RCHER

NUMBER 4, 1984.

THE NEW ZEALAND-NAVSTAR LINK:

for Maps or Miuilelll ?

"New Zealand and Australia have started talks 10 join the United States global positioning satellite
system." the 'Press' 20 February, 1984.
The Global Positioning System (GPS), also called NAVSTAR (Navigation System Time And Range),
is a Department of Defense programme that has been underway since 1964 and is expected to be fully
operational by 1988. According to the 'Press' article, NZ would tie into the GPS in order to gain
"tremendous savings in mapping costs." Two receivers would be required in NZ to receive data from 3
or 4 satellites. The cost would be $400,000 for each device.
Once again New Zealanders are being presented with a planned government tie-in to a U.S. military
programme. In a manner identical to the early public statements about facilities at Mt John,
Woodboume and Black Birch, the NZ link to NAVSTAR .is said to have purely civilian economic and
scientific benefits for the nalion. However, the U.S. military does not heve. a history of providing
technical services to any nation without military strings attached. The military roles of the above-named
facilities have been documented (construction progress at Black Birch is reported in this issue). Their
purported civilian uses were emphasised by the NZ government while mention of military applications
was avoided. In the present case we believe the public should know of the military uses of NAVSTAR­
GPS, and deserve clear answers to questions about the potential Nz links to that system.
First, what is NAVSTAR? Since its inception and early development by the Naval Research
Laboratory this navigational satellite system has been a classic example of blended civilian / military
utility that can obscure the nuclear strategic applications of the technology. The system is based upon
the precise timing of radio waves. Highly accurate geographic positions can be determined by
instantaneous radio links to NAVSTAR satellites containing atomic clocks. These navigational fixes can
be used for controlling warhead trajectories to . obtain targeting accuracies of 300 feet (circular error
probebil�y) or better.
NAVSTAR has had a long and expensive history with 11 satellites launched by late 1981. Its
expense and vulnerability to attack in space caused it to be "zeroed out of the budget" in 1981 by a
congressional committee. But its potential for civil navigation uses led some congressmen to resurrect
NAVSTAR and require thet it be opened to civilian use. Users outside the military would pay substantial

INSIDE: FIRST STRIKE IS CLOSER THAN

WE THINK BY ROBERT C. ALDR/DGE.
lees and have 10 cope with "'ussed up" signals employed 10 discourage unauthorised u se. These
complications promised to kill commercial inlerest in NAVSTAR as a navigational resource.
The Korean airliner disaster changed all that. Alleged navigationallailures thet allowed the airliner to
stray over top-secret Soviet military installations in Sahkalin Island would be prevented in fulure if
NAVSTAR were used by commercial aircraft. Senator Cherles Parey introduced a joint resolution in
September 1983 in Congress to open NAVSTAR to civilian use free of charge. The speed of satellite
development and deployment would also be incressed with new injections of funds. Thus the entire
commercial /military bill will be borne by the American taxpeyers. The full system will have 21
satellites; five experimental craft are currently in orbi!.
We may never know the true circumstances of the 'j<orean airliner incident, but il is clear that this
Single event has kept the NAVST AR-GPS system alfve taking advantage of the incident and public
concern lor enhanced navigation safety. tl is noteworthy that a proposed civilian navigation safety
system, Aerosat, failed to gain airline becking six years ago because � was loo expensive. The cost
would have been less than one-tenth the price being peid to Rockwell International, $2.5 billion, for
NAVSTAR satellite construction.
NAVSTAR-GPS will provide the intricate sateilite network for highly accurate stellar inertial guidance
(SIG) of nuclear warh8ll ds. It will be used for Trident-2 submarine launched missiles and for MX, and

"The usar equipment will be able to receive the transmissions in all weather conduions and, as no
responding transmissions are involved, is a completely passive segment, ideal for military purposes."
- Naval Global POSitioning System. Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 February, 1984.

may well be retrofitted on Trident-I, Poseidon and Minuleman-3 missiles. Advanced cruise missiles will
use NAVSTAR-linked SIG. In the southern hemisphere the star-transit data for SIG will be provided by
the U.S. Naval station at Black Birch near Blenheim. It is the only such facility in this hemisphere and
one of only 3 in the entire western military system. Nuclear blast detection sensors are also carried on
all NAVSTAR satellites beginning in 1982. They are thus to play a major role in nucleer damage
assessment during conduct of a nuclear war.
New Zealanders should be questioniAg their government's involvement in NAVSTAR-GPS. Unlike the
Black Birch facility which will provide guidance dala only through published scientific literature, there is
potential for NAVSTAR facilities to have real-time military applications in time of crisis. 'Peace
Researcher' will be directing the following questions to the NZ defence establishment:

(1) What are the capabilities of the two $400,000 receivers? Will they have both military and civilian
capabilities?

(2) What system accuracy (in metres) is to be obtained in NZ? How does that accuracy compare with
existing capabilities?

