the case be brought to the notice of the Security
Council for necessary action.
Yours sincerely,
Elected Representatives:
The List of Undersigned Parliamentary Members of 1990 General Election
No. Name State/ Division Constituency

1 Dr. Sein Myint Ayerwaddy Bogalay(2)
2 U Aung Khin Myaungmya (2)
3 U Hla Kyi Pathein East (2)
4 U Nyunt Hlaing Pathein East (1)
5 U Nyunt Win Yekyi
6 U Tin Chaw Pathein West (2)
7 Dr. Zaw Myint Henzada
8 U Mint Thein Myanaung (2)
9 U Tin Oo Myanaung
10 Dr. Tin Min Htut Pantanaw
11 U Mahn Nyunt Thein Pantanaw
12 U Tin Kyonepyaw
13 U Mann Gyaw Ni Kyonepyaw
14 Dr. Hla Win Kyaungkone
15 U Saw Lwin Kyaungkone
16 U Hla Myint Maubin
17 U Myint Thein Magwe Chauk
18 U Chit Tin Minhla
19 U Soe Win Seikphyu
20 Thakhin Khin Nyunt Yenachaung
21 U Aung San Myint Myaing (1)
22 U Kan Oo Salin (2)
23 U Tar Salin (1)
24 U Kyaw Shin Pwintphyu (1)
25 Dr. Aung Moe Nyo Pwintphyu (2)
26 U Kyaw Myint Magwe
27 U Chit Htwe Myothit (2)
28 U Aung Soe Magwe (2)
29 U Bo Htwe Natmauk (1)
30 U Han Zaw Sinbaungwe
31 U Myint Aung Myaing (2)
32 U Dr. Kyi Min Pakokku (1)
33 U Hlaing Aye Pakokku (2)

34 U Thar Maung Natmauk
35 U Nyunt Hlaing Aung Lan
36 U Htun Kywe Bago Nyaunglaybin
37 U Maung Aye Tharawaddy
38 U Paik Chone Shwedaung
39 Dr. Myo Win Kawa
40 U Tin Shwe Waw
41 U San Win Tharawaddy
42 U Aung Soe Myint Taunggoo
43 U Tun Aung Yetarshe
44 U Thaung Sein Pyi
45 Daw Hla Hla Moe Min Hla
46 U Thar Maung Okkpho
47 U Tin Oo Okkpho
48 U Nyunt Aye Letpadan
49 Daw May Hnin Kyi Mandalay Moegoke
50 Daw San San Yangon Seikkan
51 U Thein Myint Tamwe (2)
52 U Maung Maung Latt Thaketa
53 U Soe (a) U Soe Tin Hmawbi
54 U Kyaw Thwin Khayan (1)
55 U Hla Tun Kyimyindaing
56 Nan Khin Htwe Myint Kayin State Hpa-an (3)
57 U Min Htun Chit Hpa-an
58 U Kyin Thein Kyar-Seikkyi (2)
59 U Hla Maung Kyar-in-Seikkyi (1)
60 Dr. Sein Win Yangon Seikkyi Khanaungto
61 U Saw Aung Saggaing Monywa
62 U Hanthar Myint Budalin
63 U Min Thwin Myaung
64 U Thein Pe Kanbalu
65 Daw Khin San Hlaing Wet Let
66 U Soe Win Bago Bago (1)
67 U Nyi Pu Rakhine Gwa
68 U Kyaw Khine Taung Goke
69 U Mya Maung Yan Bye
70 U Kyaw Maung Buthee Daung
(Translation of above-mentioned letter to Than Shwe)

9 July 2003
Chairman
State Peace and Development Council
Rangoon
Burma

Subject – Burma’s horrible plight in the aftermath of the Depayin Episode and
solutions.
1. We have heard that there were many dead and wounded as the result of a violent
attack by thugs staged against the National League for Democracy (NLD) members
and supporters including Deputy Chairman U Tin Oo and General Secretary Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi at dusk on the 30th of May 2003 at a spot between the town of
Depayin and Kyi village. The local authorities have been vague in their explanation
and information concerning the true facts and have not given details about the
exact number of dead and injured.
2. We then heard that following this attack, NLD leaders, Youth Wing Members and
supporters were arrested and currently remain incarcerated. For the people who
are longing for democracy, this is like applying salt to a festering wound. On behalf
of the masses, we, the People’s Representatives elected in 1990 General Elections,
make this submission and call on you to:
(1) Immediately release Deputy Chairman U Tin Oo and General Secretary Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi and all NLD members from imprisonment and incarceration.
(2) Release U Aung Shwe and all Central Executive Committee members of the
NLD who have been placed under house arrest since the 31st of May and all
other imprisoned democracy activists.
(3) Remove the seals placed on the NLD head office and all branch offices in all the
Divisions, Townships and States throughout the country.
(4) Constitute an independent Enquiry Commission to compile a correct list of
those who died, those who were injured, and those who are missing as a result
of the Depayin episode.
(5) SPDC convene the Parliament in accordance with SLORC’s 1990 Elections
Law and strictly adhere to the resolutions passed by the United Nations General
Assembly with regards to Burma.
3. We do not seek to benefit just one individual, just one group or just one party. We
are convinced and sincerely believe that our demands, if met, will work towards
national reconciliation and will be for the good and benefit of the entire country
and its masses and that this will make the road to democracy smooth and successful.
4. Just as it is the present government’s responsibility to forestall and prevent any

dangerous situation that might occur, we the People’s Representatives, feel the same
responsibility to speak out and speak our mind. We again reiterate that we are
driven by a deep desire for national reconciliation, unity and solidarity among all
ethnic groups and the achievement of a new modern democratic system with
stability and prosperity.
With respect,
People’s Representatives elected in 1990 General Elections
(Names and signatures of the Elected People’s Representatives attached above)

Appendix (4)
Aung San Suu Kyi’s Speech at Monywa
-Translated by Democratic Voice of Burma (www.dvb.no)
In 1947 when my father (General Aung San) was

rallying people in Upper Burma, he visited Monywa.
As he was quite tired from the rallying trip,the Anti-
Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) arranged for
him to rest at Monywa. He said that the people in
Monywa are very ‘leinma’ (law-abiding and obedient). I
have to say that Monywa is strong and firm, rather than
law-abiding and obedient. [applause]
The reason is – in 1988, Monywa was very extraordinarily

firm and I feel that it is now even stronger. [applause]
The reason for this is, in my opinion, people here do not

like injustice. They don’t like bullying. I am rallying our
people in the NLD. I went to Kachin State to rally people in
Kachin State in this trip.
During the Chin trip, we decided to go to some townships

in Sagaing, Magwe and Mangwe Divisions. The members
of the USDA tried every method to destroy our works by
means of bullying. We had to be very patient. We believe
that everyone has the right to demonstrate.
The authorities should give people the right to

demonstrate if they themselves believe so. [applause]
We don’t want to say particularly why they allowed the

USDA members to do so, as special rights. But they aren
not staging true demonstrations. They forced some people
to join them. [applause]
Moreover, we do not react to them. We don’t. We only

report to the authorities. Nevertheless, the authorities are

not taking action against members of the USDA because
they argue that they are doing things within legal
boundaries. As the authorities are taking no action,
members of the USDA are becoming more daring and far
worse. When at Kyitaukpauk Village, in the Madaya and
Singua area, they threatened our supporters with sticks,
machetes and catapults. But we didn’t react to them. We
only reported the case to the police station. The
reason is that we want to know properly
whether there is still law and order in
this country. If not so, we want the
proof. [applause]
The next day, they increased the

harassments. Our people were inside the
NLD compound at Madaya to conduct
matters concerning youth. It was a big
compound. The audience was inside the
compound. Some were also inside a
nearby compound beyond the street.
Then, members of the USDA came to
taunt us with loudspeakers. We didn’t react In Kyi Tauk Pauk Village
to them. Only when some monks who were unable truck full o
to watch us being taunted, shot them with catapults did protesters using lou
speaker nex
their (USDA’s) cars departed. [applause]
to Suu Kyi
vechile, which i
The monks did that because they could not stand the surrounded b
bullying. [applause] NLD Youth
They did that because they could not accept the injustice.
Another thing, they did that because they pitied the NLD.
When we came to Monywa, we heard about the one-sided
bullying. We heard about how the USDA was mobilizing its
members in Sagaing. We also saw them do it along the
way. There were cars with many demonstrators. Other
people are banned from using cars. Other people are not
allowed to hire cars, but they had many cars. [applause]
From Chaung-U to Monywa the people have been

supporting us in massive numbers. I believe that they
support us because they can’t stand
bullying and injustice.
When we entered Monywa, the people of Chaung- U

welcomed us enthusiastically despite the difficulties. I
assume that they support us because there is rampant
injustice. [applause]

