InTown Suites v. Carrollton Lawsuit

CAUSE NO. DC-11-07850 INTOWN SUITES CARROLLTON, L.P. AND INTOWN SUITES TRINITY MILLS, L.P., Plaintiffs, v.
v. THE CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS; THE PROPERTY STANDARDS BOARD OF THE CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS; LEONARD MARTIN, CITY MANAGER OF THE CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS; AND BRIAN PASSWATERS, COMMUNITY SERVICES MANAGER, ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS; Defendants. IN THE DISTRICT COURT
192nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT: COME NOW, Plaintiffs, InTown Suites Carrollton, L.P. and InTown Suites Trinity Mills, L.P. (together, Plaintiffs), and file this their Second Amended Petition complaining of Defendants The City of Carrollton, Texas (City); the Property Standards Board of the City of Carrollton, Texas (Board); Leonard Martin, City Manager of the City of Carrollton (Martin), and Brian Passwaters, Community Services Manager, Environmental Services Department of the City of Carrollton, Texas (Passwaters). Plaintiffs respectfully show the following: I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 1. Pursuant to RULE 190.3 of the TEXAS RULES
OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, Plaintiffs
hereby request discovery in this case be conducted under Level 2. II. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, & VENUE 2. Each of the Plaintiffs is a Delaware Limited Partnership, and each has its principal
place of business in Dallas County, Texas.

PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 1427271
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3.
All Defendants herein may be served at the offices of the City of Carrollton,
Texas, located at 1945 E. Jackson Rd., Carrollton, TX, where: a. b. c. d. 4. The City may be served by serving the Mayor, Matthew Marchant; The Board may be served though its Chairman, Bob McCranie; City Manager Leonard Martin may be served; and Environmental Services Department Community Services Manager Brian Passwaters may be served.
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court as the amount in controversy is within this
Courts jurisdictional limits. Venue is proper in Dallas County because all, or a substantial part of, the events giving rise to this litigation occurred in Dallas County, Texas. III. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 5. Plaintiff InTown Suites Carrollton, L.P. is the owner of the InTown Suites located
at 2661 Westgrove Drive in Carrollton, Texas (the InTown Westgrove). Plaintiff InTown Suites Trinity Mills, L.P. is the owner of the InTown Suites located at 1240 West Trinity Mills Road in Carrollton, Texas (the InTown Trinity Mills). These two InTown Suites properties are substantial businesses that have been operating in Carrollton for 10 and 13 years, respectively, and together generate annual revenues of approximately $2,000,000.00 within the City, thereby contributing substantially to the Citys economic base. Together, they remit to the City of Carrollton an average of almost $60,000.00 each year in property taxes, sales taxes, and annual fees; plus, they provide other significant economic benefits to the City, including directly employing 12 individuals comprising an annual local payroll of over $308,000.00. In addition, as hotels within and serving residents of, families in, and visitors to the City, Plaintiffs provide accommodations for people whose own activities contribute substantial economic benefits to businesses in and the economy generally of the City. Notwithstanding all of the significant positive economic benefits Plaintiffs provide to it, the City has decided that these (as well as the
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Citys other four or five hotels) are undesirable and has implemented an illegal and unconstitutional licensing scheme called a Hotel Licensing Code that is obviously crafted and designed not to work with hotel operations to improve hotel properties within the City, but to inevitably bar hotels from being able to operate as businesses within the City. While it seems Plaintiffs are the first victims of the Citys anti-hotel scheme, the vagueness, overbreadth, unpredictability, lack of reasonable standards, and sheer unworkability of this licensing scheme assure that, without the courts intervention to compel the City to abandon this anti-hotel scheme and replace it with a reasonable and rational regulatory program, these Plaintiffs will not be the last victims of the Citys attack on hotel businesses within the Citys boundaries. IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Re-Development Subcommittees Idea 6. In 2008, the Re-Development Subcommittee of the Carrollton City Council, under
the stated guise of reducing crime, came up with the idea of holding hotels responsible for the criminal activities of others on their premises by the innovation of linking the granting of a lodging license to a review of both alleged criminal activity on a hotels premises, as well as to that hotels supposed history of compliance with whatever various codes the City might choose to make applicable to hotels. See Item from the September 16, 2008 Carrollton City Council Agenda, copied from the Carrollton City website, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein by reference for all purposes. This instrument was the first public unveiling of the scheme to eradicate hotels in the City and, on that same date, that proposed ordinance was placed on the City Councils consent agenda, thereby assuring that such that no public discussion about any of the details of the alleged basis for the proposed ordinance or the proposed ordinance itself was permitted before the City Council enacted the
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ordinance. It clearly was carefully orchestrated to avoid the possibility of any public discussion or even to permit any suggestions for changes or improvements to the proposed ordinance before it was enacted. At no time prior to enactment of that ordinance did any member of the City Council, the City Councils Re-Development Subcommittee, or any City staff member seek any input from Plaintiffs or, on information and belief, from any representatives of the hotel industry about the proposed ordinance to license hotels, much less to try to ascertain whether any of its provisions were unreasonable or unworkable. Instead, that Hotel-Eradication License Scheme was ramrodded through as City Ordinance 3254, despite the concerns expressly voiced by a citizen (Thomas Keen) during that City Council meeting about the process used and the lack of opportunity afforded for any genuine public comment or involvement of the affected industry, all as reported in the minutes of the City Councils September 16, 2008 meeting as posted on the Carrollton City website, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A-1 and is incorporated herein by reference for all purposes. This, of course, was as it had to be for proponents of that Hotel-Eradication License Scheme. If the hotel industry had been permitted to have input about it, the goal of putting the Citys hotels out of business might have been thwarted, as the proponents knew or reasonably should have known that the provisions enacted were vague, unworkable, duplicative of other City authority, and downright punitive in their intended effect. So just as planned that oppressive Hotel-Eradication License Scheme was enacted. Although it has since been amended several times each time without first seeking input from the hotel industry that enactment remains a Hotel-Eradication License Scheme, and now is codified as Chapter 97 of the Carrollton, Texas Code of Ordinances. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the current text of said Chapter 97 (the Ordinance).
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7.
And the Ordinance truly is a Hotel-Eradication License Scheme. In short, it
requires that every hotel be licensed by the City as a condition of operating, but requires denial or revocation of a lodging license if the hotel does not comply with the Citys building, zoning, housing, fire safety, and health regulations and codes; notwithstanding that the Texas Legislature has specified that the Citys power to regulate buildings in these areas is limited to the methods described in Chapters 54 and 124 of the Texas Local Government Code. And, as if trying to regulate these matters in the present tense in a manner differently than prescribed by the Legislature was not enough, the Ordinance goes on to also require denial or revocation of a lodging license if the number of previous violations of any of the Citys various code provisions at a hotel exceeds 10% of the number of rooms in the hotel during a twelve month period. This code violations limit is referred to in the Ordinance as the Code Conviction Limit (CCL). An example of the unreasonableness of this concept: If a hotel has 100 rooms and if during the course of a year any combination of those rooms is found to contain just 11 items that an inspector considers to be code violations, the Ordinance says that the lodging license shall be denied . . . . See Exhibit D, Section 97.05(A) and Section 97.05(A)(4). All of those 11 violations that could cause automatic denial or revocation of a hotels license could be as lifethreatening as: a missing sign; a wall or chair the inspector thinks looks dirty; a missing handle on a dresser; a torn curtain; a television not working; a door that rubs the floor; a chipped nightstand; or a door the inspector feels needs to be painted. All of the foregoing are examples of violations actually charged against Plaintiffs. Even if all of these violations are resolved promptly such that these issues no longer exist at the time of consideration of the license, this provision requires resurrection of those violations for use as the basis for denying a license to the hotel for the next year. Clearly, this Business Death Penalty bears absolutely no rational
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relationship to the severity of the infractions permitted to comprise the basis for denial of a lodging license. 8. Any careful reading of Exhibit A confirms that the true goal of the Citys Hotel
