JointStaffE Mailsredacted

From : '"7.:;:-::~::::~:,:C I V.
OASD-PA
Sen t: Wednesday, March 19. 2003 1:54 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; McCreary, T. L.. CAPT, JCS, PAD ; Rheinla nder .
Thom as E., LTC. JCS, PAD
Cc : W illcox, Chris, CIV. OASO-PA; Rhynedance , George, CO l,OASD-PA
Subj ec t : conference call with military analysts
Importance: High
Attachmen t s: Outreach Retired Military Advisors Group Teleconference Call wTth Chairm an Myers
03-19-{)3.doc
Outreach Retlred
Military Advl ...
kat.i e .
h e re 's t he list:
plea s e c onfirm r e c e ipt. txs!
•
GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JCS
CONFERERENCE CALL WITH RETfRED MILITARY ADVISORS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 2003
CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE, ROOME' "{rUE PENTAGON
Participants:
Colonel Car l Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)

Major Robert S. Bevelacqua (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman (USA, Retired)
General Wesley Clark (USA, Retired)
General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF, Retired)
Brigadier Genera l David Grange (USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)
Admi ral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN. Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak (USN, Retired)
General Barry McCaffi'ey (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
General William Nash (USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA. Retired)
General Larry D. Welch (USAF. Retired)
T Maj or General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired ) Plane to New York
Declines:
General Wayne A. Down ing (USA, Retired) In Kuwait

Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired) Plane to Ca lifornia
T elephone Messages Left (Office and Cellu la r):
General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC. Retired)

General George Joulwan (USA, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis (USA. Retired)
Genera l William F. "Buck" Kernan (USA. Retired)
General Charles A. Homer (USAF, Retired)
Admiral Dennis C. Blair (USN, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moorman (USAF, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Genera l Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Major General George Harrison (USAF, Retired)
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol, OCJCS/PA
Sent : Wednesda March 19, 2003 2:00 PM
To : CIV.OASD·PA
Subject : RE: conference call with military analysts
you do great work !
:>- - - --Or i g'

>Fr om: ClV, OASD-PA
>Se n t : Wedn@sday, March 19 , 2 00 3 12:54 PM
>To: Haddo ck , El len ( Kat i e) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; Mccr@ary , T. L . , CAPT, JCS, PAO;
Rhe inland@ r , Thomas E. , LTC, JCS , PAO
>Cc : Wil l c ox , Ch ris, ClV, OASD- PAi Rhynedance , Geo r g @, COL , QASD- PA
>Sub jec t: con f erenc e c a ll with mili t a ry ana l y sts
>lmporta nc@; High
>
>ka ti e,
>
>h @r@'s the li st :
>
> « Fi l@ : Outreach Reti r@d Mil itary Adv isors Group T@ l@c onference Call
> with Cha i rman Mye r s 03 -19 -03.doc »
>
>p l e a s e con fi rm r ec eip t . t xs !
From : ,,::::~~=~ C IV, OASD·PA
Sent : Wedne sday, March 26, 2003 10:49 AM
To : Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS , PAO
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) ltCol, OCJCSIPA; Willcox. Chris, CIV, OASD·PA
Subj ect : conference call with military analysts
Importance: High
tom.
pe r ye sterday afternoon's conv e rsation, i ne e d to lock in a t i me with general mcc hrys t a l

a nd our mi l i t a ry a nalysts asap. aga in . looking at approximately a IS-minu te phone c all
for the general:
agenda would look like thi s:
note: if we could mimic yest e rday's me eting with formers, would be great .
1 : 00 pm welcome and introduction
chris willcox. osd-publi c af f airs
1:01 pm R!!:::::U::d:a:t:e] on humani tari an p l a nn i ng for iraq
.. osd-poli cy
1: 15 pm opera tions up da t e
general s t an mcchrystal , jcs
1: 30 pm conference call concludes
1
From : ,":;::~~-::-:7.'~C IV, OASD·PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 01, 2003 1:29 PM
•
To : ~R~h e;;in
;la
inl der, Thomas E ., LTC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCal, OCJCSfPA _ _..
L
LCDR , CE PO·PA
Cc: W illcox, Chris, CIV, OASD· P CIV, OASD-PA
Subject : final agenda + list of military analysts participating in this afternoons conference call
Importance: High
Attachments : Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04·01"()3.doc ; Map Press Iraq March 31. 2003 .ppt;
Fact Sheet OIF Special Ops 03-31.Q3.doc
Milita'Y Analysts Map Press Iraq FactSheet OIF

Conference C . March 31, 2003.... SpecIal Ops 03· ...
attached i s the final a genda + l i s t o f par t i c ipant s i n
this afternoons call:
handou ts t ha t went ou t e le ctronical l y yeste r day include:
txs !
1
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, T uesday, April I , 2003
Roo m l(2) T he Pentagon
(As of M arch 28, 2003/4:30 pm)
PROPOSED AGENDA
2:00 pm Welcome and In t rodu ction (G uide lines)
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Public Affairs
2:01 pm Iraqi Paramilitary (Irregulars) Brief
L..--..,_ _--' Senior Intelligence Officer, Defense Intelligence

A enc
....~ .I Middle East Desk Officer, Defense Intelligence
Agency
2:15 pm OIF Operational Update
Major General Stanley A. McChrystaJ, Vice Director for Operations

(J-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff
2:30 pm Call Concludes
Note:
Call-In T elephone Nu mber: '.'.

Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Tuesday, Apr il 1, 2003
Room The Pentagon
(As of Apr il 1, 200311 2: 15 pm)
Participating
Ge ne ral Barry Mc Caffrey
Rear Admiral Th omas F. Marfiak
Ge neral Glen K. Otis
Lieutenant General Dan Christman
General Wi lliam F. "B uck" Ke rnan
Major Gen era l Donald W . Shepperd
Lieutenant Gen eral Th omas McInern ey
Gen eral Th omas Moorman
Bri gadier G eneral David Grange
Major General Perry Smith
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
General Charles Wilhelm
Lie utenant General Bernard Trai nor
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbe ll
Colonel Carl Allar d
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Admiral Th om as Lopez
Admira l David Jeremiah
Major General Tom Wilkerson
Tentative or Decliue
General Ronald Foge lman
General Larry Welch
Ge neral Wayne Downing (T)
Lieutenant Ge neral Buster Glosson
Co lonel Jack Jacobs
General Wilham Nash
Ge neral Wesley C lark (T)
General Hugh Sh elton
Major General George Harrison
General Joseph Ralston (T)
Ge neral Merri ll McPeak
Special Operation Achievements Thus Far
(As of March 3 1, 2003)
• U.S. Naval Special Operations forces precluded Saddam Hussein's apparent

attem pt to wage ecological warfare on his neighboring countries by seizing
at the outset of the war oil terminals off the Al Faw Peninsula.
Navy SEALs were given the Al Faw mission, with commandos from the Royal
Marines following close behind . After a preassault barrage from Marine and Air
Force jets and AC-130 gun ships, SEAL teams flew close to the water on Air
Force Special Operations MH- 53 Sea Stallion helicopters to their objective:
two oil platforms in the Persian Gulfoff the coast of Al Faw.
By the morni ng of Marc h 2 1, the SEALs, a small contingent of Polish Special

Operations Forces, and the Royal Marine units had secured those platform s
together with most of the peninsula-reducing by 90 percent Saddam's ability
to soak the Persian Gulfwith Iraqi crude. Coalition concern was j ustified.
The SEAL teams discovered that explosives had been placed at many of the
wells, although they had not yet been wired to detonators. One of the open
sea oil terminals were rigged with explosives for destruction.
This action preclu ded Hussein from potentially pouring millions of gallons of raw
oil into the Arabian gulf as he did durin g Desert Storm, which caused an oil
slick estimated as three times larger than the Exxo n Valdes oil spill in
Alaska.
It also ensured that the oil terminals were preserved for the
resumption of oil production, which will enable a much more rapid econo mic
recover y for the post-Saddam government.
• U.S . Army Special Forces have been condu cting Unconventional Warfare with
the Kurds of No rthern Iraq.
They have helped, supply, and organize Kurdish formations that have successfully
smashed the Ansar AI Islam redoubt that had been establi shed in the vicinity of
Kh unna near the Iranian border. The remnants of this organ ization thought to be
connected to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are now attempting to cross the
border into Iran.
Additionally, Close Air Support strikes in the same vicinity have forced Iraqi
Regular forces from the lines they have held for years back toward the city of
Mos ul. In addition, U .S. Arm y Special Operations Forces and Air Force Combat
Controllers (Air Commandos) have been conductin g long-range reconnai ssance as
well as SR missions throughout the Western Desert known as the "Scud Box."
To date, no SCUDs have been launched either at Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Israel
from this area.
• From the outset of the war, U.S. Air Force AC-130 gun ships have been cont inuously
engaged in close air support missions of SOF ground forces against hundreds of targets.
They have been instrumental in attiring dug-in Iraqi formations in the North,
West, and South. Additionally, U.S. Air Force Special Operations MC-130 Talons
have flown hundreds of resupply missions dropping supplies to SOF teams on the
ground.
• PSYOP missions developed by Anny Special Operations personnel have worked with
Air Force Special Operations and conventiona l Air Force units to drop more than 20
million leaflets in areas under the control of the Hussein regime.
The messages on the leaflets have ranged from providing instructions on where to
get food, water and medical treatme nt, instructions aimed at enemy soldiers on for
properly surrendering to the coa lition, and warn ings not to participate in WMD
operations.
• U.S. Army Rangers and Anny Special Operations gunship helicopters have been
instrumental in attacking and seizing airfields in Northwestern Iraq, in addition to having
conducted dozens of raids and interdiction missions against Iraqi LOCs.
From :
Sent:
To : OCJC SlPA
Subject:
Importance: High
we will ne ed e o get a copy of g ene ral rosa 's power point (d isk ) first thing i n the morning
so we can l oad compu ter for powe r poin t p r e s e n t at i o n . also , i n e e d to know i f the r e wi ll
be any handouts an i pass out the map that was distributed to mili tary ana l y s t s
tuesday ) ? t xs .
From : CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday. April 10, 2003 6:50 PM
To: Rheinlander, Thomas E., l TC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCSIPA
Cc : W illcox, Chris CIV OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James. COL,
OASD-PA; CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: military ana ysts agen a + attendance list
Importance: High
Attachment s: Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04-11·03.doc
Military Analysts
Conference c...
a t tached is f y i :
note: colonel r heinlander. i ' l l p rovide you wit h an updated list t omorrow AM . txs.
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Fr iday, Apr il II, 2003
(As of April 10, 2003/6:45 pm)
AGENDA
2:00 pm Welcome and Introduction (G uidelines)
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefensc for

Public Affairs
2:01 pm Iraqi Reconstruction Efforts
William 1. Luti, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International

Security Affairs (Tentative)
2:15 pm OI F Operational Update
Major General Stanley A. McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations

(J-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff
2:30 pm Call Concludes (G uidelines)
Note:
Call-In Telephone Numher:

Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Friday, April ! !, 2003
(As of Apl'"il l O, 2003/6:45 pm)
Participating
Brigadier General David Grange
General Montgomery Meigs
General William F. "Buck" Kernan
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
General Thomas Moorman
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Major Ge ne ral Paul E. Vallely
Co lonel Carl A llard
General Ronald Fogelman
General William Nash
General Joseph Ralston
Maj or General Donald W . Shepperd
Tentative or Dec line

Admiral Thomas Lopez (D)
Ge neral Glen K. Otis (0)
Ge neral Wayne Downing (T)
Undecided
General Wesley Clark
General Charles Wilhelm
Colonel Jack Jacobs
Lieutenant General Thomas Mcinerney
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell
Admiral David Jeremiah
Ge neral Larry Welch
Ge neral Hugh She lton
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson
Major General George Harrison
General Merrill McPeak
From : e IV,OASD-PA
Sent: Monda y, April 21, 2003 12:00 PM
To : Rheinlander, Thomas E" LTC , JCS, PAO
Cc : Haddock. Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD·PA
Subject: conference call with retired military analysts
Importance:
t om,
per our earlier conversation.

we'd like t o scrub tomorrow's conf erence call in lieu o f the one on f riday at 2:00 pm.
note: .,;;;;;.. ..1 i s schedu ling general garner f or the call.
also, re : the two addi tional outreaches. we'd like t o get the general out in front with
e mba s s y officia ls and ngo's begi nning work on iraq. again, his remarks would f oc u s on oif
operations.
can you g ive me some dates and times that would work for the general and i '1 1 go back and
schedule others around him . txs.
From: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC , JCS, PAO
Sent: Mond ay, April 21, 2003 2:37 PM
To: McCre ary, T. L., CAPT. JCS, PAO
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS /PA
Subject: FW : conference call with retired military analysts
Importance: High
Sir,
Given proposed b riefe r of the pend ing conf erence calIon Fri day and t he four day
d elay u n ti l it happens i n which ope rations will continue to wa ne , fro m t he op e r a tio na l
POV, thi ' t is time fo r MG MCChy r s t a l to bow out and hand-off t o HA gurus .
~ ha d t a l ked about t he two ou t re a c he s t hi s morning after t he 0815 me e t i ng but
not as t o who was t he a udience . Gi ve n the lis ting below, would al s o use same argue me nt as
t o MG McChrys t al no t being t he r i gh t guy t o brief.
vi r . Tom
> - -- -- Ori ~~=Ag ~ao~
>From: ~ CI V. OASD-PA
»s ent • Mond a y , Apri l 21 , 2 003 12:00 PM
>To : Rheinland er, Thomas E . , LTC. J CS, PAO
>Cc : Ha d do ck, El l en (Kati e) Col , OCJ CS/ PAi wi llcox. Ch r i s, CIV. OASO- PA
>Sub ject: conf erence ca ll with re t i r e d milit ary analysts
>I mpor tance : High
»pe r o ur earlier conversat ion .

>
>we ' d like to scrub t o morrow' s conf erence c a ll i n l i e u o f t he one on f riday at 2 :00 pm.
note : is scheduli ng g eneral g a r ne r for the ca l l.
>
>also , r e : t he two a dd i t i o nal out reaches. we ' d l ike to ge t t he genera l out in fro nt with
e mbas s y offi cials a nd ngo 's begi n ning work on i r a q . a gain. h i s remarks would focus on o i f
opera t ions.
>
>can you g ive me some d a t e s a nd t i mes that would work f o r the e nera l
>and i ' l l go back a nd schedul e o t hers around him . t xs .
From: , MAJ, SJS
Sent: Monda ril21 20034:09 PM
To: addock en; 1- -'
)(8) McCreary, T.; Rheinlander, Thomas;
Subject: FW : OASDfPA Question 1- ..1
Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status: Flagged
Attachments: Fratricide PAG FINAL.doc
Fratricide PAG
FINALdoc (47 K...
fyi -
> -- -- -Orig'
>From:
»s e nc : 2 003[ma4:ilto ~:::::;:~-:::::::-..1
21,OCPA
Monday, Ap r ilMAJ r
>To : McClellan Kenne t h LTC OASD -PAi
LtCol SAF/PAi )(8)
Ma ' SAP/ PAM
1;;;-,""'.-- - --<;""""
MAJ SJS i
-.or---------. LT SECNAVi
>Subj ec t:
>
>La di es a nd Gen t l emen,
>Was on leave las t wee k when discussion occurred o n this .
>pleas e s ee the PAG o n this iss ue, a recur ri ng o ne - and , i t is much be t t e r tha n my quote.
Mus t have bee n a very long day . . .
>
>
>
> - --- - Or i g i n a l Messag e---- -
>Fr om: Mc Cl e l l a n , Kenne th LTC OASD- PA
»sent • Frida, April 1 8 , 2 00 3 12:17 PM
>To : a.1..$ /PAM
>Cc : )(8) Lt Co l SAP/PAi MAJ OCPAi L.. .. MAJ SJS;
LT SECNAV i SAP PAM
>Subjec t: RE : OASD/PA Quest ion
>
>No t at t he mome nt . I t is s imply a recurring issue that wil l c i rc le a round a f t e r we
dec lare victory in Iraq.
>
>Tha t 's wha t I like about t he Ame ri can p ress . Th e dirt cl ods used t o c ome befor e and
d uri ng t he fi ght - - as t hey wo u ld tend t o do international ly . Now t hey seem t o come
p ri n cipa lly af terwa rd .
>
>VR
>VERITAS I NVICTRIX
>
>Ken McCle llan
>Lt Co l (USAF)
>OASD PA Press opera t~"~·o~n
~s~......
>,L.. - ' Fa x: n
>
> -- --- Or i g i n a l Me s s a e - - - - -
>Fr om: Ma j , SAF/PA
»s e n t . Friday , Ap r i l 18, 2003 8 : 5 8 AM
>To : c~e.JJ,..aD.....,JCeno.et C, OASD- PA )(8)
>Cc : )(8) LtCo l, SAF/PA i L..-_ _-' MAJ OCPAi L ----' MAJ,
1
SJSi ':":':::-:--;:;;--:::':. LT, SECNAVi
>Sub j e c t : RE: OASD/PA Question
tl!!!:=======:J, SAF/PAM
>
>s i r - - Do yo u have any quer i es on this right now?
> '-------'
> -----Or i gina l Message - - - - -
> From: McClellan, Kenneth, LTC , OASD-PA
> Sent : 'd 8, 20 03 7 : 36 AM
j, ~S A~F;/P;A====::I , MAJ , SJSi L
>
>
To : )(8)
cc:)(8) MAJ Ma
OC PAi ~ ..... LT, SECNAV
> Subject : RE: OASD/PA Quest10n
>
>
>
> Tha t was a wonderf ul a nswer right up to "AF , Army and Navy have all moved t o
diffe rent systems. " Tha t is prec ise ly what I would t hink would make this the numbe r - one
Le s sons Learned for t h i s conflict.
>
> Where are we on a r ea l - time coordi nat ion mechanism? Are we relying on s ome poo r
hu man at 40,0 00 f e e t trying to f igure out which coo rdinate s are f ri e ndli e s and whi ch one s
target s? Is there an i nteroperabil i ty common de nomi na t or that automa tica l ly sorts them
out by geographic s ec tor s o f targets and s hooters ? If it works so wel l, why did we ki ll
our own i n Afghanistan a nd I r aq? Are we IFFF frequency s atur a t e d? Was bandwidth t he
constra i n t ? Call signs? What was fundame nta l ly wrong with buying a system where tanks
and F- 16s or F- 14s could a utonomously r e cogn i ze an American o r Coali tion unit ? Have we
set up JSTARS to be the cent e r of gravity ?
>
> Anyway , we might as well sta rt f iguring out why fo i l on p lywood and g l int tape on
he l mets is s ti l l t he r ight a nswer af ter mo r e than three White Sa nds studies on t he
f riend ly f i r e i s s ue. And we nee d t o share wha tever visual presentat ion CIDAD J - 8 i s u s i ng
to ma ke t he issue (and t he l a t e st solut ion ) un ders t a nda bl e .
>
> Many thanks. Happy Fr iday .
>
> VR
>. VERITAS INVICTRIX
>
> Ken McCle l lan
> Lt Co l (USAF)
>
)(2)
Opera t,1.'0mn"s:...__,
> Fax : 1'1
>
>
> ----- Or i g i na l Messa e - - - - -
> From: Maj, SAF/PA
> Sent : 'rhureda A r il 17 2003 5:41 P~M ...,.. .,
> To: , SAF/PAMi )(8) LtCo I, SAF/ PAi
McCl ell a n , Kenne t h, LTC, OASD- PA
> Subject: RE : OASD/PA Question
>
> All -- I asked around on thi s and the a ns we r is this was an issue severa l years ago
and something the Army f ound too ex~e~n~S:i:v:e::Ja.nd now t he AF, Army and Navy have a l l move d to
different systems. Hope t ha t he lps . ~
>
> - - ---Or i g i nal Messa e -- - - -
> From: , SAF/PAM
> Sent: Wednesda A r il 16 2003 7 :05 AM
> To : Lt Col , SAF/PA
> Cc: )(8) , Maj, SAF/PA
> Subject : OASD/ PA Ques t ion
>
> Ken McC lellan has a quest i on about b l ue f orce t rac ki ng upgrade s t o ai rcraf t t o
prevent fr iend ly f ire . Can you help h i m?
>
> ----- Origina l Message -- - - -
> From : McC l e l lan, Kennet h, LTC, OASD -PA
> Sent: Wednesday, Apr i l 16 , 2003 3 : 19 AM
2
> To: ""i'':'''"-''''i'::-:~r::",,:,,:~,Maj . , SAF/PAM ;
> Subjec t: Is t l.S tru e?
>
:> Avoid i ng friendly fir e . (ABC) - But f or all t h e advantages of high-tech
we ap onry , mod ern mil itary for ces s till face a tragic , age -old problem: "fratric ide, "
o t he rwise known as "friendly fire " incident s. After De s e r t Stor m, the Pent agon conduc ted
e x ten s i ve r e s earch i nto d eve l oping ways t o di stingui sh f riend f rom f oe , but ended up
dit c h ing many of the m d ue t o cos t . One s uch program - c alled t he Batt lef i el d Comba t
I de nt i f i c a t i o n Syste m, o r Bers - wo uld have been a n ide al s e tup fo r he l p i ng to p r e ve nt
f rat r icide . The sys tem was simi lar to aut oma t i c i dentifi c a tion s ys tems deve l ope d a nd u s ed
by a ircra ft since the a dvent of radar. The Army s pent some $1 0 0 mi ll ion to devel op a nd
t est BC I S, a na l y s t s s ay. Bu t to equip the Army wi t h such automati c ident i fic a tio n s ys tems
would have cost a s much a s $40 , 000 per ve hicle. The p r ogram was c omplete l y scrappe d in
20 0 1 because BCIS, de s igned f o r g r ound c ombat , could n' t b@ adopted fo r effect i ve use with
a irc r aft , sai d Ma j. Amy Hannah, a publ i c af fa i r s o f fi c @r f or the Army. Rl t wa s di ff i c u l t
t o integrate, a nd t he system's limi ta t i ons d i dn 't a nswer the c hallenges that we r e a dded t o
t h@ [projec t) r e qu i r e men t , R s ays Hannah. MI t j ust didn' t provide what we wa nt or nee ded. R
Instead , t he Pent a go n ha s fo cused its effort s t o reduce f rat ric i de thro ugh other means .
Chi e f a mo ng them is to us e the u .s . mili t ary' S cl ear a dva nt age in advanced s e n s o r s a nd
informat ion techno logi es t o imp rove s o -ca l l e d s ituational a war e ness among fr iendl y
f i ght i ng forces. Unde r a program c a l led Fo r c e XXI Batt l e Command, Br igade a nd Be l ow, or
FBCB2 , the mi l itary p lans to c r e a t e wi r e l ess l o c a l data communicat ion ne t works tha t t i e in
variou s source o f in format ion . Computer s a nd sof tware wo uld be a b le t o co ll ect video f r om
unma nned d rone s , the pos it i o n o f f r i e nd l y f o r ce s wi t h GPS locat ion sy s t e ms , a nd dat a about
t he ene my from spy p lane s s uch as the JSTARS. By gather ing such dispa rate i n format ion
togethe r i nt o o ne Rba t t le s pa c e picture R and d ist r i but i ng i t to e ve ryone o n t he fie ld ,
i t ' s hoped t ha t e ven the common foot s o ldie r wi l l know where fri end s a nd foes are relat i ve
to the i r po s i t i o n a nd si tua tion . One Army unit, the 4th I nfant ry Di v is i o n , ha s already
been equ ipped wi th such d ig i ta l c ommuni c a ti on s technology. Bu t s i nce the d i vis i on was kept
out of most o f t he figh ti ng in I r a q, i t r e ma i ns to be see n i f t he syst em real ly co u l d he l p
in r e duci ng f rat r i c i de.
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3
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - MESSAG ES, Q'S AND A'S ON FRI ENDLY FIRE
CAS UALTIES/FRATRICIDE.
1. THIS MESSAG E PROVIDES MESSAGES AND Q'S AND A'S FOR USE IN HANDLIN G
QUERIES REGARDING FRIENDLY FIRE CAS UALTIES. IT IS INTENDED FOR USE IN
RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY.
2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSTURE IS PASSIVE, RESPONSE TO QUERIES ONLY.
3. MESSAG ES.
A DEFINITION OF FRATRICIDE/FRIEND LY FIRE PER AR 600-34. "A CIRCUMSTANC E
IN WHICH MEMBERS OF THE U.S. OR FRIENDL Y MILITARY FORCES ARE
MISTAKINGLY, OR ACCIDENTALLY, KILLED OR INJURED IN ACT ION BY THE U.S.
OR FRIENDLY FORCES WHILE ENGAGED W ITH AN ENEMY, OR W HILE FIRING AT A
HOSTILE FORCE, OR W HAT IS THOUGHT TO BE A HOSTILE FORCE."
B. FRATRICIDE IS AVO IDED OR LIMITED BY MULT IPLE ACTIONS, INCLUDING
RIGOROUS TRAINING OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS IN VEHICLE RECOGNITI ON AND
KNOW LEDGE O F FIRE CONTROL MEASURES, ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE FIRE
CONTROL MEASURES DURING THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF AN OPERAT ION
TO RESTR ICT OR PERMIT FIRES ACROSS THE BATTLEFIELD, ADHERENCE TO
FIRE CONTROL MEASURES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) DURIN G
OPERATIONS, A ND EMPHASIS ON SITUAT IONAL AWARENESS. TECHNOLOGY CAN
CONTRIBUTE TO THE AVOIDANCE OF FRATRICIDE, BUT WAR FIGHTER TRAINING
AND LEADER SHIP ARE THE PRINCIPAL DETER MINANTS.
C. TECHN OLOGY CAN C O NT R IBUT E TO THE WAR FIG HT E RS' SITUATIONAL
AWAREN ESS A N D ASSIST IN THE PREVENTION OF FRATRICIDE. EXAMPLE S
ARE THE ARMY'S FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW (FBCB2)
AND SECOND GENERATION FORWARD-LOOKING INFRARED (FLlR) (SGF). FBCB2
SUPPORTS SITUATIONAL AWA RENESS DOWN TO THE PLATFORM LEVEL ACROSS
ALL BATTLEFIELD FUNCTIONAL AREAS (BFAS) AND ECHEL ONS. ACROSS THE
BATTLEFIELD , LEADER S CAN USE THE DIGITAL DISPLAY TO REDUCE CHAOS AND
CONFUSION, AND FOCUS COMBAT POWER AT THE DESIRED POINT .
D. SECOND-G ENERATION FLiR PROVIDES ARMOR, INFANT RY, AND
RECONNAISSANCE FORCES WITH A LEAP-AHEAD CAPABILITY TO DETECT,
ACQU IRE, AND IDENTIFY TARGETS IN ALL WEATHER AND VISIBILITY CONDIT IONS,
EVEN DUR ING NIGHT OPERATIONS AND IN CONDITIONS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY
DUE TO SMOK E, DUST, SAND, AND FOG. SECOND GENERATION FLiR
EFFECTIVELY DOUBLE S THE IDENTIFI CATION RANGE AND INCREASES THE
DETECTION RANGE BY 55% COMPARED TO THE FIRST GENERATION FLiR USED
DURING THE 1991 GULF WAR. AS A RESULT , SGF ALLOWS THE SHOOT ERS TO
DETECT AND IDENTIFY TARGETS BEYOND THE RANGE OF DIRECT-FIRE WEAPON
SYSTEMS, CONTR IBUTING TO IMPROVEMENTS IN LETHALITY AND SURVIVABILITY
OF OUR FORCES AND REDUCTION IN FRATRICIDE.
E. NO MATTER HOW GOOD THE TRAINING, OPERATIONAL PLANNING, TECHNOLOGY,
AND LEADERSHIP, WARFARE IS A HUMAN ENDEAVOR AND MISTAKES W ILL BE
MADE. SOME OF THOSE MISTAK ES MAY CONTRIBUTE TO FRATRICIDE. THE
INTENSITY AND SPEED OF COMBAT, FEAR, FATI GUE, DUST, SMOK E, AND MANY
OTHER FACTORS CON TRIBUTE TO W HAT HAS BEEN HISTORICALL Y CALLED "THE
FOG OF WAR." ONE GOAL OF TRANSFORMATION IS TO CUT THROUGH THE FOG
OF WAR AND GIVE COMMAND ERS, LEADERS AND SOLDIERS A NEAR-PERF ECT
SITUATIONAL AWAR ENESS OF THE BATTLEFIELD.
F. EFFORTS TO REDUCE FRIENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE VERY
HIGH EMPHASIS. AS WAYS AND MEANS TO DO SO ARE MATURED, THEY WILL BE
EMBEDDED IN THE ARMY'S DOCTRINE, ACQUISIT ION AND TRAINING . HOWEVER,
BECAUSE CHAOS AND UNCERTAINTY REMAIN, THE COM PLET E ELIMINATION OF
FRIENDLY-FI RE INCIDENTS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED. W E MUST NOT LET
REASO NABLE CA UTION EVOLVE INTO TIMIDITY, WHICH WOULD LIKELY MEAN
GREAT ER CAS UALTIES FROM ENEMY ACT ION.
G. THE PROGRAMS BEING DEVELOPED AND INSTITUTE D TO REDUCE THE
POTENTIAL FOR FRIENDLY-FIRE INCID ENTS NECESSITATE THE CONTINU ING
NEED FOR TOUGH, REALISTIC TRAINING . THE EFFE CTIVENE SS OF OUR ARMY
AND ITS ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION W ITH MINIMUM CAS UALTIES ARE
A DIRECT RESULT OF TRAININ G.
4. QUEST IONS AND A NSW ERS.
Q 1, WHAT HAS THE ARMY DONE SINCE THE GULF WAR TO DECREASE THE CHANCE
OF FRIENDLY FIRE ON THE BATTLEFIELD?
A1. IN TERMS OF TRAININ G, ALL OF OUR COM BAT CENTERS, SPEC IFICALLY THE
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC) AT FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA, AND THE COMBAT
MANEUVER T RAININ G CE NTER (CMTC) AT HOHENFELS, GERMANY, HAVE TAKEN
MEASURES TO EVAL UATE IDENTIFICATION AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON THE
BATT LEFIELD.
Q2. THE BATTLEFIELD COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (BCIS) WAS DESIGNED TO

HELP IDENTIFY FRIENDLY FORCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE PROGRAM WAS
TERMINATED IN 2001 , WHY ?
A2. BCIS BACKGR OUND - PROGRAM WAS INITIATED IN 1993 BUT IT WAS ORIGINALLY
DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ONLY A GROUND-TO-GROUND IDENT IFICATION CA PABILITY
FOR MOUNTED COMBAT VEHICLES. IT DID NOT AS SIST WITH ALL COM BAT ID REALMS
[AIR-TO-G ROUND OR MOUNTED-TO-DISMOUNT ED I DISMOUNTED-TO-M OUNTED
IDENTITY]. ADDIT IONALLY, IT WAS NOT JOINT AND COALITION INT EROPERABLE. DUE
TO THE SYSTEM'S LIMITATION S TO MEET ALL OF THE ID REQUIREMENTS AND THE
CHALLENGES OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION , AND ASSOCIATED COSTS, ITWAS
TER MINATED IN 200 1.
Q3. WHAT IS THE ARMY DOING TO DEVELOP COMBAT IDENTIFICATION (CID) SYSTEMS?
A3. ARMY'S CURRENT APPROAC H TO CID - 3 PRONG APPROAC H - 1ST IS SIT UATIONAL
AWA RENESS; 2ND IS BETTER TACTICS TECHNI QUES PROCEDU RES (TT P) & TRAINING;
3RD IS ENHA NCE D OPTI CS + INFRARED TECHNOLOGY. W IT HOUT PROVIDING TOO
MUCH DETA IL FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY REASON S, IT CAN BE NOTED THAT CID
SYSTEMS ARE BEING DISTRIB UTED TO COALI TION AND ALLIED FORCES TO ENHANCE
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND IDENTIFI CATION OF FRIENDLY FORCE S. THESE
SYST EMS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THER MAL IDENTIFICATI ON PANEL S, THE
PHOEN IX INFRA RED COMBAT BEACO N SYSTEM AND GLOW TAPE. A DDITIONAL
SYSTEMS AR E IN DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING PHASES AND W ILL BE FIELDE D AS
SOON AS PRACTI CABLE TO PROVIDE:
• BETTER SITUATIONAL AWAR ENESS DERIVED FROM BLUE (FRIENDLY) FORCE
TRACKING, FBCB2 & GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) ENSURING UNITS
KNOW WHERE THE Y ARE AND W HERE FRIENDLE S AR E, THEREBY REDU CING
THE POSS IBILITY OF FRATRICIDE.
• BETT ER SITUATIONAL AWAR ENESS , COUPLED W ITH IMPROVED TTP HAS
RAISED THE SENSITIVITY LEVEL & ACU ITY OF TODAY'S FORCES TO ENSURE
THE Y HAVE HIGH CON FIDENC E OF TH E TARGET' S IDENTITY PRIOR TO AN
ENGAGEMENT. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS TRAINING INCLUDE S THE RECOGNITION
OF COM BAT VEHICLES (ROC-V) , THE RMAL SIGNATURE IDENTIFI CATI ON
TRAINING THAT HELP SOLDIERS LEARN TO IDENTIF Y THE THER MAL
SIGNATUR ES OF COMBAT VEHICLES. ROC-V IS AN INTE RACTIVE, W INDOWS -
BASED CURRICULUM THAT TEACHES THE UNIQUE PATERN S AND SHAPES OF
VEHICLE "HOTSPOTS' AND OVERALL V EHICLE SHAPES. ROC-V ALSO PROVIDES
SOLDIERS W ITH PRACTICAL EXPE RIENCE IN THE USE OF THEIR SENSOR IMAGE
CONTROLS. W ITH VIRT UAL SIGHT CONT ROLS, SOLDIERS LEARN TO
EFFECTIVELY ADJUST THEI R THE RMAL IMAGES TO FIND TARGETS AND BRING
OUT THE IR T HERMAL ID CUES.
• IMPROVED OPT ICS (2ND GEN FLi RS + NEW ER NIGHT VISION DEVIC E SYSTEMS)
PLUS PASSIVE TH ERMAL TECHNO LOGY, ENA BLE GUNN ERS TO MAKE A
PCS ITIVE IDENTIF ICATION WITH GREATER CLARITY AND ACCURACY, AT
GREATER RANGES .
• THE COMBINATION OF THESE APPROACHES REDUCES THE POTENTIAL FOR
FRATCIDE .
04. WHAT ARE FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES?

A4. OEFINITION OF FRATRICIDE/FRI ENDLY FIRE PER AR 600-34 . "A CIRCUMSTANCE IN
WHICH MEMB ERS OF THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY MILITARY FORCES ARE MISTAKINGLY , OR
ACCIDENTALL Y, KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTION BY THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY FORCES
WHILE ENGAGED WITH AN ENEMY, OR WHILE FIRING AT A HOSTILE FORCE , OR WHAT
IS THOUGHT TO BE A HOSTILE FORCE:
Q5. WHAT CAUSES FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES?

AS. COMBAT IS HIGHLY COMPLEX AND STRESSFUL. OPERATIONS ARE
CONDU CTED 24 HOURS A DAY, IN ALL TYPE S OF TERRAIN AND WEATH ER. THEY
INVOLVE RAPID MANEUV ER AND INTENSE ENGAGEMENTS USING HIGHLY LETHAL
WEAPONS SYSTEMS FIRED FROM A VARIETY OF AIR, GROUND AND SEA
PLATFORMS. BATTLEFIELDS ARE OBSCURED BY DUST AND SMOK E, SOLDIERS
BECOME FATIGUED , AND EQUIPMENT CAN MALFUNCTION. THESE AND OTHER
OCCURRENCES PRODU CE W HAT IS CALLED THE "FOG OF WAR :
Q6. HOW MANY AMERICAN CASUALTIES RESULTED FROM FRATRICIDE DURING THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR ?
A6. OF THE TOTAL OF 613 MILITARY BATTLE CASUALTIES IN OPERATION DESERT
STORM, 146 SERVICE PERSONNEL W ERE KILLED IN ACTION , INCLUDING 35 KILLED BY
FIRE FROM FRIENDLY FORCES, AND 467 W ERE WOUN DED, INCLUDING 72 BY FIRE
FROM FRIENDL Y FO RCES.
Q7. WHAT ARE THE LEADING CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE?

A7. THE FACTORS THAT CAN CAUSE FRATRICIDE ARE:
• CHAOS AND CONFUSION OF WAR FARE
• INADEQUATE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
• INADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT OF, AND ADHERENCE TO, FIRE CONT ROL
MEASURES
• COMBAT IDENTIFICATION FAILURES
Q8. DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM , HOW DID THE FRATRICIDE INCIDENTS
OCCUR?
AS. FRIENDLY-FIRE CASUALT IES AR E NOT UNIQUE TO OPERAT ION DESERT STORM .
DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, APPRO XIMATEL Y 39 PERCENT OF THE
FRIENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS (11 OUT OF 28) APPEARED TO BE AS A RESULT OF TARGET
M ISIDENTIFICATION . MISID ENT IFICATION WAS A RESULT OF SEVERAL FACTORS-
WEATHER AND BATT LEFIELD COND ITIONS BEING THE PRINCIPAL REASONS .
COORD INATION PROBLEMS ACCOUNTED FOR APPRO XIMATELY 29 PERC ENT (8 OUT OF
28) FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENTS . OF THE REMAINING NINE INCIDENTS, SIX WERE DUE TO
TE CHNICAL ANDIOR ORDNANCE MALFUN CTIONS; THREE INCIDENTS HAD INSUFFICIENT
OR INCONCLUSIVE FINDINGS TO DETERMINE CAUSE.
Q9. THERE SEEMS TO BE A HIGHER PROPORTION OF CASUALTIES FROM FRIENDLY
FIRE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM AS OPPOSED TO PREVIOUS CONFLICTS . IS THAT
THE CASE?
A9. BASED ON THE REPORTS USED AND THE METHODS OF SURVEY REPORTED, THE
PERCENTAGES OF CASUALTIES VARIED, TO INCLUDE : SIX PERC ENT IN
PANAMNOPERATION JUST CAUSE, 13 PERCENT IN GRENADN OPERATION URGENT
FURY, STUDIES REFLECTING 10-14 PERCENT IN VIETNAM , AND 12-14PERCENT IN
WORLD WAR II AND 17 PERCENT IN OPERATI ON DESERT STORM .
ANOTHER DIFF ERENCE BETW EEN OPERATION DESERT STORM AND PREVIOUS WARS
WAS THE GREAT NUMBER OF LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENTS AND BATTLES IN LIMITED
VISIBILITY . FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM5-SIGHTS AND COMPUTERS-ARE FAR MORE
CAPABLE THAN IN THE PAST. WEAP ONS AND AMMUNITION ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE
HIGH PROBABLITIES OF HITS AND KILLS AT GREATER RANGES . THE NATURE OF THE
DESERT PERMITTED ENGAGEMENT OF TARGETS AT RANGES EXCEEDING TWO AND
ON E HALF KILOMET ERS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND IN ALMOST ALL WEATH ER
CONDITI ONS. EFFECT IVE LONG-RANGE FIRES DO MUCH TO W IN BATTL ES WITH
FEWER CASUALT IES, BUT THESE ENGAGEMENTS ALSO PLACE A PREMIUM ON
POSITIVE TARGE T IDENTIFICATION. IN ADDITION TO INCREASED RANGES , DESERT
WARFARE IS CHARACTERIZED BY PERIODS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY. W EATHER
CONDITI ONS, SUCH AS SAND AND RAIN STORMS THAT OCCURR ED DURING
OPERATI ON DESERT STORM , THE DUST AND SMOKE OF BATTLE, AND DARKNESS
OFTEN AID ATTACKING FORCES BY SHIELDING THEM FROM ENEMY OBSERVATION . IT
IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THESE CONDITIONS WERE , TO SOME EXTENT,
RESPONS IBLE FOR RELATIVELY LOW COAL ITION CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, THESE
CONDITIONS ALSO OEGRAD E SOMEWHAT THE SIGHTING SYSTEMS AIR AND GROUND
FORCES USE. IN SUCH CONDIT IONS, STAT E-OF-THE-ART SIGHTS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
RESOLUTION TO IDENTIFY GENERAL TARGETS, BUT OFTEN LACK THE RESOLUTION TO
PROVIDE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLE TYPE. LONG-RANG E, LIMITED-VISIB ILITY
ENGAGEMENTS ARE PART OF THE ART OF MODERN WARFARE.
A FINAL FACTOR ON THE MODERN BATTLEF IELD IS THE PRESENCE OF COA LITION
FORCES EQUIPPED W ITH DIFFERENT EQUIPMENT THAN EMPLOY ED BY US FORCES.
EXTRA CARE MUST BE TAKEN WH EN COALIT ION FORCES FROM DIFFERENT NATIONS
AR E OPERAT ING IN THE SAME AREA . IN MANY CAS ES, THEY W ILL NOT SHARE A
COMMON PICTU RE OF THE BATTLEFIELD OR EVEN EMPLOY SIMILAR ANTI-FRATRICIDE
TACTICS AND CONTROL MEASURE S. FURTHE R COMPLICATING THE CHALLENGE,
COALITION FORCES MAY BE EQUIPPEDWITH COMBAT VEHICLES OF THE SAME TYPE
AS ENEMY FORCES. COA LIT ION WARFARE INTERJECTS A NEW DIFFICULTY INTO THE
CHALLENGES SURROUNDING PREVENTI ON OF FIRE FROM FRIEN DLY FORCES.
Ql0. DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM , WHAT TYPE OF INCIDENTS RESULTED IN

CASUALTIES FROM FRIENDLY FIRE?
Al0. INVESTIGAT IONS HAV E IDENTIFIED 28 INCIDENTS DURING OPERATIO N DESERT
STORM IN WHICH US FORCES INADVERTENTLY ENGAGED OTHER AMER ICAN FORCES,
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF 35 SERVICEMEN AND THE WO UNDING OF 72 OTHERS.
OF THE 28 U.S. INCIDENTS, 16 WERE IN GROUN D-T0-GROUND ENGAGEMENTS, WITH 24
KILLED AND 57 WOUND ED, W HILE NINE WERE IN AIR-TO-GROUND ENAGAGEMENTS
THAT RESULTED IN 11 KILLED AND 15 WOUNDED. OTHE R INCIDENTS INCLUDED ONE
SHIP-TO -SHIP, ONE SHOR E-TO-S HIP, AND ONE GROUND-TO-AIR ENGAGEMENT.
HOWEVER, NO CASULATI ES RESULTED FROM THESE INCIDENTS.
Ql1 . WHAT PROCEDURES WILL BE TAKEN ON T HE BATTLEFIELD ONCE A FRIENDLY

FIRE INCIDENT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OCCURRED?
All . ONCE A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT IS BELIEVED TO HAV E OCCURRED, ARM Y
REGULAT IONS REQUIRES BOTH A SAFETY AND COLLATERAL INVESTIGATION (SEE AR
385-40) . IN THE EVENT OF FRIENDLY FIRE FATALITIES, AR 600-34 PRESCRIBES
FURTHER REQUIREMENTS. AR 15-6 SETS FORTH PROCEDU RES FOR THE CONDUCT OF
INFORMAL AND FORMAL INVESTIGATIONS AND GU IDES THE CONDUC T OF
INVESTIGAT IONS REQUIRI NG THE DETAILED GATHERING AND ANALYZ ING OF FACTS ,
AND THE MAKIN G OF RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THOS E FACTS.
5. MEDIA QUESTIONS THAT GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THESE Q'S AND A'S
SH 0 DIA RELATIONS BRANCH, OCPA-MR, ATTN:
::-_=.... OR PA STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, OCPA-SCD ,.... .....
From : ~=.:::-:~:",::~~C IV. OASD·PA
Sent : Friday. Apri l 25. 2003 12:45 PM
To : Rheinlander. Thomas E., LTC, JCS , PAO ; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col. OCJCSIPA
Cc: DeFrank, James, COL, OASD·PA
Subj ect: military analysts conference call wilh mcchrystallcollins
Importa nce: High
Attachments : Military Ana lysts Conference Call Agend a 04-25-03 .doc
Military Analysts
Conference c...
attached is the agenda + fina l list of part ic ipants for this a ft ernoon's
conference call w/retired mi litary analysts :
1
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Fr iday, Apr il 25, 2003
(As of April Z4, 2003/10 :00 am)
AGENDA
2:00 pm Welcome and Introd uction (G uidelines)

Public Affairs
2:01 pm Upda te on Cnalition Reconstru ction Efforts in Iraq
Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability

Operations
2:15 pm OIF Op erati onal Upda te
Major General Stanley A. McChrystaJ, Vice Director for Operations

(1-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff
2:30 pm Ca ll Concludes (Guidelines)
Note:
Ca ll-In Telepbone Number:

Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Friday, April 25, 2003
(As of April 25, 2003/12:45 pm)
Participating
Co lonel Carl Allard
Lieutenant Co lonel Robert Maginnis
General Wi lliam Nash
General Jose ph Ra lston
Colonel John Warden
Rear Admi ral Thom as F. Marfiak
Major Genera l Donald W. Sheppe rd
Major Rob ert Bevelacqua
Colonel Jack Jacobs
General Glen K. Otis
T entative or Decline
Undecided
General William F. "Buck" Kernan (T)
Majo r General Perry Sm ith (T)
Genera l Wayn e Downing (T)
Bri gadier Gene ral David Grange (0)
General Ronald Fogelman (D)
Admi ral Thomas Lopez (D)
General Wesley Clark (0)
General Ch arles Wilhelm (0)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (0)
Admiral David Je remiah (0)
Gene ral Larry Welch (D)
General Hugh Shelton (D)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (D)
Major Ge neral George Harri son (0)
General Merri ll McP eak (D)
General Thom as Moorman (0)
I
From : Haddock. Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent:
To:
i
1W~e~d~n~~~'I'UCIV
I~Y~30;JCS
'~2~00~~~J~~JS;Iii)(8)
3 9:03 PM ----lLr:1\V, JCS , PAO~'---"' CIV
Cc:
OCJCSfPA;JD)(8) I MAJ , SJS..;f""»)(8).,--- - t'11LCDR, JCS SJS~;"')(8)
...-----'= ::.....,
SMSgt, OCJCS
Subject: 30 J ULY END OF DAY REPORT
PLEASE PASS TO CAPT THORP
WINS:
--Gen McChrysta l ma de time on his calendar for the OSD PA con ference ca l l wi t h re tired
military analys ts for tomorrow afternoon . His p lan is to bring along an 06 f rom t he JOD
who will o bserve, then t ake th is tasker on from here . I thi n k it's a g reat plan. He
indicated t ha t had d i s c us s e d t h i s with Gen Swart z, and if, i n t he fu ture, we fe lt t here
was need fo r more fire power on a particu lar cal l/sub jec t, tha t we cou l d r e-eng a ge . I told
h i m t hat whe n t hese a nalysts were s ti ll on act ive duty, they r e l ied on 065 t o b r ief them,
a nd t ha t thi s shou ld work well .
-- Go t a J5 SME to do a backgrounder with Bradley Graham this afternoon on Pr oli fera tion
Security I ni t i a ti ve . Spoke with J5 's EA, and sent an emai l to Gen Casey, (cc t he J 5 ,
e tc .) to "remind" all t ha t this was a lre a dy i n t he works , a nd so no o ne woul d be surprised
when t he y read the wa s h i ng t o n Post t o mo r row - - or Friday , whe never i t r un s.
-- WOODWARD i n tervi ew : Gen Pace brought t h i s subject u p, as i t came up at the NSC t od a y.

Condi Rice men tioned i t , Pr es i d e nt chi med in, etc. Gen Pa c e indicated that we are to
f o l l o w Condi 's l ead , g e t some input/guidance/outli ne , etc . I have a ca l l i n wit h Anna
Perez, j u st to re lay the conversation and s ee whe r e we are . I think she had a long chat
with Mr. Woodward t od a y. wi l l f oll ow up; at l e a s t the skids a r e greased, and this wil l be
an e xpec ted event. Joan has prepare d t he memo for the Chairman o n thi s .
- -Got all t he Chairman 's tra nscr ipts you sent (Ne w Delhi press conferenc e ; GEO -TV,
Pa k istan; and Ba g r a m press conference) hung on t he webs i t e . Also passed them to Co l
DeFrank f o r us e on De f e n s e Li nk . I not iced t hey used one o f J i m Garamore 's s t ori es in t he
Pe n tagon Brie f ing (the wee kly "blurb " ) wi th a hotlink to DefenseLink, so t ha t 's g r e at
(a d d i t i o na l ) c ove rage / a udi e nce .
LOSS ES : (wha t a re you l o o ki ng he r e f or??? I ' m a Marine -- t here wi ll be NOTHING in the

loss col unm!
QUESTION: Got an ema il from t he Ren don Group folks. They origi nally s e nt i t t o you, t he n
resent t o me when they got your auto -response . John Rend o n wil l be i n the bu il d i ng Monday
afternoon (4 Aug) for s everal meeti ngs, and they were ho ping to get him on your s c hedule
(and they promised he will not go over the time l im it . ) Do you want me to sche dul e this?
30 minutes?
PRED ICTION : Afraid LIB ERTY for th is we ekend may be cancell ed . Saturday schedule is
bu ilding .
And wh i l e I was p u tt i ng out f i res with an ice pick , the rest of the o ff ice was r e a ll y b us y
t oday :
.... ...,1
" aj .[···'
* WA Pos t backgrounder wi t h J5 on PIO. Pub lica tion expec ted tomorrow
* Attended Libe ri a 10 VTC today - expec t an interagency one-page tal king poi n t paper
ready f o r chop by Saturday
* St af f i ng PAG for GTMO, coordina ting a cross Joint Sta f f - waiting on J5 , due tomor row
* Choppi ng of PAG on Somalia complete
* Conducted BG Brooks backgrounder wi th FrontLine today
* Chop ping Nob l e Mali nd a SMEB
* Ale rt order be i ng worked - - PPAG being coordi na ted by Amy
• PPAG on upcoming e vent going t h r o ugh appr ova l c hanne ls
• Working a Te rro rist Informa tion Program/ J PENS - J6 Issue with e SD f o r Bo sto n Gl obe
deadline t omorrow
• wo r ki ng a J5 Gol d wa ter- Ni c ho l s Query
LTC I!~=:J
• Comp u t e r Guru's loaded Calendar Cr eator 6.0 t oda y -- LTC e nde avoring t o
l e a r n i t and tran sfer it a s Long Range Calenda r.
• Worki ng I s sues fo r Out r e a ch Pr ogra m.
• Coord ina ted wit h J l regarding lMA support p r o pos al n o t a si mpl e proc e ss . .. will
work it hard.
• Town Ha ll me e t i ng o n track for SECDEF a nd CJCS o n 14 Aug.
That 's all the news that fits.

Stay s a f e , and hu rry back to the barn .
VI '
Kat ie
Trac king: Rec ipient . ..d

Read: 7l3Ol2OO3 9:05 PM
Read: 7/3 112003 7:04 AM
Read: 7/3 112003 8:27 AM
Read: 7/3112003 7:46 AM
Read: 7/3112003 8:11 AM
Read: 7/3112003 5:57 AM
React 7/3112003 6:57 AM
2
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA
Sent: Monda Au ust 04, 2003 2:40 PM
To : CIV, JCS VCJCS
Subj ect: FW : Outreach Meeting with SECDEF and Military Ana lysts, 12 Aug, 10:30 am - 12:00 pm
Importance : Low
Just as a head's up .
SecDef is scheduled to meet with t he r et i r ed general o f f i c e r s / mi l i t a ry a nalyst s on Tues ,
12 Aug , s omecime betwee n 1 03 0-1200 he re i n the Pencagon . He may ask the Vice Chairman
(Ac ti ng Chairman ) t o join h i m.
The brie fer , e t c . discussed below is o ur s for action - - NOT looking f o r Ge n Pace co be t he
d uty o ps briefer.
Just wan ted you to be aware that thi s might pop up on Gen Pace's cal endar a s a "drive by "
with SecDef .
V! R
Kat ie
> - n norig '
>From: LTC, JCS SJS
>Se nt: Mon day , Augus t 04 , 200 3 2:0 1 PM
>To: Haddo c k , El l en (Ka t i e) , Col , OCJCS/PA
>Sub j e c t : Out r e a c h Meet ing wi th SECDEF and Military Analys ts, 12 Aug, 10 :30 a m - 12:00
pm
>I mpo r t a nc e : Low
,
,' Ma ' a 'm E ::::I
• in f o rme d me about a ne a t opportun i t y to e nga ge the Mi l i t a r y Ana l ysts and
Ci vi l i an Defense Exp e rt s next we ek, He is ho s t i ng a Les s o n s Lear ne d out r e a c h fo r t he se
ana ly~st ~s
! :o
:nJ1 2 Aug here in t he bu ild i ng , vice the wee kl y te lephon ic con f e r e nc e ca l l.
, e reque sted a IS- minut e mi li tary o perat ions br i efi ng f r om some o ne on the J oinc
Sta f f ,
> As you kn ow we a re wor ki ng to identify a n 0 - 6 br i efe r t o communi c a t e weekly on t he
conf ca ll,
> Ho wev e r , I t ho ug ht tha t if the VCJ CS wan t ed t o enga ge t h i s a udience it would be a
grea t oppo r t uni ty t o do so a nd ge t hi s me s s age out .
> What do you t hi nk ?
> v! r ......_ ....
> LTC
1
From : ~;"'~~.....I CIV. JCS VCJCS
Sent: Tuesda y. Augusl 05. 2003 9:12 AM
To: Haddock , Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Outreach Meeting with SECDEF and Military Analysts, 12 Aug, 10:30 am - 12:00 pm
Importance: Low
Tha nk you . .. l o o ki ng at SO's "two - we eke r " ... t here i s a n "Out reach " noted for
1 1 0 0 - 1 1 4 5 • .• 1 '1 1 put on boss 's schedule as a n FYI and keep an eye on it .
> ----- Or i g i na l Message - - - - -

>Fr om: Haddock, Bllen (Ka t i e) , Col, OCJCS/PA
>Se nt· ust 04, 20 03 2: 40 PM
>To : CIV, JCS VCJCS
>Su b j e c t : FW: Outreach Meet ing with SECDE F and Mi l itary Analysts, 12 Aug. 1 0 : 3 0 am -
12:00 pm
>I mpo r t a nc e : Low
>
>Just as a head 's up.
>Se c De f i s schedu led to me e t with the retired general off ice rs/ mi l i tary ana lysts on Tues ,
1 2 Aug, somet ime between 1 0 30-12 0 0 here i n the Pentagon. He may ask the Vi c e Chairman
(Act ing Chairman) to join h im .
>The br i ef er, etc . d iscussed be low is ours for act ion -- NOT l oo ki ng for Gen Pace to be
the du ty ops br ie f er .
>Just wanted you to be aware that t his might pop up on Gen Pace's ca lendar as a "drive
by" with SecDef .
>V/ R
>Katie
>
> ----- Or i
>Fr om: ~ LTC, JCS SJS
>Se n t: Monday, August 04, 2003 2 :01 PM
>To : Haddock, Bl l e n (Kat i e) . Col, OCJCS/PA
>Su bj e c t : Ou t r e a c h Meeting with SBCDB F and Mi l itary Analyst s, 12 Aug, 10 :30 am - 12:00
pm
>Importance : Low
>
>Ma t am~!!:=1_
> ~ informed me about a neat opportuni ty t o engage the Mi l itary Ana lysts and
Civi lian Defense Experts next week . He is hos t ing a Lessons Le a r ne d outreach f or t hese
analys ts o n i2 Aug he r e i n the bu i lding, vice the week ly te lephonic conference c all .
> ~ requested a I S- minu te mil it ar y operat ions brie f ing from someone on t he Joint
Staff .
> AS you know we are working to ident ify an 0 -6 briefer t o communicate week ly on the
conf call.
> However, I thought that i f the VCJ CS wanted t o engage t hi s audience i t would be a
great o pportun ity t o do so and get his message out .
> Wha t do you t h i nk?
> v/ r ....--_ ....,
> LTC
1
From : L;~~~~~"'" LTC, JCS SJS
Sen t: Thursday, August 07,2003 10:19 AM
To : Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSlPA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col , OCJCSl PA
Subj ect: FW : Military Ana lysts Conference Call with CJCS
Importance : High
Attachments: Military Analysts Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call Agend a 08-07 -ea .dcc
Militafy Analysts
CHilian Del...
Sir / Ma'am,
La t es t info on the conf e r ence Ca l l .
vi r, LTC
L.-_...l
> --- --Original Me ss a e - - ---
>F rom: CI V, OASD-PA
>Sen t: Thu r s d a y , August 07, 200 3 9 :4 6 AM
>To: willcox, Ch r i s , CIV, OASD- PA; Thorp, Frank , CAPT , OCJCS / PA; L. .J LTC,
J CS SJS
>Cc: Whitman, Bryan , SES, OASD- PA; Rhyneda nc e , George, COL, OASD - PA
>Sub jec t: Military Analys t s Co n f erence Call with CJCS
>Irnpor t a nce: Hi g h
>
>Fo lks,
>
>At t a c hed is an upd a ted a g enda a nd li s t o f participants f o r this a f t ernoon' s confe r ence
ca l l wi th CJCS -- which refl ec t s l a s t ni ght 's cha nge i n t '
>A f i n a l r evision wi l l b e f orwarded b y 1 : 0 0 pm. Th a nks !
>
>
1
OfF C o nfe ren ce C a ll
R etired Milit ary Analyst s and C iv ili a n D efense E x
3: 00 pm, T hurs day, Aug ust 7, 2003, Roo
(As or August 6, 2003/6 :30 pm)
AGENDA
3 :00 pm Welco me a nd I nt ro duc tio n (G uidelines)
Chris Willcox, Deput y Assistan t Secretary of Defense for

Public Affairs
3:01 p m Update on Joint C hiefs of Staff T r ip to the Region
General Richard B. Myers (AF) , Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
3:15 pm Questions and Answers
3:30 pm C all Conclud es (Guidelines)

Public Affairs
Note:
C all-In Telephone Number:

OIF Conference Can
Retired Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts
3 :00 pm, Thursday, A ugust 7, 2003
(As of August 7, 200319:15 am)
PARTIC IPATING Retired Military An alysts

Colonel Carl Allard
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan
Genera l Ronald Foge lman
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginni s
Rear Admiral Thom as F. Martiak
General Montgomery Me igs
Maj or Genera l Donald W. Shepperd
Major General Paul E. Vall ely
Major Gene ral Thomas L. Wilkerson
PARTICIPATI NG C ivilian Defen se Experts

Mr. Anthony Cordesman, Fellow, Center for Strategies and International Studies
Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND
Lieutenant General Mic hael M . Dunn, Presid ent, National Defense University
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Sec urity Policy
Mr. Grove r Norquist, Presiden t. Americans for Tax Reform
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institu te
Mr. Loren B. Thompson, Chief Op erating Officer , Lexington Institute
Mr. John Wobensmith, Director of Development, Institute of Wo rld Politics
T ENT ATIVE or DE CLINE Retired Milita ry An alyst s

Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (D)
Lieut enant General Buster Glo sson (D)
Major General George Harri so n (D)
Co lonel Jack Jacobs (D)
General Merrill McPeak (D)
General Thom as Moorman (0)
General William Nas h (D)
General Larry Welch (D)
TENTATIVE or DEC L IN E C ivilian Defen se Ex perts

Mr. Thomas Donnell y, Fell ow, Am erican Enterprise (T)
Ms. Nina Sh ea. Director, Center for Reli gio us Freedom (T)
Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews. Presid ent. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (T)
Dr. Mic hae l O' Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution (0)
Mr. Chris Preb le, Director of Foreign Pol icy Studies, CATO Institute (D)
UNDECIDED Reti r ed Milita ry Ana lysts
General Wayne Downing
Brigadier General David Grange
Admiral David Jeremiah
Lieut enant General Thomas McInerney
General Hugh Shelton
Maj or Genera l Perry Smith
Colonel John Warden
UNDECIDED Civilia n Defense Ex perts

Dr. Daniel Goure, Senior Fellow. Lexington Institute
Mr. Michael J. Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Mr. Will Marshall, President. Progressive Policy Institute
Mr. Jack Spencer, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation
Dr. Michael Waller, Vice President, The Center for Security Policy
From : L.,;.:~~,:",,::~~~ LTC. JCS SJS
Sent: Thursday, August 07,20032 :27 PM
To : Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSJPA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
Subject: FW ; Military Analysts Conference Call with CJCS; Agenda/Participants
Importance: High
Attachments : Military Analysts Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call Agenda OS-07-o3.doc
Military Analysts
Ovifian DeL
l ates t u p da te ..
> n n: _Orig··~t=::;::l
>From E: CI V, OASO- PA
>Se nt: Thu r s day . Augus t 07, 2 00 3 12: 40 PM
>To: Wi l l c o x , Chris, ClV, OASD - PA; Thorp , Frank , CAPT, OCJ CS/ PA; LTC,
JCS SJS
>Cc: Oi V, OSO; Whitman , Bryan , SES , OASD-PA; Rhynedanc e , Ge o r ge , COL,
OASD- PA; ClV, O~D ; Ba r b er, All iso n , ClV, OASD- PA
>Su bjec t : Mi l i t a r y Analysts Co n f e r e nce Ca l l wit h CJCS : Ag@nd a / parti cip a n t s
>lmpar t a nce: High
>
>At t ach@d is t he age nd a and f ina l l is t af part ic ipants f or t h i s a fternoon ' s con f erence
cal l wi t h Ge ne r al My ers:
>
>
>Th ose that are "t e n tat ive /dec l ined/ u nd ecided " a r e li sted o n page t h r e e.
>Txs !
>
1
OIF C o nfe rence Call
Retired M ilitary A n alys ts and Civ ilia n Defense Ex erts
3:00 pm , T hursday, August 7, 2003, Room.. •
(As of August 6, 2003/6:30 pm)
AGENDA
3:00 pm Welcome a nd Introduction (G uidelines)

Public Affairs
3: 01 pm Update on J oint C hiefs nf Staff T r ip to the Region
General Richard B. Myers (AF), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StatT
3:15 pm Questions and Answers
3:30 pm Call Concludes (Guidelines)

Public Affa irs
Note:
Call-In Te lepho ne Number:

OfF Conference CalI
Retired Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts
3:00 pm, Thursd ay, August 7, 2003
(As of August 7, 2003/12:40 pm)
PARTI CIPATING Retired Military Ana lysts

Colonel Carl Allard
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan
General Rona ld Fogelman
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
Major General Donald W. Shepperd
Lieutenant General Bernard Trai nor
Colonel John Warden
MajorGeneral Thomas L. Wilkerson
PARTICIPATING Civilian Defense Experts

Mr. Anthony Cor desman, Fellow, Center for Strategie s and International Studies
Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND
Lieute nant General Michael M. Dunn, President, National Defe nse University
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy
Mr. Michae l J. Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Mr. Steven Nider, Director for Foreign and Security Studies, Progressive Policy Institute
Mr. Grover Norquist, President, Americans for Tax Reform
Ms. Danie lle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Mr. Jack Spencer, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation
Mr. Loren B. Thompson, Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute
Dr. Michael Waller, Vice President, The Center for Security Po licy
Mr. John Wobensmith, Director of Development, Institute of World Politics
TENTATIVE or DEC LI NE Reti red Military Aoalysls
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (D)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (0)
Brigadier General David Grange (D)
Major General George Harrison (0)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (0)
Admira l David Jerem iah (0)
General Merrill McPeak (0)
General Thomas Moorman (0)
General William Nash (0)
General Larry Welch (0)
TENTATIVE or DECLINE Civilian Defense Experts

Mr. Thomas Donnelly, Fellow, American Enterprise (0)
Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, SeniorFellow, The Brookings Institution (0)
Mr. Chris Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, CATO Institute (0)
Ms. Nina Shea. Director, Center for Religious Freedom (0)
Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (0)
UNDECIDED Ret ired Military Analysis

General Wayne Downing
General Hugh Shelton
UNDECID ED Civilian Defen se Experts

Dr. Daniel Goure, SeniorFellow, Lexington Institute
From : L.. ~ LTC , JCS SJS
Sent: Friday, Augus t 08, 2003 5:02 PM
To : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: august 12 outreach meeting
fyi Ma 'am
:>Sent·
:> - -
:>To:
-~!-~o~r;1~'9~'~~~~~~~~~~:,
:> F r om: LTC , J CS SJS
gust 08, 200 3 5 : 0 1 PM
CI V, OASD-PA
:>Subject: RE ; augus t 1 2 out reach me et ing
:> #1 - Ou r reque st i s in t o the J 3 f or g e n era l o f f i c er sup port . Sta nding by fo r their

a ppr o v al .
:> # 2 - VCJCS h a s i t o n hi s c al endar t o att e nd . I think we a re fin e - no need fo r
SECDEF to do anyt hing more.
:> The o n l y thing I could see that might prohib i t his parti c ipat i o n would be
some unex pected requirement a s Ac ting CJ CS .
:> My recommendat ion i s t ha t we d o not reengage o n the is sue - it is o n t he
s c h e dul e .
:> And I d id no te t he Press Conf o n Tu esday, I be liev e t h a t SECDEF and VCJ CS wi ll share
t he podi u m on Tuesday .
>
:> Ha v e a wonder f u l weeke nd . If I get more i nf ormat i o n ton ight on t he Op e r a tions
Brie fe r for the 1 2 t h , I'll l e t ou kno w ASAP .
:> v Ir , L.';"'_ _..1
>
:> n _ nOrig '
:> Fro m: LTC , J CS SJS
»s en c . Fr 1 a Augus t 0 8, 20 03 1:18 PM
:>To : CIV, OASD-PA
:>Su b j e c t : RE: a ugust 12 o u t r e a c h meeting
:> As ked CAPT Thorp to work t hro ugh #1 this morning - e xpect he will t e ll me shortly .
:> #2 Checked r e g a r di ng the VCJCS and t ime i s set aside on h i s schedul e - think h e is
wa iting to s e e if SECDEF asks him to join him .
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Frank , CAPT , OCJCS/ PA
>
>
>
>
>
> we are st ill in need o f c losu r e on two things r e : next t ue sday 'S o u treach:
>
:> 1. i ne ed a lock on lieutenant l!!!!!= = :;::= = = = J,for the mili t ary ops b ri ef ing .
wit h t h at obvious ly, we ne ed t o know what h i s b rie fing requiremen ts wi l l be , i f any
(u n c l a s s powe r p oint , h a n d out s etc .. . ) .
>
> 2 . c o n fi rmat i on o f v cj c s part i c i p at i o n in this o u treach meeting ? note
b e l ow /emai l t ra n s mi s s i o n :
>
:> Ge n Pace i s Ac t i ng Ma n - Wed n e x t week. I heard thro ugh o ur PA,
:>Tuesday's Ou treach is wi t h r eti r e d GOs a nd Mil i tary Analy sts . .. do you
1
>t h ink my bo ss will be a s ked t o attend? Als o , you r 2-weeker is s howi ng
>CJCS d o ing the Press Av a i l . .. do you t hi nk it will still go with my boss
>instead ? Th ank s ,
>
> It was our understand i ng t hat the vcjcs had alread y been a s ked.
>
> p lea s e adv i s e soonest . t xs !
>
>
>
2
From : ~~~7~ CIV, OASD-PA
Sen t: Monday, Augus t 11. 2003 11:05 AM
To: Haddock. Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCSJPA'L ...... l TC, JCS SJS
Su bj ect : outreach with military analysts
kat ie ,
c h ris asked me to call y o u back whi ch i 've now le ft a me ssage f o r y o u with deb.
a couple of qui c ki e s :
as an f y i -- osd pa stil l has not b e en to l d that v c c j s is a l o c k by j c s p a . i f h e is - -

great , however, please l e t u s know so we can c oordinate wi th protoco l and o t h e r i nvi t e d
speakers . a l s o, v ccj s will not partici pate i n prep meet i ng wit h secde f p rior t o the
a c t u al meeting. t h i s con cept h as o n l y b een done o nce (t h e c h ai r at the la s t out r each
mee ti ng ) and i t d idn 't work wel l. we' v e been ins t ructed by s ecd e f not to do t his aga i n.
g i ve not e ; our read a h e a d

wen t i s o u r rout ine. txs .
1
From : Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSlPA
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2003 6:55 PM
To : M rs Richard B Gen, JCS CJCS' GEN Peter Pace E-mail)
Cc : CAPT, OCJCS; LT ~ S~C,"J:iO
C.Ol
S",-r."~~~'"
COL JCS V . H ddock, Ellen to. , 0 , i:l1 C PA; LTC, JCS
SJS; CIV, JCS SJS; Schwartz. Norton A., Lt Gen, JCS DJ· 3; Peterson, Joe
F, MG, JCS J3; Howard, Michelle J, CAPT, JCS J3· Case Gear e W LTG, JCS DJS;
Hawkins, James A, Maj Gen, JCS VDJSlDOM; Col, JCS SJS
Subj ect: Retired Military Outreach Delegation - 22·25 Sep 03
Importance: Low
Attachments: Agenda Revised September 21, 2003.doc
Agenda-"""
September 21, 2...
General Mye rs and Ge n e ral Pace,
Retired Mi l i t a ry TV- a na l y s t s arrived i n Iraq t oday. OSD( PA) fo llowed up o n t h e CJCS