(3) Who will pay for the receivers, and from what specific budget allocations?

(4) What personnel will operate the facilities? NZ, US, civilian, military?

(5) Where will the receivers be located?

(6) What specific NZ mapping requirements would be met by the GPS link?

(7) Will all the data derived from the system be open for civilian use and public scrutiny?

(8) Will there by an y communications ties between the GPS receivers and NZ or US military systems?

(9) Will the NZ receiving stations be part of the network of ground stations monitoring and correcting
satellite positions?

Prompt and thorough response to these questions from the NZ government may allay public
concerns about possible military use of the NAVSTAR-GPS system in New Zealand. Denials, evasive
answers and delay which we are currently experiencing with the T angimoana communications issue will
provide further evidence of secret military cooperation in planning for the waging 01 nuclear war.

Sources for this article: 'First Strike' by Rober! Aldridge, 1983; 'Steering Clear of Sakhalin' by Eliot
Marshal!, Science 222:303; 'Navstar Global Positioning System,' Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 February,
1984, p. 169.
 FIRST STRIKE IS CLOSER THAN WE THINK
By Robert C. Aldridge

"I think we ought not 10 have a first strike policy, but we ooghl to have a first strike capability,"
opined Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Tower.' The United Stales may be closer
to that capability, and all its destabilizing aspects, than meets the public eye. While attentiOll is focused
. on the first strike MX and Tridenl-2 missiles, more auslere Pentagon programmes are slipping by
unnoticed - programmes which could be 01 great importance at an earlier dale.
These programmes appesr to be centred about ihe full operational status 01 the Navstar globel
positioning system In 1988. Any missile capable 01 receiving in-flight navigation corrections from
Navslar satellites would have a larget accuracy, or circular error probability (CEP), of aboul 300 feet.
Even existing strategiC weapons would have a first strike capability. Let us look al various accuracy
improvement programmes and than examine their oombined effect.
New NS-20 guidance packages have already been installed in all Minuteman-3 missiles and a
subsequent "Guidance Upgrede Programme" was completed this year.' Installation of the latest
integrated digital command and control network is now commencing and will be finished in 1987.' It is
neithar new nor inconceivable that these programmes are equipping Minu!eman-3g with Navstar
receivers.' Five contractors were recently saleated to perform design studies leading to " receiver no
bigger than a king-size package 01 cigerettes.' Each warhead would then have a 71 per cent chance 01
destroying a missile silo hardened to withstand 6000 p.s.i. overpressure. Only 466 01 these
triple-MIRVed missiles would be needed to send one warhead to each of the 1,398 Soviet missile silos.
The remaining 84 Minuteman-3g could attack bomber bases, submarins pens whare 85 per cent of
Soviet missile-launching submarines are always in port, and other first strike targets.
By 1988 there will be 408 Trident-I missiles deployed in Trident and converted Poseidon
submarines. At eight hydrogen bombs each that is a total of 3,264 warheads. The Navy has been
pursuing accuracy improvement programmes for years and is now fine-tuning the TridenH precision.'
Again, ij is not inconceivable that this includes installing Navstar receivers. Thai would give each of
lhase bombs a 58 per cent chance of destroying 6,000 p.s.i. missile silos. Furthermore, these long­
range missiles could reach thair targets even while the submarines are in port.
Neither Minuteman nor Trident-1 missiles alone are lethal enough to be considered a firs! strike
lorce. But let us look at the combined capability of all the weapons planned to be operational by 1988,
including the Euromissiles. A first strike could be started by Ihe 108 Pershing-2s fired from West
Germany. Thase very precise weapons wHh their target-homing manoeuvring warheads would be able
to reach Moscow and other key areas in about !2 minutes. Decapitating the Soviet command and
control network would prevent the Kremlin from ordering its missiles fired before they are destroyed.
Minuteman-3 and Trident-! missiles would then be launched in a targeting pattern which sends one of
each to every Soviet silo. This 2-on-1 cross-targeting, as it is called, would increase the chance to
destroying each silo to 88 per cent, Wiping out 88 per cent of the Soviets' land-based missiles,
containing three-quarters of thair strategic warheads, is a significant capability. Some experts believe it
might be possible to send three warheads to each target without loo much interference from the
fratricide phenomenon. Then if the first two were duds the third would likely destroy the target. There
would be enough to send one Minuteman-3 and two Trident-1 warhaads 10 each and thereby raise the"
kill probability to 95 per cent.
The 70 Soviet land-based missiles surviving such an attack would have to be intercepted by ballistic
missile de/ensa systems now being tested, if those missiles wera launched in retaliation. Anti-submarine
warfare forces would sink the 15 per cent of Russian missile-launching subs at sea and other land
targets would be destroyed with left-over Minuteman-3 and Trident-1 warheads, supplemented by
Poseidon and Minuteman- 2 missiles as nseded. There would stili be a formidable nuclear arsenal
remaining to deter retaliatiOll by the Soviets by threatening counter-retaliation against their cities.
Ground-launched, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles will also be in place by 1988 W
Defense Department plans are carried out They would follow up a first strike by destroying remaining
functional silos before they could be reloaded. And if the fratricide environment (dust, debris,
electromagnetic pulse, iOllized atmosphere) should be 80 severe that high-speed, high-flying ballistic
missiles would not work, cruise missiles flying low and slow would have a chance 01 getting through 10
destroy Soviet missiles while they are held down.
Neither should we forget that between 60 and 70 MX missiles are planned to be operational by 1988
- 100 by 1989. 2-on-1 Minuteman-3/MX cross-targeting would give a destruction potential 0192 per
cent - 3-on-1 Minuteman· 3/Trident-l/MX cross targeting would up the killlactor to 97 per cent.
All of these things are planned to be available by 1988. Whereas each eiement alone does not
consttlule a first strike force, lhe entire array is another story. I1 is common practice for tha Pentagon
to isolate discussion of various weapons systems one from the olher. Defense Secretary Casper
Weinberger recently told Congress: "A lot of people talk about trying to build a first strike capability.
That is not in any sense Ihe case and you can see with the numbers thal are involved, the l00MX
4
missiles certainly dO$s not give you even what tha theoreticians call a first strike capability.'" Many
legislators have used this same argument to excuse their vota in favour of MX. But tha first strike
discussion has hardly touched Ihe Minuteman and Trident-l forces. Thai is why it is critical to examine
the complete spectrum of military programmes. The facts are, rather Ihan a few lirsl strike missiles
starting deployment during Ihe latter 19808, a first strike capability could ba completely in place by
1988.
Even if, as Senator Tower suggested, the United Stales does not inlend 10 use lhase weapons in a
first strike, tha nuclear balance is knocked askew by merely possessing the capsbifity. Military leaders
would look al capabilities, not intentions, and would see an advantage in punching !ha button firBt.
Numerous official reports have warned of the volatile anuation this would cause during times of
international crisis. 11 the Kremlin thought the United States was about to start a war it would be
motivated to use iis missiles before they srs destroyed. It all boils down io tha faci that nuclear
weapons, any nuclear weapons, do not make us saler. They might actually trigger lha attack thay are
supposed to protect us from.