Code was to put hotels out of business, not to encourage hotels to improve their facilities to meet any reasonable expectations of the City. Exhibit A tries to paint the Citys hotels as crimeridden cesspools, but contains no specifics as to any individual hotel nor any comparisons to other types of businesses in the City where crime also occurs. More importantly, Exhibit A attempts to imply that the City otherwise is powerless to enforce City codes. This, of course, is not true at all. But apparently to give that appearance Exhibit A makes absolutely no mention of the fact that the Texas Legislature has already provided the City with two specific statutory methods by which a municipality is expressly empowered to regulate substandard buildings. Those powers are specifically delegated to municipalities by the State in Chapters 54 and 214 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, each of which provides very specific and detailed mechanisms by which substandard buildings can be closed and demolished. Yet,
Exhibit A makes no references to these powers at all and instead implies that, without the ability to completely deny a hotel the right to conduct its business at all, the City is somehow powerless to regulate hotel structures that do not comply with city code provisions. omission forms the core of the purported basis for this Hotel-Eradication License Scheme. 9. After the Hotel-Eradication License Scheme went into effect, the efforts of City This
inspectors to find violations increases exponentially over previous years. Things that were never mentioned in the past began being noted and new requirements were imposed that had never existed in the past. For the first time, the Citys inspectors refused to allow Plaintiffs personnel to enter rooms with the inspectors during the inspections; also again for the first time
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the City inspectors conducted not just inspections, but unlawful searches of occupied rooms, in the course of which they left these occupied rooms in a disheveled state (including removing and tossing to the floor bedcovers and rifling the drawers and personal belongings of guests, all without the consent of the affected occupants). Once these new procedures began, it became clear that the City intended to put hotels out of business by setting them up to not be able to meet these new license requirements. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs worked tirelessly and spent over
$ 200,000.00 in 2009, 2010, and 2011 fixing, replacing, and remodeling everything that the City called to Plaintiffs attention. In this regard, all of the material items identified in the 2010 inspections (the citations for which were the basis for the Citys denial of lodging licenses to Plaintiffs) had been remedied in accordance with the Citys specified processes and to the Citys satisfaction at both Plaintiffs locations long before the time that the licensees were denied in 2011. Not only had Plaintiffs spent those substantial sums of money in doing that remedial work, at the insistence of the City, Plaintiffs also agreed to plead nolo contendre to over 130 alleged violations and to pay approximately $21,000.00 in fines to the City for those 2010 alleged violations, all of which Plaintiffs did. Nevertheless, in the 2011 denial of Plaintiffs lodging licenses, the City asserted those same remediated 2010 alleged infractions as the principal basis for denying Plaintiffs 2011 lodging licenses by calling them convictions for purposes of the Code Conviction Limit scheme. Is there even a hint of fairness or
reasonableness in the Citys treatment of Plaintiffs? There is not. 10. Whether called Double Jeopardy or merely a Sucker Punch, by insisting that
Plaintiffs first spend substantial sums to remediate their hotel facilities and then based on the same items already remediated to the Citys expressed satisfaction denying Plaintiffs the lodging licenses the City alone deemed necessary for Plaintiffs to be able to continue to conduct
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those same businesses is nothing short of impermissibly punitive and constitutes, in effect, an unlawful taking or damaging of the Plaintiffs property, including specifically their businesses. B. The Improper Denial of Licenses to Plaintiffs 11. On or about December 4, 2010 well after the 2010 alleged code violations had
been remediated Defendant Passwaters sent to each of Plaintiffs a letter regarding the necessity to apply for a new Lodging license for 2011. In each letter, Defendant Passwaters represented that: Upon review of the application the hotel will be designated as a Tier 1 or Tier 2 hotel. This designation establishes the city codes the hotel must operate under for the coming year. Attached hereto as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 are true and correct copies of Defendant Passwaters December 4, 2010 letters. Thereafter, each of Plaintiffs complied and duly applied for their 2011 lodging licenses. 12. As of December 4, 2010, the City and Defendant Passwaters had long been fully
aware not only of the number of alleged 2010 violations, but also that Plaintiffs had fully remedied all of those alleged violations according to the Citys processes and to the Citys satisfaction. No one with the City ever even suggested that anything about the remedied 2010 violations could affect Plaintiffs entitlement to the 2011 lodging licenses and, to the contrary, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 instead notified Plaintiffs that each of them would be designated either as a Tier 1 or a Tier 2 hotel. So being designated as a Tier 2 hotel was the worst either of Plaintiffs expected. However, to Plaintiffs surprise, on or about March 30, 2011, each of Plaintiffs received another letter from Defendant Passwaters, This letter did not designate Plaintiffs facilities as a Tier 1 or Tier 2 hotels, as expected, but instead totally denied both of their applications for a lodging license, stating that each had exceed their Code Conviction Limit in
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reliance on the fully remediated and settled 2010 alleged violations. Attached hereto as Exhibits C-1 and C-2 are true and correct copies of Defendant Passwaters March 30, 2011 letters. 13. In connection with Defendant Passwaters original determination to deny the
requested licenses, there was no hearing, no opportunity for Plaintiffs to be heard, and no discussion with Plaintiffs was allowed before Defendant Passwaters unilaterally denied Plaintiffs 2011 lodging licenses. This, alone, was a complete denial of due process to Plaintiffs. C. The Unlawful Hearing Before the Property Standards Board. 14. Following those March 30, 2011 letters, Plaintiffs duly appealed under the
Ordinance and a hearing was scheduled for June 16, 2011 before the Citys Property Standards Board (Board) as Case No. 2011-15. At that hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs presented evidence and argument about a number of issues regarding the background facts, including that: all of the 2010 and 2011 alleged violations had been remediated, such that there remained no work to be done; that many alleged violations were either not violations of actual code provisions or were inconsequential; and that in any event most of the alleged violations were hardly the sorts of matters that should be considered as grounds for denying a lodging license. And the Citys own witness admitted that, as of the date of that hearing, all such matters had been resolved and there were no outstanding violations at either Plaintiffs property, thereby confirming that no work or time was then required from or by Plaintiffs to conform to the Citys ordinances (which is the only specific burden imposed on Plaintiffs by the process described in the Ordinance). It was clear, however, that the Board members did not feel constrained by the review standards and burdens set out in the Ordinance and, instead, had pre-judged the situation and knew from the beginning of the hearing what decision they would render. Perhaps there was advance
discussion and agreement outside the presence of Plaintiffs or perhaps it was because the
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Ordinance itself provided no real standards for the Boards actions. Whatever the reason, the Boards decision to uphold the denial of Plaintiffs lodging licenses was arbitrary and capricious and not based on the substantial evidence showing that, as of the time of the Boards hearing, there were no outstanding violations nor convictions of any sort for code compliance work not done, that the violations being counted for the supposed Code Conviction Limit all were for matters resolved by agreement with the City long before that hearing, and were all specifically the result of inadmissible nolo contendere pleas. D. The Harm to Plaintiffs Goes Beyond Just Not Being Able to Do Business as a Hotel 15. Because the Ordinance provides that, in the absence of a lodging license, a hotels