For this, I am very satisfied because our people basically
do not like injustice. They don’t like bullying. It is good
that they still feel pity despite their sufferings. Therefore,
we need to found a democratic country based on this
attitude. We need to found our democratic country
on the belief that truth is strength and strength is not the
truth. The reason we are saying democracy, democracy
means we want our country to be law-abiding. We want
our country to be just and fair. We don’t want
people to be bullying and dominating without being lawful.
To be able todo this we need a system that gives people
guarantees. The system isvery important. We often ask
what is more important; people or policy. In my opinion,
however good the people if the system is not good, the
people, no matter how good and clever they are, will be
like people stuck in the mud. [applause]
But if you look at it the other way, however good the

system, if people are not good, the country will never
progress either. So, the system has to be good and the
people have to be good and hardworking. When I
e, examined if our people have those qualities, I found that
of they are indeed so. There are two reasons for this;
ud historically, before independence we were the most
xt
advanced people in Asia. Once upon a time, our people
i’s
is were pioneers and if so, if we have a good system we
by won’t have problems. And now, when things are not well
h. in the country, our people have to leave their country and
work abroad for their families’ survival. There, people who
work in other countries tend to succeed. The majority of
them succeed.
For example, the Burmese sailors; on one hand I have to

pity them and on the other, I have to be proud of them.
The reason is that Burmese people are reliable and foreign
companies depend on them. Burmese sailors are quite
pitiable because you can ask them to do anything you
want. They accept their duties. Burmese sailors do not
defend their fellow countrymen and the employers take
advantage of them. It doesn’t apply to only sailors,
but also other professionals. [applause]
There is no reason that our people should not be

advancing. We need to set up a system that gives people
chances. We need to set up a system that gives people
chances. I am not talking about a system that makes our
people rich. It is sure that our country could be rich if we

used that chance properly and diligently. It is very
important that our country is peaceful. Our country is a
union made up of many ethnic nationalities. Therefore, it
needs to be very peaceful. From the time of
independence, there have been many armed struggles.
Now, even though there are ceasefires, these ceasefires do
not mean peace. There is no agreement for peace.
In order to attain a peace guarantee, we can do it with

political means in our country. We will be able to say that
our country is peaceful only when all of the ethnic groups
decide to set up a union with mutual agreements. Only
then will our country be truly peaceful and will our people
have full rights and the right to make ourselves and our
country rich. Democracy is a system for rights, safety and
freedom. We have to improve our country with these
things. We have to have the desire for improvements. We
need the abilities to do it. In order to do that the country
[government] has to help the people. What I mean is that
the government has to create a high quality education
system. Without a good higher education system, our
country will not be able to rise.
[applause]
As far as I understand, the students are not satisfied with

the current education system. [applause]. As it is, it is very
sad to look at on the one hand. Our youth are not satisfied
with the education system. If you look from another
perspective, it is a good sign. The ability to see that a
bad system is a bad system is a good thing. [applause]
If we admired a poor education system, how could we

progress? Our youth are quite open eyed and eared. Some
youth only think about themselves. They want to get on
with their own lives. They want to use the latest
technology. They want to eat, drink and be merry. There
are some people like that. They are not only in our
country. Every country has them. But I have seen that
many of our youth have political feelings. They were
not encouraged.
These days nobody wants them to have political feelings.

During the time of the struggles for independence, we had
a saying; ‘The Thakhins are worth six months in prison’.
But today, six months is a laughing matter. [applause]

Appendix (5)
Press conferences of the Burmese military junta
Source: “Press conference clarifies instigations to cause unrest launched by Daw Suu Kyi
of NLD and followers including U Tin Oo.” The New Light of Myanmar. 1 June 2003.
<http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/NLM-2003/enlm/Jun01_h3.html>
Press conference clarifies instigations to cause unrest launched by

Daw Suu Kyi of NLD and followers including U Tin Oo
YANGON, 31 May- A press conference to clarify the instigations to cause

unrest launched by Daw Suu Kyi of National League for Democracy and
followers including U Tin Oo during their tour of towns and villages where
peace and tranquility prevailed was held at the Tatmadaw Guest House on
Inya Road here at 4 pm today.
Present on the occasion were Chairman of Public Relations and Information

Committee of the State Peace and Development Council Minister for Labour
U Tin Winn, Minister for Information Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, Vice-Chief of Military
Intelligence Maj-Gen Kyaw Win, Deputy Minister for Home Affairs Brig-Gen
Thura Myint Maung, Deputy Minster for Information Brig-Gen Aung Thein, senior
military officers of the Ministry of Defence, officials of the Ministry of Information,
U Sein Win of Kyodo News Agency, Patron of Foreign Correspondents Club
U Hla Htwe, President U Sao Kai Hpa and members and invited guests.
Minister U Tin Winn explained that members of National League for

Democracy including U Tin Oo led by Daw Suu Kyi toured some towns and
villages where peace and tranquility prevailed and incited unrest with the crowd

of the people, and due to their acts, there occurred a traffic jam and instability.
Therefore, people who opposed Daw Suu Kyi and NLD staged protests.
Then, clashes between those in support of Daw Suu Kyi and those opposed
to her broke out. At the same time, NLD, using the media, tried to exaggerate
the incidents with the aim of putting pressure on and finding fault with the
Government. He continued to say that real situation was going to be clarified
explained as it was required to do so.
Daw Suu Kyi and NLD members had been allowed to travel freely to meet
with party members in the states and divisions since May 2002. Daw Suu Kyi
toured Thamanya in Mon State from 11 to 15 June 2002; 16 townships in
Mandalay and Magway Divisions from 22 to 29 June 2002; 12 townships in
Mon and Kayin States from 20 to 23 July 2002; 14 townships in Bago Division
from 14 to 17 October 2002; 17 townships in Shan State from 13 to 27
November 2002; 15 townships in Rakhine State and Magway and Ayeyawady
Divisions from 16 to 24 December 2002 and 21 townships in Magway
Division and Chin State from 3 to 13 April 2003 totalling 95 townships. They
made the present tour of Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions, Kachin and Shan
States and Mogok of Mandalay Division and Monywa via Mandalay starting
form 6 May. The State dignitaries believed that if they reached states, divisions
and townships and saw the changing situation of development which pave
the way for the good future of the State, there would be a change in their
negative views and contribute to national reconsolidation. Therefore, during
their previous tours they were treated as VIPs and invited to visit Duyinkabo
River Water Pumping Project near Aunglan; Yanpae Creek Dam Project near
Taungdwingyi; Ayeyawady River Bridge (Magway) Project; Paunglaung Hydel
Power Project; Thanlwin River Bridge (Mawlamyine) Construction Project;
Winphanon Dam Project; Thayetdabin Agriculture Project near Minhla; South
Nawin Dam Project near Paukkhaung; Nyaungaing Dam Project near
Padaung and Nathmaw River Water Pumping Project near Pyay.
First, there were bilateral prior agreements before setting out the trip, to avoid
unnecessary gathering of crowds and undesirable problems, and to
systematically put up signboards after obtaining the permission of the
respective Township Multi-Party Democracy Election Commissions in the
already agreed townships. During the trip, Daw Suu Kyi and NLD followers

carried out extended party organization and youth organization work, opened
party offices and conducted organizational task. In addition, they made
attempts to organize people to come out in crowds and made political
speeches at every opportunity; they even used monasteries to hold political
talks; they blocked the public roads, by placing tables in the middle of the
road to hold political talks. In their political talks, they didn’t educate the people
about the remedial and positive measures to help fulfill the national needs
and ensure national peace and stability. Instead, they tried to find fault with
and exaggerate the weak points of the government, and ultimately, they incited
the public to fight. Trip after trip, they intensified their opposition to and criticism
against the government and the State service personnel and attempted to
incite the public. Their unjust criticism and accusations against education
and health employees, departmental personnel, local authorities and some
organizations were based on false information. Thus, dissatisfaction at Daw
Suu Kyi grew among a large number of people. They were also creating
more problems by gathering crowds. The authorities found out that during the
trip, Daw Suu Kyi knew some information by herself and some from others.
Most of the information she received were incorrect. Because the news reports
she received were unfair, that were written much in favour of one side while
strongly opposing and slandering the other side. Such biased and
exaggerated information was sent to Yangon from other places, and then
distributed to foreign media. The bad system of ardently featuring or
broadcasting the news reports that will have ill effects on Myanmar government
by the foreign media is overwhelming the NLD. As Daw Suu Kyi is surrounded
by pessimists, the government understands that it was very difficult for her to
have a positive outlook on the government however much the government
tried with good intention and constructive attitude. Thus, although the
government has no desire to blame Daw Suu Kyi, it is true that her criticisms
and attempts to instigate the public, with democracy as an excuse, will lead
to undermining peace and stability of the State. He then recounted some
incidents during her latest trip to Kachin State, Sagaing Division, and
Mandalay Division.
Daw Suu Kyi informed the government officials on 2 May that she and her
team had a plan to travel to Kachin State on 6 May; and that she wanted to put
up signboards of some Township NLD offices during the trip. Thus, the officials