Robert C. Akiridge is an aerospace engineer who worked sixteen years on strategic missiles and
warheads. He is now engaged in research aimed at better public understanding of military
programmes. His latest book, First Strike: The Pentagon's Strategy for NtIClesr War, was recently
published by South End Press in Boston.
NOTES FOR EDITORIAL REFERENCE:
1. Interview in Military Electronics/Countermeasures, Septembar 1982.
2. Fiscal Yesr 1984 Arms Contro/lmpact Statements, April 1983, pp. 2-4.
3./bid.
4. See Fiscal Year 1980 Arms Control Impact Statements, March 1979, p. 125, where the application
of Navstar to ballistic missi/es is discussed.
5. See Aviation Week and Space Technology articles: "Filter Genter," 20 June 1983, p.79; and "Filter
Genter," 1 August 1983, p. 65.
6. Hearings an Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1982, before the House Armed Services committee, 26
March 1981, Part 2, p. 760.
7. Department of Dafense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, hearings before the
House Armed Services Committee, 21 April 1983, Part 2, p. 135.

There ara more than a hundred agreements, memoranda 01 understanding and working relationships
linking the ANZUS partners. In this issue PEACE RESEARCHER continues its examination of the
ANZUS relationships by looking at

THE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

PROGRAMME
BY KEITH BURGESS
The ANZUS alliance has been the focus of attention whenever an examination of New Zealand,
Australia and United States military relationships hes been called for. It most certainly has been tha
focus of public protest for those who believe New Zealand's mimary involvement with a nuclear power,
tha United States, will continue so long as the. alliance remains intact. As an expression of unity and
complicity amongst the membar nalions, tha ANZUS alliance is worthy of such attention.
But many of lha obligations of ANZUS are carried out in quite another arena. Arrangements for joint
exercises, technical co-operation In research, decisions relating to defence sharing - all of these are
dealt with in a series of working programmes that have so far received very little public attention.
Two of the more important programmes are The Technical Co-operation Programme (TTCP) and !ha
ABCA (Australian, British, Canadian and American) Armies Programme.' They involve nations outside
the ANZUS alliance (in fact thay represent something of an Anglo-Saxon club) and they are the
principal reason for the absence 01 trilateral agreements linking the ANZUS partners exclusively.