certificate of occupancy can be revoked, and because a certificate of occupancy is required to operate as a business in the City, the Citys action under the Ordinance effectively threatens to prohibit Plaintiffs from operating their lawful businesses on their properties. The Citys
threatened actions, therefore, would deny Plaintiffs all economically viable use of their properties, or, in the alternative, would cause a significant diminution in value thereof, and therefore constitute a taking of Plaintiffs properties and their privilege to operate their legitimate businesses. 16. Not being able to do business as a hotel is harm enough. But preventing Plaintiffs
from being able to continue to operate as hotels has much greater impact and ramifications than just shutting down these two hotels. It will cause up to 70 hotels across the country to also have to shut down and close. Each of the properties at issue here is subject to a loan instrument that also includes loans for other similar properties in locations across the country. Specifically, there is an approximately $112,000,000.00 loan covering the InTown Suites Westgrove, as well as 39 other InTown Suites in Texas and other states; and there is an approximately $88,000,000.00
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loan covering the InTown Suites Trinity Mills, as well as 29 other InTown Suites in Texas and other states. Each of these loan instruments contains cross-default provisions, meaning that a loan default applicable to one property constitutes a loan default on all of the other properties covered by that same loan instrument. Inability to operate as a hotel constitutes a default under each of these loan agreements. So, if both of Plaintiffs are not able to operate their properties as a hotel, defaults will occur under both loans, and that will cause cross-defaults on the loans for 68 OTHER InTown Suites across the country. E. Conflicts and Errors in the Ordinance Itself 17. For all of the reasons described elsewhere in this pleading, the Ordinance
obviously was very poorly drafted. But there are some glaring errors and apparent internal conflicts that make it even more vague and ambiguous than probably was originally intended. First, in Section 97.07(H) of the Ordinance, the required appeal standards from the result of the Property Standards Board hearing are cited as to be found in Section 214.012 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. That statutory provision, however, contain no appeal standards at all; instead, it deals with municipal regulation of sewers and plumbing.1 So, the ordinary reader of the Ordinance would not find the necessary appellate standards for Section 97.07 of the Ordinance in the location specified in the Ordinance, thereby making the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. Additionally, while Section 97.07(H) of the Ordinance refers to Chapter 214 for those appellate standards and specifies that a lawsuit must be filed within twenty (20) days, Section 97.11(H) allows enforcement procedures, which also include appellate standards, under Chapter 54 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, which itself
Plaintiffs presume that the drafter intended to refer to Section 214.0012 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, but no published version of the Ordinance that could be located does so, including the copy obtained from the City upon which are copies of signatures and the City Seal. Interestingly, that copy itself contains no date and month when it was enacted, though it does state it occurred sometime in 2008. PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 1427271
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provides for an appeal suit to be filed within thirty (30) days, as well as permits seeking a Writ of Certiorari within ten (10) days. See TEX. LOC. GOVT. CODE 54.039(a) and (b). These conflicting appellate references also make the Ordinance difficult to comprehend and effectively set traps that could easily cause an aggrieved party to not be able to pursue whichever appellate course the City may deem applicable at the time, thereby rendering the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. Finally, Section 97.07(E) of the Ordinance expressly provides that [e]nforcement of the denial for a lodging license shall be stayed during the pendency of an appeal . . . . And thereafter, at Section 97.07(H) a provision of the same level as 97,07(E) the Ordinance identifies that [t]he action of the Board may be appealed to a District Court . . . , which is precisely what is done by this lawsuit, but the City has refused to honor the stay of enforcement provided in its own Ordinance. F. Thwarted Efforts to Obtain Record from Property Standards Board Hearing 18. On June 23, 2011, Jason Mathis, an attorney for Plaintiffs, contacted the Property
Standards Board to attempt to obtain a copy of the recorded proceedings from the June 16, 2011 hearing. Kathleen Engleheart, the Citys Building Inspections Secretary, told Mr. Mathis that he would have to speak with Clayton Hutchins, the City Attorney. When Mr. Mathis called Mr. Hutchins and requested a copy of the recording from the June 16, 2011 public hearing, Mr Hutchins refused, saying that he wanted to read it first and told Mr. Mathis that These cases . . . are subject to appeal with a writ or application of certiorari . . . if you filed a writ of certiorari, then you would get a copy of the transcript anyway. Following filing of this lawsuit, counsel for Defendants has provided Plaintiffs with a written transcription of the proceedings at the hearing, as well as exhibits therefrom. However, Plaintiffs still have not received a copy of the actual audio recording of the hearing to be able to verify the accuracy of the transcription
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provided by Defendants, and therefore have not yet had an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of the record of the June 16, 2011 hearing as provided by Defendants and, therefore, expressly reserve their right to amend and plead further after receiving the record. G. Current Status of Enforcement of the Ordinance Against Plaintiffs 19. Pursuant to Section 97.07(E) of the Ordinance, [e]nforcement of the denial for a
lodging license is stayed during the pendency of an appeal there from that is properly and timely filed. Section 97.07(H) of the Ordinance states that this lawsuit constitutes Plaintiffs appeal of the Boards action in upholding the denials of Plaintiffs Lodging licenses, as this lawsuit was filed in a District Court of the County in which the property . . . is located . . . within twenty (20) days of the Boards action. H. Recent Citations Issued to Plaintiffs 20. Recently (after the original filing of this lawsuit), the City has issued new
citations to Plaintiffs for alleged code violations based on inspections in 2011. Those citations are currently pending in municipal court. V. CAUSES OF ACTION. Count 1: Declaratory Judgment 21. PRACTICE Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 37 of the TEXAS CIVIL
AND
REMEDIES CODE to construe and declare their rights under the Ordinance. A
current dispute exists between Plaintiffs and the City with respect to the construction, application, and enforcement of the Ordinance. judgment that: A. Convictions counted for purpose of the code conviction limit as defined in the Ordinance must relate to public health, safety, and welfare. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory
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B.
The City is required to prove, and Plaintiffs may present evidence to rebut, that convictions relied upon by the City for purposes of the code conviction limit as defined in the Ordinance are related to public health, safety, and welfare.
C.
The relevant dates for purposes of the code conviction limit in the Ordinance are the dates of the violations as opposed to the dates of the convictions.
D.
Convictions for code violations based on no contest pleas or plea deals with the City may not be used for purposes of the code conviction limit under the Ordinance.
E.
The Ordinance does not allow the City to deny a lodging license to a hotel that is in compliance with laws and codes.
F.
Enforcement of the Boards decision denying a lodging license is stayed during the pendency of a proper and timely filed appeal to this Court.
G.
In the absence of a valid search warrant, the City may not search occupied units in hotels without reasonable notice to and obtaining the express consent of the occupant of each such unit. Count 2: Void for Vagueness