invi tati on wi th good attendees and a great i tinerary . '
DoD selected key l ocations t hat will cause the ana lysts t o get the Mr e al p i c t u r e . -
The key l o c a t i o n s a r e highlighted on t he a tt ached itinerary and worth your p e rusa l .
> The part ic ipants are some o f the more i n f l u e n ti al and vi s i bl e of the ana l ys t s that
commun icat e wi t h the med ia. As a mat ter of fact , severa l ana l y sts conduct e d l i v e
interviews today from Iraq.
I t h ink we're h itting a h ome run on th is trip. I 'll br ief you o n the r e s u l t s when
they return. Next step is t o s e e wh at other i n f l ue n ti al s we c an ge t t o Iraq f or a similar
i ti n era r y . JCOC is o ne idea I int e nd t o propose .. .
>
»vf r ,
>Frank
>
Fr a nk Tho rp
Capta in, USN
Spec ia l As s i s t a n t f o r Pub l i c Af fairs
~~~n.~mo~ o f t he J oi nt Ch ie fs o f Staf f
>
1
- ----_ ._------~----------
As of 21/09/2003 1823
Itinerary for
Outreach Delegation
22-25 September 2003
Delegation:
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Lieutenant General Thomas Mcinerney (USAF, Retired)
Major General Willi am Nash (USA, Retired)
Dr. Michael O'Hanlon , Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Senior Defense Expert, American Enterprise Institute
Major General Paul E. Vallel y (USA , Retired)
Mr. Mitchell Ross Semel , Sr Vice President, Programming, East Coast, CBS Entertainment
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC , Retired )
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF , Retired)
Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
Mr. John Wobensmith , Director for Development, Institute of World Politics Staff
Mr. Chris W illcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs , aSD
Mr. Brent Thomas Krueger, Director for Community Relations and Public Liaison, aSD
Mr. Don Meyer, Special Assistant, aSD
Monday, 22 Sep
OBOOL Depart Kuwait via C-130
11ll30L Arrive Baghdad International AirRort; Met by TBO
1045-1100 En route CPA helipad via rotary wing aircraft
1100-1115 En route CPA HQ via ground vehicles
1115-1230 CPA OvelViewwith CPA Senior Staff, Ambassador'sCpnfenmce Room

Attendees:
Ambassado'"'r"P"a"'tn'"'c"'k"Kenneoy, Chief of Stat!
LTG Ricardo Sanchez, CG, CJTF- 7
Ambassador Clayton McManaway, S-e~ni'o- rr" C,co-
cu~n s'-e-'lo~r'"t'o'''A'-m''bcBreme,
Amba ssador Chris Segar, Head of British Office, British Embass~
Mr. GaD' Thatcher, Director, ::?1rat~ ic p ommunications
1230-1315 Lunch - CPA Dining Facility

1315-1430 CJTF·7 Ol)jlrational Overview, a @\lor's Conference Room
Attentlees'
LTG Sanchez
- - 'O
" 'thers TBD on Ground
1430-1515 Meeting wi1h Dr. Ka~ and MG Dayton, lrag Survey rouJl (ISGj
(WMD Update)
1515-1615 CPA Ministries Discussions, Amblissaooi's Conference Room

Attendees:
Mr. Stephe"n"B
"rown
==in"'g~,-';S~e-:-nio
=r'A""d"v;""so"'r",'Ministry
' 0 ElectricitY
Mr. Philip Carroll, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Oil
Ms. Leslye Arsht, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Educalio.. '--~
Mr. Williamson Evers enior Advisor, MinilllrY of Edu<:;!tiorj
1615-1800 !lisn to 1" AD (location TBD by BG Dempsey)
1800-1815 En route AI Rashid Hotel
1815-1830 Personal time (refresh)
1830-2000
2000-2015 En route CPA helipad
2015-2030 En route Baghdad International Airport
2045 Depart Baghdad via C-1 30 en route Kuwait
2115L Arrive Kuwait
Tuesday, 23 Sep
0800L Depart Kuwait en route BIAP via C-130
1030L Arrive BIAP; met by TBD
1040-1110 En route AI Hillah via rotary wing aircraft;

met by MajGen Tyszkiewicz, CG, MND (CS) and Mr. Mike Gfoeller, CPA-SC
1110-1120 En route MND-CS HQ
1120-1150 M D: OJle atlonalOverview y MajGen Tl"'zkiewicz
1150·1200 Meet with CoalnionlMultinational leaders

~------------------------------------ ~--- - --
1150-1201 1200-1245 Lunch with troops
1245-1305 En route Women's Rights Center (CPA funded reconstruction project)
1305-1400 ;rour Women's Rights Center and Govern ~npe $::enter !3uilding,.......
wit r. Dick Naab, CPA-SC Directo
1400-1420 n route Mahawil Mass Grave site
1420-1450
1450-1515 En route Babylon
1515-1600 Site visit of Babylon
1600-1610 En route helipad
1610-1645 En route Camp Victory helipad via rotary wing
1645-1830 'CJ I' ai vis[tand dinne(,troops
1830-1845 En route BIAP via motorcade
1900 Depart Baghdad en route Kuwait via C-130
Wednesday, 24 Sep
0730L Depart Kuwait via C-1 30
1030L Arrive Mosul; met by MGDavid Petraeus, CG 101" Div
1030-1050 ~eria l tour of Mosul; nd t Div Main L2!
1050-1200 101" Area of Operation North Operational OverviewNideo
1200-1245 Lunch wlBrigade Commanders and Command Se[geants MaJon

DivMain DFAC
1245-1315 En route City Hall via Police Station and Courthouse

(Reconstruction projects)
1315-1345 Meet Governor and Vice ovsrnor and tour City Hall
Governor Ghanim al Basso and ice GlLve ha
( s '0 ~ctJ
1345-1400 En route 101 " helipad

1400-1 500 En route Tikrit via rotary wing ; met by MG Raymond Odiemo CG D
1500-1900 ~" I D Program TBO

To include: Operalio~n'"'a7"1"O"'e
v " r' view
Meet with soldiers
Dinner with soldiers
Meet Tikrit local leaders
Meet one loca l NGO
iew reconstruction :L r:>"'ro""j~
=
1900 1945 Depart Tikrit en route Balad via rotary wing
2000 Depart Balad via C- 130
2100L Arrive Kuwait

From : CIV. JCS OCJCS
Sent: Wedn esday, Ju ry 28, 2004 11:10 AM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSJPA
Cc: Haddock. Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW : 3 Aug PA Events
Is th i s s omething t ha t will i nvolve t he Chai rma n?
osn
CI V, OASD- PA;
CI V, OASD - PA;
Barber , Allison , CI V, OASD -PA;
C CI
OASD( PA AS -
> oso;
osc
.:> Subj e c t:
>
>Loo king t o do Ou treac h w/Mi l itary Ana lysts:
>
>Tuesday 3 August
>9 :2 5pm - Prep wi ?
>9 : 4 5 a m- lO:3 0 - Out r each
>10:45am- ll :30 - Radio
>
>No Pre ss Av a i l t hat wee k per Larry Di Ri ta.
>
>Let me k now i f thi s works - than ks ,
>
>
Fr om : , -_ _~... CIV. JCS OCJCS
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2004 2:33 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSfP A
Cc: Thorp , Frank. CAPT , OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: 3 Aug PA Events
I t wi l l be h ard to do . He i s o f f ic i a t i ng at a promotion c eremony a t 1 000 , which I ' ve

al ready h a d to mov e once. Do n't really want to jerk the t wo-s t a r around any mo r e . 00 y ou
know ho w long the a na l y s t s wi l l b e i n t he bui l d ing ?
> - -- --Original Me s s a g e - - - - -
>From: Hadd o ck , Ellen (Ka tie) , Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Thurs d a July 29 . 2004 7 : 00 PM
>To: CIV. J CS OCJCS
>Cc: Tho r p , Frank , CAPT, OCJC S/ PA
>Subject : RE: 3 Aug PA Even t s
>I 've a s ked t h e qu es tion .

>Most of t he t i me when OSD b r i ng s t he mi litary a n a l y s t s in to t he bu i lding to mee t with
t he Sec re t a ry, h e i nvi tes t h e Cha i r ma n to join h i m. .. s t i ll tryi ng t o g e t c larification on
e x ac t l y wha t thi s i s (who is comi ng , or i f i t is a c onference ca l l) . .. if in fa c t i t do es
i nc l u d e the Ch airman, i t wo u ld onl y be f o r t h e p r e p and out re ac h port ion -- not t he radio
i nt erviews.
>Shou ld kn ow more soon .
>V/R
>Katie
>
> - -- --Orig inal Me s s a e -- -- -
> From: CIV, JCS OCJCS
> Se nt: Wed ne s ay, u y 004 1 1 : 1 0 AM
> To: Tho r p , Frank, CAPT, OCJ CS/PA
> Cc : Ha ddock , Ellen (Katie), Col . OCJ CS/PA
> Sub j ec t : FW: 3 Aug PA Eve nts
>
> Is th i s some t h ing tha t will i nvolv e the Cha i rma n ?
>
> -- - H Orig i '1e.i.I"'- '==
> Fr om: CIV, OSD
> Sen t : Wednesda J ul 28, 200 4 10 : 48 AM
> To : CIV OSO; Wheeler OASD -PA; Rhyn e d a nce.
George, COL, OASO-PA; )(8) CIV, OASD-PA; )(8) O-PA; Wh i tm.at';~_ _•
CI V, OASD -PA; )(8) CIV, OSO; )(8)
~
~B~r~a;n;.;S~E~ .S, . CTR,
OASD-PA;
OSD-P & R~ CIV , OASD -PA; Ru f f, Eri c , SES. OASO-PA;~:~ :::::::j
)(8) CIV , JC S OCJCS ; )(8) CI V JCS VCJCS ' Me r r i tt , Roxie T . CAPT, -
OASD (PA) ; C. OASO-PA; LTC. OASD~- P:A=====;J
> C • CIV, 050 ' Ma j , 050; ~ CI V,
OSO; SSg t, OSO ; }(I) CIV ,
> Subject : 3 Aug PA Events

>
> Looking to do Ou t r e a c h w/Military Ana l ysts :
>
> Tuesd ay 3 Augus t
> 9 : 25pm - Prep wi?
> 9 :4 5a m- l 0: 3 0 - Ou tre ach
> lO : 45 a m-11 : 30 - Ra d i o
>
> No Press Avail that we ek per Larry oi Ri t a .
>
> Let me k no w if t h i s wo r ks - t hanks ,
1
>
>
>
>
2
From: Whitman. Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: J~:dn e.sdaY Augu st 11, 2004 6:28 PM
To: ~~~ C IV . OS D
Cc: Eric Ruff (E-ma il 3); Larry DiRita (E-mail 2); Barber, Allison, CIV, OAS D-PA; Rhynedance,
Geo rge, COL OASD-PA' Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col,
OCJCS/PA OASD-PA
Subject: POTUS VFW Speech Monday -- Global Posture

Just to fo l low-up our conversat ion . I attended a mee t ing this afternoon at the White
Hou s e t o discuss what the Pre s iden t was going to t a l k about i n hi s speech to the VFW on
Monday i n ohi o. One component wi l l be an announcement of h i s decis ion to retuer2n~s:o:m:e:::J
~ 7!OC.:o:o:ol l m i l i t a ry f or c e s from the ir overseas loca t ions . OSD was represented by
~ (po l i c y ) and myself.
Major c ommuni cat i on tactics will inc lude:

Thursday ni gh t -- cab l e t o embass ies
Fri day Whi te Hous e ment ion i n t he week ahead (of the speech not the specific cont ents )
Sunday (T) NSC backgrounder to a maj or news organizat ion as a set -up p iece
Monday POTUS speech at 11 : 30 , f ol l owe d by:
-- t wo background brief in $: Penta on and Fore i n Press Center (000 ; DOS; NSC
par ticipants -- Us ual suspect s : ~
and RDML Sull ivan (DJ - S).) "------------------------------------------------------"
Outreach ca l l to mil i tary ana lyst
Pentagon Channel interview with Fe ith/
Mid-Week - Pos sible SecDef op -ed in a ma j or publication a couple of days after t he speech
(ca librate any of the reporting) .
Working with OSD( po l icy ) to deve lop t he fact shee t for DOS cabl e and background br i e f i ngs
(leve l of deta il TBD) .
I have con ference cal l tomorrow wi t h t he same group t o finalize the plan . wi l l keep yo u
posted.
Tha nks , Bryan
1
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Cot, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursda Auqust 12, 2004 7:0 1 AM
To : DR , OCJCS/PA
Subj ect : FW : POTU S VFW Speech Monday - Global Posture

Flag Sta tus: Flagged
Let me c heck into th i s , and discuss with Bryan at 08 30 ... .
> --- - -O rig i na l Message - - - - -

>Fr om: Whitman , Bryan , SES , OASD-PA
»s e nt • dn y , August I I , 2004 6:28 PM
>To : ClV, OSD
>Cc : Eri c Ruff (E- ma i l 3 ) ; Larry DiRita (E-ma i l 2 ) ; Barber, Allis on, CIV, OASD-PA;
Rhynedance , Geor e COL OASD-PA; Tho rp , Frank , CAPT, OCJ CS! PA; Haddo ck, El len (Ka ti e ) ,
Col , OCJ CS! PA; OASD-PA
>Sub j e c t: POTUS VFW Speech Mond a y -- Global Posture
>
>Jus t t o fo llow -up ou r conv ersation. I atte n de d a me e t i ng t h i s afternoon at t he White
Ho u s e t o dis cuss what the Pre sident was goi ng to talk about i n h is speech to t he VFW on
Monday in Ohio . One component wi ll b e an announcement of his decision t o r e t u r n some
70 0 0 0 mil i tary f orces from their ove rseas locations . OSD was r epresente d by 1 -'
~~--J ( Po l i c y ) and myself.
>
>Ma jor commun icati on t a ct i c s will include :
>
>Thursday n i g h t - - c able t o e mba s si es
>
>Friday -- Wh i t e Hou s e men tio n i n the week ahead (o f the s p e e c h not t h e
>s p ecif ic con tents )
>
>Sund ay (T ) NSC bac kgrou nd er to a maj o r n ews orga nization as a s e t-up
>piece
>
>Monday POTUS speech a t 11 : 3 0 , fo l lowed by:
>
> t wo background br ief i n s : Pe n t a o n a nd o rei n Pr e ss Ce nt e r DoD· DOS ' NSC
p art i c i p a nt s - - Us u a l s u s pe c t s : L ~
a nd RDML Su llivan (DJ -S) .)
>
> Outreach c a l l to mil ita ry ana l ys t
>
> Pentagon Channe l i nte rvi ew with Fe it h / ~ ...
>
>Mid -Week - possible SecDe f op-ed in a major pub l i c a tio n a c o up l e of day s af t er t he speech
(calibra t e any of the reporting) .
>
>worki ng with OSD (poli cy ) to d eve lop the f ac t sheet f or DOS cable a nd b a c kgro und b r ie f ings
( l e v e l o f d e t a i l TBD ).
>
>1 have conference cal l t omor row wi th the same g roup to fi na l ize the p l a n. Will keep yo u
posted.
>
>Th a nk s, Bryan
From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
sent: Monda , August 16, 2004 10:50 AM
To: ~~~~~IV, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: News and Schedules from OASD-PA
I thJ.nk t h i s went to t h e wrong Th o rp -- might wa n t to send again.

ViR
Co l H
Messa e- - n
-
CIV, OCJCS/PA
Mo n da y , August 1 6, 2 0 04 1 0: 4 7 AM
cck , Ellen ( Katie ), Col , OCJ CS /PAi Ctr AF/XO_S~-~H;C~;.::====::._..,
:>Cc:
~~L~T~C~~O~C~J~C;S~/~P~A~~:::;:j
GOVT, OCJCS/PAi
:>Subject :
.~ "'l!~:;;;~~=r;;-;:',
SMSgt, OCJCS/PA
News a nd Sche dules f rom OASD-PA
CIV, OCJCS/PAi 'ft-
-
J
:>Import ance: Hi gh
>
:>1 s poke with Ar c h i e Da v i s l a t e last week . He provided the f o l l o wi ng up d a t e s:
>
:> 7 sep Outreach - Mil itary Ana l y s t s
>
:>(CJCS is TDY 8 - 13 Sep) to Norway, Luxembourg , Es t o n ia , La t v i a ,
:>Lithuania for Fall CHOD t o u r )
>
:>8 Sep (T) SecDef speaks a t Ra nd Annual Conference in DC
>
:>9 s ep SecDef attends Cong r essiona l Bre akfast wi th the leg i s l a t o r s who
:>met wi t h De cDe f on 9/11/i01
>
:>10 Sep - SecDe f hosts a l unch for AMB Bremer
:> PA - Di nn e r at Ka l o rm a f o r Coa li tion Ambassadors a nd CPA Le a de r s
:> (Don't know what h appened to CJ CS intent to recogni z e AMB Bremer, e tc .
»
>
:>11 Sep - SecDef p art i c i pat e s in wreath l a y i ng at Arl ing ton Na t i ona l Ceme t ery
:> SecDef s t a rts NASCAR e ven t in Richmond
:> (Don't know t he p lan abou t t h e Sunday Shows o n 1 2 Sep t )
>
:> 2 1 Sep Ou t r each - corpora te l e a d e r s
>
:>2 9 Sep Ou t r e ach with Corporate suppor ters o f ESGR
>
:>Other Tidbits :
:>NLF is e v ide n ta l l y i n terested in opening a USC center in Af g ha n i s t a n -
:>p r o b a b l y i n r e c ogni t i o n of Pat Ti l l ma n
>
:>AVA (our gold-laden " f r i e nds " i n Ca l i fornia) - t he y ' v e moved the i r gala e ven t from 2 2
Octob er to TBD - p erhaps next s pri ng . Something about the manager of t he Wiltshire ho t e l
i n Beve r l y Hi l l having l eft , e tc . ( I ' d guess he g ave them a b r e a k on $$ f o r t h e i r event) .
>
>V R
1
From : ~~__: -. C
' IV, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 10:52 AM
(Katie)~C~O~I;'~O;C~JC~~SJP
~A~~~a~~~~'LTC'
To :
Haddock,
APT Ellen
SPA OCJCSlPA; Thorp, Frank,
Cc : MAJ JCS SJS CIV, OCJCS/PA; L .....
GOVT, OCJCSJP . SMSgl, OCJCS/PA
Subject: News and Schedules from OASD-PA
Importance: High
I s poke wi t h Archie Dav i s l ate l as t we ek . He p r o v ided the following u p dat es:
7 Sep Outreach - Mi l i ta ry Analysts
(CJ CS i s TOY 8 - 1 3 S e p ) t o Norw ay, Luxembour g , Es ton ia, La t v i a , Lithuania f o r Fa l l CHOD

t our )
8 Sep - (T) SecDe f spea k s at Ra nd Annual Conference in DC
'3 Sep - Sec De f attends Congre s s ion a l Breakfas t wi t h the l e gis lators who met wi t h DecDef o n
9 /11 / ; 0 1
1 0 sep - Sec De f hos ts a l un ch f o r AHB Bremer

PA - Dinner at Ka lorma for Coa l it i o n Ambassa dors and CPA Le a de rs
(Do n ' t kno w wha t h a p p e n e d t o CJCS int ent to recogni ze AHB Bremer, etc.
11 Sep - SecDe f pa r t i c ipa te s in wreath laying a t Arli ngton Nat i ona l Cemetery
SecDef s t arts NASCAR e vent i n Ri c hmond
(Don ' t k now the plan abo ut the Sunday Shows on 12 Se p t)
21 Sep Out r each - Co rpo r ate leaders
29 Sep Ou t reach wi th Corporate supporte rs o f ESGR
Other Ti d b i ts :
NLF is e videnta l l y interes ted i n ope ning a USO cente r in Af g h a n i s t a n - probably i n
recogni ti on o f Pa t Tillman
AVA (our g o ld -laden "f r i e nd s" in California) - they 've mo ved t he i r gal a e vent from 22
Oct ober to TBD - p erh a p s next spring . Some thing about the manager of the Wiltshire ho t e l
i n Be ver ly Hi ll h a ving l e f t , etc . ( I ' d guess he gave them a break on $$ f or the ir event) .
1
From: ,"=,__,:,""",,:,,_~~ LTC , OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesda Au ust 17, 2004 1:50 PM
iii1~~~!:C IV,
To: OCJCSIPA
Cc: LCDR, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
SUbject: RE: News and SChedules from OASD·PA
For t he 7 Sep Out r e ach . .. will VCJCS speak o r a r e y ou l o oki ng f o r a mili tary
operations u p da te ?
> -----Original Messa e-----

>From : ClV, OCJCS/PA
>Se nt : Monday , August 16, 20 04 1 0 : 52 AM
>To n: k Haddock, El l e nPA (Ka t ie), Co l , ~O~C~JCC:S:/:P:A:;:::::::::i~~:-~~~, LTC, OCJCS/ PA; Thorp ,
Fra
sec .
CAPT OCJCS
GOVT, OCJCS/PAi ~
s...r-s S; )(8)
)l6)~l""l~~~~""l'~" SMSgt , OCJCS/PA
CIV, OCJCS/PA; I!!!:======:: :J
>Sub j ec t: News a n d Schedules from OASD- PA
>lmport a nce : High
>
>1 spoke wi t h Archi e Davis late l a s t week . He provided t h e f o l l owing upda tes :
>
>7 Sep - Outreach - Mil i t a ry Analys ts
>
> (CJCS is TOY 8-1 3 Sep) to No r wa y , Luxembourg, Es t on i a , La tvia,
>Li thuania f o r Fa l l CHOD tour)
>
>8 Sep - (T) SecDef spe a ks at Rand Annu a l Co nf e ren c e i n DC
>
>9 Sep - SecDef a t ten d s Congress ional Br e a k f a s t with the l egislators who
>me t with DecDe f on 9/11/;01
>
>10 Sep - SecDef hosts a l unch f or AMB Bremer
> PA - Dinner at Ka lorma for Coalition Ambassadors a nd CPA Le a ders
> (Don ' t k now what .happened to CJCS i n t e nt t o r ecogniz e AMB Bre mer, etc .
»
>
>11 Sep - SecDef part icipates in wrea t h l aying a t Arli ngton Na tional Ceme t ery
> SecDef starts NASCAR e v e n t in Richmond
> (Don ' t know the plan about the Sund ay Shows on 12 Sept)
>
>21 Sep Outre ach - Corporate leaders
>
>29 Sep Outreach with Co rpo r a t e supporters o f ESGR
>
>Other Ti dbi t s :
>NLF i s evidentally interested i n ope ni ng a USC c e n te r i n Afghanistan -
>probably i n recognit ion o f Pa t Til l ma n
>
>AVA (our go l d- l a den "f ri e nds " i n Ca l i f o r n ia ) - theY've moved the ir g ala event f r om 22
Oc tober t o TBD - perhap s next spr ing . Something about t he ma n ager of t he Wilt s hi r e ho t el
i n Be verl y Hi l l having l ef t , e t c . (I'd guess he gave t hem a b reak o n $$ for their event) .
>
>V R
1
From : 'w:::r.::::::;;::;"~.c rv. JCS OCJCS
Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:26 PM
To: Haddoc k, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW : Military Outreach September 8lh .
Wo w -- enough advan c e d not ice that we might be ab l e to p art i cip ate . Ca n you f ind
ou t when they want t h e Cha irman to t al k t o t h e g ro up?
esc
Al liso n
OASD- PA; D
:>Cc: CIV, OSO;
OSD; SS gt, OSD;
:>Sub] ect: Mil i ta ry OUt r e ach Se pt e mbe r 8th.
>
:> Per Mr . Di Ri t a we would like to d o t he Ou t reach (Mi l i t a ry Ana l y st s ) - Looking a t
Wednesda y e September:
>
:> ll :OOa m - P r ep
:> 11:lSa m-12 :00 - Outre ach
>
:> Le t me know if t hos e t i mes /da t e work - thanks ,
>
>
>
1
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent : Wednesda ,August 18, 2004 5:06 PM
To: ~~;;;:~·I V. OCJCSWA
Subject: FW : Military Outreach September 8th.
Can y ou check wi th Arch ie and get t h e timeline?

Thanks .
V!R
Col H
> -nnori~~~~;;~~j
>From: E 5 , CI V, JCS OCJ CS
>Sent: Wedne sday , August 18 , 2 004 4:26 PM
>To: Haddo c k , El l e n (Ka t i e) , Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subj e ct: FW : Mi litary Out r e a ch September 8th.
>
> Wo w -- enough advan ced n oti ce tha t we might be ab le t o p a rt ici p a t e . Can yo u find
out when t hey want t he Cha i rman to t a l k to t h e gro up ?
>
>
> -- :
>Sent
>To :
-~~-~e~r~i;g;.~n~a:~M~e~s~s~aS~~5
>From :
Wedneeda
e SD
20 04 4 : 2 7 PM
CIV OASO- PA; Rhyned a nce ,
Ge o r g e , OL, a D-PA' CI V, OASO- PA; )(I) OASO-PA; Whi tmanW:= = : ;J
B an , SES , OASD- PA; CI V, OASO- PA; CIV, 050 ; ft
CTR, OSD- P& CIV, OASO-PA ; Ru ff , Eri c , SES , OASO- PA; ~~~~~
CI V, J CS OCJ CS ;
>Cc:
OSO;
>Subject:
OASD-PA; D v·
c r y, OSO;
ssgt , 050;
Military Outreach s e ptember Bt .
. OASO- PA
CIV, OSO;
CI V, OSO t! !:======J CI V,
>
>Per Mr . Di Rita we would l i ke to do t h e Outreach (Mi l i t a ry Analysts ) - Look ing a t
wed ne sda y a September:
>
>11:00am - Pre p
>11 :15am -12:00 - Outreach
>
>Let me know if t ho s e time s/dat e work - t hank s ,
> ....._ ....
>
>
1
From : CIV, OCJCS/PA
Sent : Thursda y, August 19. 2004 8:07 AM
To : Davis, Arch ie, LTC, OASD-PA
Cc : Haddock , Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJC51PA
Subj ect: FW : Military Outreach September 8th.
Arc hie. Do you have the ti mes f o r CJCS p a r t i c i p a t i o n ? Pl ease l e t me know soonest so we
can bl ock o n h i s schedule.
Many thanks , L. ~...J OCJCS / P' I
> --- - -O rigi na l Mes sage -- - - -

>From: Haddock , Ellen (Kati e), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: wednesday , Augus t 18 , 2 0 04 5 : 06 PM
>To : CI V, OCJ CS/ PA
>Su bj e c t: FW: Mi l itary OU t r e a c h September 8th .
>Ca n you c h e ck with Arc hi e and get the timeline ?

>Th a n k s .
>V/ R
>Col H
>
> -----Or i g '
>Fr om: CI V, J CS OCJCS
>Se n t : We dne sda y , Au g u s t 18 . 20 04 4 : 2 6 PM
>To : Ha d do c k . El len (Kat i e) , Col, OCJ CS/ PA
>Subje ct: FW : Mi l i tary Out r e ach Sept emb e r 8t h.
>
> Wow -- e n oug h adva nc ed no t ice that we might be able to p a rt i c ip at e . Can you fi nd
out when they want t he Ch airman t o ta lk t o t he group?
>
>
OSD
w 2 00 4 4 : 2 7 PM
CIV,
Mil it a ry
>
>Pe r Mr. Di Rit a we wou l d like t o d o the Outreach (Mili tary Analysts) - Loo k i ng at
We dne s day 8 Sep tember:
>
>l l:OOam - Prep
>11 : 15a m- 12 :0 0 - Out r e a c h
>
>Le t me know if t ho s e t i me s /da t e work - thanks , '- ~
>
>
>
1
From : Davis, Archie, Lrc, OASD- PA
Sent : lllmav",llU9us1 19. 2004 8:32 AM
To : ...:..,..,....,.-=..'C IV. OCJCS/PA
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCSl PA
Subject: RE: Military Outreach Septemb er 8th.
I wi ll bring t h e memo with t he i nvi t ed at t endee lis t today requesting CJCS pa r t ici pa tion
10:45- 1 1: 1 5 a.m. I re ca l l t he CJCS is TOY t hat wee k . Should I make thi s r equest for
VCJ CS ?
Archi e
:> -- - -- Ori
>From : crv , OCJCS /PA
»sen t • Thursday, August 19 , 20 0 4 8 :07 AM
>To : Davis , Archie , LTC, OASO -PA
>Cc: Haddock, El l e n ( Kati e) , Col , OCJCS / PA
>Subject: FW: Mili tary Ou t r e a c h September 8th.
>
>Ar c h i e. Do you have the t i me s for CJCS partic ipa tion? Pl e a s e l et me know soonest so we
ca n block on his schedule.
>
>Many t h ank s , L...........~ OCJC S/ PA ... .....
>
> --- - -Origi na l Message - - - - -
>From: Haddo c k , Ellen (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Wednesday, August 1 8 , 2 0 04 5: 06 PM
>To: CI V, OCJCS/ PA
>Sub j e c t : PW : Military Outreach Septembe r 8 t h .
>
> an y ou chec k wi th Ar c h i e a nd g et t h e t i mel ine ?

>Tha n k s .
>V/ R
>Co l H
>
> -- - --Orig
>From : CI V, JCS OCJC S
>Sent : Wednesday, Aug u s t 1 8, 200 4 4 :2 6 PM
>To : Haddo c k , Elle n (Katie), Col , OCJCS/PA
>Sub j ect: F W: Milit ary Ou t r eac h Septembe r 8th.
>
> Wo w -- e n ough a dvan c ed not i c e tha t we mi g h t be abl e t o parti cip a t e. Can you f ind
out when t h ey wa nt the Cha irman t o t alk to t he group ?
>
>
> ---- - Or i g i n a l Messa e - - - - -
>From : OSO
>Sent · 2 0 0 4 4: 27 PM
George
>To: , COL, OASD- P .
B an SES , OASO- PA;
;~~~~~~~~:, CIV,
OASO- PA;
OASO- PA;
CI V OASD -PAiSD-PAi whi ;~;;;]
Rhynedance
CIV , OSO;
,
" CTR, OSO-P&R ' Ba rbe r All ' CIV, OASO -PA ; Ruff , Er ic , SES , OASO- PA;
!~;~i~'~V~~CCa~S~Ot~C~. J~USMC
C~S~'~~
, OASD- PA; CIV, i JCS
Davis, Arch VCJ CS;
e , LTC, OASOMe-PA
r ri t t, Roxi e T . CAPT, OASO- PA;
C SI Sgt
V, 0, 5D;
OS O; ~ 1~;;~~~~ CI V, OSO; "-
CI V, OSO -
..I CI V,
Mili tary Outreach Se ptember 8 th.

>
>Pe r Mr . oi Rita we would l i k e to do the OUt r e a ch (Mi l i t a ry Analys ts ) - Looki ng at
1
Wedne sday 8 Sep tember:
>
>11:00am - Prep
>11:15am-12: 00 - Out r e a c h
>
>Let me know if tho s e times /dat e work - t ha nks,
> '------'
>
>
2
From: L,.;,;,.".".,...,....CIV.
OCJCSIPA
Sent : Thursday, August 19, 2004 10:
To : O J · TC. OASD-PA· >til
Cc: CIV. JCS OCJCS; CIV.
OCJCSIPA' addock Ell '8), Cot, OCJCSIPA; TSgt, JCS.
OCJCSlPA LTC OCJCS/PA Thorp. Frank. CAPT. OCJCSlPA
SMSgt. OCJCSlPA· GOVT.OCJCs/PA; 01.
OCJCS
Subj ect: RE: Military Outreach September 8th .
Importance: High
Archie - CJCS wi ll be he re on the 8 September , he leaves o n TOY o n the 10 th. Plea s e bring
t h e mate rial addressed CJCS f o r the 1045-1115 timeslot . Tha nks!
Do y ou know a ny t hi ng a bout 3 Se t e mbe r SecDef's To wn Hall with Joint Staff?

We understand it is f r om 1 100 -1130, in a nd you have t he a ction . We wi ll n e ed to
br ing this to DJS - VADM Keat ing 's att e n t i o n f or i np u t . App reciate any d eta ils you can
p rovi de , 80 we can staff appropriat ely.
Ma ny t hanks for your helpfulness !
V R
1,;,;,;"'_ _..1 OCJCS /PA .
> --- - -Or i g i na l Me ssage - - - --

>Fr om: Dav is , Ar chie, LTC, OABD- PA
>Sent· ~ , Aug us t 19 , 2004 8:32 AM
>To: CI V, OCJCS !PA
>Cc: Had do c k , Ell e n (Ka tie ), Co l , OCJCS/PA
>Subje c t: RE: Military Outreach Septembe r 8t h .
>til
>
>1 wil l b r i n g t h e memo with t h e inv ited attende e li s t today reques ting CJCS parti c ipati on
10:4 5 - 1 1 :1 5 a. m. 1 reca l l the CJCS i s TDY that week . Shoul d 1 make th is reques t for
VCJ CS ?
>
>Ar c hi e
>
> --- - - Or iginal Me ss a e-----
> From: CIV , OCJCS/ PA
> Sen t: Thur sda y , August 19 , 2 0 04 8 :07 AM
> To : Dav i s , Ar c h i e, LTC, OASD-PA
> Cc: Had dock, Ell en (Ka ti e ), Col , OCJCS/PA
> SUbject: FW: Mi l it a ry Out r e a ch September 8th .
>
> Ar chie, Do you have t h e t i mes fo r CJCS pa r t i ci pa t i on ? Pl e a se l et me k now s oone s t so
we can b l o c k o n h i s s chedule.
>
> Many t h a n ks , L,;,;.. J OCJ CS/ PA L. .....
>
> -----Orig i na l Message- --- -
> From : Hadd oc k , Ell e n (Ka ti e ) , Co l , OCJ CS! PA
> Sent: Wedne sda August 18 , 20 04 5:06 PM
> To: CI V, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: FW : Mil i tary OUtre ach September 8th.
>
>
> Can you c heck wi th Archie a nd g e t t he t i meline ?
> Thanks.
. 1
· _n _
> Vi R
> Co l H
,
> -- - - - o r i g i na l Me s s a e-----
> From: CI V, JC S OCJCS
> Se n t: Wedne s day , Augu s t 18, 200 4 4 : 26 PM
> To : Had doc k, Ell e n (Kat i e) , Co l , OCJCS / PA
> Sub jec t : FW : Mi li t a ry Ou t r e a c h Septembe r 8t h.
,
, Wow enough a dvance d no tice t ha t we might be a b le t o pa rt i c i pate. Ca n you
f i nd o u t when they want the Chai rman t o t a lk t o the group?
,
,
-O;:i~9~i!~~~~~~JIj
eaaa
> Fr om: CI V, OSD
PM
~~~~~~~2~O!O~4!4~'~2~7~~~~~~i~~~~~~~
> _. - -
> To: OSO; CIV, OASO-PA; Rhyneda nc e ,
Geo
>
rge , COL,
Sent : OASD- P , OASO-PA OASO- PA; Whi
B ~a~n:~s~CI.~sV~,CTR,
;o,JA~S~CSO~-~P~OSD-
OCJ A~'CSP&~~~~~~~~~p~~
R·
;
All is n CIV , OASO- PA; Ruf f ,
:CCI
IV'V, OASO
JCS - VCJ
Er ~c ,
PA; CS ; Me r r it t ,
SBS , OASO- PA ; ~~~~-,
Rox i eCI T
V,. OSD;
CAPT , OASO- PA;
Ca t . USMC OASO- PA; oav is , Arch i e LTC OASO - PA
CI V, OSO; CI V, OSO; L. ..I
CI V, F.:~~--'l:'!Tl'~~~~ . SSgt , OSD;
, M ~l ~tary Out r e a c h Sept ember 8th .
CIV , OSD
,
> Pe r Mr . Oi Rita we would l i ke t o do the Out r e a c h (Mi l i t ary Ana l y s t s ) - Looking a t
Wednesda y 8 Sept embe r:
,
> 11 : OO a m . Prep
> 11 : l Sa m- 12 : 00 - Out r each
,
Le t me know i f t hose times /dat e wor k - tha nks,
,>
,
,
,
,
From : CIV. OCJCSIPA
Sen t: es ust 24 , 2004 9 :55 AM
To : IV, OASD-P A; Davis, Archie , LTC, OAS D-PA
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA
Subject: Military Ana lysts and Service Organ ization s
Importance: High
Follow Up Flag : Follow up

Gr e et i ng s Archi e an..,......,
We are compi li ng Holid ay li s t s fo r Genera l Myer s and wil l need name s and addres se s o f
mi li ta ry a na l ys ts i n t he a r e a and a lso the updat e d l is t o f c omma nde r s a nd e xec u t i ve
o f f i c e r s o f s e rvi c e org a n i z a t ions . Apprec i a te your as s i s tance in p r o vi ding me t ha t
i n fo rma t ion this we e k.
As a l ways many t ha n ks f or al l your sup port !
Vi R OCJCS / PA,"~"''''~
1
From : Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, Septe mber 10, 2004 4:24 PM
To : Davis Arch ie LTC, OASD-PA
Cc : CIV, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Kal;el, Col , OCJCS/PA
Subj ec t :
Archil! ,
Could you sl!nd us thl! l!l l!c tro ns o f your military analyst address list . .. We want to add
them to our protoc ol li st ...
Thanks ,
FT
Prank Thorp
Capta in, USN
Spec ial As s istant f or Public Affairs
to the Chairman o f t he J oint Chie fs o f Sta f f
1
From : Davis, Arch ie, Co l, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, September 13, 2004 5:40 PM
To: "'l.WlJ.II. CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: L;;,,-....,==~ CIV, OCJCSIPA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
Subject : resses

Attachments: Retired Military Analysts .doc
Retired Military
Analysts.doc ...
Frank ,
Of course, I can . Anything f or my c ell mate.
Archie
> - - ---Or ig ina l Message- -- - -

>Fr om: Thorp , Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
>Se n t : Friday, September 10, 2004 4: 24 PM
>To : Da vis, Ar c h i e LTC , OASD- PA
>Cc: CIV, OCJCS/ PA; Haddo c k , El len (Ka t ie) , Col . OCJCS ! PA
>Sub j ec t: Address es
>
>Arc hie,
>
>Cou l d you send u s t he ele ctron s o f your mil i tary analyst a d dress lis t . . . We want t o a d d
t he m to ou r proto c o l list .. .
>
>Tha nks ,
>FT
>
>Fra n k Thorp
>Ca p t ain , USN
>Spec i a l Ass istant f or Publ i c Aff a i rs
>to t he Cha i r man o f t he Joi n t Chi e f s o f Sta f f
1
RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS
(As of September 13, 2(04 )
Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA , Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin AF Form er JAG )
Ma or Robert S. Bevelac ua SA Retired)
Admiral Denni s C. Blair (USN, Re tired)

President
Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mar k Center Drive
Alexand ria, Virginia 223 11-1882
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)

Vice President for Advanced Concepts
Lockheed Martin
Flint Hill One, Suite 600
10530 Rosehaven Street
Fai rfax , Virginia 22030
Dr. Jam es Jay Cara fano (LTC , USA, Retired)

Senior Fellow
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Was hington, DC 20002

President
WVC3 Group, Incorporated
1800 Alexander Bell Drive
Reston, Virginia 201 91
Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)

Heritage Foundation
2 14 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
General Wa e A. Downin
Colonel (Tim ) 1. Eads (USA, Retired)
Blackbird Technologies, Incorporated
13900 Lincoln Park Drive, Suite 400
Herndon, Virginia 20171
General Ronald Fo elman (USAF, Retired)
ieutenlllllJJ.l~o.ne c c a (USAF, Retired)

kOI
Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)

Partner
Patton Boggs, LLP
2550 M Street, NW

Eagle Limited
4201 Congress Street, Suite 240
Char lotte, North Carolina 28209
Brigadier General David L.Grange (USA, Retired)

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
McCormickTribune Foundation
435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 770
Chicago, Illinois 606 11
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)

The Steven J. Greer Foundation
Colone l Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired'

.,..,-
Adm iral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)

Partner and President
Technology Strategies & Alliances Corporation
5242 Lyngate Court
Burke, Virginia 22015
General Gear e Joulwan SA Retired)

General William F. "Buc k" Kernan (uSA, Retired)
~"J
Colonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)

Operations Officer
Center for National Security Human Capital Management
U.S. Office of Personnel Management
1900 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 204 15
Colonel Walter P. Lan Jr. SA, Retired)
Admira l Thomas Jose ph Lopez (USN, Retired)

President
Information Manufacturing Corporation
7000 Infantry Ridge Road, Suite 200
Manassas, Virgini a 20109
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA. Retired)

."~
Colonel Jeff McCa usland, (USA, Retired)

Director
Clarke Center, Dickinson College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF. Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)

Louis A. Bantle Professor of Government and Business Policy
Maxwell School of Syracuse University
Department of Public Administration
215 Eggers Hall
Syrac use, New York 13244
Major F. Andy Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)

National Defense Council Foundation
1220 King Street, Suite 230
Alexandria, Virginia 223 14
General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)

Booz Allen Hamilton, Incorporated
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean , Virginia 22102
Major General Michael J. Nardorti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Patton Boggs, LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1350
C tain Chuck Nash SN, Retired)
General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)

Senior Fellow and Director. Center for Preventive Action
Council on Foreign Relations
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
General Glen K. Otis SA, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)

Vice Chairman
The Cohen Group
1200 19" Street, NW, Suite 400
...
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke (uSAF , Retired)
Ma or General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)

President, International Operations
M.J.C. Industries, Incorporated
One Fountain Square, 119 11 Freedom Drive
Reston, Virginia 20190
Maor General Donald W. Sh erd (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)

Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Ret ired)
Chief Executive Officer
Guardian Group International
1028 Jean ett Way
Bel Ai r, Maryland 2 1014
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC. Retired)

Director of National Security Programs
101m F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
80 Potter Pond
Lexington, Massachusetts 02 42 1
Maar General Paul E. Vallel (USA, Retired)
Colonel Jo hn Warden (USAF, Retired)

President
Venturist, Incorporated
8233 Old Federal Road
Montgo mery, Alabama 36 117 .
General Larry D. We lch (USAF, Retired)

Senior Fellow
4850 Mark Ceoter Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22311
General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)

Battelle
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway. Suite 601
Arlington , Vir ginia 22202
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Ret ired)

Chief Exec utive Officer and Publisher
U.S. Naval Institute
291 Woo d Road
Ann apolis, Maryl and 2 1402
Sent: Monday, Septemb er 13, 2004 6:48 PM
To:
Cc:
1~;;~~iGOVT,
~...
OCJCS/PA
SMSgt, OCJCSIPA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA;
"'1.....-
(8) -.,
CIY,
OCJCS/PA
SUbject: RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS list --to add to Holiday invite list
Attachments: Retired Military Analysls .doc
Retired Military
Analysts.doc ... 1IOli1!""- '"
Below lis t needs t o be added to t he Holiday Rec eption list you are working on .
This lis t should be your number one priority. We a re way overdue wi t h Protocol . . .
r want to see i t bef or e we turn i t back in - - to include t he copies t hat peop le have
marked corrections/ additions on.
See me wi t h any que s tions .
Tha nks .
VIR
Co l H
1
(As of September 13, 2004)
Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA , Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin AF Former JAG)
Major Robert S. Bevelacqua (USA, Retired)
Admiral Dennis C. Blair (USN, Retired)

President
4850 Mark Center Drive
Al exandria, Vi rginia 223 11- 1882
Lieutenant General Frank 8. Campbell (USAF, Retired)

Vice President for Advanced Concepts
Lockheed Martin
Flint Hill One, Suite 600
10530 Rosehaven Street
Fairfax, Virginia 22030
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)

Senior Fellow
The Heritage Foundation
2 14 Massachusetts Avenue, NE

President
WVC3 Group, Incorporated
1800 Alexander Bell Drive
Reston, Virginia 20191
Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)

Heritage Foundation
2 14 Massachusett s Avenue, NE
General Wa e A. Downin (USA, Retired)

Colonel (Tim) J. Eads (USA , Retired)
Blackbird Technologies, Incorporated
13900 Lincoln Park Drive, Suite 400
Herndon, Virginia 20 171
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired)

....-
Colonel Jolm Garrell (USMC , Retired)

Partner
Patton Boggs , LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washingto n, DC 20037

Eagle Limited
4201 Congress Street, Suite 240
Char lotte, North Carolina 28209
Brigadier General David L.Gr ange (USA, Retired)

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
McCormick Tribune Foundation
435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 770
Chicago, Illinois 606 11
Comm and Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)

The Steven J. Greer Foundati n
Colonel Jack Jacobs SA Reti red)

Partner and President
Technology Strategies & Alliances Corporation
5242 Lyngate Court
Burke, Virginia 220 15
General Goor e Joulwan USA Retired)

General William F. " uck" Kernan SA Retired)
Colonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)

Operations Officer
Center for National Security Human Capital Management
U.S. Office of Personnel Management
1900 E Street, NW
Washin gton, DC 20415
Colonel Walter P. Lao Jr. SA Retired)
Adm iral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)

President
Information Manufacturing Corporation
7000 Infantry Ridge Road, Suite 200
Manassas, Virginia 201 09
Lieutenant Co lonel Roben L. Ma ' is (USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland, (USA, Retired)

Director
Clarke Center, Dickinson College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 170 13
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
General Mo ntgomery Me igs (USA, Retired)

Louis A. Bantle Professorof Government and Business Policy
Maxwell School of Syracuse University
Department of Public Administration
215 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, New York 13244
Major F. And y Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)

National Defense Counci l Foundation
1220 King Street, Suite 230
Alexandri a, Virginia 22314
Gen eral Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)

Booz Allen Hamilton. Incorporated
8283 Greensboro Drive
Mclean, Virginia 22102
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Patton Boggs, LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037 -1350
Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)

Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Preventive Action
Council on Foreign Relations
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
General Glen K. Otis (USA, Retired)

l(Il)
General Jose ph Ralston (USAF, Retired)

Vice Chairman
The Cohen Group
1200 19w Street, NW, Suite 400
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke SAP Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton (USA , Retired)

President. International Operations
M.LC. Industries, Incorporated
One Fountain Square, 11 911 Freedom Drive
Reston, Virginia 20 190
Maor General Dona ld W. Sh erd (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC , Retired)

0'"
Ma·orGeneral Peer Smith USAF, Retired)

Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
Chief Executive Officer
Guardian Group International
1028 Jeanett Way
Bel Air, Mary land 21014
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)

Director of National Security Programs
John F. Kennedy School of Govemment, Harvard University
80 Potter Pond
Lexington, Massachusetts 0242 1
.!lll.~<;\ ''il!',1oU"'~''''-I~1" Iy (USA, Retired)

President
Venturist, Incorporated
8233 Old Federal Road
Montgomery, Alabama 361 17
General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)

SeniorFellow
4850 Mark Center Drive
Alexandri a, Virginia 2231 1
General Charles E. Wi lhelm (USMC, Retired)

Battelle
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 60 1
Arlington, Virgini a 22202
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)

Chief Executive Officer and Publisher
U.S. Navallnstitute
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, Mary land 21402
Fro m: l TC ,OASD-PA
Sent : r 05, 2004 6:44 PM
To: Lt Col, OASD-PA; TC OASD-PA; CDR,
OCJCSIPA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA ASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T.
CAPT, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA
Subject: FW : CONFERENCE CAl l SATURDAY MORN ING !!!!
FYI
Li e uten a n t Colonel , USA

De f e n s e Press Off i cer
Off ice of the Ass is tant Secreta Of Def ense ( pub l i c Affai rs )
Of fi c e : DSN:
Fa,,, ....------'
Th i ng s don 't change much:
-A lie can travel hal fway around t he world while the truth i s p utt i ng on i t s shoes. -
Mark Twain 1835 - 1910
-O:~i9~'~n~a~'~~5E~~~;
Messa
>From: CIV OASD-PA
>Se- n- t- -:
> Fr1 ay , November OS, 200 4 5:06 PM
>To : LTC, OA$D-PA
>Subjece: FW : CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING ! !! !
>
>He r e ya g o .
>Pr ogr a m Support Specialis t

>Of f ice o f t he Secre t a r o f Defense
>Pub lic Affai rs (Room
>Te lephone :
>Fa x :
>
>PLEASE SEE INVITE BELOW.
>
>
>MEMORANDUM
>
s 'rc , Re t i r ed Mi l i ta ry Ana lyst s
>
>Fr om; Colone l Ar chie Davi s
> Direc t or, Communi ty Rel ations a nd Publ ic Af f airs
> Offi ce o f the Secr e t ary of Def e n s e
>
>Date: November 5, 2004
>
s ne , Co n f e r e n ce Ca ll wi th Senior DoD Official
>
>We inv ite y o u t o pa r ti cipate i n a confe rence call , Saturday , November 6 , 20 04 from 8:0 0
AM t o 9:0 0 AM .
>
>To pic s to be d iscussed are: ··Co l o n e l Dav is wi l l foll ow th is email t oni g h t with a
message explai n ing t h e t opic of d i s c u s s i o n .
>
>participanes i n this conference c all will be Li e u t e na nt General Th omas Metz , III Corps .
Your hos t fo r this call wi l l be Colone l Archie Davis .
>
1
s 'rc particip a t e i n this conf e r e nc e c a l l, pl ea se dial '1.""'"'......""""...
~ o r ,':'
a s k t he o p e r a t o r t o conne ct you t o the Mil itary Anal ys s c o n e re n ce cal l .
... and
>
,.Pl s e R. s:.~.v
emade aLtc
>
=.:p:.=t:o~===~=::=:Jrc~ at
or c a ll h er a t l:::. ....1
>We hope you a re a b l e to pa rtici p a t e .
>
>
2
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA
Sent: Friday, November OS, 2004 7:15 PM
To : Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS /PA
Subject: FW : CONFERENC E CALL SATURDAY MORNING I!!!
May wa nt to d i a l i n if you can.

Gen Me tz o n background wi th t he Ret i r e d Military Analysts Sat 6Nov 0800-0900 Ph numbers
be l o w.
VI R
Katie
> - -_ u Orig '
>From: LTC , OASD- PA
>Sent·
>To : vember
, Lt ColOS, 200 4 5:4!~P~M;=;~~?:, LTC OASD - PA; ....".,._=-...,..-:! CDR,
, OASo-PA'
OCJ CS! PA; Whitman , Bryan, SES , OASO-PA ; Col , OASO -PA ; Merrit t, Rox i e T. CAPT ,
OASD- PA; Tho rp , Frank , CAPT , OCJCS/ PA; Haddock , Ellen (Kat i e) , col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW : CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING I ! I!
>
>
>FYI
>Lieu tena nt Colonel , USA

>De fen se Pre s e Off ice r
>Of f i ce of the As s i s tant Sec ~~~~OJ~eLe se (Public Af f a irs )
»>Of
Paxf ic
: DSN; L..,...., ....
>
>Things don ' t c ha ng e mUCh :
>"A l ie can travel ha lfway around t he wor ld whi le the truth is putti ng
>on its shoes."
>Mark Twai n 1 835 1 91 0
>
> -- -- - Or i g ·
>FromR'~!:~~~S~~5~~~f,
>Se nt ·
>To : )(S)
Novembe r OS,CIV
LTC, OASO-PA
20 OASD
04 5:-PA
06 PM
>Subje ct : FW : CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING I I I !

>
>He r e ya go .
>
>Pr ogram Suppor t Sp e c i alis t

>Of fi ce of the Secr etar of oef en se
>Pub l ic Af fa i rs Room
>Telephone:
>Fax;
>
>PLEASE SEE INVITE BELOW.
>
>
>MEMORANDUM
>
>To: Re t ire d Mil itary Analys ts
>
>From: Colone l Arch i e Dav i s
> Director , Community Re l ations and Publi c Affa irs
> Of f i c e o f the Secre t ary of De f ense
>
1
>Cate: Nove mber 5 , 200 4
>
>Re: Conference Cal l with Se n i or DoD Of ficial
>
>We invite you to participa te in a con ference call, Saturday, November 6, 2004 f r om S:OO
AM to 9:00 AM.
>
>Top i c s t o be di scussed are; **Co l one l Davis will fo llow this e mai l tonight with a
message explaining t he top i c of discuss i on.
>
>Pa r t i c i pa nts i n th is con ference call wi ll be Lieutenant Genera l Tho mas Me tz , II I Corps.
Your hos t for this ca ll will be Colonel Archie Dav is .
>
>To partic ipate in this con ferenc e call , please d ial or ~ and
a s k the ope rat or to conn e c t you to the Military Ana lysts con f e r e nce call.
>
e R · •is:.:v:.:p:.=t====~~==];;;.a
>Pl e al sto
<mai
>
t
or ca ';-;:::':""::':"''mIZr-
l l her at - -"- - - r '
>We ho pe yo u a re able t o participate.

>
>
2
from : ~~T: C OASD-PA
Sent: '" er 19, 2004 9:59
To : i:- o-JILCDR, OCJCSIPA; Maj , OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen
(Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA L.. .....
Subj ect: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call
Ma ' am ,
No t e the time - - I was thinking in Baghdad t i me .
> - - - - -origina l Me ssage - - - --

>Fr om: Da v i s , Archi e , Col , OASD-PA
>Sent: Fri d ay , Nov e mber 1 9 , 200 4 8 : 41 AM
>To: Wh itman B a n SES, OASD- PAj Merri t t Roxie T.
OASD-PAj LTC OASD- PA; LTC ,
OASD -PA
>Subj e c t: Mi l i t a ry Ana l y st s Co n f e r e n c e Call
,
>Al l :
,
>Th e c a ll-in info rmation f o r the mili t a ry ana l y st s con fer ence c a l l i s :
,
,
,
>We i nv i t e you t o pa r t ic i p ate in a con fe ren c e c a ll , Satu r day, No vember 2 0 , 200 4 from 8:30
a m to 9 : 3 0 a . m. e s t .
,
>To p i c s to b e d i scus s ed are : Ope r a tio n a l Update o n Iraq .
,
>Partici pants i n thi s c onf e rence c a l l will be General Tho mas Me tz . Your ho s t f o r this
c all wi ll b e Colone l Arc hi e Dav is.
,
>To par ti c ipa te i n this c o n f e r enc e call , p lea s e dia l or a nd
a s k the o perator to conne c t y o u to the Mi l ita r y Ana lys t s con f e ren c e c a ll .
,
,
, VR,
,
>Ar c h i e
,
>Co l o ne l Arc hie Dav i s
>Di r e c t o r
>Commu n i t y Rel at i o n s & Publi c Lia i s o n
1
From : Haddock, Enen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, Novembe r 19, 2004 11:54 AM
To : Tho Frank CAPT, OCJCSIPA _ ...._ _...,
Cc: Maj, OCJCSlPA; LCDR, OCJCSlPA
Subj ect: F : Military Analysts Conference Call
Cap t Tho rp ,
Ther e is a mi li t a ry a nalysts c o n f e r e nce ca ll t omorro w a . m. -- Sa t , from 0830 t o 093 0 --
wi t h Gen Met z .
Dia l i n i n fo fol l ows .
Th oug h t y o u mi ht be intere ste:~d~i~n="~i:.:t:e:n:":'n:. i n . ..
p lease d i a l or and a s k t h e o perator to connect you t o the
Military Ana y s ts con f ere nce ca
VI R
Katie
> -----Or i g inal Mes sa e- - - - -
>F r o m: TC OASD- PA
>Se n t: Frida November 19 , 2 004
>To: LCDR , OCJ CS! PA; Maj , OCJ CS! PA; Haddo c k , Elle n
(Ka t ie). Col , OCJCS !PA ....- - - - - -.....
>Subj e ct : FW : Mi litary Analy s ts Co nf e r e nce Cal l
>
>Ma ' a m,
>Note the ti me --I was th i nki ng i n Baghdad t i me .
>v !r
> -----Ori g i n al Me s sage- - - - -

>Fr om: Dav i s , Ar c h ie , Col , OASD-PA
>Se n t: Fri day , Novembe r 19, 200 4 8 : 4 1 AM
>To : Whitman B a n SES, OASD- PA; M,.e~ r~
r~i~+-fl'oill.ie T. CAPT, OAS~D
~-~
P~A~'J-- ,I Col,
OASD- PA; LTC OASD- PA i LTC, OASD- PA; Lt Co l ,
OASD- PA
>Subjec t : Mil i t ary Analys t s Confere n c e Ca l l
>
>AI I :
>
>Th e cal l -in i nfor ma tion for t he military a n al y sts conf e r e nce c all is :
>
>
>
>We i nv i t e y o u t o pa r ti cipate i n a conference c a l l , Saturday , Nov ember 2 0, 20 04 fro m 8 : 30
a m to 9 :30 a. m. es t.
>
>To pi c s to be d i s c u ss ed a re: Op e r a t iona l update o n Iraq .
>
>pa r t i c i p a n t s in t h is con f e r e n c e cal l wi ll be Gen e r al Thoma s Met z . Your ho st f or t h i s
call wi l l be Co l o n el Arc hi e Da vis .
>
>To pa r tic i pate i n th i s c onferenc e c al l , p l e a s e dia l o r ... .... . nd
a sk the ope rato r t o con nec t you t o the Mil itary Ana l y st s con f e r e nc e c all.
>
>
>VR,
>
>Arc hie
>
>Co l o ne l Arch i e Da v i s
>Di re c t o r
>Commun i ty Rel a tions & Publ ic Liai s on
1
>
z
Fro m : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, November 19 2 04 6:00 PM
To : 'frank.thorp
Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call
capt Thorp ,
Be l ow info prov ide d fo r tomorrow 's confer e nce ca l l.
p lans to call in t oo , j us t as a bac k - up .
V R
Katie
> ----- or igina l Mess a ge ---- -

>Fr om: Hadd o c k , Ell e n (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
-se n e , Fr i d a y , Nove mber 19, 2004 11:54 AM
:>To: Thor Fran CAPT, OCJCS/PA ~~::::;=:;;;:;:;=:::J
>Cc: Ma j , OCJCS/PA; F ~ LCDR, OCJCS / PA
>Su bjec t: FW: Mi l i t a ry Analys ts Con f e r ence Ca l l
>
»cepc Tho r p,
>The r e i s a mi l i t a r y anal ys ts confere nce call tomorrow a .m. - - Sa t, f r om 0830 to 0 930 --
wi t h Gen Met z .
>Di a l i n info fo llows.
>Thoug h t you mi h t b e i nte reste:id~'~':n :":i:s: t: e: n: i :n:J i n ...
»p Le a e e d ial or a nd a s k the ope r a tor t o connect you t o the
Mil it a r y Ana y s s c on eren c e ca
>V/R
>Kat ie
> -- ---ori gina Me s
>From: LTC OASD-PA
>Se nt: Fr i d a Nov e mbe r 19, 2 004 .9~,5~9~AM :::;:~ .,
>To: LCDR, OCJCS/PA ; Ma j , OCJ CS / PA; Haddock, El l en
(Ka tie), Col , OCJCS/PA
>Su b j ec t : FW : Mili tary Analys ts Confe r e n ce Call
>
>Ma ' am,
>Not e the t i me - - I wa s th i n k ing i n Baghd a d t i me .
>
>
:> -----Ori g inal Messag e-----
>From : Da v i s , Arch ie , Col, OASD-PA
>Sent : Friday , Nov e mbe r 1 9, 2 0 04 8 : 41 AM
)(8)
:>To: Whi tma n, Br an , SES, OASD-PA; Me r ri t t Roxie T . CAPT, OAS~D~-~P~A"'~CC cI Co l,
OASD PA ~
OASD-- PA; LTC OASD-PA; LTC, OASD-PAi L. ~
Lt Col,
>Sub ject : Mi lita ry Analyst s Con fer e nce Ca l l

>
>AIl :
>
>The c all-i n in fo rmation f o r the milit ary ana lys ts c o n fe renc e call is :
>
>
>
>We i nvi t e you to partici pate in a con f ere n ce c a l l , Saturday, Nov e mbe r 2 0 , 2 004 from 8:30
a m to 9 :3 0 a. m. e s t .
>
>Topics t o be discuss e d a re : Op e ra t i ona l Upda te o n I raq.
>
>Particip a n t s i n this confe rence c a ll wi l l be General Thomas Me t z . You r ho st f o r t h i s
c a l l will be Colonel Archie Dav i s .
>
>To p arti cipate in this conference c all , p le a1se d ia l 1- ...... or .. ~ and
a s k the o pera t or to conne c t yo u t o t he Mi l i t a ry Ana lys t s con f e r e nce ca l l.
,
,
, VR ,
,
,>Ar c h i e
>Colone l Arch i e Dav i s
::oDi rec t or
>Commun i tv Rel ations & Publ ic Li a i s on
2
Fr om : Oi Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD·OASD-PA
Sent : Monday, December 13, 2004 8:37 AM
To: W hitm an, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Broo ks, Vincent K BG OCPA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OAS D-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OAS D-PA; Haddoc k, Ellen
(Katie), Col, OCJ CSIP A
we ought to t hi nk abou t a round t abl e with mil i t ary ana l y s t s tha t v cjcs , secarmy . and l t gen
b lum can d o toda y to p u t this whole a rmor /ng issue i n t o better pe r s pect i v e .
1
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
Sent: Monda , December 13, 2004 8:41 AM
To : CIV, JCS VCJCS . ....... '1 ,
Cc: ::;"= = ...J CDR, OCJCSlPA; Maj, OCJCSlPA ; LCDR,
OCJCSIPA 1...-_---'
Subject: FW: ROUND TABLE
Heads ·up .
I'm o n my way t o a meeting at OSC PA... can ' t figure out if we 're supposed t o do t he r ound
table today , o r th i n k about it today.
I should know more wh e n I return .
Vi R
Ka t ie
> - ----Or i g i nal Message - - - - -

>From : Di Ri ta , Larry, CI V, OSO-OASO- PA
>Sent : Monday , December 13 , 2 0 04 8:37 AM
>To: Whitman, Bryan, SBS , OASO-PA ; Brooks , vi nc ent K BG OCPA
>Cc: Rhynedance , Ge orge , COL, OASD-PA ; Barber, Al lison , CIV, OASD- PA; Haddock, Bllen
(Ka tie ), Co l , OCJ CS/ PA
>Sub j e c t :
>
>we ought to think abou t a roundtable wi t h military analyst s that v cj c s , secarmy, and
l t g en blum can do t oday to put this whole armor /ng issue i n t o better perspective.
>
>
1
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSfPA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 20041 0:16 AM
To : Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD·PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; CDR,OCJCSIPA;L .. LCDR,
OCJCSfPA; Maj, OCJCSIPA
Subject : RE: One Pager Meeting · Tactics for Abizaid/Casey
George --
I 'll b e a t the 1030 One -Pager mt g ; others from this office (a nd J3 ) wi ll cover the 1100 on
rotation noti fication.
Also , I h a ve TENTATIVELY marked Gen Pace 's calendar fo r a military a na l ysts ' conf call
this afternoon at 16 45 -111 5. Included 1630-1645 prep; no t s ure if Gen Bl um and / or Gen
Schoomaker will be a vailable , or i f there woul d be i n t ere st i n s ome " c ombi ne d " prep time .
Sorry it 's la te, but t h a t ' s the b est I c ould do wi t h t h e genera l's schedul e.
Vi R
Katie
> -- - - -original Mes s age - - - - -

>From: Rhynedanc e , George, COL , OASD-PA
>Sent: Monday , December 1 3 , 2004 9 :41 AM
CIV, OSO;
>To: Ru f f , Er i c , SES , OASD-PA; Ba r b e r , All ison, CI V, OASD-PA ; ~i7~~:-::~::~~~~::~~
Whitman , B an SBS OASD-PA; Hadd ock , El len (Ka ti e), Col , OC~~ S PA
>Cc : Ca t . USMC OASO- PA; Rhynedance , George , COL , OASO-PA;
SFC , OASO-PA; ~ CI V, OASD-PA ~------------. .
>Sub jec t: One Pager Meeting - Tac t ic s for Abiza id / Cas e y
>
>Coul d we meet at 1 0 30 7 Wou ld li ke t o us e the Press Ops c o n f e r e nc e room s i nce LD has an
appoi n tment at that time. Mr . Ruff has the lead for the me e t ing a nd wil l c hair same.
Sugg e st ea ch o f you come wit h some t ho ught s o n the t a c ti c s we could empl oy f o r Abiz aid and
Ca s e y n e xt wee k . . . . If t h e press ops c onf r oom is busy, migh t we be ab l e to meet i n Ms .
Ba rbe r ' s o f fice? Th a nks , please l et me know i f yo u c a n come .
>
>Kati e Had d o c k given y our me e t i n g sched ule this mo r n i ng , p l e a se fe e l free to send a
s ub . . . .
>
>GR
>
>
1
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSfPA
~
M~on~d~a:D;ece
:im~ber 13, 20041 :05 PM
Sent:
To : COL, JCS VC.~1;;;;;;:J
Cc : )(I) PA~ LCDR, OCJCs/PA; Maj.
JCs/P )(I) CIV. JCS VCJCS L.. .....
Subj ect : FW: CONF CALL TODAY 4:45 PM
I'll bring this to the prep, but didn't know i f Gen Pa ce would appreciate th is see d
ea rlier than that -- or i f he would have t i me t o r ead it. Gen Meigs is usually on t he s e
Military Analys ts' conference ca lls, a nd he has some rathe r specific d i s cus s ion items on
Armored vehicles .. . h i s email follows.
ViR
Katie
-----original Message-- ---

Fr om: Montgomery Meigs (mailto:mcme i g s ,.... ..
Sent : Monda Decemb er 1 3 , 2004 1 1 : 5 4 AM
To: CIV OASD-PA
Subject: RE: CONF CALL TODAY 4:4 5 PM
I 'm still working my schedule.
The iss ue s ti ll not addresse d by OSD remains the tradeoff s made by the Army on whe re i t
e xpe nded i t' s investments on new gear . As you a l l know, Gen 5choomaker has done a
t remendous job o f gett ing the newe s t, be s t gea r out to t he t roops. But t he r e' s neve r
enough money to go around. So I 'm sur e t he r e were reasonable tradeof f s made as to what to
buy on t he ma r gin. I ' m also not s ure t he Army kne w tha t t he c ompany involved had ext r a
capaci ty. Remember, the people who do the cont r ac ting o fte n don 't commun ic a t e t ho s e kinds
o f t hing s t o t he operators a s a mat ter of procedu re.
I' d al s o be i nterest e d in knowi ng whe t her young t rooper Wil s on, a scout , had a n armored
Humme r . As a scout he s hou ld have and I s uspec t hi s uni t does ha ve them, a nd if so, he
was not d i gg ing in l a nd f i l l s and was put up t o the question by t he reporter who was
observi ng - most l i ke l y - people f rom truck unit s l ooki ng f or e xt ra p r ot ection . I can 't
thi nk of a t ime other than with "gun t r uc ks " i n Vi e t Nam t ha t we armored 2 1/2 and 5 ton
t ruc ks . There may be a point o f explana tion the r e t ha t ca n be he l pful.
As you know t here is a n eth i ca l i s s ue he r e a s wel l. As a mat te r o f prof essional e thi c s ,

repo r t e r s a re no t supposed to i n s e r t thems e l ve s in the news . Cl earl y that happened in
t h i s case. Not s omet hi ng one can argue i n t he he a t o f the initia l day s o f the s t ory , but
a cons ideration none thel es s .
MeM
-----Ori inal Messa e- -- --
From: CIV OASD- PA [mailto:
Sent: Mon a y . December 13, 2004 11: 38 AM ...- - - - - - -.... .1
To : Mont gomery Meigs
Subject: RE : CONF CALL TODAY 4:4 5 PM
Should I put you on the p art icipants lis t?
Program Support Specialist

Office
Public of th~~S:Je~c
Af fairs ~r~e~t~a~~~o~f~D~,e fense
(Room
Te lephone :
1
Fax:
MEMORANDUM
To: Ret ire d Mili t a ry Analys t s

From: Colone l Arch i e Da vi s
Di recto r , Community Re la tions a nd Public Af fa irs
Of f ice of the Secreta ry o f Def ense
Date: 12-13 - 04
ae • Con f ere nc e Ca l l wi th Senior DoD Of f ic ia ls

We invit e you t o pa rti cip a te i n a c onferen ce c a ll , TODAY, Decembe r 13 th f r om
4:45 pm t o 5: 15 pm.
Top ic s t o be d i scussed a re: Armor issue i n Ira q

pa r t i cipant s i n t his confere nce cal l will be Gener a l Pe ter Pa ce , v ice Cha irma n of the
J oint Chiefs of Sta f f . You r ho s t f or t h i s ca l l wi l l be Colone l Archie Da v i s .
......li::
a~r~t~i,
c i p a t e i n thi s con f ere nc e call, p lea se di a l L. • or
and a sk t he operat or to conne c t you to the Mili t a r y Analys t s confe r e nce ca l l .

'------'
Ple a set o R~~.~S~.~v:.:p:.:::::t:o====l~~=Jr'l
< mail or atc al l he r a t ",- J,= = = =I
'--;-;:':':'""7:","...
We hope you are able t o par t ic ipate .
2
)(8)

Sent: Monda • Decemb er 13, 2004 6:43 PM
To: ~;';~::2~OL OCPA'
RE: Military Analyst Teleconference (UNCLASSIFIED)
Subject:
Tha nks Joe your aummary is muc h s ho rter (and more to the point) t han t h e one I 'm
worki ng on to forward to Capt Tho rp /Gen Myers. ,.
VI R
Ka t ie
> ' ~Ul.OJu;;""....

nOrig/<
>From:
n -
..,,)(8).:....,.._-::,...,....,.
COL OCPA [ma ilto: ":- I
>Sent: Mo nd a December 13 , 2 0 04 6 :35 PM
>To: L OCPA
~ OCPAi So renson, J e f f rey A BG (P ) ASA(ALT); Haddo ck, Bll en (Katie) Col
>Cc:
OCJCS/ PA;
)(8) 01 OASD-FA
>Subjec t : Analyst Te l e c o nfe r e n ce (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
>Classif ication: UNCLASS IF IED
>Cave a ts : NONE
>
>Sir : GEN Pa c e and BG Sorenson p a r t i c i pa t ed in an eSD FA hos t ed tel econf erence t o d a y wi t h
15 military anal yst . Brie f r emarks ma de by each g e ne r a l o fficer f o l l owe d b y some
e x c e l l ent que s ti on s by the mi l i t a r y a nalys t . Al l on the record . Bulle t s ummary bel ow:
>
>* GEN PACE KEY COMMENTS :
>
> * Cha l lenge today i s to bal a n c e e quipment versus tact ics f o r troops deployed
thr oughout Iraq .
>
> • Requi r eme n t changed over time a s a t hi nking enemy found innova tive
>met hods to attac k our troops us i ng I EDs
>
> * Provided de fini tion for the t h r e e l evels of p rotec tion provided on v e hic les g o ing
i n to Iraq .
>
> • Provided a s hort summary o f t he t wo SECARMY di r e c t e d ta s k forc es u nd erway to look
a t bo t h t h e manuf ac tu ri ng base a nd the lED thr e at.
>
> * Provided cont ext o n what the Army has d one over t ime t o armor
>ve h i c l es
>
> * Ma de c l ear that a r mor is only part of protecting Ma r i n e s and
>Soldie rs : t r a i n i ng , l e sso ns learned, TTPs, and technology are a lso key
>e lemen ts
>
>*BG SORENSON
>
> * Summari z e d number of v e hi c les a r mo r e d to date : unparalleled
>accomplishme n t ve r s us a ny o ther c oa l it i on nation
>
> * Army is accel e ra t i ng FMTV armored vehicles i nto the ate r
>
> * Emphasi z ed fund i ng i s the r e and we are working closely with
>industry to meet d emand
>
> * Po i n t e d o u t the incredible t e s t i ng e f fo rt on -going : tested over
>1,000 "coupons " o f ma t e r i al s
>
> * Added e mp hasis tha t armor is o nly pa r t of the solution to protect i ng t r oop s - -
s a me poi nts a s a bo ve .
>
1
>OSD PA officials v e ry p leas ed with t he e ngage ment . Believe this ma de a b i g d iff e r e nce to
he l p counter media mi spercep t i ons.
,
>VR , COL
, ....._ - 1
,
>Clas s ification : UNCLASSIFIBD
>Cave a t s : NONE
,
2
Fro m : Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD -PA
Sen t : Tuesday, December 14, 2004 8:01 AM
To : Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George,
COL, OASD·PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Cot, OCJCS/P A
Plea se share y o u r i deas abou t genera l s c asey a nd abiza id with Le ss el and p it t man and l e t
t h e m know thi s i s what we a re thinki ng a bou t .
Don ' t di st ribute that fu ll p lan you d e v e l o ped t ha t inc ludes secde f and de p sec i d e as . Just
share t he t h o ugh ts about c asey a nd a b izaid and see ho w p e o ple f eel abou t i t .
I thi nk it would be p a r t i c u larl y important to e nsure one or both o f t h e m spea k wi th the

milit ary a n a l ys t s , and does some k ind of publ ic eve n t, too.
Tru<. .
1
From : ~~~~~~"TSg l, JCS, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, December 16. 2004 1:24 PM
To : Haddock, Ellen (Katie) , Col. OCJCS/PA
Subject : Military analysts transcript for post ing

Flag Statu s: Flagged
Atta chment s: 041213 - VCJCS Conference Call with Arm y Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Sorenson and.doc
04 1213 - vcx:s
Conference can...
Col Hadd o ck ,
Attached is t he Military a nalyst conference call you r e qu ested me f orma t.
~~~~~;:;:;:~ TSgt, USAF

Off ice of the Cha irman . J CS
~~~-'~. .c Af f a i r s
L..-_ _---1 Fa x
1
GENERAL PETER PACE, USMC
Vice Cbairman, Joint Cbiefs of Staff
Conference Call witb Army Maj . Gen. Jeffrey Sorenson and
Col. Lynn Callyer and Military Analysts
December 13, 2004
HOST CO LONEL ARCHIE DAVI S: It is my privilege to introd uce you to the group
that will be speaki ng with us today. We 've got General Pac e, Vice Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. We have General Sorenson, Deputy for Acq uisition Systems
Management, Army Secretary. And then we have Colonel Callyer from Army G8.
Gentlemen , one change in the way we normally do these type things. Today the
discussion is on the record. It' s on the record gentlemen. With that I'll pass the mike to
General Pace for opening statement and then after that we will take your que stions.
General Pace, please sir.
GENE RAL PACE: Thanks very much and thanks everybody for taking time to be on
the phone call. I just wanted to make myself available along the guys here from the
Army to try to put some things in context and answer your questions. Basically we've
got a challenge in Iraq with regard to force protection for our soldiers and our marines
that balances both, I guess the equipment that we have available to them and the tactics
that we employ with that equipment. You take the equipmen t side, going from most
protected to least protected, you can put people in tanks or Bradley 's or up-armored
humvees or th in-skinned hum vees or walking the streets in flack jacket and helmet or
walking the street without flack jacket and helmet. And on the high end the more
protected you are the more isolated you are from the civilian pop ulace, and on the low
end the less protected you are the less isolated you are. That's the science part, of course,
as you all know the art is to try to figure out where you ought to be on that spectrum of
protection so you can get both protection for your troops and the most influence with the
population. But you sure don' t want a heavy footprint or an opp ressive footprint.
So about May- June of2003, after the major combat operations, we went to about a 1/3
armo red; 2/3 rd wheeled vehicle mix and were out in the light- skinned hum vees and ended
up with a thinki ng enemy. Then around the Octobe r-November timeframe in 2003
started really employing lED ' s and VB -lED 's in a heavy way. Whic h caused the
commanders on the ground to reassess how they were emp loying their troops. Took the
commanders desired armore d vehicles from about 2,000 in the June-Jul y timeframe up to
about 15,000 required in around the November timeframe and since that time it has
ramped up to about doub le that number. So as we've gone through the series of attacks
on our troops and we 've seen the usefulness, especially the up-armored hum vee because
it' s about small enough not to be an oppressive type vehicle but it' s substantial enough to
protect the troops. You've seen that shift in emp hasis. There are basically three levels of
protection or three ways of getting to that level of protection. One is the factory installed.
You buy the up-armored hunw ee and it arri ves in theater built and ready to go. The
second is the hum vees in theater and you buy the add-o n kits from the manufacturers and
apply those to the ve hicles in theater. And the third is the folks in theater doing w hat
good so ld iers an d Marines do which is putting on locall y fabricated prot ecti on. to be able
to fill in the gap while industry ramps up.
We have do ne a lot procurement wise, there is a lot mo re we need to do. Right now
we've got a little bit over 15,000 arm ored ve hic les in theater. By the end of January we
w ill have prohably about 22,000 and by the end of March pro bably have about 28,000.
Which is a very heal thy appli catio n of money and industry. We spent abo ut $ 1.2 billion
so far on increases to armored protection and there is another $2 .4 bill ion to be spe nt to
round out the p rotective req uirements over there righ t now.
Th e Secretary of the Army has stood up two task forces. One, again on the eq uipment
side, is looking at every part of the continuum with the man ufacturers to see if we can ' t
run a little bit faster, j ump a little bit higher. to get the proper equi pment to the troops
faste r. And the othe r one that was stood up around last Octobe r when the rED prob lem
started to mani fests itself an d that is wh at is called the rED Task Force. It is a side of the
eq ua tion that deals wi th the tactics. techniques an d procedures that capture the data from
the attacks on o ur forces with these weapo ns. Analyze the results o f those attacks , share
the information in theater immedi ately and then se nd it back here to the states whe re the
Army Task Force can work on it and prep are new tact ics, techniques and procedures and
try them out, out in the d esert in Ca lifornia to see wha t wo rks best.
One more thing then I' ll stop ta lking at you and start listenin g and that is on interceptive
bod y arm or part, I thi nk you all know that that was a state of the art piece of equipment
when we started the war. it worked exceptionally well. We were producin g about 1,200
sets per month . We are now producing 25.000 sets per month . Everybody in the
CEN TCOM theater o f operations, all U.S. military , all U.S. go vernment emp loyees, have
a set of this protective gear and the Army w ill co ntinue to bu y these at the rate of 25,OOO
a month until we' ve got the Anny and Marine Corp completely outfitted. Let me stop
there and turn this back to our moderator.
C O L O NEL DAVIS: Sir, would you have co mments that you' d like to make or would
you like to go into qu estions?
G E NERAL SORENSON: Ju st let me put a co up le o f other sound bites on there which I

think, j ust to fo llow on to what General Pace said and that was I think it 's noteworth y that
over the last fourteen month s as Gene ral Pace says we have begun to j ust the armoring
capab ility there. Thi s nation has armored over 20.000 vehicles, which is so mething I
think if you loo k at the context o f wha t othe r nations or othe r arm ie s could have done.
Probably unparalleled . Th e second thing is, as he relates to the Task Force , already we
are beginn ing to work with acc eleration of deliveri es of capabiliti es for the FM TV.
which is the fami ly of med ium tactical vehicles and some of our heavier fleets as well, to
acc elerate some of that capability into theater. But clearly as has been mentioned be fore.
the focus initially from the theater was to make sure that we could up-armo r the light
skinned vehicles, specifically the humvees, because those were more in harm s way and
we have now shifted that focus because of where we are with up-armoring the vehicles,
both the vehicles in-country with armor as well as the delivery of up-armored hurnvees
from the factory as well as from other maj or commands, as well as other services. We
are now shifting that focus to the medium and heavy truck fleet and attempting to get
those fleets up-armored here within the early springtime.
COLONEL DAVIS: Ok gentlemen, with that we will take your questions at this time.
KEN ALLARD: General Sorenson, this is Ken Allard . I am curious as to what

road blocks you are finding right now in the procurement process and where they exist. Is
it in the procurement system, the funding system or in industry itself?
GENERAL SO RENSON: Well when you say roadblocks I' m not sure specifically
what.. .
KEN ALLARD: Constraints. Bad term was roadblocks. Constraints.
GE NERAL SO RENSON: WeU I think at this point in time we have been able to work
with not only the Arm y but the OSD staff, as well as with the Hill in getting the funding
that we need. We have had some difficulties in some cases, I can go back into one
particu lar design, whereby when the requirement came in we didn 't have a design for one
of these particular vehicles. We built the design, then we found we had some qua lity
control problems, we had to go back and fix it. But the long poles in the tent have clearly
been getting steel. We now have three steel manufacturers that are producing the steel.
We have all the depots basically producing these kits, as well as man ufacturers, so from
the standpoint of constraints or roadblocks at this point in time I would say that if there
was a roadblock we have certainly busted thro ugh it at this point in time.
PA UL VALLELY: Can you talk a little more in depth on some of the tactics,
unclassified basis, that we're able to use over there now since October 2003?
COLONEL DAVIS: Vallely, who would you like to address your question?
PAUL VALLELY: Well anyone that can answer. You know cell phone triangulation,
over head surveillance, convoy protection, anything that we could use that would give us
a little more definitive on the force protection and tactics that we ' re using.
GENERAL PACE : Paul, this is Pete Pace. Let me try in an unclassified mode to
answer that and then I'll ask the guys here from the Army too, if they' ve got anything
they want to add. Clearly we have some tactical means available to determine where
lED ' s may be and some technical means available to try to get those things to function or
not function when they are not suppose to. A lot of time and effort put into
understanding the changing tactics of the enemy employing them. First it was one lED
and then they would put that in place and we would change our tactics so they put in
more and then as we responded to that they have another one go ofT. So it's very much a
- - - - - -_. .--_ -
force vs. force thinking process. I wo uld not want to get into the details of exactly how
we are doing it right now because again, it will change what the other guys do and then
we will have to change again.
G ENERAL SO RENSON: Sir, the only thing I would say from the Army standpoint,
we've tried to take a holistic look at thi s. Clearly we've talked about the annoring but
that's on ly one piece of it. We've also tried to use some other pieces of sop histicated
equipment to preclude the detonation of those systems. As well as we within every
parti cular incident have an after act ion report. As Ge neral Pace mentioned before, you
have the lED Task Force over there and they clearly go back and look at specifically
what happened an d report hack. And then we introduce that immediately into our
trainin g within less than 24 hours . So the TIP's in terms of the tactics, techniques and
procedures are updated on a continuous basi s.
DON SHE PPARD : I' m trying to follow Ge ne ral Pace's numbers here. 15,000 now,
22,000 end of January, 28,000 by the end of March. We heard in repo rts after the
Secpef's town meeting of 4 50 vehicles a month. I assume that was probably just
humvees being updated by another hundred or so. So my question is.... Ca n we rea lly
reac h these numbers and how much of this was alrea dy in progress and afail accompli
before the stuff over this town hall meeti ng.
G E NERAL PACE: I' ll give you w hat I know and then I' ll ask for backup from the
Army guys. You are absolute ly right, the 450 has to do speci fically with the up-armored
humvees. When we started thi s, they were producing at 35 a month. Over time it has
ramped up to 450 a month. Every time we've gone forward to Congress with a request
for money, they have provided it. So fundi ng has not been an issue. There was a little bit
of a surprise last week when the manufacturer said that they co uld produce another 100
per month than we thought they could. With insid e of that same day that the
manufacturer said that they co uld go from 450 to 550 the Army changed, modified the
contract which, if you know procedures around this place, cha ngi ng a contract inside of
one day is kind of unusual. So the manu facturer now would be, with the funding to
p roduce that extra 100 per month, is telling us now that they will be ab le to actually start
providing those extra 100 a month in Apri l of next year. So it' s not like you can j ust turn
a swi tch and have these things pour forth. In all the other vehicles there is something
like, ohhh, give or take, 32,000 p lus vehicles in Iraq right now. The numbers I told you
abo ut are thin gs that are doable right now thanks to all the work that has been done for
the last year plus and also in the last week or so going back one more time and scrubbing
all the industry counterparts we had to see w hat might be bro ught forward faster. Again,
remembering the continuum we are on, part of this challenge is to have the right
equipment, the other part is to have the right tact ics. So we shouldn' t lay all this off on
industry providing us X number of armored veh icles. It has to do with how the
commanders in the fie ld take the resources that we are ab le to provide to them and how
we use it in a tactical world. So it' s both sides of the equat ion.
DON SHEPPARD: And j ust a follow on to that, how would you characterize, when you
say 28,000 out of32,000 are armored ve hicles an d o f course you still going to see them
blown up on TV for reasons we understand, how would you characterize that armor for
public consumption.
GE NERAL PACE : What do you mean by characterize. I'm sorry.
DON SH EPPARD: So the public thinks if we bave 28,000 armored vehicles that there
is going to be a heck of a lot less explosions and people killed and trucks blown up and
that's really not necessarily the case . How should we characterize the levels of protection
within 28,000 vehicles. Some level of protection, some level of armor, sma ll arms, etc.
not all like the up-armored humvees?
GENERAL PACE: I would say that this armor will certainly protect our soldiers and
Marines from small anns. It will protect them from some of the lED ' s kind, for example
use of artillery rounds, but clearly you can build a big enough bomb to blow up a tank, or
anything else we have and that ' s why we have to be care ful not to have the Ame rican
publi c thinking that there is a tactical armor solution that we can put PFC Pace inside of
some kind of cocoon that ' s going to protect him from everything. Clearly we cannot.
Flackjackets and helmets protect us from some level of violence, tanks protect us from
another level of violence but you gentlemen all know it is a continuum out there and a
thinking enemy that can provide a pretty good sized blast in any particul ar place at one
time. So we are doing what we should do to provide the level of protection that we know
provides an added measure of security for our guys without going to the poin t where we
have everybody riding around inside their own tank and we cannot do the j ob that we
were sent over to do . Which is not only to defeat the enemy but also to help the populace
get on to their next lives.
COLONEL DAVIS: Are there any other questions out there.
JED BABBIN: General, Jed Babbin. Some of the people I' ve been up against on the
news lately have been basically saying that Mr. Rumsfeld has been ignoring this problem
since last August. Can you give us a timeline as to really how this burbled up through the
system and when it was identified as·a major problem and what was done. Basically in
relation to that.
GENERAL PACE : Sure, I mean this is totally inaccurate to say that about the
Secretary. As I mentioned, the comm anders in the field, and I agreed with them, believe
that in the June-July 2003 timeframe that the amount of annor that we had over there and
the numb ers of vehicles we had were sufficient to be able to provide security but also to
be able to interact with the populace. And then as I mentioned, the thinking enemy, in
the October-November timeframe of 2003, started using lED's and VB-lED ' s very
aggressively. When that happened, the commanders on the ground increased their
request from the level that it was at, which was about 2,000 armored vehicles, j umping it
up to 15,000 inside the space of about a month, once they realized that they needed to
change our tactics, techniques and procedures. When we did that, it was at a time when
the industry, for just one example, industry was producing about 35 to 40 up-armored
humvees per month . We went to Congress, got the money to increase. I think it was the
first step went up to about 220 and over time we' ve gotten up to about 450, as the
industry has been able to ramp up their capacity to build more for us. So for at least the
last year the Army Task Force, the lED Task Force and the procurement process has been
working on this to provide the right solutions. And every time we 've gone to the
Secretary with a new request for added armor. and shown him the bill for it, he has been
very quick to insure that we have what we needed and has supported us very rapidly with
Congress. And Congress has given us the money we've asked for, so outside those of us
in uniform who has anything to do with leadership/providing resources to us has done it
as quickly as we 've asked for it. Within a capacity. Industry takes time to ramp up. As
you all know.
KEN ALLARD: General Pace, Goldwater Nichols gave you as the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs a lot of acquisition responsibilities and I know that you use those
authorities quite aggressively. My question really is while I am a great fan of steel as
opposed to anything else, are we limited simply to the existing technologies for
protecting these vehicles or are you looking at anythin g else? Possibly the more
aggressive use of Kevlar or some substitute for steel?
GENERAL PACE: Alright, the short answer is yes. You are right on the money, you
know there are some Kevlar applique' s out there that pound for pound are really very
strong. We are looking at those. Let my Anny counterpart, who is in that business,
answer the specifics, but clearly we are out there searching for new applications of old
technology like Kevlar and new substances materials that will allow us to do what Kevlar
has allowed us to do so far.
GENERAL SORENSEN: Yes, again this is Jeff Sorensen. As we've talked about here,
we've been really searching the entire industrial base. Up at Aberdeen proving ground,
the people up there at the test conunu nity have tested over 1,000 different coupons which
essentially represents everything from steel to composites to composites with aluminum
to everything we could find, as a way to try to get the maximum protection capability for
the vehicles. As an example, we have tested, once the coupon gets tested and is
sufficient, then we have them put together a kit. As an example, for the humvee, we have
tested 12 different kits up there at Aberdeen. Most of them have been steel but there have
been some composites. But I will tell you in some cases with respect to the composites
we've had some difficulty, if you will, adhering it to the door as well with the ballistic
glass. We 've had a much better success with the steel doors and the ballistic glass then
we have here with the Kelvar solutions, though we have used the Kevlar solutions or
composite solutions, if you will. On the back of the vehicles provide protection because
in many cases here we have a lot of older vehicles out there in Iraq. You can only put so
much armor on those particular vehicles after which point in time the suspension sort of
gives way . Unlike the up-armored humvee, which was combined as a system design to
accommodate a heavier transmission, a heavier suspension, heavier engine, etc. It was
built from the ground up. Most of our vehicles over there in theater were the older
humvees that we had to look at very care fully to design a package that wo uld not only
give the maximum force protection but also give the capabilit y that the vehicle will
continue to operate properly. So we have looked at everything and we continue to look at
everything as we try to determine solutions for this particular problem.
KE N ALLARD: General, one follow up to that and particularly in terms of commercial

techno logies that you may not have looked at before, if we run across any of that is there
any way that we can get in touch with you. It may j ust be a wild screwy idea but if it can
be something that' s productive. It' s one thing to complain about this on TV, it's quite
another to offer solutions. So how do we get in touch if we have something like that.
GENE RAL SO RENSON : I can give you my email, I can give you my phone numb er.
I' ll leave that with Colonel Davis here.
KE N ALLARD: Super.
CO LONEL DAVI S: I' ll give it to you Ken.
KE N AL LARD: Great.
GENERAL PACE: The bottom line is we really shouldn' t be collectively defensive

about this, nor shou ld we be collectively putting too big a smiley face on this thing. The
fact is that this is combat. We had some good things when we went in, we're learning
some lessons, we' re trying to adjust to that. The enemy does the same thing. And I think.
we just need to make sure that the American public understands that their sons and
daughters are important to us. -We are going to do all we can to protect them, that has
both a material solution and a tactic solution and we should j ust acknow ledge where we
are on the continuum and acknow ledge the fact that we need to continue to press hard on
this thing to get it right.
KE N ALLARD: General Pace, I was up at MSNBC when this story broke last week and
I think. that is precisely the right attitude to take on it. That it is the constant roar of
abdication. Rather than saying it' s the Army we want or the Army we don 't want, that' s
really kind of beside the point. I think that what drives a lot of people crazy is when they
have the impression that we have not done enough. Certainly the story that is there is an
entirely different one.
Q UESTIONER: Is the majority of these lED's come in detonated?
G ENERAL PAC E : I do not know the answer to that question. And I don't know that
we want to put that out anyway. Just because of some of the techniques we are using
against it. So if we could avoid going down that road, then it would probab ly be a good
thing to do collectively.
CHUCK NASH : General, Chuck Nash, question about the over all lesson that were
learning as wego beyond this with the armor on humvees and that is if you look at the
continuum of the regular humvees, the up-armored humvees, Stryker, Bradley, Abrams,
you know you've got a continuum there of protection you addressed earlier, how are the
lessons that we are learning now, as you look ahead and some of the things that we are
planning on buying and planning on doing, how many degrees has the rudder changed,
what have we learned from this?
G ENERAL PA CE : Don't know if! can answer it in degrees of mdder, I can tell you
that last Friday and Saturday and again today sitting down with the Secretary ofthe Army
and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and various meetings about budgets and
supplementals and the like, that very much a part of the discussion is as we lay out the
FY2006 bud get submission, have we in fact properly identified the changes that are
needed in the budget to reflect the lessons learned without overcom pensating and fixating
on one piece of our armed forces, if I can say it like that, so find the right balance.
Clearly inside of today's understood requirement, the funding is there. But as we look to,
as the Army modularizes it' s brigades, Pete Schoomaker and his folks, are looking at the
right mix of vehicles and armored protection for those, partially based on what we are
learning in Iraq and Afghan istan, and partially based on what we think the emerging
threat will be in the future.
CHUCK NASH: If! could, a quick follow up. One of the criticisms that I've heard is
that the Marines are taking higher casualties because they don 't have the armor that the
Army has. Is that a fair criticism?
GENERAL PACE: I don 't think so. The numbers that I know about for the Marines
and I refreshed myself on this last week, is that the Marines have 4, 100 wheeled vehicles
in Iraq right now and all of them have either level one, two or three protection right now
as we speak. So to my know ledge, thanks to lessons learned by the Army, shared with
the Marines before the Marines went back in theater this time, as the Marines came back
into theater they were able to arrive either already with the new armor on the vehicles or
to put in on in Kuwait before they went in. I know they do have a small number of
vehicles that don 't have armor and those are the ones they use inside the base camp.
COLONEL DAVIS: Sir, how we doing on time? One more question. Gentlemen, we
have time for one more question.
COLONEL DAVIS: An y wrap up gentlemen?
GENERAL SORENSEN: One thing that I would just like to add up to what General
Pace was talking about with the future. I will just tell you, again, this is Jeff Sorensen
from the Science and Technology base, we are looking at other solutions such as active
protection systems and so forth to defeat these type of capabilities. And clearly at this
point in time there has been more of a focus on that as far as lessons learned as we begin
to design the future combat system and see what we are going to do there as well as with
Stryker. So that clearly in terms of lessons learned the Science and Technology base has
had an additional focus for elements of how to make sure these vehicles can be protected
in open combat.
GENERAL PACE: And again, let me just say thanks to all of you and your time. I
know that your time is valuable and the opportunity to share some ideas with you so that
when you go out and do what you do you have at least the best info we can give you, it' s
very beneficial to us and we appreciate it.
COLONEL DAVIS: General Pace, General Sorensen, gentlemen thank you very much
for taking the time. Before we close we have one announcement.
COLONEL CURTIN: Hi I'm Colonel Joe Curtin, Army Public Affairs, on Wednesday
morning at 0800 there will be a Press Briefing on wheeled vehicle strategy in which we
are going to go into some detail with Major General Speakes and supported by General
Sorensen to address the wa y ahead. I invite you to be there and if not, tell your primary
media representatives for your networks to please attend.
COLONEL DAVIS: Thank you very much. Again, this entire discussion is on the
record.
From : Lo"':!=:~=::::::~ OASD·PA
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 12:04 PM
To : Haddoc k, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; LCDR, OCJC"SI ;;;;,.
PA :.:'= = = :::::;...
CDR , OCJCS/PA ..
Cc: Rhynedance , George, CO L, OASD·P A; Davis, Arch ie, Col , OAS D-P CIV
OAS D·PA "----_ .....
Subject: TPs from Casey for review
Attachments : TP 12·17-04 Gen. Cas ey Iraq update.doc ; 12·16.()4 Cas ey with mil analysts .doc; 12-1&-04
Casey Pentagon presser.doc
TP 12-17-04 Gen. 12-16-0'1 casey 12· 1&04 casey

casey Iraq up... WIttl nu anatys... Pentagon,...,....
All :
Attac hed pl e a s e f i nd the f i r st draf t of ta lking points off Gen. Cas ey's br iefing s .
The sources are atta ched - (1) transcript of Casey 's p r e s s e r yeste r day and (2) t rans c r i p t
from Bonnie Sc iarr e t to in Archi e's s ho p o f Casey 's b r ie f ing (phone) t o the mi l it ary
an a l ysts .
I 'l l s t and by and wai t for d i rec t i ons.
1
Gen. George Casey, commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, briefed the Pentagon press corps on
Thursday about the situation ~ iraq and the outlook for progress. Gen. Casey said the Coalition and the
new Iraqi governmenl are broadly on track toaccompiish their objectives - a OOI1slitutionaily elected
govenment and security forces capableof maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safehaven for
Ieml(. Following are highiights.
FightingtheInsurgents.
• tt has been slx months since the transition 10 sovereignty in Iraq. Commanders have reviewed the plan
they shaped in Augusl to help bring Iraq through itsconstitutional elections in December 2005. The
assessmenl isthe plan is broadlyon track.
• One keyelementof the plan was to eliminate safehavens where the insurgents gather to plan and
operate. With the iiberation ofFallujah, the insurgentsno longer have a salehavon inIraq where they
can plol and carry out ther operabons. They must look over their shoulders now.
• In 14 of the 18 provinces. there are fewer than four violent incidents a day.
• The insurgents are tough enemies - but theyare not 10 feet tall. These same people have been
oppressing the Iraqi people for 30years. They offer no alternative positive vision for Iraq - so they are
forced use intimidation to get their way. Theycannot sustain this.
Iraqi security forces are growing stronger.