ORIGINS AIID MDIIIIR I SHII' OF "Cl'

On 25 October 1957, the President of the United Slates and the Prime Minister of Great Britain
made a Declaration of Common Purpose containing the following statement:

"The affangements which the nations of the free world heve made for collective defence and mutual
help are based on the recognition that the concept of self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries
of the free world are interdependent and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and
sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part we have agreed that our
.

two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this prinCiple. "
I mmediately afterwards, the Canadian Governmeni 'announced that it loo subscribed to the principle
.
of Inlerdepsndence and declared itself ready 10 join the common effort. The resulting organisation was
called the Tripartite Technical Co-operation Programme (TTCP). 5
As a result, an exchange of notes was made which, in turn, resulted in the formation of a Combined
Policy Commlltee (CPC) which was made up 01 the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Unned Stales,
the United Kingdom and Canada and also the heads of the atomic energy agenCies of the three
countries. It was further decided that two sutrcommittees 01 the CPC should be established - one to
deal with matters in the atomic field and the other to facilitate cooperation in non-atomic research and
development (R & D). The latter committee eventually became known as the Sub-Committee on Non­
Atomic Research and Development (NAMRAD) and was composed 01 the heads of delense research
and development organisations in the US, UK and Canada.
In July, 1965 Australia came of age and was invited to join the NAMRAD Sutrcommittee and, since it
was no longer a tripartite organisation, the n8me was changed to The Technical Cooperation
Programme (still nCp). In October, 1970 New Zealand also joined the NAMRAD Sub-committee and
its current representative is Dr D. J. Barnes, Assistant Secretary (Science and Electronic Date
Processing).
RIIlPRIfSIENTA .,'011 AIID IIIFUJIflIlCIE
TTCP is managed by a permanent committee established In Washington known as the 'Washington
Deputies.' AI this level, New Zealand is not represented with the Australian Deputy acting instead on
New Zealand's behalf.
New Zealand's lack of representation in the guiding committee is a reflection on New Zealand's low
status in the western military alliance. However, while New Zealand may have little influence on olher
western powers, the reverse does not apply. As will be explained, New Zealand may forsake a proper
and adequate defence for itseij in order to fulfill its ncp obligations of shared research and
development. Certainly the ways in which decisions are made in The Technical Cooperation
Programme are a source of concern. According to a United Stales official document on the programme,
ncp possesses no resources or research projects of its own, 'but operates instead through mulual
consultation, collective decisions and persuasive recommendations.'
,
(Our emphasis).

IIIEW UAI..AIID'S CONTRIBUTlOII

The primary intent of ncp, according to the official word, is contained in the Declaration of Common
Purpose which recognised that 'no member country possessed the resources to provide adequate
defense research and development by itseH.' However, United Stales resources far outweigh those of
the other members of the programme and the United States must come very close 10 being seH­
sufficient in research and development. One of the reasons for United Slates participation in the
programme may simply be to retain allegiance of New Zealand and other member nations by making
the bond more complex and dependence on United States military science greater.
Another reason can be found in an official statement on methods which says TTCP objectives can be

�
achieved by 'recommendations of cooperative programmes on projects of high mutual interest where
special capabilities, faCilities, personnel and geo aphic or environmental (our emphasis) regions can
be utilised to greatest advantage.' New Zealan 's unique vIew of the heavens (Black Birth Ridga
Transit Circle facility) and proximity to the deep ocean environment (Antisubrnarine Warfare research
and development) obviously provide New Zealand with opportunities to contribute to TTCP,

AIITISUIIIIIARIIlIE WAR"ARIE RIESIEARCH AIID DIE"IELOMIIIII" (11 '" DJ

The New Zealand Ministry of Defence claims that New Zealand's participetion in ncp is mainly in
undersea warfare, material sciences and aeronautics. Presumably, the last two mentioned refer to New
Zealand's research in the weather proofing 01 aircraft. The 1983 Defence Review leaves no doubt as
10 where New Zealand places fts emphasis within ncp, saying this about Defence Science in New
Zealand
"Scientific
Scientific Establishment (DSE). . . Defence Science will continue to play a part in support of maritime
operations depandent on the ocean environment such as anti-submarine warfare, with increasing
emphasis on passive systems, surveillance and mine counter-measures."