22.
Article I, Section 19 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each citizen due
course of law. This guarantee requires that a law or ordinance gives persons of ordinary sensibilities notice of prohibited conduct and provide the enforcement authority with objective standards for enforcement. The Ordinance fails to give adequate notice to persons whether convictions based on no contest pleas or plea deals with the City can be used against them to deny a lodging license under the Ordinance or whether the date of conviction or offense should be used for purposes of the code conviction limit under the Ordinance. Thus, the Ordinance fails
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to sufficiently define the prohibited conduct that results in denial or revocation of a lodging license. 23. Further, the Ordinance fails to provide objective standards for enforcement by
requiring the official to deny a lodging license for reasons an official may discovery or deem advisable or necessary. Said standard vests unguided discretion with the official while the Ordinance is ambiguous as to whether the Board may grant a license to an applicant despite the evidence presented regarding the code conviction limit. 24. Section 97.07(H) of the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and confusing with
respect to its failure to correctly reference and specify the appellate standards and procedures intended to apply for appeals from actions of the Property Standards Board. 25. Accordingly, the Court should declare these provisions invalid and temporarily
and permanently enjoin their enforcement. Count 3: Violations of Due Course of Law (Procedural) 26. Again, Article I, Section 19 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each citizen
due course of law. The CONSTITUTIONs guarantees that every citizen will be provided the opportunity to present evidence in defense of allegedly prohibited conduct. The Ordinance provides for the process by which Plaintiffs may be charged with violations of the underlying code requirements and allows the City to rely on code convictions to deny or revoke a lodging license, but does not allow Plaintiffs to challenge the code convictions or present evidence regarding such convictions, including whether the convictions are properly related to public health, safety, or welfare. Thus, operation of the Ordinance violates Plaintiffs procedural due process rights by allowing the City to deny or revoke a lodging license and effectively shut down Plaintiffs lawful business enterprise without allowing Plaintiffs to present evidence and be
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heard regarding the code convictions and the relationship to, or effect on, public health, safety, and welfare, if any. 27. Accordingly, the Court should declare these provisions invalid and preliminary
and permanently enjoin their enforcement. Count 4: Violation of Due Course of Law (Substantive) 28. Article I, Section 19 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each citizen that the
laws enacted by governmental entities for the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens will be so related, reasonable, and not irrationally or arbitrarily related to such purposes. The
Ordinance states that its purpose is for the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Carrollton. The Ordinance, however, is not limited to those purposes in the application of the use of code convictions to the deprivation of the Plaintiffs Lodging licenses. Defendants instead utilize any code conviction, regardless of its correlation to the stated purpose of the Ordinance, in the determination of the number of convictions for purposes of the determination to grant or deny Plaintiffs Lodging licenses in violation of the protections of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION. 29. Requiring the denial of a lodging license for past violations that no longer exist
constitutes an irrational and arbitrary punishment resulting in the closing down of Plaintiffs businesses notwithstanding Defendants admissions that Plaintiffs businesses are in full compliance with all applicable laws and codes. The Citys Hotel-Eradication Scheme makes it impossible to comply, on the one hand, with the Citys requirements to repair City code violations in the exercise of the powers granted to the City by the Legislature, and then, on the other hand, to later comply with the hotel licensing standards. It also interferes with the intended operation of the regulatory program prescribed by the Legislature, in that it encourages hotel business owners to contest alleged violations, rather than working to resolve them amicably with the City, out of fear of having those violations later counted as convictions against the hotel for
PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 1427271 PAGE 16
licensing purposes. Under the Ordinance, Plaintiffs could not both agree to and remediate alleged violations and later expect to be licensed, making the Ordinance inherently unconstitutional and unlawful. Further, the Ordinance allows (arguably requires) the City to deny the lodging license and destroy Plaintiffs ability to use its property even after the alleged violations are corrected and the property is in full compliance. For these reasons, the Ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, contrary to its stated purpose of ensuring the availability of safe and clean hotels in the City, and by unreasonably penalizing Plaintiffs for fully remediated alleged past violations by taking away their right to operate their businesses not rationally related to any legitimate purpose. 30. Accordingly, the Court should declare the provisions requiring the denial of a
lodging license resulting in a de facto closing down of Plaintiffs businesses to be unreasonable and not rationally related to the stated purpose, or any other legitimate purpose, and, therefore preliminary and permanently enjoin enforcement of same. Count 5: Violation of Equal Protection Clause 31. Article I, Section 3 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION mandates that all persons
similarly situated must be treated equal under the law. The Ordinance distinguishes between relevant groups doing business in the City and specifically targets and disadvantages hotels vis--vis other types of similarly situated businesses, such as multi-family dwellings, apartment complexes, duplexes, restaurants, theaters, shopping centers, and other businesses. There exists no legitimate or rational basis for the City to make such a distinction between relevant groups of businesses. 32. Accordingly, the Court should declare the Ordinance invalid under state law and
temporarily and permanently enjoin its enforcement.
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Count 6: Unlawful Searches 33. Article I, Section 9 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION protects citizens from all
unreasonable searches and precludes issuance of warrants for such searches without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. The Ordinance as enacted violates this constitutional principle by purporting to allow City personnel to conduct searches of occupied units under the guise of alleged inspections without notice to or consent by the occupants thereof and without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, as is required by the TEXAS CONSTITUTION. 34. Accordingly, the Court should declare the Ordinance invalid under state law and
temporarily and permanently enjoin its enforcement. Count 7: Preemption by State Law 35. State law governs what a local government may regulate. Local government only
has authority granted to it by the TEXAS CONSTITUTION and state law. The Ordinance as enacted by the City is an improper exercise of its powers under applicable state law. The City derives its authority to enact ordinances from the State of Texas. Specifically, Chapters 54 and 214 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE address the authority of the City to enforce municipal ordinances and to regulate housing and other structures. The City has not only exceeded its authority as granted by the State but has gone so far in its regulation as to negatively counteract the express intentions of the legislature and to discourage economic investment by businesses in their properties. 36. In addition, to the extent the Ordinance is construed to allow counting of pleas for purposes of the code
convictions based on no contest (or nolo contendere)
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conviction limit, said provision is preempted by section 27.02 of the TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 37. Accordingly, the Court should declare the Ordinance invalid under state law and