• Progressively more security forces were involved and actively werljng with Coalitionforcesineach of
the recent major operations - Najaf, Samarra and FaJiujah.
• InFallujah, therewere two brigades fighting - and theyperformed well. Now there is an Iraqi Division
Headquarters in Fallujah controlling the two brigades, whichis the first time an Iraqi Division
Headquarters hasbeeninthe fieldsince the war.
• In Najaf, where the Mahdi militia were killingand terrorizing, the city is quiet. Najafis anexampleof the
positive change that cantake place once Iraqis are liberated from the insurgents' tyranny. Nowthe
governor and the Iraqi Security Forces are in charge.
Iraqi security forces are being trained and coming on line.

• ByFebruary there will be 70 battalions in the Iraqi army, including a mechanized infantry battalion.
• Iraqi division commanders have recently been appointed. Coalition forces are wor1<.ing with them to
build theirheadquarters and forces capableof independent operations. These leaders will be critical to
conducting independent counter-insurgency efforts because they will help gamer the intelligence,
shpae the plans and direct the operations.
• Training the police isa longer-leon project. but good progress is being made, especially with the special
police battal ions. By Februal)' there will be ~x public Older battalions, a special policeregiment, foor
police commando battalions and nine reg'lnal SWATteams - each of which will helplight insurgents
and terrorists on a day-to-day basis.
Reconstruction momentum is bU ilding.

• In June. the month Iraq transilioned to sovereignty, there were 230 projects from the Iraq
Reconstruction Fund onthe ground awming dirt.·
• By the end of November there were more than 1,000 projects - adding upto more than $3 billion into
the Iraqi economy.
• Reconstruction ismoving forward despite the insurgents' attempts to disrupt this progress.
The Iraqi people broadly accept theirgovernment and their security forces.
• Some polls show an approval rating higher than 70 percent.
• Iraqis have apositive viewoftheir army and their new police force.
• Sixty percentof Iraqis think their counlly ~ headed inthe rightelection.
Elections areon track for January 30th.

• Insurgents are trying tocreate a security situation that makes people believe elections are not possible.
The insurgents are desperate - theyknow they are going tobe relegated toa very different position.
• The registration process has gone forward in most of the country, though there were some incidents up
north and west inAI Anbar province. The election committee iswor1<:ing on alternatives for these two
areas.
• Commanders expect insurgents to operate in a more classic insurgent mode, with attacks in small
numbers. Insurgents may IIy tomake some high profile attacks before the election. The Coalition and
Iraqi forces are preparing for this.
• In general, the role ofthe Coalltion forces during the elections will be toconduct broad-based security.
The Iraqi security forces will work the specifics ofthe polling areas.
• There will be somewhere between 6,000 and 9,000 polling places. Guarding the sites won't always be
done atthe site - Coalition and Iraqi security forces have a range ofoptions, such as controlling traffIC
around the site and restricting access. The goal is reducethe exposure ofthe sites rather than have 20-
30 security forces huddle around each polling place.
• The insurgentsdon't want the Sunnis to participate inthe elections, because they can then claim the
election was invalid. Commanders are optimistic that there will be sufficient Sunni participation.
Success in Iraq is a tribute to thetroops.

• The sokl iers, sailors, airmen and Marines who have died in Iraq gave their lives tohelp 25 million Iraq is
build better lives and to improve the security of the United States and the Coalition.
• We grieve with their families, and with the families ofall the Coalition and Iraqi security forces who
made the ultimate sacrifice.
• The nation is grateful for the troops who fight around the world todefeat terrorism and replace it with
freedom .
Published by the U.S. Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs

CONFERENCE CALL OF 12-16-04
Retired Military Analysts
&
General George Casey
Host: COLONEL ARC HIE DAVIS : Gentlemen, Co lonel Davis here from OSD Public
Affairs . Thank you for joining us this afternoon. It is my privilege to introduce to you
Genera l Casey, Commande r of Mult i-National Force Iraq . Ge neral Casey has agreed to
speak with us this evening about operations in Iraq . General Casey, we lcome back to the
Pen tagon Sir and th ank you for your tim e. The briefin g tod ay will be on the record. We
have approximately 30 minu tes. General Casey will make an opening statement and after
that he will take your questions. General Casey, the floor is yo urs.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: OK I have no idea who is out there so nice to be with
you here. Oh th ey are handing me a list, looks like some old friends. Let me just say a
couple of things and then I'll take your q uestions and I will be fairly brief here. I have
been out there almost six months now, six months since transition to sovereignty. We've
just completed our first review of the campaign plan. I think most of you know we
published the campaign plan there in Augus t that shaped our way forward here throu gh
the constitutional elections (inaudible) in Decemb er of 05. Our assessment is that we are
broadly on track in helpin g the Iraqi peopl e get to those elections at the end of next year.
And ju st a couple of point s I'd like to leave with you.
First of all, the insurgency we are fightin g isn 't ten feet tall. They're tough guys. They
are the same folks that have oppressed the Iraqi peop le for 30 years. But they are not,
certainl y not invi ncible. There is no single leader. They offer no alternative positive
vision for Iraq. And as a result they are forced to violence to intimidate, particularly the
SUJUli part of the population to suppo rt them. We've seen time and aga in here where that
has blown back on them . It is not sustai nable for them . They also know that they can' t
defeat the coalition forces and they saw this in spades in Fallujah. And with the
liberation ofFalluj ah there are no longer any terrorists or insurgent safe havens anywhere
in Iraq. And so now they don 't have a place where they can go to plan and operate and
make weapons and car bomb s with impunity. Everybody 's got to be looking over their
shoulder. We think that is a significant step forward. Getting to a point where there were
no safe havens prior to the elections was one of the main elements of our plan. Anyway
these guys aren 't 10 feet tall.
Second , the Iraqi security forces are getting stronger every day. This has been a major
effort. Dave Petrae us' folks have done a wonderful job . By February there will be 70
battal ions in the Iraqi arm y including a mechanized battalion. On the police side we are
making pretty good progress with the local police. That' s a longer term project bu t we've
also had good project on the special police battalions. Six public order battalions, a
special police regiment, four commando battalions and nine regional swa t teams, all of
those guys are involved in the fight today or will be in the next month or so.
Third point I'll leave with you. Reconstruction momentum is buildin g. When we got
there in June there was about 230 proj ects from the lraq Reconstruction Fund on the
ground turning dirt . At the end of Novembe r there is over 1000. That ' s 3 billion dollars
into the Iraqi eco nomy. So that is moving forward and all against insurgent efforts to
disrupt and deny the ability to get on with reconstruction.
Fourth point, the governm ent, the Iraqi gove rnme nt is broadly accepted. They' ve got in
some polls over a 70% approv al rating. The Iraqi people have a favorab le impressio n of
their Arm y and their new police force. And by most polls about 60% of the Iraqi' s think
the country is headed in the right dir ection and they've got a positive view of the future.
Lastl y, we're broadly on track for the elections. We said when I got there we were going
to have to fight ou r way to the elections because the insurg ents want to actively deny this
because it will relegate them to a position that they are not accustomed to. The ir
accustomed to Sunni dominance of the political proces s in Iraq and irs not going to
happen. Fourteen of the eighteen provinces, there are less than 4 violent incidents a day.
The reg istration process has gon e forward in most of the country. Had problems up in
the north and out wes t in Al Anbar . The election committee is working on some
alternatives to that. But the elections in Janu ary will go forward. The insurgents will do
eve rythi ng, I believe, in their power to create a sec urity situation tbat tbey will try to
make us believe that there not possib le, but they will go forward and as a result we will
take another step forward in the process of movin g lraq onto a democracy.
I know that most of you former military folks .... boy you got a grea t arm ed forces out
tbere and you can be really proud of them . What they did in Fallujah, the soldiers,
sailors, airme n, mari nes and corpmen even, is a feat of arms. Some of you know abo ut
the difficulties of urban fighting, they took down a we ll plann ed urban defense in seven
days. Infli cted 3000 folks killed or captured on the enemy, with relatively insignificant
losses to ourselves. So magni ficent feat of arms there by a great arm ed forces. That' s it,
and I'll be happy to take your question s.
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS : Gentlemen, are there any questions out there?
KEN ALLARD: Hey George, Ken Allard. Can you tell us wha t you are looking forward
to in January in the run up to the election. Do you expect the insurgents to make a main
effort, another Fallujah , and if so how do you intend to respo nd?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Nice to hear from you Ken .
KEN ALLARD: Good to hear you back .
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: I don' t believe that there is going to be another Fallujab
nor do I think they will attempt to create another Fallujah. What we hear is that they
recognize that they cannot defeat us. And we've proven that time and time again. So I
don't th ink they will go to another Fall ujah . I think they'll operate more as classic
insurgents, small attacks, or attac ks in sma ll numbers . I do think they will try to make
_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~_n · · ·_
som e very high profile attacks before the elections. And that is what we and the Iraqi
Security Forces will be preparing for.
PAUL VALLELY : General Casey, Paul Va llely. Can you tell us a little bit about the
development of the intelligence capability for the Iraqi battalions and the Iraq i forces . Is
that progressing or where are we at on tha t, because I think that ' s essential moving them
towards some type of superior position over ther e when it comes to security.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY : Paul, you are exactly righ t. Insurgency intelligence is
the num ber on e priority. I will tell you we have wo rk to do in tha t area. Building an
Iraqi intelli gence capability is our number one priority for the next year. We have don e
some wo rk already with the Mini ster of Interior and Mini ster of Defense on their
servi ces . Mor e to do all the wa y down. as you suggest. down to the battalion level. We
are wo rking to give the Iraqi 's the capability of conducting independent counter-
insurgency operations. You can't do that without intelligence . So you will see that as a
main priority over the next year.
PAUL VALLEY: Great, thank you .
CHUCK NASH: General, Chuck Nash. Story has been running in the paper start ed
yesterday about six guardsmen from Ohio who stripped some vehicles that were off on
the side of the road . Accomplished their mission and it looks like they got court
martialled. Pretty much had the book thrown at them. There is an Ohio Senator tryi ng to
get clemency for them . Now it seemsj ust, you know, on that side of the story, and
what's being presented, that that' s something that should have and could have been
handled at a much lower level. Instead it didn 't. What part of the story are we not
getting abo ut that?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Chuck, I'm sorry, I have not heard that story. And I
do n' t know anything abo ut it.
CHUC K NASH: Okay, thank you.
COLONE L ARCHIE DAVIS: Any otber questions o ut there?
RICK FRANCONA: Ge nera l Casey, Rick Francona. Can you give us an idea of your
sense of what voter turnout might be?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Yeah, it depends, kind of, where you are in the country.
It could go as high , the y think, as about 80%. The real question .... It will be high in the
so uth and it will be high in the Kurdish areas. The real question is the Sunni
part icipation. And right now my personal guess, it will be greater than 50% of the Sunni
population that wi ll participate. Hopefully it will be much higher. But there is just no
wa y of knowing right now.
RJCK FRANCONA : Thanks.

PAUL VALLELY: Any update on reconnaissance surveillance on the borders, any
improvement that you see to stave off any of the cross-border operations that are being
conducted from Syria or Iran?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: We don't really see operation s being conducted cross-
border. We do see infiltration of foreign fighters across the borders. I think this is Paul
Vallely again, I think ...
PAUL VALLELY: Right it is George, Thanks.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: The problem is not necessari ly surveillance on the

borders . I mean, right now we 've got problems at the border crossings. With just honest
border guards that are checki ng properly the peop le's documentation. And that is
something that the Minister of Interior is working very hard with. We've actually had
some of our own Department of Border Guard folks, our own Department of Borders
over there working with the Iraqi' s in the effort to help them . But what we felt is that a
big ISR operation on the border doesn't necessarily service well when people are drivin g
through the ports of entry. So I think that would be my answer to that. Intelligence,
police and borders are my top three priorities for next year. So that is right up there.
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Next question please.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: You hit two out of three Paul.
PAUL VALLELY: Thank you.
KEN ALLARD: Yeah I've got another one. What is Dave Petraeus saying about, not
ju st the equipping of these Iraqi units but the schoo ling of them and the oper ational art,
how is their leadership looking and do you think that they are, in 2005, going to be a
force you can increasingl y tum to?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: [ will tell you that leadership has been a challenge. We
are wo rking to develop the brigade and division headqu arters. That will be a major focus
for the next year. They have j ust recently appointed the Iraqi division and brigade
commanders. So we are working with them to build their headquarters. As I said that's
our greatest challenge for the next year. Again, if you go back to the task, condu ct
independent counter-insurgency operations, you can ' t do that if you don't have brigad e
and division headquarters that can garner the intelligence, build the plans, direct the
operations. So that part of it is still to be done. What Dave has done is a magnificent job
of training and equipping Iraqi battalions. These battalions are on line and are actively
working with coa lition forces on operations. I will tell you that in each of the major
operations that we 've done, Najaf, Samarra and Fallujah, there has been progressively
more iraq i security force involvement in each of those operations. There were actually
two brigades of Iraqi' s in Falluj ah. During the operation there they fought well. And
there is now an Iraqi Division Headquarters in Falluj ah controlling two brigades. It's the
first time an Iraqi division headquarters has been in the field since the war. So mechanics
of the process going fairly well. As you suggest some of the leadership development and
staff building processes still be done, to build forces capable of independent operations.
CO LONE L ARCHIE DAVIS: Other questions.
STEVE GREER: Hey Sir, Steve Greer here. I got a question about the Madhi milit ia
and Sadr 's influence and what you think is going to happen in terms of the elections. Has
he reared his head lately or are things kind of quiet in that area.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Knock on wood he is.. . the Madhi militia has been very
quiet since Najar. I will say that Naja fis a good example of what can happen once a city
is liberated from the tyrann y of insurgents . Madhi mi litia was running rampant in Najaf
killing and murde ring people, intimidating and terrorizing the popu lation . Since we 've
completed that operation the Governor and the Iraqi Security Forces have taken charge of
Najaf. And reall y since then, it's not only Najafbut the south has gone almost quiet. I
think a lot of that has to do with the influence of the Ayatollah Sistani . That's one thing.
The second thing is we did some fairly signi ficant damage to the Muqtada militia durin g
the August time period. Now, I would say dormant. Okay. With a question mark. The
other point I'd say is in Sadr City, Fauawah (??spelling). Pete Carelli in the 1st Cav and
the Iraqi governme nt have done a wonderful j ob there using economic development as a
tool to keep the people on side and in support of the government.
COLONE L ARCHIE DAVIS : Any more questions?
RJCK FRANCONA: Yes, Genera l Casey, Rick Francona again. Are you detecting a
large influx of Iranians in the south?
GENERAL GEORGE CASE Y: I wouldn 't say necessarily a large influx of Iranians but
we and the Iraqi ' s both share a concern about Irani an influence in the south. And I do
believe that there are Iranian s coming into the south attempting to influence political
outcomes. But it' s not necessarily a large number of infiltrators, if you understand what I
mean.
RICK FRANC ONA: Right.
COLONE L ARCHIE DAVIS: Any more questions gentlemen?
COWNEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Last call for questions?
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: If there are no more questions, General Casey Sir, thank
you for taking the time to discuss operations in Iraq with us. We really appreciate it and
wish you all the best Sir.
GENERAL GEO RGE CASEY: Hey thank you all very much. I appreciate your
questions.
SPECIAL DEFENSE BRIEFING
.BRIEFER: GENERAL GEORGE CASEY, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL
FORCE IRAQ
THE PENTAGON, ARLINGTON , VIRGINIA

3:11 P.M. EST. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16. 2004
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GEN, CASEY: Hello, everybody. I think I'm self-int roducing. (l a ughter.)
Nice to see you back in Washingto n here. For t hose of yo u I don't know, I'm George Casey,
the commander of the Multin at ional Force in Iraq.
I'd like to j ust tal k to yo u a little about t he sit uat ion on t he gro und in I raq. I've been t here
almost six mo nth s now, and we've j ust completed a revi ew of t he first five month s. As I thi nk some
of you know, we developed a campaign plan in the July time period, John Negro ponte and I, with
both t he embassy sta ff and my staff, and we'v e been working to ward that ever since. And so we did
our fi rst maj or assessment here at the five-month point.
I can t ell yo u tha t I feel t hat we're bro adl y on track in helping th e Iraqi people complete their
transitio n to a constitut ionall y elect ed govemment at th e end of next year. We also believe th at this
objective is bot h realisti c and achievable.
Now I r ecognize th at t hat ma y not be an im pression that we all share here, and I by no means
wan t to give you th e impression th at thi s pro cess is going to be uncon te sted or viol ence-free. That 's
not going to be th e case.
But as we have seen in Naj af, in Tall Afar, in 5amarra and in 5adr City, t he Iraqi people are
fighting to throw off the mantle of terror and intimidati on, so th at th ey can elect t heir own
govern ment and build a better life for th e I raqi people.
Th ere Is progress across Iraq every day, and every day we and our Iraqi part ners are a ste p
closer to accomplishing our objecti ves.
Now let me j ust make a couple of points wit h yo u. First of all, th e insurgency that we'r e
figh t ing is not 10 feet tall. They'r e a tough , aggressive enem y, but th ey' re not 10 feet t all. They're
t he same peopl e who have oppressed th e Iraqi people fo r th e last 30 yea rs. They're th e reason th at
over a million I raq is are mi ssing and why probabl y several hundred th ou sand of th ose missing I raqis
are likely in mass gr aves aro und Iraq. They' re focused on th eir ret urn to dominance, so t hat th ey
can continue to plu nder t he great natural resources of Iraq. They offer no alternati ve vision. They
offer only intim idation and subj ugat ion.
With the win in Fallujah, with th e liberati on of Fallujah, th ey no longer have any safe havens
any where in I raq. And also, as a result of th e success in Falluj ah , it was drive n hom e to t hem th at
th ey cannot defeat th e coalitio n for ces.
50 th ey 're attacking our will and th e will of th e Iraqi people , and I personally do not believe
that th ey will defeat th e ind omitable spiri t of 25 million fr ee people who want to build a better life
fo r them selves and for th eir famili es.
second point; The Iraqi security forces are getting st ronger every day. Our plan to build t he
I raqi military and police forces is broadl y on tra ck. By February there will be 70 trained and
equipped battalions In the Iraqi army; one of those will be a mechanized infant ry batta lion.
Progress has also been made in the police and special police for ces. By Febru ary the re will be
six public order battalions, a special police regim ent , fou r police commando battalions and some
nine regional SWAT team s -- special weapons and tactics te ams nall of them contributing to the
fight against the Insurgents and the terrorists on a day-to-day basis. As most of you know, we still
have a way to go In th is area, but as I said, we're broadl y on tra ck and generally very pleased with
the performance of the Iraqi security forces.
Th jrd po jnt ; Reconstructio n momentum is bUilding . In June there were only around 230
proj ects actua lly what we call turning dirt, actua lly start ed, on the gr ound . By the end of Novembe r
there were over 1,000 , with a value of over $3 billion. All of th is in spite of insurgents' efforts to
disrupt the reconstruct ion process. This is a great tribute to the folks that work on tho se proj ects,
particularly In the embassy and the coalition businessmen and women who are over there working
to build a better I raq.
fourth po int; The interim governm ent and th eir security forces are broadly accepted by the
Iraqi people. Some poll ratings for the government are as high as 70 percent appro val rati ng. The
Iraqi people express a generally favorable opinion about their new arm y and about their police, and
more than 60 percent of Ira qis believe that the country Is headed In the right direction and the y are
optimistic about their fu ture.
We're also broadl y on track for the electi ons. Fourteen of the 18 provinces have less t han -.
four or less mctdents of Violence a day, and the registrati on process in most of the country was
executed . The Iraqi election committee is working on some alternative solutions for the two areas of
the country In which it was disrupted .
I wa nt t o be cl ear ; The insurgents and t he terrorists will continue to attack and attempt to
disrupt th e election process. And we see that dally. They won't succeed. And the elections in
January will then be but anot her step forw ard in our relentl ess progress to ward a new Iraq.
Now if I could just say a word to the home audience here In the United States. As a nation you
can take great pride in the ro le t hat our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marin es are playing in helping
bulld a new, a better I raq. Each and every one of them recognizes the Importance that successfully
accompli shing t his mission holds for our own security, and each and every one of t hem makes a
difference every day . Wherev er I go I see their acts of bravery, ccmpesslon and selflessness, and I
couldn't be prouder of t hese wonderful men and women.
Our success to dat e Is also a tribute to t he great men and women of t he I raqi security forces
and th e coalitio n who have given their lives t o defeat terrorism and to help t he I raqis t o help build a
new I raq. We grieve wit h the loved ones of all our serv ice members and wit h those of Iraqi service
members who have died.
We are humbled by their sacrifice and th eir contribution In bringing fr eedom to Iraq, and we
ar e hum bled by their sacrifi ce in enhancing the security of the Unit ed States and the coalitio n.
Lastly, we are, especially during the holiday season, also deeply tha nk ful for the love and
support of our famili es and loved ones, whose sacrifices and strength underpin everything that we
do.
Progress towards a constitutionally elected govern ment will not be easy . Nothing worthwhile
ever is. But the challenge of helping the people of I raq build a better future is one that the I raqi
people in the armed for ces of 30 freed om-loving countries can tak e on.
So thank you very moen, and I'll take your questions.

.2 General, based at least partly on the candidates the Shl' a are offeri ng, are you concerned
on what Influe nce I ran may have ov er the Iraqi govern ment afte r the January election?
GEN, CASEY; I missed th e very first part of your questi on.
.2 Based at least in part on wha t candidates the Shl'a are offering, are you concerne d about
the possible influence that Iran m ight have on the I raqi government after the electio n?
GEN. CASEY ; My persona l view" and th is is politica l, but I'm here every day and I'll give you
just my personal view. I don't see substa ntial I ranian Influence on th is particular government tha t
will be elected In January. I see I ran as more of a 10ngeHerm threat to Iraqi security. But th at 's
just n that's my view, and from .. I'm a mil itary person who 's j ust who 's there.
n
.2 You mean n from a longer view, are you tal king about a possible military attack as opposed
to politica l?
GEN. CASEY; No, I don't -- I'm not ta lking about that. I'm j ust saying from a stratearc
perspective, I raq is a long -term th reat to stability -- I 'm sorry, Iran Is a long-term threat to sta bility
In Iraq . If you look on the other side, I th ink Syria is a short-term threat because of the support
they provide to the former Ba'ath lst leaders that we see operati ng In and out of Syri a.
.2 Thank you, General.
.2 General, you ta lked about how the government is considering alternative solut ions in some
of th ose Sunni Tria ngle areas where rectstreucn is a problem. As I understand It, one of those is
holding election s over a longer period of tim e; more tha n one day, in other words . What's your
assessment of the security situation In doing them ? Doesn't th at j ust give a longer period of time for
pote ntia l attacks by Insurgents ? And also could you te ll us what the America n role is In security of
t hose elect ion sites?
GEN. CA SEY; I do not thin k the extended electi on period Is still on the table. I know that was
discussed, but I've discussed it with some of the leadership in t he I raqi govem ment. I don't believe
it's on the tab le anymore, at least It wasn' t when I left.
We are working closely with the Ministry of Inter ior and th e Iraqi elect ion committee
(SIC/commission) In build ing the security plan for the elections.
I t 's not finally formed yet. It will be probab ly by the end of thi s mon th . In general the role of
th e ccaunon forces will be one of broad -a rea security, and it will be th e Iraqi security for ces that will
work th e specifics of t he polling areas and places like th at .
.2 General , how concerned are you that the s unnrs will not part icipat e or not tum out in
numbers sufficient in t his election, not only because of the security situation, but simply because of
disaffection? And if t hey do, what does t hat mean?
GEN, CA SEY ; Again, I wish n my political consultan t, John Negropont e, could probab ly do a
better job on th is one. My view is -. I 'll give you my opinio n. My opinion is that th ere will be Sunnl
participation In this In a reasonable amount . I believe th at th e insurgents are pursu ing a strategy I
call purposeful disenfranchisemen t by intimidati ng Sunnls away fro m the election process so th ey
can say, ~Well, t he Sunnis didn't vote , so the refo re the electi on Is I nva lJd. ~ 1 don 't think tha t's gOing
to be a successful strategy, but it 's one that th ey' re try ing to Implemen t . So I th ink th ere will be
sufficient Sunnl participati on in this for people to accept the fact that it Is a reasonabl y free and fair
election.
2. You talked about at th e pollin g places it would largely be Iraqi security forces . There 's what,
9 ,000 polling places?
GEN. CASEY; It's undet ermined. Somew here between 6(,000) and 9(,000); 9(,000) is th e
hig h end.
.Q And when you look at the nu mber of Iraqi security forces, it seems like t here wouldn't be
very many Iraqi security forces. If you could ta lk about t hat, th e nu mbers at t hose polling places.
And I know you don't want to be too specifi c on t hat, but if you'll give us more detail about what the
America ns will do. Maybe sort of rapid reacti on? What?
GEN. CASEY; Again, we're still worki ng t hrough t he process, but it's like any type of security
sit uation. If you want to guard, you don' t guard every place just at t he point . You guard it away
from th e point. You restrict access to it. You keep vehicles from mo ving in th e directi on of the
polling places aroun d it . I mean, th ere's a range of opt ions t hat you do to reduce expo sure of these
particular sites, rat her than j ust tak ing 20 to 30 people and huddling arou nd the site itse lf. That's
being worked out.
My experience with elections in t he past, in Bosnia and xoscvo, again t he forces of the
coalition, the security forces norm ally operate away from t he polling sites in an area security role
and do provide reaction force if th ere's problems.
And t he ot her th ing we do and we will do and are doing is to conti nue t o conduct operations
prior t o t he elect ions to disru pt th e insurgents and to keep them from disru pting th e election
process. 50 the re's an offens ive compo nent to th is as well .
.Q General, you ta lk abou t th e progress in security across Iraq. It seems t hat t hat airport road
is a symbo l of what many people say is a growing insurgency. What is t he story with that road? And
why can't U.S. and I raqi forces patro l it effectively to sto p t he attacks th at are happening on It?
GEN, CASEY; I wouldn't necessarily see it as a sym bol of a growing Insurgency , I would see it
as a symbol of th e growing use of car bombs in t he insurg ency . And t hat real ~y is the quest ion of
th e airport road . It's a tactic that's been adopt ed by th e insurgents , They don't have to do m uch. A
car bomb a day in Baghdad or on the airport road sends a sym bol t hat th e insurgency is very
powerful, when In actuality I don 't believe th at t hey are. It's a classic tec hnique of t he urban
insu rgent . They are trying to provo ke us to do something that will make us look like we're
overreact ing to t hem.
I mean, you could t ie up tra ffic -- I mean, if you searched every car getting on t he airpo rt
road, you'd put th at part of Baghdad in knot s. 50 it really is t he issue of dealing with car bombs. We
cont inually work on t hat. And we will get -- we will get to a point where th e airport road is secure
and our people and th e people in t he embassy are protected against car bombs. But as wit h any
battl e, it's an ectton-reacttcn-cc unte rectron cycle th at we go through wit h th e enemy and the enemy
does to us.
.Q So is the re a plan for th at road or just a broader plan for attacking t he te rrorists and their
ability to make car bombs?
GEN, CASEY; I t 's a little bit of each, but we're actively worki ng wit h th e minister of Interior
and his traffi c forc es on ways to reduce th e threat s to our forces on t he airport road.
.Q. Sir?
GEN. CASEY; Behind you, and I'll come back.
.Q Yes, General. This is Drew Brown with Knight Ridder. I know you addressed this in your
opening rema rks, but in your view, are we winning in I raq? And how do you define winning? And as
a follow- up, do you believe, give n t he current situation th ere, that credible nat ional elections will be
held or could be held or are possible to be held by January 30th?
GEN. CASEY; My view of winning is tha t we are broad ly on t rack t o accomplishing our
obje ct ives, which is a constituti onally elect ed govemment t hat Is representat ive of all the I raqi
people and with I raqi security forces that are capable of maintaining domest ic order and denying
I raq as a safe haven for t error. And I believe we will get there by th e end of December '05, and I
believe we are on track to get the re by Decem ber of 'OS .
What was t he second part?
.2 About the elections, do you think that .-
GEN . CASE Y; I do.
.Q. n given the situation, it's -- th at cred ible elections will be held on January 30th?
GEN , CASEY; I do. I mean, it is going to be hard . They will fight us every st ep of the way. But
I do believe electio ns are -- credible elections can be held. I mean , again, in th e south and in the
nort h, 14 of those 18 provinces, my what I believe is that they will be unevent ful. They will be
u
contested in the cente r area of the country, but I believe th at we will succeed in that.
.Q. As a fi nal final questi on, how do you -- how do you

n what do you tell the fam ilies of
u
servic emen who have been killed and maimed over the re ? How do define victory in Iraq, ultimate
victory to these people who are losing t heir loved ones?
GEN , CASEY; I think I j ust did. But what I'd say to th e fam ilies is what I said in my opening
statement . These soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marine s tha t have died over there have given their
lives to help 25 m illion Iraqis build a better life and to Improve the security of the United Sta tes and
th e coalition .
And th ese young men and women went over th ere knowi ng th at would be a possibility, and
God bless th em . That 's what makes th is country great.
.Q. I'm curious. Could you elaborate a little bit more on th e sit uat ion up along that border?
There was supposed to be a joint border commi ttee th at was meetin g to work out the cress-border
t raffic. Has that fallen apart?
And would you also address down In the sout h, It's my understand you all are sti ll holding
some nu mber of Muja hldeen-e-khalq at a camp down near Kuwai t. What' s their stat us? How many
are t here? And what's going to finally happen to th em? And when?
GEN. CASEY; Last part first. That's more up north . There ar e my last recollection Is that
n
th ere was about 3,000 MEK folks still the re at a camp, th at we are worki ng the ir process with the
Red Cross. I do not have a timeline of when that process will be completed .
.Q. So what will happ en to them?
GEN . CASEY ; Their ultimate disposition , where t hey"
.Q. Where are the y going to go?
GEN . CASEY; Almost every one of the m has a different story, so it's a vari ety of different
places.
I 'm sorry, what was your first?
.Q. And the first one is, what 's going on at the Syrian border? You had a commi ttee that was
looki ng at th at .
GEN. CASEY; Oh. There was a meeting . That process is conti nuing. I will tell you, my
personal view is th e Syri ans are mak ing some efforts on th e border, but th ey'r e not going after th e
big fish, whIch is really the people tha t we're interested In. And we're really inte rested in th em going
aft er t he senior Ba'athlsts that are providing t he di recti on and finan cIng for th e Insurgency inside
Iraq . That's what we're realty like to see th em do.
.Q. Because you guys obv iously can't cross th e border to go aft er th em .
GEN, CASEY; Right .
.Q. Yeah, your em phasis on t he elections is making them shape into a falriy decisive eleme nt of
the entire campaign. What would be th e consequences if they are successfully disrupted by th e
insurgents ? What's at stake here?
GEN. CASEY; I t has been an important inte rmediate step in our campai gn plan since we
started this . But it is a step in the process. You're asking me a hypothetical . I don't really know the
answer to tha t.
2 Well, you plan for failure.
GEN, CASEY; Well, you also -- you plan for success. I really don 't have a good answer to
that , and I'd rath er not get into a hypoth et ical situ ati on.
2 All right , you had said that wit h th e fall of Fallujah for th e insurge nts, th ey don't have a safe
house Inside the country anymore . Mosul, since Falluj ah has seen a lot of tr ouble up there, what is
th e status of Mosul now? And do you thi nk th at Is becom ing a safe haven for insurgen ts? And what
are you doing to try to alleviat e th e ongoing problem up t here?
GEN, CASEY; l et me ta lk about safe haven for a minute, what I mean when I say safe haven.
For me, a safe haven is a place where insurgents and te rrorists can go and plan, and build
improv ised explosive devices, and bring in recru its and receive th em in, give th em trai ning, lin k
th em up with operatio ns, sta ge for operat ions, rehearse operat ions, wit h impunity .
And that 's what th ey had in Falluj ah, and th at' s what t hey don't have anymore. That's what
th ey had in Samarra for a while . They don't have that .. (inaudible). That' s what t he Muqtada militia
had In Najaf. They don't have t hat anymore .
So th ey' ve lost th e ability to operate any place wit h impunity . So what 's going on in Mosul, in
my view, Is not a safe haven. It's an area where Insurgents have gone and have had some success
against t he local security forces.
Now our folks, operat ing with additional I raqi security forces, have restored the sta tus quo.
But I will tell you more wor k needs to be done the re t o Impro ve the security situation prior to
electi ons, and it will be done.
2 General Casey n
2 I'm sorry . Could I j ust follow up? Do you see at all tha t Mosul is becoming a safe haven? I s
the re an effort at all, any intelligence tha t shows tha t th ese folks have act ually start ed moving into
Mosul and the y'll make th at kind of th eir Falluj ah?
GEN, CASEY; I see no evidence th at the terrorists are try ing to make Mosul a safe haven as I
define "sere haven. ~ It is cert ainly an area where t hey are operati ng and attem pti ng to disrup t th e
electio n pr ocess and the coaliti on and IraqI security force operat ions, but not a safe haven.
.Q. Genera l Casey, if you -- if indeed, as you say, t he te rro rists and Insurg ents have lost the
ability to operate with im punity, they've lost th eir safe haven s, then how do you explain th e fact
that they continue to take such a toll , to be so effecti ve again st the Multinational Forces?
And what -- a second question -- what , if anything, will th e Multina ti onal Force be doing
differently between now and January 30th to improve the situation and instill confidence in the I raqi
people that the y can safely go to the polls and vot e?
GEN. CASEY; To be clear, I said that the y could operate with Im punity inside the safe haven .
They are clearly operating elsewhere around Iraq.
Now th ese levels of violence since Falluja h have dropped dramati cally . And the y are actually
now down at th e lev els pri or t o Ramadan and really right where -- back where we were at transfer
of sovereignty. So th e level s of violence have come way down.
I do not n they are not necessari ly operati ng effecti vely against coalition for ces. I n fact, when
we look back, the numbers of attacks don't necessanlv produce a very high volume of casualties . I n
fact, a lot of th e attacks are in fact ineffect ive against coalition forc es. They are frankly more
successful against civ ilians and in some cases against I raqi security forces.
.Q. And th e second part of the question . What , If anything, will you be doing differently between
now and th e end of January to do --
GEN. CASEY; Oh, yeah.
.Q. -- in spite of all this, instill t he confidence to the Iraqi people that the y can safely go to the
polls and vote?
GEN. CASEY; That 's a great question . We -- I th ink you know a few weeks ago I asked for
some additional forces before the election period. We felt we needed to keep up the momentu m, to
keep th e pressure on t he Insurgents that moved away from Falluj ah after the Fallujah operation
t ook place. And t hose forces are going to help us bot h keep the pressure on th em and the n get a
more secure envi ronment prior to the elections.
The other thing that's happening now is, as I ment ioned, t he I raqi security forces are
graduating. They'r e com ing out of their t raining. And we'r e .. 18 of th ose 27 battalion s are on line,
and I th ink 12 of th em have come on line in about th e last 45 days.
And so th ey are now available to enhance security across Iraq,
Pollee continue to graduate . We cont inue to crank out the police comma ndo battalion. So there
will be a concert ed effort across Iraq, particular ly in the greater Baghdad area and the Mosut area
and in the AI Anbar provi nce, all the way up to January 30th .
.Q. You said In your opening statement you were generally pleased with t heir performa nce.
That doesn't sound like a ring ing endorsement.
GEN. CASEY; I said we are generally pleased with t heir performance. Everybody knows th ere
have been instances -- M05Ul is a good examp le -- where the police colla psed. But the re are 12
pro vinces where the pollee are doing very well every day. So it's a mi xed bag, but we're generally
pleased.
The forces in Fallujeh -- the I raqi battalions th at fought in Falluj ah did very well. And they'll
become th e center, really, I th ink, of what the Iraqi Arm y becomes.
Eric?
.2 General, the Arm y Reserve and th e Arm y National Guard have m issed th eir recrui ting goals
the last tw o months. The National Guard is announcing new Incent ives for that. Given the fact tha t
the Guard and Reserve represent about 40 percent of your forces over there and will conti nue to
rema in an Im portant part u a source of your troops In the im mediate future, how concerned are you
th at man y of th ese acti ve duty forces who would norma lly flow Int o the Reserve and Guard are not
doing so because t hey don't want to have to go back to places like I raq and Afghan istan ? How big a
concern Is tha t to you as th e commander of forces on the gr ound th ere?
GEN. CASEY; Frankly, it's not someth ing I 've th ought about deeply In about six months u
when I was th e vice chief. But dearly a good flow of active forces Int o the Guard and Reserve is
somet hing that will benefit th e Arm y, the Guard and Reserve over the long hauL And again, I
haven't th ou ght about it in a while th ere, but It's somethi ng I th ink we need to pay attention to and
cont inue to encourage and maybe incentivize active forces to cont inue to move into the Guard and
Reserv e.
.2 Genera l Casey, could I ask you a questi on about th e level of sectarian violen ce? Do you
th ink it's on the rise? There have been several lnddents recently the bomb ing yeste rday against
u
th e Shl'a and bom bing of a bus load of Kurdish militiamen up In reosut. How do you assess that
aspect of the insurgency?
GEN. CASEY; I would not assess th at th ere is a high or serio usly incre asingly level of
sectari an violence at th is ti me. There are dea rly incidents . It is a troublesome trend, and it is one
that we will continue to watch closely .
.2 What do you think th e source of it is? Is thi s I mean , Zarqawi in his fam ous letter talked
n
about trying to fome nt Just thi s sort of thing . Do you th ink tha t' s where th ese thin gs are --
GEN, CASEY ; I wouldn't want t o guess on that. But you've quoted a pote nti al source.
Go ahead.
.2 General, you said a few times th at th ings are broadly on track. But now that you've been
there six months, can you give us any specific areas where you had hoped to be further along than
you are at this point ?
GEN , CASEY; Fair qu estion, because t he analysis t hat we did did look at th at . I'll tell you, I
would have hoped we had been further along on th e Iraqi .- helping t he Iraqi uparticularly the
mini stries I'm concerned With, Ministry of Int erior, Ministry of Defense .. in building th eir
intelligence serv ices up.
We're work ing counteri nsurgency. Intelligen ce Is key t o that. And what we've said, and what
we've seen to some degree but not th e extent that I think we can If we build these effective
Int elligence service s, Is tha t we benefit from what the Iraqis know about t hem selves. So that's going
to be one of our main prtortnes for the next year.
The second major t hing that we'll be working on for next year Is th e local police. We are
contl nuino t o tra in folks. We've adapted the ir training program to mak e t hem more able to operate
In a counterinsurgency environment. You know, the cop on th e beat doesn't normally necessarily
th ink he's going to get attacked by a carload of gu ys. They need to have some paramilitary-type
skills so they can defend and protect the mselves and operate In a counteri nsurgency environment .
So that's the second point.
Third point Is I think we've got to do more work on the bord ers and on th e border guards, and
that will be another focus for the next year.
.2 General, I want t o go back to one th ing you said about the insurgency, t hat th ey're not 10
feet ta ll. That's a statement that's been used in th e past to describe th e Soviet Union soldier, the
Viet Cong, and yet we had troub le in Vietna m and it was stru ng out a long tim e. What is your best
int elligence about th e resiliency of t he insurgency, its ability t o reconstitute? (Inaudi ble) -- you can
cut off a lot of tails but you got to get at the head.
GEN. CASEY; Oh, absolutely .
2 Should the American public and t he Iraqi publi c expect this insurgency just to go on in some
form for quite a while no m atter what happen s January 30th?
GEN. CASEY: I t hink we ought to be clear that when th ey have the elect ions on th e 30th of
January , th e insurgency's not going to go away . I mean, you mentioned some othe r cases, but if
you look at th e histo ry of insurg encies, th ese areprot racted events. They go on for a long tim e.
Now, th ey won't necessaril y go on at th e same level and the y won' t necessarily go on at a level
where it will require 150,000 Ameri can troops, especially when we're creatin g Iraqi security forces
th at we'll work wit h over t he next year to help th em build independent counte rinsurgenc y capability,
but insurgencies generally go on for a long period of time, and I thin k you'd expect to see t he
insurgency in I raq go on at some level for a long time.
2 They seem to be more sophisticated. I heard th at th ere was command and contro l
sophist icatio n or th e attacks seemed to have picked up. It doesn't seem to be getting less
sophist icated, but even more as you kill a lot of t hem.
GEN. CASEY; We are seeing military capabil iti es. I wouldn't say necessaril y sophisticate d, but
we are seeing military capabilities in platoon -size attacks th at we had not necessaril y seen before.
But for th em to cond uct an attack lik e tha t tak es a lot of th eir t ime and th eir effo rt, and we're not
seeing a lot of these.
2 Gener al, could you j ust clarify your state men t on Syri a, what your concerns are about their
role in t he insurg ency or perhaps t he goin g and comi ng of foreign terrori st s across th at border ?
GEN. CASEY : I have two concerns with Syria. One, as you suggest, is foreign fighte rs. And we
see a facilitati on mode through Syria, foreign fighte rs coming into Iraq. I do not see direct Syri an
govern ment involvem ent in t hat facilitati on, but It is coming through Syri a. And I do believe th at
t hey have the capability to st op it if th ey had t he will to sto p it .
The second point is we have fairly good information that t here are senior former Be'at hfsts,
members of tha t they call th e New Regional Comm and, operating out of Syria wit h impunity and
pr OViding dire ction and fina ncing for t he insurg ency in Iraq . And th at needs t o stop.
2 I s al-D ourl one of t hem?
GEN. CASEY; He's back and n he's a back and forther. He's not necessarily in th ere.
2 General, could you -- just a quick n
STAFF: Let's make this ~ - let 's make th is th e last one, Genera l.
2 can I do a qutck , you know, questi on on .. you said t o Kathleen (sp) th at t he I raqi security
forces are perfo rming well in 12 of t he provinces in your own -- right? But one of t he things you also
say is t hat 14 of th e provinces are in pretty good shape. So it would seem th at In those 12
prov inces th ey haven't really been tested. I presume before Mosul happ ened, before the most
recent Violence, you probably th ought th ose Iraqi security forces were perform ing well. I mean,
th ey're the retrained Iraqi security forces. So if th ey haven't been tested yet, aren't t here still
concerns about how th ey would do? I mean, I guess yeste rday in Samar ra a police station was
attacked and not a shot was fired , and th ey also left th e area.
GEN . CASEY: The 12 or 16 provin ces, what I meant, tho se were police, not necessarily all
I raqi security forces. Just police. And whether or not they' ve been tested, some of t hem have. In
the south, du ring the Muqtada m ilit ia attacks, there were several pollee stations th at were attacked
fairl y heavily, particularly the one in Kut for example, and t hey did fight very well. But there is
something to wha t yo u're saying about untested .
Now in Mosul, we have seen problem s wit h th e police in Mosul over a period of time. And so
the fact that all of t hem collapsed at the same tim e was a surprise. The fact tha t they had a chief of
police who wa s not very effecti ve and who man y believe wa s corrupt -- that problem up there had
been gOing on for a longer period of time, so it wasn't a com plete shock.
Usten, th ank yo u all very mu ch. Come over here and see us.
STAFF; Th ank you all for attending .
.Q. (Off mike) n are th ey commanding, actu ally, t he insurgency , this new regional com mand
out of ..
ST A Ff; No, that's th eir name.
.Q. That's what they call th emselves .
GEN. CASEY; Thank you.
II Than k yo u, General.
END.
From : ~r:l':::~=:!. CDR. OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, Decem ber 17, 20041 2:25 PM
To : Haddock, Ellen (Katie ), Col, OCJC SIPA ~~====b
Cc : Rhyneda nce , Geor e, COL, OASD·PA; Da vis Archie Col, OASO-PA; ~ IV
OASD-PA; OASD·PA; ~CD R . OCJCSlPA
Subjec t: RE: TPs from Ca sey for review ' - - - - -...
Col ,
t hese TP a re very t ho rough a nd ext e nsive. I know we discussed possibly t hr eadi ng s ome of
yest erday 's PC s emina r the me s i nt o the m, bu t I have no t received the "b l es sed- feedback
ye t f r om the J 5 folks.
I t hi nk we s hou l d let these stand on t hei r own and perhaps f or nex t Tues pres s conf e r e nce
with SD/CJCS, t hey could use some o f the PC seminar theme s .
VR
> - - - -- Ori
>From: ~::
~
e~s~s~":=:;:=1 OABO-PA
>Se n t : Fri day, December 17 , 2004 12 : 04 Pi!~~::::::::::]
>To: Haddock , El l e n (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS /PA; LeDR, OCJCS/PA;
CDR , OCJCS! PA
>Cc: Rhynedance, George , COL, OABD- PA; Da vis , Archie , Co l, OASO - PA;
....,.;_~===~ ......
CI V OABD- PA ' - - - - - - - -...
>Subjec t : TPs f r om Casey f o r r e vi e w
>
>All:
>
>At t a c hed ple a s e f i nd the fi rs t draft o f talki ng poi nts o f f Gen. Casey' s b ri efing s .
>
>The sourc es are att ached - (1) t r a nscript o f Cas ey 's pre ss e r yes terday a nd (2) t r a ns c r i pt
from Bonnie Sci arretto in Ar chie 's shop o f Casey's b ri efi ng (phone ) to the mili t ary
a na l y s t s .
>
>1 '11 s tand by and wait for d i r e c t i ons .
> « File : TP 12 - 17 - 04 Ge n. Cas e y I r aq upda t e . doc »

>
> « Fi l e : 12 -16 -0 4 Cas e y with mil a na l yst s .doc »
>
> « File : 12 -1 6 - 04 Casey Pe ntagon pr esser . doc »
1
From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
Sent: Frida December 17, 2004 12:36 PM
To : CDR. OCJCSlPA
Cc: Rhynedance. Gear e COL OASD-PA; Davis Archie Col, OASD-PA; !::-:~ -,'C IV
OASD·PA OASD·PA LCDR. OCJCSIPA
Subject: RE: TPs from Casey for review
~::;::!:.~t hanks . Sounds like a p lan t o me.

Th e s e look g re at. Recommend you l a unc h t h e m, an d we ' l l a dd i n t o t h e p r ess c onf
a nyth i ng more we g et e arl y next week.
Th a nks for y o u r hard wor k .
VI R
Co l H
> - : -- - Or i g ·
>From: CDR , OCJCS/ PA
>Sent : Fr i d a y . De c e mbe r 17 , 2 004 1 2: 25 PM
>To: Ha d do c k , Ell en (Kat i e) . Co l , OCJCS/ PA
>Cc : Rhyned , OASD-PA- Davis Ar c h ie Col , OAS D - PA ; .'---------------~
CIV OASD-PA ; OASD- PA; LCDR , OCJCS/ PA
>Sub ject: RE: TPs f r o m Ca sey for rev i e w
>
-cei •
>t h es e TP a r e v e ry t h orough a nd extens i ve . I know we d is c u ss e d po s sibly t h r e a d i ng some o f
y es t e r d ay's PC semi na r the mes int o t h em, b u t I h a v e no t received the "b l e s s e d " feedba c k
ye t f r om t he J5 fol k s .
>1 t hi nk we shou ld l e t t h e s e s t a nd on t he i r own and p erh aps f o r next Tue s p r ess c onfe renc e
wi th SD/CJCS , the y could us e s ome o f t he PC semin a r t heme s .
>VR
>
>
> -- - -: -origii~n~t;~~~~~~:;!. OASD -PA
From
> Sent : Friday, De c ember 17 , 2 004 1 2 :0 4 PM
~
~>::~~:=~ addoc k , Ellen (Kati e ), Col , OCJCS/ PA; LCDR, OCJCS / PA;
CDR, OCJ CS/ PA
> Cc : Rhyne dan c e , Geo rge , COL, OASD -PA; Da v i s, Ar c h i e , Col , OASD-PA;
a;;;;;,.._-\,CI V OASD- PA L. .....
> ub jec t: TPs f r om Casey f o r r e v i e w
>
> Al l:
>
> At t a c h ed p l e a s e fi nd t h e f irst dra f t o f t al k ing p o i nt s off Ge n . Cas e y ' s b ri e f i ng s .
>
> The s ou rces a r e at tac hed - (1 ) t r ans cr i p t o f c ase y 's p re s s e r yes t erday a nd (2)
tran s c rip t from Bo nnie Sci a r r e t to i n Arch i e's s hop o f Ca s e y ' s bri e fi ng (p hon e) t o t h e
mi l ita ry ana lysts .
>
> I ' l l stand by and wa i t for d ire c t i ons .
>
>
>
> « Fi l e: TP 1 2-1 7 - 04 Gen. Ca s ey I raq update .doc »
>
> « File : 1 2 -16 -04 Ca sey wi t h mil analysts .doc »
>
> « File : 12-16 -0 4 Casey Pe n t agon pres s e r . do c »
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS!PA
Sent : Thursda ,Janua 06, 20057:40 PM
To :
Cc:
u cci. JCS SJS
COL. JCS VCJCS;
"')(8)..-- - - '- IV. JCS VCJCS; Thorp. Frank. CAPT,
OCJCS/PA CIV.OCJCS/PA
Subject: MOH Recipients to CENTCOM AOR
Jack Jocobs, a r etired Ar my colonel , military analyst -- a nd Medal o f Honor r e cipient is

organizing a group o f a handful of Meda l of Hono r r ecipients who are interested in go i ng
to Iraq and Afghanistan to v isit with the t roops, t o offer encouragement a nd motivation .
He is an acquaintance of Gen Pace 's, and ha s asked him for h is input on how t o proceed .
Gen Pace asked me to ge t with Legal to see what, if any, support we mi ght be able to
provide. Could t hese guy s travel via mili tary aircraft, would the Chai rman a nd/or Vice
have to accompany them, could they be worked into a "USO" type show, or ????
At your convenience , I would like to discuss this wi t h you, a nd get your input on how best
to proceed .
Thanks for your he lp ,
ViR
Col H
1
Sent : jOY.o"laDiU"C~. 2005 7:04 AM
To: ltCol , JCS SJS
Subj ect : ""''''''il<1'''''''e=,p!.!
c lents.to CENTCOM AOR
Tha t's fi n e.
J u s t wanted t o get i t o n yo u r s cop e (b e fo r e i t f ell ou t o f my bra i n altoge t h er. ) Vi R Col H
--- --Orig ~~~~~~~;~=!

;> From; I Lt Co l , J CS SJ S
;>Se n t : Fr ida y , Jan uary 07, 200 5 6; 06 AM
;>To; Haddock , Bl le n ( Kat i e ) , Col , OCJCS /PA
;>subj e c t ; RE ; MOH Rec ipients t o CENTCOM AOR
>
;>Ma ' a m,
>
;>1 probably won 't ha v e a chance t o get to t h i s unt il next wek .
>
;>v / r
>
> -----Orig i na l Message-----
> From: Ha ddock. El len (Ka t i e ) , Col , OCJCS/PA
> Se nt : Thu rsda Janua 06 , 2095 7 : 40 PM
>
> To ::
Cc Lt Col,JCS
COL, JCS SJS ~~~;;;;;,;:::===] CI V, J CS VCJ CS; Tho rp,
VCJCSi
Frank , CAPT , OCJCS! PA; CIV, OCJC S PA
> Subje c t: MOR Re c ipient s t o CENTCOM AOR
>
>
>
> Jack Jacobs, a r e t i r e d Army co lonel, mil itary a nalyst -- a nd Medal of Honor
rec ip ient i s organiz ing a group of a handfu l o f Medal of Hon or rec ipients who are
interested in going to Iraq and Af ghanistan t o vis i t with t he troops, to of fer
encouragement and motivation. He i s a n acquaintanc e of Gen Pa c e 's , and ha s as ked him f or
h is i nput on how t o proceed.
>
;> Ce n Pa c e a sked me t o get wi t h Le gal to see what, i f any, support we mi g h t b e a ble to
provide . Coul d the se guys trave l v i a mi l i t a r y ai r c ra ft, woul d the Chairman and / o r Vice
have to a ccompany t hem , cou ld t hey be worked i n t o a "U50" type show, or ????
>
;> At y our c onv e n i e nce , I wou ld like to d i s cus s this wit h y o u , and ge t y our input o n
how b est to pro c e ed .
;> Thanks f o r you r help,
;> Vi R
;> Col H
1
",-,
From: ~ ICol, JCS SJS
Sent: W ednesday, Janu ary 12, 2005 10:21 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) , Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: MOH Recipients 10 CENTCOM AOR

Ma 'am,
> -----Orig ina l Message-----

>Fr om: Ha ddoc k , El l e n (Katie), col, OCJCS/PA
>Se nt : Thu r s da J a nua r y 06, 2 005 7:40 PM
:>To: )(8) Lt Col, J CS SJS ........ ,
»cc r COL JCS VCJCS; ";.';;':<7;;;;- - - - ..... CIV, JC S VCJCS ; Tho rp , Frank ,
CAPT , OCJCS PA, CIV, OCJCS/PA
:>Subj ect: MOR Recipients t o CENTCOM AOR
>
>Jack Jacobs, a re ti r ed Army colonel , military a na l y st -- a n d Medal of Hon or rec ipien t is
organi zi ng a group of a handful of Me da l of Honor recipi e nts who are i nte r este~ i n going
to Iraq and Af ghani s tan t o visit wi t h the troops, t o off e r encoura ge ment and mo t i va t i on .
He is a n acqua int a nce o f Gen Pace 's , a nd has aske d hi m for h i s inpu t on how to proceed .
>
>Gen Pace a s ked me to get wi t h Legal to see wha t, if a ny, support we might be able to
p r ov i de . Could t he s e guys trav e l via mi l i t a r y aircraft, woul d t he Chai rman a nd / or Vi ce
ha ve to accompa ny them, could t hey be worke d into a " USO" t ype show, or ? ?? ?
>
>At your convenience, I woul d l ike t o di s c u s s th is wi th you , a nd get your i nput on ho w
bes t to proceed.
>Thanks for your help,
>V/R
>Col H
1
From : AFIS-HQ/PIA l(Il)
Sent : """:T~ue~S~da~y~,":'F~eb~l1J~a~~~01 , 2005 5:!:'31~PM
:":""------"'"
To: larry.dirita Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman,
B an SES OASD-PA
Cc:
addock....Co loop~ le .
Merritt, Roxie T.
CAPT ,OASD-PA
Rh edance, Geor e, COL,
Subject: How former military members serving as media analysts viewed the Iraqi election
Attachments: Military Analyst Coverage- Iraq 02010S.doc
Military Analyst
Coverage · Ir...
TV Broadcast Summary :
Analysts Tommy Franks, Jed Babbin, Don Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack Jacobs were all
fea tured on national news stations (Fox News, CNN and MSNBC). General ly speaking, all
agreed that t he e lection was not as v io lent as expected and that the Iraqi s ecurity forces
and American troops did a very good job . Several analysts a l l ud ed t o t he f a c t that t here
wi l l be more danger ahead. The analyst mood was positive as I raqi events unfolded.
Print/Online/Radio Summary :
Mi litary ana lys ts ' d iscuss ion of Sunday 's e lect ion i n pr int , online and radio out lets was
mi nima l , l imited to accounts quoting Wil liam Nas h a nd Bob Sca l es . Ge neral Nash was
f e a t ure d on NPR before and during t he electi on process (January 30th ) wh ile Bob Scale s was
quoted in The Bal timore Sun (reprinted by The Sou th Florida Sun Sentine l ) on keep i ng
troops safe in Iraq. In addition, a washington Times r e ade r wrote a letter t o t he paper
comment i ng on Sca l es' Op-Ed piece from e a r l i e r in the week on t he need to ra ise troop
levels .
The attached memo provides informat ion on what each analyst sa id and how o ften they
appeared on television.
2
MILITARY ANALYST COVERAGE
IRAOI ELECTIONS
Print/On line/Radio Summary:

Mili tary ana lysts' discussion o f Sunday's el ect ion in print, online and radi o outlets was
minim al, limited to accounts quoting William Nash and Bob Scales. General Nash was
featured on NPR before and durin g the election process (January 30th) while Bob Scales
was quoted in The Baltimore Sun (reprinted by The South Florida Sun Sentinel) on
keepin g troops safe in Iraq. In addition, a Washington Times reader wrote a letter to the
paper commenting on Scales' Op-Ed piece from earlier in the week on the need to raise
troop levels.
Willia m Nash (NP R)

• Iraqi troops "doing their duty" and enforcing security well
• Statements made about U.S. troops pulling out within 18 months "may be
ambitio us, but it's a good start."
• Nash emphasized the importan ce of the U.S. supporting, not leading efforts for
the new Iraq , and avoiding being asked to leave Iraq.
Boh Sca les (Baltimore Sun - print/online)

• The Sun piece described the Pentagon's plans to tak e U.S . sold iers from their own
uni ts and add them to Iraq i units.
• Scales: "It (embedding with Iraqi unit s) wou ld put our troops' safety at risk, as
they'd be more vulnerable to insurge nt attacks."
• The key here is to quickly solidify the Iraqi troops as a standalone force from U.S.
troops.
TV B roadcast S um ma ry:
Analysts Tom my Franks , Jed Babbin, Don Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack
Jacobs were all featured on nation al news stations (Fox News, CNN and MS NBC).
Generally speaking, all agreed that the election was not as violent as expected and that
the Iraqi security forces and American troops did a very good job. Several analysts
alluded to the fact that there will be more dan ger ahead. The analyst mood was positive
as Iraqi events unfolded.
Representative remarks per analyst are as follows:
To mmy Fran ks (Fox News - Hann ity & Colmes / Fox & Friends)
• Troops feel great about what they' ve done in relation to the elections
• Any election in the Arab world is a "big deal"
• This is the first practical exampl e of democracy in the Arab world
• Does not agree with comments made by Senator Kerry and Senator Kennedy
• He is proud of the work troops have done
• Last thing you want to do is announce your "t imetable" for withdra wal
J ed Babbin (MSNBC Live Coverage - Iraqi Elections)
• Withd rawa l from Iraq is "Simp ly the worst thing we cou ld do"
• Withdrawal wo uld strengthen the terrorists and weake n the Iraq peop le
• We have to look at the bigger picture, we have to dea l wi th all the Jihadist nation s
that are influencing Iraq
Don S be p pe rd (CNN Live From ....)

• What we did in the run up to the election mad e a big difference (i.e. controlling
traffic flow around po lling areas)
• There were extensive offensive operations to stop terrorist before voting took
place espec ially in relation to forei gn insurgent s
• Thi s weekend was very stressful for coalition forces
• It was very impo rtant for the Iraq is to pull this off
Montgo me ry Meigs (MSNBC Live Coverage - Iraqi Elections)

• Events in Iraq have gone surprisingly well
• It is a very tough proc ess in inventing a new government
• We will see more Iraqi forces come on board with fewer American troops
• We will have to watch how Sunnis are brought into the process
• Doesn't thi nk the coalitio n wi ll change after the vote
• Need to continue to watch insurgent s from Syria and Iran
J ac k Jacob s (MS NBC Live Coverage - Iraqi Elections)

• High lighted "hot spo ts" in Iraq in real-time durin g the po lling process
• Jacobs, duri ng the polling, predicted high voter turnout
• Security expec tations were "mana ged we ll"
• Provided an overview of how insurgents might inflict violence duri ng the vote
• Said the training of Iraq i forces by the U.S. military was key
• Questio ned whether "t wo Iraqs" would arise until the next election in October
(religious and cultural divides a potential after Sunday' s election)
WHERE T H E ANALYSTS APPEARED
• Tommy Fra nks
• Mo ntg omery Meigs
[]Jed Babbin
6
DJack Jacobs
12
• Don Shepperd
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie) , Col, OCJCSfPA
Sent :
To : Thu~rs~d;a;'~M~a~rC~h~1APT,
~7' 2005
JCS 1:11
J8 PM
Cc: CAPT, JCS SJ S;L- .J .LCDR, OCJCSIPA
Subj ect : FW : NOS Rollout
Below i s s chedu le fo r t omorrow' s pres s ev e nt .

Line - up r ight now is Mr . Fe ith and Admira l Sulliva n t o discuss t he s t r a t e g i c document s
(NDS/NMS) OSD has e xpres s ed i nt e r es t i n having someone f r om J8 "i n the wing s " during the
pre s s briefing i n t he e vent t ha t the l i ne of ques tioning takes a PROGRAMMATIC t urn .
NOT someone se nior to Admiral Sullivan (made very cl ear t o all ) but if someone is
ava i l a b l e , I would re commend t he y be on hand from prep a t 1115 through the p r ess briefing
a t least (1215) but through the c onf e rence call with mil i tary analysts (1 3 0 0) wou l d be
p re ferred.
Any possibili t ies?
VI R
Kati e
:>1115; Pre p Fei t h /Sullivan in Whitman 's o ffi ce
:> 1130; Feit h/Sullivan Pen t a gon Pr e s s Corps Brief i ng / Re l e a s e
:>1215; Feith/Sullivan Ana l ysts Br ie f i ng
>
:> - FYI only
:>1 30 0-; Fe i th Ta rge ted Me di a and I nterna l I n t e rv i e ws (Ra di o/ Pr i n t , Pe nta gon
Channe l , AFIS )
>
:>
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1 3 4 5 ; Needs t o be firmed up. Have tal ked t o
>her once
>
>
>
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject :
I say we go wi t h the knowledgeabl e 06 . .. if y ou' v e got a name, I 'll r un wi t h i t , j u s t like

we thi nk we 're smart .
Is MG Hunzeker out o f p o c ke t ? Some one a s ked , a nd I said I thought h e wa s TDY. . .