New Zealand's work in this field has included a major jOint expariment conducted with HMNZS Tui in
the South Fiji basin in conjunction with the United States to explore the relationship between storms and
the associated underwater noise which affects the performance of submarine detection systems.
New Zealand's participation in The Technical Cooperation Programme raises questions as to how
deep New Zealand is willing to become involved in super-power strategies for nuclear war. Originally a
clear division was seen between non-atomic and atomic research and development resulting in the
formation of two sutrcommittees intended to restrict achievements of atomic research and
development exclusiyely 10 the existing nuclear club. But the dividing lines between atomic and non­
atomic sciences are considerably more fuzzy then they were in 1957. New Zealand's pioneering work
in the field of Ant�submarine Warfare research and development contribute to the United States' ability
to carry out a first-strike and, hence, to bringing about the destabilising condHions that wouid make
nuclear war more likely. And under the terms of ncp, Naw Zealand is required to hand over its
10 page 8
 7
6 As the photographs show, the U.S. Navy Transit Circle Observing Station high on a ridge near
Blenheim is close to complete. A team 01 six researchers and photographers journeyed to the site in
Black Birch: cold and rain on 11 February 10 obtain some documentary lootage and assess the encroachment on
the alpine ecosystem.
The five buildings on the mountain have been constructed from a Congressional allocation of at least
$US1.25 million: The buildings are laid out in what appears 10 be a precise right-angie X-paltern with
the prinCipal slar-tracking telescope in the tall building at the centre. The root of that building is
designed for opening to the skies. A standard domed observatory (the only obviously incomplete
project) sits off to one side carefully aligned with the central axis of Ihe main telescope building.
u.s. Naval Presumably this fully-rotatable telescope will be used for locating stellar objects to be mapped with
high precision using the 18em telescope.
Two small buildings on opposite sides of the X-centre have windows aimed at sliding doors in the
Observatory upper sides of the central building. I1 is reasonable to suggest that Ihis linear array is a survey system,
possibly using laser beams, 10 check for movements in the telescope system due to natural seismic

nears Completion evenls or dropped spanners.

The fifth building is the largest and probably houses living quarters, electronic and optical
laboratories and data processing facilities.
There were no signs of any Kind (except warnings about 67,000 volts), no protecting fences; indeed,
there were no other persons in evidence on that bleak Saturday. But Black Birch ridge will soon be
populated with operators producing the star maps essential for the guidance of U.S. nuclear armed
By Bob Leonard missiles and warheads. Every delivery system that uses or will use stellar inertial guidance (SIG) will be
dependent on data from Transit Circle Observing Stalions like Black Birch. There are only three such
stations, the olher two are in the United Slates.
The list of weapons using SIG includes Trident-2, MX and possibly Minuteman-3. Advanced cruise
missiles will use SIG, Warheads carried on manoeuvering re-entry vehicles (MARVS) in the future may
achieve targeting accuracy of 30 feel (circular error probability) using SIG.

Black Birch Transit Circle Mt John has closed down. But not because the people of New Zealand wanted that closure. The
Baker-Nunn telescope system became obsolete, replaced by radar in Hawaii. Now we have Black
Observatory Station Birch. This telescope will not be involved in real-time targeting for U.S. missiles; the star location data
will be published in the open scientific literature. But the data, data generated in New Zealand, will be
nearing completion.
used lor the guidance of nuclear warheads. Thai fact cannot be disputed. After nearly seven years of
11/2/84. denials and evasion by the NZ government and the US embassy that it is a military facility, Black
Birch station nears completion, its military status finally acknowledged by Minister of Defence David
Thomson in May, 1983.
B
lindings. It is a requirement 01 the programme that ' all minutes of meetings, proceedings and such
studies or technical papers as are prepared ... are considered to be TTCP documents and shall be
made available to all five countries without reservation.' Also to be laken into consideration is that
efforts in research and development and achievements rapidly translate into feasibility studies and
hardware. Policies can then be adopted to fit the merchandise. New Zealand's research in the field of
passive sonar arrays as part of its Anti-submarine Warfare R & 0 scientific efforts, has led almost
automatically to a 'feasibility study' for installing a fixed underwater surveillance system. Just what
proportions of New Zealand's meagre resources lor research and development will be spent on Anti­
submarine Warfare and at whel expense to other potentially valuable defence projects is unknown.

Already, according 10 Ihe 1983 Defence Review, 'substantial expenditure' has been devoted to the
firsl phase of a modernisation 01 the RNZAF Orion, maritime patrol aircraft. So lar, one Orion out of jive
has been equipped with sophisticated detection equipment. But there is no public or parliamentary
debate before decisions are made and one wonders IT there is any objectivity employed at all.
Ctmclutllon
Because The Technical Cooperation Programme happens behind the scenes (in lact barely
acknowledged by the government) an assessment of its implications must rely on official descriptions.
From these we know that New Zealand is committed to certain obligations - to do its shere of R & 0
and to hand over the resu�s. We know that when il comes to making a choice of areas ofresearch
that New Zealand is subjected 10 'persuasive recommendations' and is nol represented in the guiding
body in Washington.
From our knowledge of Defence Science projects here, we know that New Zealand's primary
involvement is in Anti-submarine Warfare apparently to the exclusion of other military R & O. We
know that this both increases New Zealand's dependence on the nuclear powers, (Brita;" and the
United States) for developments in other areas, and involves New Zealand in the race to first-strike
capability.
Finally, we know that The Technical Cooperation Programme is a strand in the complex western web
and that New Zealand's participation implicates us in the East vs West conflic!. A conflict that
threatens the outbreak 01 nuclear war.

