But Who Do You Say I Am, Rob
These assumptions presuppose the two philosophical perspectives mentioned at thebeginning of this chapter: epistemological relativism and moral relativism. These viewsalso form the philosophical basis for an intellectual movement known as postmodernismwhose assumptions have been applied to questions of truth, culture, religion, andpolitics. Although the purpose of this book is not to analyze this recent movement, ourcritique, if successful, undermines the intellectual basis for it [postmodernism].
I believe that critique to be successful. So where does that leave me? I cannot fullyanalyze a movement that technically does not exist in its most liberal form, and if itdoes exist, it exists in a state of
A goodcommentary on this idea comes from Ravi Zacharias in a forum setting thatincluded Albert Mohler and R. C. Sproul:
When Christians make confessions of faith
and say “here westand this is what we believe”, the emergent church was a built-in allergy to that don’tyou think....
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1998), 82. See also, D. A. Carson,
Becoming Conversant with theEmergent Church: Understanding a Movement and Its Implications
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,2005), 114-115.
I would point the reader to a definition of “proposition truth” that Philosopher Harold A. Netland gave it:...before looking at specific arguments it is necessary to clarify what is meant by propositional truth. In order toappreciate what propositional truth is we must first be clear on what is meant by "proposition." Most philosopherstoday make a fundamental distinction between sentences and statements or propositions. The distinction isessentially between "what is said (or written)" and "what is used to say what is said." What is said is said througha sentence or by means of a sentence, but it is not identical with the sentence. Sentences are always in a givenlanguage, such as English, German, Spanish, Hindi, etc., whereas what is expressed by the sentence is not.Significantly, the same statement can be expressed in many different languages. Indeed, the same statementcan be expressed in different sentences in the same language. For this and other reasons philosophers make adistinction between sentences and statements or propositions. For our purposes we can regard "statements" and"propositions" as virtually synonymous. We can roughly define a proposition as the meaning expressed by a de-clarative sentence or as "what is conveyed" by a sentence which makes an implicit or explicit assertion.
Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth
(Vancouver, BC: Regent College Publishing, 1991),113-114. The reader should read this entire chapter, which is entitled “Religion and Truth” (Chpt. Four, 112-150).
Ravi Zacharias makes a point using Aristotelian logic that while an Eastern philosopher/religious adherent mayreject logic as a “Western/modernist” invention, the person rejecting logic has to incorporate it in his or herrejection of it:As the professor waxed eloquent and expounded on the law of non-contradiction, he eventually drew hisconclusion: “This [either/or logic] is a Western way of looking at reality. The real problem is that you are seeingcontradictions as a Westerner when you should be approaching it as an Easterner. The both/and is the Easternway of viewing reality.” After he belabored these two ideas on either/or and both/and for some time, I finallyasked if I could interrupt his unpunctuated train of thought and raise one question. I said, “Sir, are you telling methat when I am studying Hinduism I either use the both/and system of logic or nothing else?” There was pin-dropsilence for what seemed an eternity. I repeated my question: “Are you telling me that when I am studyingHinduism I either use the both/and logic or nothing else? Have I got that right?” He threw his head back and said,“The either/or does seem to emerge, doesn’t it?” “Indeed, it does emerge,” I said. “And as a matter of fact, evenin India we look both ways before we cross the street - it is either the bus or me, not both of us.”
Can Man Live Without God?
(Nashville, TN: W Publishing, 1994), 128-129. In similar fashion, Kevin DeYoung and Ted Kluck,
Why We’re Not Emergent
, mention a “modernist error” committed by Brian McLaren when he insists “oneither-or when a both-and” solution is warranted (39-40).