ViR
Kat ie
:> - - -- - Orig i n a l Me s s a e- - - - -
:> Fr om: CAPT , J CS J8
:>Sent : Thur sday, Ma r c h 1 7 , 2 0 05 1 2 : 44 PM
:>To : Had d~.J U t i e ), Co l , OCJ C'fi
s"l..p"A' - ..
»cc . )(8) CAPT, JCS SJS ; LCDR, OCJCS/PAi L. .1
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>Subjec t: RE: NOS Rollout
>
>Ka tie, RDML Bl a ke i s the Fr e n c h CHOD Es cor t t h i s week . As s uch , he i s
>ou t o f p ocket f o r this e v e n t. Offer an 0-6 with c urrent Budge t
»KnowLe dge . VR
>
> ~ N ---Or i g i nal Mess a g e -- -- -
> From: Had do c k , El l e n (Ka ti e) , Col, OCJCS/PA
> Sent : Thursd a Marc h 17 , 20 05 12 : 1 1 PM
> To : CAPT , JCS J 8 ....... ..
> Cc: CAPT, JCS SJS ; )(8) LCDR, OCJCS/PA
>
Su bjec t : FW: NOS Ro llout L ..I
>
>
:> Below i s sched ul e for t omo rrow ' s pre ss event .
> Li ne-up r i g ht now is Mr. Fei t h and Ad miral Su lliva n to d iscuss the s trat egic
documents (NOS/NMS)
:> OSD has expre ssed i nte res t i n ha v i ng someone fro m J8 " in the wings " duri ng the pre ss
brief ing i n the eve n t that the line of qu es t ioni ng takes a PROGRAMMATI C t u r n.
:> NOT some o n e senior to Admira l Su l l i v an (ma d e v e ry c lear t o all) bu t i f s ome one i s
avai lab le , I wou l d r e comme nd they be on hand f rom prep at 1 11 5 through t h e press briefi ng
at l e ast (1 215 ) b u t thr ou g h the conference ca l l wi th mi l itary anal ysts (1 3 00 ) wou l d be
p re fer red.
>
> Any po s s i b i l i t ie s?
> ViR
> Ka t ie
>
> 1115 : Pr e p Fe ith / Su l l ivan in Wh i t man ' s office
> 113 0 : Fei t h/ Su l l i v an Pe ntagon Pre s s corps Bri e f ing/Release
> 1 21 5 : Feit h / Sul l i van Ana l yst s Br ie f i ng
>
:> - FYI onl y
:> 1 30 0 - : Feith Targ eted Me d i a a nd Internal I n terviews (Radio/Print , Pe ntago n
Ch annel, AF I S )
> .J'£n!""""'l.-""'"/'''4 from 1300- 13 45
)(8)
> L..-_ _---I a t 13 4 5; Ne ed s t o be fi rm ed up . Have t a l ked t o
>her onc e
>
>
>
1
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From : FIS-HQ/P IA 1'''''
Sent: Frida Ma 13 20054:57 PM
To: 11''''
-
.... Haddock Colonel Ellen
-.... Merritt Roxie T. CAPT OASD-~
anee bro -
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IThome CaD~jn Frank
Subject:
r'"
Initial Media Reaction to BRAe announcement
Atta chments : BRAG Post Briefing- Media Reaction - 051305.doc
BRAe Post Briefing-

Media geec...
The attachment inc l ude s a n e xa mina t i on of me d i a cove r a ge from t he top 1 0 news
outle ts by circu la ti on a nd nat iona l t el e vision br oa dca s t st ations f ol lowing the BRAe
a nnounce me nt . Ea r l y onl i ne coverage consi s ted pr i mar i ly o f a r e pri nt ed AP story
a nnoun c ing the number of c l os ur e s a nd c os t savings. La t e r update s i ncluded more o r i gina l
co mmentary and r eaction from s tat e off ic i al s and legi s la tors. Nati onal t el ev ision had
s imi lar cove r age a nd i ncluded comme ntary by mi l i ta ry a na lys ts.
1
BRAe Base Realignment and Closure 2005
BRAC - POST PRESS CONFERENC E AN NOUNCEMENT

MEDIA REACTION
FRIDAY 13, 2005
The following includes an examination of media coverage from the top 10 news outlets
by circu lation and national televis ion broadcast stations following the BRAe
announ cement. Early online coverage consisted primari ly of a reprinted AP story
announcing the number of closures and cost savings. Later updates included more
original commen tary and reaction from state officials and legislators. National television
had similar cove rage and included commentary by military analysts.
ONLINE HIGHLIGHTS
Immediate coverage of th e a nnouncement:

~ The NYT, WP , USA Today, NY Dail y News and WSJ reprinted an AP story,
without adding original report ing.
» Denver Post, Houston Chro nicle tailored the AP piece for a local slant
~ The L.A. T imes, Chicago Tribune and Atlanta Journal-Constitution ran original
stories.
Updated sto r ies incl uded:

~ A WP piece on the proposal to shut down WaIter Reed
}> A NYT piece by Eric Sclun itt and David Stout on " intense reaction" across the
country to the announcement.
Co mme ntary included:

}> Reprinted AP stories highlighted overall cost savings, a "massive shift of US
forces," emp loyment numbers in affected commu nities, and part of a written
statement by the Secretary: "Our curr ent arrangements, designed for the Cold
War, must give way to the new demands of the war against extremism and other
evolving 21st Century challenges."
o Also included several quotes from state legislators who were disappointed
in their state's clos ings. For example, New Jersey's Fort Monmouth was
on the list, to which Democratic Rep. Rush Holt vowed to: "Fight like hell
to change if' and "the Pentagon's error."
» "Atlanta was a major loser .. ." but the rest ofGA fared well and the state will gain
jobs.
}> The news that Illinois will lose jobs due to closures, but such major installations
as Scott Air Force Base will stay open was greeted with " loud applause: '
}> That CO has no closures and will gain jobs was called good news for the state by
Wayne Allard, R-Colo.
)l> "California has done very we ll in this round " of closures, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-
Alpine), the chairman of the Hou se Armed Services Committee said today
Messages and quotes:

:> The aim to "p romote jointness" - "The Pentagon also proposed eliminating scores
of Reserve and National Guard bases, part of Rum sfeld's effort to promote
"jointness" between the active-duty and reserve units." (NY Dail y New s, via an
AP article).
:> The updated NYT piece on immedi ate reaction to the closures:
o Quoted Loren Thompson of the Lexin gton Institute: "savings are
generated more by reorganization than closures"
o Quoted Gen . Richard M yers : "The degree with which the services
coo rdinate, integrate and operate together will be increased, and it will
include how we manage some of our bases and posts."
o The Secretary " sought to ease fears" about unemployment caused by
closed bases.
TELEVISION HIGHLIGHTS
:> ''Bottom Line - the DoD needs the money. They want to make better use of tax:
payers money" - (CNN)
:> People in congress are saying "t he battle starts today" - (H eadline News)
:> ''There is life afte r closure but it is diffic ult" - Audience interv iew (Fox News
Dayside with Linda Vester)
:> We are going to fight this decision and we have plenty of ways to fight it -
(MSNBC - Rep . Rob Simm ons)
:> Emphas is on which bases have had j ob gains (rat her than losses) - (Fox New s)
» BRAC sets-up a national competition between communities ... that is what this
process is abo ut - (Fox News Dayside with Linda Vester)
:> Historically. Jess than 10% of bases we re able to get off the list - (Fox New s
Dayside with Linda Vester)
» Analyst: General Montgomery Meigs comments:
o Efficiency is the core principl e of this BRAC closure
o Enhancement of "joint consol idatio n"
o More open minded mili tary culture
o Biggest challenges: communities that lose jobs
o BRAC is probably a combination of the transformation initiative and the
wars overseas
ONLINE EXCE RPTS
THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION
ORIGI NAL: Four Georgia bases on closure list

Ron Martz, Bob Kemper
9:24 AM
Afte r surv iving four previous round s of base closings unscathed, metro Atlanta took a
maj or hit on Friday in the latest announcem ent of facilities the Pentagon wan ts to shut
down.
The Pentagon announced it plans to close three bases in the Atlanta area ~ Fort
McPherson in sou thwest Atlanta, Fort Gillem in Fores t Park and the Naval Air Station in
Mari etta. That wi ll mean a loss of near ly 6,500 military and civilian j obs and about $560
million in annu al payroll.
Whil e Atlanta was a maj or loser. the rest of Georgia fared well and the state wi ll actually
gain abo ut 7,500 military and civilian positions...
State officials had no immedi ate word on the list bu t Gov. Sonny Perdu e was holding a
new s conference and will visit each of the targeted facilities later today.
" We ' re disappointed. We think the community action group did a great j ob. ... We 're
prepared to challenge the recommendation," said Fred Bryant, deputy director, Georgia
Military Affairs Coord inating Committee. "We don ' t know yet what were the key factors
in the decision ."
THE CHICAGO T RI BUNE
ORIGI NAL: Illinois takes job hit but escap es major base closures
Rebecca Carro ll, AP
8:56AM CDT
Illinois would lose nearly 2,700 mili tary and civi lian jobs under base closur es
recomm ended Friday by Defense Secretary Donald R umsfel d, but the state's major
mil itary installations wo uld remain open.
Scott Air Force Base, located about 20 miles east of S1. Louis, near Bellevill e, emerged
as the big winner, gaining 797 military and civ ilian jobs. Great Lakes Naval Training
Center in North Chicago is slated to lose 2,022jobs ...
The announceme nt that Scott wou ld not clo se wa s greeted with loud applause and a
standing ovation at MidAmerica Airport in Mascou tah, IlL, where lllinois U.S. Sen. Dick
Durbin and Rep s. Jerry Costello and John Shimkus he ld a news conference to anno unce
its fate.
DENVER POST
ORIGINAL: Colorado a Winner in Base Closure Plans

Mike Soraghan, Denver Post Staff Writer and The Associated Press
09:3 1:52 AM, upd ated at 11:00 AM
...Not only was Colorado spared any base closures, the state stands to gain nearly 5,000
military jobs. .. Members of Colorado's congressional delegation expressed pleasure over
the plan's im pact on the state.
"I think it's good news for Colorado and it's great news for the Colorado Springs area, "
said U.S. Sen. Wayne Allard, R-Co lo., who served on the Senate Armed Services
Committee until recentl y.
HO USTO N CHRON ICLE
UPDATE D: 180 U.S. military bases targeted for closure by Pen tagon
AP - 10:08AM, updated at 10:39
. .. The 147th Fighter Wing of the Air National Guard will remain at Houston's Ellington
Field under the plan. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison said the wing's mission will be shifting
from national de fense to homeland security.
LA TIMES
ORIGINAL: Ca lifor nia Largely Spared in La test Round of Base Closures

Tony Perry, rmes StaIfWriter
. ..The Los Angeles Air Force Base, the language facility at Monterey and major Navy
and Marine Corps bases in San Diego were spared in the Pentagon 's list of base s
proposed for closure, which was unveiled this morning.
"California has done very we ll in this round" of closures, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-
Alpine), the chairman of the House Armed Serv ices Committee said today...
California's biggest job loss appears to be the Naval Surface Warfar e Center in Corona,
wh ich employs 900 workers and is listed for closure .. .
Although the Pentagon's list is meant to be only the beg inning of the process, 85% of
bases targeted by the Pentagon in the past have been closed
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
ORIGINAL: Pentagon Plans to Close 33 Major Bases - AP

Liz Sid oti
12:44 PM EDT
NEW YORK TIMES
ORIGINAL: Pentagon Proposal to In clude Shutti ng 33 Ma ior U.S. Bases - AP

11:01 AM
UPDATE D: Pentagon Proposes Shutting 33 Ma jor U.S. Bases and Oth er C uts
Eric Schmi tt and David Stout - I :II PM
Th e bases proposed for closing include some famili ar names in military history: the
Navy's submarine base in New Lond on, CoM., Fort McPherson in Georgia, Fort
Monmouth in New Jersey and the Pascagoula Naval Station in Mississippi. Scores of
sma ller installations wou ld also be closed, and others wo uld be conso lidated .. .
Whi le the list of recommended closings was smaller than expected, the reaction from
those affected was intense.
Senator Joseph L Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut, called the recommendation to
close the New Londo n base, which would cost several thousands jobs, "irrational and
irresponsible."
"It insults our history and endangers our future," he told The Associated Press .. .
"The savings projected by this round seem to be generated more by reorganization than
outright closures," said Loren Thompson, a military analyst with the Lexington Institute,
a consulting finn. "At present, the military is very inefficiently located and organized.
Many facilities are sited in places that made sense a century ago but not now."
After more than two years of exhaustive study, this round of base closings is an integra l
part ofMr. Rumsfeld's strategy to revamp the military into a leaner, more agile force.
"The degr ee with whic h the services coordinate, integrate and operate together will be
increased, and it will include how we manage some of our bases and posts," Gen. Richard
B. Myers , the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said.
Mr. Rumsfe ld sought to ease fears in many comm unities that clos ings could leave
thousands of local employees out of wor k. He cited examples of closed bases that had
been converted into commercial airports and economic centers. And he pledged that the
Defense Department wou ld provide retraining for workers and economic aid to help
offset the immediate economic impact in communities where bases close.
USA TODAY
UPDATE D · Battle over Bases Begins: Pentagon proposes closing of 33 major bases
- AP
Updated 12:30 PM
...One maj or closure Rumsfeld seeks is Ellsworth Air Force Base in Sout h Dakota, home
to 29 B- IB bombers, half the nation's fleet of the aircraft , and the state's second largest
employer.
Repub lican freshman Sen. John Thune on Friday called the Pentagon "flat wron g" about
Ellsworth, and he vowed to help lead the fight in the Senate to delay the entire round of
closures. "We will continue to keep Ellsworth open," Th une said .. .
Rumsfeld also recommended closing the Nava l Station in Pascagoula, Miss., which
barely survived previous base closure rounds. The decision was a blow to Sen. Trent
Lott, R-Mis s., who had fought the 1995 round of closures. At stake are 844 mi litary jobs
and 112 civilian jobs...
New England took a major hit, and Connecticut suffered the bigge st loss in terms ofjobs
with the proposed closure of the U.S. Naval Submarine Base in Groton, Conn. Shuttering
the installation would result in the loss of 7,096 military j obs and 952 civilianjobs.
Calling the recommendation "irrational and irrespo nsible," Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-
Conn .) said, "It insults our history and endangers our future."..;
WALL STREET J O URNAL
O RIGINAL: Pentagon to Propose Clos ure - AP

UP DATED: Pentagon Proposes C losure Of Abo ut 180 Installations - AP
10:55 a.m.
Later upda ted with AP piece
WASHINGTON POST
ORIGINAL: Pentae:on Proposing to Sh ut 33 Ma ior Bases - AP

Liz Sidoti
11:01 AM
UP DATED: Pentagon Pro poses Shutting \V.lter Reed

William Branigin and Ann Scott Tyson
12:54 PM
The Pent agon tod ay proposed elim inating abou t 180 military installations across the
co untry in a new roun d o f base closures and realignments aimed at saving nearl y 549
billion ove r 20 years , On e major proposal calls for essentiall y moving Wa lter Reed Army
Medic al Center from Washington, D.C. , to a new state-of-the-art. jointly staffed faci lity
in suburban Maryland . ..
Hou sing and some research facilities at the Walter Reed site in Washington woul d stay
open, b ut the faci lity as it exists today wo uld practically be shut down, and it wou ld lose
5,630 military, civilian and contractor jobs...
Among the luckiest states on the list is Maryland, which gains 9,293 job s -- more than
an y other state. The District loses 6,496 jobs und er the proposal -- mainl y from the loss of
Waiter Reed -- while Virginia loses 1,574.
Th e hard est-hit states include Connecticut, which loses 8,586 jobs; Main e, with a loss of
6,938 jobs; and Alaska , whicb stands to Jose 4,619 . Ov erseas, a total of 13,503 jobs
would be cut in the closure or realignment of U.S. mi litary installations in Germany,
South Kore a and elsewhere. Many of those job s would move to the United States.
TELEVISION EXCERPTS
MSNBC
5/1 3/20052:1 9:22 PM
Newscaster : Joining us to talk a little bit more about the strategic impli cations o f today's
announcement is MSNBC anal yst M ont gomery Meigs. Thank you so much for taking the
time today. Meigs: Good to be on the show. Newscaster: It's unusual when you think
abo ut closures and the loss ofjob s as so mething that might be helpful and mi ght make a
uni t or a situation better. But can you ex plain to us why this realignment wi ll make the
mi litary stronger? Meigs: Sure. There are three things that I see. First of all as general
efficiency, a lot of these face tha t's are being closed can be consolidated with other
functions . And can you get mo re things done for the eq uivalent DoD dollar . Efficiency
that is the first principle. Secondly, there is some joint consolidation going on. So, for
instance, the third Army headquarters, which is now in Atlanta, is being moved to Shaw
Air Force Base where it will consolidate with the Air Force headquarters that also works
for U.S. central command. So that will make planning easier, coordination, etc. and
enhance jointness. Finall y within the Army, Chief of the StafTof the Army is breaking
down some of the tribal barriers . He' s consolidating the infantry and armor schools, a
number of the logistics schools. That way you'll get much more open minded culture in
the office corps of the army. Newscaste r: Knowing Secretary Rumsfeld's vision of a
more compact Arm y, do you think this was something that, perhaps, was always in the
planning or is it a result of fighting two wars? Me igs: Well, I think it's a combination.
For instance, foreman was up for election last time. This time they're going to close it and
move the headquarters a little further north in the state of Virginia. And there are some
things that have changed as a result of what we've seen in the last 10 years. Now the army
is going to have more brigades than it has in the past. You have to have a place to put
them. Some of that is deflected in the BRAC numbers . Newscaster: We talk about all
the positive things that will come out of this. What is the difficult thing? What is the
challenging thing? The not so great news today? Meigs : Well, you got to have some
communities that are going to lose jobs. That ' s a painful transitio n process.
Fox News Channel

511312005 1:17:35 PM
Interviews with Tom Markham (Association of Defense Comm unities) and Jim Saxton
(New Jersey, Congressmen)
Those that are losing will be trying to reverse the signatures of the Pentagon . That's what
this process is about. Linda Vester: Tom, you have been through this. You know what
the fight is like when you try to save your base . How often is it a winning fight? Tom
Markham : Those hit during the first four rounds of closures said less than 10% of the
communities were able to get off the list. We don't know about this round but that was
the case in the last round. Linda: This is democracy in action, but, you know,
communities who are supportive of the military are being forced to compete with each
other to stay alive. Rep. Saxton : That's true. While, less than 10% of the bases may have
gotten off before this is not a mission impossible task to get a base ofTthe list. I would
point out in 1989 and 1991 both those round of BRAC, Fort Dix was on the list and it got
off In 1993 McG uire Air Force base was on the list and it got off So, we've got a good
record of knowin g how to do this in New Jersey, we'll spare no effort to try to make our
case. Linda: I want to bring a member of the audience. Tum out this fellow is a retired
Marine . I would have thought you would say not to close the base. But instead, you said
no, close them down . Audience Member: I'm assuming all the work that's being done
there can be done elsewhere. The reason they are closing them is they are obsolete or not
need. If they are not needed the y should close. Linda : How well do the communities get
handled after the fact in terms of retraining and stuff like that? Tom Mar kbam: There is
some retraining that goes on. However, the main challenge after these bases do close is
the economic recovery. As an example, in Denver we have been closed for 10 years. We
lost 700 jobs and $290 million a year spent on the loca l economy. Today we have 20,000
people living there, new houses, and a $4 billion economic impact. The message is that
there is life after closure but it's difficult.
Headline News
5/13/2005 11 :3 1:50
Newscaster: Tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel could lose their jobs.
Jamie Mcintyre joins us live from the Pentagon with details. Hi, Jaime. Mcintyre: Hi
Kathleen. It started as a major military operation this morning lone capitol hill as several-
inch-thick base closure recommendation report was delivered to capitol hill where
lawmakers are very interested to hear whether their particular bases are being closed or
scaled back or in some cases actually gaining, according to this Realignment plan
released by the pentagon. Lets look at some of the majo r closures. Thirty -three major
bases . Here are some of the top ones around the country. New England would lose the
submarine base at New London and also the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard targeted there.
The naval station in Mississippi is on the targeted list. Cannon air force base in Texas as
well as Ellsworth air force base where they have the b-2 bombers. The Pentagon plans to
keep the planes, j ust move them to other facilities. In some cases some of the bases are
gainin g in some personnel and responsibility. Again, twenty-nine of thirty-three major
closures. twenty-nine bases where they are going to have major reductions. Then another
forty-nine bases will be gaining either in personnel or missions under this Pentagon plan.
which now goes to the base closure commission over the next couple of months. That
begins its work on Monday when the Pentagon will formally present this plan and
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld will testify favor of it. One of the arguments they are going
to make is that tbis plan has been carefully worked out, the pieces are interdepend ent and
to change one base could affect the whole plan. The commissio n is going to have to look
at the whole thing in entirety whether it sends recommendation to the president and
ultimately to Capitol Hill. Newscaste r: Is there the possibility that the commission
could change its mind about some of these closures or is this really a done deal?
Mcintyre: we ll, in the past, the base closure commission has made some changes. but the
prospect for any particular base is going to be kind of tough. The pentagon has spent a
long time working up the rational e for each one of these. They say it is based on military
necessity. They say they need the savings that have come from the base closings. The
whole reason, there is an independent commi ssion to do this is that if it were left up to
congress, no base would ever be closed because members of Congress would simply
stall.
CNN
5113 /2005 1:05:03 PM
Newscaster: There's a lot of people crying foul already Jamie. We' ve received so many
e-mails and viewers wanting to know. sort of asking the direct question. durin g a time of
""operation Iraqi freedom"" and other ongoing wars. why base closures? What' s the
strategy. militarily for safety here at home. homeland security and, of course, fighting
wars overseas? J a mie Mcintyre: it's a very simple answer is, they need the money. That
savings that I talked about, the Pentagon needs that money for better weapons, better
materials, to better use the forces. Right now they're spending a lot of money on facilities
they don't really need. They haven't been able to close them since 1995 because of the
politics and the very sensitive nature of these kinds of closings. Because in particular, in
1995, there were accusations of people playing politics with the list because of the
presidenti al election. It made it almost impossible for the Congress to agree to a round.
They want to get as much savings as they can to make better use of the taxpayers' money.
When it comes down to the base in your backyard people don't want to see that go.
es:~~;~~2~OO5
Sent:
5:15 PM
To:
CAPT, JCS SJS ~~:2..:!~~;;:;;;;~~
Cc:
CS; !!;
~
L;I~
C ol;:;,J;C~S:S:J:S~5jCfV,jiCs:sfsol.
CIV, JCS SJS; JCS J3; CDR, OCJ CSIPA;
O;::~:::::::;;:;:;! LTC, OCJCSlP A 10,.;;,;...._.....
Subject: FW; RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS MTG - 16 Ju ne 05
Attachments: Draft Agenda · Military Analysts.doc
Draft Agenda •
M
il".., Analys... lliliir-- .,
I apo l og ize u p f r o nt f o r the s hort l e a d o n t h i s one.

OSO PA o c c a siona lly hosts a g r oup o f ret i red mili tary personn el who n ow s e rve a s media
a na l y s t s ( " t a l k i ng h e a d s") -- t h ey a r e scheduled t o be i n t he Pent a gon on Thu r sday , 16
J une from 1130- 13 45 . Ag e nd a is attached .
La s t we ek, e SD asked f o r t he Chairman t o pa rt i c ipat e ; he ' s o n l e a v e . Gen Pa ce has
i ndi c ated h is sche d u l e i s too b us y on Thu r sday , s o we a re now l ooking for a n o ther
ge ne ral /f lag o f fic er t o appr o priate l y represen t t he Joint Sta ff with th is group .
Ot her spe a kers i nc l ud e Ac t i ng De ps e c De f Engla n d, Pr i n c ipal De p u t y As s i stant Sec r e ta ry f or
I nte rna ti o nal Se curity Af f ai rs Pe ter Fl o ry , a nd a fi nal wrap · up wi t h Se c r etary Rums f e ld .
Re qu i r e me n t i s 30 mi n ute s , f rom 12 00 - 12 30 , a nd ra the r t h an p rovide them wi t h a de t a i led
bri e f , t hi s g r o up pre fe r s the op portuni ty t o have a d i s c us s i on (Q&A . ) Not s ure i f t h e
Direct or or J 3 wo u l d be i n t e r e s t e d/ ava i l ab l e, bu t I woul d app r e c i a te y our h e l p with t h i s
one.
As of this mor ning, t he li st o f r e ti r e d mil i t a ry a naly s t s who are con f i rme d t o attend :
Colone l Ca r l Kenn e t h All ard (USA, Reti r e d )
Li e u t e n a nt Gene ra l Frank (Te d) B. Campbe l l (USAF, Ret i r e d)
Lieutenant Colone l Bi ll Cowan (USMC, Ret ired)
Mr. J e d Babb in (USAF , J AG)
Ma j o r Da na R. Dil l on (USA, Re tire d )
Co lone l J ohn Ga rre t t (USMC, Retired )
Command Se r gea n t Ma j o r St e v e n Greer (USA, Reti red )
Admiral David E . J e r e miah (USN, Reti red)
Lieutenan t Co lonel Robert L . Mag inn i s (USA, Re t i r e d)
Col o nel J e f f Mc Causland (USA, Ret ire d )
Ge n e r a l Mon t g omery Me igs (USA, Re t ired )
Maj o r F . Andy Me ss i ng , Jr . (USAR, Ret ired )
Cap tain Chu ck Nas h (USN, Re t i r ed )
Gene ral William L . Na s h (USA, Ret ire d )
Wayne Simmons (USN, Reti r e d )
Thank s agai n f o r y our h e lp .

ViR
Kat ie
> --- - -Or i gi n a l Me s s a e- - - · -
>Fr om; Cl V, OASD- PA
»senc . Tue s d a June 14 , 20 05 4: 3 5 PM
>To: CDR, OCJCS/ PA
>Subjec t: dra ft a g enda
>
s f o r y our h e l p o n t h i s.
>
>
1
,
,
,
>0 8 0 public Aff a i r s ,
:>Communi ty Relations and Pub lic Lia i s on
The Pent a g on
:>Was nO . 2 0301 -14 00
,ll2l
,.L..-_ _......
,
,>www.Ameri caSupportsYou.mi l
,
,
Tra c king: Rec in ient .ead
Read: 611412005 5:26 PM
Read : 6114120057:32 PM
Read : 6114120056:04 PM
Read : 61'4120055:27 PM
Read: 611412005 5:47 PM
React 6115f2005 8:55 AM
Read: 611412005 5:17 PM
2
As of June 14, 2005
4:00 p.m.
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld

Meeting with Milita ry Defense Analysts
Thursday, June 16,2005,_ ,........,
Depu ty Secretary of Defense Conferen ce Room The Pentagon
AGENDA
11:30 a.m, Welcome and Introduction
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Ms. Allison Barber
11:31 a.m. Update on Detain ee Operations
• Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy Gordon England
12:00 p.m. Update on Glohal Operations
• Joint Staff - TBD
12:30 p.m, Update on GWOTllraq Operations
• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Peter Flory
1:00 p.m. Break
1:15 p.m. Discussion and Questions with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
1:45 p.m. Meeting Concludes
• Ms. Allison Barber

Sent: Wed nesday, June 15,2005 1:09 PM
To: Barber Allison CIV, OASD-PA
Cc : Maj,OCJCSIPA,,'L .. CIV,OASD-PA;'. oJ CDR,
OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: newest agenda
Alliso n,
we're experi enc ing s o me sche dul i n g issues -- is i t at a l l possib l e t o swap t he J oint Sta f f
blo c k o f t i me (1 2 00 - 1 23 0) with Mr. Flory' s blo c k o f time ? (1 2 3 0 - 1 30 0 ) ? ?
Thi s would a llo w t i me f or Gen c onw ay t o do the pres s b r ie f i n g wi th Mr . Di Rita begi n n ing
at 11 30 , and s ti ll get over to the Mil Ana l ysts on t i me .
ThoughtS ? ??
Vi R
Kati e
:>From;
:>Sent ·
:>:>To;
:>Cc;
--- t;-;o~r~i~9~'~~~!~f,~: CIV , OASD- PA
a y, J une IS , 20 05 1 2 ; 37 PM
CDR , OCJCS/ PA
Maj , OCJCS /PA j Ha d dock , El len ( Ka t i e ), Col, OCJ CS/ PA
:> Sub j e c t: RE ; newes t agenda
>
:> he' s more than we l c ome t o si t at t he head o f t he t a ble if that fe el s mor e natural . s e c d e f
prefers to s t a n d.
:> a s menti oned, the a na l ys ts have a s k e d about recrui t ment and r e t e n t ion issues , so t he
genera l will mos t li ke ly b e asked t ho s e questio n s.
:> a l s o, i j ust heard f rom the deputy 's office t h a t h e (s ec england) is g o ing to be s p eak ing
about QDR, BRAC , NSPS and Acquisition, fyi.
>
:>t h a n k s
> - - -- - Or i g i
;~~~~~~~T~
>
> Sent;
Fr om ; Wed nesda June 1 5 , CDR,
2005 OCJCS/PA
1 2; 2 6 PM
> To; CI V , OASD-PA
> Cc; Maj, OCJCS/ PAj Ha d do c k , El l e n (Kat ie), Col , OCJCS/ PA
> Subjec t: FW; newest agenda
>
>
:> he s tands a t the head of t h e t a b le? ?? s eems odd.
:> Anyway , because DiRi ta wants t o a l s o do a pre s s brief t omo r r o w at 1130, we 're
j uggling g e n e r a l s . Lt Ge n conway may do the press brief a nd BG Ham may do t he anal ysts.
I 'l l let you k now a s soon as we have a decision.
:> Thank s ,
>
>
> -- - --Orig i
> Fr om : CIV, OASD-PA
> Sent : wednes day , June 1 5 , 2 005 12:22 PM
> To : CDR , OCJ CS/ PA
> Sub jec t : n ewe s t agend a
>
:> hi there .
:> tha nks fo r t he phone c al l . attached is t he most rece n t a genda.
:> p lea se l e t me know what a / v n e e d s the gene ra l wi l l have . a lso, if t he r e i s any thing
he woul d like handed out , i wil l n e e d i t nI t 1 6 00 s o t ha t i c a n p r e pare the b ri e fing books
f o r the a n a l y sts .
:> genera l l y, we do not have a podi u m. secdef s t a n d s at the he ad o f the tabl e s o t hat
i t feel s like mor e o f a d i s c us s i on , so t h a t' s the f o rmat we 're as s uming a ll of our
1
s peakers wil l hav@. l e t me know i f this is not doab le.
=> thanks!
,
Sent: Frida June 17 20052 :21 PM
SJS ~~~~l:===5
To:
Cc : CDR,CAPT,
OCJCSIPA;
JCS LTC, OCJCSlPA; MAJ,
Maj, OCJCSfPA; LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA;
MAJ,JCS SJS
Subject: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
perhaps you can help d ire c t me on how to best s uppo rt th is a cti on:
SecCef , J3, and ot he r s met wi th severa l ret ired military analyst s yes terda y. They
di scussed a number of i ssue s, wi t h great e mpha s i s on GTMO and De t a ine e Opera tions. Se cDef
encouraged t he m a l l to go t o GTMO a nd see f or t he ms e l ve s . OSO PA i s c urre ntly worki ng
wi t h SOUTHCOM to ar r a nge a v i si t t o GTMO by thes e mili t ary ana l y s t s soon - - could be a s
soon as firs t week or two in July. I' ll get t he date from SOUTHCOM once they have f i rmed
up a plan.
OSC PA has taken members of this group on s imilar trips -- jus t not t o GTMO.
Ques tion/role for Joi nt Staf f i nvolve s the air t r a nsport a t i on . I beli e ve t he intent is t o
fl y t he m in e a r l y and ou t l a ter on t he same day .
What can we do t o e nsure dedicated ai rl if t is a va ilable to s upport th is vi si t ?
Tha nks f o r your he lp .
Vi R
Kat ie
1
From : Haddock. Ellen (Katie). Col. OCJCSIPA
Sent: esc un 00512:46 PM
To: ~~~~~~~~a pt. JCS SJS
Cc : Thorp. Frank. CAPT. OCJCSIPA
Subject: RE: Mil ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
~~~ - Bel ow is a sampl e; these a r e the f olk s who at te nded t he roundtabl e wi th SecDef ( a nd
DJ3 ) last week.
The g r o up is made u p of r et ired mili tary wh o se rve a s " t a l k i ng bea d s " for v a rious media.
OSD PA has c oord inated other v i s i t s in t he pas t t o he lp e d u c a t e them o n wha t 's really
go ing on in Iraq, e tc.
Th e y also d o a c onference call with t h e m o n a r ecurring basis.
We (J o i n t Staff ) u sual ly provid e a J3 ops briefer for t he ca l l. Occa s i o n a lly the Chairman
o r t h e Vi c e d o t he call -- d e pendi ng on t he top i c / i s sue at hand . CJCS / VCJCS try t o mee t
with t h e ret ired mi l itary ana lys ts each time they actua l l y ha v e a group of t h e m i n the
Pentago n , b u t last week's schedule was t oo har d , wi t h the Chairman o ut of t o wn , so t he OJ3
fi lled in .
Hop e t h a t h e l p s .
V IR
Kat ie
Con f i rmed Retired Mil i t a ry An alysts :

Colonel Carl Kenne t h Allard (USA, Re ti red)
Li e u t e na n t General Frank (Ted) B . Campb e l l (USAF , Retired )
Li e ute na n t Col one l Bi l l Cowan (USMC, Re t ired )
Mr. J ed Ba bbi n (USAF , JAG)
Ma j o r Da n a R. Di l l o n (USA, Retired )
Colon e l J ohn Garrett (USMC, Re t i r e d )
Command Serg eant Major St e v en Gr e e r (USA, Reti red )
Admiral David E. J eremi a h (USN, Reti red)
Li e ute n ant Co lone l Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Re t ire d )
Co l o nel J e f f Mc Ca u s l and , (USA, Re t i red )
Ge neral Mo n t g ome ry Meig s (USA, Ret ired)
Ma j o r F . Andy Me s s i ng, J r. (USAR, Re t i r e d )
Captai n Chuck Na s h (USN, Reti r ed )
Ge n e r a l Wi l l i a m L . Na s h (USA, Re tired )
Wa y n e Simmons (USN, Retired )
1lIi......."'ol-"'p.aAAOP - - - - -
Fr om: Ca pt , JCS SJS
Sent: Mo nd ay , June 20, 2 0 05 6:18 AM
To: Haddock, El l e n ( Kat ie ), Col , OCJ CS/PA
Sub j e c t : RE: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLI FT REQUEST
Katie, do y ou have a n y deta ils o f t h i s g r oup ?
Capt ain , JAGC, US Navy

Lega l Couns el t o t he Chairman of t he Joint Ch iefs of Staff
- --- -O rigi na l Me a s a g e - - - - -
From: MCNabb, Dun c a n J, Lt Gen , JCS J4
Sen t : Sunday , June 1 9 , 2005 10:11 PM
To : Schwa rtz , Norton A, Lt Gen , J CS OJS
cc • Harnit chek , Mark D, RDML, J CS J4j
Ha dd o c k Ellen Katie ) , Col , OCJCS /PA; ~
~~~~~;~CO
~L~JCS' J4 ;
Capt, JCS SJ S j
CAPT, JCS SJSj J-4 JLOC Personnel j Harnitchek , Mark
1
D, RDML, J CS J 4 ; COL, J4
Subject: Re: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Norty,
Our fo lks have been running the traps. We can provide dedicated airlift for public
affairs activi ties such as this per DOD 45 15 .13 -R, Chapter 3 .
~e coordina ted thi s wi th our pol icy experts and OCJCS/LC.
Per OSD Exec Sec yesterday, once OSD/PA and OSD Transportation policy coordinate and
DEPSECDEFapproves the travel, exec sec wi ll transmit to JS (J4) f o r validat ion and tasking
USTRANSCOM . We have already given TRANS COM a heads up.
We 'll fi nish wo r k i ng it with the OSD fo l ks on Monday and keep you i n f o rme d on progress .
VR
Duncan
Sent from my BlackBe rry Wireless Handheld
( Katie) , Col, OCJCS PA

JCS SJS
JCS SJS
J -4 JLOC Personne l
Sen t: Sat Jun 1 8 10:07 :51 2005
Sub ject : RE : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
Duncan, please take for action. Could we get th is approved for SAAM? Thanks. vir,
Norty.
- - - - - Or i g i na l Mess a e - - - - -
From : CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent : Sa turday, June 1 8, 2005 8 :58 AM
To : Schwar t z, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc : Mc Nabb , Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitchek, M
COL, JCS, J 4 ; Haddock, Ellen ( Katie ), Col, OCJCS/PA; Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIR LI FT REQUEST L.-----------------'
Sir :
During Thursday 'S SecDe f session wi th military analysts, he apparently e ncouraged them
t o go t o Gitmo a nd s ee t h i ng s for t h e ms e l v e s . OSD PA is worki ng t his with SOUTHCOM bu t
question has arisen as t o what we can d o wi th dedicated DoD lift to support getting t hem
in a n d out o f Git mo . Recommend passing this to the J 4 team and letting them work it.
v r
CAPT ""'r::::-l~:T:~'::':'-'"
Execut1ve AssJ.s tant
USN
Director Joint Staff

l(2)
-----original Message- -- --
Fr om: Ha d do c k , Ell en (Ka tie), Col, OCJCS/PA
2
Sen t:
To: Fri~d~a;~J~u~n~ej:'~7~~2~O:05 :2 : 2 JC
CAPT, 1 PM
S SJ S
cc. OCJCS/PA; ~~;=ii:;;=:;::;""''l.!iOlW._O
LT llC~J:liC S/ PA ; MAJ·,
JCS SJS' Maj, OCJ;S!PA; ~ LCDR, JCS OCJCS \ PA; ~
Subject:
MAJ, J CS SJS
MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
"---'"
Perhaps you ca n help direct me on how t o best suppo r t t his ac ti on :
SeeDe f , J3 , and othe r s me t with s e veral retired military a nalysts ye st e r day . They
dis cussed a number o f is s ue s, wi t h great emphasi s on GTMQ and De tai nee o p e r a tion s . Se e De f
encouraged t he m all to go t o GTMO and see f o r themselve s . a so PA is currently wor king
wi t h SOUTHCOM t o a rrange a vi s i t to GTMO by the se mi li t ary ana l y st s soon -- could be a s
s oon as f irst wee k or two i n July. I'll get the date from SOUTHCOM onc e they ha ve firmed
up a plan .
a SD PA has t a ke n members o f this group on simi lar t rips -- jus t no t to GTMO.
Question/role f o r J oint St a f f i nvolve s the a ir trans portat i on . I believe the intent is to
fl y them in early and ou t l a t e r on the same day.
Wha t can we do t o ensure dedicated airl ift i s availab l e t o suppor t this v isit?
Thanks fo r your help .
VI R
Katie
3
& ;u~e~S~d~a~JjUnr,e;2~lC2~OO5 12:48 PM

Sent :
To:
Cc : COL, JCS, J ~~::::;:J CDR, OCJCSIPA;
Col,J4l': LTC, OCJCSfPA
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST '...._ - _...
COL
.....- ....
I wa s g i v e n your n a me a s a point o f c o n t ac t f or t h i s Air lift Re que s t - - is t h at a c c u r a t e ?
I f s o, p l ea s e g ive me a c all . I understand t h a t t h i s g r o u p i s sche d ul e to. vis i t GTMO
Sa turday , 2 5 J une ...
V! R
Co l Kat ie Ha dd o c k , USMC
--- - -O rigi nal Message - --- -

From : Schwartz , No rt o n A , Lt Gen , JC S DJS
Se nt : Monday , J une 20 , 20 0 5 5 :5 7 AM
To : McNabb Dunc a n J, Lt Ge n , J CS J 4
Cc : CI V, JCS SJS ; Ha rn i tch e k , Mark D, RDML , J CS J 4 ; COL ,
4 ; Tho rp , Fr a n k , CAPT OCJCS/ PA; Haddoc k , Ellen (Kat i e), Col , OCJCS / PA;
Ca p t , J CS SJS; CAPT , J CS SJS ; J - 4 JLOC Pe rsonnel; Ma p le s ,
Mi c h a e l D, MG, J CS VDJS; COL, J 4
Subjec t: RE: MIL ANALYS TS TO GTMO : AI RLIFT REQUEST
Thank s , Dunca n . vI r, No r t y .
----- Or i gi n a l Mes eag e - - - - -

Fr om : McNa bb, Duncan J , Lt Ge n , JCS J 4
Sent : Sund ay, June 19, 2 005 10 : 1 1 PM
To: Harn
Cc: S c hwai tch
rtz,ek No rton D,
, Mark A, Lt Ge n J, CS
RDML, J 4;DJ" ~~~~~~~::;;~.
JCS COL JCS , J 4;
Ha d d o c k El l e n (Ka t i e ) , Co l, OCJCS /PA ; ~ Ca p t , JCS SJS ;
C s.P . J- 4 JLOC Pe r s o nn e l ; Harnitchek , Mar k
0 , RDML , JCS J 4 ; COL , J 4
Sub je c t : Re : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRL IFT REQUEST
No rty ,
Ou r f olks ha v e bee n r unni n g the t rap s. We c a n pro v i d e ded i c a ted a i rl if t f or p ubl ic

affa irs act ivi t ie s s uch as t hi s p er DOD 4 51 S . 1 3 - R, Chap ter 3.
We coor di n a ted this wi t h o u r p ol icy expert s a nd OCJCS ! LC.
Pe r OSO Ex ec Sec ye s t e r d a y , o nce OSO/ PA and OSO Tr a nsp o r tat i o n Po licy c oor dinate a nd
OEPS ECOEFa pp r o ve s t he t r ave l, e x e c sec wi ll t r a n s mit t o JS (J 4) f o r v alid a t ion a nd t a s k ing
US TRANS COM. We h a v e a lread y g i v en TRANSCOM a head s u p .
we ' l l fi n is h wo r k ing it wit h t h e OSO f o l k s on Mo nd a y and keep yo u i n f o rme d on p r ogre s s .
VR
Dunc a n
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handhe l d
---- -O ri gi n al Message - - - - -
Fr om : S chwartz , Nor t o n A, Lt Gen , JCS OJS <norton. s chwart z1o. . . . . . . . . ."- J
1
To : McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J 4 <d u n c a n . mcnabb
CC: Harni tche .harnitchek
COL, JCS, J4 Haddock, El len ( Ka t i e) , Co l, OCJCS/PA
<e lle n. haddoc ~ Capt, JCS SJS
CAPT JCS SJS
)(8) J- 4 JLOC Personnel
Sent: Sa t Jun 18 10 :07:51 200 5
Su b j ect : RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
Duncan, pleas e take for action . Could we get th is approved for SAAM? Thanks . vir,
Norty .
F~~~ ~ -OrigJ';)(8)
~~~~~~~~;;J CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Sa turday, June 18, 20 05 8 :58 AM
To : Schwar tz , Norton A, Lt Gen, J CS DJS
Cc : McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitchek, Mer~k J 4 ; ~~~~j(",,"j$__"
~:D:,::R:D::M:L~,::J:C:S::::l
COL, JCS, J4; Haddock, El len (Katie), Co l, OCJCS /PA; Capt, JCS SJS
Sub jec t : FW : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Sir:
During Thursday's SecDe f session with mi litary ana lysts, h e apparently e ncouraged the m
t o go to Gitmo and see things for themse lves . OSD PA i s working this wi t h SOUTHCOM but
question ha s aris e n as to what we can do with ded ica ted 000 l i ft t o support gett ing them
in a nd out of Gitmo. Recommend passing this to the J4 t e a m and l e t ti ng t hem work it .
v r
CAPT USN
Execut ive As s i s t a nt
Direc tor, Joi nt Staff
)(8)
- - - - - o r i g i na l Messag e - - - - -
From : Haddock, El l e n ( Katie ), Co l, OCJCS/PA
Sent : Fr i d a June 17 2005 2 :2 1 PM
To : CAPT, JCS SJS
Cc :
J CS SJS ; ~
~ CJCS/PA;
Ma j , OCJ CS PA; ~
LTC OCJCS/ PA; ~~~;;;;;;;:;;;1~~
LCDR,
MAJ, JCS SJS '---------'
Subject : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLI FT REQUEST
Pe r h a p s y ou c an h e lp d irec t me on ho w to b es t s u p po r t this ac tion:
SecDef, J 3, and others met with several ret ired mil itary analysts yesterday . They
discussed a n u mber o f issu es, with g rea t emphasis on GTMO and Deta inee Operations. SecDef
encouraged them a ll to go to GTMO and see for thems e lves. OSD PA i s c urrently worki ng
with SOUTHCOM to arrange a visit to GTMO by t he s e mi l i t a r y analysts soon -- cou l d be as
s o o n as f irst week or two in J uly . I 'll g et the date from SOUTHCOM once t hey h a v e f irmed
up a p lan .
OSD PA h a s t a ke n members of this group on simi lar tr ips -- j u s t not t o GTMO .
Question/rol e for Joi nt Sta ff i n v o l v e s the air t ransportat i on . I b e lieve the intent is to
fly them in early and out l a t e r o n t h e same day.
What can we do to ensure ded i c a t e d air li ft is avai lable to support this visit ?
Thanks for your help.

Vi R
Katie
2
Tracking: Recipient Read
Read: 6/2112005 1:42 PM
React 6/2112005 1:07 PM
Read: 6/2112005 1:15 PM
Read: 612112005 12:52 PM
3
From : Thorp, Frank. CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 1:19 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA;"';;;;:;;;c.;'T'"_ ....Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: Re: Mil ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT-REQUEST
Th i is perfectly legal ... Or the US mili tary has been b r e a ki ng the law f o r 24+ years ....
PIs proce e d aggre s i vely with p lann ing this whi le we work t his i s s ue ...
Frank Tho r p
Cap t.a i n , USN
- - - --Or i g i na l Message - - - - -
Fro:
To a.d. Kat ie l, JCS
Capt, Col,SJS O!~JiC~S¥CP~A~<~.~l~l~.:n:.~h:a:d~d~O:C~~:r=:::::==rJ
CC, Thorp , Fr a nk , CAPT , OCJ CS/ PA <f r a nk . thor
Sent , Tue Jun 21 12 : 45 : 46 2005
Sub ject, RB : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLIFT REQUEST
~!:~.- Below is a sample ; t hese a r e the f o l ks who attended the r oun dtab l e wi th SecOef (and
OJ3 ) l as t. week.
The group i s made up of reti r ed mil i t ary who s erve as Wt a l king heads " f o r va rious me d ia.
OSO PA has coordi na ted othe r vi sits i n t he pa s t t o help educate t hem on what 's really
go i ng on i n I r aq, e t c.
They also do a c on f erence c all with t hem on a recurr i ng basis.
We (J o i nt St aff) usually p rov ide a J3 ops br i efer f or t he cal l. occa sionally t he Cha i rman
or the v ice do the cal l -- depending on the topi c /iss ue a t hand. CJ CS /VCJCS try t o meet
wi th t he re t ired mili t a ry a nalysts each t i me they actua l l y hav e a g r oup of them i n t he
Pentagon , but las t week's s c he du l e was t oo hard, wi t.h the Cha i rman out o f t own, s o the OJ 3
filled in .
Hope that he lp s.
Vi R
Kati e
Confi rmed Re tired Mi l itary Analysts:

Col onel Carl Ke nneth Al lard (USA, Ret i r e d)
Lieutenant Gene r a l Frank (Ted) B. campbel l (USAF , Ret ired )
Lieutenan t Colonel Bil l Cowa n (USMC, Ret i r ed)
Mr . Jed Babbi n (USAF, JAG)
Ma jor Dana R. Dillon (USA, Ret ired )
Col onel J ohn Garrett (USMC, Reti r e d )
Command Se r gea nt Ma jor Steve n Gr e e r (USA, Ret ire d )
Admiral David E. J ere miah (USN, Ret ire d )
Li eutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginni s (USA, Ret ired )
Colone l Je ff McCausl a nd , (USA, Ret i r e d )
Gene r al Montgome ry Me igs (USA, Ret i r ed )
Ma j o r F . Andy Me s s ing , Jr . <USAR , Ret i r ed )
Ca ptain Chuck Nash (USN, Ret i r e d l
Ge nera l Will i a m L. Na s h (USA, Reti r ed )
Wa yne Si nvnons (USN, Retired )
r i ina I Me ss a e - - - --
Fr om: Cap t, JCS SJS
Sent : on ay, une , 00 5 6:1 8 AM
To: Haddock , El l en (Kat i e l, Col , OCJCS / PA
Subjec t: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RL I FT REQUEST
Katie, do y ou have a ny d eta i ls o f t h is g roup ?
l(ll)
Cap tain, J AGC, US Navy
Le g a l Counse l t o t he Cha irma n o f t he Joi n t Ch ie fs of S t aff
-- - - - original Me s s age - - - - -
From: McNabb , Dun c a n J, Lt Gen , JCS J 4
Se n t : Sund ay, June 1 9, 2005 10:1 1 PM
To : Schwart z , Norton A , Lt Ge n, JCS D
Cc: Ha r nitchek, Ma r k D, RDML , J CS J4; "ll(ll)
~~;;;;;;;;~:C;O;L~ JCS, J4;
Haddoc k El len Ka t ie ) , Col, OCJCS/PA ; ~ Capt, JCS SJS ;
CAPT, J CS SJS; J - 4 JLOC Personnel ; Harnitchek, Mark
D, RDML, JCS J4; COL , J 4
Sub ject : Re : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
No rty ,
Ou r folks have been running the traps. We c an provi de d ed i ca ted airli ft for pu bli c
a f f airs ac tivi ties such a s t h i s p er DOD 4 5 1 5. 13 - R, Chap t e r 3 .
We coordinated th i s wi th our po l i c y e xperts a nd OCJCS/LC .
Per OSD Ex e c Sec yes t erday , once OSD/ PA and OSD Transportation Policy coordina t e a nd
DEPSECDEFapproves the t r a ve l, e x e c s e c will transmit to J S (J4) for validat ion a nd task ing
USTRANSCOM. We have a l r e a d y g i ve n TRANSCOM a he a d s up.
We 'll f inish wor k i ng i t with the OSD f o l k s on Mo nd a y and ke e p you i nf orme d o n p r og r es s.
VR
Duncan
Se nt from my Bl ackBe r r y Wire l e ss Ha nd he l d
OCJCS/ PA
l(ll)
l(ll)
J - 4 JLOC Pe rsonnel
Se n t : Sa t Jun 18 10:07 :51 20 05
Subj ect : RE : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Dunca n, please t ake f o r a c ti o n . Could we g et this approve d for SAAM? Thanks . Vi r,

Norty .
- - - - - Orig i
From: CAPT , JCS SJS
Sent : Sat urday, June 18 , 2005 8 : 5 8 AM
To: Schwart z, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc : McNab b, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitche k, M~r~k
~D::::
R:D:M:L:::J:C:S::J:4];
COL, J CS, J 4; Ha ddo c k , El len (Katie) , Col, OCJCS/PA; Capt, J CS SJS
Sub j ect: FW: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Si r:
Du r ing Thurs da y'S SecDef s ess ion wit h mil itary ana l ysts , he apparent ly enc o u r age d them
t o go t o Gitmo and s ee things for the ms e lve s . OSD PA is wo r k i ng t h i s wi th SOUTHCOM bu t
question has arisen as t o wh at we can do wi t h dedi c a t e d DoD lif t t o support ge t t i ng t hem
2
in and o ut of Gi t mo. Re c o mmend passing t hi s to the J4 te am and le t ting t h e m work it.
v/[r:'= = :J
Assistant
Joint Staff
---- -Origina l Message---- -

Fr o m: Haddock, El len ( Kat i e) , Co l , OCJCS /PA
Sent: Frida, J u ne 17 , 2005 2:21 PM
To: CAPT, JCS
Cc: OCJCS /PA; L OCJCS / PA;1!~;;::;;;:;;;:;;:;;:;;:JW!llii:.,
MAJ
JCS
Subject :
JCS SJS
Ma j , OCJCS /PA;
"-----_.......
ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQlJBST
LCDR, JCS OCJCS \ PA;
Perhaps you can help d i r e ct me on how t o bes t support this action:
SecDef , J3 , a nd others met with s eve ral r etired mi litary analys ts yesterday_ Th ey
dis cussed a n umber o f issues, wi th gre a t emphasis on GTMO and De ta inee Operations. SecDef
e n c o u r aged the m all to go to GTMO and see for themselves. OSD PA is cur rent ly working
with SOUTHCOM to a rrange a visit t o GTMO by these mil i t a ry analys ts soon -- coul d b e as
soon as firs t week or two in J u ly. I 'll get the date fr om SOUTHCOM once they have firmed
u p a p l an .
OSD PA has take n members o f thi s g roup o n s i mil ar t rip s -- j ust not t o GTMO .
Question/ rol e for Joint Sta f f i nv olves the a i r transpor tat ion. I beli eve the i n t ent is to
fly the m i n e a r l y a n d out l a t e r on the same d a y .
What c an we do t o ensure d e d ica t e d ai r l ift is a v a ila bl e to s upport t h i s v i s i t?
Th anks for your he lp .

VIR
Kati e
3
From : Col , JCS J4
Sent: Tuesday, June 21. 2005 1:46 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCSlPA
Cc : J -4 JLOC Personnel
Subject: RE: MIL ANAL YSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
Kat ie ,
This i s t he right p lace . .. 1 '11 have t he Batt l e Capt ca l l you. We'l l need t o connec t
the d ots wi t h DoD Exec Sec.
-----Or i gi na l Me s s a ge -----
F r o m; Ha d d o c k , El len (Kat i e) . Col , OCJ CS / PA
Se n es da un 2 200 5 12:4 8 PM
To:
cc • Col, JI!S!!Jt4====:: :J
COL, JeS , J4 ; CDR, OCJCS /PA ; ' - 1 LTC ,
OCJ CS / PA -
Sub j ec t : FW : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
COL .... ,
I was given your na me as a poi nt of contact f or thi s Airl i ft Reque st - - i s that accurate ?
I f so , ple a s e gi ve me a call. I unde r s tand that thi s g roup is schedul e t o v i s i t GTMO
Sa t urday, 2 5 June . . .
Vi R
C K i Ha ddoc k . USMC
- -- - -ori g i na l Mes sage-----

From: Sc hwartz, No rton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Sent : Monday , June 20, 2 005 5;57 AM
To ; McNabb Duncan J, Lt Gen , JCS J 4
Cc ; CI V, JCS SJSj Ha rni t che k , Ma rk D, RDML, J CS J4;
COL, JCS, J4; Tho Frank CAPT OCJ CS/PAj Hadd c
El len Kat 1e, Col , OCJ CS/ PAj cap t , J CS SJS ;
JSj J - 4 JLOC Personne l; Maple s, Mi c hae l D, MG, JCS
VDJS; COL, J4
Sub ject: RE: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AI RL IFT REQUEST
Thanks, Dunc an. VIr, Norty.
---- - Or i gi na l Me s sage - - - - -
From: MCNabb , Du ncan J , Lt Gen, JCS J 4
Se n t: Sun day , J u ne 19 , 2005 10 : 11 PM
To :: Har
Cc Sc hwa r tz , Norton
ni tchek , Ma r k A, Lt GenJCS
D, RDML, J4 DJ
, J CS j ~~;:;;::::~~~I_ J CS, J4 j
ddc tie ) , Co l , OCJCS/ PA; Cap t, JCS S J Sj
~~~~:-~",~~~~~;;~~~~;
~ , RDML , J CS J4 ;
'];COL,
J - 4 JLOC
J4 Pe r s o nne l ; Harn i t c he k , Ma r k
Su b j e c t : Re : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLIFT REQUEST
Norty ,
OUr f olks have been running the t r a ps . We c an p rov ide d edi cated airl i ft fo r p ubl i c
af f a irs act ivi tie s s uc h a s t his per DOD 4515. 13 -R , Cha p ter 3.
We c oordi nat ed t his with ou r po l icy e xpe r t s a nd OCJCS/LC.
Per OSD Exe c Se c ye s t e r d a y, once OSD/ PA a nd OSD Transportat ion po licy c oordina te a nd
1
DEPSECDEFappr ov e s the trave l, exec sec will t r a n s mit t o JS (J 4) f o r v a lidat ion a nd ta s k i ng
USTRANSCOM. We have a lready given TRANSCOM a heada up.
We 'll f i nis h work ing it wi th the OSD f o l k s on Monday and keep you i n f o rme d on progress.
VR
Duncan
Sent f r o m my Bl a c kBe r ry Wireless Handhe ld
---- -O rigi n al Measage-- -- -

From: Schwartz , Norto n A, Lt Gen , JCS DJS <no r ton . s
To : McNabb , Dun c a n J, Lt Gen , JCS J4 <duncan .mc nab
CC : Ha r n i t c h ek , Mark D RDML , J CS J4 <mar k. ha r n i t c h ek
COL, JCS, J4 Haddock El l en (Kat i e), Col , OCJCS!PA
<e l l e n. haddock apt, J CS SJS
CAPT , JCS SJS
"",.""....,"',...",,,. .., J-4 JLOC Personnel
Duncan , please take for action. Could we get this

, a pproved f o r SAAM? Thanks. Vi r,
Norty .
- u u Or i g i
From: CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Satur a y, u ne 8 , 2 5 8,58 AM
To: Schwartz , Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc: McNabb, Du ncan J, Lt Ge n , JCS J4; Ha rnitche k , M a rk~D:::RD
::ML
:::'::J:c:s::J
:.i "
COL, JCS , J4 ; Haddock, Ell e n (Kat i e) , Col, OCJ CS! PA; • Ca p t, JCS SJS
Su bject: FW : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIR LIFT REQUEST
Sir:
During Thursday's SecDef sess ion wi th mili tary ana lysts, he apparent ly encouraged them
to g o to Gitmo a nd see things fo r t hems e l ve s . OSO PA i s work ing this with SOUTHCOM b u t
question has ari sen as to what we can do wi t h d e d i c a ted 000 li ft to s uppor t get t ing the m
in a nd out o f Gi tmo. Re c ommen d p a s si ng thi s to t h e J4 t eam a n d le tt ing them work i t .
CAPT USN
Ex e cu t 1v e Ass1stant
----- Or i g i n al Measage- - - - -
Fr om : Haddock . El len (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS!PA
Sent : un 2 05 2:2 1 PM
To:.
cc CDR OCJCS JCS'~~~;;';;:::li:!s..~~!!i
CAPT , ! PA;,! LTC OCJCS!PA ; "'""...,.=~"=,= .......JL.l"""
JCS Ma j . OCJCS! PA; • LCDR, JCS OCJCS\ PA; L _ _.....
c·"-.,,,.....
Subject: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIR LIFT REQUEST
Perhaps y ou c a n help di rect me on how to bes t support t his a ction :
SecDef , J 3, a nd others met with s e v e r a l ret ired military analysts y e s t e r da y . They

2
d i s cu s s e d a numbe r of issues, wi th great e mphasis on GTMO and Detaine e Op e r a tion s . SecDef
e ncouraged t he m a ll to go t o GTMO a nd s ee f or themselves. OSD PA is curre ntly working
with SOUTHCQM t o arrange a visit t o GTMQ by t hese mi li tary a na lysts soon . - cou ld be as
s oon as first week or two i n July . I 'll get t he da te from SOUTHCOM once t hey have firmed
up a pl a n .
OSD PA has taken members of this group on simila r t r i ps -- jus t no t to GTMO .
Question/role for Joint Staf f involves the air t ransportation. I believe t he intent is t o
fly them i n earl y and ou t later on the s ame day.
What can we do t o ensure dedicated a ir l ift is available t o support this v i s i t ?
Tha nks for you r help .
V!R
Katie
3
From : Haddock, Etlen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent : ~~:,:,~2 1 , 2005 3:43 PM
Capt. USMC, OAS
PA~!-P ~A;;;;~;~DR, OCJC S/PA; ~.~;;;;=
To :
Cc: ..
Thorp, Frank CAPT
OCJCSIP . LTC, JCS J4; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-P KI)
J, Col, JCS J4; LlCdr, OASD-PA '------~
Subject: GTMO AIRLIFT REQUEST
I und@rstand you are the OSD PA POe f or the flig ht r @que st fo r r etire d mi litary analysts
to go to GTMO.
I ' ve tal k@d with the POC at our J 4, and un de rstand t hi s to be the process.
1 ) OSD PA submits requ@st through SecDef's ExecSe c
2 } Exec Sec approv@s reque st , and forwards to J 4 (me mo, via email)
3 ) J 4 g ets t he approved request and tasks TRANSCOM t o execu te
Watch Off icer in J 4 (LTC woul d like to p r ov i de TRANSCOM a head s up to
expe c t the r e que s t, but need s more de tails , such a s :
number of PAX
-- fl ight from where t o where
-- departure /re turn da te s & t imes
hone numbe r s that may be usefu l :

OSD PA Press Des k : LCDR
When I spoke wi th others on this list earl ie r. I unde r s tood Saturday as t he possible da t e ;
now und e r s t a nd t ha t mi gh t change to Sunday.
Also understand that t his group mayor may no t be combi ned with a CODEL on Fri /Sat ...
I will be l e a v i ng in about an hou r t o go to my s on ' s graduat ion, but I'll be ba c k first
thing in the mo r ning i f you need anything e l s e from me on this.
ViR
Col H

Read: 612112005 4:06 PM
Thorp, Frank, CAPT , OCJC SJPA Read: 612112005 5:50 PM
Read: 612112005 4:31 PM

Reac:!: 612112005 3:57 PM
Lawrence , Dallas , OA$Q.PA Reac:!: 612112005 3:43 PM
Real:!: 612112005 6:28 PM
Read: 612112005 3:53 PM
1
)(8)
From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA

Sent: Frida Jul 08 2005 2:59 PM
To: )(8) APT, JCS S S
Cc: )(8) Col JCS J4; )(8) Ca t. USMC, OASD-PA; )(8)
CDR, OCJCS/PA LTC, OCJCS/PA Maj, \!:
O~C'::JC~S~IP~A:-'"
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Just got a ca l l from aSD PA action officer, wo r ki ng a r eturn trip to GTMO for t he Ret i r ed
Military Analysts .
Bet ween weather, CODELs, etc., the date jumped around a bit, bu t they are scheduled to go
Tuesday, 12 July .
Unfortuna t ely, the airlift support has not materi ali zed. I understand they 've d i s c us sed
wi t h each of the s ervices, but nothing ye t. n:~:::::J
The call I got was i n hope s of Joi nt Staff assisting with airlif t - - I know Col .
he l pe d ou t t he last time, a nd our JLOC team made t h i s ha ppe n. Want t o make sur e the
Direc tor is a ware o f a similar r e que s t for support (aga in) .
I 'm off to a me e t i ng , and wi l l try to stop by af terwards to discuss in more de t ail.
VI R
Ka t ie
--- --origi nal Message-----

From: S chwart z, Norto n A, Lt Ge n, JCS DJS
Sent: Mo nda y , Jun e 20, 2005 5 : 5 7 AM
To: McNabb Dun c a n J , Lt Gen, JCS J4
Cc : Cl V, JCS SJS ; Harni tch ek, Ma rk D, RDML, J CS J 4;
J CS J 4; Thorp , Frank , CAPT, OCJCS/ PAi Haddock, Ell e n (Kati e), Col , OCJ CS PA, ~
Capt, JCS SJS; CAPT, JCS SJSi J-4 J LOC Pe r s o n ne l ; Map l e s,
Michael D, MG, JCS VDJS; ~ COL, J4
Subject : RE : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLI FT REQUEST
Thanks, Dun can . Vir, Nor ty .
D, RDML ,
Sub j ect: REQUEST
Nor t y ,
Our folks ha v e b e e n running the traps . We can provide dedi c a t e d air li ft fo r p ubli c
a f f ai r s activi t i es such as thi s pe r DOD 4 51 5 . 1 3 - R , Ch apter 3 .
We coordina ted this with our policy experts and OCJCS/LC .
Per OSD Exec Sec y e ste r da y , once OSD/PA and OSD Transportation po l i c y coordinate and
DEPS ECDEFapproves the trav e l , e xec se c wi l l transmi t to JS (J4) fo r validation and t a s k i ng
USTRANSCOM. We h a v e already given TRANSCOM a heads u p.
We' l l f i nish wor k ing it with the OSD folks o n Monday and ke e p you i n f o rm e d on p r o g r e s s.
VR
Duncan
1
Sent f rom my Bl a c kBe r r y wireless Handhel d
- - - - - Or i g i n al Me s s a ge - - - - -
From: Schwartz , Norton A, Lt Gen ,
To: McNabb , Duncan J, Lt Gen , J CS J4 JCS <dunc <norton'SCh~~a~r~t;z~~~~~~~~~~~~~;:::::::]
DJS a n . mc n a b
CC; Harn i t c hek , Mar k D, RDML , JCS J4 <mark.harn itchek
COL , JCS , J 4
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~H~a~d~d~O~C~k~.~E~,llen
<el l e n. h a ddock ~ (Kat SJS
Ca pt , JCS i e ) , Co l,
OCJCS PA
CAPT, JCS SJS

J -4 JLOC Pe r s o nne
Sen t: Sat Jun 18 10: 07 : 5 1 200 5
Subj ec t : RB : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLI FT REQUEST
Duncan , please take for a c t i o n. Could we get th is a p proved f or SAAM? Thanks. v Ir ,

Nort y.
--- - -O r i gi n a l Me s s a g e - - - - -
From: Rogers , Mic hael S , CAPT , JCS SJS
Sent: Sat urday , J une 18, 2 005 8;58 AM
To ;
Cc ;
Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
McNabb , Duncan J , Lt Gen , J CS J4 ; Harnitchek, M~ir~~~~"~~~'
I!!:::::::::::;:: :J
COL, JCS, J4 ; Haddock , Bl len (Kat i e) , Co l , OCJ CS/ PA; Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: FW : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AI RLIFT REQUEST ...- - - - - - -......
Si r :
Duri ng Th u r s d a y' s Se cDef sess ion with mi litary a n aly s t s , he a ppare ntly encouraged them
t o g o to Gi t mo a nd s e e th ings f o r themselves. OSD PA i s work ing th is wi th SOUTHCOM but
que st i on h as arisen as to what we can do wi t h dedic at e d DoD lif t t o support gett ing t hem
in and o ut of Gitmo. Recommend pass ing th is to the J4 tea m and l e t ti ng the m work i t .
v r
CAPT ~~-::'~~~~..... USN

Ex e cu t i v e As s ista n t
D' r a
--- - - Or i g i n a l Message - - - --
From: Haddo ck , Ellen (Kati e), Col , OCJ CS! PA
Se n t: Fr iday , June 17, 200 5 2 :2 1 PM
To:
Cc: i ch el S, CAPT , JCS
OCJCS/ PA; ~S
~~J~S;:::;;;;:::=::::'~.w;~...I>C,lJIs / PA; .1~;:;:::;::::::;::;:;::::;;;:lUl&l".
Maj, OCJC S/ PA; LCDR , JCS OCJCS\PA;
MAJ , JCS SJS '----I
Subj ect: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AI RLIFT REQUEST
perhaps you can he lp di re ct me o n how t o bes t support t h i s a c t i on:
SecDef , J3 , and other s me t with s e v e r a l retired military analysts yesterday. Th ey

d i s c u s s e d a n umber of i s sue s, with g re a t e mph a s i s o n GTMO a nd Detainee Opera tions. SecDef
e n c o u r a g e d t hem all to go t o GTMO a nd s e e fo r themselve s . OSD PA i s currently working
wi th SOUTHCOM t o arrange a vi si t t o GTMO by the se mi li t a ry analys t s soon - - coul d be a s
soon as fi r s t week or two i n July_ I ' l l g et t he date f r o m SOUTHCOM once t hey have f irmed
up a p l a n .
OSD PA has taken members o f t h i s g r o up o n s i milar trips -- j u s t not to GTMO .
Question/rol e fo r Join t St a f f invol v es the air t r a n s por t a t i on. I bel iev e t he i ntent is to
2
fl y th~m in early and out late r on t he same day.
Wha t can W~ do to ensure de di ca ted a irli ft i s available to support th i s visit?
Tha nks f or your help.
V IR
Ka tie
Tracking: Read
Read: 7I8l2OO5 3:30 PM
Deleted: 7/1112005 6:17 PM
Reac!: 7I8l2OO5 2:59 PM
3
Sent : Sunday, July 10, 2005 5:08 PM
To :
Cc : ThO~~
." F~ra~n:kjCAPT, OCJCSlP'~~~==]CDR. OCJC SJPA;.....
LTC. OCJCSJP, --' Maj.
Subject:
Capta in Thorp --
Ou r JLOC is work i ng t his s e cond lift request f or Mi l Analys ts to g o to GTMO.
Th e da t e bounc e d around a b it -- as o f Friday , the i n tent wa s fo r t h e m to go on Tues , 12
Ju ly .
VI R
Kat ie
- - - - - Origina l Message - ----

From: Harnit chek , Mark 0 , RDML , JCS J 4
Sent : Fr ida , Jul 0 8 , 2 005 4 : 35 PM
To: CAPT, J CS SJS ; Haddo ck , El len ( Kat i e) , Col , OCJ CS! PA; J-4 JLO C
Pe r
Cc: JCS J4 ; C, OASD- PA; ~~;;;;;;;;;;;;(
LTC OCJCS PA· Maj , OCJCS!PA;
L . - _.......
SubJe ct :
of course .
L...-.....
JLOC , PIs take t u r n o n thi s ... some p rior hist ory b e l ow .
thanks,
L.-_..1
- -- - - Ori ina l Mes sa e - - - - -
Fr o m: CAPT, J CS SJS
Sent: Friday, J u ly 08, 2005 3 : 36 PM
To: Haddo c k , El l e n (Katie), Co l, OCJCS! PAi Ha r n i t c h e k , Mar k D, RDML, JCS
J4
Cc:
Sub jec t : RE : MIL
Admira l:
Coul d the good JLOC team p lease work this MILAIR li f t is sue.
vir
CAPT &.;.;,;.................._....1
Execut i v e
USN
Direct o r
---- -O ri gi n al Me s s age - - - - -
From : Haddo c k , Bll e n ( Ka tie), Col, OCJ CS! PA
Se n t : Fri da Ju l 0 8 2005 2:59 PM
To : CAPT, J CS SJS
1
~C~C~'~~~:~~~~~~~~: Col, JCS J4 ;'1.::'= = = = = :l,caPt . USMC,
Ma j, OCJCS/PA
CDR , OCJ CS/ PA;
Subjec t: FW: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

LTC , OCJCS/PA ;
Just g o t a call from OSD PA a ct i on o f f icer , working a r e t urn t r ip t o GTMO fo r t h e Retired

Military Ana lys ts.
Be tw e e n weather , CODBLs, etc., the d a te jumped a r ound a b it, but they are sche dul ed t o g o
Tuesd ay , 12 J u ly .
u nfortunately , t he airli ft suppor t ha s not materialized. I understand the Y' ve discussed
wi t h each o f the services , but noth i n g ye t.
The call I got was in hopes o f J oint S taf f assist ing with air lift -- I know co l ~~~ 1
helped out the last t i me , and o ur JLOC t e a m made t h i s happen . Want to make sure the
Director is aware of a s i mi l a r reque s t f or support (a g ai n) .
I 'm o f f to a mee ting. a nd will try t o stop b y afterwards t o discuss in mor e detail.
V iR
Kat ie
- - - - -Or i g i na l Mess age- - - - -

From: Schwa rtz, Norton A, Lt Gen, J CS DJS
Sent: Mond ay , June 20, 2005 5:5 7 AM
To: , r.e een , JCS J4
Cc: CIV, JCS SJS; Harnitc he k , Ma r k 0 , RDML, J CS J 4 ;
COL , J CS, J4; Tho , Fr a n k CAPT OCJCS /PA; Haddo'Ci!k~'=::;;;:;:1
i e ) , Col , OCJ CS / PA; Capt , J CS SJS ; .
:
~:::';;:~~i..J S ; J- 4 JLOC Pe rsonnel ; Maples, Mic hael 0, MG , J CS
COL , J4
RE: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLIFT REQUEST
Than ks , Duncan. vi r, No rty.
----- Orig i na l Me s s a g e- u u
Fr om: McNabb , Du nc a n J, Lt Ge n, JCS J 4

Sent: Sun d ay, J une 19, 2005 10: 11 PM
To: Schwartz, No r t on A, Lt c e n, JCS DJ S
Cc : Harni tchek, Mark D, ROML, JC S J4 ; OL JCS, J4 ;
Haddo ck Ellen Kat i e ) , Col , OCJCS/PA; )to) capt , JCS SJS ;
C P J CS SJS' J -4 JLO C Personne l; Harn it chek, Mark
D , RDML , JCS J4 ; COL, J 4
Subject: Re : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIR LIFT REQUEST
No r t y ,
Our folks h ave been r unn ing the trap s . We c an provide dedicated ai rlif t for p ubl ic
a f fa i r s ac tiv i t i e s such a s thi s pe r DOD 4 515 . 13 - R, Chapter 3 .
We coordinated this wit h our pol icy expe r t s and OCJCS/ LC.
Per OSO Exe c Se c yes terday , o nce OSD/ PA a n d OSD Transportat ion Policy coor d ina te and
OEPSECDEFappro ve s the tra vel , exec sec wil l t r a ns mi t t o JS (J 4 ) for validation and tas k i ng
USTRANSCOM. We have a lready given TRANSCOM a heads up.
We 'l l finish wo r k ing i t with the aSD folks on Monday and keep you in forme d o n progr e s s .
VR
Duncan
Se n t from my Bl a c kBe r ry Wirel ess Han dhe l d
,
- -- - - Or i g i na l Mesaage - - - - -
From: Schwart z , No r t o n A, Lt Ge n ,
To: McNabb , Dunc a n J , Lt Gen, J CS JCSJ 4 <dunc
DJS a<no
n .mc nab
r ton
CC: Ha r n i t c hek Ma rk D RDML J CS J 4 <mar k .ha r ni tchek ~
'.~~C~h~w~a~r~t~Z~~~~~§~~~~~~~===:: I
COL, JCS , J 4 Ha dd o ck, Ellen (Ka t ie ) , OCJCS/ PA
<e ll e n . haddock Cap t , J CS SJS
....._---_......
CAPT JCS SJ S
J -4 J LOC Personne l
Sent: Sa t Jun 18 1 0 : 0 7 : 5 1 20 05
Sub ject : RE : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIR LI FT REQUEST
Duncan, p lea s e t a ke fo r a c t i o n . Cou l d we g e t t his a pp r o ve d f o r SAAM? Thank s . Vi r,

No rty .
--- - -Origina l Me s s a g e - - - - -
Fr om: Rogers , Mi c hael S, CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent : Sa t u r day , J une 1 8 , 20 05 8: 5 8 AM
To : Sc hwa r t z, No rto n A, Lt Ge n, JCS DJS
cc . McNabb , Dunca n J , Lt Ge n, J CS J4 ; Ha rn i t c he k , Mlr
~k~:D:,:RD
:M:L:,::::J:C:S==i
J4; ~;;;t."JCsSJs:-'"
COL, J CS , J 4 ; Hadd o ck , El len (Ka t i e ), Col , OCJCS/ PA; Capt , JCS SJS
Sub j e c t : FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLI FT REQUEST
Si r:
Dur ing Thursday ' S Se cDe f se ss ion with mi lita ry anal ys t s, he a p pa r ently e nc ou rag e d t he m
t o g o t o Gitmo and s ee t hing s f o r t hems e l ves. OSO PA i s working t hi s with SOUTHCOM but
qu e s t i on has ari s en a s t o what we c an do wi t h ded i ca t ed 000 l i f t to suppo r t g e tt i ng t he m
i n and o u t of Gi t ma . Recommend p ass i ng t hi s t o t he J4 t eam and l e t t i ng t he m wor k it .
CAPT. ~~;::;::;:;;:;:;::;:::::J
Exe c u t i ve As s i st a nt
USN
Dire c t o r J o int St a f f
--- -- Or i g i na l Me a s age - - - - -
From : Haddo ck, El l e n (Kat ie), c o l , OCJCS/PA
Se n t : Friday, J un e 1 7, 20 05 2:2 1 PM
To : Ro era Mi ha e l S, CAPT, JCS SJS
ce-
JCS SJS ; )(8)
Sub jec t :
MAJ , JCS SJ S
CJCS / PA;
....._-----'
Maj , OCJ CS/ PA; )(8)
MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLI FT REQUEST

LTC OCJ CS/ PAi L~~-;:::7,::;;-:::~iNi;L/:ljl:i.t
LCDR, J CS OCJCS \PAi
MAJ
'------'
Pe r hap s you c a n help d i r e c t me on how t o be s t s u ppo r t t h i s a ct i on :
Sec Def , J3, and o t he rs me t ~ i t h s eve ral re t i r e d mil i t a ry a naly s t s ye s t e r d ay . They

d i s cus s e d a nu mbe r of issues , wi t h great emphasi s on GTMO and De ta i ne e Ope r a t ions. SecDef
enc o u raged t he m a l l t o g o t o GTMO and s e e fo r t hems e l ve s . OSD PA is c u r r e n tly wo rk i ng
wi th SOUTHCOM t o a r rang e a vi si t t o GTMO b y t he se mili tary a na l ysts soon - - c ou ld be as
soon a s fir s t week or t wo i n J uly . I 'l l g e t t he date from SOUTHCOM o nce t hey have f irme d
up a p l an .
OSO PA has taken member s o f t hi s g roup on simi l a r trips -- J UB t not t o GTMO.
Ques t i o n / rol e f or J oint Sta f f i nvo l ve s t he ai r trans po rta t i on . I bel i e ve the inten t is t o
f l y t hem in e a rly and out l a t e r o n t he s ame day .
Wha t c an we do t o ens u re d edicate d a i r l i f t i s a va i lab l e t o suppo r t t hi s vi si t ?
Thanks fo r your he lp.

VI R
3
Katie
4
From : ~~~~. C IV, OASD-PA
Sent:
To :
Cc:
Tuesday, September 27, 2005 7:51 AM
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSl PA 'p-f:::::: J
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA; ~"..".,......J CDR, OCJCSIP '
LTC, OCJCSIPA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject : Outreach meeting tomorrow
Attachments: J-S Request memo.doc; Retired Military Analysts Outreach Group- Names only.doc
,-s Request
memo.doc (26 KB) _ow,.
RetIred Military
sir ,
j u s t wanted you t o h a ve e l e c t r on s fo r t he memo i dropped o f f f or you r eques ting general
casey and someone on t he joint s t a f f t o br ief t he r e ti red mili t ary ana lys ts at a
r ound table t o mo r r ow.
oiI;'\l/·k s
OSO Pu bli c Af f a irs

omm 'ty Re la t i ons and Pub l ic Li a ison
~=-~-" The Pe n t a go n
Wa s h ing t on , D. C. 2 03 0 1
www.America Support sYo u.mi l
1
MEMORANDUM
To: CAPT Frank Thorp
From: Allison Barber
Date: September 26, 2005
Subject: Outreach Meeting with Retired Military Analysts
OSD Public Affairs requests the Joint Staffs participation in an outreach briefing for Retired
Mi litary Analysts assemhled hy the OASD·PA Office of Community Relations and Publi c
Liaiso n.
The purpose of this mee ting is to provide the group with an operation al upda te on Operat ions in
Iraq, DoD ' s hurri can e recovery and relief effo rts , and the military commissions process.
We request General Casey address the analysts on Operations in Iraq. The Ge nera l's
part icip ation, consisting of brie f remarks and Q&A, is requested for 30 minutes, 9:30 a.m. to
10:00 a.m., on Wedn esday, September 28, 2005, in roo m 3E928.
Hon . Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Hom eland Defense will be invited to
provide an update on reco very and relief efforts from 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. We request
someone from the Joint Staff address the ana lysts on the military ' s ro le in coordinating with
Homeland De fense alongs ide Me. McHale.
Brigadi er General Thomas Hemingway, Legal Ad visor to the Appo inting Authority, Office of
Military Commissions, wi ll be invited to address the ana lysts with an update on the military
commission process from 10:30 to 11 :00. Deputy Ass istan t Secretary Alli son Barber will
conduct the meeting.
The list of invited Military Analysts is attached.
Sho uld yo u or your s~[.h~'-!U~lUf~·tions. please con tac .... ~ Community Relation s
and Public Liaison at -
Attachment:
As stated
(As of July 20,2(05)
Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired)

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Form er JA G)
Admi ral Denni s C. Blair (USN, Retired )
Commander Peter Brookes (USN, Reserve)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Reti red)
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Co lonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant Co lonel Go rdon Cucullu (USA, Retired)
Majo r Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads (USA, Retired)
Dr. David M. Finkelstein (LTC, USA, Retired)
General Ronald Fogleman (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired)
Co lonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF. Retired)
Brigadier General David L.Grange (USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Maj or Steven Greer (USA , Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)
General George Jou lwan (USA , Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan (USA, Retired)
Co lonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)
Adm iral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Dr. Je lTMcCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF. Retired)
General Mo ntgomery Me igs (USA, Retired )
Major Andy Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moo rman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)
Majo r General Michae l 1. Nardotti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)
General Glenn K. Otis (USA, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke (USAF, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
General H. Hugh Shelton (USA , Retired)
Majo r General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steve Short (USA, Retired)
Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
Captain Robert R. Timberg (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant General Bernard Traino r (USMC, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA , Retired)
General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)
General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)
From:
Sent : Friday, October 14, 2005 10:25 AM
To: Haddock , Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS!PA
Subje ct : W HAT THEY'RE SAY ING: Military Analysts Back From Iraq
What The y 're Sa y ing . . .
Military Analys t s Back From I raq
Rece nt l y , a group of mi l itary analysts for va rious medi a ou t l e t s t raveled t o Iraq to gain
a firs t- ha nd a s s e s s ment o f ongoing ope r a tions . Below is a synopsis o f t hei r r e por ts from
the pas t week :
Major Ge ne r a l Don Shepper d : "And I Thi nk You Are - I ' m Encour a ged And Optimistic For The
First Time I n A Long , Long Time Tha t The Iraqis Are Going To Pull Off - They 're Going To
Pul l Of f The Ele c t i on. They Ar e Going To Get Their Forces Trai ned, And That I s Go i ng Very
Well . " (eNN's "Daybreak , " 10/11/05)
Ma j o r General Robe r t Sc al es : "But I Think The Gr ea t e s t Ho pe I s I raq, Iraq Units, The

Regul ar Army, Bu i l ding Them Up Very Quick ly So That They Can Take Ove r The Fighting And
Increase The Pr obabi l i t y Of Coming Out Of Th i s OK ." Hume: "And You Think It 's
Happen i ng? " Scales: " I t' s Happeni ng . " (Fox News' "Sp ecial Re port Wi t h Bri t Hume, "
10/11/05)
Ca p t a i n Chu c k Nash : "Be ca us e The re Ar e So Many Iraqi Troops, The re Are About 140 , 000
I r aq i Troop s And Those Ar e n 't Guys Just Wear ing Uniforms; They Are Ful l y Comba t Trained,
Ready To Go Troops And That 's The Ot her Thing Tha t's changed Since January . It 's Not A
U.S. Face On This . It 's An I r aqi Face And They Ar e Competent Troops ." (FOX News' " Fox &
Fr i e nds, 10/11/05)
t1
Lt . Colonel Robert Maginnis Ta l ks To Soldiers I n The Midd le Ea s t who Are Optimisti c And
Suppor t The Mi s s i on . "Af ter a dinner las t night with Army soldier s, Mr. Maginnis repor t s
t o u s: ' The s o ldiers expre s sed frus tra tion with t he f ac t t ha t mo s t of the U. S . news
cove r a ge about Iraq is bad , which contradic t s t heir f i r stha nd v i e w.' " (Bill Gert z And
Rowan Scar bor ough, " Ins ide The Ri ng ," The Washi ng ton Times, 10/ 11/ 05 )
Iraq's Refe r endum :
Na sh Says The I r aqis Are Runn ing The Cons t i t utional Referendum, Intend To Vot e , And Ar e
Provi ding Se c u ri ty . nash: "As a ma t t er o f f act, the Iraqis a re out f r ont on th i s. Th i s ha s
be en t he long - there 's so much di ff e rence between now and the vote, the e le ct i on bac k i n
1
J anuary. The bigges t d i f f e renc e in t h i s is number one, the Iraqi population is l e aning
very far fo rward t o vote . Over 88 p ercent of t he people in Iraq a r e registered to vote and
int end t o. There are some areas where as ma n y a s 98 p e r c e n t of the people are regis t ered
to vote and the s ecurity, t he p lan i tse l f f o r t h e security is an Iraqi plan . The u .S .
fo l ks when t h ey got i t, were r e a d y t o make wha t ever c h anges were nece ssary and they looked
a t it and t hey went wo w, th i s is a great plan, so the Iraqis a r e providin g the forces. The
Iraqi s are p roviding all of t he secur ity planning and o ur f o r c e s are t h e r e strictly as
response unit s to help out should the Iraqis get in trou b le, bu t the Iraqis are running
t h i s t h i ng. " ( FOX News' " Fo x & Friends," 1 0 /11 / 05 )
Sheppe rd Says Tha t Iraqis See Th e Referendum As "A Victory Either Way" Because The Sunnis
Ar e Participating. SHEP PERD : "No w, a couple o f things about the election . Ag a i n , the
people I 've ta lked to say t h e y belie v e the Sunnis are goi ng to turn out des pite the
viol enc e . ... They t hi nk that e ven i f the r e fe ren dum is voted down that it wil l be a
pos itive , becaus e t he Sunnis have joined t h e process fo r the firs t time. And they get can
them a modified cons ti tu tion. So, t he y see it as p erhaps a victory eithe r way, a l t ho ug h
i t certainly will be somethi ng less t han what we ho p ed for . " (CNN's " Da y b r e ak , " 10/11/05)
Iraqi Security Fo r c e s :
Scales: " From My Visi t I Conc l uded Tha t The Great est Change In The Mili t a ry Ba l a n c e ...
Since Last Summer Has Been Ach i eved By The Iraqis Securi ty Forces . " (Robe rt H. Scales,
Op- Ed, " Th e Emerging I r aqi Army , " The washington Times, 1 0 /1 4 / 05 )
Shepperd On I r a qi Secu r ity Fo r c e s: "These GUys Are Good. " SHEPPERD: " Bu t I think t h i s
is wh a t's going to happ e n : We 've got impressions tha t the I raqi forces are not good. The
t r a i n i ng is no t going well. Fr om everyon e that we ta l ked t o , nothing could be furt her from
the truth . Thes e guys a re go od. Th e y' r e coming u p to speed very, very quickly." (CNN's
" Da y b r eak , " 10/11/ 05)
Shepperd "Imp ressed " By Iraqi Troops. SHEPPERD: "But t he y can d o the key things. They can
do intelligenc e . They can d o raids. And they can do presence . And they are being - are as
are be i ng turned over to them. For instance, about 20 percent of the city of Baghdad has
now b e en turned over to the I r aq i forces . I was very, very imp r e s s e d with wh a t I s aw, and
I t hi nk th i ng s wil l get b e t t e r as they get better and as they start tak ing over some of
our duti es, a nd we g r a dually b e gi n to wi t hdraw. " (CNN 's "Daybreak," 1 0 / 11 / 05 )
Shepperd Says Iraqi Forces Are Beginning To Ta ke Charge Of Securi ng Parts of I r a q .