gave a reply to her on 4 May permitting her to put up signboards in some
townships. Then, she asked the officials to allow her to put up signboards at
16 more townships in Sagaing and Mandalay Divisions and Shan State. The
officials found out that some townships where NLD offices already had
signboards were also included in her list of 16 townships. The officials told
her that it was impossible to issue permits for the townships in time for her
trip; that they also had difficulties sometimes it was a public holiday; that
sometimes the senior official concerned was away on a trip; that the list
presented by the NLD stated only the names of the townships; that the
addresses of the places where the signboards were going to be put up were
not mentioned; that the place and the building where the signboard of a political
party would be erected had to be free from anything; that unnecessary
problems might occur if the party office was located at a religious land, a
State-owned building or land, a municipal-owned land, a farm land, a disputed
land, or a building without the consent of family members; that it was necessary
to study whether the land or the building would have such problems; that if the
officials asked the NLD to wait sometime for putting up the signboards
because of such problems, it usually accused the government of trying to ban
its signboard erection plan; that the officials had willingly permitted to put up
signboards at township NLD offices in Sagaing Division in time; that although
there were difficulties, the government always obliged with intention to build
mutual understanding and respect and to solve the problem.
If some incidents during the trip to Kachin State made by Daw Suu Kyi and
her NLD followers including U Tin Oo is reviewed, the NLD’s aims and
intentions can be seen clearly.
The problem started on 8 May when they left Mandalay for Sagaing. Beginning
from Sagaing Bridge, the NLD members flanked their convoy with about 20
motorcycles each flying flags, switching on the headlights although it was day
time, and blowing horns all along the way till reaching Shwebo. It was not sure
whether the party elders knew this or not. However, the motorcycles were
rolling flanking the convoy like that all along the way. The worst and the most
disorderly was the trip to Mogok from Momeik. The NLDs violated traffic rules
to the highest degree during the journey. About 40 motorcycles were rolling in
pairs in front of the convoy causing traffic jams all along the way till reaching
the guest house in central Mogok. The convoy was also flanked by motorcycles.
Traffic congestion also occurred in the town. During the journey from Mogok
to Mandalay, the NLDs also rode their motorcycles lawlessly. Because of
violating traffic rules, a motorcycle hit and ran over a 21-year old woman, Ma
Myat Thin Thu, of Pathein-lay village, Patheingyi Township. She was injured.
On 9 May, on arrival at Sabai Natha Village on its way from Kanbalu to Kawlin
Township, the convoy met with about 20 youths who came out of the video
house shouting “We don’t want Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” The convoy stopped
there and the followers, who are the so-called NLD youths, used abusive
language and harsh words in the middle of the village. The village youths had
to ran away as the NLD followers were throwing stones at them. At about 6

pm, the convoy arrived in Kawlin. Preparations had been made for a summer
course organized by the Union Solidarity and Development Association at a
high school. As usual, the signboard bearing the points of the People’s Desire
was also hung at the school. The so-called NLD youths took photos and shot
video of the school. The two youths from the school compound also took
photos of the convoy. The NLD youths shouted at those youths and threw
stones at them. The youths from the school compound had to flee. On reaching
Indaw, it had already past nine. Some 70 people who did not support Daw
Suu Kyi staged a demonstration, holding placards bearing the four-point
People’s Desire. However, NLDs in the dark threw stones at them. As a result,
some villagers, Htay Lwin (a) Bo Lwin, Thein Nu, Than Oo, Soe Myint Oo and
Zaw Lwin Oo, were injured.
On 11 May, the convoy reached Katha. There were a lot of people who
opposed Daw Suu Kyi’s trip there. Both sides shouted at each other with
slogans. The two sides retreated from the place and the convoy could leave
the village only after the Chairman of District Peace and Development Council
had intervened. Fortunately, there were no physical attacks between the two
groups. NLD party members in some townships and villages in Kachin State
welcomed Daw Suu Kyi in various forms. Those who opposed her also staged
protests to let NLDs know their desire. There were not so much prohibition,
obstruction or disturbances to the convey as stated in the NLD announcements
that were sent to foreign broadcasting stations daily. There were also no hurling
of stones at the convoy, attacks with clubs, hitting the windscreen with fist or
threats with Kachin traditional sword. If such threats and attacks had taken
place, the NLD convoy would have been crushed into pieces.
After arriving at Momeik on 21 May, not only did Daw Suu Kyi made political
speeches, but also U Tin Oo made slanderous remarks against the
government, threatening the local authorities to sue under various legal
sections. On 25 May, Kyaw Naing of Wayongon Village and San Oo and Bo
Cho of Yaukpinyoe Village of the crowd which came out to oppose Daw Suu
Kyi at Nweyon Village in Singu Township were injured by NLD catapult attack.
According to the NLD announcement, one of its members was also injured in
the incident. When Daw Suu Kyi arrived at Mandalay Division NLD Office in
Mandalay, where she and her followers were temporarily staying, she made
attempts to organize a crowd and gave a speech. As the crowd was blocking
the street, traffic police of Maha Aungmye Township came to the scene and
cleared the traffic jam and blockage. Some NLD party members struck the
Dyna light truck bearing number plate 5 Ka/8175 with iron rods. The car which
carried the policemen parked between 78th and 79th streets. The car’s
windscreen was smashed. An NLD news report said that the NLD members
hit the car as it drove into the crowd.
The acts of Daw Suu Kyi and party had reached beyond the degree of creating
just public disorder wherever they arrived. They intensified their act of moving
in a group of motorcycles, cars and men. They started their journey from
Yangon with only three cars carrying 18 persons. Their manpower had risen

to over 100 riding seven cars, 20 motorcycles in travelling from Mandalay to
Monywa on 29 May. When they arrived in Monywa from ChaungOo, the convoy
had 150 motorcycles, 16 cars and over 300 people. They went round Monywa
for three hours and created disturbances and disorder in the peaceful and
tranquil Monywa. A photographer named Maung Myo Myint documenting the
incident was beaten by a pack of NLDs. He received head injuries and was
warded at the hospital. His video camera was also destroyed. Daw Suu Kyi
and party put up signboard in Monywa NLD party office at night, which was
against the rules of the bilateral agreement. According to the agreement, the
NLD must inform the matter to and ask permission from the Township Multiparty
Democracy General Election Commission or Township Peace and
Development Council.
At about noon on 30 May, the convoy of 15 cars, with about 100 motorcycles
serving as point men left and right flanks and rearguards left Monywa for
Budalin. They entered Budalin at high speed, switching on the headlights of
the motorcycles and making much noise. The signboard of Budalin Township
NLD Office was then put up. Afterwards, they left for Dapayin. They stopped
at Saipyin Village and continued their trip to Dapayin with a convoy of nine
cars and 40 motorcycles at roundabout 7.30 pm. A large group of people
numbering about 5,000 were waiting for Daw Suu Kyi to stage a demonstration
against her at a place two miles from the entrance to Dapayin. As the vehicles
of NLD convoy drove out of the mob, clashes broke out between the two
opposing groups. Disorder and brawl occurred from about 8 pm to 11 pm. A
vehicle at high speed ran into a tree on road side. A vehicle of NLD convoy
run off the road, breaking its windscreen. It is learnt that NLD members torched
a vehicle of those opposed to Daw Suu Kyi. Four people died in the car
crash. The clashes left 50 people injured. Eight vehicles and nine motorcycles
were destroyed. After hearing the news, security personnel comprising MPF
members led by the Secretary of Sagaing Division Peace and Development
Council rushed to the scene and tried to put the situation under control. The
situation was put under total control about midnight. The injured were admitted
to hospitals for medical treatment. The authorities are taking measures to
address the situation and ensure regional peace and tranquility. There were
some incidents in which NLD members destroyed at night some signboards
bearing “People’s Desire” set up in Monywa but when security personnel
arrived NLD members dispersed in all directions. Now peace and tranquility
prevails in Monywa.
In the incident, the problem would not have arisen if the NLD convoy could
manage to peacefully pass through the demonstrators on either side of the
road and on the road. The conflict occurred as vehicles and motorbikes from
NLD convoy sped past the mass of the people. The cause of the problem
was that NLD broke the terms of the agreement reached with the government
and had taken the course of confrontation, thus causing disorder and
disturbances. The NLD could not even control its supporters on the road and
motorcyclists. Officials of the government frequently contacted and forewarned
those responsible in NLD to exercise restraint to avoid untoward incidents