temporarily and permanently enjoin its enforcement. Count 8: Inverse Condemnation 38. In the alternative, assuming due process allows the City to prohibit Plaintiffs from
conducting their lawful businesses on their properties, such action by the City constitutes a taking under Texas law. Article I, Section 17 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each citizen that their property and privileges shall not be taken or damaged for the public use without adequate compensation. Denying the lodging licenses pursuant to the Ordinance does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest. Further, the Citys denial of the lodging licenses denies Plaintiffs all economically beneficial or productive use of their properties. Finally, the Citys conduct under the Ordinance, including denial of the lodging license, unreasonably interferes with Plaintiffs use and enjoyment of their properties and deprives them of their right to operate their legitimate businesses, privileges to which they are lawfully entitled, without any opportunity to cure or apply for issuance of a new license for a period of three (3) years, which is unconstitutionally punitive and not calculated to assure compliance with reasonable regulations, but instead is intended specifically to put Plaintiffs and other hotel operators out of business within the City, an unreasonable and unconstitutional goal. 39. Accordingly, in the event the Court determines the Ordinance is valid, the Court
should declare that the denial of the lodging licenses under the Ordinance constituted a taking of Plaintiffs properties and privileges for public use for which Plaintiffs are entitled to adequate compensation, including, but not limited to, the fair market value of their property or diminution
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in its value caused by Citys actions, as well as the substantial consequential damages that will result by reason of the cross-defaulted loans hereinabove discussed. VI. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 40. have occurred. VII. REMEDIES Declaratory Judgment 41. Pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 37.001, et seq., Plaintiffs seeks a All conditions precedent to Plaintiffs claims for relief have been performed or
Declaratory Judgment construing the Ordinance to avoid any constitutional infirmities as requested herein, including a stay of enforcement of the Property Standards Boards denial of the lodging licenses while this case is pending in this Court. In the alternative, Plaintiffs request the Court declare that the challenged provisions of Ordinance are void and/or unenforceable, and Lodging Licenses should be ordered issued to Plaintiffs, because the Ordinance: A. B. C. Violates the DUE COURSE OF LAW CLAUSE of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION; Violates the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION; and/or, Is preempted by Chapters 54 and 214 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE and/or by section 27.02 of the TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 42. Finally, in the further alternative, Plaintiffs request the Court declare that the
enforcement of the Ordinance against Plaintiffs constitutes a taking of property and/or privileges for which adequate compensation is due, including without limitation damages in the form of fair market value of Plaintiffs property, diminution in value of Plaintiffs property, and consequential damages as hereinabove referenced.
PAGE 20
Attorneys Fees 43. Plaintiffs have been forced to hire the undersigned attorneys to prosecute their
claims and to declare and enforce their rights and, therefore, Plaintiffs seek recovery against Defendants for their costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this matter, both through trial and any appeals, pursuant to the TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE Section 37.009, as is permitted under Texas law. VIII. WRIT OF CERTIORARI 44. In accordance with Section 211.011(c) of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE,
Plaintiffs petition this Court for a Writ of Certiorari directing Defendants to submit a verified return to Plaintiffs counsel within ten (10) days containing a complete record of the Property Standards Boards actions with regard to the above matter. 45. The decision of the Property Standards Board in Case 2011-15 is illegal in whole
or in part, is unreasonable and contrary to fairness and justice, was illegally predetermined before any evidence was presented, and was not based on substantial evidence. In addition, the Property Standards Board failed to consider the fact that all alleged code violations and problems at the Plaintiffs hotels had been remediated and fixed and that (as admitted at the hearing by Defendants own witness) Plaintiffs had zero outstanding code violations at the time of the hearing before the Property Standards Board, thus establishing Plaintiffs sole burden under Section 97.07(C)(2) of the Ordinance, which was to . . demonstrate the scope of any work that may be required to comply with city ordinances and the time it will reasonable take to perform the work. The Property Standards Board exercised no discretion with its decision to revoke the lodging license of Plaintiffs, which if enforced will caused Plaintiffs considerable irreparable harm for which Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. The Property Standards
PAGE 21
Boards actions as to Plaintiffs were arbitrary and capricious and the City failed to present substantial evidence upon which the Boards decision to deny the lodging licenses to Plaintiffs can be based. The Property Standards Boards ruling should be reversed and Lodging Licenses should be issued to Plaintiffs. IX. JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE. 46. Pursuant to the TEXAS RULES
OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, Plaintiffs hereby request a
jury trial, and will tender the fee at a later date. In addition, Plaintiffs here restate their request originally made in Plaintiffs June 24, 2011 Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Application for Writ of Certiorari, and Request for Disclosure that Defendants disclose the information and material described in subsections (a) through (l) of TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2. in accordance with the requirements of TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.3 and 194.4. X. PRAYER. 47. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs prays that the Court
enforce Section stay enforcement of the Boards decision pending resolution of this case, enter a temporary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Boards decision pending trial of this case, reverse the decision of the Board and order the City to grant Plaintiffs lodging licenses, enter a declaratory judgment as requested herein, award Plaintiffs damages within the jurisdictional limits of this Court, award Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs of court, issue a Writ of Certiorari as requested herein, and award Plaintiffs all other relief to which they are justly entitled.
PAGE 22
Respectfully submitted, COWLES & THOMPSON, P.C. 901 Main Street, Suite 3900 Dallas, TX 75202
By: ____________________________________ D. PAUL DALTON Texas Bar No. 05333800 pdalton@cowlesthompson.com (214) 672-2112 (214) 672-2312 (Fax) RICHARD BARRETT-CUETARA Texas Bar No. 01812700 rbarrett@cowlesthompson.com (214) 672-2165 (214) 672-2383 (Fax) ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
PAGE 23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of this document was delivered pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a to all counsel of record as indicated below on August 9, 2011. VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION AND ELECTRONIC MAIL George A. Staples TAYLOR, OLSON, ADKINS, SRALLA AND ELAM 6000 Western Place, Suite 200, Fort Worth, Texas 76107 817-332-2580 (fax) gstaples@toase.com (e-mail) Attorney for Defendants ____________________________________ D. PAUL DALTON
PAGE 24
CARROLLTON CITY COUNCIL WORKSESSION AND REGULAR MEETING SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 The City Council of the City of Carrollton, Texas convened in a Regular Meeting and Worksession on Tuesday, September 16, 2008, at 5:45 p.m. with the following members present: Mayor Ron Branson, Mayor Pro Tem Pat Malone, Deputy Mayor Pro Tem John Mahalik, Councilmembers Tim Hayden, Larry Williams and Herb Weidinger. Also present were City Manager Leonard Martin, Assistant City Managers Marc Guy and Bob Scott, Director of Managed Competition Tom Guilfoy, Workforce Services Director Erin Rinehart, City Attorney Clayton Hutchins and City Secretary Ashley D. Mitchell.
* * * * PRE-MEETING * * * * 5:45 P.M. COUNCIL BRIEFING ROOM