SHEPPERD: "Th e Iraqi forces a r e r eady t o pro t e ct t he polli ng places . They 're ready.
They 're starting to ge t ready in v arious a r e a s. For instance, 20 pe r c ent of the territory
o f Baghdad h a s al ready been turned over to I raqi fo rces. You 're s t arti ng t o see that
s pread slowly a s they come up to speed . When the y come u p to speed, they are ma tched with
u. s. forces, and then they are given thei r own terr itory. All of that a p pea r s to me to be
working. I t' s s low, tou gh work, a nd we 'll be there for a whi le he lping them ." (CNN's
"Live From , " 10/ 11/05)
After Vis it ing Ninth Iraqi Mechanized Div i s i o n , Scales Concludes "And , Frankly, What I Saw
Was Very Encouraging." (Fox News ' "Speci al Re po r t With Br it Hume ," 10/11/ 05)
2
* Scale s Prai ses The Iraqi Commanders Of Iraqi s e c ur i t y Forces. "We v isited the Iraqi
9th Mechan ized Division located in Taji a few mi les no r t h of Baghdad i n one of the hot tes t
and mos t contested r egions o f Iraq. The un it was activated l ast Oct o be r and has ye t to
f orm comp l etely . It is commanded by Gen. Basha r , a thi r t y -year ve t e ran and , like many
pa triot ic , i nnova tive a nd s e l f- r e l i an t of fi cer s , a victim o f Saddam Hussein 's brutality .
The genera l cre a t e d the division by call ing up ma ny o f hi s old regu lar -army c omrades .
Three quarters are v e t e r a ns who have been recru ited f r om every p r ovi nce and ethn icity in
Iraq. The d i v i sion's mot t o i s, appropriate l y , 'I raq fi r s t .' Gen . Bashar built his divi sion
from a junkya rd . In l e s s than a year his s oldie r s p i c ked t hrough ac res of destroyed Sov i e t
tanks a nd a rmored pe r s onn el carriers t o pat c h together a f l e et of ove r 200 ope r a t i ona l
fi ght ing ve hicl e s. W (Robe r t H. Sc al e s, Op - Ed, W The Eme r gi ng Iraqi Army , " The washington
Times , 10/14 / 05)
* Scal e s Recount s Divi sion 's Suc cess I n Tak ing The Fight To The Te r rori s t s . " I met
Colonel Mohammed, division operat i ons o f f icer, an i nte nse ly proud a nd nationa li s t i c
o ffic er. He made clear t o me that the d i vi sion' s e ventua l goal was to de f e nd Iraq against
t he ins ur g ents wi thou t Amer ican he lp . But he attr ibuted the d i v i s i on 's rapid progre s s t o a
remarkabl y small cadre o f Ameri can sold i ers who prov ided t ra ining , logi s t i c al a nd
communicat i on s suppor t . Thi s i s a unit tha t f ight s a s it f orms . They have ki l l e d or
captured over fi f ty t err o r i st s and removed ove r s i x t y r oads ide bombs from t he maj or
h i ghwa y t ha t travel s t hrough its area o f o pe r a t ions . " (Robe r t H. s c a les , Op-Ed , WThe
Emerging I r aqi Army, w The Washington Ti mes , 10/1 4/ 05 )
She pperd: WThes e Are No Amateurs Her e . They 're ve ry Tough ." (CNN ' s wLive
Fr om, " 10/11 / 05 )
Nas h Sa ys Iraqi Troops Are Supported By The Iraqi pe ople . na sh: "They 're out there and
the Iraqi people are turning t o them - r e s ponses t o surveys, 89 percent of t he Iraqi
population ha s support and trust t he Iraqi troops and t hey ' r e telling t hem where the bad
guys are and we are rolling up that network . That' s a rea l take away. The real take away
is tha t t e r roris t t h i ng is c r umbl i ng ove r t he r e . " (FOX News' "Fox & Friends ," 10/11 / 05 )
Scales No tes That Iraqis Are providing Security And Ha ve The Capabilities To Take On The
I n s u r ge nt s . SCALES: "I'll give you one example. Remember abou t eight mont hs ago, Bill
Cowan was in here ta lking about the BlAP road, you kn ow, t he airport road? " HUME: "Ye s ,
yes, yes, yes, yes, the al ley of dea th ." SCALES: "Right. I drove the BIAP road, five
mi l e s along that road. And it 's clear of the enemy. I t 's fu ll of commerce . And who's
protecting it? The Iraqi s ixth i nfantry division. And in many ways, the y ' r e be t t e r t han
we are, i n the sen s e tha t they 're be t te r able to gather intel ligence. I mean, they can
spot insurgents by t he i r body l a nguage a nd by how they a ct and the language they use. They
can spot fore igne r s far better than our so ldiers can. And they're better able t o engage
t hese terroris ts when t hey find them of tent imes than our own s oldiers are. YOU know, being
part of the cul ture rea l ly means a lot when you 're figh t ing an insurgency ." (Fox News'
"Speci a l Report With Brit Hume, " 10 /11 / 05 )
* Sc a les: " (I r a q i Se c uri t y Forces ) Are Of t e n Very Suc ces sfu l At Finding Terrori sts
And Road side Bomb s Be cause Of The i r Intima t e Familiar ity With The Countryside And Local
Triba l Leaders . " (Robe r t H. Scales , Op-Ed , "The Eme rg i ng Iraq i Army ," The Washington
Ti mes , 10/1 4/ 05 )
Shepperd: "Bu t Remember, We Ha ve Buil t Ove r Ti me The se I nsurgents As 10 Fe e t Tall . The y

Are Not 10 Feet Tall. The y' r e Able To Do Small Att acks Wit h IBDs , But You Noti ce They
Ha ve Not Taken Ove r Po l i ce Stations Or Done Any La rge Move ments Acti ons In The Last
Se ve ral Mon th s . · (CNN' s " Live From, " 10/11 / 05 )
Sc al e s : " I On ly Hope The American pe ople wi ll Gi v e OUr Soldiers The Ti me They Ne e d To

Mat ure This Army . Gi ve Them Time , Trust Them, And Thi s War wil l Tur n Out OK. " (Robe r t H.
3
scales, Op- Ed, "The Emerging I r aqi Army ," The Washi ngton Times, 1 0/14 / 05 )
She pp e r d ; "I Think You'll St a r t Se e i ng The Insurrection Or The I nsurgency Ta ke Some Hits
Next Year And Start To Peter Out. But It Won ' t Be Until Next Year - Carol." (CNN ' s
"Daybreak, " 10 /U /05)
U.S. Troops In The Middle Ea s t :
Sc a les Says The Capabilities Of American Forces In Iraq Are Only Increasing_ SCALES :
"That's a great question . The American commitment is s teady. We're not going to s ee an
increase in American fo rces. And thei r capability is increasing, thanks to i nfusions o f
technology and the combat experience ... • HOME : · Ame r i c a n forces? " SCALES: ·American
forces . And the infusion of ne w units coming over , combat -experienced uni ts. The
i nsurgency is on a steady downwa rd trend , mainly because U.S. forces and Iraqi forc es have
been successful in cleaning out t he ratlines . .. • (Fox News' "Spe c i a l Report With Bri t
Hume," 10 / 11 /05)
Shepperd; "The U.S. Forces, They're Under Attack By IEDs. But The re's Very Li t t l e Direc t
Act ion Against U.S. Fo r ce s Anymore. EVery Time Insurgents At t a c k The U.S. For c e s , They
Really Get Hammered. And So The Lev el Of Violence Against U.S . Forces Has Gone Down,
Except For The IEDs. " (CNN's "Live Fr om, " 10 / 11 / 05 )
•
You are c urrentl subscribed t o Co mmuni c at i o n s Upda te - Ag e n c i e s a s :
ell e n . haddoc
To u n s ubs c r i b e s e n a an e ma1 l to :
lea v e -w h i tehou s e -communi ca t i ons- upda t e- agenc y-1 01 3 690Tal i s t .whiteho u se.gov
5
From :
Sent : ~;;;~~~~;
. Tuesda-¥..O-'J oberCj1IV
~',;O ASD-PA
2J,i!!;~·~
14!.JP
~MlL ~ ..
To:
Lawrence Dallas OASD-
Merntt. Roxie T. CAPT,
Tho , Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA;
Subject: Military Analysts in Iraq
Attachments: Final Military Analyst wrap-up - Iraq Referendum 10.18.05.doc
~
Final Military
Anatyst wrap-up...
This r@po r t takes a look a t ove r all cov@r a ge numbers and wee ke nd c ommenta ry
(October 15 - 16) by mili tary ana l y s t s who recent ly v i s i t e d Iraq. As a cont rol gr oup , we
have also p r ov i ded some i nsight i nto c omme n t a ry (o r lack t he r @ of ) o f thos e mi lit ary
ana l ysts who did not trave l to I r a q r i ght be f ore the r e f e r e ndum.
.----- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PAR
Military Analyst Med ia Coveraee Wrap-Up

Weekend Commentary-Iraq Ref erendum
October 18. 2005
This report takes a look at overall coverage numbers and weekend

commentary (October 15-16) by military analysts who recently visited Iraq.
As a control gro up. we have also pro vided some ins ight into commentary (or
lack there o f) o f those mi litary analysts wbo did not travel to Iraq right before
the referendum.
_ . tr '> TeIaI Cov~~ cc;-, ~
Analyst Television Radio Print Online

Montgomery Meigs 1 0 0 0
Robert Scales 3 0 0 0
Don Shepperd 8 2 0 0
Ch uck Nash 1 0 0 0
John Garrett 0 0 0 0
Robert Maginnis 1 0 1 0
.. Weekeiiil'Cove.age ~Oc" 1S.U) ,~
Montgomery Meigs 1 0 0 0
Ro bert Scales 1 0 0 0
D on Sh epperd 6 0 0 0
Ch uck Nash 0 0 0 0
John Garrett 0 0 0 0
Robert Maginnis 0 0 0 0
HIGHLIGHTS
Bob Sca les:

J;o> The insurgency is on «a slow downward decl ine," because the Am ericans and the
Iraq is are wo rking together.
). Feels optimistic that the Iraqi troops are up to speed " in terms o f the intangibles">
willingness to fight for a cause, cour age, co hes ion, and ''th e bo ttom line is yes -
these guys want to fight ."
Montgomery Meigs:
)0> Things were better than he thought they' d be in Iraq.
)0> They have secured "rough ly 100 people connected to Zarqawi's networks .. .in the
last 10 months...that's amazing."
)0> U.S. troops will be in Iraq through the first government term, through the next
four years, but with significantly less troops. As Iraqi forces get better and
stronger, US. troops will be drawing down.
)0> A positive sign is that lots of Iraqi troops, instead of US. forces, are leading
battles in certain areas, including recently in the successfu l Tal Afar situation.
Donald Shepperd:
)0> Very difficult (for the Iraqi people) to elect a competent govenunent that is not
corrupt and gaining confidence of the people will take time
)0> Iraqi forces just need to be better than the insurgents; not as good as US. soldiers
(in response to "readiness numbers").
)0> The Iraqi security forces, both the police and the military are getting better and
more capable and this is their second election. They learned from the last one.
)0> I see a rapid acceleration of the training and the capabilities of Iraqi forces over
there. The ones I visited were really good and very motivated.
)0> We must not set a date on troop withdrawa l.
Other Military Analyst Coveraee
As a means of comparing the analysis provided by the six persons who recently traveled
to Iraq, we also looked for commentary by six other retired military personnel who
regularly appear on television, in print, or on line. We chose Ken Allard, Jed Babbin,
Bill Cowan, Gordon Cucullu, Barry McCaffrey, and Wayne Simmons. We found a
combined total of one item among the six. This was a short excerpt in a piece Jed Babbin
wrote on Sunday about Washington, DC, politics (see below).
Excerpt from The American Specta tor online (posted today but written 10/15)
The unrestrained glee among the Sunday morning liberal talking heads at the Miers-
driven internecine war among conservatives was equaled only by their celebration of the
possible (and possibly immin ent) indictments of White House staffers in the Plame leak
investigation. Those political currents swept away the topic of the Iraqi constitutional
referendum, which seems to have been an unqualified success. At this writing - Sunday
afternoon -- we don't know the result. Regardless of whether the constitution was
ratified, about 60 percent of Iraq's eligible voters roughly 9 million people -- braved the
u
insurgents' threats and voted. Even in the Sunni provinces, the turnout was reportedl y that
high or higher. No matter how the vote turns out, this is an overwhelming victory over
the terrorists, whose murd er campaign failed to keep the Sunnis out of the political
process. This vote doesn't preclude failure of democracy in Iraq, but it makes it much less
likely. The Sunnis -- and the other Iraqi ethnic groups -- will long remember this vote as a
Public Affairs Research and Analysis 2

milestone on theirpath to freedom and self-government. Their memory is bound to last
longer than that of Judith Miller.
Note: General Tommy Franks appeared on Fox News on Sundaymorning, in part to talk
aboutthe newly issued paperback edition of his book. In response to questions about the
elections, he provided supportive answers, such as; it shows"the strategy is working."
Additionally. Rick Francona was later discovered to have multiple television clips on
MSNBC. Generally, his commentary was about the referendum process and the
insurgency. Unlike the traveling military analysts. he had much less focus on troop levels
and Iraqi troop readiness.
Weekend Televis ion Coverage

(Link to Actual Coverage on Fox, CNN and MSNBC)
Robert Sea les:

Fox News - On tbe Record With Greta Van Susteren
10/15105 03:57:05
Donald Sbe pperd:

CNN - Live Saturday
1011 51051 6:20:53
CNN - Live Saturday
10/ 15105 12:08:3 1
CNN - Saturday Morning
10/15105 07:48:53
CNN - Dolans Unsc ripted
10/1510510:18:43
CNN -- Live Saturday
1011 5105 18:37:57
CNN - DolaD s Unscripted
10/1510510 :07:59
Montgomery Meigs:
MSNBC - Ha rd ball
10/1 510503:57:04
Public AJTairs Research and Analysis 3

From : Maj, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Oct,,!,e, 19, 200512:06 PM
To : lIIl CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/P 0 rank, CAPT, OCJC
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie Col OCJCSlPA; CDR. OCJCS/PA;L- ---'
LTC. OCJCSIPA; TSgt, JCS. OCJCSlPA
Subject : FW : Fact Sheet - 1268 Report to Congress on Measuring the Security & Stability in Iraq
Attachments : Fact Sheet October Report.doc
Fact Sheet 0ctDber

Rej>ort.doc ...
Sirs ... her e ' s the fact sheet f or t he 126 8 Report t o Congress on Measuring t he
s e curi ty & St a bi lity i n Iraq from the DRSO of f i c e .
If you r ead this fact s heet , as we l l as the draft TPs that were generated earl i er in the
p roce ss , it qu i c kl y becomes apparent that t he i n formation is j ust too o l d to cont inue
t a l ki ng about i t. I t was ol d data the day it was publ i shed . .. a nd t ha t will continue to be
t he p roblem f or f uture reports if the 'proces s' doe s n ' t a l l ow f o r i t to be published more
qui ckl y.
I propose we make t he deliberate dec ision t o d is cont inue executi ng the rema1n1ng proposed
piece s o f a PA plan (wh i c h are civi c g r oups , J -SCOPE , a nd a l l-hands call s) . This wil l
probab l y be dis cus sed a t t he next Steeri ng Group Meet ing next week.
Whi le execu tion on thi s report was poor , I bel ieve we have enough lead time and les s ons
learned from the la s t tw o that I can p repare a mor e aggre s si ve plan for the next report
that will be issued i n J a nua ry . Th is wil l be publis hed every 90 days.
I a lso be lieve i n the midst of al l the a c tivit ies go ing on r ight now (referendum,
elec t ions, Saddam t r ial, NMSP -WOT, NSSI, etc.) that t h i s i n fo rmat ion wil l ge t lost i n the
fray, especia l ly si nc e we're already wel l ou t of the cycle fo r whe n it was r e lea s e d a nd
t he data, even whe n published on 12 Oct, was a lready o ld compa red t o what's be ing wr i t t e n
about and discussed t oda y .
Wit h your approva l , I will i ncor pora t e t he following elements into the dr a f t p lan for the
next r e por t (Jan ' 06 ) :
- - J -S COPE a rticle (written by J -S or use t he AFI S ar tic le that's usua l ly wr i t ten f r om the
pr e s s conf e r ence )
- - Al l - ha nd s ca l ls (CONCERN: unl ess the CJCS does i t AND it 's manda tory, who wi l l rea ll y
be i nt ere s t e d? We can ' t fo rce -feed t he Joint Staff , but I woul d ha te to have Lt Gen
Renuart (or o t he r designated rep ) stand up in f ront of an empty conf room/auditorium. )
-- Talking Point s /fact she e t (pr oduce d by DRSO) f or a senior l eader 'module' o f
i nformation f or speeches /public e ngageme nt s / c i v i c g r oup s , e t c .
Pre s s Confe rence
Mi l i t a ry a na l y st cal l
-- Select mi li t a ry i nt e rv i ews
-- Pos t report t o Defense Link (Cur r e nt repor t i s posted )
Please let me kn ow what yo u think.
v r,
L..-_---'
-~r~i;g~~~~~~~~~~§d~~~~~~t!~~~;~:::::~5
:> From : LtCo l, J CS J5
ctober 1 8, 2005 3 : 55 PM
:>Sent ·
:>To:
:> - - - -
J 5; ~~~::;;:::;;:::;:;:::;;:;::=~
~
Lt Co l , JCS J5; MAJ, JCS JS ; LTC, JCS NMCC; "- ~
Maj , OCJCS/ PA; CIV, J CS, NMCC
1
:>Cc: CAPT, JS J5
:>Subject: FW: Fa c t Shee t
>
:>L&G
:>HR 126 8 fact sheet as pro mised
>VR
..,~~-:~":":_~~ Lt Co l , USAF
:>Joi n t Staff , J -S policy Division
:> I y Branch Chief Pen tagon Rm L.__- '
>
:> F rom:
:> Se- nt·
:>To:
--- -o~r~i~~~~~~~R§~? MAJ, WSO- DRSO
ctobe r 18, 200 5 2: 1 9 PM
Lt Co l , JCS J5
>Sub j ect, Fact Shee t
>
:> Si r,
>
:>He re is t he fac t s hee t a s formatted per g u idance fro m OSD PA and /or LA. The f a ct s a r e
u p d a t e d bu t the re s t of the i n fo rmat i o n (e . g . ~ Annou nc e ment s o r a cti vi t ies_~ ) I'm no t s ure
abou t (J o na t h a n wa s working wi th PA/LA o n th i s ).
>
>
>
:>Respec t f ully,
>
>MAJ _' -;!~:;;;;;::;:;;::;:;:;:;;::;::I
:>Metr ic s Co o r d i n a t o r
:>De f e nse Recons t ruction S u ort Of fic e, a SD Pentagon , Room
......- ...
:> " ¥o u c a n ' t manage what y o u can ' t me asure .~
>
2
Fact Sheet
OSD - Defense Reconstruction Support Office
Washington, DC
October 13, 2005
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq -1268 Report to Congress

This is the seco nd in a series of reports to Congress meas uring stability and security in Iraq . Th e
first report was delivered on July 22, 2005 . Th e repo rt provides baseli ne measurements and
indica tors of Iraq' s political climate, security environmen t activity and security force training
and performance.
Following is a listin g of initiatives and activities that have oc curred since the last report in J uly:
Political Stabil ity
• The nationa l referendum will be held on October 15th; reports indicated one million new voters
reg istered
• Iraqis overwhe lming intend to vote on Octo ber 15th, representing another major democratic and
political mileston e
• A private med ia is thriving and growi ng in Iraq; 44 commercial television stations , 72 commercial
radio stations and more than 100 private newspapers are operating in Iraq
• Other countries have comm itted an additional $235 mill ion to rebuild Iraq
• NATO has partne red with Iraq and is training and developing a new staff college for Iraq's military
Econom ic Stability
• Iraq has normalized relat ions with the International Monetary Fund receive d $436 million in
emergency loans
• World Bank projects 3.7% growth for 2005
• Despite terrorist attacks, Iraq continues to produce 2.16 million barrels per day (bblJd) and export
1.4 million bbl/d; key oil infrastructure repairs are underway
• The-U.S. Govemment is training new infrastructure security battalions and creating a "train -the-
trainer" progra m
• Thirty years of neglect and corruption in the electricity sector have severely limited Iraq' s ability to
improve electricity output
• Communications sector expansion fueled by broad-based and strong cell phone sales and use
Security Environment
• The Iraqi Army is in the lead for planning and executing counterinsurgency operations in one Iraqi
province that is rough ly the size of New Jerse y. The ISF also have the lead for 87 square miles
in Baghdad and over 450 square miles of battle space in the other Iraq i provinces
.----- - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -
• Intimidation and brutal violence rema ins the terr orists and insurgency's weapons of cho ice, and
will remain so for the foreseeable future
• Coa lition com manders and local leaders continue to disrupt insurgent cells
• Signmcant numbers of Sunnis remain concerned abou t secur ity, but intend to vote in the
upco ming referendum
• Insurgents want sectarian violence and are promoting violence against innocent Iraq civilians
• Four provinces account for 85% of all attacks
• Fifty percent of the pop ulation is exposed to only 6% of the attacks
security Forces Training and Performa nce
• We have 36 battalions takin g the lead - capable of planning and executing missions with little or
no support from Coalition forces. And this includes one battalion completely cap able of operating
independently of Coalition backs topping. This is a 50% increase in the number of ISF cap able of
takin g the lead in combat operations .
• 116 ground comba t battalions conducting operati ons - 22 additional battalions since July
• Over 192,000 Iraqi Secu rity Forces trained and equipped - a 12% increase since July
• The total force structure proj ection has increased by 28 ,000, an d is expected to be com pleted by
August 2007
• Since January 2004 the Ministry of Defense has fielded 88 Iraqi Army batta lions including 2
special operations battalions
• Iraq units being fully integrated into all major Coalition operations
• Since JUly the Ministry of Defense forces received approximately 10,000 AK-47s, 1,800 pistols,
2,700 machine gun s an d 750 vehicles
• Eleven Iraqi comb at battalions were independently employed in Tal Afar; this is twice the number
during Fallujah operat ions
• The new logistics system is now being built
• Spec ial Operations units are undertaking reconnaissance and direct action missions
• Since July, Strategic Infrastructure Battalions have been integrated into Ministry of Defense plans
anf:J will complete Multi· National Secu rity Training Corp - Iraq {MNSTC· I} training in October
• NATO has trained 24 Iraqi senior officers - colone ls and lieutenant colone ls; two additional
course curricu la have been planned
• Since July, Ministry of Interior forces rece ived appro ximately 21,000 AK-47 s, 15,000 pistols,
1,700 machi ne guns and 1,900 vehicles
• 5,500 add itiona l Iraqi Police Service personnel have been trained and equipped since July
• 2,000 additional Special Police Commandos have been trained and equipped since July; this
program is well ahead of schedu le
• The Mechanized Police reached its target force level during this reporting period
• 1,200 additional Public Order Police have been trained and equipped since July; full force levels
are expected by the October referendum
• Since July, the Emergency Response Unit has conducted nightly ope rations in Mosul and
Baghdad; its forces have increased by 50% since July
Announcement s or activ it ies by President Bush and Department of De'ense Officials related to
th is report
Presid ent Bush :
• Rose Garden press conference

• Oval Office briefing from LTG David Petraeus
Secretary Rum. '.ld :
• Congress ional appearance with Gen. Case y, Gen. Myers, and Gen. Abizaid
• Press conference with Gen. Casey
• Press briefing by l TG David Petraeus
• Briefing to AEI by l TG David Petraeus
From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) , Col, OCJCS /PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2005 6:03 PM
To :
Cc:
'Tob ias. Ed'
'":,~~~;I LTC. OCJCS/PA;
Ibli il"'"- - - ' IV JCS SJS
Subject: ~ : rave Wit CJCS
Thanks f o r t he e mai l - - I ' l l answer what I c an, a nd look i nto t he res t .

The f ocus o f the t r i p is t r oop v is its , so I belie v e you will hav e p lenty o f acc ess to t he
troops for i nte rviews. We wi ll he l p f a cili tate wha tever yo u need .
I' l l need to get some cl a r i fi c a t ion from t he enterta i ners t o s e e what t he i r gu i de l i ne s are
wi t h regard t o g ranting interv iews a nd o r r ecor di ng the ir performances .
The ente r t a i ners who are con fi rme d for the t r ip are;
--Reggie McF adden .- Comedian
- -Diana DeGarmo . - pop vo c a l i s t (runne r up i n Ameri can Idol ) - - Mic hael Peterson --
c o untry -we s tern singe r -- (Ret ire d Co l one l ) Jac k Jacobs Vietnam-era Medal of Honor
r ecip ient (a nd more re cen t l y , mili tary ana l ys t f or MSNBC)
We might have a NASCAR d rive r , but won't k now f or c e rta in unt i l t omor r ow.
Hope that is use fu l ; I' ll t ry t o get more det a ils t o yo u s oon .
Best Wis he s,
Katie
-- -- - Or i g i na l Message - - --. -.. . -.

From: Tob i a s , Bd [ma i l t 0 "n__;;~~~~~~-
Sent: Tue sday , December 2 0, 2 005 4:58 PM
To ; Ha d do c k , Ellen (Ka t i e ) , Co l, OCJCS/PA
Sub j ec t; RE ; Travel wi t h CJCS
Col . Haddo c k -
Tha nk s f o r the s eat o f f e r . I have a couple of ques t i o ns whi ch I' m e - mai l i ng, i n
c ase I d o n ' t reach you on t he phone t his e ven ing.
Ho w much access wi l l we have t o i nt erviews wi th troops? What acce ss wi l l we have t o

i nt e rvi e ws with entertainers? Who are the entertaine rs? wi ll we be ab le to record a ct ua l
perf ormance s , audi o a nd /or video ?
Thanks f o r t he help. I 'll be back i n t ouc h t o morrow with a trave l de c i s i o n .
Ed
1
Ed Tobias
Associated Pre s s
Ass t. Manag ing Editor , Broadcast
1B25 K St. N.W . , Su i t e BOO
Wa shing t on DC 200 06
- Off ic e
~-:-_-;-::- .. - Fax
h t t p : / /www .ap.org <BLOCKED: : h t t p ://www . ap . or g/ >
From: Haddock , El l en (Kat i e), Co l , OCJ CS/PA [mai lto:ell en .haddock

Se nt : Tuesda y , De cember 2 0 , 20 05 1 :10 PM "-------.....
To:
Cc: !!!!E=;===; =J LTC , OCJ CS/ PA
Subj ect : Tr a ve l with CJCS
Mr. Tob i as ,
Tri ed t o reach you vi a phone , but unsuc ces sful .

Plea s e give me a cal l a t you r conv e ni e nce t o discuss poss i b l e tra ve l wi t h the
Chai rman during ne xt wee k' s troop v i sit.
Thanks i n adva nce,
Ka t i e
Col onel Kat ie Ha ddock, USMC

S ecial Ass i stant f or Publ ic Aff a ir s to t he Chai rman
The i nformation cont a i ne d i n this communicat i on i s i nt e nde d f or the use o f the

d e s i gna t e d r ec ipi e nts na me d above.
If the reade r of t his communication is not the intended r ec ipient, yo u a re hereby
not i f i e d that yo u have r e ceiv e d thi s c ommuni ca t i on in e rror, and that any r e view,
dissemination, distr i bution or copying o f th i s communi ca tion is stri ctly prohi bi t ed.
If yo u have r e ce i ve d thi s commun i cat i on in error, p l ease not ify The As s oc iated Pr e s s
i mmedia t e l y by te lephone at +1 - 212 - 621 - 1 898 and de l e te th i s e ma i l . Tha nk you.
2
From: Tobias, Ed
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:22 AM
To : Ha d kiln (Katie). Col. OC _S~...._ _'I-
Cc: )(I) LTC. OCJCS/PA; )(I) IV JCS SJS; Meyer, Lisa
Subject: RE: Travel with CJCS
Kat i e -
We'd like to take you up on your o ff e r and have Li s a Meyer accompany the CJCS on t h i s
trip . We won ' t b e a b le to spring a videographer, though, so o n l y one seat i s necessary.
Yo u s houl d feel fre e to wo r k logis t i cs d irectly wi th Lisa , bu t wou ld apprec iate be ing ke p t
in the i nfo l o o p .
Thanks,
Bd
Ed To bias
As s o c i a t e d Press
Asst. Managing Ed i t o r, Broadcast
1825 K S t. N.W. , Su ite 800
Was h i n ton DC 20006
~ - Of fi c e
~-:-~':":' ~~.- Fax
h t tp://www .ap .or g <BLOCKED : : http ://www .ap .org/>
From : Haddock, Ellen (Ka t i e) , Col, OCJCS/PA [mailto :ellen.haddoc k

Sent : Tu esday, December 20, 20 05 6 :03 PM ~----------------~
To : Tobias Ed
cc • LTC, OCJCS/PAi CIV JCS SJS
Subject : RE : Travel wi th CJCS
se .
Thanks for the emai l - - I 'l l answer what I can, and l ook i n t o the res t.
Th e focus of the t r i p i s troop v isits, so I believe you wil l have plenty o f access to the
troops fo r i n terviews . We wi l l h e l p f a c i l i t a t e whatever you n e e d . .
I 'll need to g e t some clarification f rom t he entertai ners to see what their guidelines are
wi th regard to g ranting interviews and or r e c o r d i ng the ir p erformances .
The e nterta iners who a re conf irmed f o r the trip are :

1
--Reggie McFadden -- Comedian
-- Di a na DeGarmo -- pop voc a l i s t (runner up in Amer i can I dol)
-- Mi c ha e l Pe terson -- country-western singer
-- (Ret i r e d Co l one l ) Jack Jacobs -- Vietnam-era Meda l o f Ho no r recip ient (a nd more

r e c e nt l y , mi l it a ry analys t f or MSNBC )
We might have a NASCAR dri ver , but won 't know f or c e rta in unt il tomorrow.
Hope that i s usef u l ; I 'll t ry to get mor e det ai ls to you soon.

Best Wishe s ,
Kat ie
-- - - - Orig ina l MeSSage - - - -~-!!;;:;::::;;~;::::J

From: To b i as, Ed [ mai lt o ~
Sent : Tue s da y, December 20 , 2005 4 :58 PM
To : Haddoc k, El l e n (Kat i e) , Co l , OCJ CS/ PA
Subjec t : RE: Trave l with CJCS
Co l. Haddock
Thanks f or t he seat offe r. I have a c o uple of ques t ions which ~'m e -mail ing, i n
case I don't reach you on the phone t hi s e vening.
How much a c c e s s wi ll we have to i nterviews with troops ? What access will we have to
i n t e rviews wi th e nt e r t a i ne r s ? Who are t he entertainers ? wi l l we be abl e t o rec o r d a c t ua l
performances, audio and/or video?
Thanks fo r t he help . I 'll be ba ck in touc h tomorrow wit h a t rav e l deci si on .
Ed
Ed Tob i a s
Assoc iated Pr es s
Asst . Manag ing Editor , Broadcas t
1825 K St. N.W . , Sui t e 800
Washin ton DC 20006
....__...... Offic e
- Fax
2
http://www .ap.org <BLOCKED : :http: / / www . a p. o r g / >
From: Ha ddoc k , Ell e n (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS / PA [ma ilto:e llen.haddock~~-------'''''''~

S~n t: Tuesday, December 20, 200 5 1 :10 PM
To: Tobias Ed
Cc: LTC, OCJCS/PA
Subj~ct: Tr a ve l with CJCS
Mr. Tob ias,
Tried to reach you v i a phone, but unsuccessfu l.

Please give me a ca ll at your convenience to discuss possible travel with the
Chairman dur ing next week's t roop v i s i t .
Thanks i n advance,
Katie
Colonel Ka t i e Haddock , USMC
S ecial Assistant for Public Affairs to the Cha irman
The information contained in t his communication i s i nte nded for t he u se of t he

designated recipien ts named above.
If the reade r of thi s communic ation is not t he i ntended recipi ent, you are hereby
notified t hat you ha ve received t h i s communica tion i n error, and t ha t a ny review,
dissemina tion, d istribution or copyi ng of this communica t ion is s tric tly prohib i ted .
I f you have r~ceived this communication in error, please notify The Ass ocia t ed Pr e s s
i mmed ia t e ly by t elephone at +1 -2 12- 621 - 1898 and delete t his email. Tha nk you .
3
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
Sent: Wednesda y, December 21, 200510:31 AM
To :
Cc: ~!:::~;JLTC, OCJCSJPA;- .....--....,CIV JCS SJS
Subject: RE: Travel with CJCS
Great news !
Look ing f orwa rd to work i ng wi t h Lisa , and with you .
All the b e s t f o r t he hol idays,
Ka t i e
- - - - -O rigin a l Message - - - -·i-~~:;;;;:;;:;;:~

From : Tobias , Ed [ ma ilto ~
Sen t : Wednesday, De cembe r 21 , 2 0 05 1 0 : 22 AM
To: 0 ( Kat i e) , Col , O C.~
JiCi
S I.!:.
PA ~ .....
Cc : LTC , OCJCS /PA; I V J CS SJS ; Meyer, Lisa
Sub ject : RE: Trav el wi th CJ CS
Ka t ie -
We'd like to t a k e y o u u p on you r o f f e r a nd have Li sa Meye r a c c o mpa ny t h e CJCS on

t h i s trip . We won't b e abl e to sp ri ng a vi d e ogr a p h e r, tho ugh , s o o nly o n e s e at is
necessary .
You shou ld f eel free to work logistics direc tly wi th Li s a , but wou l d app rec i a te
be ing k ept in t he i nfo loop.
Thank s ,
Ed
Ed Tobias
Associated Pres s
As s t . Managing Edi t or , Broadcast
1 8 2 5 K S t . N.W . , Su ite 8 0 0
Wa sh in ton DC 20 006
!-,-.,....,..,...__..1 -
- Off ice
Fax
h ttp : / /www .ap .org <BLOCKED : : http: / / www .ap . org/ >
From: Haddo c k , Ellen ( Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS / PA [ma i l t o : elle n . haddo ck

Sent : Tuesd ay , De c emb e r 2 0 , 2 0 05 6: 03 PM L. ~
1
To: Tobi a s Ed
Cc: LTC , OCJCS /PA; L ~ CIV JCS SJS
Subject : RE: Tr ave l with CJCS
Ed ,
Thanks f o r the ema i l -- I ' ll ans wer what I c a n , and look i nto t he res t .
The f o c us of the t r i p is troop vi sits, so I be l ieve yo u wil l ha ve pl e nt y o f a c c e s s

t o the t r oops f or i nt e rviews. We wi l l he lp fa cil ita t e what e ver you need.
I 'l l need t o ge t some c larif icat i o n f r om t he e nt ertai ne r s t o s e e what t he i r

g uide l ines a r e with r e ga rd to granting i nt ervi ews and o r r e c ording t he i r pe r f ormances.
The ente r t ainers who are conf irme d fo r t he t r i p are:
-- Reggie McF a dde n -- Comed ian
--Di a na De Garmo -- pop voca l i s t (runner up in Ameri c an Ido l )
-- Mic ha el Pe t e r son - - count ry - western s i ng er
- - (Reti r e d Col onel ) J ack Jacobs -- Vi e tnam- era Meda l o f Ho nor rec ipi e nt (a nd more
r ecently . mi li ta ry a naly st f o r MSNBC)
We might hav e a NASCAR d rive r , but won' t kn o w for cer t ai n until t o mor r ow.
Hope that i s us e f ul ; I ' l l t ry to get mor e det a i l s to you s oon .
Best Wi s he s ,
Kat i e
- -- - -Or i g i na l MeS Sage - - - '-~-~~;;;:~~;:;;::::J

From: Tobias, Ed [ mai l to ~
Se nt: Tue sday . Dec e mbe r 20, 2005 4: 58 PM
To : Ha ddoc k , Ell e n (Ka t i e ) , Col, OCJCS / PA
Subje c t: RE: Tr avel wi t h CJCS
Co l. Haddock
Thank s f or t he seat off er . I hav e a coup l e o f ques t i o ns which I ' m e-mai l i ng,
i n ca se I do n ' t r each yo u on t he pho ne this ev e n i ng .
How much a cces s wi ll we have to i nt e rvi ews with t roops ? Wha t a c ce s s wi ll we

have t o int ervi e ws with e nt e r ta ine r s ? Who a re t he enterta iners? Will we be able t o
r e cord a c t ua l performances, a udio a nd/ or vide o?
Thanks f or the help . I 'l l be back in t o uc h tomorrow wi th a tra ve l dec i si o n .
2
Ed
Ed Tobia s
As s o c iated Pre s s
As s t . Managing Ed i t or , Broad cas t
1 8 25 K S t. N .W. , Sui t e 800
wa ah i n ton DC 2000 6
- Of f ice
- Fax
http: / / www. ap. o r g <BLOCKED ::http: / /www. ap.org/ >
From:
[mai l t o :ellen .haddoHaddoc
ck i~ik
~::;;;;:;;;~~~
BUen Katie Co l , OCJCS/ PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 20 , 2 00 5 1 :1 0 PM

To : b '
Cc: LTC , OCJ CS!PA
Subj e c t : Tr a v e l wi t h CJCS
Mr. Tobias .
Tried t o r each you via phone, but unsuc ces sful .
Please g i ve me a call at your conven i ence to discuss possible travel with the
Chairman during next week's troop vis it.
Tha nks in advance,
Kat i e
Colonel Kat i e Haddock, USMC

S ec la l Assistant fo r Public Af f a irs t o t he Cha irman
The i nformat ion c ont a i ne d in this communica t i on is i n tended for the use of the
designated re cipients named above.
If the reader o f th is c ommunica t i on is no t t he int ended rec ipient, y ou are
hereb y n ot if i ed t h a t you h ave rece i ved t h i s communic a tion i n error , and t hat any rev iew,
d is semina t i o n, d i str ibut i on or copyi ng o f t his communica ti o n is s t rictly prohibited .
I f y ou h a ve rece i ved th is c ommuni cat i on i n e rror , pl e a s e not i fy Th e Asso c i a ted
Pres s immed i a t ely b y t el e phone at +1 -2 12 -62 1 - 18 98 and d e l e te th is ema i l. Thank you .
3
From : LTC, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wednesday , Decem ber 21, 2005 10:43 AM
To: 'Tobias Ed'
Cc:
Subj ect:
Ed ,
We will ne e d t he below inf o rma t i o n on Lisa to e n sur e we can add her to t he t r i p .
Passport # / d a t e issued/locat ion

Social s ecurity #
DOB/location
Thanks .
-----Origi nal Message-----

From: Ha d d o c k , Ell en (Katie), Col, OCJCS!PA
Sent: We dnes d a y , December 21, 2 0 0 5 1 0: 3 1 AM
To : ' To bias Ed '
Cc : LTC, OCJCS ! PA; L ..I C1V JCS SJS
Sub j e c t : RE: Travel with CJ CS
Grea t n e ws !
Looking f o r wa rd t o work i ng wi th Lis a . a nd wi th you.
Al l the be s t f or the holidays ,
Ka tie
--- --Original MeSSage --- '-~-!C:::::::::::::::J

Fro m: To bi a s , Ed ( ma i l t o ~
Sen t: wednesday, Decembe r 21, 2 0 0 5 1 0 : 2 2 AM
To : ddo ~ e (Ka ti e), Co l, 0 J_CSil.\:<'. ..
Cc : LTC, OCJC S/ PAi ~ . e l V J CS SJS i Meyer. Li s a
Subj e ct : RE : Travel wi th CJ CS
Katie -
We'd like to ta ke you up on you r o f fe r a nd have Li sa Me ye r a c co mpany t he CJCS

o n t hi s trip. We won ' t be a bl e to spr i ng a videographe r, t hough , so o nly o ne s eat is
ne c e s s a ry .
You s hould f eel f r ee t o work logist ics directly wi t h Li s a , but would

a ppreciate being kept in the in fo loop.
Thanks ,
1
Ed
Ed Tobias
As s oc ia ted Press
As s t . Ma nag ing Editor , Broadca s t
18 25 K S t . N.W . , Su ite 8 00
;hj=",,",-~~ :2 000 6
- Of fi c e
':-:-:-_,,:,,: -' - Fax
http: / / www .ap . org <BLOCKED: :ht t p: / /www. a p.org! >
From: Haddo c k El en Ka "e , Col , OCJCS !PA

lma ilto :ellen .haddock
Sent : Tuesday , De c emb e r 20, 2005 6:03 PM
To : Tobia s Ed ..... .,
Cc: LTC , OCJCS !PA ; crv J CS S JS
Subj ect: RE : Tr avel with CJCS
Ed ,
Thanks f o r the e mail -- I' ll answer what I can , and l ook i nto t he rest.
The focus of t he trip is t roop vi si t s , s o I be l i ev e you wi ll ha ve p l enty of

a c ce s s to the t r oop s f o r i nterviews . We wil l he lp fa ci l ita te whatever yo u ne ed.
I ' ll ne e d to get some c l a rif i c at i on from t he e nte r t a i ne r s to see what their

guide line s are with r egard to g ranting i n t e rv i e ws and or r ecord i ng their per forma nces.
The entertainers who a re conf i r med fo r the tr i p a r e :
- -Reggie McFadde n - - Comedi an
-- Di a na DeGa rmo -- pop voca l i s t (runner up i n American I dol )
- - Michae l Pe t er s o n -- c ountry - we s t e r n singer
- - (Re t ired Co lonel ) Jack Jacobs - - Vi e tna m-e r a Medal of Honor r e cip ient (a nd
more r e c e nt ly, mil itary analyst f o r MSNBC )
We mig ht ha ve a NASCAR driver , bu t won' t kn ow fo r c e r t ai n until tomorrow.

Hope tha t is useful ; I' l l try to ge t more det ail s t o you s oon.
Be s t Wishes ,
Kat ie
-- - - -Origi nal Message- - - -·i-~,. ~

Fro m: Tobi a s, Ed [mailto : L.~ -'
2
Se nt : Tuesday, December 20, 2005 4 :5 8 PM
To: Hadd oc k, El l en (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sub ject: RE: Tr a vel with CJCS
Col. Haddock
Tha nks fo r t he s e a t off e r . I ha ve a coup le of qu est ions whi ch I 'm e-

mailing, i n case I d o n ' t reach you o n the phone th i s evening.
How much access will we have to interviews wi t h troops? Wha t access

will we have to interviews wi th e nt ertainers? Who are the entertainers? Will we be able
to record actual pe rformances, a udi o and/ o r video?
Thanks fo r t he he l p . I ' l l be back in touch t omor r ow with a trave l