during the organization tour. But it is assumed that the problem occurred since
NLD did not accept the warning and took the course of confrontation
intentionally with the use of its members.
The security personnel concerned are giving NLD members including Daw
Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo proper care and protection.
It is known to all that Myanmar could not make efforts peacefully to build a
modern and developed nation after regaining the independence like other
countries. Time was consumed in tackling problems including internal strife,
power struggles resulting from differences in ideologies, internal uprisings
and machinations of the national traitors. Tasks for national development could
not be carried out peacefully. Nowadays, those unfavourable conditions have
been wiped out to a great extent and favourable conditions are being created.
Way has been paved for the national development. Efforts are to be made for
the national development with the effective use of good conditions. Thus,
national reconciliation or national recon-solidation or national unity is to be
built based on understanding. At the same time, all are to take part in seeking
means and ways for development of the Union of Myanmar with understanding.
Having to tackle problems and refute accusations will not contribute to the
national recon-solidation mentioned above. The government will take
systematic measures to ensure community peace and tranquility and
prevalence of law and order for development of the State.
Then, Head of Department Brig-Gen Than Tun of the Ministry of Defence

replied to queries raised by the journalists and the press conference ended
at 4.45 pm.

Appendix (6)
Translation of an interview with Zaw Zaw Aung, head of NLD
Youth Wing Mandalay Division, concerning the brutal attack on
30 May. He was traveling along with Aung Suu Kyi at the time
of the attack.
To listen to the interview in Burmese, please visit http://www.nldla-
australia.org/. This translation is also available at www.ncgub.net
Q. You were in the midst of the attack on Daw Su’s motorcade at

Depayin Township in Sagaing Division and luckily escaped. What time
did you leave Butalin for Depayin?
A. Between 4:30 and 5.
Q. At about what time did you reach Kyi Village?

A. At about 8 at night.
Q. Were there people on the road to greet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi?
A. Yes. We responded and spoke to the people.
Q. Were there people who shouted and opposed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
there?
A. I heard no such shouting.
Q. It was 8 p.m. when you arrived at Kyi Ywa. How many people were
there to greet and welcome you all?
A. I would estimate about 3000. It could have been as large as four or
five thousand.
Q. Is it a big village?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there jungle on both sides of Kyi Ywa?

A. There are paddy fields.
Q. Did you hear any opposition voices in the crowd that was out there to
welcome you all?
A. No. I did not hear any opposition voices.
Q. Were there any posters, etc. expressing dissent?

A. No.
Q. So Daw Suu addressed the people for how long?

A. About 10 minutes.

Q. You all went on from there?
A. We had not gone very far. About 200 feet from the villagers – the
cars behind had not caught up with us as yet. We could see the villagers.
They had not dispersed. Then, two monks and three laymen stood in
front of Daw Suu’s car stopping it from proceeding. They asked Daw Suu
to speak to the people.
Q. Instead of being at the place where the people had already

assembled?
A. They could have joined them if they wanted. Instead, they stood and
waited at a distance.
Q. Stood and waited, then asked for a speech?

A. Yes, they asked her to step out and speak. It was late. We had to go
on to Depayin also. So, the NLD member who was in Daw Su’s car said,
“ Honorable monk, it is very late and there is no time. Please excuse
your disciples.” But the monks did not leave. They were looking back
and said, “The people in our gang are useless.” We got out of the car
and stood around to protect Daw Su. Then the monk said, “My people
will be following up. Listen to a monk’s words. Try your best to preach
to them.” We requested them to let us pass, but they insisted that we
stay. Then, the place was lit up by car headlights and we saw about 7
cars.
Q. What sort of cars?

A. All sorts. Trucks that carry goods, earth, and Dyna cars. People
descended from those cars and without saying anything they beat up the
villagers. Because the headlights were on we could see all that was
happening.
Q. Were the villagers beaten up by the people who came out of those
cars?
A. Yes. The cars were not close by but because the headlights were on
we could see everything. There were a lot of monks who carried out the
beatings. A lot of men too.
Q. So monks came out of those cars?

A. When the villagers were being beaten up they screamed and fled.
They were chased by some of those men. Others came around to our
side, surrounded us and without saying anything just thrashed at us. We
noticed that these monks had pieces of white cloth tied around their
right hands.
Q. These monks are referred to as ‘Identity’?

A. This is how they identify themselves. This indicates that they are not
like ordinary monks.

Q. Can we accept them as genuine monks?
A. How could that be. When they beat up the villagers and our party
who were acting peacefully. We heard and we saw for ourselves how
they continued thrashing even those who were dead on the ground.
Innocent people were beaten to death. Genuine monks would not do
that.
Q. So, they beat up the villagers first, then went between the villagers
and the NLD party and proceeded to beat them up also?
A. Yes. They beat up NLD members. The villagers fled and some could
have fallen with NLD members. Our numbers were small. But whether
our numbers were small or large, no one had any weapons. Our leaders
gave strict instructions that even if attacked we were not to respond with
violence. We were to bear it with fortitude.
Q. So they continued to brutally beat up all the NLD members who

accompanied the motorcade?
A. To kill, to mutilate was their purpose. So much so that if they saw a
body moving they went for it saying, “There is still sign of life – beat,
beat.” Not with just one stick. They went through the crowd with two or
three sticks in hand and thrashed at fallen bodies. They responded to
groans or pleas for mercy with severer thrashings. At that time we were
very afraid for our lives. So we lay very still and did not move. At that
time these were the words they uttered, “ We have built roads, we have
built bridges. You do not talk about these things. What has your Aung
San Suu Kyi done for the country? You want to be under the authority of
the Kala’s wife.” [Kala meaning white man] Again they thrashed at the
fallen bodies.
Q. We heard that women also accompanied Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
What happened to them?
A. Yes, the women wore ‘pinny’ [home-spun material]. The men also
wore pinny. They announced that they did not want to see any ‘pinny’
and ordered all to remove their pinny clothing. They snatched and
pulled off the pinny clothing of the fallen bodies and those within their
reach. The girls asked them not to pull off their clothes, but they forced
them and grabbed and tugged and removed their clothes. Some of them
had their gold chains snatched. I saw this with my own eyes. Not
satisfied with this, they grabbed and took away their handbags also.
Q. So they beat up the people, and then made them remove their pinny
garments. For the men, removal of the pinny jacket is no problem, but
for the women this would be most embarrassing and disgraceful
because it is worn as a blouse. So this was a deliberate act to cause
them shame.
A. Yes, they took their necklaces and their bags with money too.
Q. For how long were they doing this?

A. It could have been no less than two hours. They went around to all
the cars and vehicles and watched to see if there was any movement and
looked on at those with injuries.
Q. What about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car?

A. Very soon after all this started five cars, including Daw Su’s and U Tin
Oo’s car, drove off to the front. The Youth Wing Security car and our
Mandalay Division car too.
Q. So they escaped from Kyi Ywa and you were left behind? So the
beating took place for about two hours after they had driven off?
A. Yes, it was more than two hours.
Q. Can you give an estimate of how many died or were wounded as a

result of that attack?
A. Over 20 people. I am talking about what happened at Kyi Ywa. What
happened after that I estimate that …
Q. So Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car got away. Then again at Depayin the
same thing happened?
A. Yes. The young people from there fled and I met them. They were
beaten up with spears- wooden and bamboo and iron rods. They saw
students with hands tied being led away and their cycles confiscated.
This person’s cycle was taken but he managed to escape.
Q. Our information reveals that gunshots were heard there.

