Improvement Measures for NPPs in China in light of Fukushima Accident

CHAI Guohan* * Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center, MEP, P.R.China The National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), jointly with other relevant governmental departments, carried out a comprehensive nuclear safety inspection on nuclear power plants in operation and under construction after the Fukushima nuclear accident. The result of the inspection showed that the nuclear power plants in China have certain capability to prevent and mitigate severe accident, and the safety is guaranteed with safety risks under control. In order to enhance the nuclear safety of Chinas NPPs, the NNSA issued requirements on improvement measures for each NPP based on the result of the inspection. For the purpose of standardizing common improvement measures, the NNSA has compiled the General Technical Requirements on post-Fukushima Nuclear Accident Improvement Measures for NPPs (herein referred to as the General Technical Requirements). The General Technical Requirements is compiled based on the practical situation of Chinas NPPs, taking into account of the preliminary experience feedback of the Fukushima accident and gathering comments and suggestions from all parties concerned in the nuclear industry, which reflects the level of understanding of the nuclear community in China concerning safety improvements after the Fukushima accident. It is an integrated document to guide Chinas NPPs in taking the improvement measures. There are 8 Technical Requirements: 1) Technical Requirements of Flood Defense Capability Improvement for Nuclear Power Plant. 2) Technical Requirements of Emergency Water-Injection and Related Equipment. 3) Technical Requirements for Mobile Power Supply. 4) Technical Requirements for the Monitoring of the Spent Fuel Pool. 5) Technical Requirements for the Improvement of Hydrogen Monitoring and Controlling Systems 6) Technical Requirements for Habitability and Functions of the Emergency Control Center. 7) Technical Requirements of Improvement on Radiation Environmental Monitoring and Emergency 8) Technical Requirements in Dealing with External Natural Disasters. Defense In Depth concept are adopted in the General Technical Requirement. For example: Level 1: Permanent water prevention seal measures applied both for underground and above ground flood defense measures. Level 2: Early warning and handling ability when external event occurs. Level 3: Provide temporarily power by using mobile emergency power source, use the AFW or LHSI pump if available. Level 4: Water injection to the secondary circuit or the primary circuit by using mobile pumps. 24

Level 5: Habitability and Functions of the emergency control center, Radiation Environmental Monitoring and Emergency response. (The recommended storage building for the mobile equipment should be flood protected against the water level of flood which is 5 meters above the design basis flood, and the storage building is at least 100 meters far from the safety significant building of nuclear power plants.) 1. Technical Requirements of Flood Defense capability Improvement for Nuclear Power Plant The main contents include investigation and evaluation for the function capability of flood defense and drainage facilities in nuclear power plants, and to take appropriate protective measures to keep their safety functions to the maximum extent under beyond design-basis flood conditions. 1) The latest observations and analyses data should be considered, and the surrounding environment changes after the construction of the plant should also be taken into account. 2) According to site conditions, appropriate beyond design-basis flood scenes should be determined, such as the design basis flood condition accompany with a millennium retain period rainfall. 3) Permanent water prevention seal measures should be applied both for underground and above ground flood defense measures.

2. Technical Requirements of Emergency Water-Injection and Related Equipment The main contents include technical requirements of removing residual heat by water injection to the secondary circuit or the primary circuit, emergency water-supply to spent fuel pool. The technical requirements of mobile pumps, water-injection pipeline and water sources are also put toward in this document. 1) Remove the residual heat through injecting water to the secondary circuit and / or the primary circuit, and spent fuel pool by mobile pumps and external power when the nuclear power plant losses part or all of the safety system functions. The equipment should be able in operation for at least 72 hours after the accident. 2) All of the preparations should be completed in 6 hours after the shutdown. 3) The secondary circuit and / or primary circuit pressure relief should be considered to ensure the appropriate flow of emergency water injection.

3. Technical Requirements for Mobile Power Supply The main contents include the function of the mobile emergency power supply, equipment requirement and relevant operation rules, for mounting the mobile emergency power supply in the nuclear power plant. 1) when all of the AC power supply (including DG) lostthe nuclear power plant should provide temporarily power by using mobile emergency power source.

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2) On a multi-units site at least two mobile power supply should be equipped , and at least one of them should have the capability of carrying a low-pressure safety injection pump or a auxiliary feed-water pump. 3) The mobile emergency power supply has the capability for an interval of no less than 4h at full-load with the fuel taken by itself, and also has the load-carrying capability for an interval of no less than 72h with fuel supplement.

4. Technical Requirements for the Monitoring of the Spent Fuel Pool The main contents include the requirements for the means of monitoring, the range of measurement, monitoring instrumentation, and system availability. 1) The indication devices for the water level and temperature measurement should be provided in the main control room or in the other appropriate locations, and the related alarms should also be provided. 2) The water level and temperature measurements should perform their functions in/after design basis earthquake. 3) The power supply of the water level and temperature measurement system should be ensured in the case of loss of all AC power sources (including the site additional diesel generators).

5. Technical Requirements for the Improvement of Hydrogen Monitoring and Controlling Systems The main contents include the analysis of hydrogen distribution in containment, hydrogen monitoring and the validity evaluation of hydrogen controlling measures under severe accidents, as well as the function requirements and the equipment requirements of the hydrogen monitoring and controlling systems under severe accident conditions. 1) The hydrogen concentration should be less than 10%(V/V), assuming the hydrogen generated from the metal-water reaction involving 100% of the fuel cladding metal in the active fuel region and distributed uniformly in the containment. 2) The damage of the integrity of containment by combustion or exploration due to local accumulation of hydrogen should be avoided.

6. Technical requirements for habitability and functions of the emergency control center The main contents include the technical requirements on the improvement of the emergency control center. 1) Unless it can be proved that the emergency control center can be available under all hypothetical emergency condition, otherwise a backup emergency control center should be established in suitable location where it is unlikely to be affected. 2) Emergency control center should meet the requirements of the habitability and accessibility. Evaluating the habitability should not be limited to the design basis accidents. During the given sustained emergency response period (usually 30 days), the effective dose received by staff should not be greater than 100mSv. 26

3) Emergency control center should be implemented the seismic design by increasing one degree according to the earthquake intensity of the site area, and checked according to SL2 (equivalent ground acceleration). Emergency control center should have the ability to withstand the design basis flood hazards, and it can be waterproof obstructed in case of beyond design basis flood.

7. Technical Requirements of Improvement on Radiation Environmental Monitoring and Emergency The main contents are to analyze and assess the rationality and representativeness for the layout of NPPs radiation environmental monitoring, to improve emergency monitoring programs under severe accidents, to provide necessary monitoring means under the condition of accidents, and to establish the requirements on emergency response programs and concerted action programs including emergency personnel and material preparations for multiple units site in emergency statue simultaneously. 1) When environmental monitoring facilities are unavailable caused by extreme external events, appropriate back up monitoring means with wide range or a measure to promptly recover the monitoring facilities should be available. 2) NPPs should develop an emergency response plan for the accident conditions of two reactors being in accident at the same time, implement emergency preparedness, and carry out emergency training and exercises. 3) The operating organization of nuclear power plant should consider the emergency support capabilities of associated nuclear power enterprise group, and incorporate that as an important supplement to their own emergency preparedness and response system.

8. Technical Requirements in Dealing with External Natural Disasters The main contents include the requirements in strengthening the contact and information exchanges with the meteorology, hydrology, ocean, and earthquake regional administration agencies; the requirements in further improving disaster prevention plan and related management program; the requirements for improving early warning and handling ability when external event occurs.

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