decision.
Ed
Ed To b i a s
Associat ed Pre ss
Asst . Manag ing Ed i t o r , Br oa dca s t
1825 K St. N. W., Su ite 8 00
B 00 06
~ Office
~~~"':"~~~~~ ~ . Fax
http: / /www.ap.org <BLOCKED :: ht t p: / / www. a p . org / >
From: Haddock , Ellen (Kat i e), Col, OCJCS/PA

[mai l t o :e l l e n . haddoc k
Sent: Tue sday , De c ember 20, 2005 1 :10 PM
To: Tob ia s , Ed
Cc: LTC, OCJCS/PA
SUbject: Travel wi th CJCS
Mr. Tobi a s ,
Tr ied to reach you vi a pho ne , bu t unsucce ssful.

Pl e a se g i ve me a cal l a t your convenience to d i s c us s possib l e tra vel
wi th t he Chairman d ur ing next week's troop visi t.
Thanks in a dvance,
Katie
Colonel Katie Ha ddock, USMC
S ecial Assist ant for Public Af fairs to the Chairman
3
The inf ormation conta ined in this communicat ion is i nt e nde d f or the u s e
of t he de s i gnated r ec ipi ent s named above.
If the r e a de r of thi s commun icat ion is no t t he i nt e nde d recip ient , you
a re he reby noti fied t ha t you have rece i ved this communication i n error , and t hat any
revie w, d is s emi nation, di s tributi on o r copying o f th i s communica tion is s tric tl y
prohibited .
If you have rece i ved t hi s communi c ation i n e rror, p lease notify The
Associated Pr e s s immedi ately by te lephone a t +1 - 21 2 - 621 - 1 898 and delet e this ema i l . Tha nk
you.
•
From: Haddoc k, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCS/PA
Sent:
To:
~~;:::5r,
~
3 , 2005 1:48 PM
LTC, OCJCS/PA
Subj ect: Fw: your ma il
-- ---Or i gina l Message---- -: : :: ;J

Fr o m: Merrit , Roxie T . [Merr i tt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD- PAl
To: Haddock , Ellen (Ka ti e) , Col , OCJCS /PA
Sent: Fri De c 23 13 : 08 : 05 20 05
Sub ject : FW : your mai l
Katie ,
I can ' t fi nd Di a n e on the g lobal. Could y o u forward t hi s e mail to h e r. Follow - up t o the

Conway analys t cal l t hi s a m.
Rox ie T. Merri tt
Captai n , u . S. Na vy
Director , DoD Pre ss Oper a t i ons
Off ice o f the Assi stant Secretary o f Defense f or Publ i c Af f a irs Pentagon , Room 235 65
a.t.o 20 3 0 1 - 14 00
c ell )(2)
" Li fe , Liberty a nd the Pu r su it o f Al l Who Th r ea ten I t"
--- - - 0 . . ge - - - - -
Fr o m: CI V, OASD -PA
Sent : Friday, De c e mbe r 23, 2005 1 2:27 PM
To : Merritt Ro i e T . CAPT, OASD-PA
Cc : CIV, OASD-PA
Sub ect: Fw: your ma l l
hi r oxi e , cou l d you p a s s this alo ng t o someone in jcs who can g et it to conwa y ??
t h ank,s !
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Ha ndhe l d
----- o ri gi n a l Mes
From : r ober tma 7 3
To : CIV, OASD- PA
Sent: Fri Dec 23 11 :39 :12 2 005
Sub ject: Re : your mai l
I' m on no ti c e f or t h e News ho u r for this e vening . I ' d l ike Met r i c s t hat indicate
d owns i zi ng at t his t i me makes sense. Sp e ci fi c a l ly, numbers o f attack s , t u rn ove r
ba t tle space t o I S F etc.
Can y o u h e lp?
Bob
1
Robert L . Ma i nni s
http : / /home .comcast .net /~

-~---------_ .....
------.-~-.--~~~~"i na l message -~iW----------------"
Fro m: CIV , OASD- PA"
« . • . OLE_Ob j ... »
MEMORANDUM
To: Re t i red Military Ana l ysts
From: Da l la s La wrence
Dire ctor , Community Rela ti ons and Publ i c Lia ison
Office of the Secretary o f Defense
Da te: Dec ember 2 1 , 2 0 05
Re: Co nf erence Call with Senior 000 Of fi c i a ls
We i nvite you to pa rticipate in a conference call , Fr i d a y , De cember 23 , 2005 from

9:3 0 -1 0:0 0 a .m .
Li e u t e na n t General J a me s T. Conway would like t o brief you regarding troop adjustments in

Iraq. In o rder t o part icipate in this call, yo u must a g r e e t o EMBARGO t h e information you
r ec eive o n the c all u ntil NOON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23 , 2 00 5 . Th e ca l l will be on
b a c kg r ou nd , s o you are fre e to q u o t e a senior DoD o f f i c i a l once the embargo is lifted.
TO par tic ipate in this conference ca l l, please dial or and

t o b e connected to t h e Analysts conf erence call. I...........----J n~~::::::::::::::;'
Please R. S . V. P . to L. ..... at .... .. or call her a t L. -'
We ho p e you are able to partici pa t e .
OSD Pub l ic Af fai rs

Community Rela tions and Public Li ai s on
The Pentagon
Wash in ton D.C. 20301
www .Ame ricaSupportsYou . mi l
2
r·' 1
From: ~ 1
Sent: ~~ed lle Sd av...J.a o.u a ry 11 2006-5,0
To:
i
Haddock Ellen (Katie\'

Col, OCJCSfPA; I
l·x.,-
~w.:rewei.9alla
)(I) .
~~I~e!Vl
RoxieT. Merritt Roxie: T CAPT OASD-PA · )(8)
I"xo
1
To:
Rh edance Gear e Colonel K8)
Subj ec t : Media Coverage of the Body Armor Issue
Atta chments : Body Armor 1.9.06.doc
Body Anno<
.s.os.ecc (213 KB).
« Body Armor 1 . 9 . 06 .doc »
Note: For t ho s e o f you i nt e r e s t e d i n what r eti r e d mili tary personne l now s erving as TV
ana lys t s have to say, several have commented on the i s s ue .
2
PA R
MEDIA COVERA GE: BODY ARMO R STUDY

January 11, 2006
SUMMARY POINTS
» "Secret" Pentagon study call deaths preventable-"Either a larger plate or
superior protection around the plate would have had the potential to alter the final
outcome," the study concluded.
)- Vulnerabili ty of the military' s body armor has been known since the start of the
war-data collected since 2003
);> Pentagon continues to have armor problems ranging from shortfal ls in bulletproof
vests to heavily armored Hum vees and trucks
);> Pentagon working to adapt and improve solider protection but need to consider
safety from extra armor against the loss of combat effectiveness from too much
annor
» Soldiers question the use of more annor---compJain that it is already difficult for
them to move
,... Politicians criticize the Pentagon-Senator Clinton requests an inquiry into the
issue.
Print/Onlin e Sum ma ry
Med ia coverage of the Armed Forces Med ical Examiner's body armor study has followed
the lead of New York Times reporter, Michael Moss, who first broke the news on
January 7. The coverage centered on the studies finding that additional armo r would
have prevente d close to 80% of the death s caused by wounds to the upper body.
The media provided a relatively descriptive explanation of the study's findings, but
shifted to a more critical perspective in its presentation of the Pentagon' s efforts to
provide armor to its troo ps. After the initial reporting, coverage expanded to include
skepticis m voiced by soldiers regarding the ben efit of added armo r to combat
effective ness and criticism of the Pentagon from politicians.
W idely quot ed Pentagon comments :

:> "As the information became more prevalent and aware to everybody that in fact
these were cas ualty sites that they needed to be worried about, then peop le were
much more willing to acc ept that weigh t on their body" -Maj. Wendell
Leimbac h, Marine Corps Systems Command
}> " In response to the chan ging battlefi eld conditions and as new technologies
eme rge, the Army continues to develop imp rovements to soldier protec tion
equipment to enhance surv ivability and mobility. We take operational security
very serio usly and will not discuss in public sensitive issues that may render any
insight to the enemy about our capab ilities, fielding plans, or tactics, techniques
and procedures"- Anny spokesman Paul Boyce
Television Sum mary
Television broadcasts also referenced the New York Times as the media outlet to «break
the body armor" story, however, it is Good Mo rning America's daily segments keeping
the issue alive. It has included interviews with Senator Clinton, the manufactures of bod y
armor and official U.S. Army statements about the distrib utio n of armor overseas.
Addi tionall y, many military analysts such as Wesley Clark, Bill Cowan and Boh
McG innis have also provided their perspectives. Coverage was on all major national
networks and local markets (ABC, NBC and CB S).
Mjlitary Ana lyst Quotes:

:> The reali ty is we're fighting a real war. Unfortun ately, if you burden soldiers
down with every piece of protective Annor that we would like to, they wouldn't
he ahle to move. (McGinnis)
:> We 've been worried about this for a long time this, is historic under inves tment in
the protection of individua l soldiers and marines. It's been going on 25 years,
since Vietnam . (Clark)
:> On this part icular issue, I believe the military conti nues to do the abso lute best
that they can for the troops out there... (Cowan)
PRINT/ONLINE EXCE RPTS
Clinton: Vests not protecting troops in Iraq Jan uary 10

(Newsday) hy Glenn Thrush
Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton claims that hundreds ofV.S. soldiers may have died
"need lessly" in Iraq because of inadequate body arm or and wan ts the Senate Armed
Services Committee to hold hearings into the safety of the standard arm ored vests issued
to troops.
Sen. Clinto n seeks inquiry into body armo r st udy January 9

(Newsday/AP)
Sen. Hillary Rodh am Clinton urged Congress Monday to re-exam ine the Pentagon's
standards for soldiers' body arm or in Iraq, after a new study found most fatal torso
wounds to Marines would have been prevented or minimized with more protection .
"With U.S. troops risking their lives daily in Iraq, A fghanistan and elsew here, we owe it
to them to make sure they have the best equipment possible," Clinto n wrote to committee-
chairman John Warner.
Body~A rmor Gaps Are Shown to E ndanger Troops January 7
(Washington Post) Arm Sco tt Tyson
The Marine Corps and Army are wo rking to upgrade body armor to preve nt fatalities
caused by torso wounds from gunshots and exp losions, after classified Pentagon forensic
studies high lighted how gaps in current armor are leaving troops vu lnerable.
U.S. troop s in lraq often complain that insurgents -- espec ially snipers -- have
demonstrated the y know how to exploit the gaps in the current armor. For example,
enemy snipers have killed U.S. forces with single shots to the neck or upper torso .
PeDta!!On Stu d y Links Fatatities To Body Ar m or - January 7 (w idely reprinted)

(New York Times) by Michael Moss
A secret Pentagon study has found that as man y as 80 percen t of the marines who have
been killed in Iraq from wounds to the upper body could have survived if they had had
extra body armor. Such armor has been available since 2003 , but until recently the
Pentagon has largely declined to supply it to troop s despite calls from the field for
addi tional protection, acco rding to military officials.
Military offi cials and contractors said the Pentago n's procurement troubl es had stemm ed
in part from miscalculations that underestimated the stren gth of the insurgency, and from
years of cost-c utting that left. some armoring compani es on the brink of collapse as they
wa ited for new orders.
Armor Faulted in Some U.S. Deaths - January 7

(Los Angeles Times!AP)
An unreleased Pe ntagon study of fatal torso wou nds to Marines in lraq found that most
might have bee n prevented or minimized if the troops had bee n weari ng improved body
armor.
The findin gs underscore the difficulty facing the Army and Marin e Corps in providing
the optimum level of body armor protection . The Army and the Marine Corps have
weighed the benefits of additional safety from extra armor against the loss of combat
effectiveness from too much armor.
U.S. So ld iers Question Use oeMore Ar mor - January 7

(Houston Chro niclelAP) by Ryan Lenz
BElli, Iraq - U.S. so ldiers in the field were not all suppo rtive of a Pentagon study that
found imp roved bo dy arm or saves lives, with some troops arguing Satu rday that more
arm or would hinder combat effec tiveness.
But man y soldiers say they feel encumbered by the we ight and restri cted by fabric that
does not move as they do. They frequ ently joke as they strap on their equipment before a
patrol and express relie f when they return and peel it off.
Both the Army and the Marines have weighed the expected payoff in additional safety
from extra armor aga inst the measurable loss of combat effectiveness from too much
armor.. .Others questioned the effectiveness of additional body armo r.
Mass. pols blast Bu sh for ski m py G I armo r - January 8
(Boston Globe) by Laura Crimaldi
Bay State congress ional leaders yes terday blasted the Bush administratio n over a new
Pen tagon stud y that revealed as man y as 80 percent of Mari nes killed in Iraq from torso
wo unds co uld ha ve survi ved if they had better body armor.
"That fatalities that have occurred could have been prevented is unforgivable. The first
basic respo nsibJity that we have to those peop le that put on that un iform is to gi ve them
the tools that they need to do the job and come home safely," said Ll.S. Rep. Stephen F.
Lynch (D·9th), w ho is leavin g for a fourth trip to Iraq in a few weeks.
"It is outrageous that this mistake was ide ntified at the outset of the war, but armored
vests were not o rdered until this Septemb er. Our troops deserv e more than speec hes about
' staying the course .' They deserve a plan for victory in Iraq and the latest military
tec hno logy. President Bush has denied them both," U.S. Rep. Edward Markey (D- 7th)
said in a statement.
Pentagon stu dY fa ults US body armor in Ir aq deaths - January 7

(Reuters) by Will Dunh am
Better body armor could have prevented or limited about 80 percent of fatal torso wo unds
suffered by Mari nes killed in Iraq, a report by U.S. military medical ex perts obtained on
Friday said.
Christopher Kelly, spokesman for the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, said the
office that conducted the study performs full autopsies on all troops killed in'Iraq and
Afgh anistan and that the evaluation of body armor "is one of many issues we address
with these investigations."
"Information regarding the effect iven ess of bod y arm or has been shared w ith those who
des ign and fie ld personal protective gear," Kelly sa id.
Se na tor Barb visits Indiana troops - January 7

(WTHR, IN) Roger Harvey/Eyewitness News
A Pentagon study shows the US needs to do more work to protect troops fighting in Iraq .
Senator Ba yh and other lawm akers say the report is disturbing and bette r body armor is a
mu st for Am ericans fighti ng for freedom .
For the families of these so ldiers who lost thei r live s, they wou ld like to see some quick
action . Senator Evan Bayh responded, "Frankly, heads ought to roll if there are peop le
who are responsible for not getting ou r troops the body arm or they need to protect
themselves. Th at is just not acceptable."
TELEVISION EXCERPTS
WSB - Good Morning A merica

1/1112006 7:14:19 AM
Co ntinuing on issues of security. Good Morning America is still on the case of body
armor and protection of Am erican troops. AB C news has now received new information
from the army (they had been reluctant to give a statement). They now say:
"Every solder in harm s way has a complete set of body armor, the best bod y
armor in the world---nearly 700,000 full sets of intercep tor bod y armor have been
provided to soldiers." - U.S. Arm y
They add now upd ated side armor will enter prod uction shortly. Our question is what
does "shortly" mean? This afternoon there will be a hearin g of the senate anned services
commi ttee looking into the whole issue. We will have more on all of this for you
tomorrow .
W SB (ABa Good Morn ing America

*Interview with Hilary Clinto n. Som e commentary by Howard Dean (partial transcript)
111012006 7:1 2:32 AM
Diane Sawyer: Still on Body Armor watch this momi ng. We told you yest erda y about
the secret Pentagon study that found the lives of more than 80010 of troops in Iraq with
fatal wounds may have been saved if they had additional pieces of bod y armor. After our
report later, "good morni ng America" received so man y phone calls from so many
military parents anxious to buy body arm or for their children being sent to Iraq and this
morni ng Ne w York Sen ator Hi lary Clinton joins us. She called for an inves tigation and
she's at her home in Chappaqua, New York. Thank you for being with us. I want to get
right to it. You have called on the Pentagon to make the additiona l armor available. Have
you gotten any reaction from the Pentagon?
Senator Clinton : Well, Dian e, this is the last of many requests that not only I but a
number of my colleagues in the congress, parents soldiers and marines and others have
made on their own behalf over the last now nearl y three years. and it just is heartbr eaking
to me that once aga in we have a study that look ed at the wo unds that marines suffered
and concluded as you rightl y said that we perhaps could have avoided so man y of these
fatalities with the right body armor. Th e prob lem is that we have not provid ed that bod y
armo r in a timely way. We have not given man y of our soldiers and marines the
protection that they need. It' s just unforgivable and unacceptable. We' re looking for
answers and I hope finally we will get them .
Sawyer: The army has issued a statement; the Department of Defense has issued a
stateme nt. They both said the same things. They continue to develop improvements to
soldier protection equipment but they also add they won't discuss these issues in pub lic
because it might render insight to the enemy and aid the enem y in some way. Doe s this
aid the enemy in some does this aid the enem y in some way to discuss this publicl y?
Clinton: Of course not. In fact, this has been discussed publicly for nearly three years .
WLS (AB Cl - Good Mo rni ng America

119/2006 7:14:02 AM
Diane Sawyer : Now someone who knows all about this, Jason Beck, president and CEO
of Diamondback Tactical Defense, which makes body armor. He ' s also a former Marine
and an instruc tor in hand -to-hand fighting. The vulnerab ilities are here and on the
shoulder?
Jason Beck: The shoulder region as well as the sides . There are no balli stic plates in
either of those regio ns. We have ballistic plates in the front and back.
Sawye r : But it is availa ble to provide for the side?
Beck: Correct. And the Marine Corps has purchased 27,000 sets. They have
approx imately 2,500 sets in the field curren tly.
Sawyer : But the anny?
Beck: The study just came out about a month and a half ago or right around that time,
the anny has been moving as fast as they can . They're a big machine.
Sawy er: Well, you say that. But these are lives at stake. As fast as they can?
Beck: They should be able to provide these within the next six months to a year to where
they actually have every single troop covered.
Sawyer: Should be able to. We' re going to keep the pressure on, if we can.
Hea dline News

1/812006 5:16:37 PM :
A Pentagon study suggests that not all U.S. troops are happy about impro ved body armor.
Man y soldiers say the armo r is restricti ve, weighs too much and incre ases the chances of
getting killed .
MSNBC - Sca r borough Countrv

" Interview wit h mili tary analyst Lieutenant Colonel Robert McGinnis
1/9/2006 10:00:25 PM
J oe Sca rbo rough : Did a Pentagon cover-up kill hundreds of marines in Iraq? A
shocking secret report from the Pentagon says as many as 80% of the marines killed in
Iraq from wounds to the upper body could have been saved if they had been wearing
extra Bod y Armor. Why was the secre t Pentagon study focused on saving lives buried for
two years ? (Gap in Transcript)
J oe Sca r bor ough : Let me bring in Lieutenant Colonel McGinni s, saying that 80% of the
mari nes may have been saved from upper torso wounds if he had had the right type of
plates. What do you make this Pentagon report? Why don't you think that those types of
plates should be used?
M cGinnis: Well, the types of plates that are used are ceramic plates, ballistic plates.
They have di fferent characteristics that we can't describe here. But I looked at the study
on the website. 93 cases, of course, you gave the statistics and the breakdown and
interestingly recommended that they use larger plates, ceramic pads for the shoulders and
sides. And you put a lot more weight on the soldiers . And you ask the soldier on the
ground, I was there in 2003, I was there twice, I was not issued protective gear in the fall.
This past fall, I had the Kevlar as well as the body armo r and every soldier now over
there obvio usly has it. We' ve learned a lot, clearly in three years . But the study is not; it's
not been done in a laboratory. The reality is we're fighting a real war. Unfortunately, if
you burden soldiers down with every piece of protective Annor that we would like to,
they wouldn't be able to move. And the irregular warfare that we're fight ing. they would
endan ger themselves based on what the soldiers are telling us.
CNN Late Ed ition With Wol f Blitzer

"Intervi ew with Howard Dean
1/812006 12:47:23 PM
Howard Dean: I was disgusted when I read in the New York Times yesterday that 80% of
the inj uries in the Marine Corps could have been preve nted if the Pentagon, Secretary of
Defense and the Presiden t supplied them with the armor they had. They requested that
from the field, the Pentago n refused. Secretary Ru msfeld ought to resign.
Fox News - Fox News L ive

" Interview with General Clark
118/2006 11:26:24 AM:
Newscaster: I'm go ing to ask you about a New York Times article saying that 80% of the
U.S. forces who have suffered who died, actua lly from chest wo unds didn't have to, had
only they had the right body armor. Do you agree?
Gen eral C la r k: Yeah, I do. We've been worried about this for a lon g tim e this, is
historic und er investm ent in the protection of individual sold iers and marin es. It's been
going on 25 years, since Vietnam . We knew when we cam e out of Vietnam the key thick
was the body count. How many people we have lost. Yet, we invested in armored
vehicles, high tech weaponry, missiles, and radars . But we didn't put enough money into
the protection of the lives of the individual soldiers and marines on the battlefield.
Fox News - Fox a nd Friends Sunday

*httervi ew with Bill Cowan
118/20068:25:38 AM
On this particular issue (body armor), I believe the military continues to do the absolute
best that they can for the troops out there and here are the big issues, one, procureme nt is
very difficult. Even if we had the abso lute solution today getting it bought through the
procurement manufacturin g and distribution proc ess cou ld take a long time. Secondly for
troo ps on the ground, I know from experience we aring body armor in Vietnam it's
restrictive and the study says if we had more parts of the body covered we wou ld have
lost less people, but the issue for the trop on the ground is he's got to have mo bility, these
kids are carrying heavy equipment and gear and packs already and they've got to be able
to move so sometimes you're willing to give up some of that body arm or because you
need that mobi lity and that flexibility on the gro und
I think if you talk to the mari nes or soldiers operatin g against the enemy out there
conducting, engaging, fighting, maneuvering, yeah, they'd like to be more prepared, a
littl e bit more protected but I certainl y want to maintain my mobility, my flexibility, my
ability to jump, move, run , shoot , communicate, all the thin gs that somebody down there
on the ground has to do, that' s what their mission is and you don't hear a lot of complaints
from the troops right now.
We hate to lose any of our men or women over there, but you can't protect them 100
percent of the time with 100 percent perfect solutions.
From : IV, OASD-PA)
Sent: 13 20061:01 PM
To :
Cc:
CIV. OAS -
OASD-PA · Lawrence Dallas
CIV OSD-LA]
OASD-PAj ' CIV. OASD-PAj: DI

Rita. l arry [Di Rita. larry. CIV. OSD-oASD-PAj
Subject: Transcript - Military analysts body armor
Attachments: 01-11-06 Lehrer NewsHour body armor.doc; 01-12-06 Speakes, Sorenson body armor
final.doc
0 1-11-06 Lehrer 0l-lH16 Speakes,

NewsHour body ... Sorenson bod...
Atta c hed i s the trans cript f or the mili t ary ana lyst cal Ion
Thursday , Jan . 12 a t 14 30 .
Top i c was body arm or.
Gues t s were MG St e phen Speakes of the Army G-8 and MG Jef f Sorens on from Assi s tant
Secre tary o f t he Army Cl a ude Bolton 's off ice (Army acqui s it ions l.
Brie fing was ON THE RECORD.
Pl ease note:
1 . Mr . Ruf f ha s a sked that CAPT Me rr i tt ge t the transcript to our reporters a nd a l s o

posted on ou r Defe nael i nk web site i n the transcript b in.
2. The t rans c r ipt references an a ppe a r a nce by Lt. Co l. Bob Mag innis (r e t l , one of our
mili t ary anal yst s , on the Lehrer NewsHour on wednesday , Jan . 11. I ' v e at tache d a
transcript of tha t d iscus s i on in case anyone wou ld l i ke t o r e a d i t . He appears with
retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Roge r Charles , p r esident o f So l d ier s for the Truth . t he
advocacy group that o bt ai ned and published t he Pe ntagon s tudy o f Marine de a t h s from t or s o
wounds.
Any qu esti ons s ee o r ca ll me
1
Copyright 2006 MacNeiVLehrer Productions
The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer
Jan uary 11, 2006 , Wednesday Tran script #8439
HEADLINE: The Ailto Hearings;

Blueprint for Rebirth;
Protecting the Troops
BYLINE: ANCHOR: JIM LEHRER; GUESTS: TED OLSON; DAWN JOHNSEN; LT.
COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.); LT. COL. ROB ERT MAGINNIS (Ret.);
CORRESPONDENTS: KW AME HOLMAN; RAY SUAREZ; SPENCER MlCHELS;
MARGARET WARNER; GWEN IFILL; TERENCE SMlTH; KW AME HOLMAN
BODY:
JIM LEHRER: Good evening, I'm Jim Lehrer. On the NewsHour tonight, the new s of this
Wednesd ay, then : Highlights from day three of the confirmation hearings for Supreme
Court nominee Samuel Alita, plus analysis by Ted Olson, form er solicitor general for
Pres ident Bush, and Dawn Johnsen, deputy assistant attorney general in the Clinton
administration; a report from New Orleans on a blueprint for rebuilding the city; and a
debate between two retired military officers on the e ffectiveness of body arm or for U.S.
troops in Iraq.
FOCUS - PROTECTING THE TROOPS
JIM LEHRER: Finall y tonight, the debate over body armor for U.S. troops in Iraq.
Margaret Warner has our story.
MARGARET WARNER: As U.S. casualties have mou nted in Iraq so too has criticism of
the bod y armor supplied to soldiers and Marines. It's called interceptor body armo r and
its des ign has been modified five times since the war began.
But insurgents appear to have figured out how to exploit gaps and weak points in the
troops' protective vests.
Some members of Co ngress have jumped on the issue, including Democratic

Congressman John Murtha when he called for a rapid timetable for withdraw.
But the Pentagon has defended the leve l of protection for American troops. The latest
turn in the controversy cam e from a veterans group called Soldiers for the Truth
published pre liminary findin gs of a secret Pentagon study of93 Marine deaths from torso
wounds over two years .
According to the New York Times, the stud y found as many as 80 percent of those
Marines could have survi ved if they had had extra bod y armor. For example, the study
said as many as 42 percent of the Marine casual ties who died from isolated torso injuri es
co uld have been prevented with improved prot ection in the area surrounding the plated
areas of the vest.
The Pentagon respo nded last week by stating it will continue seeking improvements to
body armor, but, quo te, will not discuss in public sensitive issues that may render any
insight to the enemy.
Today Senate Armed Services Comm ittee chairman John Warner called Pentagon
officials, including a soldier and a Marine wearing body armor, to a closed-door hearing
on the issue.
MAJ. GEN . WILLIAM CAITO, U.S. Marine Corps: We're fielding the best body armor
and protective equ ipment avai lable we think in the world today. And as we have the
opportunities to upgrade the equi pment, we do that.
MARGARET WARNER: Last September the Marine Corps ordered 28,000 sets of side
plates to offer additional protection for its troops in Iraq.
MARGARET WARNER: Do U.S. troops in Iraq have adeq uate body armor? For that, we
tum to two former military officers who are weari ng alternative varieties of protected
vests: Retired Army Lt. Col. Robert Maginn is served in Vietnam. He's curre ntly a
consu ltant to the Pentagon and receives regular briefings there. He's wearing the body
armor common ly worn by American troops in Iraq. Retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Roger
Char les is president of Soldiers for the Truth, the advocacy grou p that obtained and
published the Pentagon study of Marine deaths from torso wo unds. He's wearing one
more expensive alternative advocated by some Pentagon critics.
We invited the Anny and Marine Corps to participate in this discussio n, but they
declined.
Welcome, gentleme n. Thank you for coming in.
And Col. Charles, let's start with you. Why did your gro up publish this, expose this on
your web site?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.) : We had quite a bit of communication from groups
in theater -- Afghanistan and Iraq express ing strong dissatisfaction with the current body
armor for various reasons.
11 began to appear like there might be a story. We decided to pursue it beginning in

Septe mber, and along the way picked this part of the study up. We did not get the
complete study.
MARGARET WARNER: Now the study only looked at a certain kind of death : That is,
torso wounds. Were you able to extrapolate from that to say how many of the overall
American deaths in Iraq migh t have been prevented with different body armo r?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): We did not do that but the New York Times in
their piece which aired -- which was published last Saturday in their newspaper did
extrapolate.
I know the reporter, Michael Moss, that did this work and very confident in his
meticulous research, and he said that over 300 deaths, if you included the Army, killed in
action were probably -- possibly prevented had we had the better body armor.
MARGARET WARNER: So 300 of the more than 2200 deaths.
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLE S (Ret.): Yes.
MARGARET WARNER: What was yo ur reaction to the study, Col. Maginnis?
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, you know, Margaret, the battlefield is not
a controlled environment. It's not an experimental lab.
Yes, there's no doubt that soldierswere killed and they were killed because there were
gaps in body armor. But it's hard to tell from the study whether or not all of lhem were
wearing the same bod y armor and a lot of the other details that you'd want to have in
trying to make this deci sion .
MARGARET WARNER: And they did say they were preliminary results.
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): They did.
MARGARET WARNER: Well, now, Col. Maginnis, you are wearing what American
troops wear in the field. Could you stand for us and just tell us what this is and how it
protects the soldier wearing it.
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.) : Okay. This is the outer protective vest, about
eight pounds.
MARGARET WARNER: This is called the --
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): The interceptor body armor but it's the vest.
And then you have inside both the front and the back ll-pound ballistic ceramic, you
know, protector -- small anns protection inserts.
Now we have a deltoid shoulder protector here. They weigh about five pounds. Now the
Army soon will come out with side panels that weigh about three-and-a-half pounds that
are ballistic plates just like the front. And then ofcourse you have things on the neck and
in the groin.
MARGARET WARNER: A ll right. Col. Charles, so what is wrong with this? What did
the study show? Where were the vulnerabilities in this ves t acco rding to thi s study?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): We ll, the major vulnerabilities were in thi s area
bere. And I'd like to point out thi s is not a ballistic defen se piece o f gear. This is
protect ion against shrapnel b ut it's not the same as thi s hard plate that's in the front and
the rear.
So there is no ball istic plate protection here, so this is an area of concern -- this whole
area here and then around the throat and neck.
MARGARET WARNER: Stay standing both of you, p lease. Col. Charles, you're wearing
one more expensive alternative advocated b y some. What is it and why is it better? It
actually looks skimpier, ifI may use that word, than what Col. Maginnis is wearing.
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Rer.): Well, first of all, we did not bring the shoulde r
attachments which are available.
But thi s is an out fit called Pinnacle Armor. produ ces -- the tra de name is Dragon Skin.
And these are small titan ium ceram ic plates that are positioned in kind of a fish scale
approach.
An d it gives you protection from there to here, and then from the rear there back. Th ere's
about an inch -and-a-half on each side where there is no protect ion as compared to, you
know. about a foot on the side on here.
There also obvious ly is vu lnerability here and around the thr oat and so on. But, ov erall
it's abo ut 140 percent more area of protection with thi s system than the inte rceptor.
MARGARET WARNER: Why wouldn't 140 percent more area be better?
LT . COL. ROB ERT MAGINNlS (Ret.): Well, it would be ifit was all proven through
science. You kno w, certainly the shoulders and the neck, major difference w ith this -- no
groin protection .
And, you know. the co ntracting people as well as the Army scientis ts say. look. be
careful wi th Dragon Skin because it's good for a kni fe fight but we don't want to take it to
Iraq because o f the ballistic issues. And they're not comfo rtabl e with it yet, but perhaps in
the future.
MARGARET WARNER: Please be seated. What do you mean the ball istic issues? Is thi s
a questio n of mobi lity or is there a difference in these two between. let's say you took a
direct hit -- let's forge t about the gaps or set that aside -- is there a difference in the level
of pro tection betw een thi s ceramic one and this one with these disks?
LT. COL. ROB ER T MAGINNlS {Ret.]: Well, [ can't tell you the exact because it 's
classified but this will take a fairly sizable small arm direct hit. And he'll have to speak
for his own.
LT. COL. ROG ER CHARLES (Ret ): This will not only will take that hit but will take
multiple hits and the ceramic plate used in interceptor, one of the complaints from the
troops in the field was that too often after one round impact, then you had a bunch of
gravel basically inside the pouch.
It basicallyjust kind of disintegrated and lost his rigidity and crumbled upon impact.
MARGARET WARNE R: Is there also -- [ had read today, Col. Maginnis, an issue of
mobility or at least some commanders were sayingthough you look a linle more
mobilized than Col. Charles at the moment, that this actually was a little more flexible
than this.
LT. COL. ROB ERT MAGINNIS (Ret.) : Well, you know , you can modify this. You can
take these shoulder pads off. You can take this neck guard orr: You can even take other
aspects. You know. it really depends upon what the mission says.
Now. we've upgraded a lot, at least five times overthe last couple of years to include this
ballistic plate, and it really addresses the issue that he just brought out.
MARG ARET WARNER: Col. Charles, the insurgents are tremendously adaptable, and
as been pointed, out they've kind of adapted; they know what this vest looks like. Why
wouldn't they just adjust to this vest?
LT. COL. ROG ER CHARLES (Ret): Well, they had the chance. There was an
unsolicited letter from an American contractor over there who was shot eight times in the
back wearing one of these that he purchased for his own use.
And he did not know he had been shotunti l he got back and took it off and saw thebullet
perforations in the canvas cover. There was no soft tissue damage so it's proven in the
field that it can take multiple hits and still provide protection.
MARGARET WARNER: What do the people you've talked to tell you about why the
military has not adopted this? Is it the cost? Is that they really have doubts about its
effectiveness?
LT. COL. ROG ER CHARLES (Ret): The basic reason, as hard as this may be for your
audience to understand, is not invented here: Bureaucratic turf protection because the
Army people that were charged with providing this ten, fifteen years ago had a program -
- it produced something beginning in 1998 I believe, 1999. But it wasn't this - and t. They
didn't want to use this because they did not claim invention of it.
MARGARET WARNER: Is there a little bureaucratic problem here or --

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): There's bureau cracy everyw here Margaret. In
1999, the interc eptor came on line . There have been a lot of modifi cations since. We're
still maki ng those modifications. It's not perfect.
There's no protection system that's 100 percent perfect bu t it is a lot better than it was and
it's getting better all the time. The scientists tell us that it's the best that the world has
today.
MARGARET WARNER: Better than this?
LT. COL. ROB ERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): They said bar none. Ynu know, I've already
made my statement with regard to Dragon Skin .
You kno w, they're looking at this. Anything that comes across their table they will
examine. They have research go ing on at MIT even now on a variety of tec hnologies.
We want to find the best techno logy to save our soldiers witho ut j eopardizing mobili ty.
MARGARET WARNER: How much more would it cost to buy these?
LT. CO L. ROB ERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, you know, that's a contractual issue . I
don't know what his firm wou ld sell the Arm y his parti cular product for. But first it has to
go through all the extensive ballistic tests which it hasn't but this material has .
MARGARET WARNER: And , finally, to you, Col. Charles, as Co l. Maginnis has said,
the Marines have ordered now side panels for these vests. How much of the prob lem will
that solve?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): Well, it won't solve the propo rtion to the addi tional
area that's being cove red hut let me just say I am not a representative for Pinnacle Armor.
We were told by several independent consultants who work for the Pentagon that cannot
be narned because of fear of losing their jobs that this was probably the best ava ilable
bod y annor. It's wha t they wou ld take to Baghdad. The y do not have any financial ties
with Pinnacle Armor. We're not saying it's the best. We're saying it ought to get a fair
test.
MARGARET WARNER: And what's your very brief explanation of why 80 percent of
these soldiers did suffer wounds that went into the gaps?
LT. COL. ROB ERT MAGINNIS (Ret. ): Well, some of the soldiers weren't wearin g bod y
armor becau se the study j ust isn't clear. You know, those that were, you kno w. yes, there
are places that you can shoo t them. And it depends upon their position and so forth. So
it's a tough. tough finding. We're doing our best I think.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Co l. Maginni s and Co l. Charles, thank you both.
RECAP
JIM LEHRER: And, again, the major development of the day: Supreme Court nominee
Samuel Alita again declined to say the right to abortion is settled law.
JIM LEHRER: And to our honor roll of Ameri can service personnel killed in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We add them as their death s are made official and photographs become
available. Here, in silence, are eight more.
JIM LEHRER: We'll see you online, tomorrow at 9:30 A.M. Eastern Time with our Alita
hearing coverage, and again here tomorrow evening. I'm Jim Lehrer. Thank you, and
good night.
LOAD-DATE : January 12, 2006

Jan . 12, 2006
Military Analysts Call
Briefers:
MG Stephen Speakes, Director, Force Development, Office of the Deputy Ch ief of Staff, G-8,
United States Arm y
MG Jeffrey Sorenson , Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the Ass istant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
Host: Allison Barber, DASD eSD-public Affairs
Ms . Barber: This is Allison Barber. We have with us General Speakes and General Sorenson .
Today's call and information is on the record and we'll open it up. General Spea kes, if you'd like
to go ahead , and then we'll take some questions and move forward . Thank you both for your time
today.
Spea kes: Sure. This is Major Genera l Steve Spea kes. My job on the Army staff is the director of
force developmen t. As the director of force development, we're responsible for Army investment
accounts for equipment; we 're also responsible for overseeing the distribution of all of that
equipment. And so we get in the business of insuring that soldiers acros s the Army have the
equipment they need in accordance with the missions they are given .
Wha t we would like to do is - General Sorenson and I - is talk our way throug h this. What we'll
do is Quickly high light what we think some of the key issues are, and then we'll talk through what
we believe is the appropriate u or frankly, the truth in terms of some of the issues from our
perspective.
The first issue is we saw in the weekend coverage the perception that essentially , once again, we
in the military are react ionary to the developments that are happening over on the battlefield . And
so what we'll talk a little bit is our longstanding comm itmen t to go ahead and field the right stuff,
and to antici pate trends on the battlefield.
The other thing that you saw is some discussion that said we continue to have a problem with
various armored vehicle s. And what we can quickly summarize for you is the success story that
we have had in armore d vehicles, and what we continue to do to improve our overall armored
vehicle posture .
So what we'd like to do first of all is to begin by talking a little bit about body armo r. I think that-
and for example, I saw Colonel Maginnis the work that you did on MacNeil Lehrer (referencing 11
January broad cast), and obviously, you have not only worn it, but you can talk it, and so what I
will do for everybody else is just summarize some of the key points from our perspective.
Integrated body armor, interceptor body armor is something that has been in the Arm y inventory
essentia lly since the start of this war. We have gone from about 75,000 sets that were availa ble
and distributed in the Army at the time we crosse d the line of departure in Kuwait, to now over
700 ,000 sets. Th is amount is enough for all the forces operating in the Area of Operations plus
the majority of the operating force of the Army.
But, more importantly, it has gone through a continuous series of improvements, and the
impro vements have been a twin pull of the dynamic of what we see on the battlefield and then
what our venous research, development and testing activities teU us back here in the United
States . And so those two imperatives are then constan tly giving the Army the chance to see
where we ought to go to improve, and then to make those improvements .
The most important feedback we get always is what we call operational need statemen ts, wh ich
are statements from the commander in the combat zone of what he needs to improve the
capab ility. And they are short, specific requirements that commun icate here is the need that we
see, and then here is the quantity that we want fielded . They are then brought in to the Army; they
are worked wit hin the Arm y, both as a matter of strateg y in term s of how fas t we ca n do it, wha t
the techno logy is, and then to make sure that we have a distribution prog ram once we get the
actual capability put together. So , tho se are the dynam ics that drive us.
Now, let's talk specifica lly about what we have bee n able to field. I mentioned 700 ,000 sets of
inte rceptor bod y armor has been provided to soldie rs . The next majo r improvement that we saw
in terms of the qual ity of armor wa s what we call the deltoid axillary protector (DAP). And as ma ny
of you have seen on TV , what that involves is an abil ity to protect both the shoulder and also the
side of the bod y.
Now, the issue there was that that came in (inaudible) in 2004, and essentially by Jan uary [sic.
september] in 2005, we ha d com pleted fielding about 170 ,000 sets of what we ca ll DAP . Now
DAP was our best effort to insure that sold iers had m obility in their shoulders and upper bod y.
And so wha t it d id is it gave you a protection against fragm ents , beca use wha t we were seei ng
was soldiers in the com bat zone - particularly who wer e up in turrets - had a problem in that the y
were being exposed to frag m entation and had no protection over their shoulders and side. An d so
this material, which has the sam e basic ballistic protection as the outer tactical vest - wh ich is
worn acros s the res t of the bod y - gave us the ability to protect shoulders on this - sold iers that
were exposed , and also the side of their bod y.
And so that was the in itial effort that we undertook to try to fix someth ing that we saw was a resu lt
of com bat - wh ich is the need to protect so ldiers aga inst fragmentation .
The next thing we wanted to do was to continue to improve the quality of the armor that we
actually issue to so ldiers. And so what we 've bee n ab le to do is work on an increase to the quality
of the actual armor plate that we have provided to sold iers . And at this poin t now, we've got
essentiall y the second generation of armor plating that has bee n iss ued - actually. I'm sorry - the
third generation of arm or pla ting that we have issued this war to enable soldiers to better be
protec ted against the ballistic threat that they face.
And so. that is som ething that we have undertaken to do over the course of the last year, and it's
another success story, and one that we don't want to publicize. The rationale for that is obvious:
the more we talk about it, the more inform ation we pro vide the enemy. And o ne of the things
that's been very, very concerning to Army leaders is the open discu ssion of spec ific targeting
weaknesses or vulnerabilities that we see on soldiers when we see it in the me dia. An d so in this
case, what we have done is quietly fielded an enhanced capability to the basic SA PI (small arms
pr otective inserts) plate that man y of you have worn in theater whe n you have been in there.
So that is another important aspect of ou r ove rall program , which is as we improve, not to
publicize what we're improving and why . And yo u can obviously anticipate with your respective
backgrounds wh y that's so important.
Th e next issue then was something that the Arm y and the Marines both took on in their own wa y
and that was the actual add ition of SAP I plates to the side of the body. To give you a perspective .
you're talking abo ut essentially about nine inch es of the side of a bod y that is righ t now not
pro tected by the side of a SAP I plate. In other words , what you've go t is the OAP protecti ng a
large measure of the side of a bod y, but you don 't have the ac tual ballistic protecti on that is
afforded by a SA PI plate.
And so , the requ iremen t came in essentially in September to the Army in a final fo rm that
ide ntified our requirements then to prov ide wh at we are now call ing side SA PI pro tection. An d
side SAPI pro tect ion was the final ele me nt in all of this. It was designed to give us essentially
protect ion that augmen ted the Deltoid Ax illary Protector or OAP I which alread y had pr ogressed to
the shoulder and side of the body. So this wa s ou r latest effort in term s of continuin g to improv e
this overall design and our capabilities.
What we are seeing obvious ly is cont inuing evolutions in the nature of threat that we face . As you
know , the rise of the lE D has been something we've noted and we are reflecting in our body
armor protection, and the increas ing lethality of the weapons system s being used against us.
And so those dynam ics will make this a cont inual process. And so whe n headlines that we see
right now describe that we are now belatedly issuin g or rushing out to correct a deficiency, those
headlines entirely mis s the point.
This has been a progra mmatic effort in the case of the Arm y that has gone on with great intensity
for the last five months; was underway in December in terms of final decisions were being made
and capabilities that we will see fielded here in the spring . And so all of this is something that the
Arm y is very committed to, wh ich is a continuous evolution in our ability to better protect soldiers,
and yet at the same time, to master the dynamics of not overburdening them .
The soldiers who appeared yesterday in front of Senators Warner, Levin and Reed captured very,
very we ll the fact that we are at about the point wher e a soldier has to ma ke serious decis ions
about how much this armor he or she can afford to wear cons istent with mission, and with the
operat ing environment in terms of tempera ture or other environmental factors .
And the Marine that appeared in front of the public yest erday specifICally addressed why he
doesn 't use DAP. And his view of DAP is that it is unduly restrictive to his ability to operate with
his soldiers and upper body, and he doesn't prefer to wear it. We certainly understand that, and
that has been a part of all of this. is the design of all this body armor, and General Sorenson win
talk to that in detail because that is critical. None of this stuff is rushed out to the point that
soldiers look at and don't feel irs been integrated or proper1y tailored to the rest of the equipment
they are wearing. And that involves soldiers who are operating in a prone position, or soldiers for
example who are in combat assaults, or soldiers who are truck drivers. And this capability has got
to be universal in the sense that it fits all those operatin g environments and enables the soldier to
do his or her job.
The other thing, when we say his or her, it's an important factor to consider. We can be outfitting
a 245 pound man , as we demonstrated yesterday, or you can be outfitting a 115 pound female
military policeman . Both of them require the same amount of protection. Both of them obviously
have very different carrying capabilities in terms of how much they can hold in the way of body
armor and then all the rest of the weapons ammunition that they carry with them as a part of their
basic load.
So those are the facto rs that then cause implementation decisions to not be snap decisions. It's
not a matter of simply snappi ng your finger. And then the other final part is that all of this is
rigorous ly tested as part of the design process that General Sorenson will talk about, and is also
then a part of cont inuous surveillance as we continue to buy and test as we go through this
program .
So all of this I would summarize is designed to give you the belief that the protection of soldiers is
our number one mission. Continuous evolution of this protection is absolutely essential, and that
we can't get by by ever saying that a solut ion that we have today is the optimum . It represents our
best at the moment, and w ill cont inuousl y be improved as we see the need to do it or we develop
the capabil ity to do it.
So wha t I would like to do now is pause, and I will give over to General Sorenson, who is our
military deputy for acquisition.
MG Sorenson : OK, my name is Jeff Sorenson. I am the deputy for acquisition and systems
management. Let me just kind of cover a couple points that I think Steve - General Speakes -
has already mentioned, but let me just empha size it.
As he pointed out, we have gone through a continual evolu tion here of improvement in terms of
capability. I mentioned yesterday we've gone thro ugh seven improvements. He mentioned the
fact that we are on our third gene ration of plates. The other part icular improvements are
essentially to the vest itself, as well as to other outer parts, specifically the DAP and as well now
the side plates .
In all cases we have taken a very rigorous app roach to making sure that as we produce this
capability and develop it that we are taking into accou nt much of the human recto-s wtlich the
soldiers have to operate within. And I know in some cases peop le think that's a very bureaucratic
process , but as we cert ainly take a look at this the last thing we want is to pro tect these so ldiers
from gett ing killed by a bullet, and yet have them suffer with this additional weight of - you know,
a 130 pound fema le or a 140 pound male, 30 extra pounds of body armor in 130 degree heat and
suffer a death from heat stroke. So these are the types of things that have made this very
complex, as well as their ability to even move, and in some cases, get up and get down and ge t
out of the way.
I'd like to take this moment just to cover a couple other points which I think probably would be of
some value, because I think they are important, esp eciall y in the last 24 hours with peop le in
different companies mak ing accusations and allegations in wtlat their capabilities are.
I have seen, to some distress , part icular members of the Hill talking abou t how we need to talk in
very high degrees of specificity what types of coverage and capabilities we are doing . As General
Spe akes says , we don't want to give any of this inform ation out. Th is is very sens itive to our chief;
in fact, even contin uing to have these discussions is so mething that I don 't think he is really
appreciative of because of the fact that it talks to someth ing that is very sensiti ve to him with
respect to force protect ion.
But reco gn ize as we 've done this, this is ju st one piece of the overall for ce protection cap ability.
This is the personal piece . We 've done the armo ring of the veh icles ; we 've also done and added
electronic and counter measures, and we have also changed a lot of the techniques, tactics and
procedures with which they operat e. And all these are gene rated to trying to improve the soldier's
ability to be better protected with respect to force protection .
Now one particu lar instance here, we had a company come up yesterday and basica lly allege
that the y had a capab ility that quite frankl y the Arm y has ignored and has really not taken
se riously, and so I ju st want to put out some facts with respect to that.
The compa ny's name I believe was Pinna cle. Facls are that we did test this particular ca pability
back in 2004, and it failed. Th ey have subsequently worke d to improve their particular system , but
with respect to our abili ty to validate with their improvemen ts, we have not been able to do so as
yet.
The PEO and the PM have discuss ed this with the CEO as of the end of Dece mber, and offered
to procure some systems to verify manufacturer's performance claims, but at this poin t in time the
company said that they don't rea lly have a production system ava ilable and will not have it ready
for testing or even prototypes until February of 2006 . However, with respect to the system , they
have pro vided some pla tes , which we have done some initially testing of up at Abe rdee n test
center . And though the tests are not maybe at this point in time representative of the entire
Pinnacl e armor system, the preliminary test data says at this point that th is will not meet the
Arm y's requirements. Again I say this will not meet the Arm y's requirements. It will not meet it
with respect to performance; with respect to weight it is estimated at this point in time that it will
add 10 more pou nds to just a med ium size, so as opposed to a 3D-pound weight, we now have
40 pounds. In addition , the initial understanding of the costs, it's about 50 percent greater.
So we are welcome at this point in time to have them provide this capability and have us analyze
it, but to date, it has not been anyth ing that has passed our particular test , nor is it something that
they are able to produ ce at this time for our evaluation in a complete system.
And with that, I think I will stop and let anybody ask any questions that they might have .
Q: It may be for Genera l Sorenson, or wh ichever of you gentl emen . Two ques tions keep com ing
up. Num ber one, is the cost an issue? How much extra are we spending ? Is there a default in the
budget? And number two, I would like to know if you guys are using an y special fast-track
procurement methods to get this stuff boug ht and in the field?
MG Sorenson : Let me try to address that. W ith respect to cost , we do have fund ing to pay for this
particu lar added capability .
Q: W hat is it costing per set?
MG Sore nson: The co sting per set, at this point in time, all I can tell you is right now the entire
contract is going to be - are you talking about the extra side plates now, or are you talking about
the entire ensem ble?
Q: W ell, let's take each. I mean, you know, can you give me an idea wha t each costs per soldier,
wh at are spending on armor for the basic vest? Jeff and I and a bunch of othe rs were over in Iraq
in Decem ber and we wore the bas ic vest wh ich has the front and back plates, and some sort of a
collar arrangement, and I don't know what that cos ts, and what do the enhanced systems cost?
MG Sorenson: OK, if I add up all the different pieces and parts that go to what you now know to
be your IBA , which is essentially your vest, with your side plates , it's roughly at this point in time
about $2,100 for that particular piece . If you add the OAP, it's another $300, and you add the side
plates we are probably talking about another 51,000 . So add it all togeth er, you're probab ly
$3,400 or someth ing of that-
Q: Right. So basically everyo ne who's saying we 're not willing to spend another $260 a sold ier is
full of something othe r than Swiss cheese.
MG Sorenson : Thai's correct, that's correct.
Q: Last questio n, I'm sorry . Can you tell us if you're using any of the fast-track procu rement
procedures to get th is stuff out and in the field?
MG Sore nso n: I think at this point in time we are . In fact, the way they bas ically work this
particular cont ract is we 're goi ng to put on contract initially, if you will- and I don't know if you got
to see yesterday what the particu lar soldier wea ring it looked like, I mean, he had - the side
plates .go into a pouch, the pouch is attached to the melle - if you will - ves t there . And what
we 're doing right now is acce lerati ng the delivery of the pouches themsel ves. And clearly we've
struct ured in the cont ract a very aggress ive capability. In fact, in some cases we will be able to
produce and outstr ip what the Marines are producing in the time frames they are looking at
beca use of access to additiona l contractors .
Q : A couple questions . The weight of the average soldier, the weight of the average combat load .
I have a picture of a Marine with all the accou trements and it came out to 95 pou nds. That 's
helpful in this argument. So if there are some official numbers we can have that wou ld be well
rece ived .
Yesterday the representative I was deba ting was arguing that the SAP I front plate, you know,
shatt ered inside with one rou nd became useless. I didn't accep t that. But I need - and I am
sen sitive to what the chief is saying , so, you know, help me as to wha t we can say. And then the
last question, on this dragon skin stuff. Th is guy was saying you had (Navy) SEALS using it, a
number of federal agencies, a whole bunch of people over there, and the last thing I didn't accept
is one of them took eight shots in the front or the back. I forget, and none of them penetrated.
Can you help me on any of these?
MG Sorenson : Bob , the only thing I can help you with is the following . All I can lell you is the PM
and the PEO have engaged that compa ny with respect to dragon skin. That's the name of the
company, it's called Pinnacle Armor. We have offered to buy some of their systems to verify their
claims . The answer that we got is that they do not have a production syste m available for us to
test. So all the claims with respect to, you know , they took eight shots and everybody's wearing it
and all that kind of stuff is interesting and nice; however, comma , they have not come through
and not been validated by the Arm y with respect to testing to our requirements.
As I said before, to date, they failed in 2004 , we brought them back right now. we'v e tested their
plates. Their plates at this point in time do not satisfy the ballistic protection required. The y do not
satisfy the ballistic protection required. As well, their plates are heavier, they would add about 10
more pounds to what we think we are currenUywe ighing, and that's about 31 pounds, and as
we l . the cost of it is such is that it adds - I mean, their cost right now, I've seen cost fIQures that
just to get their plates is at like $5,000, so already, you're not even talking about the system,
you're just talking about the plates.
Q:Wow.
MG Sorenson: So , all their stuff, in terms of their discus sion, is intere sUng and pro bably
noteworthy and newsworth y, but the fact of the matter is it's aJl - you know, we haven't seen the
beef here. It's all, as someone would say, all Hooah, no do-ah . You can quote me on that one. I
mean the fact of the matter is they haven't brought anything to bear . I mean, they just have not.
And we cont inue to ask for it, and it has not been available.
MG Spea kes: The re's one other point that I wou ld like to add without going into to much specifics,
and that is when General Sorenson's guys do the testing . Obviously, we are not satisfied with just
one impact.
MG Sorenson : Correct .
MG Speakes : And so that idea that because their system has the ability to repel multiple-round
impacts, that it's better than ours, is just wrong. That's fundamental to the testing that the Army
does . And obviou sly, we don't wa nt to go any more specific than that. But there is an issue there
of basic credibil ity. You 're not going to give a soldier something tha t is good for only one round
before the plate shatters, and that was the impact that you were left from listening to the McNeil-
Lehrer stuff last night. That guy made that claim .
MG Sorenson: I wo uld second that, and I forgot to make that statement before , but I completely
agree with Genera l Speakes . I mean, the fact of the matter the perfonn ance of this capabil ity is
obviously exceed ing one roun d. And we won 't go into what either type of round or what
exceeding that means. But the fact of the matter is it does not shatter wtth one round.
MG Spea kes: And then there is one other issue that we probably ought to take on, wh ich is the
fundamental que stion of have we provided protection in a timely way? We just addressed both
the cost that is being invested by the American government, by the Ame rican taxpayer in
protecting every sokl ier. It's extraord inary . The other thing we need to address is the fact that we
are not operating on a timel y basis.
Let's put it in terms of com parison . Once we adapted to the operating environmen t in Iraq, it
became clear that the origin al concept that said that body armor was somet hing that was
prioritized to essentially dismou nted soldier - the combat infantryman, the com bat engineer. and
instea d becam e a full-force requi rement , what we had was in the summ er of 2003 the realization
that we had add itional need for essentia lly the rest of the force . Now the enorm ity of that
requirement was staggering at the time. I think the importan t thing then was that with in the period
of then to April of 2004 , we were able to equ ip the en tire opera ting force in the CENTCOM AOR
with body arm or. And that was a figure approaching 200,00.0 soldiers . And so the enormit y of
both the Department of Defense's response, but also the American manufacturers who did what
they were asked to do to produce this to a sta ndard. And one of the other things General
Sorenson ha sn't highlighted, I guess but is the normal produ ct that he does , is in addition to the
testing he's highlighted is he certifies, the other thing is the continuous testing of every lot that's
produced. And so what you are talking abou t now is the ability to propert y equip every soldie r in
the AOR, and to do it to a standard where we could guarantee to American taxpayers and fam ily
members that what we were giving them met standards.
And so this idea that we're simply not interested, and we're not timely, and we 're reactive and we
only wa it for press reports is just frankly offen sive. And I think that's the other thing we' ve got to
refute is somehow we are pass ive and uninterested in this bus iness. It is a matter of passion, and
every one of this who is a part of this thing feels the moral imperative to do the best we can.
Ms. Barber: Any other questions?
Q : All ison, is there someone who can give us the we ight of the average soldier, and the weig ht of
the combat load, if there's a difference between the Marine Corps and the Arm y in the field in
Iraq?
MG Speakes: Th is is Steve Speakes . I wou ld sugge st that we not go that way. Here 's why. When
we are talking combat load, I was fascinated because what you had was two differe nt dismounted
professionals appear in front of Congress yesterday. Both of them acquitted the mselves very
well. They both explained that the whole issue of how much a soldier is wearing, or a Mar ine, is
depe ndent upon mission and the oper ating environment and not upon the Service. In other
words , both of them discussed the same basic terms - outer tactical vests, SAPI plates, it's a
given . After that, then, do you wear the DAP or not ? An importa nt que stion . I think whe n we get
the side armor out in sizable quantities, it is going to be something where soldiers are once again
going to interact with their chain of comma nd and decide whether they nee d it and wan t it,
because it's more poundage once again. And the othe r thing is it seals your body in in a way that
is going to become very, very heat producing. Because righ t now your body breathe s ess entially
in the sides, in the top whe re you have some level of ventilation.
The other thing that you then have is your weapons , and most soldiers are carrying two weapons
now, they are carrying an M4, they are probably also carrying a nine millimeter. You're car rying
the magazines for both . You're carrying the ammun ition that's in the magazines. You're carryi ng
water, and then you 're carryi ng at least probably one day's worth of some kind of combat ration.
Whe n you put all that together , the figures really become staggering. 00 they wea r it on a
sus tained basis, or do they take it on and off? All of those subjec ts that become something that
as we talked poundage yesterday, it became very confus ing for the civilians who were listen ing.
And so I'd simply say, if you take a look at it right now what we' re showing is the basic armor that
we are issuing a soldier, for a med ium-size soldier, wen t from about 60 pound s to abou t 31
pounds. That 's only the start of what a soldier or Marine is wearing. And after that. it's all mission
depende nt, not Service dependent. Does a 16 to 31 pound increase help a little bit?
Q: So the other take awa y is this. You have gone through three basically continuous evolutions in
the field ing of these sets . Is that correct?
MG Sorenson: No, not exactl y. Partially correct. What was said wa s we have gone throug h three
genera tions of the protective plate s. We have gone through another four evolutions of the ent ire
ensemble, so in all pieces here we have continued to improve everyth ing, OK ? So , total is seven.
So we have made improvements to the vest , we 've made improvements to the external elements
of the vest. we've made intern al improveme nts to the type of composites, if you will, that are used
in these plates. And those have gone throug h three generations .
Q: OK, and the total is you now have enough to, you know , to equip on average about 700,000 or
more than (enough ? ) to equip the entire operating force ?
MG Sorenson : Oh, absolutely. No question .
COL Thoma s Spoe hr (Director of Materiel, AITny G-8) : More than enoug h to equ ip the soldiers in
Iraq, not quite the operating force . (The operating force is defined as every soldier in the Arm y
that could pote ntiall y deploy .)
Ms . Barber: Great, well with that, thank you folks for calling in and for your time. General
Sorenson , General Speakes, thank you for your time.
From : CIV, OASD-PAJ
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IV, OASD-PAJ
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Subject: Transcript military analysts ODR

Attachments: 01-25-06 ODR Ryan Henry, VADM Chanik.doc
0 1-25-06 QDR
:yan Henry, VAOM ..
At t a c hed is the t r a n s c r ipt fr om ye sterday ' s bri e fi ng wi t h Mr. Rya n , VADM
Cha ni k and t he mi li tary analys ts.
The br iefing was on bac kground.
1
Tran script
Military Anal yst Briefing
Topic: QDR
Jan. 25, 2006, 2E556 The Pentagon
Mr. Ryan Henry, PDUSD Policy; VADM Evan M. "Marty" Chanik
Ho st: Eric Ruff OASDPA
ON BACKGROUND
Transcriber: Murphy
Mr. Ruff: Hell o? Folks, this is Eric Ruff and with me is, among others, are Ryan Henry
and Admiral Marty Chanik, and they'll be talking to you for a second - in a second or
two.
I just wanted to open up by talking a little bit about sort of what we are doing here.
Obviousl y, as we are getting closer and closer to releasing the QDR, in about - what is it
now, probabl y about 12 days or something like that - a week from this Monday,
information is already starting to come out more and more.
You probably saw Mark Mazzetti ' s piece in the LA Times (Jan. 24), so we kind of made
a decision to start talking about this a little bit. So we are talkin g on background now
about the QDR. And I think the framework we are working in - and we have a document
that' s called a preface. It' s a preface that's going to go in the front of the QDR when we
send it up. And we can make this available to you guys. I don 't know if we have the
electrons on it yet - but we have a - it 's about a three-page docum ent, and Tara (Jones)
or somebody will get it out to you eith er by fax or email, if we can email it OK? So, I
think we've got all that information for everybody who ' s on the call.
Import ant to remember here is that this QDR is not a new beginning. In esse nce, we've
been working lessons learned since we came in in 200 I. And it ' s been a process by which
over the last year or so a number of assumptions have been looked at and tested and
tested and the thinking has been throughout this what have we learned from Iraq? What
have learn ed from Afghanistan? And what do we know going into the future about what
our force structure is going to be?
This thing has been a very high collaborati on with civilian - I haven 't been here mor e
than two years, but the civilian and military collaboration in terms of this document, and
Ryan and the admiral can certainly speak to this - has been really something to watch
over the last year-plus.
So with that in m ind, I'll just - we ' ll tum it over to Ryan and then Ryan, you and Marty
can just take it from here.
Mr. Ryan : Yeah, hi, this is Ryan Henry. First of all I want to say hi to Ken and Tim from
a former life. I am going to walk you through some high points on the QDR. My role was
as I guess basically the traffic cop, the manager, and then I was supported by Marty who
is the J-8 here, and also the folks in PA&E, and the three of us pretty much represented
the management cell.
One thin g unique about this QDR as Eric was alluding to is that it was not a staff product.
It is the work of the four stars, and their Senate-confirmed civilian equivalents in the
building. They drove it; they made all the decisions; they directed the work on it; and
. they' re the guys that put thousands and thousands of hours into it.
It is a wartime QDR. That 's one thing that ' s different from in the past. We think that
we're in the fourth year of a very long war. It' s a war with a different sort of enemy than
we faced in the past, and different sort of needed capabilities that we have to develop.
The QDR itselfis supposed to be a 20-year look into the future of what the department
needs. We're supposed to develop a strategy and then resource that strategy. Anoth er
thing that we did different this time is before starting the QDR we did the strategy. That
was published in March of '05. It's available on DefenseLink. It' s an unclass document.
That strategy took about six mo nths of the senior leadership ' s time. And when we refer to
the senior leadership, we' re talking the secretary and the deputy, the chairman and the
vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs , three Service secretaries, five ~ four service chiefs, and
five undersec retaries. And that comprises the headquarter' S senior leadership, and then on
a periodic basis we bring in the nine combatant commanders to get their inputs. That
group was supported by the vice chiefs of the Services and some of the other direct
reports to the secretary who, at their four-star level, ended up doing an awful lot of the
staff work to pu sh it forward to the senior leadership.
What we came out with were two twin imperatives. And the bottom line of the QDR
report itself says that we need to shift our balance and the capabilities we had, that the
Sept. I 1, 200 1 represented a chan ge and an off-balancing of what the strategic contex t
that we thought we had up until that point. And so we are shifting our balance and we are
shifting our capabilities. And I' ll talk to some of the areas we are doing that in.
We see four sets of challenges that we have in the future to be able to address. And
historically we've looked at a traditional set of challenges which basically involved major
combat ops, and state-vers us-state conflicts. And we looked at everything else as a lesser-
includ ed case to be able to meet that.
As we look to the future we see a set of irregular challenges which are represented by
both Iraq and Afgh anistan, but also the operations that we saw in Haiti and Liberia, and
this is where usually the enemy is within a state, but not part of a state. We are not
fighting anothe r nation-state, but some sort of movement, and it requ ires a different set of
capabilities, sometimes thought as lower level but still an area where we need to develop
more expertise.
The second set is a catastrophic set of challenges. And those are one time of events that
could occur to the U.S. They are just unacceptable for us to accept that blow. Pearl
Harbor wou ld be an example of that; 9-1 1 is an example of that; getting hit by a nuclear
lED in one of our cities would be an example of that. And so defen se has a role in
protecting the nation against that in the future .
And then the final set of the four is disruptive. And that is a challenge or a threat whic h
might come against us that would basically neutrali ze the American military as a key
instrum ent of national power.
And you kind of think of if another country would have gotten stealth rather than us,
what would have that meant? If somebody comes up with a bio-warfare agent that can
genetically target our soldiers or something, than those are the type of challenges that we
want to be able to meet.
So we look at the future; we look at about .getting capabilities across all four of those sets
of challenges. .
The second big part of the QDR was a recognition that as we chan ge the capability of the
forces in the field we have to change the headquarters. That the headquarters and the way
that we 're currently and operated is not sufficiently agile to be able to support the
fighting forces that we have over there . So we have to do things to better suppo rt them
and to be able to accelerate our ability to reorient the force. So there is an intemal look
here, too.
There's a recognition that this QDR, as Eric was saying, is a point in time across a
continuum oftransfonnation. Show it represents a snapshot in time. It is something that
started working on basica lly two years ago started the initial effort, and we' ll stilt be
working on it two years from now.
There is a point in time on the 6th of February where we send up a report to the Hill, but it
is an evo lving process.
Eric talked a little bit about the lessons leam ed and what went in here. It was more than
just Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the - the other areas in the global war on terror - the
Philippines, the Hom of Africa, Georgia and the Pan-Sahel (in Africa). These are areas
where we are trying to fight the global war on terrorism. We are working with partner
nations; sometimes they lack the capability, sometimes they lack the will to be able to
effectively prosecute this, and we need to do things to build up their capabilities.
Another big area is humani tarian. Our biggest victories to date in the global war on
terrorism which involves impacting the hearts and minds of the moderate Muslims have
been in our responses to humanitarian disasters. Specifically, the earthquake aro und
Christmas of ' 04 and then the tsunami from the earthquake, and then Pakistani
earthquake (October ' 05). And the polling that the agency does and the shift of opinions
because of those toward the United States and away from radical Islam has been very,
very significant.
So that speaks to another problem that we face in the future and that ' s one of
unpredictabilit y and uncertainty. We cannot predict with any certainty whatsoever how
our forces might be able to be used in the future. We can say with a very high probability
that within the next 10 years U.S. forces will be employed somewhere in the world where
they are not today. But as far as when that will be, where that will be, or how that will be.
there is j ust no way to determine that. So we have to have an agility of forces and we
have to build capabilities, rather than focusing on a specific threat.
And then the final area that has informed the work is our response in support of civil
authorities. specificaUy, lhe military' s response to 9- 11, and now more recently Hunicane
Katrina and Rita. And that in providing the American people security. we have a role to
play on the domestic front, too.
So the QDR then will speak to - the document will speak to four key focus areas that we
are concerned with building more capabilities at the beginning of the 2151 century.
How do we provide defense in-depth to the homeland? How do we hasten the demise of
terrorist networks? How do we preclude hostile powers or rogue elements from acquiring
or using WMD? And then finally, how do we influence and impact countries that are at
strategic crossroads?
And they're we are thinking ofthree countries specifically. We are thinking of Russia
and to temper its move toward authoritarianism. We are thinking of China and
successfully managing its rise in the community of nations as a constructive force, and if
that didn 't prove success ful, how do we dissuade them from hostile ambitions? How do
we deter them from (inaudible - cursor? Cursory?) actions and if ca lled 00, how would
we be able to defeat them? And then finally then India. the world's democracy, second-
largest Muslim nation, we think: a key partner in the future, and how do we build a
strategic alliance with them?
So those are four prob lem areas that the QDR addressed, and in doing that, they tried to
come up with for our external customer, who we personify in the president. how are we
going to be able to provide him. and his successor more importantly, options to be able to
deal with these key problem areas of the beginning of the 21 5t century?
And then for our internal customer, who we view as the joi nt warfighter, how do we get
them the capabilities set that they'll be more effective in dealing with these? And so the
QDR then goes through and takes 12 different areas where we are interested in
developing and enhancing capabiliti es. And then it goes on to look at the headquarter' s
function - how do we do governance at the headquarter' s level? How do we improve on
some of our processes? What do we do as far as the human capital strategy? And then
finally, and probably most importantly, what can we do in the area of building
partnership capability and capacity?
Now that partnership and capability capacity happens domestically. as far as working
with state and local governments, Department of Homeland Security; it happens
interagency on the national security front , working with State Department, the NSC, CIA
in an interagen cy process; and then internationally, how do we build the capability of the
partner nati ons that we work with? Because thi s is very clear to the Department of
Defense that we have to have lots of humility as we approach the problem set before us.
We are not goi ng to be able to predict what is going to be able to happen, and we are not
going to be able to so lve it on our own , eith er as a department or a nation . We are go ing
to be dependent on partners. Most times for sure they are going to be able to for sure
address the problem cheaper than we can, and man y times they are going to be able to do
it more effectively because they are fami liar with the local cultural terrain, they know the
language, and they can operate more effectively in the environment we are in.
Along those 12 areas that we talked abo ut being able to make changes, we talk about
leading-edge investmen ts that we can make and dec isions that we can make in the fiscal
year ' 07 bud get, that arrives on the Hill the same time that the QDR does . But tho se are
on ly leading-ed ge investm ents. The major shifts the department needs to make will be
made as we do the program - future-year defense program in the co ming year, whic h will
look at the years ' 08 through ' 13. So that's wh ere a lot o f the significant vectors that the
QDR has set will find their way into programmat ic change, although there are so me that
are handled in the QDR itself.
And with that, at a top level - I guess one of the things - two other points real quick. One
is we did do a forc e-planning construct. We have refined the force-plannin g construct
from 2001. We maintain that we will still be able to do two major conflicts nearly
simultaneously, take on e of them to the level of wh at we call a win-decisive, sometimes
categori zed as something that might result in a regim e change. We'll be able to do those.
In the past , we had thought of bo th of those as conventional campaigns. Goi ng forward,
we want to have the capability to have one of them he a pro longed , irregular campaign.
The ana lysis that we did in the QDR clearly proved that the mo st stressing thing on the
force is not the high- intensity major combat operations, but it is the pro longed, irregular
campaign that goes on for a number of years and requ ires a rotational base to support it.
And the multiplier effect there is what puts the stress on the force.
Some of the other things we learn ed is that we talk about the forc e some people think of
an acti ve-reserve component. We also need to think about an operational and an
institutional co mponent. And the usability and the force that we employ forward is onl y
the operational component. And so as we look at what the size of the force is, rather than
looking at total end strength, whe re there is man y things on the institutional force we can
do to tran sfer to civilian jobs or contractor j obs, we really - what the number we're reall y
interested in is what do we have in the operational forc e, and what are the capabilities of
those forces versus the problem set we are confronted with?
And so the QDR does a lot to mo ve more capability and more num bers into the
operatio nal forc e. It also does a lot to move mo re ca pability into the irregular special
operations arena, makin g some sizable increases there, and taki ng the general purpose
forces and start to give them (soft-light ?) capabilities.
Also in the force- planning co nstruct, we recognize the need to have a deterrence, but not
a one-size-fits-all deterrence , which we've had in the past of massive retaliation, but one
that wi ll also work against rogue powers who might be in a state o f collapse or wo uld
seemingly appear to be unde terrable and also terrorists and their networks.
And so there was the addition of a broader deterrent capability. So the force-planning
co nstruct maintains the two-war strategy; maintains the forward presence; talks to a
steady state versus sur ge. In the area of surge there's going to be two - we wi ll be able to
handle two major conflicts, one of them which might be a prolonged irregular and take
one of them to a win-decisive level.
It also recognizes that the force sizing, versus the force planning. is going to tend to be a
function of policy choices being made. What are you going to have in the way ofa
mo bilization as you face different co nflicts? What are you going to do as a rotational
base? What are you going to do for time Iines (inaudible - at?) the operational criteria that
you set for yourself? Are you going to stay engaged at the same level aro und the wo rld?
Are yo u goi ng to do anything different institu tionally to be able to move forces from the
institutional to the operational? And the n what will you do with emergency autho rities
you might have like we currently have on end strength?
The QD R went in with the assum ption that the force size, while it was about right, but the
force capability distribution needed a lot o frebalancing. After a year of work and
analysis, we feel com forta ble with that initial assumption and have kept it.
So wi th that, if Marty Chanik has anything to add I'll let him do that, and then we can
start taking your qu estions,
VADM : Chanik: Good afternoon. I think probably the best use o f your tim e tha t goes is
to go to your questions, because quite frank ly, Ryan really captured the essence of the
report and I think he hi ghlighted it pretty we ll. So I think we're read y for qu estions.
Q: Yeah, this is Jeff M acCausland, sir, with CBS . Can you tal k a bit more detail,
particu larl y about the Arm y. I mean the secretary, frankly, got beat up a little bit beat up
today in the pr ess co nference I watched. There' s been some leaks about reduction in
National Guard brigades and shifting force structure to the active, which co uld make
some sense, but it gets peo ple down in co mm unities all exe rcised (in audible) interv iewed
the other day.
So can you talk a little bit spec ifically about Army, what you' re thinking about there
force -structure wise, change the National Guard-active mix , those kind of things ?
Mr . Henry: O~ well the Army is going away, obviously, from the differentiated division
concep t to modular brigades, 77 of those of the combat brigades. Of those 77. in the
reserve component, there will be 28 that will be fully capable and on the par with the
active.
In the past, there was - we had 16 enhanced brigades, and not all of those were actually
whole brigades. We're moving it up to 28. The brigade structure on the reserve
component will stay at 106, but the remaining brigades will be in the combat support,
combat service support.
So, from our way of thinking, we are bringing up the reserve component and making
them part of the varsity. As we start to develop how we will use these brigades and
develop rotational models, then the reserve component will be part of that force
generation model for the Army.
So, to be perfectly honest with you, we are a little bit perplexed on the type of responses
that we are seeing. Now, in a planning process and as one starts to look at alternatives, all
sorts of numbers are thrown around. And I think the reaction you are seeing is is it's not
that we are decreasing the Guard or taking them down. There is a mentally that says that
the highest number that a Guard guy ever saw that what they might be at is not the
number we settled at as we worked everything out. So at one point in time there were
numbers that were under consideration that were above 28 on the combat brigades, but at
no time had anything been finali zed, as we balanced everything out, keep them ·a t the
same level , 106 total brigades, 28 which are the combat ones, which is up from the 16
quasi-full brigades that they have now .
Q: One quick follow up. Will there be any on the Guard side divisional flags go away?
Because that gets them upset even if, you know, the number of brigades stay constant.
Mr. Ryan: Right, right. And as you are probably aware, there 's a lot of flags around right
now to which there aren't necessarily whole unit s to go with. The number of flags will
remain the same. The percentage of flags that have real , viable forces associated with
them will go up. But that is not to say that there might not he a handful around that are in
the current status that they are now that there's not necessarily a fully associated unit with
them. But no flags - to my knowledge - to my knowledge no flags will go away.
So they'll still have the same bragging rights.
Q: Exactly.
Q : Hello. Jed Babbin, American Spectator. Have you guys gotten a sign off from
Negroponte and Goss (Porter Goss?) on this? Because what I am hearing is you guys are
going to be putting an awful lot more into establishing defense-related intelligence
capability and there could be a little bit of a turf war brewing, no?
Mr. Ryan: The QDR has been staffed through the NSC, up to the highest levels, in
(and?) components that comprise the NSC - the intelligence community, the State
Departm ent, the Department of Homeland Security, Justice Departm ent, it has also been
staffed through those organizations also.
I - we have not solved the problem of the iron major and the titanium co lonel, either in
our organization or other ones. You will be able to find somebody buried in an
organizatio n who somehow feels that his particular parochial interest was not served as
fully as he thought. You will oot find anybody at the senior levels of the defense
establishment - and that's the four stars - that don 't believe in this document. That 's -- [
mean, some of us that have participated in it think that the document itself is just an
artifac t of the QDR . But really what the QDR was it was a process that brought the
departmen t in, looked at a common set of problems, and came up with a cohesi ve
approac h to it that everyone buys in.
There - one of the things we get hit for is that there were no majo r weapo n cuts. We
didn 't kill any major weapon systems in the QDR. Because we had such a co llaborative
effort, we were able to make large investm ents in the areas we need to do, witho ut having
to do that. And it couldn ' t have been done if it were n't the Services that were coming
forward and saying this is how I can do my part to contribute to be ab le to shift the
balance and where we need to go.
So, I' ve only been in the Pentagon for three years, but guys that have been through here
and sat through all the QDRs say that this was fundamentally different in kind as far as
not just the approach at the senior leadership, but as it developed, the collaborative effort,
the fact that - and the vices - and maybe Marty' s got a better count than I do - but I
wo uld say the vices put in 500 hours of their time over the last 15, 16 months, in sitting
down and collaboratively working with the under secretaries and the deputy and the vice
chairman in tryin g to come up and work through these solutions.
And we couldn't got to where we did if this wou ldn' t have represented - the spirit
wouldn't have been one of that we are all in this together and we have to come up with
comm on solutions.
We also, as far as inclusivity, brought in on many of our meetings members ofthe

Departm ent of Homeland Securit y, the CIA; we actually had some of our key allies
part icipate in our internal discussions. And so this was much more inclusive than it' s
been in the past, too.
So, you know, there might be some people who feel that they were injured but we are not
aware of anybody at a leadership level anywhere in the government that feels
uncomfortable with this report.
VADM Chanik: And just to put an asterisk to the question on Ambassador Negroponte,
Office of the Secretary of Defense folks that are the intel side of tbe house is working
very closely continuous process working with the director of national intelligence and the
CIA . So there' s been an awful lot of crosstalk durin g the de velopment of this QDR and
continuing onward with balancing the capabilities tha t are represented in all those three
organizations.
M r. Ruff: More qu estion s?
Q: If nobod y else is go ing to jump in, it's Jed Babbin for one mo re. You've mentioned a
term and you just scared the liver out of me, guys. Nuclear lED?
Mr. Ryan: Yeah, I mean if - let's face it, we've got so me bad guys out there that are
trying to develop a full nu clear full cycle, and have the abil ity to produce fissi le material.
This is al l abo ut what the (? Response) to the global war on terrori sm. It is weapons of
mas s destruction. It is a g lobalizat ion mechanism which allows the movement of
materials and ideas in a network wo rld, and it is the emergence of terrorist organizations
that have no lim it to the amount of terror tha t the y are willing to put on any nation or an y
gro up of people to get to the ir political ends.
And the nexus of those three things is what keeps us up at night.
Q: Forgive me for interrupting but I think one of things tha t I am heari ng is that if it is a
new term, it' s got to be an identifiabl e threat. Is this near or longe r term?
Mr . Henry: We have co untri es that are producin g nuclear materials that are not under the
non-proliferation treaty right now. So it is a possibility of wh ich we cannot ignore . And I
mean it is the high end, worse case. It doesn 't necessaril y - a nu clear lED is not
necessaril y something that would have to go critica l, and it could j ust have a radiological
dispersion aspec t of it -- known as an ROD - radiological dispersion dev ice.
And the other thing is is the QDR is given a responsib ilit y to look out in the next 20
years. When we go to the int elligence comm unity and ask them to look into the future,
and to give us an ass essme nt of where we are go ing to be, they can do it with a certain
degre e o f acc uracy out to five years.
The world we live in right now though, going out 10 years is an extrem ely iffy exerci se,
o ne that they feel uncomfortable with. And they will not venture out to the 20-year mark
because the wo rld's just too uncertain; we cann ot pred ict which way things are going to
go . The enemy is evo lving too fast to be able to do an y sort of linear ex trapo lation.
And so we have a responsibi lity in looking out at that 20 years to be able to address all
feasible threats and to try to anchor what the high -end one is. An d a terrorist with a -
with a - with fiss ile material, and with a little bit of know-how, is the worst-case
scenario .
That co upled though - I wo uld say that's on a par with a terrorist with bio-warfare
knowledge, too, or access to bio-warfare materials. Both of those are the high end one.
Q : Thank you.
Q: This is Jeff MacCausland again. There's been a lot of leaks, and I emphasize the
words leaks, so you can say that's not necessari ly true, that one of the things this report is
going to say to the shifting of a particu lar number of forces - particularly air and naval -
from, frankl y, the Atlantic to the Pacific. Can you talk about that for a second?
And also , how do you see balancing the effort to, if you will, find a good relationship
with the Chinese as oppo sed to creating a force structure that they find threatening and
then we end up, you know , fulfilling our own prophecies?
Mr. Ryan: Right. I mean that's a - let me deal with the latter one, the Pacific and stuff
like that. I mean, stability is the coin of the realm in the Pacific. It' s not subject to an
alliance structure like the Atlantic is. The U.S. is a force for stability in the region . I think
it's recogni zed by all. We don't use our forces out there in an aggressive nature.
By the same token, for operational respon siveness, the timelines due to the distance
involved are significantly different in the Pacific, so we need to have thin gs forward . Our
ability to respond with 17,000 troops within one week of Lbe Banda Aceh tsunami , to be
able to be delivering relief, we could not have done if we didn 't have our forward basing
and forward presence structure that we have there.
In order to do that, there will be a shift of maritime toward the Pacific . We talked about
that in QDR '01; we continue to talk about that in QDR ' 06. And you' ll probably see
som e specific metries in the report that will very discretely deal with that.
In the Atlant ic - the Atlantic is a -- to maintain our traditional relationship with NATO,
to encourage the transformation of NATO from a Cold War structure to one that can
make a difference to the world we live in. Obviously you' re aware that we ' re doing [SAP
(International Sec urity Assistance Force) out-of-area ops there in Afghanistan, and we're
working with them on the NATO response force, and we ' re having discuss ions on other
areas as we' ll go to Werkunde (Gennany) and the ministerial is coming up here in couple
of months on areas that NATO can continue to grow there. But it probably doesn't
require the same force structure that it did during the Cold War.
Q: Thank you.
Mr. Ruff: OK. we'I l just recap here. We ' ll get this material out to you, and [ know one or
two folks asked if they could get a transcript of this just for your own personal use and
the answer is yes, we 'll give you that. It's on background.
And I would just add one last thing and that is, you know, there ' s been a lot of discussion
is building and QDR is certai nly part of this umbrella in the long war. And just for your
assay, you ' re going to be seeing in the days and weeks ahead the secretary and leadership
in this building talking more about this long war and what the components are. And I
wou ld just give you that as something to be watching out for as we go forward with
speeches and things like that.
OK? Thanks everybody.
(end of call).
From: Haddock , Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSfPA
~
Sent :
To: T;u~e;S;d;a~J;an~u~CDR,
a~ry 31.OCJCSfPA
2006 11 :,~iif''---...,
)(0) Maj, OCJ CSfPA
Cc: )(0) CAPT, JCS OVCJC SfPA
Subject: FW: Iraq Progres s Report
Your thoughts?
This is the "9010 " brief . .. appropriate briefer? Mil Analysts seems tame enough . ..
ViR
Col H
:> -- -- -Ori
:>Sent
:> Fr om::
:>To:
~=~;;~~~~~~[~~~~~~~7~:::~CDR' OASD-PA]
Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
:> Sub j e c t:
>
:>Sir/ Ma 'am - During our morni ng meeting with the serv ice PAs to discuss the
QDR/Budget/ Defense Posture, an interesting i de a came up wr t the Iraq Progres s Report .
>
:> I s t he r e va l ue to brining in some of the mi litary analys t s (s i mi l i a r t o what we 're do ing
wi th t he QDR ) and br iefing them on t he 9th about our release of the progress report on the
10th? We can also se t up a phoner t oo i f you wis h . who would be the appropriate person
to br i e f them?
>
:>VR/ CDR!,-:--:--:-_ ...,.
:>OASD PA Defens e Press Office Pol icy Team Defense Intelligence
1
From : :=::l':::-l==:Maj , OCJCSlPA
Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2006 11:30 AM
To: '" dock Ellen Katie), Col, OCJ CS/PA; ~_ _.... CDR, OCJCSlPA
Cc : ~~~~~~ CAPT, JCS OVCJCSlPA
Subject: RE: Iraq Progress Report
Yes ma'am ... Lt Gen Re nua r t and Mr Ro dman b rie fed the n l y s t s o n t he r eport i n
October. He would b e good a gain . . . o r BG Jones or COL i f yo u wan t a d i f fe re nt
leve l . Eith er way , I wou l d r ecomme nd an OSD-JS j oint bri e f1 ng - - wi t h the OSO br ie f e r
s peaking fi r s t since t hey brie f o n t h e f i r s t t wo se ct ions of t h e report (po l i t i c a l ,
eco nomi c ) and we can mat c h t h e appropriat e l e vel J -S speake r to who t h ey ge t f o r OSO. Does
t hat ma ke s e n s e? vr , ~~......
:> -- -- - Or i g i n a l Me ssage - - - - -
:>From: Had doc k, El l e n ( Kat i e) , OCJCS /PA
»sent • Tue s d a , January 3 1, 2 ~t::;::::::::::J
:>To: CDR, OCJCS /PA; ~ Maj, OCJCS / PA
:>Cc; CAPT, JCS OVCJCS PA
:>Su b j e c t : FW : Iraq Pr ogre s s Rep o rt
>
:>¥o ur thoughts?
:>This i s t h e " 90 10 " b r i ef .. . a ppropriate b ri ef er? Mil Analys t s seems t ame e no ugh . ..
:>V/ R
:> Col H
>
:> From:
:> - - t- -·
:>Sen
:>To :
:>Su bjec t:
esci
-0~i~9~'n~a~1~M~e~.~.~a;e~-~-~-~-~-~~5~~~f~~f.::~
nu a ry 31 , 2 00 6 10: 02 AM
CDR , OASD-PA)
CAPT , JCS OVCJ CS/ PA; Ha dd oc k , Ell e n (Kat i e ) , Col,

I raq Progress Re po r t
OCJ CS/ PA
>
:>Si r/ Ma 'am - Duri ng our morni ng me e t i ng with the service PAs t o d is c uss t he
QDR / Budget /Def e n se Po s t u r e , an i ntere s t ing i d ea came up wr t t he I raq Pr ogr es s Rep o rt.
>
:>Is t he r e va l ue to b r i n i ng in some of t he mil i t a r y a na lys t s {si mil i a r t o wh a t we 're doing
wi t h t h e ODR) and b ri efin g t h e m o n the 9th a bout our r e l e a s e o f t he progre ss report on t he
1 0t h ? We can al s o s e t up a pho ner t oo i f you wish. Who wou ld b e t h e appr op r iate p e r s on
t o b r i e f t h e m?
>
:>VR/ COR
:>OASD PA De fe ns e Pr e s s Of fi c e pol icy Te a m Defen s e I nte l l i g e n ce
1
Sent : esda an 31, 2006 7:46 PM
To: 6:.- ~Maj , OCJCSIPA
Cc: l(O) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA CDR, OCJCS/PA
Subj ect: RE: Iraq Progress Report .... ...1
Th anks L,..;._ .,.... it d oes make s e n se .

P l eas ~ g et with i n OSD and s e e if t he y h ave s o me o ne i n mind f rom t h ei r side.
Th e Rodman/Renuart t e a m is good by me , i f t h e y are a va i labl e a.nd wan t t o do it . The other
recommended n a me s are a lso g ood .
V IR
Col H
:F~~~~ -oril!!!::~::::::::::]Maj, OCJ CS/ PA

>Sent : Tuesday, January 31, 2 006 11 :3 0 ~~::::::::::I
>To: t i e l , Col , OCJCS /PA ; ~ CDR , OCJCS/ PA
>Cc: CAPT, JCS OVCJCS /PA
>Subje ct : RE : I r a q Pr og r e s s Report
>
>Yes ma 'am. _. Lt Gen Re nuart and Mr Rodman briefed the mil a naly sts o n
>t he re rt i n October . He wou ld b e good a gain . .. o r BG J ones o r COL
if y ou want a dif ferent l evel. Ei t her way, I wou ld rec ommend an
_
>OSD- J S j o int briefi ng - - wi th the OSD briefer speaking firs t si nce they
>brief o n the f i rs t t wo sec tions o f t he r eport (pol i tic a l, e c o no mi c) a nd
>
>
..... ......
>we c a n ma t c h the approp ri a te l evel J - S s peaker to who t he y ge t for 0 5D .
>Does that ma k ~ s ense? vr ,
----- Or i g i na l Me s sage - - - - -
> Fr om: Had do c k , El l en (Kati e), Col , OCJ CS/ PA
> Sent : ry 31, 200 6 Il j·,ili\-l~ •
> To : CDR, OCJCS/ PA; .,.... ... Maj , OCJCS/PA
> Cc : CAPT, JCS C;{!
> Subject: FW : I raq Progr e s s Rep ort
>
> You r tho ught s ?
> This is t h e " 901 0" bri ef . .. a ppropriate bri ef e r? Mil Analys ts seems tame enough . ..
> V IR
> Co l H
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
- --or~~g~i~n~a~1~~~5~:~~~~~~:~:::
From:
S ~ nt:
To:
Tue sda
Su b j ect:
Mes sa e-- - - -
Janua
CDR, OASD - PAl
OCJCS / PA
> Si r / Ma' am - During our mor nin g mee ti ng with the service PAs to di scu s s t he
ODR/Budg~t / D e f ~n s ePo sture , a n i nte r e s t i ng idea came up wrt the Ira q Progres s Report.
>
> Is there v a l u e to br i n i ng in some of the mi l i t a ry a n alysts (s i mi l i a r t o what we 're
doi ng with the QDR ) and b r iefin g the m o n t he 9th about our re lease o f t he p rogres s repor t
o n the 10th? We c a n also set up a phoner too i f y ou wish . Who wou l d b e t he a ppro pri a t e
person t o br i ~f them?
>
> VR/ CD
> OASD ( PAl Defense Pr ess Off ice Pol i c y Te am
> Defense Intelli e n ce
>
>
1
From: Lw.:;;;:=:<b.:"-o~ Maj, OCJCS/PA
Sent: ednesday, February 01,20064:03 PM
To: Haddock. Ellen Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA
Cc : CAPT JCS OVCJCS/PA; ~=~-,CDR, OCJCSIPA;.. .I
lTC , OCJCSJPA; lTC, JCS SJS
Subject: RE: Iraq Progress Report
Ma'am ... I just spoke with CDR i n OSC/PA ... Th e r e p ort is d u e to b e del i v e r e d to
Cong ress o n the 10 t h o f Februa ry , so it won't be inc luded in the rol lout o f a l l the other
s trategic documents.
Here are the things OSC/PA is conside ring :
9 Feb - - Mi l Analyst Call with two bri e f e r s ( t h ey haven 't d ecided who from OSD yet and
then appropriate level from J -S )
9 Fe b -- Select one o r two media members and provide an embargoed interview with same two
briefers 1 0 Feb -- Report del ivered to Congress 1 0 Feb - - Media Advisory for i nterested
media to attend i n t e rv i e w with s ame t wo b r i e f e r s
I've cc 'd LTC r!~=:::J o n this e-mail to b r i ng him i n to the fold and get his t hough t s on
t h e LA p iece s o we can coordina te app rop r i ate l y .
I will let everyone k now a s thi ngs p r ogr e s s and when a final action p l an is ap p r ov ed and
agreed to b everyone.
vr,
> --- - - Or i g i na l Me s s age - - - - -

>From: Haddock , Ellen (Kat i e ) , Col, OCJCS/ PA
»sen e . Tu e s da J a nua ry 31, 2 006 7: 4 6 PM
>To : Ma j . OCJCS / PA
»cc • CAPT, J CS OVCJCS/PAi CDR, OCJCS/ PA
>Su bj e c t: RE: Iraq Progress Repo r t "------------"
~Thanks =::::;1,
»Pkeaae g et wit h
it d oe s make sen s e.
in OSC and s e e i f t h e y hav e someon e i n mi n d from the i r side .
The Rodman/Renu a rt t e a m i s g ood by me, i f t hey are a v a i l ab l e a nd want to do it . The ot her
r e c ommended n a mes a re a l s o good.
>V/R
>Col H
>
> - -- --or i gi ~es aa~ -- - - -
> Fr om: ~ Maj , OCJCS/ PA
> Sent : Tue s d ay , a nuary 3 1 , 2006 11: 3 0 AM
> To : Haddock , Ell e n (Ka t i e ) , col , OCJCS/PAi CDR, OCJ CS/ PA
> Cc; CAPT, J CS OVCJCS/ PA
> Subje c : raq r ogre s s Report
>
> Yes ma'am ... Lt Gen Renu art a nd Mr Rodman briefed the mi l a nalysts o n
>the r e o rt i n Oc tober. He would be good a gain ... or BG Jones or COL
' f you want a d i ff erent l evel. Ei t he r way , I wou ld recommend a n
>OSO- JS joint briefi ng -- with the OSO b r i ef e r s peaking firs t si nce they
>b r i e f on t he f irst two sec tions of the repo rt (p o l i t i c a l , economi c ) and
>we c an match the a pp r o p r i a t e l ev el J- S s peaker to who t hey get f o r OSO.
>Doe s tha t make se nse? vr ,
> """'---'
> -- - - - Or i g i n a l Message-----
> From: Haddock , Ellen ( Ka t i e ) , col , OCJCS /PA
> Se n t: Tue s d a January 31. 2 00 6 11:2 3 ~AM;;;;;;:::===J
> To : • OCJCS/PA ; Maj , OCJ CS/ PA
> Cc : CAPT, JCS OVCJCS PA
> Sub j e ct : FW : Iraq Progress Report
>
1
> You r t houghts?
> This is the "90 10" brie f . .. appropriate brief er ? Mi l Analys ts seems tame
enough . ..
> VI R
> Col H
>
> Messa e-- -- -
>
> I , 20 0 6 1 0;02 AM
> ~~ ~ CAPT , J CS OVCJCS!PAi Haddock, El l e n (Ka t i e) , Co l,
OCJCS!PA
> Su bj ec t: Iraq Progress Repor t
>
> Si r / Ma 'am - Du ring our mor n i ng mee t ing wi t h t he s e rv i ce PAs t o dis cus s t he
QDR/Budget !oefe nse Pos ture , an i n t e r e s ting i de a came u p wr t t he Iraq Progress Report .
>
> Is there v alue t o b rining in some o f t he mi litary a na lys ts (s i mi li a r t o what
we 're d oi ng wi th the QCR) and bri e fi ng t hem on the 9th abo u t our re lea s e o f the progre s s
report on t he l Ot h ? We can a l s o se t u p a phone r too i f you wish . Who would be the
appropr iat e pe r s o n to b ri ef t hem?
>
> VR/ CDR !:_~~':":'~_
> OASD (PA) Def e n se Press Offic e Po l i c y Te am
> Def e nse Inte ll! ence
>
>
2
From : , CIV, OASO-PAI
Sent: Monday, February 20, 2006 5:32 PM
To : Haddock, Elien (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA
Subj ect: FW : "Fighting the Long W ar" - copy? L.. .1
h i. can some one on your s ta ff he lp with th is request for one o f the mi li t a ry a nalysts ?
thanks !
From : robertmag 7 3 ~~ ~ [mailto:robertmag73,. ..

Sent : Monday , Februa ry 20 , 20 06 5: 30 PM
To :
Sub ject: - Fi ght i ng t he Long War- - copy?
Today's Washingt on Times includes an article by Rowa n scarborough that mentions a n

unclassified 27 - page Joi nt s ta ff bri efing for Re a d Admiral Bil l Su llivan. I believe ,
a c cor d i ng t o the artic le, t he firs t s e c t i on i s - Why Ameri ca wants a short war. -
I'd like a copy and I suspec t others would li ke one a s well.
Can you help?
Tha nks .
Bob
Robe r t L . Ma g i nni s
1
)(8)
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Foll ow Up Flag : follow up

FYI
:F~~~ fi-~o:r:,~'~~~:~~~~~~:;:~:;:~;:~~:::;;=========]:IV'
inal Me ssa e - - - - -
-;, OSO]
»sen c b rua r y 2 1 , 200 6 1: 4 0 PM
>To : Cr y , JeSt OCJCS
>S u bj ect : RE : 22 Fe b Ou tre a c h - time .
>
>Cor rect - no CJCS/ V
>
> -- - - -origina
>Fr om: ~ Cr y, JC S, OCJ CS [<mai lto
>Se n t· Au.
>To : CIV , OSO)
>Su b jec t : RE : 2 2 Feb Ou t rea c h - time .
>
>My g uy i s no t i nvolve d . . .. ri ght ?
>
> -- -- -Ori gi ~es.saQ''''
- "-,,-,,-,,- ,,,
> From: cr v, eSD}
> Se nt:
> To : CIV, e SO);
YN l e SO)' HI) CI V , OSO];
c r Y, CASD- PA ; ~
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v HI) [Whi t ma n, B a n, SES , OASD- PA ;
)(8) crv OASD- PA • )(8)
)(8) )(8)
)(8) CI V, OASD -PA ] ; Ru f f,
Eri c )(8) [Me r ri t t , Roxie T .
CAPT , OASD-PA] ; USMC, OASD -PA] ; La wr enc e,
Dallas La wrenc e , Dall a s, OASD- PA )(8)
CIV OASD- PA . Bu cci Stev e n [Buc c i , Stev en , Dr. , eso
)(8) CIV, OASD- PA] i Ri chard , J ose ph
h
)(8) Lt Col , OSD] i )(8)
CI V, OSD] ; )(8) CI V,
OSO)
> Cc : ""',;,"""- '1>ll!"""'IT'"",""CCI V, JCS, OCJC S i ... .....C
. IV JCS OVCJ CS
> Subj ec e Outreach ti me. -
>
> conf i r ming t hat we a r e s t i l l o n f o r t omorrow as s ho wn be l ow - r oom? Is it
>
>
>
> Me s s a e - ----
>
>
CI V,
Barbe r, Roxie
IV ,
PA , )(8) Co l
oso
, ,.... _ --;::::7'"-
Cc: ::I::;:e~s~o~.;;~7,~~~
CIV, JCS, crv, O
S'eo'' ' '-. .- - - - ... CIV,
OCJCS; i~~ ~ JCS, OVCJCS
, Subj ect : 22 Feb Outreach - t i me .
,
> For t h e out reach on 22 Feb , i s it possible t o a djust the time to start 15
mi nute s later - new time wou l d b e :
,
, 1 :30pm-l :4 5 ·PA Prep
, 1 :4Spm-2 : 3 0 Outreach
,
, Le t e know thanks ,
,
,
, - n n Orig i lllli\r.,><"J'ua
, From: CIV, 050
, Sent : ~
F~rti:d:a.l.""::::'::~'l.'
Janua ~3, 20 06 9: I ~AM
!l!:!
OSD;
......
~~~~~~;;~~:~~~~:,~~~~ r;~~~~;~§~2~~J~~~
CIV. 050; CIV OASO - PA; CI V, OASD-PA;
1 , 050; CIV, CI V, 050;
CIV, OASO- PA; Ruff , Er ic , SES, OASO-
Ca p t .
St even USMC, OASO;,-~~~:~:--:~~t
Dr .• OSO; .~
CIV , 050;
CIV, OSO
, cc . CI V, J CS , OCJCS; CIV, J CS ,
OVCJ CS
, Subj e c t : RE : PA Schedule Items from 1 2 Jan Meeti ng
,
> Fr iday 3 February:
> 1 0 :45am-l 0:55 - PA Prep
> 1100 - 112 0 - Tri -West Hea l thc a re All iance - SO par t ic ipate in cermeony
present i ng por tra it s o f MoH recipients - locat ion TBO .
,
, Wedne sday 22 Fe bruary:
, 1 :1 5a m- l : 3 0 - PA Prep
, 1: 30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/ Re ti red Mil i tar y Analys ts & Civilian
,>Oef ense Expe rt s - l ocat ion TaO
, Tuesday 28 February:
, 8:4Sam-9 :00 - PA Prep
, 9:00am-9:20 - Meet w/ National Gua rd Yout h Cha ll e ng e Group - l o c a t i o n
>TBO
,
, Fr i d a y 1 0 March:
, 11:10am- l1 : 20 - PA Prep
, 11:25 - Wa l k to POAC
, 11 : 30am- l 1 : S0 - Me e t W/USA Basketba l l Leadersh ip (MY e ven t ) @ POAC
,
, Thu r s d ay 1 6 March :
, 1: 15pm-l:3 0 PA Prep
, 1: 30 p m-2 :1S - Ou t r e a c h w/Strat egai c Commun ic a t or s
,
,
, Le t me know i f thi s work s - t h ank s,
,
, Cathy.
,
>-----Origina l Messag e--- --

,
2
,
l~~~~~=~~~~~
From:
Sent: "' CIV' OASD·PAj
To: I! IV, OASD·PAj
Cc: Smith, Dorrance HI) [Smith. Dorrance HON, OASD-PAI; Ruff, Eric [Ruff,
,;E~ri~c~,S~E~S~.!
-;
~~rya~n~~~~[w~hi~tm~an~'~B~rya~n~S~E:S:O~ABarber
[Thorp, Frank, ROML. OASD-P ; arber, Allison
OSO]; Whitman.
OASD·PAj; Haddock, Ellen Katie Col OCJCSIP
~S~D~.P~A~JAllison
;~1h~orp~'CIV
~F~ra~nk
U Col, OASD·PA .
Ballesteros, Mark j. (Ballesteros. Mark J .
(Vician Todd Ma' OASD-PA ' Ca nter Jose h
P
CIY • OASD(PA))
Subject : Dempsey military anetyst trans cript
Follow Up Flag: follow up

Attachments: 03·16-06 Dempsey ISF training.doc
03-16-06 Dempsey
ISF training....
Attached is the e di t ed t ranscript f rom yesterday's milita ry ana l yst c all with
LTG Dempsey .
The e nti re c a ll wa s on ba c kground.
1
Military Analysts Call
Thursday, March 16, 2006
Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, comm ander of the Multi-National Security Transition
Comm and - Iraq (MNSTC -I)
On Background
Hosts: Mr. Da llas Lawrence, OAS DPA, OASDPA
Roo LTG Dem psey in Iraq
Transcriber: Murphy
Lawrence: (in progress) the entire call will be on background. You are free to quote
the source as a senior military leader, but oth er than tbat, it's 00 background, and
General Dempsey should be calling in shortly.
(bre ak to wait)
The show is YOUTS, sir. We have gone over the ground rules. Our folks know this call is
on bac kground, and we apprec iate you joining us this eveni ng from Iraq.
Dempsey: My pleasure.
Lawrence: General, if you'd like to kind of give an openi ng overv iew of the current status
of forces, what the successes your folks are seeing there, anything you'd like to discuss,
then we can open it up for questions.
Dempsey : Yeah, I think I wo uld. But I will keep it brief, because I wou ld rather j ust field
the questions that they are interested in.
Firs t of all, hello to all or you. Mo st of you have been over here at one time or another. I
am ju st crossing my 21 $1 month in Baghd ad, 14 the first time and seven now. So I' ve got
a bit of a, it seems to me, a historic al perspective o n this who le thing.
And what I wo uld say in general term s in that regard is that although the generation of
the combat forces, the more than 100 battalions of Army and poli ce battalions that are out
there get most of the notoriety. the - it seems to me that the - an equally important story
is the institutions that are being built above it, that is to say the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior, as we ll as the - kind of the foundati on of the who le thing which is an
education system , an lraqi training and doctrin e command that includ es 18 institutes,
academ ies, colleges and trai ning centers so that this force we are building will be two
things princi pally - three really. One is capable, clearly. But the other two are one that is
an institution from top to bottom , from foot so ldier to minister, and even more important
than that an institution of national unit y, that is, a cohesive force inside the country at a
time when they clearly need some cohes ive forces wo rking on their behalf. And I think
there ' s been some reason s to believe that that endeavor and that entire enterprise is
moving in that direct ion.
And with that, I will say onl y one other thin g, and that is I know nothing, literally, about
Operation Swanner, so if you will stay clear of that, I wo uld be happy to answer your
qu estions.
Q : General, this is l eff McCausland. Good to talk to you agaio. Co uld you talk a little bit
abou t that national unity functi on ? Of course, there 's been various repo rts after the
bo mbing of the Go lden Mosque (22 Febru ary in Samarra). And in genera l, the ones I
have read seem to be summarized by saying the Iraqi sec urity forces, the arm y,
performed qu ite we ll; in fact, they deployed rapidly and were a settling influence,
however, that the po lice forces were somewhat mixed resu lts in terms of that who le being
cohesiv e, being identified as a unifying force, et cetera.
Could you talk a little about those events, and tho se two different parts of the sec urity
force?
Dempsey: Sure . In general term s, I would say that the anny and the national police - and
the national police, by the way, used to be called when you were here last time the special
poli ce - and consis t of the commando division and the public order division, those
national forces , we have more visibility on them than we do the local po lice, but -
perform ed very we ll. They we re very deliberate; they we re po ised. I wo uld describe their
activities as a settling - clearly a settling influ ence on what was essentia lly a very
emot ionally charged atmosphere.
There were reports of ce rtai n unit s that chose not to confront armed militia, and there
were some arm ed militi a activities that cropped up, notabl y the (Muqtada Sadr' s) Ja ysh al
Mahdi in and aro und Sadr City . But frankl y, they didn 't have much politi cal top cover to
do so. In other words, there was a conscious decision taken at the national level not to
exac erbate the problem by handling two problems at once, you know , yo u've got the
emotionally charged atmosphere of the mosque and the religious und ertones of that and
the decision was made not to confront militias, but rather ensure that they were not acting
in criminal ways. So, for example, there were a couple of mosqu es that were taken over
by militi as - the militia of course claimed - and it may be true -- that they took them over
in order to protect them - but when the legitimate force s went and said, okay, we got it
now , they -- in every case -- they dispersed.
There were oth er reports about armed groups moving throu gh the streets, you kno w,
shooting their rifles in the air and thin gs that over here are somewhat common place, I
don't want to diminish that, but in every case, again , the legitimate sec urity forces had a
leveling effect on all that and kind of channeled all this excess energy.
Now we 're still in the - this is all very recent, so we 're stilt in the process at some level
of accumulating our lessons leamed. And there were a couple of instan ces where local
pol ice in parti cular, I am not talking abo ut the national po lice or the national army, but
the local po lice ma y have, you know, turn ed a blind eye to some thi ngs. But frankly, I
saw this as a wa ters hed moment for the Iraqi Sec urity Forces, and they not only passed
the challenge but did so very well .
Q: Genera l, Jed Babbin. Th anks again for hosting us when we were over there in
December. What can you tell us about the militias infiltrating the "legitimate forces and
we hear all sorts of goofy reports abo ut peopl e coming in and sect arian violence coming
out of some of the se forces.
Demp sey: First of all, let me go from the latter part of your question to the form er. Make
no mistake about it, there are intelligence report s on a frequ ent basis that cause us to be
concerned about the activities of pieces of the legitimate security forces, never an entire
unit, but rather an individual or two or three or 10, maybe, inside of a legitimate unit.
And we've got a system in place with our Iraqi counterparts to investigate those. And we
have on, [don 't know , in the last six month s or so, we 've had the occas ion to change
commanders of battaJions in both the arm y and the national police - aga in, the
commandos and publi c order.
We 've also changed a numb er of brigade commanders because there was enough
evidence they we re not exerting the kind of control and discipline over their force they
needed.
Bu t again, thi s is probably two or three battalions out of 100 or so in the army, and one
bri gade out of eight in the nation al police and two battalions out of 24 in the nation al
police.
So, I mean, you know, it ' s significant, but not anythin g that would me to describ e this as
an endemic probl em.
Now, back to the issue of infiltration. This is one of my favorite words, naturally. And
it's hard for me to sign up for infiltrati on when we talk about the legitimate, that is to say,
the governmental recognized militias - you know, the peshmerga, the Badr and seven
others are identified in CPA order No. 91 as legitimate militias that mu st be over tim e
disarmed and/or assimilated into Iraqi society and even the Iraqi Security Forces.
So we clearly have had former Badr Corps, former peshm erga come in to the security
forces as individuals, intentionally. In fact, in some cases we 've taken input s and allowed
them to be recruited intentionally that way as part of an assimilation pro cess. The key is
not to have them all in one place, and the seco nd key is to have the leaders of units be
diverse, and have the MiTT (Military Tra nsition Team) teams that overwatch them be
sensitive to these kind of things and also the spec ial police transition teams as well.
Now there are other militi as, let' s even be less speci fic, and call them armed gro ups out
there that are more probl ematic. And I mentioned the Ja ysh al Mahdi as one of them,
because it's not a recognized militia by the CPA order No. 91.
Secondly, man y of the young men that tend to drift toward Jaysh al Mahdi are
uneducated, almost universally unemployed, and as a result they can't even get into the
._-- -- -- -
legitimate security forces because the legitimate security forces have a recruiting stan dard
and generally the y can't pass it. So they pose a little bit different kind ofproblern.
But infi ltration is probab ly less prec ise than it ought to be, given that in some cases these
men are actuaUy invited in.
Q : Hey Marty. Bob Scales, how are you doing?
Dempsey: Hi , Bob , good to hear from you.
Q: Listen, I am intrigued by your description of a building of an institutional part of the

arm y. a sort ofTRADOC if you will. Are you actua lly build ing things like academies,
staff colleges, war colleges , NCO academi es, things of that sort? And if so, is that your
mission or does that belong to some body else? And I guess the last part is how is that
goi ng?
Dempsey: It is my mission. It was actuall y - it all started on Dave 's (petraeus) watch,
actu ally. The concept has kind of matured and in fact, in my other hat, which is the
NATO comm ander in Iraq, that 's really in terms of officer education, that ' s their nich e.
But, yeah, we 've graduated our first class from the Iraqi military academ y at Rustamiyah
78 new second lieutenant s, none of whom had previous military experience. And that' s
sign ificant, because you know we' ve also brought in, as you kno w, former officers to fill
the ranks, and this was the first class - it graduated in Jan uary, that is young men who
never had any previo us military experience. So tha t' s the begi nning, it seems to me, of an
officer development system, officer education system that will over time, yo u know,
essentially repl enish the ranks from start to finish.
And we ' re goi ng to - we actually, it' s another one of these national unity initiatives.
There' s three military academies in Iraq. One in Zakho , one in Qu alachulon (?), they're
both in Kurdistan , and one at Rustamiyah. And we 've got them linked togeth er with a
common curriculum, a common program of instruction, common course length, they
share instructors. And no w they are each produ cing about 100 every nine months. Where
we want to get them is to each produce about 300 because ou r analysis of the life-cycle
needs of the anny is that they ' ll need abo ut 900 new lieut enants every year.
But that's all in place. There' s a j oin t staff co llege equiva lent to our Comm and and
General StafT Co llege in place. It wi ll grad uate 50 juniorlevel they call it - that'd be
majors and lieutenant colonels and then this year, this is the pilot year, 37 of the seniors,
which are esse ntially full co lonels and civ ilians, by the way, and that course wi ll double
in size next year as well.
There 's a war college - actually the y are going to call it a national defense universi ty,
that will ope n in September. And by the way, that' s not unique on the anny side. On the
police side we 've recently converted Baghd ad po lice co llege to the production of
office rs, and they've got a nine-month course - I' m so rry, they' ve got a six-month, a one-
year course, and they've got a three-year course . And all those are up and running and if
you all come over here and want to visit them -- I think that this is what will essentially
create this enterprise that will endure over time.
Q: I am trying to get over there specifically just to bother you for a couple days so I can
come back and report all that. I really think the larger message need s to be made . It's not
just about producing battalions or producing soldiers and policemen, but it's also about
producing infrastructure, and I think that' s a story that the American peopl e need to hear.
Dempsey: Absolut ely right . And, just to highlight - or reinfo rce that point, it' s really
what we focus on now. I mean the generation of units is really (in train?) and requires
very little - and by the way, handed over in great measure. The platform instructors for
all of these institutes, academies, training centers, used to be exclusively Coaliti on and
now it' s 70 percent Iraqi. And by the end of this year, we will have tran sitioned most
instructor positions over to Iraqis and then we ' ll be in a mentoring and advi sing role
there.
We ' ve also sent 500 mid-grade officers out of country as part of a NATO initiative to,
you know, to the Marshall Center. And we had a kid graduate from Sandhurst who
graduated with an award for the best foreign cadet. So, I mean, that's the institution side
of it. It' s not sexy, but it' s the most important thing we ' re doing.
Q: And a story that needs to be told.
Q: Hey, sir, Ken Allard. Actually I thiok we adopted the class at Rustami yah on our last
trip over there ourselves. And we sure remember them very fondly.
Dempsey : Yeah, that' s right, I do.
Q: The thing that I am getting a lot of questions about from our correspondents -- by the
way, they talk about the present level of violence is making it even tougher on them to
cover the story than it otherw ise would have been.
One of the things that is interesting to me, based on my own experience in Bosnia, is
whether or not you are seeing any signs of what amounts to a de facto ethnic cleansing?
Because what happened over there was not so much that you had the death squads
moving around , they were certainly present, probably in the same way that they are in
Iraq, but what was happening is that a lot of what was going on was simply people
getting out ofhann ' s way. Are you seeing any signs that that is going on, and ifso, what
are the institutions you 're building doin g about that?
Dempsey: Yeah, one of the - well, a coup le of ways to answer that, or a couple of aspects
to the answer. And that is most of the problems, this is no surprise, it's a flash to the
obvious, you know, it's where the fault lines exist. And the princip al fault line exists in
Baghdad, pure and simple. It's also the center of gravity politicall y and so forth.
So we haven't seen the kin d of prob lems that you are talking abo ut any p lace else than
Iraq with the excep tion of Baghdad. On e of Gen eral Casey's CC lR (commanders' critical
information requi remen ts) is d isplacement o f civilians, for exactly the reason you talk
abo ut. Are they bein g forced out, are they leaving?
By the way, the an alysis o f that is very co mplicated right now because we are right in the
middle of Arba'een. Ashura is, you know, their Good Friday essentially, and then 40 days
later is the Arba ' een holiday and they - and many o f them troop south, many o f the Shi ' a
pilgrims, I should be more specific - troop sou th . And that 's go ing on at precisely the
time we are trying to figure out, you know, what 's truth and what's fiction about the
movement of peop le.
There have been two - sin ce the Samarra mosque incident - there' s been two reports o f
fami lies on the mo ve. One was I think - and again thi s is all on background, so please
don't use the exact numbe r - one invo lved 200 fami lies and another one about the same
number mo ving from Baghdad south . An d the firs t report was absol ute ly d etermined to
be pil grims. Th e second one we don 't have the answer yet; it could very well be that there
were peopl e that had moved out o f southeast Baghdad to the so uth, to ge t away from
what they pe rce ived to be an unsecu re situation.
As to w hat we ' re doing about it, thi s is really an operationa l answer to that question, but
we are really foc used lik e a laser beam on Baghdad, because again, for all the reasons I
men tioned . And General Casey as you know has brought up the - a piece o f his
operational reserve to thi cken the ranks. It' s also been, by the way, apretty goo d test of
their abi lity to move and determi ne wha t timelines they would need to have to mo ve.
We've brought thre e battalions of public order back from - they were forward deplo yed
elsewhere, we brought them back into Baghd ad . Th e Iraq i arm y has moved another
couple battalions into Ba ghd ad.
So we' ve prob ably increased the force levels in Ba ghdad by about anywhere from 3,500
to 4,000. Increased a number of patrols by between 150 and 200 a day. Kind of the issue
now is restoring public co nfidence, frankly, and that takes place by increased presence.
An d so all that ' s happening. And we're moni torin g the k ind of things you j ust talk ed
about as part of our CC IR.
But to this poi nt, we haven't seen tho se kind o f disp lacements. What we have seen is kind
o f a b it o f a back and fort h, you know, there will be a Sunni atrocity and then there will
be a Sh i'e atrocity and a Sunni atrocity. So the real tric k here is to break the cy cle, and
we are wo rking on that.
Q: Ge nera l, Bob M aginni s. Question regarding the defense ministry an d the interio r
ministry and whether or not you are seeing indications that they are maturing eno ugh to
be able to oversee co untrywide the typ es of functions that you j ust described.
Dempsey: Yeah, maturing -- the present participle applies. They are clearl y, they are
clearly maturing. And we monitor - just like the tactical units have a - we call it a
transitional read iness assessment. It' s a monthl y report card, if you will. We 've got one
that we, that we - where we evaluate ourselves, because we are not advisors over there,
we ' re partners with them. And so on a monthl y basi s we determine what progress we
have made or have failed to make on 18 key functions in any ministry, and it's everything
from personal management with, you know, subtext of pay and promotion and
retirement, all the way down to the inspector general function.
And we have - you know that I've got developmental respon sibility for both ministries.
And I've got right now about 70 soldiers and civilians in each ministry, and that number
is going to go up a bit here in the nex t month because we have made some ana lysis of
additional needs. And we really want them to get off to a promising start in this first 100
days of the new government. We are really focused on having them achieve some
successes in the first 100 days or so in the new government. And so we 're really, we 've
got some programs we ' ve worked out with them to give them a few early wins if you
want to call it that.
So, now there are some processes though where we have made enormous strides, pay for
example . Promotion we're close, very close. And some that are just going to take longer.
And the two that come inunediately to mind are procurement and contrac ting. You know,
they come from a command-directed economy where pretty much if you needed it you
asked for the money, if you got it, you spent it. There was no competitive bidding and no
competing in the free market econo my against other sectors of the economy.
But they are very much in a free market economy now. The y have to make their case to a
coun cil, and they' ve to do competitive bidding. This is their law, by the way, not ours -
their new law r should say. So that' s been a real eye opener for them, and that probably is
going to take, you know, a couple of years , I think, to mature.
Q: General , just one follow-up . The pay you mentioned, you know, what have you done
to fix that?
Dempse y: Great question. Well, first of all, we've identified the probl em . The problem
wasn' t pay; it was easy to lump it in to the category of pay. The problem was really
personal accountability, frankl y. So, for example, if a commander up in Mosul didn 't
have proper accountability of his peop le and either numb ers or in rank structure and he
placed a demand on the system - and it's still a manual system - and here came the
payroll (north?) and he got there and he didn't have enough money to pay, then it was
sort ofl umped in in precisely as a pay problem. Well, it wasn't a pay probl em, it was a
personal acco untability problem . So that' s where we put our effort.
And we've got a couple of initiatives in place to build for them what we might call a little
personn el admi nistration center in each battalion where as these soldiers go on leave, you
know, they 're basically on a zl-day on, seven-day olTcycle, they process in and out each
time. And it' s beginning to give us a heck ora lot more clarit y on what's ou t there. And
as a result, I would venture to say - now thi s, ou r last month may have been an ano maly,
I hope not, but the last month we had fewe r than 1,000 pay prob lems in an army of, you
know, that's just now at about at 106,000 . And those were co rrected very quickly upon
identification.
Th e police is a little different. You know, they draw their pay and their support for local
police fro m the provinces and then the national police are suppo rted from the center. So ,
you know, we' re learning as we go with that, but we 've made some pretty significant
strides w ith that as well.
Q: Gene ral, this is l effM cCausland again. On the (inaudible) side, there' s been a lot of
focus frankl y on the actual ministers, a Mr. (inaudi ble - sounds like he might mean
Sayan Jab er, interio r minister) the minister of interior is one that (inaudible - is talked
about?) an awful lot. I'll full y understand if you don 't want to want to co mment at all.
But I am curi ous about your thoughts at all, because obviously the guys at th e top are
go ing to be key and essential on ans wering a lot o f these question s, whether it's
infiltration, whether it 's pay, (in audib le) et cetera .
Dempsey: You know ministers - in gen eral terms - I don't wan t to commen t about them
personally because, you know, I mean, I have such a close relation ship to them it
wouldn 't take too long to figure out where it came from.
But I will tell you in tell you in general terms, what this country needs in my view is
mini sters who -- you know, we tend to say we need a government of national unity, and
that's a fact. No dou bt about it. But you do need ministers in the key positions who have
a strong poli tical backing. In other words, they've got to have a consti tuency so that as
they are buffeted by othe r influencers they' ve got some political backing. I mean, this is a
democracy now.
(break in tran script)
Q: Sir, Ken Allard again. I was reall y impressed wit h some of the (inaudible - sounds
like BUDS) that we saw, particularly with the overlapping surveillance systems. Have
those th ings been any real assi stance to you guys in dealing with the problem of the civi l
violence? Have tho se systems helped you guys at all react ?
Dempsey: Yeah, I think so. Frankly, Pete Chiare lli would be better positioned to answer
that because he reall y has access to that all the time. But I do know that --
Q: WeU teU him tha t [ said hi and also that -
Dempsey: I will.
Q: And ['U ask him tho se embarrassin g qu estions myself.