A. Yes. We heard the gunshots. It was between midnight and 1:00 am.
We were deeply worried for our Aunty Suu and Uncle U Tin Oo. Without
any shooting, here about 20 or so died and sustained injuries. With
shooting it could have been worse. More could have died.
Q. Did these attackers go forward or did they retreat?

A. It appeared to be a separate group. They turned and dispersed.
Q. At about what time?

A. After 10:00 pm.
Q. How did you escape then?

A. I was lucky. I escaped without injury. I fled and crossed the paddy
fields to Monywa.
Q. After you escaped what did the USDA do after they retreated?
A. Though I was not hurt, I was shaken and very distressed. It was
about 10:30. I saw a person on a cycle. He looked like he had come to
see the spectacle. He stood and looked at the dead and after some time
he departed. Then at about 12:45, three Hino buses arrived without any

passengers. They saw the injured and fallen, some dead and the line of
cars. They turned back and left.
Q. So those injured and the dead were left lying there?

A. Yes, I saw some being taken away in cars.
Q. In the end what happened?

A. We were not steady on our feet. I looked on. At about 12:45 (I had
my watch on so I knew the time) members of the police force, the fire
brigade, and local authorities put the injured and dead bodies into motor
vehicles. Then what astonished me most was that our car, which was
heading west for Depayin, was pushed so that it appeared to be heading
south and shoved down into the ditch. Another car was also pushed into
the ditch. This was a deliberate act to create a different scenario. I
witnessed this with my own eyes.
Q. To look as if two cars had collided?

A. Yes, to appear that way. I couldn’t believe my eyes. I remember this
very clearly. Then some of the cars with injured people drove off
towards Depayin. Some cars went in the other direction. About 30
persons remained. I cannot say definitely if they were the police or
USDA members because they all were in the same uniform. They
pushed the cars towards the Ye U side.
Q. These were the cars in which NLD members had traveled?

A. Yes. They pushed them. Then we could hear them removing steel
parts from them.
Q. All of this happened in Kyi Ywa? You don’t know what happened in
Depayin?
A. No, I don’t know about that.
Q. Earlier you said that you had heard gunshots from the place towards
which the cars were headed after this incident. Some did not say so.
Some said they saw. It looks like there was another party of attackers.
A. Yes, that is definite. Because we heard those shots and people who
saw it have spoken about it.
Q. Thank you for giving us this information.

A. This is an account of what we know. If they fired shouts many would
have died. It must be worse than what happened here.
Q. The events that happened later must have been more serious.
A. Yes. We have experienced very serious attacks. Thank you.

Appendix (7)
Testimony of Soe Than, NLD member, Kamaryut Township,
Rangoon
Personal data
Name: Soe Than (a.k.a. Aung Soe Than)
Date of Birth: 1 January 1971
Parents: U Sein Net & Daw Aye Yee
Occupation: Farmer
Address Kyauk Twinn Village, Myaing Township, Magwe

Division
ID number: 8/Ma Ma Na (Naing) 032 913

My name is Soe Than (a.k.a. Aung Soe Than). My ID number is 8/Ma Ma
Na (Naing) 032 913. My parents are U Sein Net & Daw Aye Yee. I was
born on 1 January 1971. My educational level is eighth standard. I worked
as a farmer when I lived in Kyauk Twinn village, Myaing Township, Magwe
Division.
In 1995, I joined the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Kamarut

Township, Rangoon. My position was “In Charge No. 1” of the NLD Youth
Wing of my Township.
On 24 August 1998, I was arrested. I was prosecuted under State Provision

Act, section 5 (j). On 20 October, I was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment
in Special Court No. 1 inside the compound of Insein Prison.
On 22 January 2000, 47 political prisoners and I were transferred to

Tharawaddy Prison. On 23 September 2002, I was released from prison
under an agreement (401 criminal procedure code) that my sentence was
suspended but would be extended if I engaged in any political affairs
against the regime. Military Intelligence (MI) personnel took me to my
native village on 25 September. I joined the township NLD branch in
Rangoon.
While I was working in the NLD, I experienced the following confrontations

between the junta and Aung San Suu Kyi:
1. The planned attack on people gathered to listen to

Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech at Gwitalit junction,
Bahan Township, Rangoon, on 3 November 1996.
2. The planned attack on the Aung San Suu Kyi, Tin

Oo and Kyi Maung, leaders of NLD on 9 November
1996. They had left their residences to meet with
the public.
3. Disturbance against the founding ceremony of the

NLD Youth Wing in Mayangone Township,
Rangoon Division on 28 October 1997.
4. Physically harming the participants of a reading

circle session on 25 June 1998.
5. Disturbing Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Irrawaddy

(21-29 July 1998)
6. Disturbing Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Irrawaddy

(12-24 August 1998)

As far as I can remember, the military government has attempted repeatedly
to assassinate Aung San Suu Kyi since 1996.
Win Sein delivered a speech against Aung San Suu Kyi during a ceremony
at the Lel Pyin Village primary school in Indaw Township. He delivered the
speech at the ceremony to present applications for USDA memberships.
He was Minister for Rail Transportation and a secretary of the USDA at
that time. He said, “We must get rid of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is creating
political unrest. Do you understand what it means to ‘get rid of?’ It means
we’ll have to kill her. Have you got the guts to kill her?” He repeatedly
asked the crowd of USDA members. No one responded to him. Therefore,
he continued, “We must kill her.”
After his speech, USDA members in Rangoon Division were selected for
training in order to attack Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members. Since 1
November 1996, there were special trainings for USDA members in a
building near the Ministry of Home Affairs compound. The trainings even
emphasized practicing how to attack people and vehicles.
At that time, Aung San Suu Kyi usually gave public speeches in front of
her residence on the weekends. On 3 November 1996, the authorities
stopped people at Gwitalit junction. As a result, the public was not able to
go to Aung San Suu Kyi and they just stayed at the junction. In some
other places also, the public was blocked from going to Aung San Suu Kyi.
The people coming from North Okalapa Township and Kaba Aye Pagoda
were blocked at the junction near Sedona Hotel. The people coming from
South Okalapa Township, Thinggangyun and Tamwe Townships were
blocked at Harmittit junction.
At about 5:00 pm, some vehicles reached the public blocked near Sedona
Hotel. Several USDA members got out of the vehicles and went into the
crowd. I was in the crowd. We all were forced to stay in a small area
because the authorities had blocked the roads.
We all stayed close together. Then, we decided to join the crowd at the
Gwitalit junction. We walked together along Set Hmu Tit Road. USDA
members also stayed among us. Several riot police disturbed us at the
back of the crowd.
While we were walking, some USDA members in the crowd shouted,

“Run! Run!” The people had no idea why they were being asked to run. I
noticed that the people shouting and running away were USDA members.
They have (Burmese traditional) bags. Some of them were wearing their
sarong over their shoulder. After they alarmed people and began running,
many people also ran. The riot police chased after those running and beat
them up. USDA members also attacked the people using batons and
catapults they had in their bags. As the two groups systematically attacked
the people, the people scattered and some were arrested.

On Saturday, 9 November, people tried to reach Aung San Suu Kyi’s
residence to hear the speech she was giving. The authorities prohibited
the gathering by using various tactics. The authorities also tried to
assassinate NLD leaders.
That day, the University Avenue was closed between Innya Road junction
and Gwitalit junction. Kaba Aye Pagoda Road was also blocked from Sedona
Hotel to Harmitit junction. The authorities had effectively blocked every
road leading to Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence.
The people were not allowed to pass through to that area. USDA members
were placed there in advance and behaved like local residents. USDA
members from North Okalapa Township stayed around the Sedona Hotel.
Some were playing ‘Chin Lone’, cane ball and football. Some were playing
chess, while others sat on the side of the road as though they were porters.
In the early evening, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo went to Kyi Maung’s
residence. After Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade left his home, some 200
thugs on the Kaba Aye Pagoda Road attacked the motorcade. They had
weapons and had been waiting for the motorcade. During the attack,
Aung San Suu Kyi’s driver drove the car through the thugs so that she was
able to escape the assassination attempt. As the thugs used stones, chains
and batons, the windows of Aung San Suu Kyi’s car were destroyed. If the
driver hadn’t been able to drive away, she would have been killed on the
spot.
Tin Oo’s vehicle was also under attack. His left cheek was injured by pieces
of glass. Vice Chairperson Kyi Maung was also attacked. He later told me
that he barely escaped the attacks with different sorts of weapons. However,
he did incur some head injuries from pieces of glass.
The three NLD leaders barely escaped the brutal attack and just reached
us at the Gwitalit junction. Then, they gave speeches for a while, as the
people were waiting to hear them.
It’s clear that the authorities had tried to assassinate the NLD leaders.
On 28 October 1997, Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members tried to go to
the Mayangon Township NLD branch office in order to join in the founding
ceremony of a local NLD Youth Wing. USDA members and several riot
police blocked the road. On Kaba Aye Pagoda Road, Aung San Suu Kyi
and NLD members were harassed in various ways. Vice Chairperson Kyi
Maung and some 20 others were arrested and sent to Shwe Ta Kaw
Cemetery, on the outskirts of Rangoon. Some 100 NLD members, including
myself, were arrested and sent to different places on the outskirts of