FOOTNOTE: Meetings of the Non-Atomic Research and Development (NAMRAD) Sub-committee

take place in member countries by rotation, with Australia and New Zealand sharing 8 turn. In addition,
occasional symposia take piece but apparently completely under cover.
ANZUS Council meetings receive rapt attention even though we expect no more than the prepared,
predictable communiques and the faint rumours of dissatisfaction.
Perheps New Zealanders should be listening more keenly to the meetings of TTCP where New
Zealand's true involvement in super-power militarisation can be found.

Sourc.s; NZ Government pamphi•• , on TTCP. A United Stat•• manual on NAMRAD, 1983 Defence
Review, MOD corr.spondence with PEACE RIISIIARCHER.

. .
·Others are the Air Standardisation Programme and The Naval Command, Control and Communications Organisation.
The ABCA Programme will be discussed in a subsequent issue of PEACE RESEARCHER.
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 the secrecy surrounding signals Inlelligence"
OPERA"nONS IN NEW ZEALAND
By KEITH BURGESS

In the February 1984 issue ofPEACE RESEARCHER, signals intelligence (SlGINT) operations in New
Zealand were reported in the context of El secrel SlGINT, five-power agreement. Despite t he Defence
Ministry's impenetrable wall of secrecy, PEACE RESEARCHER gathered evidence of the agreement's
existence and ils implications from other sources. Here PEACE RESEARCHER details jus! how
obdurate the government is being and lists its concerns.
The Ministry of Defence is perSistent in denying information about signals intelligence operations in
New Zealand. In March of this year, Owen W�kes, working as peace researcher lorPeace Movement
New Zealand, disclosed the whereabouts and an assessmenl of El rscently (1982) constructed SIGINT
!..cility, the Defence Communications Unit at Tsogimoana nesr Ohakea. Wilkes described it as 'New
Zealand's most important foreign base.' The facility has never been referred to in any report of the
Ministry of Defence and, bayond the insistence that the facility is New Zealand's, no satisfactory
answers have baen delivered about ils purpose or the reasons lor secrecy.
In addition to the secrecy surrounding the Tanglmoana facility itseH, PEACE RESEARCHER hes
found the Ministry tighHipped about other aspects of SIGINT operations.

THE SIICRIIT AGREEIIIIE NT

New Zealand's relalionship with other foreign SIGINT agencies is defined by the secrel UKUSA
Agreement. At the time of writing, PEACE RESEARCHER is awaiting the consideration of the Chief
Ombudsman to investigate and review a decision made by the Ministry 01 Defence to 'neither con!irrn
nor deny the existence or non-existence' of the agreement. The agreement governs cooperation and
exchange in the field of signals intelligence.
C

PEACE RESEARCHER has provided evidence of the agreement's existence 10 the Ombudsman end
is appealing on the grounds Ihal acknowledgement of the agreement could not possibly, in Ihe words of
Saction 8 of the OfIicial lnformatlon Act, 'pr�udice the defence and security 01 New Zealand.' In lacl,
PEACE RESEARCHER claims that lack of public scrutiny poses a danger 10 New Zealand's 'defence ,
and securily.'

OIIr concerns about the agreement are:

*The level of secrecy that surrounds the agreement and absence of public scrutiny.

*The hierarchical structure of the agreement with the United States as first party
and all others as second and third parties.

*The amount of, power afforded some individuals and agencies privy to certain
information by the methods of exchange and the compartmentalisation 'of intelligence.

*The reluctance of the United States, as first party, to pass on intelligence unless it
is in the express interest of the United States.

'Ne� Zealan �'s d�pen\ ,ce upon the United States for intelligence which could
r�s�1t 10 t�e distortion of New Zealand's defence posture being vulnerable to
miSinformation.

'New Zealand's dependence could result in a compromised foreign policy strongly

influenced by the United States and this ."would have an effect, in particular, on the
Qovernment's attitude to US nuclear armed warships and nuclear weapon free zones.

'Electronic eavesdropping - intelligence gathering by interception of communication signals.

10
The Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).

The Government Communications Seouri!y Bureau is almos! oerlainly New Zealand's equivalent of
such lore;gn SIGINT agencies as the Un�ed Slales National Seourity Agency (NSA) or Britain's
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Acccrding to Oesmond Ball, Australian strategic
analyst, !ha GCSB was aSSigned a small portion 01 the South-West pacffio lor the oolloollon of signals
intelligence to fulfil New Zealand's role in the world-wide SIGIIIIT community.
The bureau was formed within the Ministry 01 Defence in 1977 but went unacknowledged until !ha
dissemination of a Public Service Official Circular in July, 1980. I1 was announced as 'the national
authority for communications and technical security matters.'
PEACE RESEARCHER I forwarded a request under the Official Information Act lor information about
the Government Communications Seourity Bureau. We wanted to know:

*What are the funclions (mission) of Ihe buresu.

*The budget.

'1fWhether the GGSB has expanded its operatIOns sInce

. -
1977 .
-

*Number of personnel.

*Whether the GCSB employed electronic listening equipment.