1. 2. 3. Dinner Mayor and Council reports and information sharing. Receive supplemental staff information and responses to questions.
* * * * EXECUTIVE SESSION * * * *
4. Council convened in Executive Session at 6:10 p.m. pursuant to Texas Government Code: Section 551.071 for private consultation with the City Attorney to seek legal advice with respect to pending and contemplated litigation and including all matters on this agenda to which the City Attorney has a duty under the Texas Rules of Discipline and Professional conduct regarding confidential communication with the City Council. Section 551.072 to discuss certain matters regarding real property. Section 551.074 to discuss personnel matters. Section 551.087 to discuss Economic Development. 5. Council reconvened in open session at 7:10 p.m. to consider action, if any, on matters discussed in the Executive Session.
INVOCATION was led by John Jobb, Community Bent Tree Church. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE was led by Councilmember Williams. PRESENTATIONS 12. Recognition of AICPA Outstanding CPA in Government Award For Bob Scott. Mr. Martin stated that on August 18, 2008, at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 25th Annual National Governmental Accounting and Auditing Update Conference our own Bob Scott was awarded the AICPAs 2008 Outstanding CPA in Government Award. The award recognizes CPAs working in the state and local government who have made significant contributions to increased efficiency and
Exhibit A-1
REGULAR MEETING & WORKSESSION MINUTES SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 2 effectiveness of governmental organizations and to the growth and enhancement of the profession. While Bob has made many contributions over the years to the government finance profession, his nomination specifically recognized his recent work with the Texas Municipal Retirement System (TMRS) and the coordination of a shared actuarial service contract that assisted Texas governments in implementing the Governmental Accounting Standards Boards new standard on Other Post Employment Benefits. 13. Present a Proclamation Declaring October 2008 as Disability Employment Awareness Month. Cathy Coangelo of the Alliance for Agency Executives Serving People with Disabilities was presented a proclamation declaring October as Disability Employment Awareness Month. PUBLIC FORUM 14. Hearing of any citizen/visitor on items not listed on the regular meeting agenda.
Citizens/visitors should complete an appearance card located on the table at the entrance to the City Council Chambers. Speakers must address their comments to the presiding officer rather than to individual Council members or staff; Stand at the podium, speak clearly into the microphone and state your name and address prior to beginning your remarks; Speakers will be allowed a maximum of 5 minutes for testimony; Speakers making personal, impertinent, profane or slanderous remarks may be removed from the room; Unauthorized remarks from the audience, stamping of feet, whistles, yells and similar demonstrations will not be permitted; No placards, banners or signs will be permitted in the Chambers or in any other room in which the council is meeting. In accordance with the State Open Meetings Act, the City Council is restricted from discussing or taking action on items not listed on the agenda. Action can only be taken at a future meeting.
Thomas Keen, 2001 Bryan Street, #1250, Dallas stated that Had a comment about the citys policy and procedures with regard to staff or council initiated proposals? It is good for the city to identify a problem within the city, and it is good for the city to want to do something about that problem, but would suggest at the outset that the thing to do would be to contact the area or business that you are having a problem with to see if there could be something worked out on a reasonable basis. If staff is imitating a proposal and come up with all kids of good rules that appear good on paper and present those to the Council in the form of an ordinance and it is on the Consent Agenda and the first notice that those effected by the ordinance get is of the council meeting when the ordinance is considered and then they are not allowed to speak because it is on the Consent Agenda, that is a problem. When people are not told that they are about to be clubbed over the head, they cant take precautions and try to work out the problem. This is a problem with the City Council rules and not the Texas Open Meetings Act. Mr. Keene said that there are several options you can take in a situation like this. You can forbid the industry completely from your city if you think that industry is a problem, you can regulate that industry, or you can try to communicate with the people you believe are causing the problem to see if there are some options other than regulations. The appropriate thing to do is meet with that business and try to find a middle ground. It is a much more appropriate way than adopting an ordinance that nobody knows about and cant speak about on a consent agenda item and are likely to get a measured response but a predictable response of litigation over something that could have been completely avoided by some communication.
Exhibit A-1
REGULAR MEETING & WORKSESSION MINUTES SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
PAGE 3
CONSENT AGENDA (*All items marked with a single asterisk are part of a Consent Agenda and require
no deliberation by the Council. Each Council member has the prerogative of removing an item from this agenda so that it may be considered separately. Contracts and agreements are available in the City Secretarys Office.)
Councilmember Hayden moved to approve Agenda Items No. 15-24 and 26-29. Second by Councilmember Marchant. The vote was cast 7-0 in favor of the motion. BIDS AND PURCHASES *15. Consider Approval Of Bid #08-042 For The Purchase Of Seven Police Pursuit Motorcycles From American Eagle Harley Davidson In An Amount Not To Exceed $115,493.00. Consider Approval Of Bid #08-041 For The Purchase Of Water Meters From Various Vendors In An Amount Not To Exceed $132,000.00. Consider Approval Of An Agreement To Repair Or Replace Roofs On Various City Facilities With Benco Roofing Through An Interlocal Agreement With Buyboard In An Amount To Not Exceed $126,878.00.
*16. *17.
CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS *18. Consider Authorizing The City Manager To Enter Into A Contract With The Cities Of Addison and Farmers Branch, Senior Adult Services And Project Lifesaver International. Consider Authorizing The City Manager To Approve An Extension To The Interlocal Agreement With Dallas County To Continue Carrolltons Participation In The Dallas Area Household Hazardous Waste Network. Consider Authorizing The City Manager To Approve A Construction Contract Agreement With Texas WaterWorks (Robax Corporation) For The Construction Of The Rosemeade Aquatic Facility Phase II Project In An Amount Not To Exceed $1,432,251.00.
*19.
*20.
ORDINANCES *21. Consider An Ordinance Approving A Negotiated Resolution Between The Atmos Cities Steering Committee And Atmos Energy Corporation. *22. *23. *24. Consider Ordinances Amending Chapter 31, The Comprehensive Fee Schedule, To Include Various Fee Adjustments As Included In The Fiscal Year 2008-09 Budget. Consider An Ordinance Regulating Hotel Operations. Consider An Ordinance Authorizing Updated Service Credits, Increase In Retirement Annuities, Discontinuance OF Supplemental Death Benefits, And Future Service Contributions.
Exhibit A-1
REGULAR MEETING & WORKSESSION MINUTES SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 RESOLUTIONS *26.
PAGE 4
Consider A Resolution Authorizing The City Manager To Enter Into An Agreement With Senior Adult Services For Services Provided To Carrollton Citizens For The 2008-09 Fiscal Year In An Amount Not Exceed $147,500.00. Consider A Resolution Authorizing The City Manager To Establish A Retiree Health Savings Plan, Sevelop An Administrative Policy For The Plan, Establish Age Based Premiums For The participants Who Wish To Remain On The Citys Health Plan Upon Retirement, Enter Into A Contract With ICMA Retirement Corporation For The Administration Of The Plan And Investment Of Plan Assets. Consider A Resolution To Change The Individuals Authorized To Invest Funds And Make Withdrawals From The Public Funds Investment Pool Known As Texpool. Consider A Resolution Requesting A Longer Amortization Period And Establishing A Policy For Voluntary Contributions To Texas Municipal Retirement System That Will Improve Funded Status And Reduce The Length Of The Amortization Period Below Forty Years Without Increasing Mandatory Contributions.