Rangoon. In the evening, eight activists, including the following, were
arrested at their homes. They received seven years imprisonment each.
1. Khin Maung Myint (died in Kalay Prison)
2. Win Win Htay (a.k.a. Ma Po)
3. Nyan Thaung, owner of the residence in which the Mayangone

Township NLD branch was operating
4. Soe Myint, Chairperson of Thakata Township NLD branch
5. Dr. Than Nyein, elected MP
6. Dr. May Win Myint, elected MP
On 24 June 1998, there was another assassination attempt against Aung

San Suu Kyi. Some other Youth Wing members and I tried to reach Aung
San Suu Kyi’s home in order to join a circle reading session. We were
planning to discuss the book “United States Government”. The book was
translated by Daw San May (a.k.a. Shwe Ku May Hninn).
The MI checkpoint in front of ‘Pyae Wa’ restaurant didn’t allow us to go on

to Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence. The MI personnel told us that the Youth
Wing members were not allowed to go because there would not by any
reading session. They refused to allow us to go to her house because they
said they hadn’t received the list of people who wanted to attend. They
gave different sorts of excuses and kept us from passing the MI checkpoint.
The intelligence units had been running camps around Aung San Suu Kyi’s
home. They claimed that they had to stay there for her security. Intelligence
personnel carefully checked everyone before they visited Aung San Suu
Kyi.
On that day, Tin Oo, vice chairperson of the NLD, gave a list to the
intelligence personnel. The list included the names of the participants
going to join the reading circle session. However, we were still not permitted
to enter her residence. We reported to Tin Oo that we were at the checkpoint
and he later reached us. The intelligence personnel still continued to block
us. Tin Oo went to Aung San Suu Kyi to inform her about what was
happening at the checkpoint and he was allowed to enter her residence.
Soon after, he and Aung San Suu Kyi reached us by car. She told us,
“Come to my residence. (We’re having a) reading circle session.” Finally,
we passed the checkpoint. The two NLD leaders followed us in their car.

Major Sithu, an MI officer ordered, “Stop them! Stop them all! Don’t let
them pass!” The riot police blocked the road. We said, “Our leader has
already given permission. We will go on to her residence”. The officer
shouted, “What kind of a leader is she anyway? Strike! We don’t care!”
Mone Naing of Bahan Township, Aung Htoo of Botahtaung Township,

Pyae Sone of Irrawaddy Division, Aye Tun of Yan Kin Township, and I
stayed at the head. Other NLD members followed us. Tin Aye, Myo Min
Naing and some other Youth Wing members followed, staying around
Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle. We passed the residence of the Military Attaché
to Thailand. Then, we reached the primary school next to Aung San Suu
Kyi’s house.
At that time, Major Sithu ordered, “Beat them up! Beat all of them up!”
Soldiers, MI personnel and riot police (about 70) started to beat us. First
the five people at the head of the group, including me, were beaten. Then,
Aung San Suu Kyi left her car and ran to us shouting, “Don’t beat the
young people. Just beat me”. We also shouted, “Don’t come near us!”
However, she ran towards us. She told us, “Don’t fight back! Just accept
the attack.” She asked us to respond with nonviolence. She shouted, “Let
them beat you, and allow it!”
Captain Zaw Htoo Aung was also there. He was the Intelligence officer
based at Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence. He shouted, “Be careful! Sister
(Aung San Suu Kyi) is with them! Sister is with them!” However, Major
Sithu didn’t heed this warning because he is a senior office. Major Sithu
shouted, “I don’t care sister or whoever! Beat all of them up!”
Riot police used different kinds of weapons, such as batons, wooden planks
from the primary school yard, and tree branches. They also used the
helmets that they wore. The attackers also included security officers that
had pretended to be locals before the attack. They grabbed the nearest
planks and attack us with them. Aye Tun suffered a head injury. Mar Mar
Oo was hit on the back of the head and she fell down. Dr. Than Win
(elected MP of North Okalapa Constituency) was also taken down on the
tar road. His pinny jacket (NLD uniform) was also torn. Some NLD members
behind Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle were beaten and taken away. They
were pushed back to Koke Kine junction.
Tin Oo, vice chairperson of NLD, didn’t protect himself. He protected only
Aung San Suu Kyi. He used his big umbrella to stop them from beating
Aung San Suu Kyi. He is a former military leader. He was much quicker
and more skillful than us at protecting her. However, his big umbrella was
destroyed and he was also beaten. We took the beatings with our own
hands. My right hand was hurt and until today I can’t use it properly.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s left shoulder was hurt. Tin Oo warned, “Young girls,
protect your aunty, embrace her!” Then, the young girls embraced her. We
also stayed behind the girls while we held each others’ hands. Our backs
were terribly hurt because of the beatings. They attacked us for ten or
fifteen minutes before they stopped. However, the riot police and soldiers
continued to surround us. They then placed barbed wire around the
soldiers.
There were about 30 of us. We had tried to enter the compound at about
2:00 pm. It was raining all day and water flooded the tar road. About
seven buses pulled up so no one at the junction would be able to see us.
Riot police moved back behind the buses. Then, the authorities placed the
barbed wire behind the riot police. We were completely blocked in.
There was blood on Aung San Suu Kyi’s shoulder. Major Thura (also known
as Major Nay Soe) said, “You can go if you want. Ask the young people to
return home. Don’t let them go into your compound.” She replied, “Thura,
you know me. We will all go inside. Otherwise, we will not go.” Then, he
and some other officers went back to their base camp around Aung San
Suu Kyi’s house.
We just sat there in the rain. Aung San Suu Kyi explained that the book
was about the United States’ government and we had planed to discuss it
during a reading circle session. The book details the duties and
responsibilities of the president, congressmen, and the rights of the people
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. This constitution was
created by the people’s representatives. In Burma, the military government
was trying to draw up a constitution by themselves. The junta didn’t want
us to discuss the book because it contained facts about the U.S. Constitution.
Tin Oo talked about his experiences on the battlefield. Then, we all sang
political songs.
At midnight, Tin Oo slept on the tar road while leaning against us. Aung
San Suu Kyi also leaned against the girls and slept.
The next morning, at 10:45 am, Major Thura came to us and said, “You
all can go inside the house.” We then took showers and rested for awhile.
Dr. Tin Myo Win came to us and treated people who had been injured. At
about noon, we had lunch together. We hadn’t eaten a meal with her
before. It was our very first time.
The attack carried out by riot police and soldiers was the second assassination
attempt against Aung San Suu Kyi. She escaped because Tin Oo was able
to protect her.