*Whether there are posled within the MOO liaison personnel belonging to various foreign SlGINT
agencies. (We listed all known foreign SIGINT agencies):

*Whelher the MOO maintains liaison with any ol lhes" agencies.

Tsking eight weeks to furnish a reply, Ihe Ministry of Defence eventually responded by answering
three 01 our questions and refusing to answer the others, Citing Seotion 6 of the Official lnformalion Act
as their reason.
Significantly, the MOO is being less candid about GSCB in 1984 than it was in 1980 when Defence
Minister David Thomson responded to written parliamentary questions. At that time, the budget of
GCSB was $400,000 and personnel numbered 22.
The renewed secrecy suggests that GCSB ha� grown by expending ils staffing and costs - the
latter possibly for the purchasing of technical equipment such as that recently observed al
Tangimoana.
I( appears that New Zealand came of age within the SIGINT network with !ha establishment of a
SIGINT collection facility here and !ha setting up of GCSB to oversee and administer SIGINT operations.
Previously, New Zealand has been represented overseas by Australia's Defence Signals Directorate
(DSD) which took a prominent part in establishing a SIGINT facility in New Zealand and still,
apparanelty, maintains a presence.
There is no doubt that GCSB WGuld have a responsibility for making SIGINT operations secure at
Tangimoana. The Official lnformstion Directory lisls GCSB responsibilities as 'communications secur�,
communications research and analysis and technical security.'
There is some consolation, amongst the dearth of official information, that a New Zealand agency
carries oul this responsibility. Elsewhere within the SIGINT Community, NSA plays a disproportionate
part in overseeing SlGINT operations. There is the suspicion though that Australia's DSD assumes a
major responsibility and may be representing the interests of NSA. Some information on the posting of
liaison personnel would certainly make clearer the matter of who's in charge.

LIAISON P11l11l5OtiNIII.
The Ministry of Defence refused to release information about the posling of liaison personnel
belonging to NSA, GCHQ and other SIGINT agencies. This refusal is a comment on t�e importance of
liais
. on officers
As we pointed out in February PEACE RESEARCHER, 10 ensure that procedures are being !ollowed
and 10 administer SIGINT exchanges, Ihe SIGINT community depends on the joint staffing of many of
the major intercept stations and the transfer of SIGINT personnel throughout the British, Canadian,
Australian and New Zealand agencies. These liaison officers are responsible for physically handling the
exchange of intelligence material. Their presence is an indication of who runs the SIGINT operations.

Concerns about New Zealand's membership in Ihe UKUSA Agreement and participation in combined
signals intelligence operations go beyond New Zealand' 8 unquestioning collaboration in spying on the
airwaves. - Keith Burgess.

(For a more comprehensive account of the UKUSA Agreement and other aspects of SIGINT opsrations
in New Zealand, see the February issue of PEACE RESEARCHER. Write P.O. Box 18541,
Christchurch, 9).
,

'Peace Researcher' Comment

MIUTARIZING NEW ZEALAND
By Dennis Small

"Security is the foundation on which a civilized society is buUt" proclaims the 1983 Defence Review
(p. 5). Today, it is obvious enough that compstition among nation states 10 ensure security by military
means is destroying what civilized values remain in the world. The famous annual reports by Ruth
Sivard on 'World Military and Social Expenditures' have traced over the years Ihe global process .of
increaSing militarization and all its horrendous effects. But there is money to be made from military
manufacture and the current New Zealand government is keen for NZ to get a slice of the aclion.
NZ and Australia are currently looking for closer coopsration in defence production. "Regional seU­
sufficiency" is the catchword here but the economic forces at work go deepsr. A NZ defence industry
is also being encouraged 10 meel the specialized needs of the ever-growing multinational arms .industry
as well as to promote NZ exports. Thus NZ becomes parasitic on the misery of the world and indeed
develops ils own vested interest in that misery.
A series of reports produced in 1980 point to the government's strategy 0/ encouraging high
technology manufacluring for the international military trade. This series, entitled "Technology and
Innovation in the NZ Manufacturing Industry," was published by the Physics and Engineering
Laboratory (PEL) of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. Significanfly, a principsl
recommendation was thal Australia and the US offer potential for a NZ sub- contracting capscily in !he
defence field (McCulloch, D.G., "Technology and Innovation in the NZ Manufacturing Industry," PEL
Resource Paper Two, The Role of Government, July 1980, p. 52 Appendix 3).
What is stressed inthese reports is the necessity of close government and industry cooperation in
developing selected defence mifltary products and markets. The government has taken such advice 10
heart and has been assiduously cultivating this opportunistic approach _. what Defence Secretary Mr
Denis Mclean calls the "smorgasbord approach." (The Star, 20 February, 1984). New Zealand
government-employed scienti!ists now often come up with original ideas and prototypss which are then
farmed out to private manufacturers. A $2 million development fund for defence-related projects was
recently announced (Wellington Confidential, No. 12, March 1984).
A recent" smorgasbord" example is the hand-held multi-charinel radiometer developsd jointly by
PEL and Delphi Industries of Auckland. The Minister of Science and Technology, Dr Shearer, praised it
as an instrument designed to gather essential information about earth rescurces (The Press, December
19, 1983). Later, Delphi Industries stated that the US Delense Department might keep its uses of the
radiometer secret (The Star, January 24, 1984). Delphi's customer was the US office of Naval
Research and the radiometer was to be used in the Space Shuttle, now a heavily militarized project.
New markets like Southeast Asia are being investigated as outlets lor NZ's incipient defence
industry. Thus governments such as Indonesia. South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, which
sanction the official use of violence against the public (see psge 11 in Sivard, 1983) are 10 get our
help. Government hypocrisy about arms control, let alone human rights, is again revealed.