Dempsey: Yeah, yeah. No problem . But I will say that he has reported that some of those
thin gs have allowed - you know the who le issue in this part of the world, I am not just
talking abo ut Baghdad or Iraq, but this part of the world is rumor genera lly trumps fact.
And what these overlapping systems have allow ed us to do in many cases is confirm or
den y and tamp down things tha t oth erwi se could rea lly spin out of control.
Lawrence: An y additional questions for the general?
Q : Well, thanks for what you' ve done , buddy. This is Bob Scales. You know , you've
done a terrific job and all of us over here are really proud of you.
Dempsey: Well , thanks. That means a lot. And by the wa y though , it hasn 't escaped me. I
know you 're tryin g to get ov er here , but I notice yo u didn't try to get over here before St.
Patrick ' s Day (laughter).
Q : Hel ' I am on a (six - inaudible) train tom orrow morni ng; I am go ing to O 'Houlihan 's
on 57 Street, and I'll drink a beer (inaudible) I am go ing to march in the parade, Marty
(laughter).
Dempsey: Are you rea lly? That 's great.
Q: Take care, my friend.
Dempsey: Al l right, you all take care .
Q : Take care, sir.
Q: Thanks to you, general.
Q: Hey Dall as?
Lawrence: Yes, sir. Folks , just a quick reminder that was on background. Go ahead,
co lonel.
(sidebar conversation continues).
End of transcript
From :
Sent:
To:
Cc :
Subject:
General Pace, Si r :
I have the f ollowing i n fo rmat ion regarding upcoming media i nt ervi ews on t he topic of
ret ired gene ral s cal l ing f or Se cre t a ry Rumsfeld' s r esi gna tion. Al s o pasted below is the
text o f the Pr e s i dent ' s s ta tement of s uppo rt f or SecDef.
Ve ry Respe ctfu lly ,
Ka tie
TONIGHT
Friday , 14 Ap ri l:
1700 - 1800 GEN Franks on "Hardball" (MSNBC) 1800 - - Oe n Mye r s on Fox News 22 00 - - Gen
Jumper on "Anderson Coope r 360 " (CNN)
Al s o ton i ght : Gen Mye r s ha s t aped a n i nt e rv i e w wi th Ba r ba r a Starr , CNN ... she ha s bee n
do i ng s egment s a t the top of t he news at 1 70 0 , 18 00 , 1 900 , a nd 20 00 -- a l though I a m not
certa in when his interview wi ll air.
Sunday , 16 April
09 00 -1 000: Gen Mye r s on FOX NEWS SUNDAY with Chris wall a ce
In o t her ne ws :
-- Expe c t i ng to see an OpEd by Lt Gen DeLong i n Saturday, 17 Apri l Ne w Yor k Times - -Ge n
Jumper has in terviewed with AP and LA Times -- should s ee someth ing f r om t ha t s oon.
- - Lt Gen Mc I ne r ny (and another mi l i t a ry a nalys t) have written an OpEd p i ece t hat should
a ppear i n wa l l Street Journa l on Monda y , 19 Apri l.
- -Oe n Mye r s i s also writing an OpEd , and is expect ing to i nt e rvi e w wi t h AP, Ne wswee k , a nd
Kansas Ci ty Star -- no furt her deta i ls on these ye t.
Subj ect: STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
THE WHI TE HOUSE
Of fi c e of the Press Secretary
For I mmed iate Relea se Apr il 14, 2006
1
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Earlier today I s poke wi th Don Rums f e l d a bout ongoi ng military operations in the Gl obal
War on Terror. I rei tera ted my st rong s uppor t for his leadership during this his toric and
challenging time f o r our Nation .
The Department of Defense has bee n tasked with many difficult missions . Upon assuming
o f fice, I asked Don to transform the largest department i n our government . Tha t k ind of
change is ha rd , but our Nation must have a mi l i t a r y t ha t i s fully prepared to confront the
da ng e r ou s threat s o f t he 21s t Cen tury. Don and our military commande rs have also been
t a ske d to take t he f ight t o t he e nemy abroad on multiple fronts.
I have seen first - hand how Don relies upon our mi l i t a r y commanders in the fi eld and at the
Pentagon t o make decisions about how best to complete t hese missions. secretary
Rumsfeld's ene r ge t i c a nd steady leadersh ip is exac tly what is nee de d a t t his critical
period . He ha s my full support and deepest appreciation .
GEORGE W. BUSH
# # #

' p e t e r . p a c e, ~ ~
Giambastianl, EP, ADM, VCJCS Read: 4/1512006 8:12 AM

ooem o. Raymond T, LTG, JCS ACJCS
...,
Sham, Walter L., LTG JCS DJS Read: 4/14/20063:53PM
Read: 4/14/2006 3:55 PM
Read: 41t4l2006 4:59 PM
Read: 4/1712006 12:35 PM
Read: 4/1 412006 5:36 PM

Read: 411412006 4:22 PM
React: 411412006 3:46 PM
React: 4/1412006 3:54 PM
Ruff, Eric Jb)(8) Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD) Read: 411412006 3:45PM
I''''
Read: 4/1 4/2006 3:46 PM

Deleted : 4/17120065:14 PM
Read:4/1 912006 3:53 PM

Whitma n, Bryan ! g)(8) . [Whitman, Bryan, SES, Read: 4/14/20065:32 PM
OASD-PAJ
2
Recipient Read
Reac!: 4/1412006 3:45 PM

Read: 4/1412006 4:38 PM
Read: 4/1412006 3:47 PM
Pace, Peter, Gen, JCS. CJCS Read: 4/1412006 4:18 PM
3
From : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA
~F;r~id~a~&>~r~il~14IT2~
Sent :
63 :57 PM
~~~§~~!!!:=~~::::i
To:
Cc : LTC OCJCS/P
MAJ, OCJCSI. LCDR JCS OCJC SIPA~==;-......
A CIV JCS SJS CIV, JCS OCJCS CIV JCS SJS
Subject: FW: INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SECDEF
Might want t o c a pture t h e s e transcript s for Monday ...

Than k s .
VIR
Col H
-----Original Messa ge- - -- -
Fr om : Haddo c k , El l en ( Kat i e ) , Co l , OCJ CS /PA
Sent: Friday , r i l 14 2 0 0 6 : 4 PM
To: ' peter. p ace
Cc: Giambas t ian EP ADM LTG, JCS ACJCSi Sh a rp, Walter L.
S, Co l, JCS SJS ;
CAPT J CS OVCJCS /PA; LO~~e Co l J CS SJS; COL, JCS,
OCJ CS' CAPT, S, Lt CoI,
MS t OCJCS PA,CIV,
Ru ff, EriPA}i
OASD- c Ruff Bri c,COL
SES OSD};~'~~::::::~~~
, J, CS JS'
LTC, OCJCS / PAi 0;;;;;;' ..1 CDR, OCJCS / PAi Ma j,
OCJ CS/PAi CI V, JCS SJS
Subject : I NTERVI EWS I N SUPPORT OF SECDEF
Genera l Pace , S i r :
I have t he f o l l o wi ng i n fo rmati o n reg a r d i ng u p c o mi ng media i nt e rvi e ws o n t h e t op ic of

r e t i r ed ge ne rals c a l ling f o r s ecretary Rumsfe ld's r es i gnation . Als o pas t ed belo w i s t h e
text o f t h e P resi d e nt ' s s tatement o f s upport fo r SecDef.
Very Re s pe ctfUlly ,
Ka tie
TONI GHT
F r i d a y , 14 April:
1 700 -18 0 0 GEN Fr a n k s on "Ha r dba ll " (MSNBC) 1800 -- Ge n My e r s on Fox New s 220 0 -- Ge n
J u mpe r o n " And e r s o n Cooper 360 " (CNN)
Al s o tonight : Ge n My e r s has taped an interview wi th Barbara St a r r , CNN ... s he ha s be e n

d o i ng segme n t s at t h e t o p o f t he news a t 17 0 0 , 1 8 0 0 , 1 9 0 0, a nd 200 0 -- a lthough I am no t
ce rtain wh en his i nt e rview wi ll a ir.
Sunday , 1 6 April
0 900 - 1 00 0 : Ge n My e r s o n FOX NEWS SUNDAY with Ch r i s wal lace
In o t h er ne ws :
-- Expect ing to see an OpEd b y Lt Ge n De Long in S atu r d ay , 17 Apri l Ne w York Times --Gen
Jumper h a s i nt erviewe d wi th AP a nd LA Ti mes -- should s e e somethi ng fro m t h a t 800n.
--Lt Gen McInerny (and anot her mili t ary a naly st ) ha v e wri t ten an OpEd p iece t h a t s hould
a ppe ar i n Wall Stree t J ou r nal o n Mo nd a y , 19 Apr il.
--Gen My ers i s al s o wri ting an Op Ed , a nd is expecting to intervi ew with AP, News week , a n d
Kan sa s Ci ty Star -- no fur the r d e tai l s o n t h es e yet.
Subjec t: STATEMENT BY THE PRES I DENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

1
Offic e o f the Pre s s Secretary
For Immediate Re l e a se Apri l 14 , 2006
Earlier t oda y I spoke with Don Rums fel d a bout ongoi ng mi lit a ry op e rations in the Global
Wa r on Terror . I reite rated my strong suppor t for his l e a de r s hip dur ing this hi s t oric and
c halleng ing time for our Nat ion.
The Departme nt of Def ens e ha s been t a sked with many d i f f i c u l t missions . upon a s s uming
off i ce , I asked Don t o trans f orm the l a r ge st department i n our gove r nme nt. That kind of
change is har d, but our Na t i on must have a mili tary that is full y prepared t o confront t he
dang erous threats o f t he 2'l s t Century . Don and our mi l i t a r y commanders have alao been
tasked to take the f i ght to the enemy abroad on mul t i p le f ronts.
I have seen first-han d how Don r e l i e s upon our military commanders in the f i e l d a nd at t he
Pentagon t o make decisions about how best t o comp lete these mi s s i on s . Sec re t ary
Rums f el d' s energetic and s t e a dy leadership is exact ly what is needed at t his cri tical
period. He has my f u l l support and dee pest a pp r e c i a t i on.
GEORGE W. BUSH
# # #
2
",-,
From: Giambastianl, EP, ADM , VCJCS
Sent : Saturday, April 15, 2006 8:14 AM
To: 1!~~~~;f:a tie), Col, OCJCS /PA; Pace, Peter, Gen. JCS, CJCS ~!:~=:;:;::::l
Cc: 1:" " Col, JCS SJS CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA;O:
A, COL JCS OCJCS' CAPT JCS , OCJCS ; Sharp Waller L. LTG JCS
DJS; COL, JCS J5; "" CDR, OCJCS/PA; CIV,
JCS SJS
Subject: RE; INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SECDEF
T KS Katie .
From: Haddock, Ellen (Kat ie), Col, OCJCS/PA

Sent: Friday, April 14 , 2006 3 :45 PM
To : Pace , Peter, Gen, JCS, CJCS
cc.G
iambaati .
LTG , JCS DJS i )(8)
OCJ CS ' )(8)

CAPT
CAPT J CS OVCJCS/PAi
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"" ,,!!!;;::;:;::;:~ LTC , OCJCS/PA; KI) CDR, OCJCS/PA; Maj,
OCJCS/PAi ~ CIV , JCS SJS
Subject: INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SBCDEF
Genera l Pace , Sir :

I have t he f ollowing i nfo rma tio n regarding upcomi ng media i n t e rvi e ws on t he topic o f
retired generals calling f o r Secretary Rumsfe ld's res ignat ion . Also pasted be low i s the
t e xt of the President's statement of suppor t for SecDe f.
Very Respe ctfully ,
Kat ie
TON IGHT
Friday, 14 Apr i l:
17 00-1 8 00 GEN Franks o n "Ha r db a ll " (MSNBC)
1800 -- Gen Myers on Fox News
2200 -- Gen J umper on "And e r s o n Coope r 360 " (CNN)
Also tonight: Gen Myers has taped a n i nterview with Barbara Starr , CNN . .. she h a s been
doing s egments at t he t op of t he news a t 1700, 1800, 1900, and 2000 -- al t hough I a m not
c ertain when h is interview wi l l a ir .
Sunday , 16 April
090 0 - 1000: Gen Myers on FOX NEWS SUNDAY with Ch ris wallace
I n other news:
-- Expe c t i ng to see a n OpEd by LtGen DeLong in Saturday, 17 Apri l New York Times
-- Ge n Jumpe r has interviewed with AP and LA Times - - shou ld see somethi ng f r o m that s oon.
--Lt Gen McI ne rny (a nd another mili t a ry ana lyst ) have writ ten an OpEd p iece t ha t should
appear i n Wall Street J ourna l on Monday, 19 Apri l.
-- Ge n Myers is a lso wr it ing an OpEd, and i s expecting to i n terview with AP, Newsweek, and
Ka n s a s City Star - - no f urther deta i ls on the s e ye t .
Sub ject: STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - --
THE WHI TE HOUSE
Of fice of the Press Secre tary
For Immediate Release April 14 , 2 006
Earli er t oda y I spoke with Don Rumsfe ld about ongoing mi l i t a ry o pe r a t i o ns in the Gl obal
War o n Terror . I r eiterated my s t rong support for his leader ship during this hi s toric and
c ha l l e ng i ng t ime fo r o u r Nation .
The De partment o f Defense ha s been tasked wi t h many d iff icult mi ssi ons . upon assumi ng
o f f i c e. I a s ke d Don to transform the la rgest d epar tment i n o ur g overnment . That kind of
c hang e i s ha r d , but ou r Nati on mus t have a mi l it a ry t hat i s full y pre pared to c o n f r o nt the
dangerous threats o f the 21st Cen t ury. Don and our mil i t ary c ommanders have a lso been
tasked to take t he f i g ht t o the ene my ab r o a d on mult iple f r o n t s .
I have seen first -hand how Don r elies upon ou r mi litary c ommanders i n the f ie l d and at the
Pe n t a g o n t o make decisions a bo u t how bes t t o complete t hese missions. Secr etary
Ru msfeld'9 energe tic a nd steady l eade rship i s exactly wha t is needed at t hi s critical
pe riod. He ha s my fu ll support a nd deepest appreciat ion .
GEORGE W. BUSH
# # #
2
From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), cor, OCJCSJPA
Sent : o d 20067:11 PM
To: lOll COL. JCS. OCJCS
Cc : lOll CIV. JCS. OCJCS; LCDR. JCS. OCJCS
Subj ect : FW : Read Ahead Retired Military Ana lysts 04-18..(l6.doc
Attachments: imageOO1.gif; oledata.mso
e SD PA is coordina t ing a Ro undTable t omorrow wi th s e cDe f , CJCS , and 1 7 r etired mi li tary

ana l y st s . (Li s t of att e nde es is at t h e bot tom o f thi s e mai l . ) Th e y wi l l be h ere from 13 4 0
t o 1 60 0 , l o c a l.
I ti nerary inc l udes:

1345 - 14 30, b r i ef i ng from I raq v i a c onfer e n ce c all (b r i e f e r s till not y e t identif ied )
144 5 - 1 5 1 5 with Gen Pa c e a n d
1515-16 00 wi t h SecDef
I' l l provide Ge n Pa ce a c opy of t h i s rea d-ah ead i n the a . m.

Jus t wa nted t o g i v e you a h ead 's up.
Vi R
Katie
liItal-l'easaa - - - - -
Fr o m: CIV , OASD- PA]
Se nt: Monday , Ap r i l 1 7 , 200 6 5 :2 0 PM
To : Had dock. Ell e n (Ka t i e) , Col , OCJ CS/ PA; Ba rbe r , All ison [Ba r b e r , Al lison , CI V,
OASD- PA]
Cc: La wr e n c e , Da llas [Lawrence Dal l a s OASD- PA] '
CI V, OASD- PA]; tCol , 0 5 0 ]
Subjec t : Read Ahead Retired Military Ana lysts 04 - 1 8 -06.doc
hi . p l ea s e note a d di ti ona l analysts for t omo r r o w ' s r oundtab l e. we n ow have 1 7 .
r:il- nks
__ _
upda t e d April 17, 2006
READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
OUTREACH MEET I NG WI TH RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS
Da te /Ti me : Tuesd ay. Apr i l 1 8 , 20 06 3: 1 5 p .m .

t o 4 :0 0 p .m .
Loc at i o n : SecDef Di n i ng Roo m, L. 1
Backgr ound :
1
* Approximately sixtee n retired mi litary ana lysts who serve as mi l i t a ry/ defe ns e
experts for ma j o r media ou tlets .
• La s t outreach meet ing with t his group was September 2005.
• Comments shou ld be cons idered on ba c kgr ound .
Ti me l i ne :
1:4 0 p .m . welcome and I nt r oduc tion
• All i son Barber , De put y Assis tant Secretary of Defense f o r Pub l ic Af fa irs
1 : 45 p.m . Update on Iraqi Security Forces (v ia video t el e confe r e nc e )
• Briefers TBD
2 :30 p.m. Break
2 :45 p . m. Upda t e on Globa l Operations
• Genera l Peter Pace, Cha irman of t he J oi nt Chiefs o f Staff

3 :15 p.m . Discuss ion and Quest ions wi th Sec re t ary of De fe ns e Donald H. Rumsfe ld
4:00 p.m. Meet i ng Conc l ude s
At t a c hme nt s:
• Lis t of part ic ipants

Tab A
Secretary Dona ld H. Rumsfe ld

Meeting with Retired Military Ana lysts
Room The Pent a gon
L...-......
Tuesday, Apr i l 18, 2006
Part ic i pants
CONF I RMED :
Mr. Jed Bab bin (USAF , JAG)
2
Li e u t e n a n t General Frank B. Ca mpb e l l (USAF , Retired )
Dr. J ames J ay Carafano (LTC , USA, Ret ired )
Co l one l (Tim) J . Ea d s (USA, Re t ired )
General Ronald Foge lman (USAF , Ret ired )
Co l one l J ohn Ga rrett (USMC, Ret ired )
Command Se rgeant Majo r Steven Greer (USA, Re t ired )
Li e ute nant Colonel Rob e r t L . Mag innis (USA, Re tire d )
Co l onel Je f f McCausland (USA, Ret i red)
Lieutenan t Ge n eral Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retire d )
Ca p t a i n Chuck Nas h (USN, Ret i red )
Ge nera l Wil l iam L . Nash (USA, Re ti r e d )
Maj or Genera l Robert H. Sca les , Jr. (USA, Retired)
Ma j o r Ge ne ral Donal d W. Sh e pp e r d (USAF , Re ti r e d)
Mr. Wayne Si mmons (USN, CIA , Retired )
Ca p t ain Ma r t i n L . St r o ng (USN, Re tired )
Ge neral Tom Wil kers o n (USMC, Retired )
3
~
~eS~d~a~;~,CIV,
Sent :
To : 2006 9:28
JCS, AM
OCJCS
Cc: ... COL, JCS, OCJCS MS91. JCS. OCJCS
Subject: FW : Read Ahead Retired Military Analysts 04-18-06.doc

Flag Stat us : Flagged
Attachments : imageOO1.gif; oledata.mso
During prebrief wi th SecDef, h e mentioned Gen Pace should have 4 5 minutes with these guys
too ... not sure i f t ha t works, or if SecDef mentioned it t o Gen Pace t his a . m. , or what,
but wanted t o g i v e you a head's up.
- - -- - Or i inal Messa e -----
From: crv , OASD-PA]
Sent: Monday , April 1 7 , 2006 5 : 20 PM
To : Haddock, Ellen ( Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS / PAi Barbe r, Al lison [Barber, Allison, crv,
OASD-PA]
Cc: Lawrence , Dallas
Clv, OASD - PA] ; Lt Col , OSD)
Sub j e c t : Read Ahe a d Re ti red Mil ita ry Analys ts 04-1S-06.doc
h i . ple ase note addi tional a na l ys ts f o r t omorr o w' s roundtab le. we now have 1 7 .
ks
Upd a ted Apr il 1 7 , 20 06
READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
OUTREACH MEETING WITH RET IRED MILITAR Y ANALYSTS
Dat e /Tim e : Tu esday, Ap ri l 18 , 2006 3 :15 p . m.

t o 4 : 0 0 p. m.
Loca tion : SecDef Dining Room,

1....----1
Ba ckgr ou nd :
• Ap p r o x i mate l y sixteen ret ired mili tary analysts who serve as mili t ary/defense
experts f o r major medi a out lets.
• Las t outreach meeting with this group was September 2005 .
1
• Commente should be cons i dere d on background.
Ti me l i ne :
1 :40 p.m. welcome and Introduction
• Al l ison Barber , Deputy Assistant Secretary o f De fense f or Public Aff airs
1:45 p .m . upda te on Iraqi Security Forces (v i a v i deo teleconference )
• Briefers TBD
2 :30 p . m. Br eak
2 :45 p .m . Update on Globa l Ope r a t ions
• Genera l Peter Pace, Cha i rman o f the J oint Chi e f s of St a f f
3:15 p .m . Di scussion a nd Questions with Se cretary o f Defense Dona l d H. Rumsfe ld
4:00 p . m. Meeti ng Concludes
Attachments :
• List of Part ic i pants

Tab A
Secre tary Dona ld H. Rumsfe ld

Mee t i ng with Retired Mil itary Analys ts
Room The Pen t agon

L..-.....
Tue s da y , April 18, 2 006
pa r t i c i pa nt s
CONFIRMED :
Mr. Jed Babb i n (USAF, J AG)
Lieutenant General Fra.nk B. Campbe ll (USAF, Ret ired )

Dr. James J ay Carafano (LTC, USA , Retired )
Colone l (Ti m) J . Eads (USA, Ret ired )
2
Ge nera l Ron a l d Foge lm a n (USAF, Retired)
Colone l J ohn Garre tt (USMC, Ret ire d )
Comma n d Sergeant Ma j o r Steven Gr e e r (USA, Re t i red )
Lieutena n t Co lonel Robert L . Ma g innis (USA, Ret ire d )
Colo ne l Jeff McCausland (USA, Retired )
Lieutenant Gene r a l Thomas McI ne r n ey (USAF , Retired )
Ca p t a i n Chuck Nash (USN, Re tired)
Maj or General Robert H. Sca l e s, Jr. (USA, Retired )
Major General Donald W. Sheppe rd (USAF, Re t i r e d )
Mr . Wayne S immon s (USN, CIA , Re t ired )
Captain Ha r t i n L . St rong (USN, Retired )
General Tom Wil kerson (USMC, Retired)
3
Sent: Tuesda ril1 8 20065:16 PM
To : COL, JCS N M
~C~C
:,-_ _..... ,
Cc : .........==~ CDR, OCJC S/PA, Lt Col, JCS J3
Subject: RE: 191100 APR O/C with DJ3
Tha nks, ~~~__J

First off, I app r eciate you comi ng to t he re scue today , a nd helping us get BG Ham t o brief
the r e t i r e d mil ita ry a nalysts .. . he was v ery well rece ived.
The analys ts spoke v e ry highly of him (t o the Se c Def). Thank you fo r your part i n making
that ha ppe n !
I' l l ~ t here t omorrow at 11 00 to discuss Ops Only p r e s s a va i l abil i ties, o r anythi ng e l s e
t he general wa n t s to talk about !
VI R
Kat ie
> -----Ori gi na l Messa e - - - - -

>From; COL , JCS NMCC
>Sen t: Tuesday, April 18 , 2006 5 :00 PM
add
>To: ~~::~;~~~ (Kati e ), Col,
>Cc: ~ CDR, OCJ CS/ PAi Lt Col , JCS J3
>Subj e c t: 191 100 APR o/ c with DJ3>~~----------'
>
»xa c i e ,
>Ca l l e d e a r li e r t oda y ref possible OPS on ly press ava i labil ity oppo r t un i t y f or t he OJ3 . I
spoke wi t h hi m l a s t ni ght and LtGen Conway wou ld li ke t o s ee you f or 20 mins to get the
t he way ahead f or a n ops only s essi ons. Themes, t al k i ng point s , possible sticking po ints ,
agendas .... e tc. Also what are possible DTGs for an o p s on ly session ? This wee k? I a m
runni ng out o f whit e spa ce t hi s week . Woul d be be s t to f ocus o n ne xt week. Give me a
hollar .
>
»v r
>
M Ci
LCDR JCS
> & CJ CS press
>
>
> « Fil e : ' 060 418 SD & CJCS p res s er . doc » Gene r al s, Admirals, Attached is the
transcript from t oday ' s press ava i l abi lity wi t h SecDe f and Gen Pace. I t is 13 pages - the
fi r st 11 of whi ch d iscuss the c r it ic ism o f the Se creta ry by retired general o f ficers.
Gene ral Pace dis cusse s (aga in) the pr oces s of ho w sen ior o f fic e r s and c i vilian l eadership
d iscuss de c i s i on making - page 8.
>
> At page 11 , t here is a question about Afghanistan a nd the conce r n about t he poppy
crops . Ot he r top i c s (no t that there was muc h t i me for s uch ) incl uded Kethn i c c leansing - i n
Iraq , dealing with t he mil i ti a s and the f o rma t ion of the Iraqi government.
>
~ ~CD~R~;::::J
> Publ i c Affa i rs Of fic e
> Of fi ce of the Cha i rma n o f the Joint Chie f s of Staff
> The Pe nt a on
>
1
:> n iprne t :
:> s i p r net:
>
2
From: ~;....,....,..J. ,'C D R, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, April ' S, 2006 5:27 PM
To: Ham Carter F BG JCS NMCC
Cc: CAPT, JCs NMCC; LCDR JCS J3; Haddock, Ellen
(Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA L.. ......
Subject: FW: 191100 APR O/C with DJ3
Sir -
Echo Col H' s note - t ruly - t hey really appre ciated the pe rspectiv e you prov ide d .
Thank you SOOO VERY MUCH for coming t o t h e rescue today. Name y o u r flavo r !
> -- - -- Or i g ina l Me s s age - - - - -

>Fr om: Had dock , El len (Kat i e) , Col, OCJCS! PA
»aent • a ' 1 18 , 200 6 5: 16 PM
>To : COL, JCS NM
~C!CE;:=====:1 Lt Col , J CS J3
>Cc : CDR , OCJCS!PAi l
>Subj e c t : RE : 191100 APR O!C wi th OJ3
>
>Tha nks ,1,;,;';"_ ..1
>Fi rst off , I appreci ate you c omi ng to t he rescue today, and helping us get BG Ham t o
b r ie f the r e t i r ed mili t ary a nalys ts . .. he was very wel l r eceived .
>The a nalysts spoke v ery highly of him (t o t he SecDe f ). Thank you for your part in mak ing
t ha t happen !
>1 '11 b e there tomorrow a t 1 100 t o di scuss Cps On ly p ress avail abiliti es , o r anythi ng else
the general wants to t a lk a bou t !
>V!R
>Ka t i e
>
> --- - -orig n a S~ - --- -
>F r om , ltlll COL, J CS NMCC
>Se nt : Tue s d a y , Apr i l 18 , 2 00 6 5:0 0 PM
>To : Had do ck Elle n (Kati e) . Co l, OCJ CS PA
>Cc : CDR, OCJCS! PAi Lt Col , JCS J3
>Sub j e c t : 1 9 11 0 0 APR OIC wi th DJ}o~------------1
>
»xa t I e ,
>Ca l l e d e ar l ie r today ref po ssible OPS only p r ess a v ai labi li t y op por t u n i t y for the DJ 3 . I
s poke wi t h h im last n i ght a nd LtGe n Conway wou ld like t o see you fo r 2 0 mi n s to g e t t he
the way a h e ad for an ops o n l y s ess ions . The me s, ta l k ing poi n ts , poss ibl e stic king points ,
agendas . .. . etc . Al s o wh a t a re poss ible DTGs f o r an Cps only sess ion ? This week? I a m
r u nning out o f wh ite s pace t h i s wee k. Wo u ld be b e st t o foc us on nex t week. Give me a
h ollar .
>
>Vr
Ant hony L ,
C,
JCs NMCC; LCDR J CS J3 ;
> t r anscr ipt of SecDef & CJCS press con f e r e n c e
>
>
> « File : 0 6 0 4 1 8 SD & CJCS p r esser .doc » Generals , Admira ls , At t a c he d is t h e
transcript from t oday ' s press a va il ab i l i t y wit h SecDef and Gen Pace . It i s 1 3 pages - t he
f irs t 11 of which d i s c u s s the cri t icism of the Secretary by retired general o ffic ers.
General Pa c e d i s c u s s e s (a g a i n ) t h e pro c e s s o f how senior o f f i c e r s a nd civi lian leade rship
1
d i s cu s s decision maki ng - page 8 .
>
> At page 11, there is a que s ti on about Af ghanistan a nd the conc e r n about t he poppy
crops. Other t opi cs (not that there was much time f or such ) inc luded "e t hn ic c leansing " in
Iraq, dea l ing with t he mi l it ias a nd the formati on of the Iraqi governme nt .
>
> Vr
>
>
> CDR
> Publ i c
> Of f i ce o f o f the Joint Chief s o f St a f f
> Th. Penta
>
> n~prnet :
> s iprne t :
>
2
From :
Sent :
To: crv, OAS D-PAI
Cc : Smith, Dorrance KI) (Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PAj; Whitman, Bryan _t..-.....,: -...
~
~h~ilm
~a~
n fB~rya
~ n, SES, OASD·PA); Ruff, Eric (Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD); Thorp, Frank
[Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD·PAj; Barber, Allison arber Allison CIV
OASD·PA · Maka, Brian Maka, Brian, LTC, OASD-PA);
CDR, OASD-PAI; AFI5-
HQ/W~e;b;o :;:ra
~tion
ijsl ; Haddock, Ellen Katie Col
.. CIV,OASD-PAI;
Subj ect : transcript China report
Attachm ents : 05-22-06 China Rodman.doc
05·22-06 (]\ina
Rodman.doc (58 .,.
At t a c hed is the tran scri pt from this morning's conference cal l wi th Mr. Peter
Rodman a nd the military analysts regard ing the 2006 China Mil i t a ry Report.
As yo u a nnounced , t he call was on bac kground a nd the i nf ormation is emba r goed un til 1500
Tuesday.
1
Transcript:
Peter Rodm an, Ass istant Secretary of Defense for International Secu rity Affairs
Monda Ma 22 2006
Host OS D·Public Affairs
OSD-Pub lic Affairs staff: LTC Brian Maka
Trancri ber: Mu hy (digita l)
Room
Top ic: 2006 China Mili tary Report
On Background
~-:-_... ,We are go ing to go ahead and get started. , will just remind you qu ickly we are on
bac kgrou nd so you are free to quote a sen ior DoD official. All of the information that you get here
today we ask that you embargo until 1500 tomorrow. So with that I am going to go ahead and rum
it over to the ass istant secretary of defens e, Peter Rodman.
Mr. Rodman : Good morning . Good morning and thank you for co ming in, or tuning in, or whatever
the phrase is. I th ink you are familiar with the origins of this report. I'll just say a brief word about
that and then secondly, what we think som e of the highlights are . And I think we should try to get
- we ll we don 't post , I guess we won't post the full text .
LTC Maka : Sir, it will be an active link on it tomorrow morning, or tomorrow aftemoon.
Mr. Rod man: Okay. But anyw ay , you know, this is a congress iona l man date. We have done this
every year for a number of years . And the Cong ress as ks us a number of questions abo ut
China's not onl y China's military progra ms but its long-term strategy. So the report, as in past
yea rs, has a lot of discussi on about the unde rlying factors in China 's military policy and so it
ranges - you know, it isn't j ust nuts and bolts. It's about strategy, it's about eco no mic factors, a
little bit about political context, and so forth.
The - I wou ld mention before I get into this report a couple of important quotes in som e other
repo rts. The president's National Security Strateg y Report in March had a very important
sentence in it about hedg ing . You ma y reme mber that sentence . (")Our strategy see ks to
encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people while we hedge against other
possibilities.(") Tha t's from the president's National Security Stra tegy Report , and that pretty well
enca psulates what our stra tegy toward China is. We try to put a constructive - we try to shape
developments in a constructive direction but obviously, particularly in this dep artment. our job is
to watch clo sely what China is doing, and to be the on e to be prepared to do what's necessary to
carry out our commitments in the Asia-Pacific region . And part of that task is 10 watch closely
what Chin a is doing.
The QDR (Quadrennial Defe nse Review) also had an important discussion abo ut China , and it
tal ked abo ut China having the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S., and to fie ld
disruptive military tech nologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages .
Th at's the QDR in February. You may have cop ies of that.
So that gets us into the subject here, wh ich is what China is doing. Th at's - I can now get into
som e of the specific highlights . A lot of what' s in the report is not new, because a lot of what we're
talking abou t has been a trend that we have spo tted in previous report s. But some of the thing s
that we highlighted in this report are China's stra tegic forces modernization.
We've mentioned this before , it's not brand new; but it's something that we are really com menting
on that I think we should call yo ur attention to . There are at least 10 varieties of ballistic missiles
dep loyed or in deve lopm ent - at least 10 varieties of ballistic missiles either deployed or be ing
de veloped. W e see qua litative improvements as well as quantitative improvemen ts. So. you
know, the qua litati ve improvem ents include improved range, mobility and accuracy. You know,
ICBMs , for example, are the mosl advanced, they 're solid fuel road mobile ICBMs that can reach
the United States.
Again , this is not new, but we're struck by the strength of these programs . Shorter range missiles
opposite of Taiwan - they have continued to build about 100 new ones a year, and so the total is
up, you know, close to 800 . That again is not new, but it's just inexorably growing , that missile
force opposite Taiwan, about 100 a year.
We see very capable cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons. Aga in,
it's not new, but we are, you know , calling attention to some of these developments and these are
giving the Chinese new options . Five submarine programs, five different submarine acqu isition
programs.
Now what does this mean strategically? Well, we see a number of things. We see, as we
ment ioned last year, a lot of these things are - they go beyond Taiwan in their significance. It's
obv ious that much of China's military development is focused on a Taiwan contingency. But we
see both in their statements by some of their strategists and in some of their procure ment that
China is beginning to develop - again, I emphasize beginning - to think in terms of it to develop
the capabil ity to project power. They 're only at the beginning of it, but I think this seems to be part
of their long-range intention . And this could relate to contingencies - for example related to
resources or territorial disputes, of which there are many in the region.
So, aga in, this is worth noting . We have noted it before but it continues to be worth noting .
Another issue - well, another issue we' ve caned attention to before is about their use of nuclear
weapons. There seems to be a debate going on about the no first-use doctrine. The Chinese say
that they're commitled to a doctrine of no first-use weapons , but we' ve seen a few stray
comments by more than one strategic thinker calling this in to question. Now, they have
reassured us, I repeat - when Secretary Rumsfeld was there, he was reass ured by the Chinese
that they adhere to the no first-use doctrine , and we take them at their word. But they say there is
- we see these occasional comments as an indication of a possible debate that is going on
among Chinese strateg ists and we think it is worth of note that there may be this debate going on.
But the issue gets to another big issue about transparency, which is how we often state our
concern . China is a sovereign country, it has a right to build up its defense capabi lity as it
choose s, but the lack of transparency is dearly a concern for not onl y us, but China's neighbors.
Th is lack of transparency is reflected in a number of things; we talk in this report as in the past
about the defense budget. We think their defense budget understates their real defense spending
by a factor of two or three. In other words, their real defense programs are we think two or three
times wha t their declared defense budget is because of --probably because of differen t
accounting methods, probably becaus e a lot of things they just do not include a lot of their
n
research and development, a lot of their foreign purchases, they just don't include in their defense
budget. But in any case the lack of transparency adds to the concern of China's neighbors.
Another aspect of this is a surprise factor. We mention in this report, as in the past , that every
once in a while we encounter a new program of theirs Ihat we didn't know about. You know , a
new submarine or some program that, you know, has reached a mature stage that we just didn 't
know about. And that's a concern , obviousl y. And that is a continuing concern, and that is
me ntioned in this report.
Another problem is we worry about the dangers of miscalculation. 1mean it's - we don't want to
overestimate Chinese capability, we don't want to underestimate Chinese capability. And we
don't want them to make a misjUdgment, you know, to overestimate their capability. And so, you
know , one of our objectives of our military exchanges with China is to try to illuminate a little more
w hat they're up to, get them to disclose more of what they are thinking. They publish a white
paper every couple of years, which is a step forward, but it's not anything like what we do. I
mean , we have our QDR for example, as well as, you know, every year, SecDef goes and
testifies. We are incredibly transparent about our assumptions, our planning , our strategies, you
know, as well as the procurement that supports those.
And Taiwan, by the way, came up with a recent with a recent statement that their national
security strategy which - again , reflects the fact that it's a government accountable to a
legislature and - but the Chinese have -- are only at the beginning of, you know, disclosing what
their real thinking is, and that, as I say, is the problem .
We are concerned about the specifics of their build up, but as I said, the lack of transparency
gives a whole new dimension to the problem .
I would ment ion just a couple - well, a couple of other nuggets in the report. There's a famous
quotation from Deng Xiao Ping -- this is in previous reports -- it's called the 24-character strategy.
And it's a maxim of his that goes back about 15 years but- it has been often quoted by senior
Chinese strateg ists. And it's about - you may have seen it before, but I'll read it again. n Observe
calmly, secure our position , cope with affair s calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time. Be
good at maintaining a low profile , and never claim leadershlpf").
The phrase that strikes me of course is hide our capacities and bide our time. I think this
encapsula tes wha t China's strategy is - they're very patient, they know their weaknesses. And
our report, by the way, is very clear about China's weaknesses; we're not trying to portra y them
as 10 feet tall.
But the Chinese are - seem to be aware of their limitations, but they are patiently and
syste matically bUilding up their options so that five years from now, 10 years from now, they will
have significant options that the y don 't have now. And that the balance of forces may be shifting if
we are not careful to be, you know, to respond in our own plann ing.
So I think the Chinese have a strateg y. The y talk about comprehens ive national power . You
know, there's a debate in the west - oh, are they focusing on economic development versus
military. Well, in a way they are doing all of the above. Clearly their economic growth is the
foundation of everything else and their defense budget - their declared defense budget is rising
faster than their GOP. They recently announced 14.7 increase in their defense budget. And that's
a lot more than their economic growth rate , and that also reflects a recent trend. So they are
modernizing their milita ry rapidl y, system atically. It certainly lacks - there are a lot of things they
can't do. Their power projection capability is very, very limited right now . And aga in, we are very
aware of China's weaknesses and China's vulnerabilities. But they have a patient long-term
strategy and I think we have to recognize that.
Anywa y, let me stop there, and I am happy to answer some questions.
Q: Mr. Rodman , Jed Babbin, American Spectator.
Mr. Rodman : Jed, how are you?
Q: Well, not bad for a grumpy old guy. Hope you're we ll. The issue that pops into my head is the
question of Taiwan 's investment in their own defen se. The last I heard the legis lative yuan (juan?
Taiwanese legislature?) had turned down the appropriations for the 200 1 arms package 50-some
odd times. Is there any change in that or any change or modifi cation or spending?
Rodman: Well, you're absol utel y right to raise that. We discuss that in this report, at least to som e
degree it's clear that if it doesn 't get serious about national defense and the balance of forces it's
going to tilt even more radically. We had a - well, first of all the Chinese issued their - I mean the
Taiwanese issued their - the government issued its own national security report , which is a good
thing . And we hope that there 's a serious national debate beginning in Taiwan .
The government has committed itself to a three percent - a three percent of GOP by 2008 . In
other words , whatever happens to the special budget - you know, whether it's done by special
budget or just the regular defense budget, (Taiwanese) President Chen has said that they ought
to be spending three percent of GOP on defense. The mayor of Taiwan was in this country a few
weeks back and Mayor Ma, he's the mayor of Taipei. And we had a chance to talk to him about
this - you know the KMT (Kuomintang), the opposition party has to be serious about defense, I
mean , we just indicated, you know, without taking any sides in their politics that the United States
as a friend , you know, expects them to be carrying a significant load for their own self defense,
and he said he agrees with that, and he said it's, you know , at some point as his party or his
campaign , you know - as his campaign develops that he'll come out with his own defense
program. And we certainly emphasize what the American view is and as I say he may -- he gave
us some reassurance, and we just hope that will be reflected . You know they, you know , there
ought to be a national consensus in Taiwan about facing up to the threat that they face . And we'll
see , we 'll see how it unfolds, but at least we delivered the message - we deliver the message to
both sides, you know , to both parties or both the major parties whenever we get a chance .
L.. .. Gentlemen , any other questions for Mr. Rodman?
Q ; Well , if nobody else is going to jump in, let me jump back in.
Mr. Rodman: Please .
Q ; A couple of things that struck me in last year's report. Again, their dedication to asymmetric
weapons such as anti-satellite weapons, cyberwarfare and so forth .
Mr. Rodman ; Yes .
Q ; Is there any change in your assessment from last year or, and if so, what is it?
Mr. Rodman ; No - well, they 're highlighted again , both of those things . So you're right, we don 't
have a concrete development to point to except they're among the developments that we
highlight. They're still working on those things .
I mean a lot of things -I mean the report is - every year a lot of it is not new, a lot of it is
cumulative information, but as I say, there's a section that highlights what some of the new
developments are, at least the highlights that we think are worth pointing to, and those things -
cyberwarfare, anti-satellite, R&D, they're still in there .
Q ; Don't mean to just dominate the whole conversation, but in terms of Adm . Fallon's (PACOM
commander) visit a week or so ago, he was, I think doing what you suggest needs to be done,
trying to leverage them into being a little bit more open . Is that having an effect, do you notice an
effect on the openness question?
Mr. Rodman ; Well we - it's incremental. When Secretary Rumsfeld was there in October, we
nd
visited the 2 artillery headquarters. And that was a bit of a breakthrough. And we had their
command brief and they didn 't disclose a whole lot, but it was an interesting contact. And we
have now , we have invited - you know , that's their missile forces -- and we invited the
commander to visited STATCOM, to come to the U.S. as a guest of STRATCOM, and they have
accepted that invitation . When Hu Jlntao was here they let us know .
So that 's an interesting contact. We want to continue - develop a dialogue with them about
strategic contact and so forth; you know , the no first use issue, or any other issue. So that's
useful. You know , we're always pressing to see new place s, we're always making that point we're
- yo u know, we're trying to invite interesting Chinese here.
Another focus is j unior officers - ed ucational exchanges. It's something that President Bush is
particularl y interested in. And we think we're making some headway in some of these areas.
Secretary Rumsfeld talks abou t, you know, dem ystifyi ng each other . You know , we don 't want to
exaggerat e this beca use, you know , there are some laws of geopolitics that aren't going to be
repea led here, but it certainly helps if more Chinese you nger officers get some expo sure to us
and vice versa . So we think we're making some headway in doing that since secretary
Rumsfeld's trip there .
Q: Last quest ion for me then I'll shut up. There's - one of the things that I think cam e up in a
previous co nversation we had was your state ment, or words to the effect, that one of the principal
lessons of Mr. Rums feld's visit was that we coul d have . I th ink you said, very can did discuss ions
with the Chinese and it wou ldn't blunt the relationship. Is that still true? And who is having very
frank talks with these guys?
Mr. Rodm an: Well, the president raised a lot of these issues when he saw Hu Jintao. I am going
over there in early June for our defense consu ltative talks and we - these are high·level strateqic
discussions and we talk about everyth ing. And , you know , I am not going to be inhibited about
raising questions about things they do that are disturb ing.
But I think you are absol utely right, when Secretary Rumsfe ld was there in both his public
remarks and private remarks , you know , he listed th ings they are doing that are disturbing , and
you know, not in a lecturing way but in a very calm way, and, you know, they are perfectly able to
deba te. But I think that is the right tone for a discu ssion.
Q: Thank you very much.
I-_ _... Gen tteme n, any other questions for the secretary ?
Mr. Rodm an: Let me mention one other sma ll thing. It's not in the news right now. This is the EU
arms embargo and we discuss this and this report as before. Th e Europeans have backed away
from , you know, the attempt to lift the ir arm s embargo. Now, they haven 't killed this , but it hasn't-
has not bee n a live issue for them, and we hope it wo n't be. W e have not changed our position
that we would strongly oppo se it.
Similiarly with Israel. We've had more successful discussions with the Irsraeli s to shut down their
arm s trade with China . We think we've reached a good und erstand ing with them . And then finall y
we 've put this on the agenda of our discussion s with the Rus sian s, who are the - of course, the
biggest source of weapons.
But the importa nce of the Europea n embargo is that the Chinese , we expect, would see k
technolog y, dual-use tech nology in Europe, things they could not they cou ld not ge t from the
Russian s. And we are conv inced that the Chinese would exploit any open ing very effectively and,
you know, their technological development is their focu s, and we woul d, you know, not wa nt the
European s to be contr ibuting to that.
But anyw ay , the good news there is the Europeans have - yeah , it's softwa re - I think what they
wo uld get from the European s is not, you know, jet fighters but dua l-use technologies of different
kin ds that wou ld help them qua litatively upg rad e. But anyway, the good news is that the
Europeans have backed off. I me an, our president made a very strong - began a strong
campaign last yea r, and the Europeans seem to have backed awa y. But , anyway, we reiterate in
this report our stro ng fee lings on that matte r.
Anyth ing else?

t!!! := :::JOkay. Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us. We appreciate your time .
Q : Thank you very much.
,,::::;:=~. I f
you have follow-up ques tions, please don't hesitate to emai l me as always and we'll
get some documents out to you over em ail.
Q: l et's have another one of thes e when Mr. Rodman gets back from his June trip.
Mr. Rodman : Okay.
..._ _... Okay , great. All right gentlemen, have a good day.
Q : Good bye.
From : CIY. OASD-PAj
Sen t: Thursda June 01 2006 7:07 PM
To :
Cc:
CIY OASD-PA : CDR.

PAl : LTC OASD-PAI: vician, Todd M
(Vician, Todd Ma' OASO-PAJ; Ballesteros, Mark j . " - _.....,[Bat1esteros, Mark J, l rc.
OASD-PA): LlCol. OCJCS/PA -
Subject: transcript - military analysts Haditha

Attachments : 06-01-06 Haditha.doc
06-01-()6
Haditha.doc (73 KB)
Attached p l e as e find t he tra n s c r i pt f r om this afternoon 's mi l i ta ry a na l y s t
cal l an Hadi tha .
Br ief e r s were BGen Sa ndkuhler a nd Col Dav e Lapan ,

The ca l l wa s ON BACKGROUND ,
1
~-------
Transcript
Conference call with military analysts
Thursday, June I, 2006
Subject: Haditha
Host: OSD-Public Affairs
Briefers: Marine Brig. Gen . Kevin Sandk uhler, staffjudge advocate to the Commandan t;
Marine Co l. Dave Lapan, deputy director of Mari ne Corps Public Affairs
Transcriber: Murphy
ON BACKGROUND
Jones: Again, thanks for joining us this afternoon. This is obviously a hot topic and an
important one and we appreciate you taking time out.
I have with me Brigadier General Ke vin Sandk uhler. He is the staffjudge advocate to the
commandant of the Marine Corps. And I also have Colonel Dave Lapan with me who is
Brigadier General (Mary) Kru sa-Dossin' s PAO. So he 'll be also able to speak to you on
the subject.
This call is on background, so as always, we ask that you only quote senior DoD officials
with the information that you receive on this call. So with that, I am going to go ahead
and hand it over to the general and the colonel , so they will mak e bri ef opening rem arks
and then we 're, you kno w, free to take qu estions.
Lapan: Gents, thank you again. Dave Lapan here. Again , I am the deputy director of
public affai rs for the Mari ne Corps. We do appreciate you taking the time. Hop efully we
can give you some information that will be of use to you, as I am sure you are being
pressed - mayb e not as much as we have - but certainly enough to comment on this
situation.
As you all recognize, we are in a pretty tenuous situation here, with an ongoing
investigation which constrains us from what we are able to say. We are certainl y helped
by tho se of you who have an und erst anding of the system and aren't on acti ve dut y. You
have a little bit more freedom to talk about thin gs, so we're hoping that we can give you
information that' s useful in allowing you to do those things when you are asked to
comment.
I guess , just as a - I'll do a quick background on the situation just in case anybody isn 't
completely up to sp eed. Incident s of 19 November 2005 in Haditha in western Iraq. At
the tim e it was Two Marine Expeditionary Force, which had command of that area of
operations in Anbar Province. The third battalion, 1st Marines, whic h is normally part of
the Fi rst Marine Di vision , was attached to 2 MEF for tho se operations. Three-one, I'll use
the shorthand - is back in the U.S. now, has redeployed to their hom e base at Camp
Pend leton . If there is from the investigati ons that are ongoing any type of follo w-up legal
action it is likely to be handled at Camp Pendleton because aga in that 's where the unit
that is involved is based currently.
As you may all may know alread y, Ti me Magaz ine is the ones who kind of brought this
to the mil itary that started at first an initial inq uiry b y Multi -National Corps - Iraq . They
found enough there to convene a second AR 15-6 investigation, which is headed by Major
General (Eldon) BargewelI , which is ongoing at th is point. And Major General (Richard
C.) Zi lmer, w ho is the current commander of Mu lti-National Force - West convened a --
Naval Criminallnvestigative Service investi gation. So those are the two on going
investigations -- the AR15-6 and the NCIS investi gation.
I am sure you have been asked, as we have, about w hen those are going to wrap up . We
don't know. It is certainly not expected to be imminent, despite repo rts that you see.
Again, can 't put a time frame on it, and Gen eral Sandkuhler can probably talk more about
wh y it's so difficult to kind of nail down how long investig ations take and he ' ll talk
process stuff.
So hopefully that brin gs you all up to speed. If I have repeated or sai d anything that you
are already aware o f I apologize, but I just wanted to make sure we are starting on a level
playing field . I'll let General Sandkuhler now talk abo ut so me o f the legal issues
associated wi th where we are today.
Sandkuh ler: Good aftern oon, Kevin Sandkuhler here. I am the staffjudge advocate to the
commandant of the Marine Corps , the senior military lawyer to the Marine Corps.
One of the reasons we took this opportunity to talk with you ge ntlemen is to reiterate
some things which I thi nk you all prob abl y know, but to make the points concerni ng what
it is we can and cannot say at this time as the se investigations are being co mpleted.
First of all, with the pending investigation - the old statement that you don 't know what
you don 't know. The investigators are out there gleaning facts eac h and every day, and
you don't know what they have unco vered eac h and every day, so whatever you say
co uld probabl y be wrong about the investigation or the status of the investigation, and
you don 't want to int erfere with their processes.
But the other thing that really co nstra ins us that I was asked to disc uss is, you kno w, the
top ic of unlawful command influence. Most of you are aware of it. Mo st of you -
especially General Scales and General Shepperd - have probably had SlAs tell you abo ut
this in the past. But it becomes critical now for us to make sure that we do not do
anything or say anything that will prejudice our abil ity to brin g whatever charges or
wh atever wrongdoing is uncovered in the investigations to the prop er level or the proper
forum for accountab ility.
We hav e to - and that puts us in the bad position, if you will, with the media of not be ing
able to tell them all that the y want to know or confirm item s that they find from other
sources that they wanted to talk about that perhaps in other settings local distri ct attorneys
wo uld be more than happy to talk about -- but their system doesn't have the same
features that OUTS does .
So I wanted to stress the topic of unlawful command influence and why there is
frustratio n - there is frustration on our part as to what we can and canno t talk about.
So 1will leave it at that and let ' s see if yo u gentlemen have questions and items that we
could address for you.
Q: Yeah, this is Bob Scales real qu ick. I - this is a little short-fused but I am supposed to
- I have written an essay, if you will, on the subj ect, which I am supposed to talk abo ut
and record this afternoon. I won der if I might just send it to you just for a truth check, if
that's okay.
Lapan: Yes, sir. Dave Lapan here. My email address - and all of you fee l free to email
me if you need to - is David dot Lapan . That's I, a, p as in papa, a, n as in November, at
USMC dot mil.
Q: Well thank you very much. I app reciate it.
Q : Don Shepperd . Process question here . The AR 15-6 and the naval criminal
investigation are two separate investigations. What happens to the AR 15-6 report if it
goes to -- when the facts are found, who does it go to? And who decides whethe r or not to
prefer charges? And is that - is that decision to prefer charges or not independent of the
NCIS? In other wo rds, if they dec ided not to, could NC IS also go ahead and prefer
charges?
Sandkuhl er: Kevin Sand kuh ler here. NelS does not prefer charges. A convening
authori ty wo uld have to prefer charges. The AR1 5-6 is an administrative investigation
that is looking the two topics that yo u have heard abo ut before - the training and the
reporting (repo rt?). Those are the two item s they are looking at. That is an adm inistrative
investigation, and they will produce their findin gs and that is go ing to General Chiarelli
in Iraq and Casey-- Genera l Casey had him do that. And 1think the flow will be Chiarelli
to Casey to us - to the Marine component, and perhaps, back through Abi zaid as well. Up
and down the chain of command.
NC IS investigation was convened by General Zilmer, the Multi-Nationa l Fo rce-Wes t

commander, but he is in the operational chain of command as we ll. We expect that
investigation to flow up the sam e chain of command. We expect those cases, those
findings, to come back to the Marine Corps, to the Marine Component at least, which is
Marine Forces Central Command, for us to take action.
That's how the processing of those investigations should follow . There will be - there
could be the preferal (sp) of charges by the Marine COI]>S based upon the 15-6, but if they
find so me other criminal conduct we could go back to NClS and say investigate furth er
on another avenue of inquiry.
Q: So Marine Corps Central Command will be the one to decide after it goes through the
chain of command and the recommendations decide whether to prefer charges is what I
hear you saying?
Sandkuhler: I think that's what the process worked out by the commanders has been. It' s
an operationa l chain of command issue and that's how I believe it's going to work out.
Q: What's the name that goes with that?
Sandkuhler: Sattler. You all know John (LtGen John Sattler), right?
Q: Yes. Absolutely.
Sandkuhler: I think John is the one on this situation who has been tagged, with the
concurrence of General Abizaid and others, that that's how it's going to work.
Q: This is Je ff McCa usland. I understand that - if I have got this - that the 15-6 with the
training and (inaudible) repo rting. Can you comme nt at all on - apparently there have
been reports that the battalion comman der was relieved. Can you comment on that? And
can you also comment as far as the Navy criminal investigation just in terms of how
many Marines are at least subject to the investigation, or does that go too far?
Sandkuhler: Well, on the commander of the battalion - 3rd battalion, 1st Marines, was
relieved by the commanding general of 1st Marine Division. And it was done for the
trad itional stated reason of loss of confidence. I cannot tell you, and the commander does
not have to explain to us, if there was somethi ng more - (were they invo lved?) the event
that's the subject of all the media attention now, or whether there are other actio ns? You
know, there co uld have been failures of inspections. There cou ld have been a higher
disciplinary rate than other commands. I don't know other than the commander of the 1st
Marine Division lost confidence in the ability of that lieutenant colonel to command that
battalion. And I think that's what we have reported before.
Now the second question about -
Q: How many Marines, at least in raw numbers, are the subject of the Navy criminal
investigation?
Sandkuhler: Now, I don't - I don 't think I know an exact number so I hesitate to give you
a number.
Q: Okay.
Sandkuh ler: They are talking to a number of peop le. They have been interviewing any
num ber of individuals, and some of those individuals they may interview you for one
purpose, but then find out that perhaps there is some other reason they had to talk with
them further, or they might have done something else wrong that may have nothing to do
with this. So I would be very hesitant to throw out a number, because I am pretty
confident I would be wrong.
Lapan : And j ust to jump on again, on the first part of the question, the battalion
commander of3 -1 was relieved, as were two of the company commanders within that
organization as well. And as the general said, the relief was done by the commanding
general of the 1st Marine Division because the unit was back at Camp Pendleton at that
time and so 3-1 feU under the 151 Marine Division because they were back in the States,
and they weren't forward when these reliefs took place.
Sandkuhler: And to reinforce that, the general did that, General Natonski and that ' s been
reported before, he could have figured out stuff or seen stuff upon their return from Iraq
that was enough for him to decide to relieve him, and I have - you know, I would not tell
you and I do not know his mental calculations he went through before he did that.
It could have been any number of events that led him to that conclusion, and I don 't think
it is centered on this investigation because this investigation - or the investigations
relating to (Haditha?) have not been completed yet.
Q:Ok.
Q: Gents, Jed Babbin, Two questions. Number one, can you tell us ifIGl (sp) was
brought back early becau se of the suspicion of these events and number two, can you also
tell us going back to the command influence point, how strongly you guys have been
counseling both the military and civilian leadership to basically clam up so we don 't
screw up the prosecution?
Lapan : Dave Lapan here. On the first part, no, 3-1 rotated back on their normal schedule;
they were not brough t back early. An aside to that, the other incident that has been
recen tly discussed involves 3«1 battalion, 5th Marines. That unit still is in country, and
members of that unit have been returned to the United States pending the investigation
into those allegations.
So in the case of 3-1, the Haditha incident, they were not brought back to the States early.
But 3«1 battalion, 5th Marine, separate inc ident - Hamandiyah - that just happened more
recently, some of those individual s have been returned to the States early pending the
investigation.
Sandkuhler: On the unlawfu l command influence issue, what we have done is you have
probably all seen the press release done by the commandant. That includes - you know,
that was carefull y crafted by us, if you read those words, and I know General (inaudib le,
sounds like reid?) has read those words carefully, to take it above, and keep it above any
claim where we are trying to influence the course of the investigation , or influence the
discretion that subordinate commanders will have to exercise in the course of any
investigation, any court martial that mayor may not result, or any administrative action.
As you all know, there are a variety of people who will now have roles to play, from
members of court marti als, judges, lawyers who make decisions as to what the charges
should or sho uld not be, and the convenin g authorit ies.
We could have peopl e who get charged for some not ob vious offense by some other
subordinate commander that we can 't predict today. So we are trying to put out the word
to the Marine Co rps, through the commandant's words, and other things J do through the
SJA channe ls, to make sure everybody keeps it at the right level so we retain our ability
to use the mil itary j ustice system for the purpo se for which it was intended - to provide
good order and discipline for the force, and to hold peop le accountable when necessary.
So that ' s what we 're working on, Jed.
Q: That's great. Hey, appreciate that. One quick follow up. Have the Iraqi s sq uawked at
all about bringing any of these guys back, early or late?
Sandkuhler: This is Kevin Sandkuhler. I have no idea. I haven't heard.
Q : On that, two quick follow-ups. Oneili~sj.lr.10,r

( those who have not - at least I haven' t seen
this press release by the commandant could you possibly have that sent out to us?
That'd be grea t.
L . . _.. Yeah, absolutely.
Lapan: I can get it to you. And I will also - we ll, I will get it to Tara and let her pass it to
yo u. The other thing, too, is those of you who read Tom Ricks' s story this morning
probabl y saw reference to some other gu idance we put out on this very subject, again , to
make sure that anybo dy who - anybod y out there who was being approac hed on the issue
of Haditha knew where the out-o r-bo unds lines we re and why. I can get you some of that
guidance, as well.
Q: That'd be grea t. (inaudible) couple of TV spots. Second question is, what Jed j ust said.
The Iraqis have announ ced that they are going to do their ow n investigation, and maybe
it's too soon to comment on that. But will there be any coordination between what we ' re
doing, NCIS in particular, wi th the Iraqis, or do yo u guys see that as being totally out of
bo unds?
Lapan : Don 't know at this point. We have not heard anything along those lines.
Obviou sly we have seen the comments coming out of the Iraqi governme nt, but it hasn 't
translated into any action at our point at this ju ncture.
Q: This is Bob Maginni s. Question on press release that came out earlier today, I think
out of Iraq, out of the Corps. Is this being typified as a trainin g stand down? Or, I saw the
commandant 's message a couple days ago. What exactly is he doing in country? What
are the messages he ' s sending? Can you go over that agai n, j ust for clarifi cation ?
Lapan: Sure. Two separate things, obviously. The commandant had a trip previously
sched uled in whic h he was going to be visi ting Iraq. It was not a trip that was put together
for this purpose, but since he was goi ng, he wanted to talk to his Marines.
The things that he talked to the Marines abo ut were the importance of our core (Corps?)
values - honor, co urage and co mmitment, talking abo ut do ing the right thing. Also,
making the point that the vast majority of Marines are doing the right thing - day in, day
out, under very chalJenging circ umstances both in combat and out of combat.
Wanted to get the message to them that eve n though there has been a lot of atte ntion paid
to this incident and these allegations that he believes that most Marines - that this is an
aberration, that most Marines are doing the right thing. He wanted to reinforce that. But
he also wanted to talk about the importance of doing the right thing, of having moral
courage, of ad hering to our core (Corps?) values again. Those are some of the things that
he wanted to talk abo ut. It was not intended to be a training in the way that this MNC-J
announceme nt came out, done separately by General Chiarelli for whatever reasons.
J don't have any indications here that there wo uld be any kind of tra ining stan d down.
Obviously those guys across the battlefield are busy, and they can't afford to have
everybody stop what they are do ing but I think - and again I am talking a little bit out of
schoo l because it's an MNC-I issue, but I don't get the sense it's a stand down as much as
making sure that commanders are rein forcing those tra ining aspects on so me type of
schedule.
Q: As a folJow up, perhaps or someone in OSD can clarify whether the Corps has
pu t out so mething that is in fact - I am hea ring through other peo ple is being interpreted
as a training stand down, and that 's why I wanted some clarification.
A follow up question abo ut this particular battalion, 3-1. Wasn 't this their third tour, and
were the people we are talking about that are being investigated, were they on their third
tour wit h this battalion?
Lapan: The battalion itself, it was their third time back, but remember, the people in the
batta lion change out all the time, so it's not as if the enti rety of the battalion was there for
the third time , you would have variations throughout the ranks. In fact, I am sure they had
people that were on their first tour at this time.
The second part of the qu estion was - oh, whether the individuals that were invo lved -
do n't know to that level of detail in terms of if it was this person ' s first time or third time.
Again, as General Sandkuhler said, it's a pretty wide net. It'd be tough to decide who it
was that is co nsidered, you know, part of the investigatio n.
Q: Thank you.
Q: Don Sheppard. I got hit with a question on radio the other day about - it had been
reported that $2,500 payments were made by the Marine Corps to some of the families
involved, and it was not the normal policy to pay reparations in the field.
I am not sure this is your area, but do you know anything about that?
Sandkuhler: Well J think , one thing is that we call it salatia payments and they're done a
lot in Iraq. They are done in other parts of the wor ld, as well. And what they are is - and
they range from things like when we have automobile accidents, when we damage
property through eithe r operational damage or through other damage; you know, our big
trucks run into buildings on a regular basis, or run into Iraqi cars, and we offer them
compensation for the damage that they suffered. And in this case, there was some salatia
payments done to the famili es - or paid to the families, and I would not classify it as
being unusual.
Lapan : The other important aspect is that salatia payments are not an admissio n of guilt,
either. Again, they are a way to recompense individuals, families, whatever, for damages
of one type or another. Again J know - in fact, to take it to the lowest level, when J was in
Haiti two and a half years ago, we were paying people for breaking locks off their doors
when we doin g searches. I mean, it goes from the very small level to the very large level.
Q: This is Jeff McCausland again . Can you guys comment at all abo ut this one young
Marine, I think he is still on active duty out in California, apparently he has released a
bunch of photographs. His mother has been on TV . He claims he was part of the quote
unquote clean-up crew, but also has gone on to make allegations about the fact that - or
his mother has at least - that the Marine Corps has not addressed this kid' s PTSD and all
the problems associated with this Haditha thing. Have you got any comment on that as
well?
Lapan : The Marine in que stion did do an interview with the Los Angel es Times. He has
since stopped doin g interviews, from what I understand, of his own volition - nobody
told him - again, as far as I understand nobod y told him not to. But his mother is carrying
the case. She has done a number of interviews. Again, her focus has been more on the
PTSD issue and she has talked somewhat about what her son told her he saw and
experienced.
Sandkuhler: He' s also been accused of a variety of crimes in the local community there,
which is reported in that article from the LA Times. I don 't think we 've seen anything
official or unoffici al about his claims of PTSD and whether he' s being treated and stu.ff in
(and?) that. We have not explored that yet.
Q: Bob Maginnis again. The LA Times today, a town awoke to slaughter. Very detailed .
Were these two reporters on the ground, or are they basing what they are sayin g in here
on second and tertiary sources?
Lapan : Well the - and I am just going offrnemory from reading the story this morning
becau se I think that it mentio ned that they wouldn't reveal the name of the reporter for
security reasons, one who may have gone into Haditha to condu ct the interviews, but also
believe that they conducted interviews with individuals, so variou s levels ofsourcing in
terms of peop le who may have seen what happ ened, may have been involved , or may
have heard from others - so it could have been second- or th ird-hand infonnation. I
didn 't get the indication that the reporters were there when any of this happ ened, but then
went back afterwards to talk to the townsp eople. Does that - does that help at all?
Q : Yeah, it is littered with quot es that are very incendiary, so I am j ust curious as to the
sourc ing, so if that's what you have, that' s what you have.
Q: Jed Babbin again, guys. In terms of the Congress, we 're hearing that Senator Warner
might want to have hearings or something, I mean, what requirements or what requests
are these help ful folks levying on you these days?
Sandkuhler: Kevin SandkuWer. We have - I am not aware o f having recei ved any official
request for information or documents or people to testify, et cetera, yet. They have all
said that, you know, we are going to have hearings on this some time. We have not
gotten, as you characterize it, the helpful requests so that they can help clari fy the issues
for us.
It does raise Jed, as you know, a significant number of legal issues. Are they going to
subpoena witn esses? Are these witnesses going to be peop le that will have to get some
level of immunization to testify at the Congress? How does it impa ct cases in the future if
there are cases? Evidence, other information. It does not make life simpler.
Q: It ' s preci sely the kind of help you rea lly do n' t need.
Sandkuhler: From the legal standpo int, I wou ld love for every body to keep their mouths
shut so we can get the investigation s done so people will keep talking to us, so we can get
all the evidence gathered without having any taints and peop le runnin g and hiding with
inform ation when they find out, you know, their name is going to be plastered all over the
media, and get that all conc luded so we cou ld proceed in an orderly fashion without the
helpful peop le from other sources.
So the Congress - that will be problematic, as you can ima gine. And ju st go back to the
prior history - you know, the last, I don 't - go back 30 years, 25 years, 20 years - think
of all the prob lems when they wanted to have Ollie North before the criminal
investigation was don e, and how that impacted the ability to prosecut e and defend, et
cetera.
Q: Thanks.
Lapan: One other note on the congressi onal piece, too. As I am sure you are aware, the
comman dant did go over to the Hill, again not on specific request, but in order to keep
the leadership apprised of what was going on in these cases and his legislative director
followed him and did some briefing as well.
Q: The nature of the enemy that was bei ng fought on November the 19 th in Haditha, were
they characterized in the immediate after action as j ust Sunni insurgents, or were there
evidence of foreign j ihadists that were embedded and perhaps were even using children,
women as shields?
Lapan: Don' ( know the answer to that one. That may be something that com es out in the
course of the investig ation, but I do not know. I was there at the time in terms of - in Iraq
- we felt, in our intelligence, you know, verified that the foreign fighter influence-
influence, I should - the numbers of fore ign fighters in western Iraq was pretty small.
Obviously they had a big influence. But most of the guys we were fighting in western
Iraq were local Sunni insurgen ts.
Q: Okay.
L.._.I All right gentlemen, any other questions?
Q: Yeah, I just sent that emai l to you David. Could you just read that over and make sure
it's okay?
Lapan : Will do, sir.
Q: are you going to follow up w ith the Corps to find out if they sent out something
on a training stand down , because I am confused by what is on the web page.
L.._J Yeah, no, we ' ll get that to you.
Sandkuhler(?) : I don 't think they have used the term stand down. I am looking at the
press release, and they just talked abou t a training, commander direct training.
Q: They even said one report I got (inaudible - that it?) would be conducted over the next
30 days.
Voice (?): Right , that' s what it says in here.
Q: anything you can get on that, I' ve got to go on two TV programs here, that
would be great, as well as that press release by the commandant of the Mari ne Corps.
........1 Sure.
Lapan : And, Dave Lapan again. Just one last point I'd like to make, and I think General
Sandkuhler will probab ly jump on. As you can imagine, we have received a lot of
requests from media to get the commandant out there to talk, to do interviews, to have
media tag along as he goes and talks to Marines. Obviously, lots of concerns with that on
a nu mber of leve ls, not the least of which is, again, perceptions of unlawful command
influence. So we are getting a lot of pressur e, but the commandan t's talks to his Marines
are intended to be that, for him to talk to his Mari nes.
Again, we do not want to put the comm andant in a position based on, you kno w, the
media' s desire to get him to talk that's going to pollute the sys tem. So, while be is
obv ious ly concerned. he has serious concerns with these allegations, he is not in a
pos ition to address them whi le there are ongo ing investigations. Sir?
Sandkuhler : I wo uld j ust reinforce, you know, the stateme nt that he has made on Marine
virtue is the kind of statement that you wo uld expect the senior Marine, o ur leader, to talk
abo ut with Mari nes when there' s investigations pend ing, to talk abo ut bow we expect
each of us to behave, and at what level to behave, and how we can compo rt ourselves to
comply with our honor, co urage and commitment. And that' s the kind of thin gs he needs
to go out and reinforce.
Talking to specifics to all of the Marines in the Marine Corps doesn't do any good. That's
not what he needs to reinforce. He needs to reinforce the basic virtu e. So that's what he is
goi ng when he goes out; he is talking to his Marin es about how we expec t Marin es to
behave, whetber it is on liberty, on d uty, on the battle field or off the battlefield.
Q: Co uld you say again the exact title of AR 15-6 investigation, what do you call it in the
Mari ne Corps?
Sand kuhler: Well, in the Marine Corps terms we' d call it like a JAG manual
inv estigation. And that the 15-6 agai n is - the Army guys can tell you this - is AR 15-6
that refers to the regu lation that guid es it. It's an administrative investigation that
com man ders can use for a variety of reasons - to find out why their supply system is
losing gear, to find o ut why peop le are getting in trouble in town - they can use it for any
number o f reasons. In this case it 's to look at why the reportin g was not acc urate, and
also was the level of training of the Marines involved prior to the event sufficient? And
those are characterized as administra tive investigations. And then if they find the criminal
investigation - criminal matters that they think exi sts, then they can tum it over to NClS,
or the commander can take some admi nistrative and disciplinary action based up on that
investigat ion.
Q: Thi s is Jeff McCausland aga in. Sadly, I don't think this is going to go away any tim e
soon -- I sure hope to God it does -- but it might be useful Dave, and Genera l
Sandkuh ler, if you can have send us some co ntact info in addition to Dave 's email
address and you all' s offices in case we need to make a quick check on the legal side or
on the public affairs side as this thing goes on for however long it goes on.
I-o::-~ Yeah, I am happy to do that. All right gentleme n, thanks again for j oining us, and I
will send - and I will be sending out stuff this afternoon. Keep us posted for media that
you do on this.
Q: Yeah, I'll be on O' Reilly toni ght Tara.
Q: CNN in the morning.

L..-..I
.......... Okay, great.
Q: Thanks very much guys .
1-_'" Let us know if we can do anything els e for you.

Q: Bye.
From : Lapan Col David [da vid .l apa n~~(~ .....
Sent: Friday, June 02. 2006 7:11 AM
To: Haddock . Ellen (Katie), cor. OCJCS/PA
Subj ect : Re: Hope you're not working today
Th anks Kat i e . As it turned Qu t, a pre -p l a nned bac kg r ound er f o r s ome mi l a na l ysts happened
yeste r d ay af t e r n oon . J e d Babb in wa s one of t he pa rticipan t s .
v r
Co l Da v e Lap an . USMC
Deputy Direc t o r o f Mari ne Corps Publ i c Affairs
Se nt f r om my Blac kBerry Wi r eles s Handhe ld
-----Original Message - - - - -
.....__.......
From : Haddoc k , El l e n Kat ie ) , Col , OCJ CS! PA
To: JedBabb in
CC : CDR, OCJC S/PA; ~ ~ LtCo l . OCJC S/ PA; LTC,
OCJCS PA -
S ent: Fr i J un 02 05: 2 3: 5 2 2 0 06
Sub ject: Re: Hop e you ' r e not worki n g toda y
J ed ,
Can't be certain you wi l l r e ceive t h i s i n time, s i nce we a r e airborne , a nd wi l l be f or the
nex t 1 6 p l us hours. Re c ommend y ou t al k t o Col Dav e Lapan in USMC PAO o f f i c e . I know the y
are not i n t e r e s t ed i n t a l k ing a bout the case -- bu t f o r t he very s ame reason yo u are
hopi ng to h igh l i ght .
The number t o USMC PAO i s
Hope t h at is u s ef u l . .. L- -'
Ta ke c are ,
Kat i e
- ---- Or i g i n a l M ss ~q -----
From: J edBabbin
To: Haddo ck, El len (Kat ie) , Col, OCJCS!PA
Se n t : Wed May 31 0 7 :1 0 :5 6 2 0 0 6
Subj e c t: Re: Hop e y ou 're not wor king t o day
Katie : I g o t wha t I needed from anot her sou r ce . No worri e s . And would v ery much l ike t o
t a l k t o yo u o r one o f the b o s se s on background before 1700 t od ay. Any cha n c e ? I'm do i ng a
c olumn a bout why we n e ed t o l e t t h e mi li ta ry j u s t ice sys t em run i ts course a nd not l e t the
med i a spi n th is i nto a nother My Lai . Bes t , J e d.
ab .
(home o f fi c e )
(home f ax )
(mobil e )
1
Fro m : Thorp, Frank , [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PAJ
Sent : u[sda u!'l.20 006 7:3" AU ., ...... ,
To: (USAF); l<'Ol -,! DoD\-r · · ' I CAPT OVC
~=~~~~R~D~M~L~C~H INFOCAPT
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CHINFOj; l<'Ol I
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Subject: FW: Transcript - BG Barbero Lebanon military analysts
Attachment s: 07-19-06 Barbero Lebanoo .doc
07-19-06 Barbero
L.ebanon.doc (m
Wanted t o make sure you s aw t h i s
Frank Tho rp
Rear Admiral , U.S. Navy
Deputy As s istant Secretary of Defense
Joint Communication)
a ---- -
From; OSD PA
Sen July 1 9, 2 0 06 6;17 PM
To ; CI V, OASC -PA
Cc; Smith, Dorra nce HON OSC PA; Whi t man , Brya n SES OSC PAj Ru f f , Er i c , IE ~S~=i0iSiD~-~T~h~O~~~,
Fr ank RDML OSC PAj Barb e r , Allison SES OSD PAj Co l OSD PA;
CI V, OASD- PA; Ba l l e s te ros Mark J LTC, OASD -PAj Ca enter, J o s e p h LCDR ~
OSC PAj CIV, OASD- PA; OSD
CDR, OCJCS/ PA
Subje c t ; Tran s c r ip t - BG Ba r b ero Le ba no n mi lita ry a na l y s ts
At t ached i s t he t r a n s c r i p t f rom the 163 0 phone ca l l wi th BG Mi ke Ba r be r o and the mi l i tary

a na l y s ts on Le b a no n .
The c all wa s o n b a ckground.
1
MilitaryAnalyst Call
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
Briefer: U.S. Anny Brig. Gen. Michael Barbero, DeputyDirectorfor Regional Operations, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, J-3
Topic: E . n of U.S. citizens from Lebanon
Location The Pentagon
ON BACKGROUND - quote as senior DoD official
Host: OSDPA
Transcriber. Murphy
I-....I(introductlon of the general). Again thiscall is on background, so you may quote a senior
DoD official. So with that, General Barbero.
Barbero: This is Mike Barbero, and I know a few of you , so those of you who know me please don't
hold that against me.
Let me just tell you where we are as far as contracted shipping. Navy ships are going to be in the
area; I can discuss the command and control arrangements and then some of the messages that-
I just came froma pressconference at the State Department to try to shoot back at this why are we
so slow, the delay, et cetera.
Let me talk about contract shipping. A contracted ship, the Orient Queen - I think you saw it on the
news, departed Beirut approximately nine o'clock eastem daylight time this moming. Inour count,
over 1,000 American citizens.
We think it will take 24 hours for that ship to make a round trip - download inCyprus, back- to
arrive back dockside in Beirut. And this is the maiden voyage, so we'll see how that works.
Hopefully we can make one trip every24 hoursof a thousand passengers.
We have - Transportation Command has been aclive since the start, and they are the ones doing
the chartering in support of State Department, and they have chartered two other commercial ships
- the motor ferry Rahmah - spelled R-A-H-M-A-H, a Panamanian flag ship, capacityof about 1,000
passengers , and it should commence operations outof Beirut on the 21" .
Right now it's being - it's reached - and the question is why is it taking so long?Well, we're
conducting safety and readiness forsea inspections, then it must transit the Suez Canal.
And the third shipwe have under contract is a high speed vessel - the Vittoria - V-I-T-T-O-R-I-A,
an Italian flag ship, capacityof 330 passengers, and it again is also being inspected and we think it
will commence operations on the 22"'.
And what some may view and describe as delays I describe as making sure we are putting our
American citizens - evacuating themsafely 00 ships thatwe have inspected and are confident that
can evacuate them safely.
And as you know, we have been using CH-53 helicopters since Sunday to centinuously move U.S.
citizens from the embassy cempound.
We have six CH-53 helicopters that have been doing that today. Three of them are CH's, CH-53
cargo helicepters from the 24" MEU, and three are MH-53s from forces - U.S. forces based in the
United Kingdom.
Navy ships that we have either on site oron the way. USS Nashville will begin operations tomorrow
and we think we can handle 1,000 American citizens per day and they'll either - it's an amphib-
and they'll either transport the citizens from Beirut using their landing craft - I think that's the most
likely way they'll do that - although I don't know, I've answered that by saying the local cemmander
on the scene will make that assessment. But theycan handle 1,000 acitizens adaystarting
tomorrow.
We also have two DOGs - guided missile destroyers - USS Gonzalez and the USS BarTY, Aneigh-
Burke class. And they are there for escert, primarily, and search and rescue. And they will be
escerting these cemmercial earners back and forth.
And then the fourth ship that's on the way - oron station is the USSMount Whitney, which is a
cemmand-and-ccntrol ship, and Brigadier General Jensen could move his cemmand post to this
ship; it is set up with a full suite ofcemmand and central systems.
And we have five more ships that we are heading towards and will enter the joint operational area
within the upccming days.
We've established ajoint operational area, basically encempassing Cyprus to Lebanon, and as you
know, Lebanon isthe responsibility of Central Command, that's why they were given this mission.
They have further - the chain ofcemmand goes to NAVCENT, and he has delegated Brigadier
General Jensen, United States Marine Corps, as the on-the-scene cemmander.
Israel is in -- under the UCP the responsibilityof the European Command, so European Command
iscenducting ccordination with Israel to facilitate our passage through the blockade.
Let's see. The themes I've been telling -I've been passing to people as they.ask the questions of
timeliness is- we have - we are in support of Department of State, and as soon as we had adraft
request from Department ofState, we started toplan it and ccordinate with CENTCOMor EUCOM
to start moving assets.
And we have assets from European Command that we have chopped to Central Command; for
example the -I think the USS BarTY isan example. The helicepters out of the UK are from
European Command, and we have assets from United States Special Operations Command and
Transportation Command isdeeply involved in this.
But as soon as we heard - got adraft request from the Department of State, we immediately
started acting on that late last week and all throughout the weekend.
But the thing I have been telling people who have asked abouttimeliness is we have to balance the
requirements for a safe, secure and rapid operation, and we're doing it with a sense ofurgency.
But I also tell themit's atime - as Admiral Walsh said the other day it's physics, it's time-<listance.
The MEU was ashore in Jordan, conducting and exercise, so they had 10 disengage from that
exercise, regroup, reload and Ihen get underway.
We had a ship involved with - in an exercise I think in (and?) assets in Ukraine or Romania- a
EUCOMexercise which they had 10 disengage from and move that way.
We had ships move from the Red Sea- ships that had already transited the Med were tothe west,
had to reenterthe Mediterranean and head thisway. And they are moving as fast as they can.
So with that - I've told people that. you know, it's a war zone, with an active blockade and our job
is to get it right the first time and not rush tofailure. And that's why we're balancing those three
main concems and operational imperatives I've mentioned.
So with that, I can answer any questions - let me just give yousome numbers, projections, of
American citizens we can handle. Yesterday we handled about 400 - I am sorry - yesterday we -
and I amgoing to lalk in terms ofcapacity, because we have assetson site and then the
ambassador and the embassy has to get these citizens to either the landing pad at the embassy Of
dockside, and frankly, we have not filled every seat.
But let me talk in terms of capacity. Yesterday we had the capacity to evacuate about 440
Americans: today it's 1,340. Tomorrow it will be acapacity of 2,400; Fnday we will have the
capacity to evacuate about3,800, and then Saturday with all the assets we'll have on station we
could evacuate 6.500.
So as you see, we're rapidly forming this task force and building our capability. And with that, I'll
answer any questions you might have.
Q: This isJeff McCausland from CBS. Great summary. Quick question, long question. Quick
question - then I assume 6,500 is what you see assteady-state capacity unless things become
dramatically worse - example, having to move folks out of Israel.
And second question is, with the two DOGs forescort duty, can you talk at all aboutsecurity
concerns, for example it seems that a large ship like this with U.S. passengers moving in that area
could be a prime Hezbollah, al Qaeda, pick your favorite nightmare target. Could you talk a little bit
about those concerns?
Barbero: Well the first thing - as faras our capacity, the embassy has requested that we meet a
rate of 2,000 per day, so that is our baseline, and that is the number we have been operating and
building to. So anything above thatisadditional capacity that we have pushed to the area. So that
isour planning figure. Now that could mange if things go south; bUI2,OOO per day is what we got
from the embassy and the Department of State and that's what we've been operating with.
---------------- - - -
As far as missile threat, we have no indications ofthreat toour task force or American citizens, but
the point I make is we are building a capability for thislocal commander to be able to respond to
any threat that may arise.
Q: Thank you.
Barbero: Okay.
(shortcross talk)
Q: Am I correct thatthe ambassador- his responsibility are ashore; in other words, you all pick up
responsibilities when the people getto the point ofembarkation, but you're not planning on any
trips ashore since the ambassador and the movement of people from locations in Lebanon to ports
ofembarkation?
Barbero: We have not been asked forthat, and I am sure down at the tactical level theymay be
looking at some options, but we - it has not beendiscussed with useither at the Oepartment of
Defense or inour ~anning .
Q: This isJohn Ganrett. With regard to the ambassador or the embassy, the country team's
responsibility to get the folks to the collection point, have theyordo you anticipate that they will be
asking for any Iransportation type support for that once you get within range or whatever the
parameter is thai has to be mel?
Barbero: We have not received and there has been no discussion with us about requirement10
move Americancitizenstothese points of embarkation, either the Americanembassy for airor
dockside for the ships, so that has not been discussed with us or we have not been given a
waming order forthat.
Q: Okay, sir, thanks, and one follow-on, Have they asked for any kind of security supportfor those
collection points, et cetera?
Barbero: No they have not, not at this time, bul we will have the capabilily if that changes.
Q: Sure.
Q: Hey sir, it's Steve Greer. How are you doing?
Barbero: Hey, sergeant major, how are you?
Q: Hey, I am doing greal sir, I'mglad you're stillinthe fight.
Barbero: Cool.
Q: Say, I'vegot a quick one. How are we getting the word out to citizens out there - is it loud
speakers or radio, oris it lV? Are those capacities still available there? Orhow are we notifying
themof where these embarkation points are at?
-----------
Barbero: The embassy and State Department are doing that, and the State Department has done it
through various means. We are not responsible for that, although we are flowing some PSYOPS
torces there that can help the ambassador as tar as crowd control and announcements and things
like that. But that is strictly the embassy'sjob and I am not sure howeffective they have been in
doing that or exactly what means they have been doing that by; I don't know.
Q: Sure. Sir, and one more for you. At these two sites, isit U.S. Marines that are there providing
the security and the kind of the patting down so some sort ofsuicide bomber guydoesn't jump on a
53 orhappen toget on one of these ships? Isthat our forces doing that, isthat the Lebanese
military, who isthat involved in that?
Barbero: Sergeant major, I don't knowfor sure.
Q: Okay.
Barbero: Icouldn't answer that. I knowthat there is security in place and they are checking
credentials and paperwork and registrations and things like that, but as far as who isphysically
securing each one ofthese guys orchecking them, I don't know for sure, I couldn't give you a
straight answer.
Q: Okay, thanks though, I appreciate it.
Barbero: Okay, hooah.
Q: This isJeff McCausland again. Can youtalk at all about any future contingency planning. I
mean, obviously we hope that this willbe contained to south Lebanon, but have youconsidered
any additional- ofcourse youget those interesting boundary issues between CENTCOM, EUCOM
- if you should be, for example, asked to evacuate U.S. citizens from northem portions of Israel, or
does anyone have an estimate of how many U.S. citizens right now are in Syria, if we should have
to expand the area ofevacuation?
Barbero: Umm, we are, you know, we've got this plan pretty well in motion, and alii better say is
Central Command is, you know, looking atall the possible threats and contingencies and we are
assessing that now as part of any kind of planning.
Q: Okay.
Barbero: So, that's normal for us to -
Q: Do you know offhand, ordoes anybody there knowoffhand, I mean I know right now they say
there are about 25,000 U.S. in Lebanon, how many U.S. there might be in Syria right now? I mean,
God knows how many there are in Israel, but what the number might be for Syria?
Barbero: I don't know. The State Department hopefully could answer that.
1-..... Gentlemen, any more questions for the general?

Q: Just our I came on late. This isJeff. What's our ru les ofengagement here? Are we on
background?
We're on background.
L.-..I
Q: Where are we?
........1 Yes,sir, we're on background.
Q: Background, okay.
~--'''' y one else have questions forthe general?All right, well thanks gentlemen for joining us.
General, thanks so much for your time.
Q: Grea~ thanks a lot, sir.
Barbero: Thanks. Sergeant major, good heanng you again.
Q: Hooah, sir, cool.

From : aCPAI
Sent: Tue sday, July 25, 2006 8:58 AM
To:
Cc :
Subject :

Flag Status : Flagged
Classific a tion: UNCLASS I FI ED

Caveat s : NONE
All three of you have r equested t h i s informa tion, so t he below E- mai l note addres se s
issues of interes t to you:
>Ve r es e c t fu l l y ,
>Arnry P
> hone: f ax :
>
>Update f r om the Chief o f Army Publi c Affai r s
>
>More tha n 23 5,000 U.S. Army Soldie rs are s erving overse as in 120 countri e s . Mor e t ha n
91 , 00 0 U. S. Army Soldiers ma ke up t he backbone of t he Ameri c an and coa l itio n t eam i n Iraq,
as o f JU ~y 18, 2006. There a r e 17 ,00 0 Army So ldiers serving i n Afgha ni s tan as part o f
Opera tion Endur i ng Fre edom.
>
>
>Ada ptabi lity a nd l earn ing
>-- The Army remains a lea r ni ng o rgan i za ti on. We are exami ning Ope r a t i o n Iraqi Fr e e do m
a nd Ope r at ion Enduring Fre edom o pera ti on s f or counteri nsurgency i ns i g ht s ( ~ l e s sons
learne d N
t o be a ppl ied to the cur r ent f orce and the i mpl i c a t i ons f o r f uture f o r ce
)
doctrine, organizati on, tra i ning, a nd ma ter ie l develo pmen t s.

>
>-- The U. S. Ar my Tr a i ni ng a nd Doc tr i ne Comma nd , i n c oordinatio n with the U.S. Mar ine
corps , is f orma li zi ng many count er i nsur gency l e s s on s l e a r ne d over t he pas t t hr e e year s
i nt o a ne w Army f ie ld manu a l on c ounte r i nsurge nc y operatio ns -- expe c t e d t o be relea sed
l a t er this year . The Army ha s t he Ce nt e r f o r Army Les s o ns Le arne d , war c o llege s and ho st s
of s c hool s a lso teaching boots-on- the -gro un d i nsights fr om t he Iraq war t o dep loy ing
So ldie r s and , i n some cases, our c oalit ion par t ne r s. For over two years , t he Cent e r f o r
Army Lessons Lear ned a lso ha s ha d a s us tained presence in Iraq ga theri ng rea l - t i me le s s on s
l e arned and he l ping f o rm an I r a qi Les sons Le arne d Ce nt e r .
>
>-- Recognizing t he e xt reme importa nce o f the military- t rai ni ng mission i n Iraq , the Army
ha s charged t he 1s t I nfa nt ry Divi sion wi th orga nizi ng, equip ping, traini ng a nd de p loyi ng
adv i s o ry t eams. In a ddi tion t o t he - Bi g Red One'sN mission , t he Army a l so i s a dap t i ng ho w
it assig ns o f fi c ers a nd NCOs t o t hese critical jobs. Th i s ensures the t e a ms are f i l l ed
conti nually wi th our be s t tra ined a nd l e d peop l e . I n theater, senior l e aders e s t abl i s hed
a trai ni ng a cade my exclus ively f or U. S. c o mmande r s to rei nforce their un der s t a nding of
counterinsurge ncy, and t o unde rscor e t he ir critical partne rs hi p wi th Ira qis.
>
>-- On the e qu i pp i ng ef fort, dur i ng the pas t t wo years the Army added over 25,000 armored
HMMWVs i n Iraq -- a bo ut ha l f of which are the M1114 factory-armored v ari ety. The Army
f i e l de d over 50 0 , 000 sets o f s t ate-of -the-ar t body armor. In addition to perso na l armor
and vehicle armor , t he Army expanded t r a i ni ng venues a nd developed suites o f
counte rmeasure syst ems t o p rovi de a mor e holistic approach to defeating Improv ised
Explosive Devices. The Army a lso made major steps in decreasing t he r e spo nse t i me for
1
fi elding ma t e r i el sol utions and t r a i n i ng improve ments, and the Army continues t o p rocure
readily-ava i l ab le commerc ia l a nd g o ve rnmen t equ ipment t o p r o v i de n e w technologies to
Soldiers fast er. Agil e ro bots, mo de l - s i z e planes and mi niature c ameras now often go into
harm's way, r a t h e r t ha n Soldiers .
>
>
>Re c r u i t i ng and re t ention of quality people
>- - I n the fi rs t n ine mo n t h s o f Fi s c a l Year 2006 (through June 2006), almost 100,000
Soldier s reenlis t ed in the Army . Two out of three So l diers eligi bl e to r eenli st, continue
to r e enl i s t.
>a . As of end of mon t h June, a c t i v e Army ree nlis ted 56,531 Soldiers th i s f isc a l year:
109% of t he ye ar-to - date s t raigh t -line gl i de pa t h of 52,002. Overall Fisca l Year 2006
retention miss ion i s 64 ,20 0--a l mos t i dentical to the FY05 mission .
>b . As o f end of mo nt h Jun e, US Army Reserve reen listed 12,329 Soldiers thi s fisca l
year : 95% o f the year -to-date straight - line g lide path of 1 2 , 93 2. Overal l FY06 r e t e n t i o n
mi s s i on is 1 7 , 7 1 2--1 ,464 more than FY05.
>c . As of end o f mon t h Jun e, Army Na t i o na l Guard reen l isted 30 ,803 Soldiers this f i s c a l
y ear : 1 2 2 % of t he year-to-date s t ra i ght-l ine g l i d e path o f 25,23 9. Overal l FY06 r e t e n t i on
mission is 34,875--2,305 more than FY05.
>
>- - So far t h i s f iscal year , mo re t han 1 25 , 000 Americans h a ve answered the Ca l l t o Duty
a nd joi ned t he U .S . Army. In June alone, mo re than 2 0 , 00 0 patriots joine d the Army t e a m.
>a. In t he June r e porti ng pe r i od , the Ac tiv e Army met i t s g o al for t h e thirteenth
consecut ive month, recrui ting 8,756 Soldiers i nto the Active Army : 1 0 2 % of the month ly
goal of 8,600. So far t h i s f i s c a l year, we are at 10 4% of the year -to -date mission,
recruiti ng 51,612 So ldiers towards a goal of 4 9 ,7 00. The fisca l year recru it ing mi s s i o n is
80,000- identica l to l a s t year'S mission .
>b. I n the June reporting period we a c ce s s ed 5,640 So ld iers into t h e Army Res erve : 121%
of t he mon thly access i on goa l of 4 , 66 1. So fa r this f i s c a l y ear, the Army Res erve is a t
101% of the y ear - to-da te access ion mission, access ing 2 5,004 Soldi ers towar ds a goal o f
2 4,836. The fiscal ye ar mission of 36 , 03 2 i s 7,547 more t han l a s t year's mission.
>c . In t he June reporti ng pe r i o d we accessed 5,823 Soldiers into the Army National
Guard: 101% of the monthly g o a l of 5, 7 43 . So far this fisca l year , the Army Na tional Guard
is a t 1 0 3 % of the year-to -date mi s s i on , a ccess ing 51,4 77 Soldi ers towards a goal o f
49,988 . The fiscal yea r mission of 70,000 i s 7 , 0 00 more t han l ast y e ar 's miss ion .
>
>-- Regarding waivers: Th e Army h a s a soun d pro c e s s for conduct ing waivers t hat a llows
tho s e who have overcome mistakes, made earlier in their l i v e s , to s e rve thei r country.
Only 3 of 10 men a nd women between 1 7 a nd 24 yea rs o ld f u l l y quali fy f o r service i n the
Army d u e t o medical, mora l, phys ic a l , education a n d apti tude chal lenges, and s tandards i n
our society have c h ange d over the y ears. AS an example , t od a y ' s young men a nd women are
b e i ng charged for offenses t ha t i n ear l ier yea rs wouldn't have be e n cons idered a serious
offense, a nd might not ha v e re s u lte d i n charges in the f i r s t p lace. We a re a re f lec t i o n o f
t h o s e c hanges. The Army does not rehabil i tate en list ees who r eceive wa ivers; they h ave
already overcome the ir mi s take s .
>-- It should a lso be noted t hat we do not a llow e nlis tme n t of anyone who is pending a
cri mi n al c h arge, serving any type of probat ionary p e riod, parol e, c o n f ine me n t or wh o i n
li e u of or a re s u l t of bei ng pro s e c u t e d was o r de red by a court to serve in the mi l itary .
The mi l itary s ervices are not an al ternative t o the cr i minal j ust ice system a nd should
neve r b e vi ewed as an alte r n ativ e source of r e h abili t a t i o n for those t ha t have not
subscribed to the lega l a nd mo r al stand ards wi thin our socie ty. Fo r t hos e that h ad p ast
involvement with t he l aw, the waive r p r o c e s s recognizes tha t some p e o p l e have made
mistakes and h a v e overcome the i r pas t beh a v i o r and have the potent ial for b e i ng a
product i ve and law a biding citizen .
>
>-- The u n derlying p u rpo s e of a moral character waiver a nd standar ds t hat are applied in
that r e gard is to mi n i mize the r isk o f enlisti ng p e r s o n s who may b e c o me disciplinary
probl e ms or a security ris k t o t he mi l itary . When an applicant a p plies f or enlistment a nd
h as had a p a s t h istory o f cr i mina l misconduct a thorough r eview is made to evaluate the
p er sons c urrent c h a r acter a nd p o tent i al for mi l ita ry service. In mos t cases we see ,· the
charg es were from a period o f t i me when t h e a pp l i can t was young a nd imma t u re. We look at
t he r ecent history s uch as employm e nt , school ing, re f ere nces and signs o f remors e a nd
changed b ehavior s ince the inc ident occurre d as p art of the waiver p r o c e s s.
>
>Mis conduc t Al legations
>-- Almos t 650,000 troops have deployed t o I r aq a n d Afgh anistan, and more t han 10 0 , 00 0
2
troops hav e be e n deploye d to t he Balkans - - - and served hono r ably . The widespread med ia
cover age of the deta i nee abu se and t he rape a nd mu r de r of a n I r a q i fema le teenager and her
fami l y gives the percept ion that So l di e r misconduct i n Ira q is r un ning r ampant. Ac tua lly
i nc ident s of serious Sol di er mi s c onduct are f e w.
>
> -- The Army has a long hi sto ry o f pol i c i ng it s elf and continues to live the Army Val ues.
I n the c ases o f Abu Ghraib and Mahmudi yah , i t was So ld i ers who r e por ted t he a l legations of
mi s c onduct . Soldiers report, leaders a c t , and the system takes action if warranted . By
aggressively i nvestigating and p ros e cuting a l l a llegat ions o f cri mes committed by So ldiers
we may be able t o r e f ute mi s i n f orma t i on and reduce Iraqi anger and hate conce rning s uch
all e gat i o ns .
>
>-- The U.S . Army is a va l ue s- ba s e d o rgani zation. We are d i s a p po i nt e d - heartbroken --
t ha t some o f our own are charged with br eaking the f a i t h and trus t bestowed upon t hem. We
do no t like what may have happened; unfortunately we can not change it , but we c a n do
e ve rything i n our power to bring to jus tice those who a re guil ty . When all ega tions o f
Soldie r misconduct are reported they are fully investigated in an open and tra nsparent
system. We t a ke a l legations o f wrong d o i ng by So l d i e r s ve ry seri ous ly , and a re committed
t o thor oughl y invest igate such a ll e gat ions.
>
>- - Thus f a r , al legations a gainst 267 Soldiers have been addressed in courts-martial , non -
jUdici a l pun i shme nt s, and o t he r adverse admi nistrative punishments. These include, as of
J une 16, 2006 :
>- -v ccu xc e - mart ia l :
u 85
>- - - - - Non - j udi c i a l punishments: 95
>- - - - - Ot he r adminis trative actions: 87
>
>- - The U.S. mi litary has gone to great l e ngths i n our t r a i n i ng, education, a nd pre -
deployment exercises to ensure that our soldiers know wha t const i t ut e s violations o f t he
law of war. The Army ensures each Sol die r is physical ly and me ntal l y tough, and t rained
in wa rr i or tas ks a nd dril ls. Be fore any So l d i e r is de p l o ye d t o I r a q or Af gha nis tan, t he
Army employs a trai ni ng a pp r oa c h t hat includes instruction a nd exerc is es in the Ru l es of
Engag eme nt , Ru l e s fo r the Use o f Force , Esca l a tion o f Fo r c e princ i ple s , Law o f Wa r,
So ldie r's Ru l e s , Uni form Code o f Mil i tary J ust ice, Co de of Conduc t , Army va l ue s , Ethi c s
and Cul t ur al Awar ene s s .
>
>Bottom Li ne
>We're in a long war. Ne ver before , sinc e the inception of the all - volunteer f orce i n
197 3 , has our Army f a ced s uch myr i a d complex challenges i n a n ever -chang i ng and unc ertai n
globa l e nv ironment .
>
>Le a ders a t all levels are wor ki ng harder than ever to sus t a in the i n stitution and
simultaneously t rans fo rm whi l e e ns ur i ng t he Army is ful l y sta f f e d , t r a ine d and equipped t o
achieve v i c tory i n the war o n t errorism.
>
>The Ameri c a n pe op le can be p r oud o f the conduct and a c c ompl i s hmen ts of the Amer i can
Sol d iers who are figh ti ng f or the free d om o f ot hers, our o wn freedom, and ou r wa y of l ife .
>
>
>Classi fication : UNCLASSIFIED
>Caveats: NONE
>
>Class i ficatio n: UNCLAS SI FIED
>Caveats : NONE
3
From : Whitman, Bryan [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]
Sent : Tuesday, August 0 :01 PM
To :
Cc:
Smith, Dorrance
Ruff, Eric
[Smith, Dorran
[Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD];
":;;Q:;
~
S~Q;-;:;==;::::;::;;:;;;::::::;:::I
...._ _~
Mr, OSD-COMPn ; Haddock, Ellen (Katie ), Col, OCJCSlPA; Range l, Robert S ..ll'J)
[Rangel, Robert S, CIV, OSD]
Subject: Dh , by the way.....
Did I me nt i on that LTG Steve Bl um was doing a De f e ns e Wri t ers Group b reakf a s t t hi s
morning:
WASHINGTON CAP) More than two-thirds of t he Army Nati ona l Guard 's 34 br igades a r e not
combat r e a dy due lar gely to vast equipment s hort f a l l s t ha t wil l take a s much as $21
billi on to correc t , t he top Na tional Guard ge ne r a l said Tuesday .
The c omments by Lt. Gen. H. St even Bl um came in the wake o f di s closures by Army o f f i cials,
a nalysts and members o f Congres s t ha t two -thirds of t he active Army's brigades a re not
r a ted r e a dy for war.
The pr ob l e m, t hey s a y, is driven by bud ge t constraints tha t won ' t a l l ow the mi li t ary t o
comple te the personnel tra i ning and equipment repairs and rep lac e me nt tha t mus t be done
when units re turn home a f t e r deployi ng to Ira q or Afgha nistan.
~-I am fu rthe r behind or in an even more dire si tua t ion than t he act ive Army, but we both
have the s a me symptoms, I j us t have a h igher f e ver , ,. Blum said.
One Army o f ficial acknowledged Tuesday t ha t while all o f t he act ive Army uni ts s erving i n
t he war zone are ~~ l O O p ercent " r eady , t he situat ion is not the same for thos e at home.
1
From : :E~t:A::--_"" C IV, OASD-PAJ
Sent:
~~DoffFr;ce~~;JFn~~; C IV, OASD-PAj
To :
Cc : ~mith, Dorrance KI) [Smith, Dorrance, HON OSD-PA]; W hitman, Bryan ~:::~=~
hilman Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD); Thorp, Frank
horp, Frank, RDML OAS D· PA); Barber, Allison [Barber, Allison CIV
OASD-PAj; Keck, Gary L (Keck, Gary L CO $D ]; Turner, James
[Turner, James, CIV, OASD-PA ' Ballesteros, Mark j. [Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC,
~i~D~-~J~Ca; Vi~'~ci~enter
a~n'iT~od~Joed~M~~~~(v~ iCl~'a~n~,T~od~IV,OASD-PAj
LCDR OASD·PA . Ca.,p.t OSC P
d Ma' OASD-PA ' Ca enter, Joseph
CIV OASD-PA ; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA; .."""' ..1
CDR, OCJCSlPA; L1Col,OCJCSlPA
Subject: military analyst transcript 07 August
Attachments: 08-07-00 military analyst call.doc
08007-06 mllitafy
analyst call...
At tached i s t he mili tary a na l y st transcr i pt f r om Coday 's phone c all.
Per ins tructions , t he s peake rs on thes e transcripts will no w be identi fi e d as Rbr i e f e r R

rathe r t han by Cheir name .
This call was o n ba ckgr ound , wi t h t he speake r t o be identified as a s e nior mi li ca ry

o fficial,
Questio ns pl ea se s ee me o r
1
Transcript
OSD-PA military ana lyst call
Briefer: Senior Military Official
Mo nday, Au st 07 2006
Transcriber
ON BACKG !R
=O"'UND
= "....
- .Jquote as senior military offic ial
Host: OSD-P A
....._ _~ (i n progress) per SOP, I am j ust going to let everyo ne on the call know this
call is on background, so you may quote a senior DoD official with anything you hear on
this call. General. unless you want to go on the record. you can state that at the time.
otherwise we ' ll keep it on background. And with that, I am just going to hand it over to
you for any opening remarks you have and then you can feel free to take their questions if
you would.
Briefer: Okay, we ll thanks very much. Hello everybody, glad to have the oppo rtunity to
say a few things as we look at the Middle East here in this particularly interesting time
for us.
A few points I want to make up front and then 1will be happy to answer any questions. I
know that's probably what everybody wants to do.
First of all, the three major movements that we see playing themselves out in the region.
Number one, we see Iranian-sponsored activity going on with -- through the Syrians and
into Hezbollah and throughout the other Shi ' ite communities in the region. That plays
itself out in a way that is designed to gain time for the Iranian nuclear program and also
designed to increase Iranian regional power in a way that I think is definitely increased in
the past year or so.
Secondly we have the Sunni extremists al Qaeda and their associated movements that are
operating throughout most of the Sunni regions. I wouldn' t say that they' ve necessarily
increased their levels of activity but they are certainly looking for mergers and a way to
increase their value on the global stage. J don 't think that they probably think that they've
done enough here lately, and we should look for them to try to make a statement here in
the foreseeable future, probably outside of the region, but it could also be delivered
against tbe oil infrastructure, as you know that they' ve tried to do before.
And of course the third big issue that constantly plays itself out is the context of the
Arab -Israel context - or conflict. You see it manifesting itself in the HezboUab, Lebanon,
Israel, Palestine activity that's going on. When the process is moving forward it seems to
make the region in general a bit easier to deal with. When the process breaks down and it
moves towards conflict, it makes the region very difficult to deal with, not only from the
United States' perspecti ve, but from the perspective of all the powers in the region.
I think., you know, currently we've got to stabilize Iraq, stabilize Afghanistan, we've got
to keep the flow of resources going in the region ; we 've got to deter Iran; we have to help
out where we can with regard to helpi ng the Lebanese arm y at the right time, and also
with regard to ma intaining some readin ess of our forces off the coast of Leban on . It ma y
come as a surprise to you but the 15,000 - nearl y 15,000 Am ericans that were evacuated
off the coast of Lebanon were evacuated under a CENTCOM operation, not a EUC OM
operation.
J think the key point that' s going on in Iraq where all of these interesting major probl em s
come to bear in one form or another is that we see a shift from insurgency over the past
seven or eigh t months - and it probably started sooner that - more to sectari an vio lence
and sectarian activity .
I think that this type of problem that we are seeing in Baghdad, which has really reach ed
very serious levels of concern for us, has got to be dea lt with, and I want to make sure
that everybody knows it's just not a matter of dealing with it mi litar ily; it's a matter of
dealing wi th it mili tari ly, to a certain extent economically, but ce rtain ly politically. And
in particular on the po litical arena is a requirement to get the Jaysh al Mahdi rogue
elements under contro l, and where they can 't be brought und er control po litically, they
have to be dealt with .
We also have a pretty robust program that's starting to show some good effects agains t
hitting the what I wo uld call the death squad cells. We certainly know the Sunni death
squad cells because they primarily tend to be al Qaeda related or Ba' athi st related that we
have a fair ly good view of. On the Shi'a side it' s been harder for us, but last night we
conducted so me operations against some of the Shi' a death sq uads that had some good
e ffect, and we continue to want to do more or that, and we' ll have to do that in
conj unction with the Iraqi armed forces.
The - it's clear from op erations that are going on in Baghdad, at least I think it' s clear in
my mind, it ma y not be in the public ' s mind, our forces are there primarily to participate
in the outer cordon op erations that are going on to isolate the Sunni, and Iraqi security
forc es are doing a lot of the main work except for some of the preci se hits that need to be
done against the various death squad elements that we're findin g in that battle space.
Certainly we thou ght that the situation was seri ous enough so tha t on its way out of the
country we decid ed to divert the 172"' (Stryker Brigade) for anywhere from 90 to 120
days into the Baghdad area. We did it for a couple of different reaso ns. One, they are very
experienced; they did a great job up in Mosul, And two, they are a very well-integrated
unit with regard to both operational and intelligence capability, and experienced in a way
that we think will start to help us see some bette r results in the Baghdad space relatively
soon.
The situatio n in Afghanistan probably deserves a mention or two . As you kn ow, abou t a
week and a half ago we transitioned the regional command so uth region over to NATO
command. We think that that area will contin ue to be contested by the Taliban; we also
expect some increase in Tali ban activity in the eas tern sec tor, which is primarily a U.S.
sector, and while the re is certainly a lot of activity, particularly in Helmand province, it's
not all Taliban; part of it is Ta liban, part of it is certainly drug-lord related activity that ' s
going on there. But we don't see anything mi litarily that would unhinge our efforts right
now as we go through the remainder o f the sum me r and into the winter period in
Afghanistan .
So, that having been said I guess there' s probably other place s we co uld talk about in the
region. Ce rtainly we've got activity going on down in Somalia. where the United Islamic
Courts or the Council o f Islamic Courts - they tend to change their names frequentl y - are
showing a degree o f capacity down there that we haven't seen an yone particular party
have before. Wh at's wo rrisome to us about that is that they de finit ely have contacts with
aJ Qaeda and they have been known to harbor al Qaeda militants in the region, although
not in gre at numbers. We certainly should expect a pickup of activity there.
Throughout the rest o f the region. the d ynamic as you can imagine with all o f these
various things going on really presents a very pr essuri zed and dynamic military period,
but also the dipl omatic and political activity that's goi ng on is probably as intense as I've
ever seen. So that having been said, nobod y has yet ordered No rth Korea into our AOR
and so we're happy with that.
Q : Hey, general, it' s (name); how are you?
Briefer : Hey, how are you (name)?
Q: Terrific. Listen, take you back to your first thre e points. Do you see an y convergence
or divergence or parallels tracks between, you know, the Iranian Hezbo llah largely Shi 'a
effort and of co urse the al Qaeda Sunni extremists? (For these guys? Are these guys?) on
parallel tracks, do they hate eac h other, are they tacit cooperative ? Can you make any
comment on that at all?
Briefer: Yeah, my view on that is that they are not cooperating officially. I ce rtainly don't
see it. I regard what 's going on in Hezboll ah Hamas battle space as be ing manipulated by
Iran, direc ted by Syria and executed by Hamas and Pales tine and Hezboll ah in the
Lebanese bo rde r area.
Th e convergence - I thi nk it' s our worst nightmare if there were to be some convergence
but the way peo ple are behaving towards one another throughout the regio n - Sunni and
Shi ' a - I think would be a very tactical and a very transitory sort of conve rge nce, and,
you know, I can ' t imagine them coming together in a big way against us, although I can
certainly imagine and I think it 's not out o f the rea lm of the possib le that in Iraq, you
could see the Iranians dialing up the pressure in so uthern Iraq , whil e at the same time al
Qaeda in al Anbar Province and around Baghdad are tryi ng dial up the pressure. They
would not be coordinated mo ves; they would be moves that are trying to be
complementary of one another, but not necessari ly cooperate with on e another. Over.
Q: Thank you.
Q: You mention that we have to deter Iran? How the heck do you do that?
Briefer: One thing that we certainly do with the Iranians is that we continue to know
where their IRGC Kuds force people are acting, where they are operating. Certainly in
the Persian Gulf area it's been very interesting to me - or in the Arabian Gulf if you want
to use the term that our Arab buddies use - it' s very, very clear to me that the Iranian
military activity that was fairly aggress ive that we saw from their naval and air units - at
least aggressive in terms of their defense posture - has gone down actually below what
we've seen , so it's interesting to me that as the pressure gets turned up militarily on the
Hezbollah front that they are showing really no levels of big activity on the - within their
own territory or in the territory that they normally patrol and operate in in the Arabian
Gulf area.
This doesn't mean that we won't see them try to operate in southern Iraq and in Sadr City
through their surrogates, but it' s very difficu lt for us to really know how that surrogate
activity cause and effect is working. We have, as you know, captured equipment that has
been smuggled across the border, but every time we capture it it' s never in an Iranian' s
hand, it ' s always in an Iraqi-Shi'a hand of some sort.
So, the best way for us to deter the Iranians as a nation-state is to make sure that our air
and naval presence in the region remains robust enough to be able to deal with them if
things get more - more difficult with them, and for them to understand that while they
think we may be tapped out, that we are definitely not tapped out, and that, you know,
they can be dealt with militarily in a defensive manne r if necessary.
Q: But that doesn't reach to the (inaudible) of their nuclear program.
Briefer: Well, their nuclear program - you've got to make sure that over time you' re
doing what you can to not allow that nuclear program to go forward. If there's a
requirement for military activity against that, we'll cross that road when we come to it. I
think that it's a while before they have the capacity to field a nuclear weapon, although I
understand that there' s a lot of people in the intelligence community that's got different
views on it. My view is still pretty much like I think the view of most people in the
community, somewhere after 2010.
Q: (name).
Briefer: Hey (name).
Q: Sir, how are you?
Briefer: Great.
Q: l 72nd into Baghdad. Is that enough - realizing you have a force constraint. Some folks
around town and other places are talking the numbers ought to go up considerably over
the next six months or so. How would you respond to that?
Q: Well (name), I think if you take into account the Iraqi arm y units that are around
Baghdad, an d the loc al Iraqi poli ce and you take into account that at thi s stage in the
campaign we want them to take the lead in dealing with the sectarian violence to the
ex tent possible, that we are relying heavily on Iraq i mi litary to do the job for which
they're capab le of do ing. And so U.S. forces on the outer co rdo n and doing the prec ision
work and also providin g the ena blers is what we are trying to accomplish there. And of
course you know that we've got U.S. transition teams with most of the Iraqi units.
There's two divisions worth of what I would call national po lice that haven't rea lly
achieved the level of discipline or real ly done what I think the Iraqi government needs
them to do . They are somewhere between the loc al po lice and the army, and that force we
are in the process of standing it down at various locations, retraining it and trying to get it
back on line with reliable connections to the new Ministry of the Interior. So my answer
is there 's a helluva lot more troops available in Iraq than there ' s eve r been. The military
in particular is pretty responsible and pretty active. I think more American troops over
and beyond what we currently have we certainly wouldn 't want to do but we don't rule it
out if necessary.
Q: (name). You mentioned possible he lping the Lebanese Army. How do you see we
co uld enter in an d help there? Are we just ana thema because of o ur relations hip with
Israel?
Briefer: We ll I think in the short term it's probabl y not a good idea for us to be aro und,
altho ugh that' s a po litical decision . In the long term, they want us to be aro und. Th e
Leban ese army's got very good connections with the Un ited States and France and other
western co untries. They want to be reformed along western lines. Hezbollah doesn 't want
to have weste rn trainers or western contractors or western co nnections with it, and o f
course they don 't want to be disarmed in the long run for reasons that I think are obvious
to us.
I think that you don't ach ieve anything unti l over time the Lebanese government has
attained its sovereignty down to the bord er with Israel , and that w ill be a long slow
process. But as we move tow ard that process, I thin k it 's essential that you bring the
Leban ese army'up to the stan dard that has to be done immediate ly -- which is fixed some
o f their spare parts prob lem s and some of their com bat systems prob lems and then you
begi n some trai ning not only insid e Lebanon but (a broa d?) .
Now, nobod y' s told me to begin training. We have co nducted an assessment before the
problem with Hezbollah started a whi le back. And that assessment tells us there' s
probably a two- to five-year pro gram that' s necessary to get the Lebanese army up to the
point where they can really be what we would co nsider to be effective. And that's got to
be accompanied by a program to disarm the Hezbollah militia which of course is a
difficult point in its own right.
Q: Thank you.
Q: Another question on al Sadr's Mahdi army. What kind - what kind of a strategy can
you go about usin g to handle this guy? You say it' s a political probl em for a1Maliki . Is
there anything that will work other than just the normal police work, and then at some
poin t going after the part of his militia that won't cooperate?
Briefer: Well, there' s two different ways that you have to look at it. Number one, there ' s
- when it gets to the point where there will be large-scale direct confrontation, do we
have the forces in the field necessary to take care of it, and I think the answer is yes. I
think they have no intention of trying to provoke a major confrontation. They' ve done
that twice in the past and it and it never worked out for them and I don' t think that they
are tryin g to do that right now.
No doubt however that there are rogue elements - rogue may be a term that's subject to
some debate - but there are certainl y elements that don 't appear to be necessarily
connec ted to Sadr himself that are participating in these various death squad activities.
It' s really clear to me that we've got to target them, and one of the real marks of whether
we are going to be success ful in Baghdad or not will be the willingness of the Iraqi
government - national governm ent - to underwrite those military operations necessary to
take those cells out, not onl y on the Shi 'a side, but on the Sunni side.
Q : Th ank you.
Briefer: And so I think it's the leadership, go after the known cells that are going the bad
work, and like I said last night we had some prett y good effect and we are going to
continue that process.
Q: Thank you.
Q: General (Name.)
Briefer: He y (nam e).
Q : Iran is of cours e as we all know leadin g the Lebanese problem. They are also I believe
you would agree a major problem with you in Iraq right now, not only within the
governm ent - you have elements within the government that are I think are cooperating
with the Iranian s (Akeem? Sp?) and others I am told . If we don 't take out and change the
regime or leadership in Iran we are going continue to have major probl ems over there.
Has anyone prop osed, and I know you can 't reall y give me the answer, but the fact is
regime change with Europ e and everyone has got to be an eventual decision or we' ll
never get any stability in the region.
Briefer: Well, I tell you (name) the Iraqi - or the Iranian government is very unpopular
with its own people.
Q: Concur.
Brie fer: And in my mind if you can contain and protect and deter and do tho se things that
brin g into account an aw ful lot of the sentiment in the Arab Sunni population that they
want to contain and prot ect and deter the Iranians in conj unction with the United States,
then I think you can start setting the conditions that isolate the Iranians.
If you can solve the problem in Lebanon in a way that diminishes Hezbollah, which again
at this particu lar point is probabl y more diplom atic than it is military, and if you can start
movin g both Iraq and Syria towa rd the Arab center, then I think there' s a very good
chance that Iran 's power is both deterred and contained.
But it' s a long-term strategy, it'd take an awful lot of effort, it' s very hard to do when
there ' s an Arab-Israeli conflict going on, but I think the Iranians are masters at taking
advantage of unsettled situations, and as you know, they play all sides against the middl e;
they not onl y are working with the Iraqi government to try to get the Iraqi government to
stabilize, but their IRGC Kuds force people are working with the vario us Shi ' a rogue
militi as specifically to undermine the security situation down in Basra and up in Sadr
City.
So it' s a very complicated problem for us but I'm of the opinion that we 've got enough
power, there ' s enough regional sentiment and there' s enough opportunity that over time
you set the conditions where the Iranian current government of (amedi neged - sp) and
the various other extreme factions that have come together really can' t make it in the 21 st
century. That may be wishful thinking, but that ' s what I think.
Q: Well , when I said regim e change I am nollalking U.S., but I am talking covert and
letting the Iranian people take their country back, and doing the same things that you are
talking about getting alliances over there that would encourage this activity. I mean, lord
knows they' ve got enough demonstrations and instability there and we know the
population doesn't like them, but how would we get that coa lition over there, plus covert
operations to set up so that the Iranian people would ensure that that regime cannot keep
a stable country over there? That' s all I am saying.
Briefer: It ' s again probably the work of somebody else than CENTC OM, but I can tell
you that there is a tremendous amount of concern in the Arab countries about Iranian
hegemon y right now. And it's actually just not in the Arab Sunni states, but you also see
a lot of it reflec ted from the Iraqi Shi 'a politicians as well. It ' s not true that they are
completely dominated by the Iranian s. I think ultim ately they are trying to build
themselves a state that will be part of the Arab world.
So the num ber one story last year was Iraq stability. As I go around the Arab world this
year, the number one story is Iranian expan sioni sm, hegemon y and nuclear program .
Now, in this period of unsettled activity, a lot of people have a lot of desire to sort this
thing out rather quickl y so that a unified front can emerge against the Iranian s, but that
will take a lot of (scaling?) - covertly how things emer ge, (name), Ijust can ' t say.
Q: Okay, thank you sir.
Q : (Name) again . In view of your last statements there, do you view the turn in
statements by the surrounding Arab countries toward Hezbollah from their original
statements as simply rhetoric that will soon pass. or do you see any way that these
governments can have any long-term interest in supporti ng Hezbollah, you know,
considering they are an Iranian based factor ?
Briefer: Well . it depends upon the state. For example, the other day there were Shi'a
demonstrations, in (Damahn? Sp?) the oil-producing area of Saudi Arabia. And this is
preci sely what the Saudis thought wou ld happen as a result of Iranian ambitions in the
region. And so I think you' ll always see Saudi Arabia very much squared off against
Shi 'a interests. whether they are in the form of'Hezbollah, various parties in Iraq such as
Muqtada Sadr's folks, or. you know, within the vario us Gulf States .
Jordan, on the other hand, whic h - you know, the king has been speaking out a lot against
the Iranians, that having been said, his people - or the Jordanian peop le -- are looking at
Hezboll ah as one of the few Arab resistant movements that' s ever been able to do
anythi ng the Israelis, and so he ' s got a problem in managing street expectatio ns with his
own goo-po litica l outlook, and so, you know - again, it's complicated, but I think it's
transitory. I think over time most of the Arab countries with the exce ption of Syria
understand that they' ve got to dimini sh Hezbollah power beca use it's a conduit for
Iranian powe r, and I think ultim ately the other Arab countries will work hard on the
Syrians to get the Syrians out of that orbit as well. But it' s pretty interesting and dynami c.
Q: It' s (name) again. On the Syrians, I mean do you see any (inaudible) to suggest that
there would actually be an opportunity to just (peel?) the Syrians away and of course
Syrian . Iranian (?) cooperation also may be marriage of conve nience, and there may be a
possibility to provide a series of incentives to make them do something like Qadaffi , and
sort of find religion, to use a very bad metaphor. Do you think that' s at all possible or just
wishful thinkin g?
Briefer: No, I think it's possib le and I think it' s a road that ought to be pursued. I think a
cornerstone of our strategic thought how do you get the Syrians away from the Iranian
orbit? And again, it's over time. You know, we' re kind of stuck in contac t in this current
crisis, and I do n' t believe that we necessarily need to think that what's going to happen in
the next two or three wee ks or next two or three mon ths is going to be the way it's going
to emerge.
I think in the longer term the strategic framewo rk looks to me that it can move in a
positive direction if we can get not only our own internal capabilities synchronized, but
also that of our friends in the region probab ly most im portantly, and also the Europeans.
I think when people look at how the Iranians have been playing this game and it's not
real clear to people right now but it will be a couple weeks after things settle down,
people will be even less interested in Iran emerging as a nuclear weapon state, and so I
think the impetus will change, will be pretty major. Again , I am not trying to be overly
optimistic, but I am not pessimistic that we necessarily move towards escalation in more
difficult times although that's possible, too .
Voice: Gentlemen, we have time for on e last qu estion.
Q: Hey general, (nam e). Question is abo ut how we are ge tting our story out about
information operations. From the beginning many o f us on this phone call have talked
with senior o fficials who said they've never really been happy with the 10 campaign.
And it j ust seems that the bad guys are popping up gmups all over the Middle East, all
over the wo rld, as these things - ma ybe the y're not organized togethe r but for some
reason, you know, it 's like a bunch of ants -- when one finds food , they all know it.
And these things are popping up, and it just see ms like the Iranians are sitting there,
nobody' s putting an y pre ssure on them, at least that's visible, as least in the medi a, at
least that you can see here. My qu estion com es down to: Wh at are we doing for the
people who are not picking up arms, who are not throwing bombs, who wan t to have a
stable society, what are we doing to inoculate them agai ns t these gro ups as part o f our 10
campaign that shows that we're the good guys?
Briefer: Yeah, well, first of all, it's a great question . It' s one that we could talk on for
anoth er hour. But I would tell you that we are not go ing to ever con vinc e the people in
the region that we are the good guys, at least not in the next 10 or 15 years. What we need
to do is convince people in the region that it is not in their interest to side with either the
Sunni extremists or the Shi 'a extremists, and the Shi 'a extre mists is state suppo rted, the
Sunni extremi sts much less clearly so, and we need to empower the moderates to the
ext ent that we can.
But the first thing that we need to do better - and I don 't think that we've done it at all - I
mean, it 's interestin g, when I testify in Wash ington, it' s as if I - you know, this is a one
player gam e, that we happ en to be playing a major tournamen t of some sort against
ourselves in the Middle East, and the on ly thing that matters are the mis takes that we
make in unhinging our theoret ically unstoppable plan .
Th e truth ofthe ma tter is there's an awful lot o f acto rs in the region that either are our
enemies directl y, or our enemies ind irectl y, and we don 't talk enough about who they are,
what they represent , what they (m ean? Made? Main?) and what happens if thei r vision
becomes mainstream in the region. lf the extremist vision, either revolutionary Iranian or
al Qaed a ideology becomes mainstream in the region , the reg ion will eith er mo ve to a
major war against itself- Sunni versus Shi'a, or one of those two groups will move to a
major action again st us in the west, at a hellu va lot more cost and problem then we
curre ntly have .
So, why doesn 't this work it out? Wh y can' t we seem to talk abo ut the enemy? Your
guess is as good as mine. We talk about it as much as we can ; I guess we' re not doin g a
very good j ob of it, but I think we've got to expose this enemy for what this enemy is,
and at the same time admit that we make plenty of mistakes, but on the other hand, we
need to understand that there's an enemy that' s got a plan, got an ideo logy and there are
actually two very directions that are designed to throw the United States out of the region
and it' s fortunate for us that they haven't come together. I don 't think they will come
together, at least not in the short term, but, you know, we've got to be talking about what
revolutionary Iran means and thinks, because they are in my mind clearly doing
everything they can to be at war with us.
I read somewhere today somebody said, well the Iranians have been at war with us for a
long time, we've just never been at war with them. But the question is, you know, how do
we articulate what the Iranians have done, are doing and will do against our interests in
the region and against the interests of the moderates in the region? To me it' s easier to
deal with that because it's tied to a state sponsor. AI Qaeda is a tougher thing to deal
with, because it ' s an ideology. Yet, if you get on their web sites and you just use their
own words and show their pictures of what they think they 're all about, you would think
it would disgust thinking people the same way that fascism and Japanese militarism
disgusted people in the Second World War, but unfortunately, it really hasn' t got to the
danger point yet.
Now, the other final thing I' d say to you is I have been reading a lot of intelligence here
lately about what these various groups are saying to one another, and interest ingly
enough they seem to think that they are getting chewed up by the media as well. And I
was reading some conversation points here of some senior al Qaeda information where
some of the senior leaders exchanged information and I won't reveal how we know this,
you can imagine, but they' re essentially saying we j ust can 't seem to get the media to
understand what we 're doing and why we're doing it. And certainly within Iraq as we
capture al Qaeda people that operate for AQIZ that they seem to think that all the media
outlets are against them, and if people only knew their story, they would be on their side.
But of course, people know what they're doing, and they're not on their side.
So, look, I hope this is useful for you. I appreciate what everybody is doing. It's an
interesting time, but not one in which we ought to wring our hands and be pessimistic. I
think there' s ways to maneuver through this successfully.
L,-_ _..... .General, thanks so much for j oining us again today, we really appreciate your
time.
Briefer: Okay.
'-;;:""''"7'::-' Gentlemen, again, just as a reminder you are free to quote a senior military
official from today 's call, and thanks for joi ning us.
From : ~_~..,.,..... CAPT OVCJCSfPA
Sent : Thursday, November 16, 2006 1:23 PM
OCJC:~P~A~'~~~~~~~:~S~ fPLtCol
~A~;~~~
To:
Haddock, Enen (Katie Col
M LTC OCJCSlPA CIV JCS SJS; OCJCSIPA;
PA CIV, JCS
OCJCS' )(I) CIV JCS OVCJCS' CPT JCS SJS
Subj ect : Gen McCaffery GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06
Atta chment s: McCaffrey,NDUConf,GWO T- l l 0606.ppt
McCaffrey.NOUCon
f.GWOT· l1 0606 ....
Kat i@ and Team - -
Received th@ a ttached GEN McCaffre y ppt brief f rom CENTCOM ; i t i s a GWOT p r esentation made
recently a t NOV.
Wh ile t h@r @ i s no thing pa r t i c ular l y new he r e. he do@ s provide unfe ttered observati ons on
I r aq. incl uding dys functi ona l /broken gove r na nce . lack o f Congres si ona l support f or long -
t erm f undi ng s o lut i ons . da ngers of diploma tically confronting I r a n . and "g rossly "
i na d@qua t@ interagency suppor t. Thi s i s relevant because GEN Mcca f f r e y speaks i n va r i ous
venues , i s a n adjunc t p r ofe ssor at We st Poin t . and i s a mil itary ana lyst f or NBC and
MSNBC. Hi s a udience r e a c h i s signi fi cant. and hi s observati ons wi l l cont i nu e to s hape
po pu lar o p i n ion as we transi tion t o a new SECDEF and cont inue t o l ook hard a t t he GWOT way
ahead.
For you r SA.
v
1
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
United States Military Academy at West Point
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Presentation to:
National Defense University
Defense Worldwide Counter Terrorism Conference
Monday, 6 November 2006
BARRY R. McCAFFREY
GENERAL, USA (RETIRED)
2900 South Quincy Stree t, sune 300A
Arlington, VA 22206
brm@Imccameyassociatel;.com
10)·824·jl60
SIX INSIGHTS ON THE WAR ON TERROR
• The threat terrorist organizations have been intimidated and badly damaged.
• The threat has morphed and remains a huge danger to the US and our allies .
• Global animosity toward US foreign policy and the Administration is

universal, intense, and growing.
• Homeland security has improved immeasurably since 9/11 (not withstanding

Katrina).
• Homeland security is grossly under-resourced, lacks congressional support,

and remains incoherent.
• The proliferation ofWMD nation states and technology remains the principal
threat to the American people and our allies.
GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey

ELEVEN OBSERVATIONS ON IRAQ -- 2006
l it - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence ofV.S. comba t forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. Our allies are leaving.
2 nd - The Iraq i Arm y is real, growing, and much more willing to fight. However, they are very badl y equipped. The Iraqi Police are a
disaster.
3 rd - The Maliki Administration is dysfun ctional. Governance is brok en. The nation is gripped with fear and distrust.
4t h. - Coalition and Iraqi forces have largely succeeded in neutralizing the foreign jihadist threat at a strategic and operational level.
5t h. - Inter-Agenc y Support for our U .S.- Iraq strategy is grossly inadequate. Onl y the Armed Forces and the CIA are at war.
6t h. - We face a serious strategic dilemma - Are U.S. combat troops conducting a police action gov erned by the rule of Iraqi law --
or -- are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-ins urgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning
institutio ns?
7th - U.S. Detain ee polic y and conditions have improved dramatically. We may have over-corrected.
8th - U. S. combat forces need to reduce th eir footprint to get down to ten combat brigades by Christmas. We are going to break the US
Arm y.
9t h - Iraq cann ot sustain economic recovery without enhanced and lon g-term U.S . budgetary suppo rt. Congressional support is lackin g.
10 t h - Tough U .S. diplomatic rhetoric abo ut confronting Iranian nuclear weapons is ill-adv ised.
n» - There is gro wing animosity by the US Arm ed Forces toward s the Me dia.

NINE OBSERVATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN - 2006
1st _ Afghanistan has in five years moved from a situation of: mindl ess violence, cruelty, poverty, massi ve production of drugs, the absence
or government, and isolation -- to a nation with a strugg linS democr atic governme nt; an exploding economy; a rapidl y growing,
disciplined Army; a vibrant free press, and active diplom atic and eco nomic ties with its neighbors and the world.
2 nd - There is little question that the level of fighting has intensified rapidl y in the past year. Three years ago the Ta liban operated in squad
sized units. Last year they operated in company sized units ( 100+ men). Thi s year the Taliban are operating in battalion sized units
(400+ men).
3 rd _ The early assumption by NATO of a lead role in supporting the Afgh an government is a triumph. NATO is dramatically under-
resourced for the task at hand.
4 t h • Afghanistan also produc es more than 90% of the world ' s opium poppy (4,475 met ric tons 2005) and is also the world's largest heroin
producing and traffickin g co untry.
51. _ The creation of 44 battalions o f ANA Forces (30,000 troo ps) in 36 months is an enormous success story. They are the most disciplined,
and effective military force in Afghanistan 's history. In general, these troops are very courageous, and aggressive in field operations .
The Afghan Arm y is miserab ly under-resourced .
61h _ The Afghan National Police are vital to establishing order in the urban and rural areas . (33,000 Afghan Nationa l Police ANP nominally
exist and 5,200 Afghan Border Po lice) Th ey are in a disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and
trained, riddled by drug use and lackin g any semblance of a national police infrastructure.
7lh - We must eradicate the opium crops without fail each growing season -- and massively resource alternative econom ic development.
81h _ Th~ c~untry remains devastated ~ y th.e peril of 45 0 ,~00 l and~in es which kill and maim ~un~reds ~f peoI? l ~ a y~ar; foreign .
nussronen es are harassed; there IS Widespread public perception of government corruption, mcludmg mini sterial involvement Iii
illegal narcoti cs; intimidation and violence directed at NGO workers increased during the past year.
9 t h - We must re-think the relative imp ortanc e we place on A fghanistan , This was the source country ofintemational terrorism. If we fait
and it slips back into anarc hy -- it will again be a sanctuary for internationa l terror .

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS FROM GUANTANAMO - 2006
1st - There is now zero physical or mental abuse of prisoners in this facility by either guard personnel or military intelligence
interrogators.
2'· - Military interrogations are clearly in compliance with previously published U.S. military training standards.
3nJ - Procedures to review the status of Detainees exist. 179 have been released. More than four hundred and fifty Detainees
are now being held. At least one-third are extremely dangerous terrorists.
4th - Environmental conditions clearly exceed those provided to U.S. Military personnel on garrison active duty.
51h - Opportunity to worship is respected. There is uninterrupted prayer time.
61h _ Medical care, dental care, mental health care, nutrition, and cultural sensitivity exceed the standards of'Ll.S. first-line
institutions.
7th - Detainees receive 4200 calories a day with 53 individually prepared special diet meals. Four different menus and three
meals a day are offered. Halal and cultural dietary requirements are supported.
8th - All Detainees have significant opportunities for recreation (2- 12 hours daily).
9tb _ Detainees are provided two full sets of clothing, have privacy in cell toilet facilities, and are permitted regular showers.
10'>- Books and magazines are offe red to all compliant Detainees. (All Detainees regardless of status have a Koran in their
cell).

WHAT IS IN OUR FUTURE?
I I' - The US economy continues to dominate the global marketplace.
2nd - US - Japanese economic and political cooperation grows even more intense.
3 r d _ Saudi Arabia continues to modernize and maintains stability.
4th - Relations with Europe dramatically improve with the next Administration.
5th - Relations with Russia, China, India, and Pakistan -- now immeasurably better than pre-91l1 -- will continue to strengthen.
61h _ North Korea comes apart.
7111 - Terrorists strike America.
81h _ Crisis in Iraq -- uncertain outcome.
9l h _ Showdown in Afghanistan -- uncertain outcome.
l Oth- The death of Castro -- meltdown of repression.
11t h _ Confrontation with Chavez -- instability and oil.

From : "'=::_-:-""':7_~ CAPT , JCS , OCJCS
Sent : Thursday. November 16. 2006 2:28 PM
To : Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCS/PA
Subj ect: RE: Gen McCaffery GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06
Thanks Ka t ie !
CAPT ~~~~~~~~~, USN

Sp e c1 a l As s 1 s ta nt t o CJCS
Di r e c t o r , Cha o Act i on Group
From: Ha ddock , El l e n ( Kat ie) , Co l . OCJCS / PA

Sent: Thursda Nove mbe r 16 , 200 6 2 : 27 PM
To : CAPT , J CS, OCJ CS
Sub ject: FW : Ge n Mc Caffe ry GWOT b r i e f - 6 NOV 06
No t that y o u n eed one mor e thing to read -- and maybe you 've h e ard d irectly fro m Ge n
McC a f f rey , b u t tho ugh t thes e 6 brief s l i d es were wo r t h s h a r ing . . .
Vi R
Katie
Fr o m: CAPT OVCJ CS/ PA

Sent : Th urs day , No v ember 1 6, 2 00 6 1: 23 PM
Elle~gIK~~at~i~ei)~'~C;O~'~'~O;,C~J~C:S~/~P~A~;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;~~~:P:~
LTC
M LTC OCJCS/ PAi CS SJS ;
To : Haddo ck,Ma' , OCJ CS /PA; )(I) CIV JCS
~~~~~~:;;;;;~: CIV JCS OVCJe S ; ~
Sub je c t: Ge n McCaff e ry GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06
J CS SJS
Kat ie a nd Te a m --
Re c e i ved the a t tach e d GEN Mc Ca ffre y p p t bri e f f r o m CENTCOM; it i s a GWOT p r e s entat ion ma d e
r ece n t l y a t NDU.
Wh ile t here i s no t hing p ar t icu l ar ly ne w here , he does p r o v ide unf e t t e r e d o b s erva t ions o n
I r aq , i nc l u ding d ysf un ct i o na l /br o ken governance , l a c k of congress i ona l s upp o r t f or long-
t e rm f u nd ing s o l u ti o n s , dan g ers o f d i p l oma t ica lly c onf ronting Iran , and "g r o s s l y "
inade qua te i nte ragency s u pp o r t. Th is i s re l evant b e c a u s e GEN McCaff r ey s p e aks in v a r ious
venue s , i s an a d j u n c t profes s o r at Wes t Po i n t , a nd is a mil i t ary analys t for NBC and
MSNBC. Hi s a ud ienc e rea ch i s s ign i f ican t , a n d h i s o bs erva tions wi l l con ti nu e t o sha pe
popul a r o p i nion a s we tran s i t i o n t o a ne w S ECDEF a nd conti nue to l ook h a r d at the GWOT way
a h e ad .
Fo r y our SA .
vr
From : Lt Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent : Monday, December 11, 2006 10:54 AM
To:
Cc:
1~~~~
1::
"" (Katie), Col, OCJC
CAPT OVCJCS/PA ' LTC OCJCS/PA' - -'
LTC, OCJCS/PA; '~;;'~~~~~:<Jcli::IDIPA
Subje ct : UPDATE: MEDIA TNTERVIEW REQUESTS
Importance: High
Ma'am . .. r ev i s ed r eque s t below, t o include br i ef ing to mil analysts t omor r ow, fo r DJ S