In 1998, the military government arrested elected MPs all over Burma
under 1961 Habitual Criminal Offenders Act, Section 5(1) (f) and (g). The
NLD objected to those arrests, releasing a statement that read that the
people of Burma had elected those representatives and that the authorities
had arrested them merely to insult them.
However, the junta told the international community that those elected
MPs were not under arrest. Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to show that they
were in fact under arrest. She tried to visit Min Hla Township in order to
meet Hla Hla Moe, an elected MP. She was stopped along the way. She was
blocked in front of Riot Police Regiment 5 in Mawbe Township, on the
outskirts of Rangoon.
She also tried to visit elected MPs in the Irrawaddy Division. She was
blocked when she went to Nyaung Done Township. She left Rangoon at
around 9:30 am. She was blocked in front of the Riot Police Regiment 9
in Hlaingthaya Township. When the road was crowded with vehicles the
authorities unblocked the road. However, she was blocked off again in
Htan Tapin Township.
The authorities forced the local people of Ahnyasu Village, Htan Tapin
Township to carry sandbags, which were placed on the bridge in Ahnyasu
Village. The villagers were also forced to erect barbed wire in order to
block the road. Highway buses were standing by near the bridge.
When Aung San Suu Kyi’s car arrived, the two buses moved to the bridge
in order to block the road. Aung San Suu Kyi’s driver was forced to make a
U-turn. The driver was skilled, which is why there wasn’t an accident.
When the car stopped, riot police rushed to the car. The riot police officer
ordered Aung San Suu Kyi to return to Rangoon. She replied, “I came to
meet the elected MPs. Why did you block the road?” The officer said, “I
can’t answer your question. Just go back to Rangoon.” She replied, “I will
not go back at all. Don’t tell me again.”
Then, the riot police lifted up her car to the small bridge nearby. The
bridge was over the ditch along the road. Inside the car, Aung San Suu Kyi
was with Hla Pe, chairperson of Irrawaddy Division NLD branch, and two
drivers.
The officer said, “You are allowed to return to Rangoon. But, you can’t
continue your trip.” The riot police unblocked the highway road. Aung San
Suu Kyi’s car tried to drive away. A truck waiting nearby blocked the
highway road. The riot police lifted the car and moved it onto the small
bridge again. They installed brake locks on the car’s wheels because they
didn’t want the car to drive away. Anyone on the highway could not have
known that her car was blocked. Passersby would have thought that the
car was parked along the roadside and that the people inside the car were

taking a rest. The authorities systematically blocked her because they wanted
to maintain the claim to the international community that they didn’t stop
her.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the three others in the car didn’t receive any meals.
They collected water using an umbrella when it rained. They stayed there
for eight days.
Dr. Tin Myo Min, her family doctor was allowed to meet them. On the
eighth day, the doctor claimed that she would die if she didn’t receive
proper food and water. The international community asked the junta to
free her. At about 10:00 pm, Major Thura and two female police officers
took her away by force. She was then forced to return to Rangoon. A
police officer drove the car. Inside the car, Major Thura held her waist
while two female police officers held her legs.
After they were forced to return to Rangoon, Aung San Suu Kyi, Hla Pe,
and the two drivers held a press conference. They presented some
photographs at the press conference. Dr. Tin Myo Win also explained how
he had to save her life while she was in a weakened state inside the car.
That was the third assassination attempt against her. Fortunately, she lived.
I believe that she survived because of her goodwill for the country.
From 12-24 August 1998, she tried to visit Irrawaddy in order to meet Dr.
Tin Min Htut, elected MP of Pantanaw Constituency-1. Again, riot police
moved her car to the same small bridge for 13 days. This time she brought
water bottles and snacks in the car. Because of those provisions, her health
didn’t deteriorate too seriously. The authorities didn’t feed her anything
over the 13 days. This was the fourth assassination attempt.
To obtain information about Aung San Suu Kyi, four other NLD members
and I went to the place where she was being held under arrest. On 21
August, the authorities tried to arrest us so we left for Rangoon. On 24
August, I was arrested. I was tortured while in prison.
After I was released from prison, I rejoined the NLD. I took part in Aung
San Suu Kyi’s trip to Chin State in 2003. During the trip, the local people
who came to see Aung San Suu Kyi were attacked. Htay Oo, chairperson
of the District Peace and Development Council beat them using a bamboo
shoot. I witnessed it in Myoma Road. Firemen in uniform also arrived at
the area where Aung San Suu Kyi was giving speech. In their car, they
played loud music to disrupt and disturb her.
Captain Lin Zaw Kan of MI Unit 20 came and recorded her speech using a
tape recorder. The authorities blocked the suspension bridge that connects
the east and west areas of Gangaw Township. A Kalay-Yay Ne train was
also canceled. The authorities didn’t want the local people to welcome

Aung San Suu Kyi. The authorities understood that she has the support of
the local people.
When we left Gangaw Township, large logs blocked the road. We had to
remove them from the road in order to continue the trip. Those large logs
were from the forest reserve. The authorities claimed that Aung San Suu
Kyi had freedom of movement, which was clearly untrue.
The above-mentioned events are my own experiences. I had to express it

because I want other people to know that the junta has tried to assassinate
Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta cannot hide what happened at Depayin.
Now, many people are becoming aware of the Depayin Massacre.
-Soe Than
(a.k.a. Aung Soe Than)

Appendix (8)
Statement by Prof. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
58th Session of the General Assembly
Third Committee, Item 117 (c)
12 November 2003, New York
Mr. President,
I have the honor to introduce my interim report, which refers to my

activities and developments relating to the human rights situation in
Myanmar in the first seven months of 2003. I am pleased to present you
an update following my sixth visit to Myanmar from 3 to 8 November
2003.
My main government interlocutors were the Prime Minister, General Khin

Nyunt Secretary-2 of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC);
the Foreign Minister and his Deputy; the Home Minister; the Head of
Department of the Office of the Military Intelligence; the Director-General
of the Prisons Department; representatives of the governmental Human
Rights Committee and the National Convention Convening Commission. I
had access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK), the General Secretary of
the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as three members of
the NLD Central Executive Committee (CEC), who are currently under
house arrest. I also met with representatives of ethnic nationalities parties
and other political parties, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), the
diplomatic community, international civil society organizations, international
and local, business community, and the media. I would like to express my
appreciation to the Myanmar authorities for their full cooperation in
facilitating my mission.
Mr. President,
This visit took place in a very different context to past visits. Since my last
mission in March 2003, the human rights situation and the process for
national reconciliation have been marked by significant setbacks, the
incident in Depayin on 30 May 2003 involved serious human rights abuses
and had deep political implications. In my last report, I presented the
accounts of the 30 May events according to the version of the authorities

and other reliable sources, as well as my own preliminary reading of the
incident, based on the information available at the time of writing. During
this mission, I was able to supplement my knowledge about the incident
through interviews with some victims and eyewitnesses as well as
discussions with the authorities and DASSK. In response to my request, I
was told that the authorities would share with me an unpublished report
on the results of their official investigation. From what I heard and saw
during this mission, I can say that there is prima facie evidence that the
Depayin incident could not have happened without the connivance of State
agents. The evidence that I was able to collect until now indicates that, as
pro-DASSK rallies were growing larger, in particular from 25 to 30 May
2003, there was an escalation of threats, provocation, harassment,
intimidation, bullying, and orchestrated acts of violence with the involvement
of those opposed to the NLD and/or those who had some connection to
government affiliated bodies. I find it difficult to believe that it would not
have been possible to handle the evolving situation peacefully, thus averting
the unnecessary loss of human life and suffering.
What happened at Depayin constitutes a lamentable regression in the area

of human rights, not only the incident itself but also its ripple effects; the
closure of all NlD offices in the country; the incommunicado detention of
DASSK; the house arrests of NLD-CEC members; arrests and sentencing
of NLD members and supporters and others activists; and their increased
surveillance and intimidation. Effective measures to bring perpetrators to
justice are still lacking, as mostly people who were victims of attack, rather
than their attackers, had been arrested.
Rectifying this regression requires the immediate unconditional release of

all those who have been in detention or under house arrest since 30 May
2003. In addition, compensation for the surviving victims and the families
of those who lost their lives should be considered. There should also be a
thorough investigation, in accordance with international standards including
public announcement of its results and accountability of those responsible.
There should also be guarantees for non-reprisal and non-intimidation
against those who cooperate in establishing the truth about Deapyin. NLD
office should be re-opened too. All of these measures will contribute to
healing some of the wounds left by this tragedy.
Looking back at the period between May 2002 and May 2003, when many
people had some hope, albeit mixed with uncertainty, I have the impression
that opportunities were missed to build on the earlier confidence-building
efforts. Lack of sufficiently solid bonds of mutual confidence lead to mistrust
instead of growing confidence and eventually resulted in what happened
in Dapayin. The tragedy on 30 May 2003 should not have happened and
must not occur again.
The 30 May events also became a key defining moment in the change of
attitude of the international community towards Myanmar. The SPDC came