AVAILABLE FROM PEACE RESEARCHER: Extracts from 'The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence
Policy,' a secret document released last month by the Nalional Times. Endorsed by the ALP., the
document says that if Australia seems remote from definable military threat, New Zealand IS even more
so and that New Zealand has still developed no policy for ne.!ional defence. Send $1.80 10 Box 18541,
.
Chrislchurch.
,
 THE 1982 US/NZ LOGISTIC SUPPORT AGREEMENT - AND HOST
NATION SUPPORT.
Part of a wider scheme.
The 1982 Logistic Support Agreement, signed by the governments 01 the United States and New
Zealand, has significant provisions contained in it for the benefit of the United States. This agreement
which commits New Zealand to providing repair facilities and supply bases for United Slates military
forces falls into a pattern of agreements being established elsewhere in the world, officially termed
Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements.
According to a recent US Government document, the United States manpower and budget
restrictions have 'severely limited the ability of the US 10 provide adequate support for its deployed
forces in times of war.' The document, entitled 'United States Military Posture FY 1984' and prepared
by the Organisation of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, goes on to list areas of responsibility and name
specific allies.

'Decontamination, resupply, mobilised reservists and airfield damage repair are areas in which the
United States is attempting to hand over responsibilities to a/lies. '

Committing allies to provide Host Nation Support appears to be a far reaching scheme that the
current United Slates administration is undertaking in an effort to overcome restrictions placed upon it
by Congress. Decontamination, resupply, mobilised reservists and airfield damage repair are areas in
which the United States is aliempting to hand over responsibilities to allies.
Described by Defence Minister David Thomson as 'ANZUS in action,' the 1982 Logistic Support
Agreement represents New Zealand's own commitments to Host Nation Support. The agreement
commits New Zealand to providing repair facilities and supply bases for the United States during
periods of international tension.
It also provides for the 'pre-posilioning' of United States weapons systems in New Zealand as well
as 'munitions, ammunitions and other explosives' belonging to the United States. The NZ Nuclear Free
Zone Committee has publicly expressed concern that by providing facilities lor the 'refit and
maintenance' of US warships and aircraft, some of which carry nuclear weapons as standard
equipment, New Zealand is issuing an open invitation 10 the United Stales to station nuclear weapons in
New Zealand lor prolonged periods.
A significant fact is that, under the terms of the agreement, the United States can determine for itself
the circumstliOces that would qualify as 'periods of international tension.'
The revelationary US document indicates that Host Nations Support commitments are being asked of
many of the United States military allies and is 'an important initiative aimed at overcoming force
sustainment deficiences.'
As a notable example of United States progress in providing wartime Host Nation Support for US
Armed Forces, the document refers to a 'Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement' signed with the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on 15 April, 1982. This agreement provides support from the
civilian sector such as transportation, communications, maintenance facilnies, supplies and labour.
The FRG has agreed to supply approximately 93,000 mobilised reservists to support US forces in
various tasks; facility security, airfield damage repair, collocated operating bases support, resupply,
casually evacuation, prisoner of war handling and decontamination.
According to the document, HNS negotiations are continuing with the UK, Belgium, Ihe Netherlands
and Luxembourg. A 'statement of principle' indicating the intent of each country to provide increased
HNS was signed by 1981 by Belgium, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom and by the Netherlands in
1982. In the pacific HNS has existed lor many years in Korea and Japan.
II is evident that the 1982 Logistic Support Agreement is part of a much wider scheme in which the
United States is committing allies to guarantee support for its war preparations.
An indication 01 what is to come has been outlined in an article appearing in the March 19, 1984
issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology. According to the article in order to remedy a shortfall in
current airlift capability, a US Airforce study is proposing 'a balanced programme of airlift, sea lift and
strategically prespositioned equipment and supplies.' (our emphasis).
There is no doubt that the 1982 Logistic Support Agreement would permit this happening at short
nolice. On August 10th on National television Minister of Defence David Thomson said the provisions of
the agreement could be activated with a ministerial "O.K.' Keith Burgess
-

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