*27.
*28. *29.
Council considered the following item separately: *25. Consider A Resolution Authorizing The City Manager To Enter Into An Agreement With Metrocrest Social Service Center For Services Provided To Carrollton Citizens For The 2008-09 Fiscal Year In An Amount Not To Exceed $88,500.00. Councilmember Mahalik moved to approve Agenda Item No. 25. Second by Councilmember Weidinger. The vote was cast 6-1 in favor of the motion, Mayor Pro Tem Malone voted no. PUBLIC HEARING -INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION 30. Conduct an Additional Public Hearing On The Proposed Operating And Capital Budget For The Fiscal Year October 1, 2008 Through September 30, 2009. No action was required for this item OTHER BUSINESS 31. Consider An Ordinance Adopting And Approving An Operating And Capital Budget For The City of Carrollton, Making Appropriations Therefore For The Fiscal Year October 1, 2008 Through September 30, 2009. Councilmember Simons moved to approve an Ordinance Adopting And Approving An Operating And Capital Budget For The City of Carrollton, Making Appropriations Therefore For The Fiscal Year October 1, 2008 Through September 30, 2009. Second by Councilmember Marchant. The vote was cast 6-1 in favor of the motion, Mayor Pro Tem Malone voted no.
Exhibit A-1
REGULAR MEETING & WORKSESSION MINUTES SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 5 32. Consider A Resolution Ratifying The Property Tax Increase Reflected In The Fiscal Year 2008-2009 Operating Budget. Mayor Pro Tem Malone moved to approve a Resolution Ratifying The Property Tax Increase Reflected In The Fiscal Year 2008-2009 Operating Budget. Second by Councilmember Weidinger. The vote was cast 7-0 in favor of the motion. 33. Consider An Ordinance Establishing The Tax Rate And The Tax Levy For The City of Carrollton For The Tax Year 2008 Upon The Taxable Property In The City of Carrollton In Conformity With The Laws Of The State Of Texas And The City. Councilmember Weidinger moved to approve an Ordinance Establishing The Tax Rate And The Tax Levy For The City of Carrollton For The Tax Year 2008 Upon The Taxable Property In The City of Carrollton In Conformity With The Laws Of The State Of Texas And The City. Second by Councilmember Mahalik. The vote was cast 7-0 in favor of the motion. Mayor Branson adjourned the meeting and reconvened the Worksession at 7:34 p.m.
* * * * WORKSESSION * * * *
COUNCIL BRIEFING ROOM
6.
Discuss the Proposed Construction Contract For The Rosemeade and Thomas Pool Improvements. No Discussion. Discuss Fiscal Year 2009 Proposed Budget. No Discussion.
7.
8.
Discuss Proposed Rezoning of PD-169 (Belt Line Road Corridor). Christopher Barton, Senior Planner stated that PD-169 includes both sides of Belt Line Road from Josey Lane to Erie Street (on the north side) and Myers Street (on the south side). The current ordinance for PD-169 was enacted in 2003, and was one of the outcomes of the Carrollton Renaissance Initiative. In June 2008, staff began analyzing the effect and administration of PD-169, in order to determine its continued appropriateness and efficacy. On August 5, 2008, staff made a presentation to the Redevelopment Sub-committee regarding findings and recommendations. The Sub-committee recommended that the presentation be made to the full City Council for direction. As part of that approval, staff will ask City Council to schedule a joint public hearing with the Planning and Zoning Commission, in order to complete the proposed zoning change in a prompt manner. A joint public hearing will also allow formal notice of the proposed zoning change to be made by placing a paid advertisement in the legal notices section of a local newspaper instead of mailing formal notices to the approximately 250 property owners in the subject area and adjacent to it.
Exhibit A-1
REGULAR MEETING & WORKSESSION MINUTES SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 6 There are no financial implications on current or future operating budgets regarding the zoning request itself. However, staff may recommend future programs to partner with landowners to improve the appearance of the area. This project is a City Council strategic goal aimed at improving the visual character of the Belt Line Road corridor west of Josey Lane, which serves as an important entryway into Carrollton and the future Downtown Carrollton Station TOD area. 9. Discuss Amendments to the City Council Governance Policy. Ms. Mitchell stated that at the City Council Strategic Planning Session in July, Council directed staff to make changes to the Governance Policy. Staff made the following changes: 5.7 Members of the Council shall conduct an orientation for new council members Is amended to read: 4.7 Staff shall conduct an orientation for new council members. 10.2 In order that Boards, Commissions and Committees may accomplish their tasks free of political influence, it is preferable that City Council members not attend the meetings of Boards, Commissions and Committees. If a City Council member should attend a meeting of a Board, Commission or Committee, the member shall not take part in the meeting nor address the board in any manner whether by questions or statements. A City Council member shall not attempt to influence the decisions of Boards, Commissions and Committees either directly or indirectly nor express an opinion to a Board, Commission or Committee about its actions unless at a City Council meeting. Is amended to read: 9.3 In order that Boards, Commissions and Committees should accomplish their tasks free of political influence. If a City Council member should attend a meeting of a Board, Commission or Committee, the member shall not take part in the meeting. A City Council member shall not attempt to influence the decisions of Boards, Commissions and Committees either directly or indirectly nor express an opinion to a Board, Commission or Committee about its actions unless at a City Council meeting. Staff also did some renumbering of the sections and included the Council Travel Policy and a Code of Ethics. 10. Discuss the 2009 Council Meeting Calendar. Ms. Mitchell stated that every year in September, Council sets the meeting for the next year. Most months fall in accordance to the first and third Tuesday meeting schedule. The months where the dates need to be moved for council travel conflicts or holiday conflicts will need to be discussed. Council made the following changes. Second meeting in March will be March 24.
Exhibit A-1
REGULAR MEETING & WORKSESSION MINUTES SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 Second meeting in October will be October 20. 11. Discuss Future Agenda Items.
PAGE 7
ATTEST:
______________________________ Ashley D. Mitchell, City Secretary
___________________________________ Pat Malone, Mayor Pro Tem
Exhibit A-1

InTown Suites v. Carrollton Lawsuit

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InTown Suites v. Carrollton Lawsuit

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CAUSE NO. DC-11-07850 INTOWN SUITES CARROLLTON, L.P. AND INTOWN SUITES TRINITY MILLS, L.P., Plaintiffs, v.

192nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

CIVIL PROCEDURE, Plaintiffs

place of business in Dallas County, Texas.

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court as the amount in controversy is within this

And the Ordinance truly is a Hotel-Eradication License Scheme. In short, it

Article I, Section 19 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each citizen due

temporarily and permanently enjoin its enforcement.

convictions based on no contest (or nolo contendere)

CIVIL PROCEDURE, Plaintiffs hereby request a

* * * * PRE-MEETING * * * * 5:45 P.M. COUNCIL BRIEFING ROOM

REGULAR MEETING & WORKSESSION MINUTES SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

______________________________ Ashley D. Mitchell, City Secretary

___________________________________ Pat Malone, Mayor Pro Tem

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