under unprecedented international condemnation, which resulted in
increased international sanctions against the country. Subsequent actions
of the SPDC, namely the appointment of the new Prime Minister in August
2003 and his announcement of the seven-point road map, were
acknowledged by some members of the international community.
Lessons should be learned from the Depayin incident and that knowledge
applied sooner rather than later by all those who really care for the future
of Myanmar. It is not a question of seeking revenge, or taking a partisan
political stance. Effective redress of those human rights violations involved
in the incident would also provide a moral compass to guide the country
forward on the path to democratization. Missing this opportunity for
reconciliation could lead to more negative developments. I, therefore,
proposed to the SPDC that they allow me to conduct an independent
assessment of the 30 May events. The authorities have not yet agreed to
this proposal.
During this mission, I got sufficient insights on the so-called road map of
the SPDC, The SPDC established three committees (Convening, Working
and Administrative) to prepare the National Convention, which had their
first joint meeting on 5 November 2003. The authorities informed me that
the starting point for the National Convention would be the 104 Principles,
all political parties would be able to participate equally in the Convention
and there would be new elections according to a new constitution. My
reading of this information is that the results of the 1990 elections are
unlikely to be considered. In my view, these and other indications do not
yet show those elements conducive to a genuinely free, transparent, and
inclusive process involving all political parties, ethnic nationalities and
elements of civil society.
I reiterated that any credible political transition, to be successful, should

be guided by human rights principles. These require the lifting of all
remaining restrictions on the freedoms of expression, movement,
information, assembly and association and the repealing of related “security”
legislation. I indicated that the opening and reopening of all political parties’
offices must be considered as an immediate priority. At the moment, the
only political party able to conduct its activities is the National Unity Party
(NUP). The remaining nine of the ten legally registered political parties
exist only in name because of the restrictions in place. I also proposed that
the SPDC pursues the establishment of a national human rights institution
according to the Paris Principles, as an important step on the path towards
a credible political transition. The implementation of the above-mentioned
human rights requirements will create at enabling environment for open
and wide-ranging discussion among the SPDC, all political parties and
ethnic nationalities.
As the authorities at all levels expressed their agreement in principle to my

proposals for incorporation human rights and freedoms from the early
stages of any process leading to political transition. I expect that credible

indications would be given as to when and how these human rights reforms
would be implemented.
Concerning the circumstances surrounding the situation of DASSK, I was

informed by the authorities that she is no longer being detained under any
provision of “security” legislation. However her phone line remains cut off
and security arrangements remain in place. In effect, her circumstances
are those of one who has been placed under house arrest. She made it
very clear to me that she would not accept freedom for herself until all
those arrested since 30 May 2003 have been released. To my knowledge,
so far, the SPDC has not yet made any offer to release her.
Despite my repeated calls to refrain from new arrests, I received reports

that there have been approximately 250 new arrests since 30 May 2003.
However, the latest governmental figures I received quote 153 people
arrested in connection with the Depayin incident, out of which, according
to the same source, 109 have so far been released, including the eight
prisoners released on 9 November 2003. My estimation, based on
crosschecking the figures from various sources, is that the number of
remaining detainees appears to be higher than the official figure. Their
immediate and unconditional release in no way affects the standing request
for the release of all remaining political prisoners. I called for an amnesty
to release all political prisoners as a “barometer” of a sound political
transition. In the political history of Myanmar, there have been examples
of amnesty laws, which could encourage the government in pursuing such
an initiative at this juncture.
During my visit to Insein Central Prisoners, where I interviewed 19 political

prisoners, I was able to verify that the practice of extending the detention
of those political prisoners who have served their prison sentence by placing
them under “administrative detention” still continues. This practice continues
to be applied even to very elderly and infirm prisoners. Although I am
pleased to report that their spirit is strong in spite of their long
imprisonment, I condemn this practice as cruel and unacceptable. Although
the law provides for this measure, I called for the repealing of the relevant
legislation as these provisions contravene international human rights
standards.
I have to report the continuing ill treatment of detainees in pre-trial

detention, especially in Military Intelligence (MI) interrogation centers. In
addition, I am very concerned about detainees either in pre-trial detention
or undergoing trial proceedings who are allegedly kept in conditions which
amount to incommunicado detention. Moreover, the grounds for arresting
these individuals are often highly arbitrary, i.e. purely for the exercise of
their freedoms of opinion and expression. In addition, the right to a fair
trial, including the right to access a lawyer, continues to be denied to
political detainees.
I am also concerned with reports of recurring religious intolerance and

violence allegedly instigated to distract attention from present political
problems, which I will address in more detail in my future reports. I am
also concerned about the reportedly forced conscription of civilians into
military training, as well as forced participation at political rallies staged to
support the government’s roadmap.
I have to report that an agreement on the modalities for an independent
assessment in Shan State has not yet been reached. I will pursue it with
the relevant authorities, as I remain concerned with continuing allegations
of serious human rights violations in ethnic minority areas.
The suffering of the vulnerable in Myanmar is evident. I was able to visit

the recently inaugurated exhibition on HIV/AIDS, and was impressed by
the efforts of the government and the development assistance community
to prevent and fight HIV/AIDS. I am also aware of the other activities of
the assistance community to address suffering in areas that include health,
protection, education and livelihoods. Much more needs to be done, the
vulnerable of Myanmar cannot be made to pay for economic policies that
do not place sufficient emphasis on the poor. I am impressed by the work
of the UN community in Myanmar and their partners, including the
cooperation between the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the Myanmar Human Rights Committee to conduct human rights
training for government officials. This is the first such cooperation between
the UN and Myanmar authorities. I will encourage you to do more to
support the Initiatives of the UNCT and their partners. Cooperation could
be, for example, explored in the area of economic reforms and sustainable
livelihood options should the political transition arrive at a positive outcome.
Mr. President,
The 30 May events defined the political realities in the country in a much
more clear-cut way than previously. Now the situation is unique and
complicated and I do not see any other solution for Myanmar than through
dialogue and harmony at the negotiation table. At this delicate juncture in
the history of Myanmar, the SPDC, the NLD and other political parties, as
well as the ethnic nationalities, must put their heads together and decide
what direction is best for their country and how they want to get there. A
unilateral move by any one group that excludes the others will not bring
Myanmar closer to its optimal destination. The continuation of the present
stalemate is a serious obstacle to the improvement in human rights of all
people of Myanmar.
******

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The Second Preliminary Report

The Ad Hoc Commission

The Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre

This publication has been funded by the Euro-Burma office.

Chapter (6) 122

Chapter (7) 137

Chapter (8) 147

178 (2) Statement from the NLD

197 (5) Press conferences of the Burmese military junta

204 (6) Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung

209 (7) Testimony of Soe Than, an NLD member from Kamayut

4 Ad hoc Comission on the Depayin Massacre

2nd Preliminary Report: May 2004 5

1. Victims and eyewitness who courageously testified or provided

2. Organizations, leaders and all other responsible personnel from the

3. Legal experts and lawyers from the Burma Lawyer’s Council,

4. The Political Defiance Committee of the National Council of the

5. Members of Parliament from inside Burma, the United Nationalities

6. The Network for Democracy and Development in Burma that

6 Ad hoc Comission on the Depayin Massacre

2nd Preliminary Report: May 2004 7

Therefore, the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), the

Members of the Commission

1. U Khin Kyaw Han, member of the NCUB Presidium and elected

8 Ad hoc Comission on the Depayin Massacre

1. U Aung Htoo, M.A. (Human Rights), R.L. and General Secretary

The Commission has the total political support and guarantee of

The Role of the Commission

The Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre is not an organization

Collecting Testimonies from the Witnesses

In the process of collecting and accepting testimonies from witnesses,

The Commission experienced many difficulties in carrying out this

The Commission tried its best to be as objective and accurate as

2nd Preliminary Report: May 2004 9

The Commission published an urgent preliminary report in English

Crimes Committed by the Military and Impunities

Furthermore, a sham commission was formed on 13 March 1988,

10 Ad hoc Comission on the Depayin Massacre

The Significance of the Depayin Massacre

Furthermore, the crime was not directed against ordinary citizens.

If military impunity continues, as it has thus far in other crimes,

The Commission, therefore, will strive its best to at least uncover

The Forte and Weakness of the Commission

2nd Preliminary Report: May 2004 11

The Recommended Policy Concerning the Massacre

The Depayin Massacre is not an incident that concerns just one

As long as those who are responsible for the planning, organizing,

Prosecution of Crimes and the Cycle of Violence

The task of bringing about justice with regards to the Depayin

12 Ad hoc Comission on the Depayin Massacre

Efforts of the Commission

The Commission, despite limitations in its power, human resources,

1. The Commission has and will continue to gather information,

2. The Commission has and will continue to approach international

3. With the assistance of the NCUB and the National Coalition

4. The Commission published its first preliminary report in English

5. The Commission has submitted a full report, complete with

2nd Preliminary Report: May 2004 13

Pleas from the Commission

In fact, at present, not much to speak of has been achieved in

Bringing about justice with regards to the massacre, in accordance

The Commission has published this report partly because it wants

-The Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre