The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is

whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders
for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its
eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood
to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It
was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who
was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is
made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for
first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section
which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel,
or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room
or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form

Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance
requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The
only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does
appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon
the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:

W/N was there a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling:

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which
is not the case here O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,

The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power.

The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers

extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading
decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the
genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a
license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls; 9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days
other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a
place where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all of which are intended to protect public
morals.

To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is
the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of
fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." 18 It is not a narrow or
"technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form
or phrases.21