appr oval .
vr ,
to: sharp:
whitman;
. barbero· r icha rdson, j ohn ; satt ler;
DJ S , Sir; a couple of r equests p l e ase,
1 ) Secretary Rumsfe ld wi l l ho l d a lunch meeting wi t h t he mi l itary a na l y s t s tomorrow a t

noon. This morning, SecDef r e quested t he analysts rec eive an Iraq Update Brie fi ng prior t o
his lunch mee ting with them.
Lt Col from office as r eached out t o J -5 (ME) a nd J -3 to request a briefer be
identif1ed to present a combined UNCLASS strategy/curr ent ops br i e f i ng (20 mi n ea) for the
g r ou p tomorrow at 11 15 i n the De p Se c De f (T) conference room. BG Jones has t entat ively
a gr eed , pend ing a f or ma l ta s ki ng , to brief I raq strategy. Rea d- a he ad packages a r e
fort hcomi ng f r om OSD/PA f or the b r i e fer (s ) i de n t i f i e d .
With yo ur concurre nce, I r eques t you p l e a s e f orwa r d t o J - 3 and J-5 reque s t ing the i r
a s s i stance in i de nt i f y i ng a br i efer f or tomorrow's e ven t.
2) Thorn Shanker, Ne w York Ti me s , has r eques ted a background interview with LTG Lut e.
He j ust r eturned from I raq and one o f the stories he 's worki ng on i s a profile of GEN
Abiza i d. One o f GEN Abi zai d 's s enior aide s e ncourage d Thorn to ta lk wi t h LTG Lu t e a s he i s
someone who knows GEN Abi zai d well and can talk a bou t hi s c a reer .
LTG Lut e ha s agreed to the i nt e rvi e w a nd, pe nding approval, we ' ve tenta t ive l y s cheduled
t he i nt erview f or t omorr ow, a t 1230.
Lt Col 1 f r om my o f fi ce wi l l be p res en t to monitor t he i nterview.

Recommend we s upport . Thorn is one of the bes t a nd will write a me a n i ng f u l and t ho ught f ul
pe r s ona l pr of i l e.
Ve ry Respectfull y,
Katie
t
From : Lt Col, OCJCSIPA
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2006 11:25 AM
To: Haddock Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJC
Cc : CAPT OVCJCSJPA LTC OCJCSIP
LTC,OCJCSJPA; CDR, OCJCSIPA
Subject: UPDATE 2: MEDIA INTERVIEW REQUESTS
Ma 'am... j us t got a ca l l f r om BG J ones (J- 5, ME) . .. he hone st l y doesn 't t h i nk we s hould be

o f f e ri ng a stra tegy b r ie f for I r a q becau se the r e isn 't a ny thi ng new to s ay and we could
only g e t ou r s e lves i n a jam by pot e nt ia lly con f l i c ting wi t h wha t Se cDe f wi l l s a y 4 5
minutes l a t e r whe n he meets wi t h t hem. He sugges ts a J -3 c urrent op s updat e and leave
stra t e gy / pol i c y que s t ions t o t he SecDe f. I actua l l y agree with h i m. .. t h i s t i me. Based on
your t hou hts , I ' ve ad justed the reque st below a s such .
v r,
Fr om: 1::-__,.--..".-...,..... Lt Col, OCJ CS/ PA

Se nt : Mond ay , December 11 , 2 006 1 0 :5 4 AM
To :,
ce (Kat i e) , Col , PA;
OCJ"I,CiS
! i::P=
A = = = = = 1 LTC OCJ CS/ PAiL ....
LTC, OCJ CS PA; J CDR , OCJ CS/ PA
Sub jec t : UPDATE: MEDIA INTERVI EW REQUESTS
I mpor t a nce: Hi g h
Ma 'am ... r e v i sed r equest be l ow, t o inc lude b r i e f i ng t o mi l a na l y st s tomor r ow, f o r DJS
a pp rova l.
v r,
to: s ha rp :
c c: ====: ;:J,.e:tdOC
:J<,;I-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---,..- J whi tma n ;
DJ S, Si r ; a coup l e o f r eques ts please,
1 ) Secre t ary Rumsfel d wi l l ho ld a l unch me e ting wit h t he mili tary a na l y s t s t omor r ow a t

noon. Thi s morn ing , Se cDe f requested the a nal ysts r e ceive a n I raq Update Br ie f i ng pri or t o
his l unch me e t i ng wi t h t hem.
Wi t h yo u r concurre nc e, I requ e st you p l e a s e fo rwa rd to J-3 reques ti ng t he ir as s is t a nce in

i dentifyi ng a brie fe r fo r tomor row' s e vent .
2 ) Thorn Sha nk er, New Yor k Ti mes , has reques t ed a background i nterv i e w wi th LTG Lut e .
He j us t r e tu r ned f r om I r a q and one o f the storie s he 's wo r ki ng on is a prof i l e of GEN
Abi za id . One o f GEN Abiza i d ' s s eni o r a i de s e nc our a ge d Thorn t o talk with LTG Lute a s he is
s omeone who knows GBN Abi za id we l l and can ta l k about h i s caree r.
LTG Lute has a g r ee d t o the i nterview a nd , pend i ng a pp r ova l , we ' ve ten ta tivel y schedul e d
the interv iew f or t omor r ow, at 12 30 .
1
Lt Col ~...........l f r om my office will be p r e s e nt to moni tor the i nt e rvi e w.
Recomme nd we sup por t. Thorn is one of the be s t and wil l wri te a meaningf ul and thoughtful
pers ona l p r of i l e .
very Re s pe c t f u l l y .
Katie
2
Fr om :
Sent:
To :
~ ~~ij~~~~L1~C~O~1 ~J~
C ~
S ~
'
Cc : CAPT
OVCJCS /PA; TG JCS J3; Col JCS
0g DJS; J3;~!!;;:;==::::I
~_ J3; OASD-PA ;~~~~I;;~~~~~
JCSJPA
MAJ,i JCS, J3;
n, Bryan )(II) ..... W, L1Col,
[Wh itman, JCSSES,
Bryan,
;;;O:L;:
O:S D=
P:A~'IB. roero, Mk:h.el 0 BG JCS NMCC' CDR JCS
J3; ':" CAPT JCS NMCC; COL JCS J3; ...
Col, JCS , J-3 L.. -'
Subject : RE; MEDIA REQUESTS
Both a pprove d
:.·F~r~om
;;;C,:----uOOi;;:;:;:;;-"''':::-'''''':T.:T---''''''-;;;;=
Haddock, El len (Kat i e) , Col, OCJ CS/ PA
>Se nt: Mond a y, December 11 , 200 6 12 : 56 PM
>To: Sha Walter L, LTG , JC S DJ ..- .,
>Cc: Col J CS SJ S ; b Lt Co l , J CS, ODJS;
CAPT OVCJ CS/ PA; Lute Dou l a s E LTG J CS J3 ; JCS J3 ;
G, MAJ, J CS , J 3 ' Lt Co I , JCS J3 ; Lt Col OCJCS PA·
Whi tma n , Bryan [Whi t ma n , Brya n , SES, OASO- PAl;
L COL OSO PA . Barbero , Mic ha e l 0 LCOR JCS J 3 ·
CAPT J CS NMCC; COL JC S J3 ; Col , J CS,
J- 3
>Sub j e c t: MEDI A REQUESTS
>
>Ge nera l Sha rp, Si r;
>We have the fo l l owing me d i a requests f or J oint Staff pe rsonne l:
>1 ) Sec r e tary Rumsfeld will hol d a l un ch meet i ng wi t h the mil it ary analysts tomorrow at
noon . Thi s morning , SecDef r e qu e s t e d the a na lys ts re ceive an I r a q update Br ie fing p rior to
his l unc h mee t ing with t hem.
>Lt Col f r om my off i ce as reached out t o J- 3 t o r eque s t a briefer be i dent if ied t o
p r esent a n UNCLASS c ur r e n t ops upda t e brief ing f or the g roup tomorr ow at 1115 in t he
DepSecDef (T) con f ere nc e r oom. Read -ahead packages are f ort hcoming f r om OSD/PA for t he
briefer ident ified.
>J -3 s taff ha s bee n informed o f the reques t ; with yo ur conc u r r e nce , we wi l l continue
coordinat ion wit h J3 to i de n t i f y a br ie fe r for t omorrow's e ve nt.
>
>I mport an t one t o s uppor t - - the s e ana lyst s wi ll u s e thi s i n forma t i on to inform the i r
frequen t report i ng/ a na l y s i s in the national me di a .
>
>2) Thorn Shanke r , New York Times , has requested a ba c kground interview with LTG Lute.
>Thom Shanker j us t re t u r ne d from Iraq and one of the s t or ies he 's wo r ki ng on is a p r ofile
o f GEN Abiza i d . One o f GEN Abiza id 's senior a i de s e ncour a ged Thom t o tal k wi t h LTG Lute a s
he i s s omeone who kn ows GEN Abiza id well a nd can ta lk about his career.
>LTG Lute has a g reed t o the interview and , pend i ng a pprova l, we 've tentat i ve ly s c hedul ed
the interv iew fo r t omo rrow, a t 1230 .
>Lt Col f r om my of fi ce will be pre sent to moni t or t he i n tervi ew .
>Re comme n we s uppor t . Thom i s one of t he be s t a nd wi l l wr ite a me a n ing f u l and t hought f ul
prof ile .
>Very Res pec t fu l l y ,
>Ka t i e
>

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From : '"7.:;:-::~::::~:,:C I V.

plea s e c onfirm r e c e ipt. txs!

CONFERERENCE CALL WITH RETfRED MILITARY ADVISORS

Colonel Car l Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)

T Maj or General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired ) Plane to New York

General Wayne A. Down ing (USA, Retired) In Kuwait

T elephone Messages Left (Office and Cellu la r):

General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC. Retired)

you do great work !

:>- - - --Or i g'

pe r ye sterday afternoon's conv e rsation, i ne e d to lock in a t i me with general mcc hrys t a l

Milita'Y Analysts Map Press Iraq FactSheet OIF

handou ts t ha t went ou t e le ctronical l y yeste r day include:

2:00 pm Welcome and In t rodu ction (G uide lines)

Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

2:01 pm Iraqi Paramilitary (Irregulars) Brief

L..--..,_ _--' Senior Intelligence Officer, Defense Intelligence

Major General Stanley A. McChrystaJ, Vice Director for Operations

2:30 pm Call Concludes

Call-In T elephone Nu mber: '.'.

• U.S. Naval Special Operations forces precluded Saddam Hussein's apparent

By the morni ng of Marc h 2 1, the SEALs, a small contingent of Polish Special

Attachment s: Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04-11·03.doc

2:00 pm Welcome and Introduction (G uidelines)

Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefensc for

2:01 pm Iraqi Reconstruction Efforts

William 1. Luti, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International

2:15 pm OI F Operational Update

Major General Stanley A. McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations

2:30 pm Call Concludes (G uidelines)

Call-In Telephone Numher:

Tentative or Dec line

per our earlier conversation.

»pe r o ur earlier conversat ion .

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Attachments: Fratricide PAG FINAL.doc

2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSTURE IS PASSIVE, RESPONSE TO QUERIES ONLY.

4. QUEST IONS AND A NSW ERS.

Q2. THE BATTLEFIELD COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (BCIS) WAS DESIGNED TO

04. WHAT ARE FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES?

Q5. WHAT CAUSES FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES?

Q7. WHAT ARE THE LEADING CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE?

Ql0. DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM , WHAT TYPE OF INCIDENTS RESULTED IN

Ql1 . WHAT PROCEDURES WILL BE TAKEN ON T HE BATTLEFIELD ONCE A FRIENDLY

Importa nce: High

Attachments : Military Ana lysts Conference Call Agend a 04-25-03 .doc

2:00 pm Welcome and Introd uction (G uidelines)

Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

2:01 pm Upda te on Cnalition Reconstru ction Efforts in Iraq

Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability

2:15 pm OIF Op erati onal Upda te

Major General Stanley A. McChrystaJ, Vice Director for Operations

2:30 pm Ca ll Concludes (Guidelines)

Ca ll-In Telepbone Number:

PLEASE PASS TO CAPT THORP

-- WOODWARD i n tervi ew : Gen Pace brought t h i s subject u p, as i t came up at the NSC t od a y.

LOSS ES : (wha t a re you l o o ki ng he r e f or??? I ' m a Marine -- t here wi ll be NOTHING in the

That 's all the news that fits.

Trac king: Rec ipient . ..d

> ----- Or i g i na l Message - - - - -

3 :00 pm Welco me a nd I nt ro duc tio n (G uidelines)

Chris Willcox, Deput y Assistan t Secretary of Defense for

3:01 p m Update on Joint C hiefs of Staff T r ip to the Region